CHAPTER II

AN

ONTOLOGICAL

APPROACH

TO

REALITY
Prolegomena

The demand for some pronouncement on the nature of the Reality is one which human mind cannot help making. But there seems to be nothing more hazardous on the part of human speculation than to offer a universally acceptable conception of the same. The conclusions of logic and reflection leave us with the idea of One Being, an all-inclusive Absolute, than which there is no other. But the facts of experience, on the other hand, compel us to admit a plurality of existence which cannot be confined within the narrow walls of rigid identity, we cannot help believing in the existence of one fundamental all inclusive unity, but, at the same time, we cannot afford to deny the existence of the manifest plurality. But then, the problem is, in what relation does the plurality stand to the all-inclusive unity? Is the unity the sole Reality and the plurality mere nugatory? Or, otherwise, is the plurality the real Reality and the unity mere abstraction and super-imposition of mind? To put the same problem in a more concrete way, what is the status of the world of animate beings and inanimate things? Is this world a real entity existing in its own right, or but a mode of a single Absolute Reality, the only entity there is or can be?

Various ontological approaches to Reality

All these questions seem to converge on one main issue and that is the riddle of 'one and many'. Different theories
ries have been put forth to solve this problem. On the ground that one and many are incompatibles, some thinkers affirm one and deny many, some affirm many and deny one, and some who do not fight shy of this incompatibility accept both as real but ascribe different degree of importance to each of them. This results in four different lines of approaches to Reality, viz.,

Reality is (i) mere identity (ii) mere difference (iii) identity in difference in which difference predominates (iv) identity-in-difference in which identity predominates.

The Advaitin's approach to Reality stated:

The most distinguishing feature of the Advaita Vedânta on its metaphysical side is the advocacy of the doctrine of nirguna Brahman. The one and the only Reality admitted is the pure Brahman devoid of all determinations. Accordingly with his dialectic of negation the Advaitin denies all differences in the Absolute Unity. He finds no room for many in the unity of pure non-differentiated Brahman. To him unity defies logically all differences. Thus failing to reconcile the unity with multiplicity, he negates the latter to posit the former. The Absolute, for him, is not a synthetic unity but an abstract identity. The world of animate and inanimate objects, then, is but a transient mode of the eternal, immutable and unitary Absolute. There is nothing like a real existence, a real summum bonum, for the finite beings. Within the range of the finite he can never experience that the end has been really secured. The consummation of the end of all existence consists merely in removing the illusion under which all finite spirits live and which makes the end seem yet unaccomplished. As a matter of fact there is nothing like finite spirits, because they are no others than the One
This leaves no room for doubt that the worldly progress and achievements are but appearances of an eternally complete Absolute which has no unfulfilled purposes and unsolved problems.

The Advaitin's standpoint criticised

Thus the Brahman of the Advaitin is exclusively a principle of rigid identity. To borrow a well-known Western phraseology, it is like a lion's den to which many paths lead, but from which none leads back. But the Reality is too rich and complex to be imprisoned within the narrow walls of rigid identity. Even Śāṅkara, the most thoughtful of all the Advaitins, though feels shy in giving place to multiplicity at the transcendental plane, he also feels that the multiplicity cannot be dismissed as mere nugatory. It is mithyā but not tuṣṭa. It has an existence, though apparent one. He cannot outrightly reject the many, nor can he find a place for it in the One. Though he is wise enough to leave the problem as almost inexplicable under a good reason that human understanding is incompetent to comprehend how one becomes many, yet to conceive an end of an existence, however apparent, that has no beginning, is certainly a strain upon thought. The taxing problem remains as to why the unity should even in appearance be broken up into multiplicity, why the Infinite appears in the guise of innumerable finites, why this world of illusion be here at all.

Further, the ontological position of the Advaita is based on an epistemological position, that thought is identical with Reality. But our point is, if the Thought is identical with Reality, all knowledge is needless or tautological; and if it is opposed to Reality, knowledge is impossible. As a matter of fact every judgement is an affirmation of Reality and not mere apprehension of identity devoid of contents. It is
true that knowledge—relation cannot be established between two altogether different terms, but it is also meaningless to talk about two exactly identical terms. Though every judgement affirms identity, there is also another equally important factor viz., difference. Thought qualifies Reality and presupposes a distinction between subject and object, which are integrally united and not isolated bits. Therefore, Reality is not bare undifferentiated unity, but a unity that contains and admits of differences which are all real. All determinations, limitations and differences are in it, but not of it. They are not left unorganised but coordinated. These differences which are accommodated in this unifying principle do not extinguish at any time. They are coeval and coeternal with the unity, even though subject to change from subtle to gross state and vice versa. Thus alone can we meet with the demands of reason as well as experience.

