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31. Siddhi-traya Yāmunāchārya

32. Gītārtha Saṃgraha Yāmunāchārya

33. Gītā

34. Mahābhārata

35. Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā

36. Īśvara Saṃhitā

37. Jayākhyā Saṃhitā

38. Lākṣmi Tantra

39. Nārada Pāṇḍarātra

40. Parama Saṃhitā

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Does Bādarāyaṇa Favour Pāṇcarātra?

by

S. R. Bhatt

In the tarkapāda of the second chapter of the Brahma-sūtra, the last adhikarana, viz., Utpatyasasmbhavādhikarana, is very controversial. It consists of four sūtras (numbering II.2.39 to 42 according to Rāmānuja, and II.2.42 to 43 according to Śaṅkara). The great ācāryas who commented upon it are not agreed upon their interpretation. Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Vallabha and Śrikanṭha envisage in it a reference to Pāṇcarātra school, whereas Nimbārka, Madhva, Baladeva and Śrīnivāsa hold that it is directed to the Śaṅkta view.

I

The ācāryas who give the śaṅkta interpretation do not seem to be convincing. They interpret the first sūtra as a refutation of the view that Śakti alone, independently of the intelligent being, can create the world. The sūtra holds that it is impossible to create the world without the help of puruṣa. This sūtra is also interpreted differently. The origin of the world is not possible because it is eternal. As the world is not something produced, Śakti cannot be its cause.

The form of the above sūtra is mere ‘utpatyasasmbhavāt’; from this it is quite evident that it has been put forth to refute a particular doctrine. In the first sūtra of every adhikarana of tarkapāda, where Bādarāyaṇa initiates the refutation of other systems, he has always used the characteristic words like anumāna, hṛṣya parimandala, samudāya, abhava, sarvaṭhānupalati, ekasmin, pati etc. which are indicative of the particular schools refuted. In the present sūtra also which initiates such a discussion, we may expect of him to have used such a technical word of the system he has intended to refute. The wording of the sūtra does not shed sufficient light to enable us to say decisively as to which system it refers.

If we interpret this sūtra as a refutation of the Śaṅkta view, then we will have to interpret it in a general way,—that from a
particular element (viz. Sakti) there is no creation of the universe, and therefore it cannot be the cause of the universe. But we have no basis to interpret it so. Nor do we have any other indication, because the word Sakti does not occur in the sūtra, and the Sūtra-kāra has not used any word characteristic of the Sakti school.

On the other hand, if we take it as the initiation of the refutation of the Pāḍārātra view, then from the wording of the sūtra we get the indication of the characteristic doctrine of the pāḍārātra, viz., 'parama kārayāt parabhavabhāsāt Vāsudevāt Saṃkar- śaṇo nāma jīvo jñāyate', in the same way in which from the sūtra II.2.31 (ekasminnasambhāvāt) we get the indication of the Anekāntavāda of Jainism.

The second sūtra is interpreted by them as follows: 'If it is said that in producing the world puruṣa helps Sakti, the sūtra answers that no sense-organ is possible on the part of the puruṣa prior to the creation, and without a sense-organ it is not possible for the creator to be the helper.'

The preceding sūtra, as we have seen, does not refer to the Sakti doctrine, and therefore the present sūtra also ipso facto does not refer to the same. But if we concede that in the present sūtra there is refutation of the Sakti view, then the interpretation given by those commentators would not be in conformity with the context and with the sūtra itself. The above commentators hold that the first sūtra refutes the view that Sakti without puruṣa cannot create the world. When in the first sūtra itself the help of puruṣa is negated, it is out of question to say in the next sūtra that puruṣa being without instrument cannot be a helper to Sakti. Moreover, in the preceding sūtra—if we regard it as a reference to the Sakti doctrine—only this much is said that Sakti cannot produce the universe. Why it cannot produce is not mentioned. Nor is there any reference to puruṣa. Then from where the reference to puruṣa has been taken and the meaning put that the puruṣa, having no instruments, cannot help the Sakti? From the word 'Kartuḥ' in the present sūtra, we have a reference to that element only which is referred to as Kartā in the preceding sūtra, and that element is Sakti and not puruṣa. If in the present sūtra 'kartuḥ' is accepted for puruṣa then in the preceding sūtra also the same meaning must be accepted. Lastly, in the present sūtra 'kartuḥ' cannot stand for 'Sakti' because it is masculine, and because Sakti cannot be said to be without instruments.

