PART II

CONSTRUCTIVE
CHAPTER VIII

Dynamism of the Real

Introductory:

We shall, now, proceed to undertake a thorough examination of some of the theories which try to reconstruct the relation of knowing mind with the object known through a concept which goes in the name of sense, sense-datum or sensibilia as it forms the starting form of any effort at explaining the entire knowledge situation. We had a slight acquaintance with these intermediaries in the accounts of Dr. Moore and Dr. C.D.Broad and we felt that the account given by them does not hold good against the criticisms of Gestalt Psychologists who have tried to overthrow the entire theory of sense-data. We are inclined to undertake the stock account of such theories because we feel that the theories based upon sense-data form an important starting point in any account at explaining the relation of knowing mind with the object known.

The concept of sense-data has continued to exercise its influence especially in psychology till recently, and its use in ordinary terminology is so deeply rooted that any explanation at knowledge situation must make a reference to it.
I Question of the nature of Sense-data belongs to metaphysics.

The question of the nature of sense-data, observes H.H. Price very appropriately, belongs not to the theory of perception but to metaphysics, because, so long as Psychology is concerned, it takes for granted that there are sense or sensations playing their part in all perceptions by relating the perceptual object to the perceiving mind. It is a presupposition, a datum to start with the science of psychology in explaining the act of perception and not an established fact. How they are, and what they are must be determined by metaphysical investigations and not by Psychology itself.

The problem of the nature of sense-data arises because of the cases of illusions and hallucinations in which the sense-data are found to be quite illusory. If at all sensations are to be retained in use, they must be ontologically oriented. The problem of the nature of sense-data must be included in ontological discussions and not epistemological ones. To try to decide the nature of sense-data epistemologically is to step outside the proper limits of epistemology.

The invention of sense-data, we might remember, was obviously conceived after the fashion of points of space and time, because space and time calculations could not be worked out otherwise and so the phenomena of primary and secondary qualities cannot be

1. Perception by H.H. Price p. 105
be explained without the concept of sense data. If we cannot explain what qualities are made up of we are forced to do away with the conception of qualities altogether and along with the setting aside of the conception of qualities, the entire world of experience also must be set aside, because, what we come across is a bundle of qualities whether visual, tactual, olfactory or auditory while the nucleus of the qualities or the substance continues to remain unknown and unknowable in absence of any experience through sense-data. Sense-data, therefore, were presupposition of some sciences, which failed to provide any explanation of the process of knowing.

II - Concept of sense-data involves Contradictions:

Those who invented the concept of sense-data as a possible intermediary in knowledge situation did not inquire as to whether the concepts of space and time which work in some sciences are accurately conceived or not, they also did not inquire as to whether the points and instants into which the space and time are divided stand metaphysically or not. They also did not inquire as to whether the space and time are actual or simple mental conceptions invented to facilitate some calculations which we badly require to be worked out for some of our pragmatic purposes. They did not inquire as to whether there can be more than one ways—other than the one they devised for their calculations into which the
concepts of space and time can be devised or not. They did not inquire whether it is possible or not to correlate both the concepts, or, whether they are really two concepts or one, or two sides of the same concept. All these questions really speaking did not pertain to their field. Price has tried to tackle some of these problems with a view to delineating a proper theory of the nature of sense-data. The concept of space is, he maintains, an absurd concept because a place has no being per se - it is only a place for something. And if we insist upon saying that a place is a particular existent, as it must be in order to be red or thus and thus surfaced, we shall have to find some other place for it to be situated in, and we shall be committed to the absurdity that space is itself in space. The absurdity of the concept of time can equally be pointed out. And if both these concepts - space and time - are found to involve contradictions and therefore, absurd, their points and instants equally cannot withstand criticism and must, therefore, be rejected outright. And if sense-data are conceived after the fashion of the points and instants of space and time, they must equally involve contradictions and must, therefore be rejected outright.

III Sense-data - an outcome of intuitive introspection:

The theory of Kemp Smith, that in sight and touch, we are indubitably aware of, is the surface of a 'region of space' must also be rejected for where there is no space, how
can there be the region of space? Or, if the concept of space be absured, the concept of the region of space must equally be absured. And Hume is perhaps right when he says that the distinction of space and time is a 'distinction of reason'. Price, therefore, conceives them not as substances but as 'events or occurrences' and maintains that we may still call them particular existents, for happening or occurring is one way of existing, but they do not exist in the way in which tables or trees do.\(^1\) Sense-data according to him are an out-cone of, a kind of intuitive introspection or sensing is an acquaintance with ourselves\(^2\) and is distinct from feeling because though we are intuitively aware of them, we should no longer say we feel them\(^3\). They are, according to this theory, 'vital events' inhering in brain and conceived not merely as a piece of matter but has vital as well as physical capacities. It is not merely the brain but a sensorium\(^4\). They may very well be psychical in the sense that they be places of the self or soul, if the self is something more than the merely cognitive affective and conative being that it is usually taken to be.

IV Sense-data are teleological:

This assumption of self, of which the sense-data are phases, Price agrees with Aristotle, is apart from the action

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1. Ibid p. 116
2. Ibid p. 120
3. Ibid p. 123
4. Ibid p. 131
of brain and mind upon it . . . a pure potentiality\(^1\) and, therefore, a mere ' Unding', in short, to be nothing at all. Sense-data being both psycho-cerebral, form a permanent condition and a proof of self and the self and the entire organism along with brain together form a substantial compound having certain characteristics which neither of them could possess if it existed alone. Sense-data are, therefore, neither psychical nor cerebral but psycho-cerebral or vital and are teleological.

With regard to the origin of sense-data, Price after examining various theories, especially causal and phenomenalist ones, concludes agreeing with phenomenalist that a sense datum is an event of a unique order. It does not occur in anything, neither in a purely physical entity, nor in a complete thing, nor in a mind or soul. It is what may be called a basic constituent of 'total' nature i.e. the world of complete things and yet it has no place in nature\(^2\) and thus if there were no physical occupants, there would be no sense-data. The families of sense-data are public and independent of minds and along with them the world of complete things is also public and independent of minds. The world of complete things, he maintains, is as real as any realist could desire and it is the only sort of world which is of interest to us because of the intrinsic qualities of physical occupants, apart from their relations to sense-data, we have no knowledge at all, and no prospect of getting any.

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1. Ibid p. 132-33
2. Ibid p. 320
V An unsuccessful attempt of mediating:

The contradictions involved in the theory of Price are obvious. The sense-data, on one hand, are psycho-cerebral, and on the other hand, they are neither purely physical nor in mind or soul, but are a basic constituent of total nature having no place in nature. All this is nothing but confusion arisen out of an effort to maintain the independence of objects and relating the same object to a perceiving mind somehow or the other. It is an effort, no doubt an unsuccessful one, at mediating the positions of idealism and realism. We do not enter into the detailed criticism and analysis of the position of Price because as is indicated previously the entire theory based on sense-data is under fire from Gestalt psychologists and is being gradually recognised as inadequate and outdated.

VI Sense-data are convenient fictions:

W.T. Stace comes very near to the position that epistemology need not try to step over its natural boundaries by raising the question with regard to the nature and origin of sense-data. At the most, it should, if it wants to use the concept satisfy itself by accepting that the sense-data are necessarily taken as given or granted, as logically ultimate and that which we cannot doubt because we cannot go behind it, and that which possesses primitive and absolute certainty and which is there-
fore the necessary-logical beginning of argument must be
taken for granted.1

He maintains that we arrive at such given through abstraction because these particulars are taken up and submerged by consciousness with universals which are inseparably linked up with them. It is at the higher level of thought that we separate them through abstraction. It is through communication with other minds that we proceed to build upon the given data our knowledge of a world having objects which are different from the given.2 Objects, therefore, are convenient constructions or fictions and are neither independent nor factual. Such constructions or fictions have no other but a pragmatic use only. Realists' effort at providing them with a logical basis, therefore, is baseless and unjustifiable.

VII Object is Ontological and belongs to metaphysics:

Prof. Ledger Wood accepts the data as given but introduces a reference factor which is in consciousness and which intends an object, but the object according to him and as against realists, is not ontological but epistemic as it is intended by the knowing consciousness while the Ontological object proper he agrees belongs to the domain of metaphysics and not epistemology.3

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2. Ibid p. 100
3. *The Analysis of knowledge* p. 22
Prof. Wood, by introducing the distinction of object into that which is epistemic and that which is ontological reveals his strong leaning to realism. He does not disclose what object or objects are ontological belonging to the domain of metaphysics and what object or objects are epistemic. It seems by keeping continued the obscurity of the meaning of object, he wants to safeguard his theory from the charge of ambiguity.

N.K. Smith admits that though sensa are inadequate and deceptive at times as an ultimate datum, they are more physical than psychical and are required for pragmatic considerations of literally describing the world for scientific purposes. They are objects for the subject and have no independent status of their own. Smith comes very near to Kantian position when he asserts that along with sensa, the intuitions of space and time are mixed up indissolubly and that while they themselves are misleading, the space and time directly reveal some essential aspects of reality.

VIII Sense-data are modifications of Cognitive activity:

According to Ducasse, we are unable to discern any such intervening entities as sensa or sensibilia but we do find the modifications of cognitive activity which we name as

1. Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge p. 69
2. Ibid p. 180
sensa or sense-data which are nothing but the ways of apprehending or the *species of awareness* of perceptual consciousness and all such sensory experiences are knowing by intuition wherein sensing is elemental and indubitable\(^1\). If there is no sensing there could be no knowing at all. Knowing beyond this stage, he maintains, involves causal relation, belief and interpretation of signs which represent the objects and leads him to offer a theory of meaning. R.M. Chisholm, admits that the language of appearing does neither remove nor solve the basic epistemological and metaphysical problems. The language of appearing fails to explain especially the phenomena of dreams, hallucinations and after-images. He admits that sense-data may not be fully distinguishable entities, still they are essential for the proper analysis of knowledge situation and we have nothing to do but to replace the language of appearing which misleads by some other interpretation of the same phenomenon. He, therefore, with a view to offering fresh proposals for interpretation, divides the cognition into three different levels of sensation, perception and scientific law. It is a question of one's own choice as to which language one should select at the level of sensation and Chisholm maintains that the language of appearing is nearer the language of common-sense than the language of sense-data.

The level of perception involves intentionality which is more psychological than physical in character and in veridical

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1. Nature, Mind and Death p. 265
perception, the object and not merely a state of perceiving mind, that is apprehended. With regard to the level of scientific law, he admits that we cannot say what we want to say in our serious moments without reference to ontological connections.'

IX Other Theories:

We shall now consider two other efforts at resolving the dispute with regard to the relation of knower and known by penetrating deeply below the level of entire knowledge situation. In our opinion these efforts are more or less ontologically oriented and the role of epistemology has been duly subordinated. It is in a sense grafting the entire knowledge situation on ontological or metaphysical base, and to that extent it is an effort at arriving at a proper viewpoint of philosophy. The question of success or failure of the philosophers is a different issue altogether for we are interested not in the result or the final outcome of the process but the process itself because each one of them does contain the germs of truth which may find a proper place in a synthesis of different viewpoints, if they are viewed from a proper perspective.

X Real is dynamic:

As against the realists' conception of real as something static, inert and mechanical, Bergson proffounds his real as something ever changeful. The change according to him, is
the essence of reality, the change not mechanical but impelled from within by an *elan vital* a vital urge ever changing and putting forth ever new forms flowing incessantly without any break or hindrance. It shoots, grows and ripens without ceasing and in which past endures and prolongs and present gnaws into future. It is a creative evolution as against mechanical evolution either of Darvin or of Spencer or equally mechanical but teleologically inspired dialectical evolution of Hegel- an evolution without end or goal or purpose- a free creation of a free will urged from within. It is self-inspired and self-controlled. Its forms shoot forth in a multilinear directions and the best example of its own such creations can be had at the level of life represented by an innumerable multiplicity of species each distinct and distinguishable one from the other and yet innumerable. The free-will of ego is a voluntary act inspired from within without any express motivation. Life, according to him, represents two major forces working simultaneously, one being the accumulation of potential energy from matter, and the other, spending of the same energy in a discontinuous and explosive way, in movements. Plant life represents the former while animal life, the latter.

XI The role of instinct and intelligence:

The animals are to be classified as those in whom the ways of expending accumulated energy takes on the form of instinct

1. Creative Evolution p. 6
which perform for them specific functions with a very high degree of efficiency. The world of insects is a domain of instincts. The other species include higher vertebrates in whom the expending energy appears as intelligence which is inferior to instinct in efficiency and lacking in precision but superior in versatility and organisation. Everything that goes in the name of our knowing, including scientific knowledge has its base in the instinct and intelligence manifesting at various levels of biological evolution. While insects specialize in instincts, man specialized in intelligence, the one is not without the other.

The Progress of history of mankind, Bergson maintains shows that intelligence and matter are sharply contrasted one with the other. Intelligence has always found itself busy with matter while when the problems of sentient life are confronted with it, it has always found itself quite helpless because, matter is highly organised while life completely organised. One without any order, the other completely ordered. The order that a scientist detects in nature is a geometrical order, a formal order imposed by the intellect a ἱερον extra.¹

The intellect's division of unorganised matter into separate bodies relative to our senses and intellect and that matter looked at as an undivided whole, must be a flux rather than a thing. The intellect moulds certain configurations of matter leaving at the same time ample scope for the instinct

¹. Ibid p. 196
XII Intellect and instinct rooted in consciousness:

Both intellect and instinct are rooted in or are the offshoots of consciousness in general which must be co-extensive with universal life. The more the consciousness is intellectualized, the more the matter is spatialized and, therefore, the traditional metaphysics when it deduces a priori the categories of thought, it compresses intellect, reduces it to its quintessence, holds it tight in a principle so simple that it can be thought empty and draws from it what it virtually puts into it. It does not trace its genesis. It is because of this that most of the philosophers are one in affirming the unity of nature and representing it in either abstract or geometrical form. The intellect, in their case, is as vast as reality. He quite adequately observes that, to these philosophers, the faculty of knowing is co-extensive with the whole of experience or reality. To him, on the contrary, the function of the intellect is to act and to know that one is acting, to come in touch with reality, and even to live it but only in the measure in which it concerns the work that is being accomplished. It may be argued as to the possibility of one's going beyond intellect or thought, he replied that it is of the essence of reasoning to shut us up in the circle of the given. But action breaks the circle. Intellect

1. Ibid p. 199
2. Ibid p. 201
forms a solid nucleus of conceptual thought out of the fluid of which it is an offshoot and clings it as if it is the real leap. It cannot come out of it unless it takes up a leap. One must thrust intellect outside itself by an act of will. When intellect undertakes the study of the being, it extends the mechanism of matter into life, conceives it something inert and dead and consequently conceives a metaphysics which is quite near the physics of inert matter and in which a mechanistic conception of all nature is reflected. The doctrine which a priori accepts the simple unity of knowledge and of the abstract unity of nature takes shape. Intellect has then no other choice except falling back upon dogmatism and scepticism. The timing, on the contrary, is not accessible to intellect but to instinct.