Statement of Organicism—a more satisfactory view.

A true system of thought, therefore, is that which recognises both the opposite elements (one and many) and yet rises above them to a higher principle, a supreme synthesis in which the opposition is reconciled. Organicism is a theory which fulfils this task by postulating a unity which expresses itself in and through the diversity of forms and functions. The idea of a living organism is not that of a barren unity of abstraction which is bereft of multiplicity of its organs, but that of a concrete unity which realises itself in and through the multiplicity. Just as a part is not intelligible except through the idea of the whole of which it is a part, and just as a whole is not conceivable without any reference to its constituent parts, so also the organs are not intelligible save
save by the idea of the organism, and the organism also is not conceivable without any reference to its organs. Thus organicism regards one and many as members of an organic whole, having each indeed a being of its own, but a being that implies a relation to the other.

Superiority of ORGANICISM over Advaita

The Advaitin cannot speak of such a world of mutual appreciation and organic relation, for there is no such thing as a society of selves in his philosophy. He tells of a state of existence which is not a society of selves, but the Only Self, one without a second, resting in its own glory. Here there is no manifoldness, but solid singleness. So he cannot entertain the idea of mutual give and take which is the core of organicism. The chief value of organicism lies in the fact that it recognises the inalienable individuality and the reality of the manifold finite spirits and matter, and assigns them a proper place, function and value in the unifying conception of an all-embracing unity (or Absolute) without in any way destroying its Supreme perfection. The Absolute though differentiates itself into matter and spirits, is not exhausted in them nor does it become completely identified with them, but reserves an inexhaustible amount of reality, whereby it transcends the world. The multiplicity of finite spirits and matter also, instead of being annihilated in the all-absorbing unity of the Absolute, enjoys a relative reality, derives its being, discharges its functions and realises its value within the concrete unity of the Absolute. Both are necessary to each other and realise themselves in and through the other.
The Organicism of the Upaniṣads

Centuries before, the Upaniṣads have developed this theory and Rāmānuja has presented it in a systematic and well-thought-out form, and therefore, it calls for our consideration.

The problem of one and many has been one of the central issues of inquiry in the Upaniṣads. There the disciple puts forth a query before the preceptor, *Kena ekena vijñātena sarvam vijñātam bhavati?* (i.e. by knowing which One everything else can be known?). And the answer that he gets is, *Ekena brahmavi-jñātena sarvam vijñātam bhavati* (i.e. by knowing One Brahman everything else can be known). The Brahman of the Upaniṣads is the 'Whole' of metaphysics, the 'Holy' of religion and the 'Abode' of all aesthetic and ethical values. He is the all-pervading Supreme Reality which contains within Himself all finite spirits and matter. All sentient beings and non-sentient things live, move and have their beings in Him, who originates, accommodates and assimilates them within His organic unity. This truth is expressed in the Upaniṣadic sayings like 'Tajjalāḥ' (Chād.III.14.1), 'yato va imāni bhūtāni jāyante yena jātāni jīvanti yat prayant-yabhisamviṣanti tadviṣayāyasva tadbrahmeti' (Tait.III.I) 'Sammulā somyemāḥ prajāsādāyatanāssatpratisthītāḥ' (Chānd.VI.8.6.) and the like. The Śvetāsvatāra abounds with such passages, which need not be reproduced here.