The third sūtra is explained by this school of commentators as follows: 'if you hold that the Sakti is possessed of inherent
knowledge etc., then there is no objection, because thereby you have come over to our doctrine of Brahma.'

But this interpretation is also quite untenable. If in any doctrine the creator is regarded as possessed of inherent knowledge etc., this does not mean that that doctrine would become Brahma vāda and would be acceptable to the Sutrakāra, nor by such simple modification it would become unassailable in the eyes of the Sutrakāra.

The fourth sūtra is interpreted by them as a concluding general condemnation of the Śakti doctrine. It does not contain any new argument and hence is not very important. Thus it is clear that this adhikaraṇa is not meant to refute the Śakti doctrine.

In the group of āśuriyas giving pāñcarātra interpretation, which seems to be more convincing, there are wide divergences. Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Vallabha hold that in it the Pāñcarātra is refuted just like other doctrines in the rest of the pāda. Bhāskara, however, maintains that he differs from the Pāñcarātra in regard to its doctrine of the individual souls having been produced from Brahma (II. 2-40); but as the Pāñcarātra holds that the Supreme Brahma is both the material as well as the instrumental cause of the world, he is in agreement with it. (Śaṅkara also attacks only some of the doctrines and tenets and agrees with the rest of them). Vallabha follows Śaṅkara except in II-2-41, where he explains 'tādāvatītāsādhitī' as 'tāvāramam pratīṣṭhātī' i.e., plurality of the lords. Rāmānuja agrees with Śaṅkara and Vallabha regarding the interpretation of the first two sūtras, but differs with regard to the explanation of the last two sūtras. According to him the first two sūtras contain objections against the doctrine in question, and thus mention the 'prima facie' view; but the last two sūtras refute those objections and ultimately establish the pāñcarātra doctrine, which is thus the doctrine held by the sutrakāra.

In this group only two commentators—Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja—deserve our special consideration. Śaṅkara commences by remarking that the Pāñcarātra deserves acceptance in so far as it holds that God is both the efficient and the material cause of the world. So also when it says that Viśudeva is the highest Reality, whose nature is pure knowledge, and that He dividing Himself in four parts, appears in four forms as Viśudeva (denoting the Highest Self) Śaṁkarṣaṇa (individual soul) pradyumna (mind) and Aniruddha (Principle of egolism), there is nothing to object. Nor is it objectionable to hold that by devotion and meditation we reach the Highest Being.
But Śaṅkara takes exception to the doctrine that Saipkarsana, i.e., individual soul, springs from Vāsudeva, i.e., the Supreme Lord for it is impossible that the individual soul would spring from the Highest Self, which would make the former non-eternal.

Śaṅkara in the second sūtra further rejects it on the ground that observation does not show an instrument (mind) springing forth from an agent (individual soul).

In the third sūtra also Śaṅkara rejects it. He writes that even if it be said that in consequence of their being endowed with knowledge etc., Śaṅkaraṇa and others are really all lords free from faults, and without any imperfections, the following objections may be raised: (i) If the four lords have the same attributes do they not constitute one and the same self? (ii) Here the pāṇcarātra commits the fallacy of uselessly assuming more than one lord, and thereby contradicts its own principle of one Supreme Lord. (iii) Further, it cannot be maintained that from one Highest Being spring four forms possessing equal attributes, because cause requires pre-eminence over effect; but no such difference is admitted by the pāṇcarātra. (iv) Lastly, why to limit the forms of Vāsudeva to four only? The whole world from Brahman to a blade of grass should be regarded as a manifestation of the Supreme Being.

The last sūtra, according to Śaṅkara, holds that the pāṇcarātra doctrine cannot be admitted owing to there being many contradictions in the doctrine itself, and owing to its containing many passages contradictory to the Vedas. It sometimes mentions these four as qualities and sometimes as bearers of qualities. Śāndilya, the promulgator of the pāṇcarātra system, it is said, was dissatisfied with the Vedas because he could not find in them a satisfactory way of supreme excellence and final beatitude. Therefore he took recourse to the pāṇcarātra. This, says Śaṅkara, amounts to saying that the pāṇcarātra system is superior to the Vedas.

Thus Śaṅkara holds that the author of the sūtras is not in favour of pāṇcarātra, though some of its tenets are not unacceptable.