XIII Role of Philosophy:

Philosophy, according to him cannot and must not accept the relation established by pure intellection between the theory of knowledge and that of the known between metaphysics and science. Philosophy takes facts and laws from the scientist's hands, adds a critique of the faculty of knowing and also if he thinks proper a metaphysics¹. Philosophy invades, in this case, the domain of experience and business itself, with science, the theory of knowledge and metaphysics.

1. Ibid p. 205
and puts them on some sort of gradation. The more, the science penetrates the life, the more symbolic and relative or contingent the knowledge it supplies to us becomes. The more we transcend pure intellect the deeper we shall get back into reality and complete our account will be.

XIV Consciousness continually drawn to its opposite:

About consciousness, which is the source of the order of spirituality as well as the order of materiality, he maintains, that it is not the borrowed consciousness of a certain living being placed in a certain point of space because though it is a reflection of its own principle, it is continually drawn to its opposite. In order that the consciousness can approximate with something of its principle, it must detach itself from the already made and attach itself to the being made. It is only a free action, freely motivated in rear moments of the becoming in which our whole personality, we feel, fully organised. It is intuition that breaks the order established by conceptual understanding and again tries to establish itself through concepts but soon find itself its own foothold and returns again to intuition to undo what has been done by the intellect. If this intuition can be prolonged, sustained and generalized and above all assured of external points of reference in order not to go astray, the object of philosophy would be attained.

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1. Ibid p. 252
In vital activity, he maintains, we see that which subsists. Life, in reality, is a movement, materiality is an inverse movement and each of these two movements is simple the matter which forms a world, being an undivided flux, and undivided also the life which runs through it, cutting out in it living beings all along its track. And these currents run counter to each other and from the entire organisation. Intellect as it is accustomed to work upon matter perceives only parts external to parts.

XX Identification of consciousness with real:

Bergson, we may point out, views reality as changeful but does not indicate the source of change. If change is real, why it should be so and not otherwise? If it is change, of what it is change and why? If it be conceived as the inner dynamism, then again the question arises as to the inner dynamism of what? His division of entire reality into that which is inert dead or matter, and that which is vital, seems to have cropped in because of his identification of consciousness which is the source of intellect or matter and intuition or life. Now, consciousness is an epistemological category especially so when it is established as the source of the genesis of life and matter. This consciousness, if at all is to become meaningful and give rise to materiality and spirituality must detach itself from the already made and attach itself to the being-made i.e. it must become abstract. It
is, then, nothing but the abstract making intellect which must form part of the epistemological aspect of reality.

In Bergson, therefore, we find an unconscious identification of epistemology and ontology. Of course, Bergson is aware of this limitation and admits consciousness because he does not find any better word. But in that case also, if he were fully aware of the implications, he would have preferred rather something else. He reveals his dissatisfaction with the term employed sharply when he says that philosophy should provide, after taking up facts and laws from science, a critique of the faculty of knowing, and also a metaphysic. His contempt for any kind of conceptualisation as the work of intellect creates a momentary impression as if he condemns all knowledge altogether but that is not so.

XVI Role of knowledge emphasized:

On the contrary, he, thereby, emphasizes the continuity of knowledge from primitive responses of lower animals to higher conceptualisations at the human level. He does not take knowledge to be a closed compartment or something that is already finished and final. On the contrary, to him knowledge is the process of ever-becoming. Knowledge does not touch reality but in the manner in which it concerns our needs of the time. His transcendence of the field of epistemology or going beyond intellect shows his dissatisfaction
with the way in which he is required to put his intuition of the real through conceptual cobweb which hides and in a way distorts the reality.

His opposition of intellect and instinct or intuition is not justifiable, for it is being recognised gradually, in psychology, that it is very difficult to draw a sharp line of demarcation between the two. Call it either instinct or intelligence but in no way they are opposed to each other. At the most, what they represent is the two extremes of the same process of evolution and one is not without the other. Bergson maintains that the intellect is the mainspring of action whenever our vital interests are at stake, instinct displays the same tendency when the natural function which it aims at fulfilling is obstructed.

XVII  Deus ex machina:

The concept of interruption due to which the materialisation takes place introduces in his theory an unnecessary element of *deus ex machina*. It is because he took matter and life in opposition to each other that he was compelled to resort to this concept. In fact, the material world and life, both, are in continuity and not opposed to each other. They may stand on different grades of evolutionary process but are in no way cut off from each other. On the contrary, we may say that the life is life because of matter. Matter is the foothold of life, and according to modern theories of physics,
it is very difficult to define matter as has been taken by Bergson, it is infused with what we may call life in equal measure.

XVIII. Axiological aspect improperly emphasized:

His insistence upon the action which breaks the rigid circle that a conceptual thought builds out of fluid, gives prominence to the axiological aspect and is not proper because action without any kind of conceptual determination leads to nothing. It is not the action of the will, for the action of the will is always pre-determined by the end at which it is aimed and hence is not blind. It may be unconscious but not wholly blind, while any kind of action does not become the action of the will unless it is conceptually pre-determined, i.e. unless it is deliberately willed or pre-conceived.

XIX. Conceptualisation cannot be done away with altogether:

He admits that in the absolute we live and move and have our own being and in that case, whatever our knowledge may be by intellect or, howsoever distaste we may show towards this kind of knowledge, it is a knowledge of the absolute, we must accept, for otherwise where shall we place it? If we place it outside the absolute, we will fall in the trap of dualism. No philosophy, we may assert, can do away with conceptualisation, for even the intuition, unless it is translated through concepts, will not yield any philosophy. Of course, we used-
not stop at the level of conceptualisation we agree, and we agree also with Bergson, that after some sort of conceptualisation one must try to live according to one's own inspiration and try to approximate to the intuition and enrich it by making it prolonged instead of keeping it momentary. The resolve of the will to action will be required here. The true freedom, Bergson is quite right, will be enjoyed truly by making a resolve to live it and the conceptual cobweb will automatically break.

In Bergson, we find the effort at establishing a balance in our theoretical and practical aspect. After drawing a sharp distinction between the task of intellect and that of instinct or intuition at human level, he says that a complete and perfect humanity would be that in which these two forms of conscious activity should attain their full development and laments the loss we have suffered by sacrificing intuition at the altar of intellect. This, in fact, would have led Bergson to emphasize unequivocally the importance of both, the intellect and the intuition. But due to his dissatisfaction at the overall importance attached to intellect and the works of intellect, he went to the other extreme and emphasized the importance of intuition and will at the cost of the balance which he lost sight of.

1. Ibid p. 281
XX Reconstruction of the system of Ontology:

In A.N. Whitehead, we find again, an effort at constructing a system of ideas which can bring the aesthetic, moral and religious interests into the relation with those concepts of the world which have their origin in natural science. It is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted. Whitehead aimed at the reconstruction of the system of metaphysics or ontology which may determine the meaning and significance of all avenues of thought. In short, he undertook an endeavour to reconcile the claims of metaphysics and epistemology and determine the relation of both of them wherein the extremes which both realists as well as idealists embraced may be avoided. In this own language, he sought to transform some main doctrines of Absolute idealism on to a realistic basis. He feels that all constructive thought on the various special topics of scientific interest, is dominated by some such scheme unacknowledged, but no less influential in guiding the imagination and, therefore, philosophy should aim at constructing such a scheme of ideas and explore the possibility at interpreting experience in terms of that scheme. Such a scheme, he maintains may be named 'speculative philosophy' and categorically lays it down that it must be coherent, logical and necessary and that everything of which we are conscious as enjoyed, perceived, willed or thought shall have the character of a particular
instance of that general scheme. Such a scheme has two sides: rational and empirical. Rational side is expressed by the terms coherent, and logical and empirical side by the terms applicable and adequate.

XXI The method of Free imagination:

The actual world provides us a datum or starting point in the guise of an immediate experience of things around including ourselves. The analytic observation of the components of such an experience employs the method of pinning down thought to the strict systematisation of detailed discrimination already affected by antecedent observation, a method, Whitehead maintains which if consistently pursued, would have left science where it found it, which fails. He, therefore, suggests a true method of discovery viz, the method of free imagination which starts from the ground of particular observations, makes flight in the thin air of imaginative generalisation, like an aeroplane and again lands for renewed observation rendered acute by rational interpretation. Philosophic reconstruction of such a scheme should not be devised in abstraction but must have its origin in the generalisation of particular factors discerned in particular topics of human interest.

XXII Philosophy should describe general character of Universe:

This is perhaps for the first time we come across a philosopher who delineates the correct standpoint and subject-matter of philosophy. According to him, philosophy neither merely

1. Ibid p.7
deals with deductions nor abstract metaphysical first principles or essences and thereby seeks to transcend what is obvious with the firm conviction that all productive thought has preceded either by the poetic insight of artists or by the imaginative elaboration of schemes of thought capable of utilization as logical premises.\(^1\) Philosophy therefore, aims at larger generalities, the quest of which in any special science blends it as philosophical. And no science worth the name can afford to limit itself within a certain restricted compass. It must pass beyond its legitimate field by the sheer necessity of its own inner impulse and make propositions which when properly analysed must propose the general character of the universe in which the facts comprised under the perch proposition falls.

Philosophy has, therefore, a practical aim of analysing propositions. It therefore undertakes close analysis of the language employed as a tool for our expressions and tries to determine language which otherwise is thoroughly inadequate. According to him a precise language must await a completed metaphysical knowledge.\(^2\)

XXIII Metaphysical system must be all inclusive:

Truth, according to him, is nothing else than how the nature's composite manner of the organic activities of the world.

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1. Ibid p. 14
2. Ibid p. 18
obtain adequate representation in the divine nature. Such representation composes the consequent nature of God. Which evolves in its relationship to the evolving world without degradation to the eternal completion of its 'pre-mordial' conceptual nature'. This is what he means by the maintaining of 'Ontological Principle'. Metaphysical system, he asserts, must be all inclusive and nothing should fall outside its scope because whatever is found in practice must lie within the scope of the metaphysical description. When the description fails to include the practice, the metaphysics is inadequate and requires revision. Metaphysics, according to him is nothing but the description of the generalities which apply to all the details of practice giving rise to a synoptic vision or insight. Such a vision has its seat in consciousness by which the selective character of the individual obscures the external totality from which it originates and which it embodies. An actual individual of such higher grade has truck with the totality of things by reason of its sheer actuality.

XXIV The task of philosophy is to recover totality:

The task of philosophy, therefore, is to recover the totality obscured by individual selection and this can only be had if the religion and science are fused into one rational scheme of thought and this is possible only among higher orga-
organisms where we find emotional experience and conceptual generalisation which require reconciliation in such a way that emotional experiences illustrate a conceptual justification and conceptual generalisations find an emotional illustration. It may be called the philosophy of organism. He has deliberately devised his own terminology for the philosophy of organism because the ghosts of old faculty psychology have continued to haunt metaphysics with the result that it suffers from the fallacy of 'misplaced concreteness'.

World is made up of actual entities:

Actual entities, variously termed as actual occasions, according to him, are the final real things of which the world is made up. Even God is also an actual entity. So also is the 'most trivial puff of existence in far off empty space'. These actual entities are drops of experience, complex and interdependent. He says that his notion of actual entity is the transformation of the notion of 'substance' of John Locke and his 'Ontological principle' is the extension of a general principle laid down by Locke in his essay i.e. the notion of power transformed into the principle 'that the reasons for thing are always to be found in the composite nature of definite actual entities in the nature of God for reasons of the higher absoluteness, and in the nature of definite temporal actual entities for reasons which refer to a particular environment.'

1. Ibid p. 27
Summarily the ontological principle means 'no actual entity, then no reason.'

Actual entities are analysable in an indefinite ways. The mode which exhibits the most concrete elements in the nature of actual entities is termed as 'prehension'. A prehension reproduces in itself the general characteristics of an actual entity referring to an external world and involving emotion, purpose, valuation and causation. Prehensions are, he maintains, a generalisation from Descartes' mental cogitations and from Locke's ideas.

Actual entities unlike monads of Leibnitz involve each other through their prehensions of each other. The real individual facts comprised under actual entities continue to remain real individual particulars and are called the nexus. The ultimate constituents of any immediate experiences are actual entities prehensions and nexus.

Philosophy, according to him, has to explain the abstract and not the concrete nature of the universe. The fact is fact because of its form and yet it is more than its mere form. The definiteness of fact is due to its form and creativity is the ultimate behind all forms. These forms are eternal objects similar to Plato's ideas. In this philosophy, the actual entities are not permanent but forms, which suffer changing.

1. *Mind* vol. LXIII No. 290 p. 417 Para III Irving-Block's notes on Ryke's Plato's I & II *Mind* XLVIII (1939) p. 129
relationship with actual entities which persist subjectively but are immortal objectively because in persisting they lose their immediate subjectivity but acquire objectivity by contributing actively in the creation of new actual entities which replace them.

XXVI Philosophy of Process:

Philosophy of organism is a philosophy of process. Every actual entity, therefore, is being as well as becoming at the same time because it embodies within itself its own 'principle of unrest.' It refutes the realistic principle of 'res extra' or inference of quality in substance which Whitehead calls the theory of 'vacuous actuality' and is the extension of ancient doctrine of 'no one crosses the same river twice.'