The Brhadāraṇyaka in an oft-recurring simile tells us how God is the Supreme Soul. 'Just as the spokes of a wheel are held together in the navel of the wheel, similarly in this Supreme Soul are centred all these beings, all gods, all worlds and all individual souls. The Supreme Soul is the king of all' (III.5.15) In another passage the same Upaniṣad tells us by a change of metaphor that 'just as little sparks come out of
fire, even so from the Supreme Soul all prāṇas, all worlds, all gods, all beings come out.*(II.I.10) The same is corroborated in the Gītā.(VII.7). The doctrine of Brahman as Antaryāmin, advanced in the Brhadāraṇyaka by Yājñavalkya in conversation with Uddālaka Ārūṇī gives a classical exposition to this view. Uddālaka puts a query before Yājñavalkya, 'pray tell me what is that thread by which this universe and the other universe, and all the things therein, are held together? Do tell me also who is the controller of the thread of this universe and the other universe and all the things therein?' The celebrated answer given is, 'who dwells in the earth and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who from within controls the earth and within the earth, He is thy soul, the Inner Controller, the Immortal'.(III.7) What a sublime view is expressed in these immortal words. In the Taittirīya we find a remarkable passage wherein it is described how God, the One, transformed Himself into the manifold world. This passage is notable because of its reconciliation of the contradictions, and because it tells that the contradictions are also real. It runs as follows, 'Having created the universe He entered into it, because both this and that, the defined and the undefined, the supported and the supportless, the knowledge and the not-knowledge, the reality and the unreality, yea, He became the reality, it is for this reason that all this is really called real.'

Rāmānuja's approach to Reality

Like the Upaniṣads, Rāmānuja solves the problem of one and many not by denying many and affirming one, nor by denying one and affirming many but by making many the predicate of one. As a matter of fact one and many had never posed
any problem for Rāmānuja, because he starts with the position that one, by its very nature or immanent necessity, is impregnated with the many.

Rāmānuja's rejection of Advaitin's approach

Rāmānuja is not content with a mystery hidden in the clouds of negatives. He does not deprive the Absolute of all determinations and reduce it to bare abstraction by ruthless logic of negative method. Like the Advaitin, Rāmānuja rejects the view of mere plurality, and admits the existence of one Being only, but further adds that all finite beings are real expressions of this Supreme Being. The Advaitin denies everything of Brahman but Rāmānuja affirms everything of Brahman. He is a monist no less than the Advaitin but his monism is concrete one. He is as emphatic as the Advaitin in declaring that there is nothing other than Brahman but adds that by 'other' he means heterogeneous and homogeneous differences only and not the internal ones.

The Absolute of Rāmānuja is a living reality with a creative urge. It is a synthesis which does not deny differentiations, but expresses itself through them only. It is a whole that does not deny its parts, a substance that does not oust its attributes, a ground which does not negate its consequent, an integrity that does not shut itself of fulness. It is a concrete Being which contains the finite as moments of its own existence, through which it transcends its own initial abstract character.

Thus Rāmānuja believes in the existence of a Complex whole which includes both unity and diversity as integral elements. God is such a comp-lex whole of which cit and acit constitute the modes. This idea is the very life blood of
Rāmānuja's philosophy. It is very well expressed by the term 'Viśistādvaita' which is a name assigned to his system. The underlying idea can be explained by the illustration of a fruit wherein the pulp and the peel, the fibre and the form, the taste and the smell etc. all together constitute the fruit; and though inseparable, all are mutually different and distinguishable having their own specific inalienable characteristics. Likewise God comprehends within His organic fold all matter and souls which are His attributes, modes, accessories, accidents, powers, bodies, forms, organs etc. He is above all, in all and through all. All are in Him, out of Him and into Him.

The concept of God as Sarīrin

The sum and substance of the organismic view of Rāmānuja lies in the idea of God as Sarīrin, which may be regarded as the raison d'être of his system. This is the solution the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad has offered for the vexed problem of One and many. Accordingly, God is regarded by Rāmānuja as the Supreme Embodied Soul, because the entire complex of intelligent beings and non-intelligent things constitute His body. He is indwelling (antaryāmin), supporting (ādhāra), controlling (niyantā) and final (śeṣā, Lit. utiliser) cause. The body is, therefore, defined by Rāmānuja as 'Any substance which a sentient soul is capable of completely controlling and supporting for its own purposes, and which stands to the soul in an entirely subordinate relation.' Thus Rāmānuja maintains that the Absolute is a supreme organism consisting of a cosmic soul and its dependent bodily parts (the world and the selves) which serve its purpose. The bodily parts, or the modes, are identical (ananya) with God as they are one with Him in their substance. But they are also different from God, just as the body is different from its soul. Though the modes are thus different from God, they do not create any divi-
sion in the integrity of His being, for He realises His synthetic character through them only. The modes also, in the synthetic totality, lose the sense of isolated and independent units, keeping up their individuality. This modal dependence of the world and the finite selves, however, does not rule out their monadic uniqueness. They do not have some distinctive existence of their own, and what makes them adjectives or modes is the fact that they cannot be understood without reference to God, their substance.  