Rāmānuja, however, agrees with Śaṅkara regarding the interpretation of the first two sūtras that they are meant to refute some of the tenets of pāṇcarātra, but he differs in that these sūtras constitute only the pūrvapakṣa, i.e., the prima facie view. He holds that the first sūtra raises a doubt that the pāṇcarātra may be destitute of authority in so far as it belongs to the same class of tantras as those of Kapil and others. Further the pāṇcarātra holds that from
Vāsudeva, who is the highest Brahman and the supreme cause, there originates the individual soul called Saṃkarṣaṇa. From Saṃkarṣaṇa springs the internal organ called Pradyumna and from Pradyumna comes the principle of egoity called Aniruddha. Now this theory implies the origination of the individual soul and this is contrary to the scriptures, because the scriptural texts declare the soul to be without a beginning.

The second sūtra also expresses the inadmissibility of the Pāṇcarātra view that the internal organ called Pradyumna originates from the individual soul called Saṃkarṣaṇa. This is quite opposed to Mūḍaka II.1.3 which declares that the mind also springs from none else but the highest Brahman.

Now Rāmānuja twists the meaning of the last two sūtras. He holds that the word "विः" in the third sūtra sets aside the view maintained in the two previous sūtras. 'Apratisedha' is taken to mean that there is no contradiction to the Pāṇcarātra. Rāmānuja says that if Saṃkarṣaṇa etc. are of the nature of Supreme Brahman, then truly there cannot be any objection to it. As a matter of fact the Pāṇcarātra teaches not an impossible origination of the soul, but that the highest Brahman called Vāsudeva, out of compassion for the devotees voluntarily abides in a four-fold form, so as to render Himself accessible to them. This is also supported by the scripture, 'not born, He is born in many ways.'

Moreover, Saṃkarṣaṇa etc., are the beings ruling over the individual souls, internal organs, and the organs of egoity. There can be no objection to their being denoted in this way. This case is analogous to that of Brahman being designated by the terms like ether, breath and the like.

In the last sūtra Rāmānuja holds that the doctrine of the origination of Jīva, which is brought forth as an objection, is distinctly controverted in the books of the Pāṇcarātra as well, and hence the objection raised against it on this ground is without any basis. Rāmānuja winds up the adhikarana with a long discussion on the authoritativeness of the Pāṇcarātra, putting forth some arguments in its favour. He writes that the alleged charge of condemning the Vedas imputed to Śāṇḍilya is due to a gross misunderstanding of what he has said. Śāṇḍilya's observations are only to eulogise the Pāṇcarātra and not to condemn the Vedas. He argues that the Pāṇcarātra is meant to facilitate the understanding of the Vedas which by themselves are difficult of comprehension. This case is at par with Nārada's words in the Chāndogya VII.2.
Rāmānuja argues that the authority of the Pāṇḍarātra cannot be challenged because the Lord Himself has composed it, to enable his devotees to grasp the true meaning of the Vedas.

Lastly, he pleads for the orthodoxy of the Pāṇḍarātra on the basis of the Mahābhārata, saying that the sūtrakāra who is also the author of the Mahābhārata, has maintained the orthodoxy of the Pāṇḍarātra in the Mahābhārata, and hence in the Sūtras he cannot repudiate their orthodoxy and thereby contradict himself. Here it may be objected that in the Mahābhārata Sāṁkhya etc. are also mentioned as worthy of regard, but in the sūtras those same doctrines are refuted. Why should not the same hold good in the case of the Pāṇḍarātra? The reply that Rāmānuja gives is that the Sāṁkhya etc., are of human origin, whereas the Pāṇḍarātra is of divine origin, and hence its authoritativeness.

Let us now see how far Rāmānuja is true in holding that the sūtrakāra has favoured and not rejected the Pāṇḍarātra. It is quite evident, as all the commentators agree, that the tone of the first two sūtras is combative. The difference of opinion is only with regard to the interpretation of the last two sūtras. In the second sūtra, holds Rāmānuja, the use of the particle ‘vā’ is indicative of the change of side in the argument, both in the Pūrva Māṁsā and Vedānta. One can find such instances in the third páda of the third chapter. But with reference to the context, such an inference does not seem to be warranted. It is true that the Sūtrakāra while refuting the origination in the preceding sūtra, in this sūtra has used the word ‘vā’ which indicates that here he is not refuting some of the Pāṇḍarātra doctrines. But this does not mean that it is a change of side. It may be that in this sūtra he has given an alternative which though true may not be worthy of importance. Or it may be that in the preceding sūtras after refuting the origination, in the present sūtra he has given an alternative that if by mana we mean knowledge which arises from Jiva, then this is not to be refuted. In the Upaniṣads, various forms of knowledge are referred as mana (Ait. 5.2, Brh. 1.5.3.). The word ‘vā’ suggests two alternatives. If the first is accepted, then the Pāṇḍarātra is worth condemnation; and if the second is accepted, then it is not to be refuted. In this respect neither the interpretation of Śaṅkara nor that of Rāmānuja seems to be correct.