Whitehead in his final analysis attributes all evils entered into metaphysical systems to the 'subject predicate' mode of Aristotelian propositions. According to him, even Aristotle's own speculations were free from this type of logic. Those who criticize Aristotle, implicitly throughout their discussions presuppose subject predicate form of propositions. Modern philosophy, he maintains started on a sound principle— that all knowledge is grounded in perception and to build its epistemological theories, analysed perception into an awareness that universal quality is qualifying a particular substance. The next question as to how perceiver perceives was asked and

1. Ibid p. 43
and replied that he perceives by his organs of sensation. The universal quality qualifying the substance, therefore, was taken to be his private sensations referring to particular substances other than himself. Subject predicate form of propositions consequently was taken to be expressing the fundamental metaphysical truth. The philosophy of organism fully accepts Descartes' discovery that subjective experiencing is the primary metaphysical situation which is presented to metaphysics for analysis. This subjective principle requires 'objective principle' for balancing as to the datum of experience and this can be done by transforming Descartes' principle into a derivative abstraction, necessary indeed as an element in the description of the fundamental experiential feeling, but delusive as a metaphysical starting point. This derivative abstraction is called 'objectification.'

XXII Knowledge is a process:

Knowledge, in the philosophy of organism is relegated to the intermediate phase of process, and does not form part of the existence of any actual entity which is the absorption of the objective content into the subjectivity of satisfaction. Its importance, therefore, is no necessary element in the concrete actual entity. It is simply a capacity which may not be present in the earlier phases of the historic process of succession of actual entities and may manifest at a later stage.

1. Ibid p. 243
Every actual entity has the capacity for knowledge and there is the gradation in the intensity of various items of knowledge, but in general, knowledge seems to be negligible apart from a peculiar complexity in the constitution of some actual occasion.

Philosophy of organism finds a hierarchy of categories of feeling in the place of the Hegelian hierarchy of categories of thought. It reestablishes the reformed subjectivist principle that 'apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingess.' The epistemological difficulty, according to him, is only solvable by an appeal to Ontology.

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**XXVIII Empirical epistemology:**

The process of knowing, Whitehead maintains, is constituted by the reception of entities, whose being is antecedent to that process, into a complex fact which is that process itself. This renders the entire epistemological situation in Whitehead thoroughly empirical and all comprehensive. He, therefore, conceives his actual entities as 'drops of experiences' and they include within themselves the feeling which in this philosophy, is all comprehensive. All primitive modes of our perceptions or prehensions are shot through and through with feeling element which after passing through, various categories culminates into 'satisfaction.'

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1. Ibid p. 253
2. Ibid p. 288
3. Adventures of Ideas p. 229
element which after passing through, various categories culminates into 'satisfaction.' Feeling, therefore, is fundamental in all apprehensions which constitute the inner ingredients of all actual entities, which science misses as it takes account simply of the external. The whole existing order of the world consists of such actual entities and they are also the 'final real things' of which the world is made up. Each such actual entity arises out of its own predecessor entities and passes over into new entities. Each, thus, is fully determinate and yet involves freedom in its 'creative advance' into novelty.

XXIX Monistic attitude of epistemology:

There are also eternal objects the forms which participate into actual entities, the real objects. They are like ideal possibilities into which actual entities objectify. They are infinite and lack the quality of substantiality. They are any entity whose conceptual recognition does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entity of the temporal world, and their original situation is in that comprehensive feeling which constitutes the 'primalordial nature of God.' It is the 'concrescence' of these eternal objects with actual entities that is the reason for the constitution of a novel entity. It is a process in which the universe of many things acquires an individual unity in a determinate relegation of each item of the many to its subordination in the constitution of a novel one. Prehension is an aspect of concrescence and
and human perception is one variety of prehension. This prehension is also an inward feeling which underlies all knowing conscious or preconscious.

The view that each actual entity prehends into itself its predecessors along a certain historic route and is in turn received into its own successors indicates monistic attitude of Whitehead in epistemology and places him on par with Alexander and American neo-realisists. The questions of subject and object, mind and body and their relations, he maintains do not arise. There is always, in knowing, a transcendent element characterising that definiteness, he asserts, to which our experience must conform. But this transcendent element is not to be completely identified with the experiential one. Subject and object therefore, are not only inseparably linked with each other, they are linked with the entire universe into an organic unity. This places him on par with absolute idealists and against logical and metaphysical atomists whose theory of simple location assumes the independent individuality of each bit of matter.

XXX Subject - object relativity:

Whitehead has successfully illustrated through example drawn from sciences that an object though retaining its distinct character, can become the part of perceptual experience. This amply bears testimony to our effort at showing that the
the distinction of subject and object in the presented whole and apprehended by intuition as a whole is an artificial creation and not a basic one. The epistemological problem, therefore, of relating an independent object with the sentient subject is a pseudo-problem. The more fundamental problem is metaphysical rather than epistemological because what we name as subject or object is no more what it stands for. Subject and object are relative terms and are also interchangeable i.e. subject is never fully subject but is an object at the same time and object equally is a subject in the wider whole which they constitute. And yet this whole is not an impotent whole of absolute idealists. It is creative of new entities by participating in ideal possibilities or eternal forms. So also is the case with the antithesis of universal and particular in the sense of being just what it is, diverse from everything else, and every so-called particular is universal in the sense of entering into the constitutions of other actual entities. The distinction, therefore, of particular and universal is relative.

XXXI God is identical with Reality:

God, he maintains, plays the necessary role of mediating between physical and conceptual prehensions and is as good as any actual entity. He is an 'unmoved mover' who is eminently real. He feels that the combination of these two into the doctrine of an original, eminently real, transcendent creator,
at whose fiat the world came into being and whose imposed will it obeys is the fallacy which has infused tragedy into the histories of Christianity and Mahometanism. God, he maintains, is not to be treated as an exemption to all metaphysical principles invoked to save their collapse. He is, on the contrary, their chief exemplification. God's premordial and consequent natures reconcile at the end, the opposites found in experience. The consequent nature of God is conscious and is the realisation of the actual world in the unity of his nature and through the transformation of his wisdom.\(^1\) The premordial nature is conceptual, the consequent nature is the weaving of God's physical feelings upon his premordial concepts. God is completed by the individual fluent satisfactions of finite fact, and the temporal occasions are completed by their everlasting union with their transformed selves purged into conformation with the eternal order which is the final absolute wisdom.\(^2\) God is thus the ground of opposites. In short, Whitehead\(^1\) God is immanent as well as transcendent and stands over against the world expressing the final metaphysical truth that appetitive vision and physical enjoyment have equal claim to priority in creation. God and World stand, thus, to each other in this opposed requirement, and both are in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, in the creative advance into novelty.

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1. Process and Reality p. 524
2. Ibid. p. 527
Why does Whitehead's system require the agency of God at all?

With all humility, he admits that religions experience is also a part of our total experiential data—may be real but in no case insignificant. The main function entrusted to God in his system is that of ordering eternal objects into a patterned relationship. This arrangement and order among eternal objects is due to the agency of God. The eternal objects have their subsistence in God. He also makes them available for use by other actual entities. He functions as the principle of concretion and this is also the 'ultimate irrationality' in the universe for which we cannot demand reasons.

XXXII Misplaced concreteness in Whitehead:

This shows that God as interpreted by Whitehead is identical with the universe because he is as actual as any other actual entity. Here we find also 'misplaced concreteness' of which he himself has complained throughout, for God in his system seems to be the ultimate principle of metaphysics. Now according to his own previous utterances, it is not the concrete nature of the universe that demands explanation but the abstract principle which gives rise to it, or bare potentiality which manifests into concrete multiplicity of the universe.

God, again, according to this philosophy is partly abstract and partly concrete because if he includes the eternal objects which are infinite in his consequent nature and which are
abstract, they will form abstract nature of God while, the actual entities which are concrete particulars and which form part of his prêmordial nature, would constitute concretteness of God. God therefore, cannot be a metaphysical principle and hence also cannot be identical with metaphysical reality or be an ultimate metaphysical principle. It seems Whitehead, by adhering to succumb to the temptation of maintaining monism in epistemology, has tendered himself to the same fallacy to which we have seen, both realists as well as idealists succumbed.
CHAPTER IX

Return to Subjectivity

Turning Point:

We have seen, in the previous chapter that an effort was made to view reality as something dynamic which can only be caught hold of by instinct or intuition and not by intelligence because intelligence according to that viewpoint can have an access to that which is static and inert. This sharp division of consciousness into intelligence and instinct led the author of this viewpoint to recognise two aspects of reality viz. materiality and spirituality running counter to each other. And to that extent the author succumbed to relegate some kind of inertness or staticity to the reality which he himself pronounced to be cut and out dynamic or changeful. We have objected to this type of rigid division of consciousness into that which is something inert and static, and that which is dynamic and changeful on the strength of the investigations of psychology which no more recognise the instractive and intellectual aspects of consciousness as opposed
to each other. They, on the contrary, form part of a single process of the manifestation of consciousness at various stages where the one is not without the other and the whole process is fused with dynamism at all stages of its development or evolution.

We have also seen another attempt at the reconstruction of a system of ideas which can bring aesthetic moral and religious interests into the relation with those concepts of the world which have their origin in natural sciences. It tried to reconcile the extremes of realism and idealism by the method of free-imagination or 'speculative philosophy.' It has succeeded to a certain extent in maintaining a proper viewpoint so far as the objective aspect of the real was reconstructed but failed no sooner it turned its gaze upon subjective aspect and consequently identified god with the real and conceived it to be the ultimate reality of metaphysics. The reason of the failure of this system, in our opinion is that it did not take care to explore the subjective aspect in its totality and went on generalising on the strength of the traditional aesthetical, moral and religious experience. And to that extent, the exploration of the true nature of the subjectivity as the source of all aesthetic, moral and religious experiences was neglected.

We, now, shall witness some brilliant efforts at exploring the inner depths of this subjectivity which is the ground of
all experience, aesthetic, moral, religious and scientific.

I Opposition to Hegel:

What impelled Søren Kierkegaard to indulge into the domain of philosophy seems to be the predominance enjoyed by Hegel's thought. In his own words his philosophy is the exact opposite of Hegelian mediation which claims to be an absolute process. This is possible only when history is finished. The system of Hegel is, therefore, in a constant process of becoming. Kierkegaard is not prepared to concede this because it does away with the possibility of absolute choice which we will see is a cornerstone of the world view he has advocated. Hegel and his school has, according to him, confounded two distinct spheres i.e. the sphere of thought and that of freedom, the sphere of contemplation and the sphere of action, one philosophical and the other ethical, because action according to him is futuristic while philosophy turns towards the past, towards the whole enacted history of the world. It shows how discrete factors are fused in a higher unity. It mediates the opposites into a higher unity which exists for thought. It forgets that the opposites must first exist before one can mediate them. He therefore rules out anything like mediation altogether.

II Feeling as the inner dynamism of Reality:

He finds fault with Hegel not for introducing dialectic
but for keeping dialectic simply limited to the field of thought. Hegel's partiality to thought as the only efficient instrument in the hands of man through which he can comprehend reality irritates him and he intends to show that even genuine thought, if it is not shot through and through with burning passion, presents nothing but bloodless categories. The world view, therefore, which intellect—cold intellect of sciences erects on the strength of such categories presents a view which is nothing but a mechanical dance of categories, which does not unfold the mystery of the universe. The inner dynamism of reality reflects through despair and doubt which is so much prized in modern philosophy by Descartes and others as a starting point of all philosophizing. It is nothing but a despair of thought and despair equally is nothing but a 'doubt of the personality'\(^1\). It is the inward movement in thought itself in which one behoves as impersonally as possible. It is, therefore, not something purely subjective but out and out objective.

Doubt though a despair of thought is, nevertheless, not free, for it is in the realm of the finite, being the consequence of necessity. Freedom, therefore, is denied to thought, to the doubt. It is only in the movement of choice that real freedom is first felt. To doubt is to perpetuate oneself in the contradictions, while to choose is to get out of it and feel the freedom.

\(^1\) Ibid p. 215
What is this choice? In reply to this question he, for the first time in the history of the Western Philosophy, boldly proclaims, like our Upanisadic Seers "I myself am the absolute" and continues that 'I posit the absolute and I myself am the absolute' and that 'I choose the absolute which chooses me, that I posit the absolute which posits me'. This does not mean that the absolute is a creation of his own fancy and that in the act of positing the absolute, the author creates it afresh. The absolute is already there, the act of choice is the act of positing, for if the absolute were not there already, the question of choice would not have arisen at all, and yet if there is no positing, there equally is no choice at all. The absolute exists, for if in case it were not there, it could not be chosen.

III God is not absolute:

To the question as to what is this absolute, he replies that it is 'I myself in my eternal validity' and makes a distinction between God of religion and absolute. God of religion, though absolute falls short of complete absoluteness as it requires the self who is devoted to him. The devotee and God are separate entities and therefore, the absoluteness of God is not complete so long as the self who devotes himself falls outside it. The absolute must absorb everything if it is to be absolute at all.

The absolute is the self that chooses absolutely or the self

1. Ibid p. 217
2. Ibid p. 218
is chosen by the absolute. This self which is absolute is the most abstract thing and yet at the same time, it is the most concrete. It is freedom. The self that is chosen is infinitely concrete because it is himself. The act of choice exercised absolutely brings into existence the self means of choice. It did not exist previously but existed as merely 'himself'. There are two dialectical moments involved, that which is chosen, does not exist and comes into existence with the choice, that which is chosen exists, otherwise there would not be a choice. The free spirit is created out of the principle of contradiction.

The self which is thus posited absolutely is not entirely abstract and empty but contains a rich concretion, a manifold variety of determinants and characteristics because it does not annul its lower stages but retains them as its own concrete manifestations or its own manifold contents and thereby enriches himself. The self which exercises the act of choice, ceases, thereby to continue to remain a finite personality but infinitizes itself by its own absolute choice. It is this infinitized self which is free.

IV Difference of Good and evil absolute:

The self that so freely posits itself gives rise to the dualism of Good and evil, subject and object etc. the absolute difference that is so visible in the evidence of concrete life. So long as the self does not exercise the choice and posit itself
as its own absolute in its universal validity, the absolute difference of good and evil, though latent does not manifest itself to him. So long as it continues to think as a finite self, it thinks sheerly out of necessity and does not think freely. And to that extent it continues to remain in the region of contradictions, in the field of relative differences and does not reach the point of absolute difference. Thinking, so long as it used universals, infinitizes personality but not absolutely. The absolute infinitization of personality occurs only when the self chooses itself as an absolute as it itself is the absolute. The self that thus posits itself as the absolute, does not think out of necessity. It thinks freely, for it thinks itself absolutely or it is the self-thinking of the absolute in him.¹ It means that the thinking of the self, that has chosen is a constituent factor of the absolute.