Aprthaksiddhi—The theory of relation between God and the World

The relation between the substance (God) and the modes (world and finite selves) is regarded by Rāmānuja as one of 'inseparability' (aprthaksiddhi). Describing the nature of this relation Prof. Hiriyanna observes, 

'It connotes that one of the two entities related is dependent upon the other in the sense that it cannot exist without the other also existing and that it cannot be rightly known without the other also being known at the same time.' 

'This negative way of indicating the relation emphasises the identity of Being and its attributes and at the same time retains the conception of relation in the integrity of Being by rejecting the absolute oneness and identity of the Śankarites'. Prof Hiriyana regards this relation to be 'the pivot on which his (Rāmānuja's) whole philosophy turns'.

The Advaitin's denial of relation

The incompatibility between the absolutistic dogma and the dualistic requirement of relation leads the Advaitin altogether to deny relation. It has a place in empirical consciousness, but it cannot be applied to the Absolute. It is something mysterious. It has an appearance but no reality. Criticising the naiyāyika concept of samavāya the Advaitin points
out that a system of relation leads to an infinite regress. In the dynamic character of Being, Rāmānuja, on the contrary, finds the possibility of inner relation without involving any infinite regress.

**Aprthaksidhi of Rāmānuja compared with samāvya of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika**

According to the Nyāya school relation is a real entity intervening between two terms, or the relata, as a tertium quid (padarthāntara), or as a distinct 'link' connecting them into a relational unity. The samāvya is usually regarded as an internal relation, but Prof. Hiriyana has rightly pointed out that it is external only. He writes, 'Even samāvya, it is necessary to add, has to be explained as an external relation, although it is usual to represent it as internal in modern works on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.' He elsewhere writes, 'The very fact that it is independent and relates ultimately simple factors, shows that it cannot be an internal one'.

The aprthaksidhi of Rāmānuja is similar to the samāvya of Nyāya in regard to its recognition of the reality, mutual necessity and the distinctiveness of the relata in it. But the aprthaksidhi is different from the samāvya in three respects. Firstly, unlike samāvya, aprthaksidhi is not a separate entity (or category) external to the relata. Secondly, the relata in samāvya remain mutually external although they are held together in an 'external' unity by samāvya. In order that samāvya may hold good there should be two genuinely different entities. But the aprthaksidhi relation, as we have seen, rejects alike identity and difference. The third and the last point of difference, which is a consequence of the second is that while samāvya is an external relation, aprthaksidhi is an internal one.
The principle of समानाचिकरण्या as the basis of aprthaksiddhi

How the Absolute is related to the so-called manifold appearance, or, in other words, how the one contains the many, has been a problem for the Advaitin. Bradley, in the West, also confesses the inability of human thought in this respect. He writes, 'We do not know why and how the Absolute divides itself into centres, or the way in which so divided, it still remains one. The relation of the many experiences to the single experience and so to one another is, in the end, beyond us.'

But for Rāmānuja this is not a difficult problem. He rejects the absolutistic principle of bare identity and discovers a living principle of differentiation at the very heart of identity. This principle of differentiation within the unity of the Absolute, he interpreted in terms of समानाचिकरण्या, (i.e., a grammatical principle of the coordination of words in a sentence) with the help of which he throws away both the concepts of bheda and abheda and institutes instead the concept of Viṣeṣaṇa (predication).

On the basis of the principle of समानाचिकरण्या, Rāmānuja holds that unity and diversity can co-exist and be in intimate relation to each other. The two are distinct and not contradictories, and can be reconciled in a synthetic unity. Rāmānuja, thus, does not deny many but makes it a predicate to one, with the help of the 'adjectival principle.