Further, in the same sūtra Rāmānuja interprets the word ‘vijñānādi’ as Brahman which seems to be improper, because nowhere the sūtrakāra has used this word in this sense. He always uses it in the sense of mana or buddhi (e.g., 2.3.16). Nor is this
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word a technical term in the Pāṇcarātra school. Similarly Vallabha’s interpretation, which is also more or less the same, does not seem to be acceptable.

From the interpretation of Rāmānuja it is quite evident that in the last sūtra he has twisted the meaning. Here he explains ‘vipriṣṭedhācca’ as ‘and because the origination of the individual soul is contradicted in this śāstra’, saying thereby that the objection raised in the first sūtra is out of question, since the Pāṇcarātra does not hold this view. But this interpretation is not at all happy. Here he not only explains away the question of origination, but also commits the fallacy of inconsistency. This becomes evident by comparing it with the sūtra, 2.2.9., where Bādarāyana uses the same phrase to mean that contradictions in the Sāṅkhya system make it unacceptable to the wise. The interpretation of Rāmānuja that in the Pāṇcarātra śāstra itself the origination of the Jīva is refuted and therefore the Pāṇcarātra is regarded as valid by the Sutrakāra, would have been correct provided in the sūtra itself instead of ‘vipriṣṭedhācca’ there would be simply ‘pratiṣṭedhācca’. Vipriṣṭedha means mutual contradiction and this is accepted by Rāmānuja as well in 2.2.9.

So far as negation of the origination is concerned, it is found in some sections of the Pāṇcarātra, but there must have been some section which accepted and preached this doctrine, as is testified by Kṣemarāja in the Pratyabhijña hṛdaya. Though the alleged doctrine is not present and also not accepted in the modern Pāṇcarātra school, and hence the above criticism of the sūtrakāra is not now applicable to them, yet the fact remains that the interpretation of Saṅkara and Vallabha is not incorrect. It must be that at the time of Sūtrakāra the Pāṇcarātra was holding this view, and later on in view of the opposition it has altered this doctrine. Moreover, Rāmānuja while defending this doctrine and arguing that the Pāṇcarātra does not preach this origination, quotes Parama Samhitā (2.19); but in that Samhitā this verse ‘Vāsudevāt Saṁkṣeṣaṇo nāma jīvo jāyate’ does not occur. It seems that by the time of Rāmānuja those Pāṇcarātra works which held the origination must have been non-prevalent.

The argument of Rāmānuja that the sūtrakāra is also the author of the Mahābhārata etc., is entirely baseless and has no proof for its support. Consequently it carries no weight. Secondly, in the Mahābhārata itself (xii. 349.64), the Pāṇcarātra is distinguished from the Vedas and is regarded as outside the pale of vedīc
orthodoxy. Lastly, in the Mahābhārata, Sāṃkhya etc., are also praised but they are condemned in the sūtra. The defence of Rāmānuja that the Sāṃkhya etc. are condemned because they are of human origin whereas the Pāñcarātra is of divine origin seems to be a lame excuse.

As a matter of fact the tarkapāda is meant to refute rival theories, as Rāmānuja himself accepts (parapakṣa pratikṣeṣo hīnasmin pāde kṛyate 2.2.10). In the whole of this section the sūtra-kāra is on the offensive, refuting through reasoning only, without recourse to the scriptural texts. In this section he refutes those schools of thought that were regarded by the orthodox section as outside the sphere of the Vedas. The Pāñcarātra was also regarded as outside the pale of the Vedas, and therefore we cannot reasonably expect Bādarāyaṇa to have accepted the Pāñcarātra view. Had he intended to favour the Pāñcarātra, he should not have dealt with it in the tarkapāda. The best place to discuss this would have been 2.3.18, where on the authority of the scripture the sūtra-kāra negates the origination of the soul and propounds its eternity. Moreover, if the sūtra-kāra wanted to defend the Pāñcarātra he could have done so in a far less ambiguous manner.