The good, on the contrary, which one posites by willing it, has no existence apart from his willing, and therefore, he is free who wills Good. Same is the case with evil. The choice, the absolute choice, therefore, becomes the only condition for becoming free, whether it is on the side of Good or on the side of evil. If Good and evil, he maintains, were not in me, I cannot choose it and thereby fall short of becoming the absolute.

¹. Ibid p. 228
V An Ethical view of Life:

He therefore, prefers an ethical view of life, personality and their significance. His definition of ethical is—by which man becomes what he becomes—the ethical makes man what he himself is. He should, therefore, become transparent to himself. His ethical view differs from that ethical view which regards duty as something externally imposed upon an individual. The duty, in his theory, is nothing imposed ab extra, but is an expression of the inmost nature of an individual.

He commits contradiction when he maintains that the ethical is the universal and so it is the abstract, and maintains that only when the individual himself is the universal, it is possible to realize the ethical. For if the individual is universal and abstract, how does he differ from the mystic who also is an abstract and whom he condemns? And if they are identical what was the necessity of condemning the mystic? If ethical is universal, it ceases to be particular and loses all concreteness. And the process from concrete to abstract or from particular to universal is the cornerstone of epistemology, while the ethical view which this theory advocates is a supposed contradiction to another prevalent view which regarded duty as something imposed ab extra has an ontological base as it conceives. Good and evil to be residing in an individual who makes the choice
stage of the development of an individual. Even the aesthetic, ethical and religious consciousness of an individual is a steady growth from moment to moment. The man whose aesthetic view has not developed beyond his physical appetites has no doubt a being but his being is very limited. While at the same time an artist of the calibre of Rabindranath Tagore whose aesthetic view comprehends the entire realm of nature may represent a being truly representative of the Being which is the subject matter of ontology.

VI Role of subjectivity:

We have labelled this philosophy as ethical idealism because he has supplied us a standard in which thought is capable of measuring being, even on the human plane. Although he does not allow any idealistic identification of mind and the thing, he sees the need for a rational standard or an ideal governing human moral and religious activities.¹

According to him the cognitive needs of man are wider than is the ability of scientific method to satisfy them. Man, therefore, cannot help asking questions about the meaning of existence, the nature of human person etc. etc., These questions fall within the region of what he terms as 'subjective reflection' or existential thinking.

Subjective here does not mean the priority of thought over being in any absolutist sense, nor does it mean the glorification

¹. Mind of Søren Kierkegaard- by Collins p. 142
of personal whim or caprice. With a view to going beyond the epistemological dilemma between idealism and naturalism he gave a moral and religious meaning to subjectivity.

Subjectivity means inwardness and existential truth is not only inward but also dialectical. This kind of truth tries to synthesize the highest what of knowledge with the deepest how of creatively response, both cognitive and volitional. Still however, he insists on the real distinction between the knower and the thing known when it is a question human cognition and favours an empirical theory of truth and thereby limits himself to epistemological realism.

His ontological intention is obvious when he maintains, as against Kantian conception of the impossibility of a personal god and a religion distinct from morality, that when one who has known the living God, determines his relation to the universal by his relation to the absolute and not his relation to the absolute by his relation of the universal.

Again while criticizing Hegelianism he does not deny the unity of mind and thing propounded in it. He, with a view to safeguard the religious conception of God, his omniscience and providence and with it the intelligibility of Being, admits that in the eternal reality of God, there is oneness of thought and being, mind and body.
Reality according to him, must be viewed is individual and non-conceptual. This suggestion is noteworthy because a conceptual reality lands us into epistemologism, the consequences of which we have seen. Individual must mean that which individuates or that which is capable of undergoing individuation. This guarantees against any static conception of reality which makes it difficult to explain the origin of world on metaphysical basis and imports into it the meaningless concept of illusion.

VII Neglect of Science and Scientific Knowledge:

Kierkegaard's transcendence into the subjectivity of personal life is equally an abstraction for which he condemns both, an aesthetist as well as a mystic, and yet he himself is not an exception to it. It also neglects the science and the scientific knowledge as if it has no positive role to play. And yet one positive element which we find in his pioneering work is that he drew pointed attention of the philosophers who were dazzled by the being of the objective world revealed through sciences, to the self- the person, the subject, who is no less important than the objective world and yet who was rather pushed into a corner and neglected completely. Along with the natural philosophers, idealists, realists, pragmatists as well as positivists all- as we have tried to point out throughout turned this partial knowledge of reality into the reality itself, and in the wake, tried to raise epistemology to the level of ontology. He rightly raised a hue and cry over this partial situation and focussed the attention of the philosophers to the task.
of investigating the nature of the being of the subject in
its existential aspect. His revelation of the four major
characteristics of the nature of the being of the subject viz.
inwardness, indeterminateness, individuation and non-conceptual
ness is his positive contribution to the total ontological
situation in which subject and object equally stand in an
indissoluble unity.

VIII Anti-rationalism and anti-scientism:

In conformity with the above remarks, Jaspers rightly
points out that Kierkegaard thought the most frightful way to
live was to bewitch the whole world through one's discoveries
and cleverness to explain the whole of nature and not under-
stand oneself. Kierkegaard's anti-rationalism was equally
inspired because it conspired in man to force him to attend to
the outward and to falsify the inward by compelling it to
square itself with the system fabricated out of its own nature
neglecting at the same time the other vital aspects of exist-
ing of the self. It manifested a revolt against reason and system
building inspired from the very depths of existing which
sought itself to express through a negative resolution, an
absolute choice which is as good as nothingness or the absurd
martyrdom.

IX Life of Philosopher a starting Point;

Jaspers maintains that the reaction against metaphysics

1. Reason and Existenz by Karl Jaspers p. 26
has driven some to science and others to religious dogma. Those who are driven towards science viz. positivists, have reduced all philosophy to science. The idealists, on the contrary, have reduced science to philosophy. Those who turned to religious dogma, aimed at saving the life of the emotions and the imagination. We must, he says, return to philosophy to break these superstitious cults, define the limits of science and recognise that science is the definition and standard of objective knowledge. At the same time, he maintains, we must recognise that philosophy cannot be an universal knowledge. We must recognise the discontinuities in the realms of Being. The three forms of Being, being-there, being-onself, and being-in-itself have the meeting place in the life of the philosopher who, by living his own life, participates in all the three. The life of the philosopher must, therefore, be our starting point.

He assumes the reality of the world in which the philosopher has his foothold, the being-there, which compels and controls the adherence to knowledge and in which everything is an object. This objective world is related to human understanding. Science therefore, is a relation of this objective world with consciousness in general. The objects of the world of science are, compared with that of subjectivity, stable and certain, and it is because of this that those who think that the science is everything refuse to enter into subjectivity.
Reason always seeks unity and totality in the world of objects and hence posits fully realized objectivity of knowledge as an ideal. And science is incapable of reaching such an ideal because there are vital forms of consciousness over and above the level of public knowledge which are not accessible to the method of sciences. Whatever information science gathers through the method of induction is only probable and continues to remain indefinite in some fields. Science, therefore, achieves clarity and universality at the cost of unity and totality to which reason aspires. Science, therefore, provides simply first stage of philosophy from which a philosopher starts.

Philosophy according to Jaspers starts with the life of the philosopher who communicates not what he knows but what he is. The unity and totality which reason seeks and aspires after, belongs to the world in its transcendence. Being-in-itself to which only the thinker has an access through his own transcendence, or being-onself meets the objective world or being-there. Philosophy must, therefore, be associated with the world of objects through the life of, or the person of the philosopher and not through his doctrines.

Philosopher, when he fails to find the unity and totality to which his reason aspires turns from the world of science to the world of his own inner experiences and finds not objectivity but liberty, not knowledge but choice. He thinks
'I am a being who is not, but who can and ought to be.'

The thinker at the bottom of all that he is or does is liberty, a source of his possibilities, of what he wills to be. Existence to him is this active choice of himself in liberty. If one does not come to oneself and exercise one's liberty in the realm of being-one'self, one remains in the realm of being there, objectively determined, a thing along with other things. This consciousness, not of what I am, but of what I am resolved into what shall I be to which one perpetually returns at the level of being-one'self is the consciousness of one's essence. Jaspers, we may remark, has put Kant and Kierkegaard together.

X  Encompassing never comes as an object:

The Being or 'Encompassing' assumes three different forms, Being-in-itself, Being-onself and Being-there. The being-one'self functions as the medium or condition under which all being appears as Being for us. That this does not mean that Being-in-itself is the part of the entire encompassing. The encompassing is rather the whole as the most-extreme self-supporting ground of being, whether it is being-itself or being as it is for us. The Encompassing never appears as an object in experience, nor as an explicit them of thinking. This does not mean that it is empty. Of the two approaches of Being as the encompassing, the most usual and most natural way for every beginning in philosophy is towards being-in-itself conceived as nature, world or God. However Jaspers thinks it fit to approach it from the other i.e. to search into the very encompassing ................
which we are. The ground of the entire Being, in its all
the three modes is the being-one self or spirit or consciousness
or empirical existence which cannot be grasped as though it
were something in the world which appeared before us. Rather
it is that in which all other things appear to us. We do
not cognise it as an object, rather it functions as the limit
of all other objects. We make, as it were, an abstraction of
ourselves. We look and see what are, but while doing so,
we always remain enclosed within that in which we are looking.

XI Transcendence through Knowledge:

The empirical existence or being-one self when made into
an object becomes something alien or its overpowering other
which is the world and when we try to investigate the conscious-
ness in general i.e. when we try to cognise the other, we no
longer can remain confined to the other but get over it and
embrace consciousness in general. There is a leap between
the multiplicity of subjective consciousness and the universal
validity of that true consciousness which we can only be one.
As subjective consciousness, we embrace actuality but as
consciousness in general, we participate in inactivity, the
universally valid truth, an infinite encompassing. This
is through the possibility of knowledge and through the possibility
of common knowledge of Being in every form in which it appears

1. Ibid p. 54
to consciousness. ¹ This third mode of being, the transcendence is the spirit which also we are through knowledge because it is as spirit, we become the totality of intelligible thought, action and feeling, a totality which is not a closed object for knowledge but remains idea. Spirit, according to him, is the comprehensive reality of activity which is actualized by itself and by what it encounters in a world which is always given and yet always being changed. It is the process of fusing and reconstructing all totalities in a present which is never finished and yet always fulfilled.

We may ask here, as to why the spirit undertakes the activity of reconstructing totalities, the answer cannot be had. Similarly, the question of totalities being fulfilled and at the same time always fulfilling also arises. But all these questions Jaspers never cares to reply. He further maintains that we transform the world and ourselves into the intelligible which encloses totalities. As objects in this mode of the encompassing, we know ourselves from within as the one, unique, all embracing reality which is wholly spirit and only spirit.²

We saw that in Jaspers, it is through knowledge that the being oneself transforms itself into being-in-itself or the spirit which is all embracing reality. We may now ask as to what is this knowledge? Jaspers maintains that knowledge is

1. Ibid p. 57
2. Ibid p. 58
is nothing but the communicability. The life of the philosopher is not important as it is, it is important as it communicates through the totality of intelligible thought, action and feeling i.e. as the reason. The reason, therefore, is the bond between all the three modes of Being.

Reason, at the level of empirical community or existence assumes relativity and continues to remain a changing truth because empirical existence itself changes. The truth at the level of consciousness manifests itself through the dichotomies of the knowable which by means of all the logical categories, grasp in affirmation and denial that which is valid for every body. Communication of spirit assumes the emergence of the idea of a whole out of the communal substances. The communication at this stage is due to the presence of the idea of the whole otherwise it slips into the indifferent and trivial.

We do not know why one should communicate at this level at all. Can one not be a spirit if one does not communicate? It is well-known that some who have reached at the level of spirit have preferred to remain silent and silence, in their case, has become more significant than an express communication.

Jaspers himself is not satisfied with this mode of delineation for he says that this whole way of looking at things still leaves something in us dissatisfied.¹ And this dissatisfies

¹. Ibid p. 90
of ours that strove to grasp all the modes of communication together and then experienced its impossibility sprang out of an impulse which itself belongs to none of the three modes of Encompassing. Even the will to communicate in this three modes holds its energy, according to him, at the service of a universal will to communicate which comes out of reason and existence.

XII Hierarchy of the modes of encompassing Ontological:

Jaspers recognises the priority of the role of ontology when he tries to view all the three modes in a hierarchical Gradation in a complete whole. The whole thus established is as such that in it three modes are so levelled that the earlier looses substance without the later, and that none can claim an absolute priority in being, each is indispensable in the whole- whole, moreover which is no more sum of levels, but an internally articulated structure of modes of Being. The question of such a hierarchy of the modes of encompassing is Ontological. He recognises that thought has a formal priority not a priority in being or value. Such a priority of thought means that no mode of the encompassing can be present to us or become effective in us unless its content enters into the medium of thought. Thought has formal priority because it penetrates into everything and that nothing can withdraw itself from its contact. The actual existence of all modes of the encompassing has priority over thought which is dependent upon them and still this priority is brought to light by

1. Ibid p. 108
thought. Thought is again the only medium through which all
the modes of the encompassing can be related to one another.
Thought in this capacity functions as the medium of movement
in the world. Jaspers, thus relating epistemology and ontology
and deciding the question of the priority of the one over the
other in mutual reciprocation as the formal and material priority
turns to identify both and says that the universality of thought
might seem to be identical with the mode of the encompassing
which is consciousness as such. It is not merely identical
with it, but is consciousness as such transcending itself.
They all are reason in this sense.¹

Jaspers, however recognises the necessity of reorienting
the entire knowledge situation not in the fashion of idealists
whom he criticises sharply², but in a way quite different from
the previous one. He maintains, that instead of there being
a demand for universal and unlimited thinking which as such
leads into emptiness and infinity, there is a demand to think
out of reality, out of Being itself and by thought to advance
on back into Being.³ Knowledge of knowledge or epistemology
must be reoriented on concrete substantial ontological grounds.

XIII A Pure Ontology must be reared:

Jaspers hints at the possibility of a logic of which Kant
laid the foundation and Hegel developed in a particular way

1. Ibid p. 110
2. Ibid p. 124
3. Ibid p. 125
which has already been rejected because of its being partially true. He admits that Kant’s transcendental logic taken in its widest sense initiated in a new and ever since indispensable basis on which, we agree, a true ontology must be reared.

Hegel’s attempt at a solution of the problem, he admits, is related to our contemporary one.  