The principle of समानाचिकरण्या defined and explained

The समानाचिकरण्या is a grammatical term which stands for 'community of case relation of two or more words'. It is defined by Kaiyāṭṭa, under Paṇini I.2.42, as 'Bhinnapavrṭti nimitayuktasya enekasya śabdasya ekasmin arthe vṛttissāmānā- dhikaranyam.' Rāmānuja also takes the term in the same sense.
and accepts this definition when he writes, 'bhinnapravṛtti
nimittānām śabdānām ekasmin arthe vṛttiḥ sāmānādhi
dhikaranyamiti śābdikeh.'¹⁴ (i.e. the bearing on one sense of more words with
different reasons for their application). Accordingly, in logic,
it would mean 'coordination of the two (or more) terms in a
judgement.' In metaphysics it conveys the abiding of several
attributes in a common substrate, or 'the application to one thing
of several words for the application of each of which there is
a different motive.' The aim of sāmānādhi dhikaranyakya is, therefore,
'Just to convey the idea of one thing being qualified by several
attributes.' Here 'one thing' evidently refers to the unchanging
unitary principle of God and the 'several attributes' to the
realms of cit and acit which are marked by difference, mutation
and plurality.

Different applications of the principle of sāmānādhi dhikaranya

Rāmānuja has made different constructive as well as
polemic uses of this principle. The Advaitin resorts to laksṇa
in order to prove that Brahman is non-differentiated Reality.
But Rāmānuja repudiates the Advaitin's distinction of primary
and secondary meanings of the texts, and with the help of the
principle of sāmānādhi dhikaranya, interprets the texts in an alto-
gether different way and thereby proves that Brahman cannot
be regarded as non-differentiated. The second use am made of
this principle is for proving the reality of the finite self and
the world. Lastly Rāmānuja uses it to prove the distinctness of
Brahma from the finite self and the world.

Application of sāmānādhi dhikaranya to prove that Brahman is
differentiated

Rāmānuja differs fundamentally with regard to the
interpretation of the Upaniṣadic text, 'Satyam, jñānam, anantam
brahma'(Tait.II.I) which gives the definition of Brahman as 'truth, knowledge and Infinitude'. The main issue is whether in this text the terms in question denote the very being (svarūpa) of Brahman or His characteristics.

The Advaitin develops the view that the Vīśeṣaṇas (satya, jñānam and anantam) have here not an attributive but a definitive function (lakṣaṇārtha). Attributes, he argues, serve the purpose of specifying members of the same particular class, but Brahman does not belong to any class. Therefore, these attributes do not have any attributive function. At the most they can have a negative or an indirect attributive function. That is to say, the term 'anantam' denies to Brahman the properties of phenomenal objects. The terms satyam and jñānam cannot be taken negatively, but only indirectly. The Advaitin further maintains that these terms which are found in coordination or apposition (sāmānācchikaraṇya) convey an impartite and non-relational sense only. That is to say, the text in question is understood to mean that Brahman is Truth, Knowledge and Infinitude, and not that it is possessed of these three characteristics. In order to explain this he takes the help of an illustration 'So'yam Devadattah' in which on the basis of jahadajahallakṣaṇā, the two terms 'that Devadatta' and 'this Devadatta' which stand in coordination are regarded to convey the idea of one individual. He further adds that though these terms refer to the same non-differentiated object, viz. Brahman, yet they are not synonymous.

Criticising the Advaitin Rāmānuja maintains that sentence, where the terms stand in coordination, does not convey an impartite and non-relational sense, but, on the contrary, it denotes one entity as qualified by the characteristics connoted by the terms of the sentence. For his support Rāmānuja quotes
the definition of coordination given by the grammarians. It is
the application to one thing of several words, for the application
of each of which there is a different motive. To put it in terms
of modern logic, it means that though the terms of a proposition
have different connotation, they can yet denote one and the same
thing. Thus, for instance, in the judgement 'blue lotus', the
term 'blue' has a different connotation from that of 'lotus'
and yet the two terms refer to one object viz. 'lotus'.

Rāmānuja further argues that the three terms in the
text in question, do not have one purport only. By the very
nature of the principle of coordination we must needs admit
a plurality of causes for the application of those several terms
to one thing. If it is still insisted that they do have one
purport only, then, Rāmānuja replies that in that case the three
terms would not but be synonymous, and as such the employment of
more than one term would be superfluous. If it is further said
that it is not superfluous because there is a difference in
respect of their connotations (nimitta bheda), then in that case
Rāmānuja refuses to admit that a number of terms can refer to a
non-differentiated object even if they be mere apophatic.

Regarding the applicability of the illustration 'So'yam
Devadattah' which, according to the Advaitin (following the
Naiyāyika) is an identity-judgement and predicates no attributes
to the subject, Rāmānuja replies that the Devadatta of 'here
and now' cannot be wholly identical with the Devaddatta of
'then and there', because then and there he had different attri-
butes than here and now.