The argument of Dr. Thibaut that it is not an unnatural procedure to end the polemical pāda with the defence of a doctrine which is to be viewed as true, is without any force, since the exposition and the defence of the true doctrine is the object of the whole book and not of one single adhikaraṇa of the tarkapāda; and what is more important is that we do not come across in the whole work, any characteristic doctrine of the Pāñcarātra, nor do we find the terms Vāsudeva etc., so peculiar to the Pāñcarātra. The fact that this particular doctrine is refuted last of all, can be explained, as Ghate suggests, by the circumstance that it is most allied to the Vedānta doctrine, and Śaṅkara and Bhāskara have admitted this at the very beginning of this adhikaraṇa.

Thus the possible conclusion we can arrive at, on the basis of the above examination, is that the interpretation of Rāmānuja is far-stretched, and though Śaṅkara’s interpretation is not fully correct, yet it seems to be nearer to the truth.
THE VEDÂNTIC PRECURSORS OF THE VIŚISTÂDVAITA PHILOSOPHY OF RÂMÂNUJA

by

S. R. Bhatt, Vallabh-Vidyagan

There has been a considerable wrong impression that Râmânuja has made a bold attempt to force an old work of great authority (viz, Brahma Sûtras of Bâdarâyaña) into the service of the sect to which he is said to belong. It has often been suggested and taken for granted that in the interpretation of Brahma Sûtras and Gîtâ Râmânuja was essentially and substantially influenced by the Pâścarâtra Sâṁhitâs and the work of the Ālwars, and was very much inspired by them. But while examining the validity of the above contentions we may naturally put the following question:—Is there not a Vedântic tradition of long antiquity to which Râmânuja belongs, and in the light of which alone he has interpreted the Vedânta Sûtras, and in this paper we shall attempt to answer it.

As a matter of fact, the school which Râmânuja professes to follow, had a venerable ancestry commencing almost from the times of the Sûtras. There is sufficient evidence to prove that the theistic interpretation by Râmânuja was no innovation, nor does it betray any non-Vedântic influence. In fact he not only belongs to an ancient and strongly defined theistic tradition of the Vedânta, his theology also purports to be a faithful representation of the Vedântic teachings enshrined in the Prasthâna Trayi. Within the intellectual theosophy of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, we find distinctly theistic and devotional tendencies gradually developing which find their culmination in Râmânuja Vedânta.

A careful reader of the Upaniṣads will not fail to find that in the Upaniṣads there are considerable number of essentially different theories, all of which claim to be fundamental teachings of the Upaniṣads. Among them are two more or less distinct lines of speculations, both fundamentally monistic in character, but one emphasising the unity and ignoring the differentiations, and the other maintaining that the unity is not inconsistent with
differentiations. The two tendencies are sometimes to be met with in the same Upaniṣad one chapter of which, for instance, represents the first and another the second. But roughly speaking the Brhadāraṇyaka may be said to follow the former line and the Chāndogya and Kośitaki the latter. This gave rise to two schools of Vedāntic interpretation from the earliest times, which Śāṅkara and Rāmānuja avowedly followed in later times.

Further the Brahma Sastras themselves furnish us indications of their having existed already at an early time essentially different Vedāntic systems. In the sūtras we find Vedāntic doctrines of teachers like Ātreya, Āśmartha, Audulomi Kārṣṇājini, Kāśakṛṣṇa, Jaimini, Bādari etc., being quoted by Bādarāyaṇa himself. Among the passages where diverging views of these teachers are recorded and contrasted three are of particular importance. The first and the most important passage is met with in the fourth pāda of the first adhyāya ( sūtras 20 to 22 ) where the question is discussed whether in Brh. Upaniṣad IV-5. 6. the self enjoined there as the object of seeing etc., is the individual soul or the Highest Soul, In connection therewith the Sūtras quote the views of three ancient teachers about the relations in which the individual soul stands to Brahman. 1

According to Āśmartha, as interpreted by Bhamati on Śāṅkara, the soul stands to Brahman in a bhedābheda relation, i. e., it is neither absolutely different nor absolutely non-different from it, as sparks are from fire. Rāmānuja explains it that the individual souls are one with Brahman in so far as they are its effects.