He has, here, simply given a hint, a direction in which true ontology must be reared. He has, we may say, failed to work out the details of it. But then, such an indication clearly points out that historicity of the Being must be made the raw material or the true content of philosophy proper or ontology, and such a historicity must comprise within itself the important results of Being in general of the world of experience which science undertakes to investigate, and the Being in general of the self which reflects itself in poetry, arts, culture, as well as historical sciences i.e. the Being in general of the subject must be synthetically related to the Being in general, of the objective world and thus philosophy must constitute the study of the Being qua Being in the language of Aristotle. Such an ontology can and must become philosophy proper. Kant, Hegel and Aristotle, in this effort, must remain the arch torch-bearers of all future philosophies. The light can only be had in this direction only.

XIV Is there a 'Personal life' of philosopher?

We may say, as we have already pointed out that Jaspers

1. Ibid p. 133
has clearly indicated at the possibility of rearing the superstructure of a pure ontology in which epistemology plays so important a role that not even the smallest portion of experiential world is either lost or condemned to be either an illusion or an appearance, for being one-self gnaws into transcendence through not knowledge or communication but through the personal life of the philosopher. He has, though aware fully, not been able to utilize the being-there which even in the personal life of the philosopher plays an important role. We may say that by endowing the philosopher with a personal life, and by making that life the vehicle of transcendence, he has introduced into his philosophy an unnecessary element of abstraction due to which his philosophy stands condemned at the hands of his critics. We, too, may raise a fundamental problem with regard to the so-called personal life of the philosopher. The personal life of the philosopher cut off from its relation to being-there is an abstraction. What he has called the personal life of the philosopher, if put through the analysis, would reveal elements of being-there to a great extent. And in that case, it is a question whether it can be called a personal life at all. Jaspers, we may say, has stumbled on the very rock on which, the ship-wreck of Kierkegaard and many other philosophers, we have witnessed, has taken place.

XV Beyond Subject-Object relation:

Gabriel Marcel took up the task of healing the wound inflicted
by trying to go beyond the position confined to subject-object relation by Jaspers. He, therefore, turned to the concreteness in which the subject-object situation appears not as discrete elements presenting themselves in their abstraction but in their unity i.e. in the unity of living and thinking. He thought his way through idealism but freed himself from the spell of it because he found, it denatured man and the world. He, therefore, undertook to explore the possibility of restoring the veridical and vital experiences arisen out of the interaction of man and his environmental world around him. This situation leads Marcel to the same lines of thought for which a beginning was already made by Jaspers viz. the contemplation of Being qua Being, the interest into which, according to him, was destroyed by Kantian and Bergsonian critiques which in their own way lowered the status of both, subject as well as object. Kant lowered the status of object to which we have no access by reducing it to a mere unknowable thing in itself and Bergsonian materialism lowered the status of the subject by reducing it to a mere by-product of bio-chemical processes going on into the body. Marcel reacts sharply to this effort of reducing oneself to the thought-in-general and the objective world to a collection of universal characteristics which he feels is not a way to penetrate into the nature of things. But its alternative is not either agnosticism or scepticism but to return to the unity of concrete being. He maintains that the secrets of world which is beyond subject and object and yet the product of an active relation between them cannot
be made an object of universal knowledge.

W.I. Question of Being is primary:

Marcel criticizes Descartes for not paying sufficient attention to the form of being enjoyed by the knowing subject. 'I think' he says, is a specialized function of the whole man and hence must not be mistaken for the existing individual. It is an abstraction from the total situation in which a man lives and the essence of man is to be in a situation. My awareness, he maintains, of my existence is not first of all a separation of myself as a knowing subject from my body as a known object, because it is the existence of my body in the world that constitutes me a subject before it is given to me as an object to a subject. My body thus participates in the life of the world primordially and inspires a confused awareness of universal existence which is subsequently destroyed and replaced by consciousness of myself by reflection. This primordial unity of subject and object must again be restored by the second effort of thought getting rid of false problems arisen out of the abstraction, of subject from its object and object from its subject.

The experience of my incarnation in a body which exists in continuity with all other objects in the world and the problem of my relation to it is such a primary problem. To solve this problem of the relation of subject with its own object, we must
raise another problem as to what am I? or what is the subject? For once we decide what the subject is, and what the object is, the question of relation arises then and then only as to how this subject is related to this object.

The question of Being, therefore, according to Marcel is primary and present while that of the knowledge is secondary because, it cannot either explain or prove Being. Knowledge must presuppose Being. Even my own being and the being in which I participate are not problems before me on which I may get to work because I have no standing and no possible existence of subject and object outside of Being. The independent existence of subject and object is an abstraction introduced by reflection which must be reinstated by a subsequent reflection which is a philosophy proper.

This learning to regard Being not as a problem but as a mystery is fundamental in Marcel. A mystery, according to him is not a problem which lies beyond the scope of present knowledge, it is a mystery because it is an experience which escapes being reduced to a public object before a universal subject. Subject and object, according to him interpenetrate and are inseparable one from the other. They are mutually involved constituents each of the other. This doctrine of mystery is nothing but the recovery of learning of the lost immediacy and this is only possible when we have learnt to think away what we have learnt to think. Thus reflection upon reflection
reveals to us the lost immediacy and restores the assurance of one's own being and thereby makes transcendence, which was inevitable, in Jaspers voluntary. The assurance of Being gained by concrete philosophy in the second phase of reflection defining the status and competence of knowledge as something within, and not outside, as responsive to, and not the master of, the enfolding, the primary mystery of Being, opens up thereafter a way for further explorations of Being in certain intensely lived experiences.

XII Being assimilates having:

Marcel draws a sharp distinction between being and having when we say that I have a body. He says in such cases, 'I' stands on a higher plane. They are not on the same footing in a reciprocal relationship. This indicates an active passage from subject to object, which is irreversible. Still however, I cannot dispose of the relation of having which affects it. The relation of having with being when on a material plane exercises a tension on being or supresses one who has it, i.e. our body or the tools we use. But on a creative level, being gradually assimilates and transforms having into being. And this abolishes the duality and the tension between interior and exterior, between what I am and what I have. Being not only transforms having, it itself also leaving higher plane on which it stands, becomes one with having because it cannot stand aloof from its own having. Being cut off from its own having is an
abstraction. Having must be assimilated to being. Idealism, he maintains, tries to abolish having by reducing it to being and materialism attempts to reduce being to having and, thereby, both prove their inadequacy and contend in favour of some form of Realism.

Marcel agrees with Jaspers that the task of a philosopher is to dare to think that there is a reality which cannot be thought. Being can be experienced, indicated, attested, but cannot be represented and possessed. He admits that this reality which is beyond the subject-object relation of scientific thought is not the object of religious faith because it is a metaphysical reality, inaccessible, presupposed, a mystery. It is my reality, a source and secret of all that has any value in my life.

But this transcendental 'I' cannot exist unless a transcendental 'thou' also exists. Marcel after going quite a long way falls back upon this primitive dualism, and maintains that I and thou can be with each other, present to each other and help to maintain each other's transcendence. It is the absolute I who is to each believer an absolute thou. Personal existence here, is retained conditionally that it may undergo incarnation as well as transcendence.

XIII How subject and object permeate is not indicated:

Marcel's philosophy fails to provide for Being-in-itself in the language of Jaspers. It simply stops at Being-there
which was ignored by Jaspers. He does not clearly indicate as to how subject and object permeate each other. By retaining subject and object in the transcendental form as absolute I and absolute thou, he has retained dualism. We may say, that if the absolute I who is to each believer an absolute thou transcendently, can they be two distinct entities retaining their separation? Is it not the belief which introduces dualism? For if one is not a believer, the question of a distinction between I and thou does not arise. He seems to have retained the distinction due to his regard for Christianity otherwise, as metaphysician, he should have come over this distinction or dualism.

XIX Man is the portal to the deeper levels of reality:

We saw in Jaspers that instead of making the being-there a vehicle for the being-onself to transcend into Being-in-itself, he preferred the personal existence of the philosopher. We suggested, while criticizing him that he could have achieved the same result through being-there which was ignored. Heidegger takes up the thread, rather in a different way. He starts with unfolding the structure of personal existence and arrives at the concept of Being-there or Dasein which plays a decisive role in his philosophy. The primary philosophical problem for both is the problem of Being. He, therefore, undertakes to formulate the basic questions and forms of analysis which are to lead to a clarification of the meaning and structures of Being. It is an analysis of human being, because, he believes
that man is the portal to the deeper levels of reality and that only through a disciplined analysis and description of human being, can the path be opened for the apprehension of Being itself. He employs the phenomenological methods in his analysis of human being or 'Dasein'. The ontological content of philosophy, according to him, is Being.

In his analysis, he seeks to get back at the data of immediate experience as they reveal in their primitive disclosures. This method, first of all discloses a fundamental experience of "being-in-the-world". Man, according to him, encounters the world as a going concern and initially discovers himself as involved in or engaged in practical and personal projects. The world existentially understood means a field or a region of human concern which is never disclosed independent of this concern. World is not without man. Man's being-in-the-world describes human reality in terms of a self-world correlation which underlies all concrete participation and engagement.

By human concern and personal existence in whose analysis Heidegger seeks a clue to the deeper levels of Reality, it is likely to give an impression that, he intends to neglect the rest of the world, around, but that is not the case. By being, he understands everything including the thinker, the

1. Being and Time p. 27
thought and the objects of inquiry. By personal existence, it
may not be misunderstood that he wants to import an element of
subjectivism. On the contrary, personal existence to which
he refers is the most objective out and out in so far as it is
not the personal existence or life of the philosopher as was
the case with Jaspers. Personal existence means existence
or the being of the subject in general. The entity 'Dasein'
refers to all those ways of behaving which are constitutive
of, and therefore, are modes of Being for those particular entities
which we the inquirers are ourselves\(^1\) and which are adequately eno-
ough suited to work out the question of Being. This entity
which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as
one of the possibilities of Being he denotes by "Dasein".

This being, he says, has been presupposed in all ontological
inquiries. It is not a concept but has the character of taking
a look at it beforehand so that in the light of it, the
entities presented, get provisionally articulated in their being.
Heidegger notes a very good suggestion out of the result of
his researches and which tallies almost equally with our sugges-
tion in the last chapter that basically all ontology, no matter
how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has
at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its own aim,
if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being
and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task.
The question of Being, according to him, therefore, must aim
not only at ascertaining the a priori conditions of the possi-

\(^1\) Ibid p. 26-27
bility of sciences but also explore the meaning of those ontologies which preceded the era of scientific investigations and thereby reveal the fundamental structure of the being of the subject in general. Even the manner in which the investigations of sciences are carried out reveal nothing but the structure of the being of the inquirer for they answer only those questions which are posed to them by their own thinkers. Scientific investigations thus become the various modes of the investigating being of the subject. They, therefore, fall within the purview of Dasein.¹

XXI Ontological priority of Dasein:

The basic characteristic of Dasein is that it always comports itself to existence, not in terms of actuality proper but in terms of possibility, and in understanding the existence, it also understands the being of the world. Ontology, therefore, when takes for its theme entities whose character of Being is other than Dasein, it has its own foundation and motivation in Dasein's own critical structure, in which a pre-ontological understanding of Being is comprised as a definite characteristic². An existential analysis of Dasein must, therefore, become the foundation of all ontologies. Dasein whose existential analytic becomes the fundamental Ontology, has, therefore the following characteristics. It is prior to all other entities in an ontical one because it is an entity

¹. Ibid p. 32
². Ibid p. 33
whose being has the determinate character of existence, and ontological priority, in that it possesses an understanding of the being of all other entities, thereby, providing the ontico-ontological condition for the possibility of any ontology.

Temporality is the meaning of the being of Dasein. Ordinarily even, time, he maintains, has functioned as a criterion for distinguishing various realms of Being. Time has, therefore, an ontological reality. Time is not only the being of Dasein, but is also the condition which makes the historicity of Being Dasein itself possesses. Historicity, therefore, is a determining characteristic for Dasein in the very basis of its Being.¹

Greek ontology, according to him, and its history has sufficiently proved that when Dasein understands either itself of Being in general, it does so in terms of the 'world'. The ontology, arisen out of it deteriorated into a tradition which took the material about this 'world' as something self-evident- the material for reworking the ontology. Hegel's ontology is an example.²

Kant undertook the adventure of investigating the dimensions of temporality but failed to provide us a proper problematic of Temporality because, he altogether neglected the

1. Ibid p. 42
2. Ibid p. 43
problem of Being and hence also failed to provide an ontology with Dasein as its theme or in Kant's own language, he failed to give a preliminary ontological analytic of the subjectivity of the subject.¹

Dasein in the form of the subjectivity of the subject is 'means Being' and is defined as that living thing whose being is essentially determined by the potentiality for discourse. Heidegger makes Dasein as the clue to the progressive understanding of the structures of Being but admits that this special entity in and through which we shall arrive at the horizon for the understanding of Being is itself 'historical' so that its own ontological elucidation necessary becomes an 'historiological interpretation.'²

Phenomenology, according to him, keeps itself limited to entities only. It is an ontology, no doubt, but over and above it, there should be a fundamental ontology taking as its theme that entity which is ontologically distinctive Dasein ³ in order to investigate the being in general and the phenomenology of Dasein has that character through which the authentic meaning of Being as well as the basic structures of Being, which Dasein itself possesses are made known to Dasein's understanding of Being. He terms this ontology as 'hermeneutic' and distinguishes it from philosophy which, according to him is universal phenomenological ontology. The hermeneutic or

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1. Ibid p. 45
2. Ibid p. 46
3. Ibid p. 61
or human ontology keeps itself limited to human sciences only, and because Dasein is in itself 'historical,' its ontological elucidation assume the form of historiological interpretation. It is, in short, the analytic of existence of Dasein. His ontology, therefore is limited to the existence of Dasein as distinguished from that of other entities.

XXII Possibility of Relating Existentia with Categories:

The characteristics of Being of Dasein revealed through the existential analysis of Dasein, he terms 'Existentia' as opposed to categories, the characteristics of Being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein. He envisages the possibility of relating these two basic characteristics of Being i.e. existentia and the categories, one pertaining to the subject or 'who,' and the other pertaining to the object of 'what,' but somehow keeps himself limited to the time till the horizon for the question of Being has been clarified.