In the end Rāmānuja reminds the Advaitin that the
distinction of several attributes predicated to one thing does
not imply distinction in the thing itself. Even though the chara-
characteristics connoted by the several terms found in coordination are different, the object denoted remains one and the same, without losing its integrity. The mere fact that an object is related to several characteristics would not mean that the object itself is not an integral whole. One and the same entity may be related to several characteristics without in any way impairing its integrity. Thus the true meaning of sāmānādikaranya is not absolute identity but the relation of a thing to its attributes.

The application of Sāmānādikaranya to prove the reality of the finite self.

According to the basic premises of the Advaita school, true self is one only, and the plurality of individual selves is not ultimately real. In order to support his contention he takes the help of the famous scriptural text 'Tattvamasi' which, as he declares, equate the finite self with Brahman. Śankara, in the Upadeśasahasri, declares that when we establish the sense of tvam by means of anvaya (positive) and vyatireka (negative) formulations the sense of the judgement tattvamasi becomes clear. The terms 'anvaya' and 'vyatireka' which also occur in the Niśkarmyasiddhi of Suresvara, are explained by Prof. Hiriyanna as 'method of agreement' and 'method of difference'. J.A.B. Van Buitenen explains Śankara's meaning in the following way, 'the proposition is first considered positively by anvaya, whereby the connexion is realised between that in 'tat' which is in 'tvam' and contrariwise; then it is considered negatively by vyatireka, whereby that in 'tvam' which is not in 'Tat' is excluded from 'tvam' and contrariwise.'

Rāmānuja, on the basis of the principle of coordination, points out that in all cases of predication what is predi-
csted is not a bare identity but a substance which is characterised by different attributes, so that the 'tvam' cannot be entirely identical with 'tat'. The coordination here is not meant to convey the idea of the absolute unity of a non-differentiated substance. On the contrary, the words 'tat' and 'tvam' denote a Brahman distinguished by difference. The word 'tat' refers to Brahman, Omniscient, etc. the word 'tvam' which stands in coordination to 'tat' conveys the idea of Brahman in so far as having for its body the individual souls. 'This' he writes, 'is in accordance with the general principle that coordination is meant to express onething subsisting in a two fold form. If such double-ness of form were abandoned there could be no difference of aspects giving rise to the application of different terms, and the entire principle of coordination too would be given up.'

Application of sāmāṇḍhikaranya to explain the relation of Brahman to matter and souls—

Rāmānuja further applies this principle to explain the relation of Brahman to matter and souls. He maintains that all scriptural teachings with regard to Brahman as cause and the world as effect, or Brahman as soul and the world as body, imply in the end that Brahman is the substance and the world is its attribute. Therefore, he writes, 'All things thus are predicative to, or modes of, paramapuruṣa; hence paramapuruṣa alone exists (the substance), adjectivated by everything else. All terms are thus connotations of Him by the rule of sāmāṇḍhikaranya, or the rule which expresses the inseparable relation existing between substance and attribute, or the invariable co-existence of subject and predicate.'

With the help of the principle of coordination Rāmānuja further provides the necessary distinction between Brahman, the
criticism of dr. padmarajiah against sāmānādhikaranya answered

Dr. Padmarajiah observes that 'it is questionable whether Rāmānuja does not overstrain the slender grammatical coordination in seeking from it a sanction for his theory of reality as a complex whole.' He puts forth two arguments in support of his observation. 'First sāmānādhikaranya conflicts with the most fundamental basis of satkāryavāda which governs the entire philosophy of viṣiṣṭādvaite. It is an established fact that in any form of satkāryavāda difference is subordinate, not equal, to identity. Secondly, deriving an ontological fact from the notion of sāmānādhikaranya amounts to, as it has been rightly pointed out, taking 'the grammar of language for the grammar of reality.'

The first argument of Prof. Padmarajiah is clearly a case of ignoratio elenchi. This can be made clear from his own observation of Rāmānuja's metaphysics. He writes, 'Thus there can be little doubt that in Rāmānuja's philosophy, identity, represented by Brahman, is, as shown in the present account, the primary principle; and difference, represented by modal elements of cit and acit, is the secondary principle having Brahman for its source and explanation.'