Audulomi, on the other hand teaches that the soul is altogether different from Brahman upto the time when obtaining final release it is merged in it. This school is named as Satya-bhedavāda. This view, as Bhamati suggests, is also accepted by the Pāścarātra.

The above two views are not acceptable to the Sūtrakāra. The siddhānta view is announced in the Sūtra 22 under the name Kāśakṛṣṇa. The wordings of the sūtra are ‘ Avasthiteh iti Kāśakṛṣṇa ( accounts for the circumstances

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1. See Thibaut S. B. E. Vol. XXXIV Intro. P. XIX.
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mentioned on the ground of the permanent abiding or abode. By this permanent abiding Śaṅkara understands the Lords abiding as or in the condition of the individual soul and thus sees in the āṣṭāṅga the enunciation of his own view that the individual soul is absolutely non-different from Brahman, which in some way or other presents itself as the individual soul. But here Rāmānuja dissents. He like Śaṅkara holds that the Kaśyapāṇa’s opinion is the siddhānta view but he explains the permanent abiding as Lord’s permanent abiding within the individual soul as is described in the Antaryāmin Brahman. Rāmānuja agrees with Śaṅkara that Kaśyapāṇa upholds the identity of individual soul and Brahman, but it is like that of body and soul, and not the absolute one. Now the question before us is, whose interpretation is correct one? We cannot negate that the term ‘avasthiteh’ does not mean ‘special state or condition’ as Śaṅkara interpretes, but it must be urged in the favour of Rāmānuja that in other five places (viz. 1.2.17 2.2.4, 2.2.13, 2.3.24, and 3.3.32) where this word occurs in the āṣṭāṅgas, it regularly means permanent abiding or abode within something.

In 3.4.7 to 14 it is stated that according to Jaimini the soul of him who possesses the lower knowledge of Brahman goes after death to the Highest Brahman, while Bādarī—whose opinion is endorsed by Śaṅkara—teaches that it goes to lower Brahman only.

In the āṣṭāṅgas 4.4.5 to 7 the opinion of various teachers concerning the characteristics of the released souls are given. According to Audulomi its only characteristic is thought, while Jaimini maintains that it possesses a number of auspicious exalted qualities. Bādarāyaṇa declares himself in favour of the synthesis of these two views.

Thus it is clear from the above that even before Bādarāyaṇa composed the Vedānta Āṣṭāṅgas there were different views about the teachings of the Upaniṣads. It is further evident that the views advocated by Rāmānuja are not outside the pale of Vedāntic speculations which are of a long standing.

Turning next to the Śaṅkara Bhāṣya, we there meet with
the indications that the Vedāntins were divided among themselves on different points of dogma. Śaṅkara more than once refers to the opinion of ‘another’ commentator of the Śūtras, and in several places Śaṅkara’s commentators explain that the ‘other’ stands for the Vṛtti-kāra Bodhāyana, whom Rāmānuja expressly follows in toto. There are two remarks of Śaṅkara which are of great importance for our purpose. The one is made with reference to the Śūtras 7 to 14 of the third pada of the 4th adhyāya. ‘Some’ he says, declare those Śūtras which I look upon as setting forth the siddhānta view, to state merely the pūrva-pāka. ‘This clearly indicates that there is a difference of opinion of fundamental points. The next is under 1-3-15 where Śaṅkara after having explained at length that the individual soul as such cannot claim any reality, but is real only in so far as it is identical with Brahma, adds the following words, ‘Apare tu vādinaḥ paramāarthikameva jīva rūpamīti manyante asmadiyā ca ‘kecit’ i.e., other theorists, again and among them some of ours are of opinion that the individual soul as such is real. The term ‘ours’ here made use of, stands only for Vedāntins. From this it appears that Śaṅkara himself was willing to class under the same category himself and philosophers who—as in the later times Rāmānuja—looked upon the individual soul as not due to fictitious limitations of maya, but as real in itself, whatever may be the relation in which they considered it to stand to the Highest Self. 2

Yāmuna, the author of Siddhitraya and Gītārtha Saṅgraha, and the teacher of Rāmānuja, mentions a series of authors who preceded him and composed works explanatory of the Śūtras. They are Bhasyakṛta (perhaps Dramida), Śrī Vatsāṅka, Ṭāṇka Bhārtrprapaśca, Bhārtrhari, Brahmadatta, Śaṅkara and Bhāskara. The first three belong to Viśisṭadvaita school. 3