With regard to the problem of knowing, he maintains that according to his existential analysis of Dasein, knowing is a founded mode of access to the Real. The real is essentially accessible only as entities "within-the-world" and all access to such entities is founded ontologically upon the basic state of Dasein, Being-in-the-world and this in turn has care as its

1. Ibid p. 67
2. Ibid p. 70
3. Ibid p. 245
more premonial state of Being. If once we accept Dasein or Being-in-the-world as the Being of the Dasein, the question of the reality or otherwise of the world becomes quite meaningless. He criticizes Cartesian thinkers as they took subject in complete isolation and then tried to affect, one way or the other, the relation between the subject and the object. The contemporary theories tackling the 'Problem of Reality' in various types of realisms and idealisms have tried one after the other solutions to mediate in between the subject and the object forgetting the fundamental ontologico-epistemological position of Dasein. Now have they paid enough attention to analyse the nature of Dasein or the subject. What is now needed, according to him, is "the basic insight" that while the different epistemological directions which have been pursued have not gone so very far off epistemologically, their neglect of the existential analytic of Dasein has kept them away from obtaining any basis for a well-secured phenomenological problematic. He doubts whether the simple phenomenological analysis and corrections of Dasein or subject only would give us any guarantee for appropriate formulation of the problem of the relation of epistemology and ontology.

XXIII Existential analysis of Dasein unsatisfactory:

Under these circumstances, we feel that neither a mere existential analysis of the nature of the subject as Dasein or

1. Ibid p. 250
or being-in-the-world only, nor the phenomenological analysis of the object only, will help us in formulating a correct solution of the problem of establishing any consistent and satisfactory answer to the relation of epistemology and ontology. We must, therefore, formulate, on one hand, the Being in general of the subject not in isolation but as Heidegger has rightly pointed out as Dasein or being-in-the-world, and on the other hand, Being in general of the object, not in isolation but as 'objects of the world world' on the strength of the phenomenological analysis and try to synthesize them in their mutual relationship. Heidegger began, as we have seen, with the right perspective in view but lost himself in simply exhibiting the Being of the Dasein only, though according to his original plan, he was expected to work out the synthesis of subject and object in a 'subject-object' whole.

Heidegger's theory of existential ontology accords with Realism in holding that external world is really present-at-hand but differs in so far in fact that instead of holding that the Reality of external world needs to be proved and is also capable of proof, it rather presupposes the reality of the world in the very constitution of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, and thereby nullifies the necessity as well as the possibility of any such proof. Heidegger finds in Realism a lack of ontological understanding as it tried to explain Reality ontically or on scientific grounds by real connections of interaction between things that are real.
He finds all types of idealisms inadequate in so far as they fail to clarify as to what do they understand when they emphasize that Being and reality are somehow only in the consciousness. They are correct if they mean by this that Being cannot be explained through entities. Idealism is correct, according to him, only if it lays down categorically that Being can never be explained by entities but is already that which is 'transcendental' for every entity. Idealism is wrong if it tries to trace back every entity to a subject of consciousness. By exposing the inadequacies of both Realism and Idealism, Heidegger has a clear perspective and he has in the beginning as we have seen, pointed out the possibility of working out the problem, but has left his promise unfulfilled.

XXIV Appeal to infinity:

Sartre starts his account with his criticism of Heidegger in whom, according to him, human reality, being ontic-ontological, can pass beyond phenomenon towards its being i.e. a passage from particular object etc to the essence from homogeneous to homogeneous. He questions the possibility of the sameness when the passage is from the existent to the phenomenon of being-actually passing beyond existent to its own being. While reducing all dualism to the dualism of 'finite and infinite, he clearly lays down that his theory of phenomenon has replaced the Reality of the

1. Being and Nothingness Int. (XVIII) p. 46
thing by the objectivity of the phenomenon and that it has based this on the appeal to infinity. But finite and infinite in his theory do not retain their opposition. The infinite reveals or manifests in and by finite. Finite on the other hand is nothing but one of the members of the series which is infinite. What appears is but an aspect of the object and the object is at the same time altogether within as well as outside of it. It is within that aspect because, on one hand, it manifests in that aspect and on the other, it shows itself as the structure of the appearance which is at the same time the principle of the series of which the object is the member. It is outside of it because the series being infinite, never comes to an end. The object, as outside, transcends its aspect through a 'Potency' which returns to inhabit the phenomenon.

Sartre appreciates the position of Heidegger as an improvement on Hegel who does not preserve a being for non-being, not even an abstract being, and categorically states that nothing is not, it nihilates itself. The being of human reality is the sole concern and is defined as "being-in-the-world" or Dasein. The world to Heidegger, is a synthetic totality of instrumental realities pointing to one another in order of widening circles. This means that human reality both springs forth and finds itself in Being. Human reality can make Being reveal itself only as an organized totality in the world by surpassing its own being. All determinations for Heidegger
are surpassing since they presuppose a withdrawal taken from a particular point of view. This passing beyond the world of instruments is affected by Dasein, which directs the whole process. The Being of Heidegger, as against that of Hegel, is revealed in and through a 'pre-ontological comprehension' and is involved in every conduct of 'human reality'. Anguish, according to Heidegger is nothing but a permanent possibility of finding oneself "face to face" with nothingness. Hegel conceived Being as passing on into Nothing and at the same time maintained that Being and Nothing are the two sides of the same coin. Sartre emphasizes the view which conceives Being and Nothingness not only as complements but also as components of the same real. But at the same time, he insists on maintaining the posteriority of Nothingness over Being. He charges Hegel of making the mistake of conceiving Being and Nothingness as thesis and antithesis. According to him, non-being, not being opposite of being, cannot be simultaneous. It must be subsequent to Being since it is being first posited and then denied.

XXV Nothingness Carries Being into its heart:

Dasein of Heidegger manages to realize the contingency of the world by surpassing into Nothingness or non-being for it is nothingness alone in which being can surpass. But this surpassing is also at the same time establishing in the Being

1. Ibid p. 16
2. Ibid p. 14
from which Dasein can raise the question as to how does it happen that there is something rather than nothing and feel the contingency of the world. This passing into nothingness and thereby establishing into being is what Heidegger calls anguish.

Sartre raises here an important question as to where does human reality get its power of immersing thus into non-being? He appreciates Heidegger's contention that negation derives its foundation from nothingness. Nothingness also stands at the origin of negative judgments because judgments on one hand, it is itself negation and on the other, it is the negation as being. Nothingness, therefore, according to Sartre, carries being in its heart and because, nothingness can be nihilated only on the foundation of being, 'nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being'.

He further maintains that if Being be conceived as full positivity, it does not contain Nothingness as one of its structures i.e. Being-in-itself neither produces nor excludes Nothingness. It lacks all relation with it. It cannot be conceived either as outside Being or in terms of Being, because it is non-being. The power of nihilation which is normally attributed to Nothingness is in fact a property of Being because it is only the Being which can nihilate itself. For nihilating

1. An Introduction to Metaphysics by Heidegger.
2. Being and Nothingness ... p. 18
3. Ibid p. 21
Being must be and since Nothingness is not, it cannot nihilate itself. Another being, therefore, is required which carries within it Nothingness and brings it in this world. This cannot be Being-in-this-world. But such a postulation of other Being will lead us to regressus ad infinitum. Sartre, therefore, conceives this Being which brings Nothingness into the world as endowed with the power of nihilating Nothingness which is within its own Being. The Being, by which nothingness arrives in the world is a being such that in its Being, the Nothingness of its Being is in question. The being by which Nothingness comes to the world must be its own Nothingness.

XXI Being appears in dual character:

The foregoing analysis will show that Being in Sartre again appears in its dual character as Being which is full positivity and, Being by which nothingness comes to this world. We may say that Sartre manifests, here, the major weakness which was manifest in Hegel in whom the absolute appears in dual character as absolute self-fulfilled and the absolute self-fulfilling. Why this so happens is quite obvious because in Sartre an unconscious under-current of absolute idealism works and impels him to treat both epistemology and ontology as identical, for the whole question with regard to the origin of negation has been derived from the negative judgments. It is nihilating power of negative judgments that compels him.

1. Ibid p. 24
him to postulate Nothingness on one hand and by the same vein of thought, compels him, on the other hand to place nothingness in the heart of Being. On one hand, along with Heidegger, he admits that Nothingness is not, and on the other hand, he maintains that it is at the very heart of Being. He, therefore, by the very logic of negative judgments is driven to postulate a concept of Being which, apart from a Being which is full positivity is the Being which has nothing at its heart. Thus in Sartre, Hegelianism returns fulfledged.

The Being through which Nothingness comes into the world is man. The question, therefore, is what must man be in his being in order that through him nothingness may come to being?

The being of man that conditions the appearance of Nothingness must be freedom. In freedom the human being is his own past, as also his own future in the form of nihilation. And it is in anguish that man is conscious of his freedom. Heidegger considered anguish as the apprehension of nothingness. It is this nothingness which is the foundation of the freedom of a human being. It cannot be described because it is not, we can, at best, hint at its meaning by saying that this nothing is made-to-be by the human being in his relation with himself. It is a necessary motive, correlate of consciousness, a nothing which separates a motive from consciousness and characterizes itself as transcendence in immanence. It is the project in

1. Ibid p. 24
2. Ibid p. 34
in the language of Heidegger. Man, the Being that brings nothingness into the world projects himself towards Being-in-itself. Here, we find in Sartre, Kierkegaard reappearing unalloyed. For, for-itself or the Being that brings nothingness into the world, is here defined in terms of freedom and as the self of Kierkegaard projected itself towards absolute through absolute choice, for-itself projects towards in-itself through anguish (or Dread).

For-itself as a Nothingness and as always a future project is a pursuit of Being or in-itself in the form of self-ness. This again involves the problems of possibility of value, and of temporality, all of which are integrally related to the basic concept of For-itself as an internal negation of Being-in-itself. Now, if the For-itself is a relation to the In-itself by way of negation, some sort of bridge is required to connect the two. This bridge, according to Sartre is knowledge.

Knowledge cannot by itself give the account of Being:

Being-in-itself is logically prior to Being-for-itself because For-itself originates somehow through a rupture in the Being-in-itself and needs Nothingness which the latter does not need. Nothing external caused the rupture in the self-identity of Being-in-itself. It somehow occurred. For-itself is what it is in and by In-Itself and would be a mere abstraction without it. For-itself is an appearance of Being-in-itself, appearance in the sense in which Husserl uses it. More clearly it can be
said that existent or Being-in-itself manifests through a series of its own appearances. These appearances are the full-positivity of the Being-in-itself and therefore appearance is not supported by any existent different from its own. We should not, therefore, seek any essence behind the appearance. In any ontological inquiry, the being first of all encountered is the being of the phenomenon, an appearance of Being. We have, therefore, on one hand, the phenomenon of being and on the other hand, the being of the phenomenon both of which are required to be related. The exact relation which unites the being of phenomenon with the phenomenon of being constitutes the ground on which all knowledge must depend. The surpassing towards the ontological of which Heidegger speaks is the phenomenon of Being which revels in a pre-reflective cogito or self-consciousness. Only the being of phenomenon and not the phenomenon of being can be determined in concepts. Knowledge cannot, therefore, according to Sartre by itself give an account of being and this means that being of the phenomenon cannot be reduced to the phenomenon of being. When we talk of the being of phenomenon, we have in our mind an appeal to the Being which requires phenomenon. The phenomenon of being requires the transphenomenality of being. This means that the being of the phenomenon, though, coextensive with the phenomenon cannot be subject to phenomenal conditions. It therefore surpasses the knowledge, provides basis for all knowledge.
Idealism according to Sartre, followed the maxim that every metaphysics, in fact presupposes a theory of knowledge and every theory of knowledge, a metaphysics, and consequently tried to reduce being to knowledge which we may have of it. It ought to have given simultaneously some kind of guarantee to provide a sound basis for knowledge.

XXVIII Theory abandons the primacy of knowledge:

The known refers to knowledge, and knowledge to the being who knows in his capacity as being. This means that knowledge refers to consciousness. And as Husserl has shown, all consciousness is consciousness of something other than itself, and something other than itself means nothing. All consciousness, according to Sartre is, therefore, nothing i.e. consciousness has no content. All consciousness is not knowledge. Only knowing consciousness is knowledge on the condition that it be consciousness of itself as being of that knowledge of the object.

Thus Sartre abandons the primacy of knowledge. While criticizing seventeenth century rationalists, he makes it clear that they defined and logically constituted an object of knowledge as absolute. They, thereby, referred to the absolute of knowledge and not the absolute of existent.

Sartre, has previously defined consciousness as a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself. This means that
it is non-being. This is his famous appeal to infinity referred to herebefore. This being of consciousness is radically different because its meaning requires an elucidation in terms of the revealed-revelation of another type of being, a being-for-itself (Pour-soi) which as we have seen is opposed to the being-in-itself (en-soi).