Regarding the second argument, I must say that I fail to understand the logic behind it. If any principle, grammatical or otherwise, can be invoked to explain an intricate problem, what is wrong in it, especially when as we have seen in the case...
The integral view of Rāmānuja restated

The upshot of the foregoing discussion may be summarised as follows. The Absolute of Rāmānuja is a synthesis which does not deny qualifications, but on the other hand expresses its fulness through them. It has a history of its own life and development, a history which is self-revelation of itself to its own inner possibilities. In its concrete nature it possesses matter and souls as its attributes. These attributes, though different, do not refer to different substrates, but by a common reference find room in one and the same Absolute. In the integral conception of Being the inner differences of attributes ultimately resolve into an inner unity.

The dialectics of Rāmānuja explained and contrasted with the dialectics of Hegel.

In the dynamic character of the Absolute Rāmānuja finds the possibility of inner self-revelation and self-unfoldment. This conception naturally leads us to expect the process of self-projection and self-integration, which we may name as dialectics. The thesis of 'Being' requires another thesis of 'attributes' (I do not use the word 'anti-thesis' for the obvious reason shown below), which again results into a higher synthesis of 'Being and attributes', and thus presents the concrete picture of Being.

But, unlike Hegel, the dialectics of Rāmānuja does not consist in the synthesis of 'being', and 'non-being', but in the synthesis of substance and attributes. Rāmānuja lays emphasis on the identity of Being and the logic of identity.Unlike Hegel, he does not accept the necessity of contradiction. The 'being' by its very nature denies or excludes 'non-being'
and hence there can be no talk of their synthesis. He writes that a thing qualified by 'is' cannot at the same moment be qualified as 'is not' (Ekasmin vastūni astināsti tvāde ācchāyātapa vād yagapadaseṃbhavād. Śrī Bhāṣya. 2.3.31) So the dialectics of Rāmānuja is not a dialectics of opposites or contradictories. The underlying principle is not the law of contradiction but the law of co-ordination. In his identity is a fundamental principle, though he cannot accept an absolute identity. He institutes in its place a concrete identity which implies distinction and determination but not negation.

Further, it is true that Hegel discards spinozistic static Absolute conceived after the manner of geometrical categories, and lays great stress on the dynamic principles of differentiation and self-evolution, yet according to one main line of his thought this development is merely logical and not historical. In other words, it is purely formal and schematic and does not involve any real strenuousness or output of energy. It costs no effort on the part of the Absolute for such a logical development. Conflicts between disembodied 'thought-entities' involve no physical wear and tear. 'Bloodless categories have no blood to shed, hence the battle is nothing more than a shame fight and its issue a foregone conclusion.' All this is just the opposite of Rāmānuja's position. The dialectic movement of Rāmānuja is a movement, not of logical concepts, but of spiritual beings. His is not an Absolute which does not come out into the open field of human experience. On the contrary it is an Absolute which functions dynamically in the history of mankind.

Rāmānuja and Spinoza on determination

For Spinoza every determination is a negation, and every predication a perversion, of reality. He, therefore,
banishes the concept of differentiation from the sphere of the Absolute. But for Rāmānuja, unlike Spinoza, every determination is an affirmation and acquires a positive meaning in a judgement. It, therefore, adds to the infinite glory of the Absolute, because under the principle of coordination every affirmation ultimately reaches the Absolute. The concrete identity of Rāmānuja combines within its fold both distinction and determination, but all this is svagata (internal) only.

**Dynamism of Rāmānuja compared with the static view of the Advaitin**

The basic difference between the Advaitin and Rāmānuja begins with the static and dynamic views. Dynamism has been the fundamental postulate of Rāmānuja's philosophy which determines the whole course of his subsequent thought. According to the Advaitin, who starts with a static view, the Reality is undifferentiated pure consciousness. All human knowledge, being essentially relational, is inadequate to comprehend the non-relational Absolute. In the Advaitin's epistemology a clear distinction is made between the static, or indeterminate, or transcendental knowledge and dynamic, or determinate, or relational knowledge. The latter has empirical ideality but not the transcendental reality.