Rāmānuja, at the very outset, in his Śrī Bhāṣya, claims to follow in his bhāṣya the authority of Bodhāyana who composed a vṛtti of the Śūtras which was abbreviated by the ancient masters. In addition to Bodhāyana he appeals to a series of

2. Ibid. P. XX
3. See Dasgupta H.I.P. Vol. III P. 108
ancient teachers (purvacaryas) who carried on the true tradition as to the teachings of Vedânta and the meaning of the sūtras. In the Vedârtha Saîmgraha we meet with the enumeration of the following authorities - Bodhâyana, Taṅka, Dramiḍa, Gîhadeva, Kapardin and Bhâruci and the quotations from the writings of some of them are not unfrequent in the Vedârtha Saîmgraha as well as in Sri Bhâṣya. Among these only the first three are known as the authors of specific commentatorial texts, whereas of the others nothing but the names have been saved from oblivion.

Bodhâyana, perhaps, was the first commentator on the Brahma Śūtras. The earlier commentators on the Śūtras, perhaps, were also the advocates of Viśiṣṭadvaita, the origin of which may be traced to the Puruṣa Śûkta. Bodhâyana, also known as Vṛttikâra, composed a vṛtti, an extensive commentary on the Śūtras, short quotations from which are met with in some places in the Sri Bhâṣya of Râmânuja and in none of his other works, and the doctrines of which are understood to be refuted in many places in the commentary of Sâṅkara.

The few fragments from the Bodhâyana vṛtti are not very informative of his views. But from his stress on the continuity of Karma and Brahma Mīmāṁsâ we may conclude that he had accepted the importance of ritual acts as preparatory to liberating intuition of Brahman, and that he adhered to the Jânakarma samuccaya view with its corollaries of the reality of the phenomenal world and the individual soul. From the fact that Râmânuja professes to follow him and that the ancient teachers had commented on him we may with probability hold that Bodhâyana anticipated in many points, if not in all points, his later successor Râmânuja. Similarly we may with all probability maintain that the mysterious Gîhadeva, Kapardin and Bhâruci were generally favourable to Râmânuja's system of unity in difference.

On Taṅka and Dramiḍa we are better informed. They were perhaps the commentators on Bih. and Chân. Upaniṣads. Brahma seems to regard the relation between God and the world inclu-

5. Dasgupta H. I. P. III P. 105
The individual soul is a spiritual substance qualified by the essential property of knowledge. Yāmuna’s main contribution consists in establishing the self-consciousness of the soul.

The whole universe stands to God in a relation of an object supported, governed, and utilised because it is His body as it were.

Yāmuna holds that the emancipation can only be achieved by means of bhaktiyoga, being supported by jñāna and karma. A comparison of the views of Yāmuna with that of Rāmānuja,

6. See Philosophical Quarterly, Amalner, April 1963–PP 438,
would make it evident that Rāmānuja has developed and elaborated systematically what Yamuna had already discovered.

From the foregoing, the conclusion that we can arrive at is that the theistic interpretation by Rāmānuja of the Brahma Śūtras and Upaniṣads, was no innovation, nor does it betray any foreign influence. There had been great names in the past under the Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Vedānta and Rāmānuja in no place countenances slightest departure from the strictest Vedāntic tradition established by them.
शहीद की तीन महीने दिवस के काबियों की सामाजिक मुहूर्त है। यह काबा की भी इस
प्रमुख का परम्परा नया काबा चा साक्त। वंदेमार्ग, कब्र समाधार चरणचरण के सम्मिलन
यहाँ भी शहीद की शून्य तीन गांव में है। अधिकांश नागरिक भाग यह है।

साहित्य: यह काबा विद्यालय में पढ़ा जा रहा है, सौंदर्य विद्या सस्त्र विद्या (काब्ज) है।
जिसे वीर रस की सरस निगमित, वधार, मनोरंजन मग, वसाहत शीतल, मनोरंजन
कल्पना, विद्वानसम्बन्ध मैथॉमस, नवं निर्माणतात्जज बुद्धिक है।

स्ट्रिक्टकाल में वैदिक एवं पंचरात्र
विचारार्थ नाथ वियस

वाक्यविद्या काल में भारतीय सांस्कृतिक वर्तन पर दो विचारवादार्थ—वैदिक एवं वाक्यविद्या—
समानता रूप से समाधान होनी चाहिए है कि विपक्ष बन मे भी भाग यहाँ की जन्म होती है।
वाक्यविद्या नाथ का स्वाभाविक रूप से समाधान होनी है। वैदिक विचार वान तथा वाक्यविद्या है कि यह वाचन के पौरोषण होती है। पौरोषण
नाथ का स्वाभाविक रूप से समाधान होनी है।