XXXIX Theory concedes to Idealism and Realism:

Knowledge has being, and the being of the knowledge is a reference of knowing consciousness to itself. The being of the For-itself is knowledge of being on condition that this knowledge has being. This is a concession to idealism for it means that the being of knowledge is identical with the being of the For-itself which makes known to itself what it is, through the In-itself i.e. in its being, it is a relation to being of the For-itself and the For-itself is only the nothing which realizes that presence. In this presence of being of knowledge to consciousness, Sartre concedes to realism. The world, the instrumental thing, space, time, all are pure hypostatized nothingness which in no way modify the pure being revealed through them. Knowledge, in short puts us in the presence of the absolute and there is a truth of knowledge as the being of For-itself and reunites For-itself with In-itself and For-itself is nothing other than pure

1. Ibid p. 216
2. Ibid p. 217
nihilation of the In-itself.

XXX Logic of negative judgments ruptures the theory:

We fail to understand as to why Being-in-itself nihilates at all? Again, For-itself comes into existence through the rupture of nothingness in the Being-in-itself. This rupture in Being-in-itself occurs somehow. Why should it occur at all? Sartre has failed to explain. While conceding being to knowledge and by reducing the being of knowledge to the being of For-itself, he has again identified epistemology and ontology which he separated when he denied the primacy to knowledge and made the Being-in-itself as the being of consciousness the sole basis of all knowledge. For-itself, according to him, is on one hand, coupled with nothingness, and on the other hand, has a being. This means that while consciousness confronts its own object or something other than itself, it meets with its own non-being which has a being. Consciousness which is already a negation or nothingness meets with its own non-being. Thus by a double negation, the Being-in-itself is restored its own identity. But, in this process of restoring the identity to Being-in-itself, he has preferred a course which we feel is not adequate enough to withstand pertinent questions of the time. Instead it would have been better if instead of introducing a factor of nothingness in the Being-in-itself and also without making nothingness one of the cons-
constituents of the being of consciousness, he could have straightway dealt with the being of consciousness as such. Negation or nothingness which somehow ruptures Being-in-itself is required in his system because of his regard for a purely epistemological problem of negation. This has cropped up in his system because of his high regard for dialectic and the role which negation plays in it. Heidegger we may point out has clearly shown that dialectic is an outcome of taking 'Logos' in the sense of a language. Language discourse moves in the direction of thesis, antithesis and synthesis and hence has a negative character. Hegel identified thought with reality and hence conceived dialectic as the nature of reality. In fact it is a nature of thought only.¹

XXXI Full-positivity of Being is lost:

In the concluding remarks he says 'the For-itself and the In-itself are reunited by a synthetic connection which is nothing other than the For-itself itself.'² We may say where was, then, the necessity of creating For-itself if it were to be reunited with In-itself through itself? And if, as he says, For-itself is nothing, For-itself after it is united with Being-in-itself carries nothingness into the Being-in-itself which was in the beginning a full-positivity. It will, therefore, be left with an element of nothingness brought into it by its union with For-itself and hence, will lose that full-positivity. This

¹ Introduction to Metaphysics, Ch. 4
² Being and Nothingness, p. 517
negative element is an outcome of dialectics as explained above and is quite obvious throughout Sartre's discussion of 'Origin of negation'. If this be so, it is clear that Sartre has sought to identify epistemology with Ontology which, he was aware, was the prime mistake due to which Idealism failed to provide any consistent bridge to relate finite with the infinite and ultimately had to reduce all reality either to subjective consciousness or to an objective notion (absolute idealism) which retained this subjective element within itself in the form of an idea.

XXXII Theory as an outcome of Atomism:

Where shall we seek the source of the failure of this theory? We saw that For-itself according to Sartre, is a tiny nihilation which has its origin at the heart of Being, and this nihilation, he maintains is sufficient to cause a total upheaval to happen to the In-itself. The whole theory seems to have been inspired by the prevalent theory of atomism according to which if a single one of the atoms which constitute the universe were annihilated, there would result a catastrophe which would extend to the entire universe and this would be, in particular the end of the Earth and of the solar system. Sartre has failed to see the possibility that, that which is capable of annihilation of the entire universe may equally be capable of producing the entire universe for the origin of the entire universe, according

1. Ibid p. 617
to his own theory, is the very negation at the heart of the Being-in-itself which gives rise to For-itself. The question arises, then, as to why conceive For-itself as negation and oppose it with Being-in-itself to reunite by a tour-de-force to Being-in-itself?

XXXIII Pre-occupation with human interests only:

The schools of Existentialism, we saw, brought about a turning point in the history of philosophic speculations by assigning proper place to the role which subjectivity plays and by rejecting the duality of subject-object by resolving them into a higher unity. It also pointed out the possibility of a pure Ontology to which we have up-till-now striven hard to drive. But with all these strong points at its credit, Existentialism fails to satisfy us as it keeps itself limited to purely human interests. Though there are diversions in the directions of hinting at the possibility of a pure and complete ontology and Heidegger as well as Sartre, tried in that direction but could not fulfill the promise, the former because of his vast span and the latter because of his preoccupation with Hegelianism.
CHAPTER X

Towards a Pure & Complete Ontology

I Summary Recitulation:

We have seen that most of the theories we have surveyed so far have not been able to explain satisfactorily the relation of Epistemology and Ontology for their own inherent weakness. The major weakness, we could locate among them, was their susceptibility to the prevailing air of Epistemologies which the idealists and the realists inherited from their fore-runners of the Pre-Hegelian Era viz. the rational epistemology of Descartes and other rationalists, and the Empirical Epistemology of Locke and his followers. Idealist followers of Hegel introduced Epistemologism in contemporary philosophy by identifying Ontology with Epistemology and the realists raised a hue and cry over idealist subsumption of the objective world under the self or consciousness. They, thus, wanted to relieve Ontology from its being overshadowed by Epistemology at the hands of Idealists. Idealists, as they had relied upon rational epistemology by identifying reality with sentient experience, in fact, should absolute have maintained ineffable character of their absolute. Instead, they sought to maintain and describe the positive nature
nature of Reality on the strength of their revelations of the logic of Experience and thus, tried to justify their epistemological determination of reality as final. They thus tried to 'effect' and absolute reduction of the Ontology of the infinite to the epistemology of the finite. They forgot that what is ultimate for epistemology is not necessarily ultimate ontologically.\(^1\) Over against the idealist contention that the object of knowledge depends upon its being known either for its existence or for its character, the realists sought to maintain their claim that the object of knowledge is independent of the knower and the knowing process with respect to both, its character as well as its existence. They, therefore, were driven to maintain the doctrines of contingent pluralism and correspondence against the idealist doctrines of system and coherence. But they failed because they could not relieve themselves of the Epistemological monism.

Critical realists, as against neo-realists properly claimed that knowledge involves, in one stage or another, an active experiencing that cannot be assimilated to objects and that knowledge involves objects that are independent of being known. Knowledge, according to them, is an apprehension not merely of one's own cognitive experiences, but of the objects themselves which are intended in such experiences. They are wrong when they onesidedly insist that the object itself is known. It is because of this that they have not been able to establish the link between the knower and the known successfully. Nor do their suggestions for establish-

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1. Axionoetics ... By A.G. Javadekar P. 124
establishing such a link help us any more. Santayana’s doctrine of animal faith is an instance in point. They seem to work under the assumption that independent objects are, under favorable circumstances, apprehended in experiences, and, that this helps us in achieving a degree of order among experiences that renders them intelligible and thereby facilitates the progress of sciences. A sharp ravage, therefore, within the ranks of realists has developed. American neo-realists, for example are for the most part epistemologically monists and refuse to make a distinction between the object and that through which the object is known. They, thereby, conceded to idealism that the object of knowledge is often identical with that by which it is known and, that, the reality involves considerable logical system. Truth, therefore, according to them is a little more than mere correspondence. American critical realists, on the other hand, are largely epistemologically dualistic in distinguishing the object and that through which it is known. They, therefore, continue to insist upon the independent substances and have found little place for system in reality.

The schools of analysis pronounced to revolutionize philosophy by denying conceptual mediation and by insisting upon verifiability criterion but could not maintain their position any further for they had to admit that empirical judgments are rooted in immediate experiences, and that the meaning is prior to language. Meaning, therefore, points to something which transcends empirical boundary. They
therefore, were led to admit metaphysics—which they had dismissed altogether in the early phase of the development of their theory— as a conceptual system and insist upon the study of the syntax which again led them to admit the absolute concept of truth. The movement of analysis, thus, turned out to be a metaphysical movement declaring at the same time that problems of Epistemology are but pseudo-problems. They also were led to believe in the possibility of a descriptive metaphysics which covers, among its other aspects, the task of the proper analysis of language. Their contention that whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent suggests that reality is inexhaustible in linguistic expressions, and, that the language fails to grasp all aspects of reality adequately. To keep silence, therefore, does not tantamount to the denial of reality.  

II Survey of Reconstruction:

We have, then, in the constructive part of this work, surveyed some of the efforts which sought to resolve the dispute with regard to the relation of the knower and the known by penetrating deeply below the level of the entire knowledge situation. We have, there, tried to show that these efforts are more or less ontologically oriented and the whole of epistemology has been duly subordinated. These efforts in a sense, are directed towards grafting the entire knowledge situation on metaphysical base and to that extent, they are rightly directed towards arriving at the proper standpoint of philosophy.

1. Ibid ... P. 126
These efforts at the reconstruction of the entire knowledge situation view Reality as dynamic and ever changeful against realistic conception of the Real as something static inert and mechanical. The change, they maintain, is the very essence of reality. A change not mechanical but spontaneous, impelled from within, self inspired and self directed. The philosophy of Bergson is in point. But after admitting the dynamic nature of reality, he fell back on consciousness as the source of intellect which reveals the material aspect of reality. He, thus, introduced an unnecessary element of a deus ex machina and it is because of this that his philosophy failed to satisfy. In Whitehead again, we found an effort at constructing a system of ideas which can bring our aesthetic moral and religious interests into relation with those concepts of the world which have their origin in natural science. He sought to reconstruct a system of metaphysics or ontology which may determine the meaning and significance of our epistemological investigations. In fact, he endeavoured to reconcile both metaphysics and epistemology and determine the relation of both of them wherein the extremes which both, the realists and the idealists embraced can be avoided. He, therefore, sought to transform some main doctrines of absolute idealism onto realistic basis. Philosophy, according to him, neither merely deals with deductions nor abstract of generalisations but merely describes metaphysical first principles or essences and thereby, seeks to transcend what what is obvious with the first conviction that all productive
thought has proceeded either by the poetic insight of artists or by the imaginative elaboration of the schemes of thought capable of utilization as logical premises. It is to him though an adventure worthy of our labour wherein even partial success has its own importance.

Philosophy, therefore, aims at larger generalities, the quest of which in any special science blends it as philosophical. Philosophy, has, therefore, a practical aim of analysing the propositions made by sciences which pass beyond their legitimate scope through the sheer necessity of their own inner impulse and the proper analysis of which may propose the general character of the universe. It, therefore, undertakes close analysis of the language employed as a tool for our expressions and, tries to determine the language which, otherwise, is thoroughly indeterminate. According to whilehead, a precise language must await a completed metaphysical knowledge. Language thus, as we have maintained ( vide chapter VII ) has a metaphysical base.

III Primary Metaphysical Situation:

Whileheads scorn against 'subject-predicate' type of analysis is of typical interest to us, for we do believe as well, that this type of analysis may be necessary for epistemological purposes but cannot be sustained in metaphysics because primary metaphysical situation does not admit of any such distinctions because the subject when thoroughly grasped turns

1. Process and Reality p. 14
2. Ibid p. 18
out to be an integral basic constituent of the entire, objective situation, and the object, equally, is not without its own subjectivity within itself. In fact, it can safely be said that subject and object are relative in the sense that they both presuppose and sustain each other. The "subject-object whole" is, therefore, a primary metaphysical situation that is being encountered. The subject, though individual, turns out in final analysis to be full of objective elements for all subjects grow and have their existence, and depend upon their existence, not in noid but in a situation which has reference to the entire universe. The human individuals and their minds do not exist, much less grow in void.\(^1\) The personality of the philosopher, the subjectivity of the subject of primary metaphysical situation, is a primary determinant in all knowledge situations—be they philosophical ones. And yet, the personality of a person is not entirely conditioned by socio-cultural factors. There remains a 'being' that is unanalysable in terms of socio-historical studies. And it is that, which initiates progress in the field of knowledge as well as society. The subjectivity of the subject, because of this, does not always lead to solipsim. It is only when the subject fails to rise above his socio-historical determination that he plunges in, and is lost in solipsim. The 'being' therefore, of the subject is a matter of metaphysical interest. So also is the case, with the said object of the 'subject-object' whole situation. The object is inexhaustible and is full

\(^1\) Axionoetics ... p. 94,95 II, 96
of the 'being' which refuses any mode of analytical approach and, is also full of subjectivity. The contemporary theories in physics substantiate this point. The fault of the preceding theories lies in that, that they viewed subject and object in isolation one from the other. The knower as well as known cannot be abstracted from the knowledge situation without making significant knowledge impossible. The previous epistemological theories of Empiricists suffer double abstraction that from metaphysics and from Psychology-while those of the rationalists suffered abstraction from physics.

IV - Denial of Reciprocity

The following paragraph is noteworthy in this connection:

The general trend of Indian as well as Western epistemologists seem to regard epistemology as the basis of metaphysics. The success of metaphysics is made dependent upon a sound epistemology. The adequacy of means is determined by the possibility of reaching the end. So that we cannot insist upon the formation of a theory of knowledge independently of the end to be achieved in metaphysics. We have to decide the adequacy of epistemology from the metaphysical point of view. As in the case of the relation between methodology and metaphysics, the relation between epistemology and metaphysics is interdependent but if the emphasis on methodology or epistemology is put first independently of metaphysics, the adequacy of methodology or epistemology could never be judged. As the methods are dependent upon the nature of reality, so too, the means and criteria of knowledge are dependent upon the nature of reality to be known.

1. Essentials of Philosophy .... N.V. Joshi p 121, 129, 144
3. Ibid .... P. 68 Chapters IX & XII (Emphasis ours)
Against this paragraph we simply raise one objection—while endorsing the rest—can we say that the nature of reality is dependent upon the methodology or Epistemology \((\text{if their relation is that of interdependence})\)? No, we cannot because as the author has properly maintained, the methodology or epistemology must depend upon metaphysics for the methods it employs to achieve the end viz, the revelation of the nature of reality. We, therefore do not agree with the contention that the relation between epistemology and metaphysics is that of interdependence. On the contrary, we maintain that the epistemology must depend itself upon ontology and, that a truly metaphysical viewpoint must be ontological for in Ontology we try to describe the nature of reality grasped through the speculative insight or through the method of free and unfettered speculation. The very starting point of any epistemology is grounded in such free speculations and the indulgence into which in any science leaving aside its proper bonds blends, as Whitehead has shown. Philosophy. Epistemology, therefore, has a starting point in Ontology, which describes the nature of reality encountered, and cannot be treated as a starting point of Ontology. The relation of both, therefore, is that of single dependence and not that of mutual interdependence.

Whitehead has put this point nicely when he said:

"When we survey the chequered history of our own capacity for knowledge, does common sense allow us to believe that the operations of judgment, the operations which require definition in terms of conscious apprehension, are those operations which are foundational in existence either as an essential attribute for an actual entity or as the elimination whereby unity of experience is attained?"  

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1. Process and Reality p. 244
also Adventures of Ideas p. 327
V Role of Subjectivity:

The object, as we have seen, is not without its own subjectivity. The definition of matter in contemporary physics reveals the matter as an organism self-determining and initiating its own movement, resisting at the same time any force applied ab extra. The subject and object, as Whitehead has shown are not only inseparably linked up with the entire universe into an inseparable and unanalysable unity but are also relative and must stand or fall together. The distinction of subject and object in the presented whole and apprehended by intuition as a whole, is an artificial creation and not a basic one. The epistemological problem, therefore, of relating an independent object with a sentient subject, equally independent, is a pseudoproblem because such an effort views both subject and object in isolation one from the other and then tries to relate them. The real problem is metaphysical, rather than epistemological because what we name as a subject, or object, is no more what it stands for. They are relative and interchangeable and are different not in kind but in degree only. For what we call the subject reveals a better organisation and comprehensiveness than what we call the object; at the same time, and object, equally, is also a subject in the wider whole which they constitute. And yet this whole is not an important whole of absolute idealists because it is full
of creativity as it is dynamic. This creativity of the whole reveals in its assimilation of its own elements and putting forth them into better and better forms.