Rāmānuja rejects this distinction between empirical and transcendental knowledge. According to him every piece of knowledge is relational and expresses a subject-object relationship. Knowledge, in order to be knowledge, must unfold a system of relation. It is not mere cognition but recognition as well, and by its very nature contains an immanent necessity to establish the determinate relation involved in recognition. This makes knowledge transcend its indeterminate state and to develop fully its determinate character.
The Advaitin's stress on static transcendence has created a gulf between transcendent consciousness and immanent experience, and he has been forced to explain away the latter as unreal in its metaphysical import. Rāmānuja tries to bridge this gulf and gives every piece of experience an epistemological basis and metaphysical meaning. The Advaitin's Absolute is a denial of all relational concepts but Rāmānuja's Absolute is essentially one which does not deny but harmonizes all relational concepts in its being, though it transcends them.

In the Advaitin intuition transcends experience, in Rāmānuja it absorbs and assimilates experience.

Resume

In view of the foregoing consideration we sympathise with the protest of Rāmānuja against the idea of an all-engulfing Absolute, and with his effort to find room in the system of reality for finite individuals possessing a certain measure of autonomy and capable of entering into free personal relationship with God. The monistic doctrine of the unity of the world must be so modified as to safeguard the rights and values of human personality and of purposive activity in a temporal world. It is not enough to say that the reality is spiritual unless this assertion carries with it the ultimate and inalienable value of individual persons within the whole system of things.
References and Notes

1. See my paper 'Contribution of Vedânta to Organicism' Indian Philosophy & Culture. Sept. 63.

2. I am well aware of the modern attempt to give a realistic interpretation to Sankara's account of the world and the individual souls, but Sankara's philosophy is not the 'soul' of the Advaita, though it may be regarded as the 'soul' of the Advaita. Further I feel that this sort of interpretation does not seem to be entailed strictly by the basic premises of the system, which are the doctrines of Nirvisesa Brahman, Vivartavâda and Mâyavâda. For the realistic interpretation of Sankara's philosophy see the Vedânta Lecture of Dr. A.G. Javadekar at the 1963 Session of Indian Philosophical Congress.

3. Śrî Bhâsya i.i.i.p. 83

4. The philosophy of Râmânuja in this respect may be compared to that of Bradley when the later writes, 'The parts are members. The whole is an organic unity in which they function.' (Mind. P. 32, Jan 1926) 'That we discover rather is a whole in which distinctions can be made, but in which divisions do not exist.' (Appearance and Reality P. 128). But however, this comparison cannot be carried too far, because Bradley's Absolute is neither a self-conscious spirit, nor a person, and also because for him God and Absolute are not one and the same.

5. Essentials of Indian Philosophy P. 177.


7. Outlines of Indian Philosophy p. 399

8. The naiyâyikas distinguish between samavâya and samayoga.

Pt. 1.p. 5) A relation is samyoga (conjunctive) when the
relata are separable (yutasiddha). It is sameva (inherent) when they are inseparable (ayutasiddha).

Samavāya is regarded by the naiyāyika as a category which though not an existent (sattā) is a subsistent (bhāvā).

(See Bhāṣā Paricheda of Viśvanātha p. 30 Kā. 13). The nature of a subsistent is very well explained by Russell in the following example, 'Suppose, for instance, that I am in my room. I exist, my room exists, but does 'in' exist? Yet obviously the word has a meaning, it denotes a relation which holds between me and my room.' The Problems of philosophy. P. 90. London 1951

10. Outlines of Indian philosophy, p. 230
11. Proceedings of Indian philosophical congress, 1927, (Calcutta University, 1929, p. 162)
12. Appearance and Reality p. 527
13. See my paper Loc. cit. (F.N.11)
15. Ibid
16. Vedārtha Samgraha 23,
17. Padyabhāga II. 18, 183.
18. See his edition P. 236
20. Śrī Bhāṣya. I.I.I. p. 130
21. The word 'attribute' here is not to be understood in the ordinary sense of the term, but in Spinozistic sense, i.e., an attribute denotes an object which depends upon something else for its existence, etc.
23. 'Whenever we cognise the relation of distinguishing attribute and the thing distinguished thereby, the two clearly present themselves to our mind as absolutely different.' Śrī Bhāṣya I.I.I


25. Ibid p.97


27. Prof. P.T.Raju in his Idealistic Thought of India (p154) and Srinivasadasa in 'Darsanadaya' have wrongly maintained that for Rāmānuja difference is primary and identity secondary. That the difference is secondary is the logical outcome of the principle of sāmānādhikaranya.