VI Individuality

The entire process, thus, seems to be directed from objectivity to subjectivity and thence to individuality for there is found better and better organisation and comprehensiveness as we move from objectivity to subjectivity and finally to individuality.

Such a stress on the role of subjectivity is found in contemporary existentialist theories. The philosophy of Kierkegaard has brought out four main important characteristics of Reality viz, the subjectivity or inwardness, individuality or dynamism, non-conceptualness and ideterminateness. It has focussed the attention of philosophers on the self, the person, the subject who is no less important than the objective world studied by the sciences. The subject that was pushed into a corner and neglected completely was brought to the centre and thus, the partial treatment of turning the fragmentary aspect of reality exhaustive of its entire content was nullified at a single stroke. The study of the subject of the primary metaphysical situation, in its existential aspect has been brought to the notice of natural philosophers, idealists, realists as well as positivists. Jaspers remark that Kierkegaard thought the most frightful way to live was to bewitch the whole world through
through one's discoveries and cleverness, to explain the whole of nature and not understand oneself is illustrative of this point. But Jaspers centred his philosophy round the life of the philosopher who he thinks is a meeting place of all the three forms of Being or Encompassing, being-there, being-onself and being-in-itself. Being-in-itself, in his philosophy, is accessible only to the thinker through his own transcendence or being-onself of the objective world or being-there. Being-in-itself, as we have seen, in Jaspers appears in dual form as that which is self-fulfilled and self-fulfilling at the same time, for, it being a spirit, at the same time, undertakes to reconstruct the totalities encountered from the being-there.

VII Possibility of Raising Pure Ontology:

He, however, pointed out to the possibility of rearing a pure ontology on the foundation laid by the logic of Kant and later developed by Hegel. He thus insists upon taking into account the historicity of the Being which must form the raw material of Ontology. Such a historicity must comprise within itself the important results of Being in general of the world of experience which science undertakes to investigate, and the Being in general of the subject, and both these must be synthesized thereby evolving the true picture of the Being qua Being of Aristotle.

Marcel insisted upon restoring the primordial unity of
of subject and object which interpenetrate and are inseparable one from the other. Being according to him, gradually assimilates having and transforms having into being. He has failed to show how subject and object permeate each other.

Heidegger took up the thread and made being-there which was neglected by Marcel, the cornerstone of his philosophy. Being-there in his philosophy is the same as 'man in the world' as against Jaspers' only world' because he believes that man is the portal to the deeper levels of reality and that only through a disciplined analysis and description of human being can the path be opened for the apprehension of Being itself. Man's being-in-the world describes human reality in terms of a self-world correlation which underlies all concrete participation and engagement. This human concern or personal existence is the most objective cut and cut in so far as it is not the personal existence of the philosopher as was the case with Jaspers. Personal existence, in his philosophy means the existence or the being of the subject in general. Being of the subject has been presupposed in all ontological inquiries and is not a concept but has the character of taking a look at it before hand so that in the light of it, the entities presented get provisionally articulated in their being. The question of Being, according to him, therefore, must aim not only at ascertaining the a priori conditions of the possibility of sciences, but also explore the meaning of those ontologies which preceded the era of scientific investigations as revealing the fundamental
characteristics of the being of the subject in general. Even
the manner in which researches in sciences are carried out
reveal nothing but the structure of the being of the inquirer
because they answer only those questions which are posed to
them by their own inquirers. Scientific investigations, thus,
become the various modes of the investigating being of the
subject. The study of the being of the subject in relation to
the being of the object or self-world correlation provides the
ontico-ontological condition for the possibility of any Ontology.
Historicity, therefore, as a characteristic of the being of the
subject in relation to the world or Dasein, we found in the
philosophy of Heidegger. Heidegger anticipates the results
arrived at by us when he maintains that phenomenology keeps itself
limited to entities only. It is ontology no doubt, but over
and above it, there should be a fundamental ontology taking as
its theme that entity which is ontologico-ontically distinctive.
He envisages the possibility of relating these two basic charac-
teristics of Being viz. Existentia—the characteristics of
the being of Dasein revealed through the existential analysis
of Dasein and categories revealed through sciences as the
characteristics of the being of the objective world in general
one pertaining to the subject or 'who' and the other pertaining
to the object or 'what.' He criticizes Cartesian
thinkers as they took subject and object in complete isolation
and then, tried to effect, by one way or the other, the relatio
relation between the two.

But the hope which Heidegger gave rise to, is found annulled by the philosophy of Sartre who fell back on epistemology and Hegelian dialectic. Being, according to him can only pass into Nothing. This is highly questionable. Can being not pass into Becoming? Why should it pass in Nothing at all? But this idea he seems to have borrowed from the 'anguish' of Heidegger. Anguish, according to Heidegger is nothing but a permanent possibility of finding oneself "face to face" with Nothingness. The passing of Being into nothingness is also at the same time establishing into Being which Heidegger has called anguish. Nothingness, therefore, seems to be an unnecessary *deus ex machina* projected from the logic of negative judgments i.e. from Epistemology. The philosophy of Sartre, as was the case with all types of Epistemologies thus, leads us to the *regressus ad infinitum* and manifests all major weakness which we witnessed in absolute idealism. In Heidegger we saw, that Dasein comports to Being-in-itself through knowledge and therefore, according to him, epistemology must await completed metaphysics. In Sartre also we find that we have on one hand phenomenon of being, and on the other, the being of the phenomena both of which he admits are required to be related. And the exact relation which unites the being of phenomena with the phenomenon of being constitutes the ground on which all knowledge depends. He also admits that only the being of pheno-
phenomena and not the phenomenon of being can be determined through concepts. Knowledge, therefore, in his opinion, cannot by itself give an account of Being.

VIII Outline of Pure and Complete Ontology:

The only ray of hope, thus, we could trace in contemporary schools of Existentialism because, it is there that we could come across an honest effort at explaining and describing Being-qua-Being, not in the totality of its expressions but partially i.e. so far as it affects the human aspirations. The outstanding contribution, among existentialists is that of Heidegger who sought to construct a pure and complete ontology out of the stock of knowledge we have gathered so far. But Heidegger, due to his own limitations, confined himself to Dasein only, and failed to fulfill the promise which he gave rise to in the beginning of his work Being and Time. Sartre dragged existentialist movement on Hegelian lines and sought relief in ending in Epistemologism.

We propose to point to the possibility of the construction of pure and complete ontology on the following lines.

Pure means pure i.e. without any shed of Epistemologism. This does not mean that in our system we would, as was the case with some existentialists, neglect the output of the achievements of scientific effort. Nay, on the contrary, we propose to
construct an ontology which would embrace every effort, wherever it be, in any field of the vital experience and embody the results of such efforts in a consistent way having each one its due. Nor do we intend to close our doors for further innovation in the field of knowledge. Our ontology, as has been made clear in the introduction of this work, will leave every door open for the admission of results achieved out of the expansion of the horizons of the fields of knowledge. It will embrace the results achieved by the body of knowledge so far.

2. It will be complete in this sense that it will embrace the entire field of experience down to present times and will not leave any sphere of knowledge so far explored untouched and unembodied within itself. This does not mean that it will leave no scope for any future ontology of ontologies. It will be exhaustive of the achievements of the body of knowledge so far covered. Expansion of the horizons of knowledge will certainly demand new ontologies which can cover up their results and embody them in a consistent way.

3. For this purpose, it will be in the language of Aristotle a study of Being qua Being which means that it will embrace the entire field of the inquiry, the thinker, the thought and the objects of inquiry in the most generalized form. The question of Being, as Heidegger says, must aim not only at ascertaining the a priori conditions of the possibility of sciences but also explore the meaning of those ontologies which
preceded the era of scientific investigations and thereby reveal the fundamental structure of the being of the subject in general because even the manner in which the investigations of sciences are carried out reveal nothing but the structure of the being of the 'inquirer' for they answer only those questions which are posed to them by their own thinkers. Now this according to our view can only be when we consider the subject-object whole of knowledge as the absolute or the synthesis of the structures of the being of the subject in general and the being of the object in general as the individual whole.

IX Limitations of Epistemology:

We have differentiated knowledge from Epistemology for epistemology is not knowledge. The aim of Epistemology is not to add to our existing stock of knowledge. It, simply, seeks to establish conditions under which a piece of knowledge can be regarded as valid. In otherwords, Epistemology seeks validation of knowledge and thereby prescribes limits to our effort at exploring the possibility of knowledge. But this effort is not in vain for it helps us in making a distinction between significant knowledge and mere opinion, and thereby guides our effort in the right direction. It is therefore important no doubt.

It is wrong when it assumes the functions of ontology i.e. when it oversteps its natural boundaries and seeks to convert the existing stock of knowledge as revealing the entire structure
or nature of Being, or absolute. It falls, by such an effort into dogmatism by prescribing boundaries to our knowledge. Ontology here reminds it, that the fields explored so far leave scope for further explorations and that the conditions of validity prescribed by epistemology, themselves require further revision i.e. the criticism of its own tools under the light of the experience of the whole, and thereby impels it to reflect on its own nature, scope and limits leaving every scope for doubt and its consequent satisfaction.

Ontology, thus, provides a standing temptation to epistemology to reforge its own tools and take a phillip in the direction of proper systematisation to achieve comprehensiveness precision and thereby completion of itself. Epistemology, therefore must look to ontology for further hope, be prepared for the admission of new informations obtained through explorations of the novel realms of Being and work under constant guidance over itself by ontology which works through the method of free and unfettered speculations.

A complete ontology, therefore seeks the synthesis of the being in general of the subject and the being in general of the object of the entire realm of experience and gives rise to the picture of the whole which it considers as absolute and whose nature in broad generalities it describes. Ontology, therefore, is descriptive cut and cut.
X Subject-Object whole:

Now the subject and object of our experience are not poles as under as were treated in the era foregone. The idealists and the realists quarreled on this issue only, because they regarded them in complete isolation one from the other. In fact as the philosophy of Whitehead has amply borne out, they are relative and therefore cannot be treated in isolation. Subject is no more a subject if there is no object and object is no more an object if there is no subject. Subject and object, in fact, cannot be isolated at all. They stand together and fall together.

Marcel has put the matter quite nicely. We set out with 'I and my body' as the subject, and 'my body' as the object. Heidegger's Dasein represents a synthetic view of Marcel's position in as much as it clearly points out that it is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological too. It, therefore, provides an ontico-ontological condition for the possibility of any ontology. I and my body are not distinct. They are rather in an indissoluble unity — a synthesis of particular and universal not opposed to but supplementary to each other for particular is nothing but an instance of the universal if we speak in terms of epistemology and are, therefore, an individual. Our body, therefore is our means of communication with the universe all around and being a part of
it, its understanding will require us to study in broad generalities the positive sciences viz. physics, chemistry, biology and other sciences related to them. Thus, such a study will relate ontology, on one hand with ontological conditions and compel it to seek explanation from them. While 'I' would require the study in broad generalities of those realms which are explored by, normative sciences including ethics, Religion and History. Thus ontology which we propose will seek to synthesize the results of all vital spheres of experience and determine in broad generalities the nature of the Being. 'I' is a being of the body as body is a being of the universe around. It is this indissoluble unity, which every one is and which we all individual. In a sense, everything is individual in so far as it occupies its place in the entire existence and asserts its attendance. But individuality in case of 'I' not only shows a better organisation and comprehensiveness, but also thereby, comports itself and has a direct truck with the being of the universe in an indissoluble unity, in a way which is peculiar as it has the capacity to reflect on its unity with the universe and thereby to expand or transcend itself from its mortal imprisonment.

We shall, for the sake of convenience and for the poverty of words at our disposal join Marcel and call the 'I' the subject and 'my body', which is in an indissoluble unity with the universe, the object. Our ontology, therefore will seek a
a synthesis of the characteristics of the subjects in general, as revealed by their specialized realms of inquiry, and the characteristics of the objects in general. The synthesis that we propose, therefore, will not be open to the charge of being the bloodless categories and the whole activity of synthesis as the mechanical dance of bloodless categories, for the characteristics of the being in general of the subject and the being in general of the object are no more categories of the old bygone conception of Reality as a rigid, dead, substance, nor are our subject and object totally opposed to and cut off from each other. Reality is dynamic and, therefore, subject and object are interchangeable to a certain extent. They are so i.e. interchangeable to a certain extent, because subject as we have shown is a subject because it shows a better and better dynamism in comparison to the object which shows comparatively slow dynamism. It is a difference in degrees, but because it is a difference of degrees, subject shows more intensity and therefore more spontaneity and, therefore has a capacity of assimilating more and more of its own objectivity. And the more it assimilates its objectivity, the more powerful becomes its concretion or creative urge so that the sphere of its active creation enlarges and embraces the entire universe in which it finds itself fully satisfactory.

XI The characteristics of subject-object whole:

What are, then, the characteristics of this subject-object
whole which we consider absolute is a natural question, for we are to describe the nature in general of the being qua being. They are:

1. Subjectivity or Inwardness
2. Individuality or dynamism
3. Non-Conceptualness
4. Indeterminateness
5. Concretion
6. Historicity or Eternity.

We shall have to trace, in our proposed ontology, the development of these characteristics from their roots in the objective aspect for as we have already stated, they lie deeply embedded in those forms or individuations of reality which are less organised and less comprehensive i.e., the objective realm or Nature. It is a Hegelian task ahead of marking the close of an era which awaits an effort at reconciling the seemingly conflicting claims. But this task is beyond the scope of this work and we await the opportunity when a proper synthesis of the 'Existential' and the 'categories' is worked out with a view to presenting the picture of the whole.

1. The categories which belong to Experienced physical world are:
   1. Extension (2) Succession (3) Space (4) Time (5) Number
   6. Magnitude (7) Motion (8) Change & (9) Quality

   In a more complex form they are:— (i) Matter (ii) Force (iii) Causality (iv) Interaction (v) Thinghood etc.,