प्राचीन वाक्यविद्या कर की भारतीय सांस्कृतिक वर्तन पर दो विचारवादार्थ—वैदिक एवं वाक्यविद्या—
समानता रूप से समाधान होनी चाहिए है कि विपक्ष बन मे भी भाग यहाँ की जन्म होती है।
वाक्यविद्या नाथ का स्वाभाविक रूप से समाधान होनी है। वैदिक विचार वान तथा वाक्यविद्या है कि यह वाचन के पौरोषण होती है।

1. शाब्र विस्तिरण के राज्यों में, 'दे भार भारतबाहेर देश शीर्षक, भद द्वितियसं—
सेवक दु द चारदेशिय बाहेर ही का भाष द लेटर सिविलिय दंड फिल्माजिल
विशेषज्ञ बाहेर हो हेल्पर उपर अवर भाष बाहेर हेल्पर—भाष द जैनरल साइड
वायर हिल्स'।—दिशा बोल्ड बॉल्ड बॉल्ड बॉल्ड, दु 1937।
सुदीप काल है। वैदिक और आर्याकालीन विज्ञानारोहों के पारसंस्कृतिक संस्कृति के बारे में निवास ही होता था। तत्त्व वैदिक एवं कटु प्राचीन शास्त्रीय ईंधनों के पीछे यह स्थापित होता है। वहाँ तत्व वैदिक एवं कटु शास्त्रीय ईंधनों के पीछे यह स्थापित होता है।

बस्त यह निवासयात्मक रूप से नहीं ही था। ग्रहण यह है कि परंपरागत संस्कृति के रचनाओं के प्रभाव पर भी भागीदार रहता था, यह भागीदार पर भी भागीदार रहता था। तत्त्व शास्त्र रहता है कि भागीदार परंपरागत संस्कृति के प्रभाव पर भी भागीदार रहता था। क्योंकि संस्कृति के प्रभाव पर भी है कि क्योंकि प्रभाव पर भी है कि क्योंकि प्रभाव पर भी है कि क्योंकि प्रभाव पर भी है कि क्योंकि प्रभाव पर भी है कि क्योंकि प्रभाव पर भी है कि क्योंकि प्रभाव पर भी है कि क्योंकि प्रभाव पर भी है कि क्योंकि प्रभाव पर भी है कि क्योंकि प्रभाव पर भी है।

हालाँकि निवासयात्मक रूप से नहीं ही था। ग्रहण यह है कि परंपरागत संस्कृति के रचनाओं के प्रभाव पर भी भागीदार रहता था, यह भागीदार पर भी भागीदार रहता था। तत्त्व शास्त्र रहता है कि भागीदार परंपरागत संस्कृति के प्रभाव पर भी है कि क्योंकि प्रभाव परंपरागत संस्कृति के प्रभाव पर भी है कि क्योंकि प्रभाव परंपरागत संस्कृति के प्रभाव पर भी है कि क्योंकि प्रभाव परंपरागत संस्कृति के प्रभाव पर भी है कि क्योंकि प्रभाव परंपरागत संस्कृति के प्रभाव पर भी है कि क्योंकि प्रभाव परंपरागत संस्कृति के प्रभाव पर भी है कि क्योंकि प्रभाव परंपरागत संस्कृति के प्रभाव पर भी है कि क्योंकि प्रभाव परंपरागत संस्कृति के प्रभाव पर भी है।

5. भारतीय भाषा वेधशास्त्र संस्कृत के प्रभाव पर भी है कि क्योंकि प्रभाव परंपरागत संस्कृति के प्रभाव पर भी है कि क्योंकि प्रभाव परंपरागत संस्कृति के प्रभाव पर भी है कि क्योंकि प्रभाव परंपरागत संस्कृति के प्रभाव पर भी है।

6. शब्दे दृश्यों में वीडियो में अनुवाद है।

7. ‘शुद्ध-वेदांसारायण’—ईस्वरसंहिता।

प्रवचन

‘शंकरसास्त्र परमाङ्ग्ला वेद वेदांस लालू’—शंकरसंहिता।

8. ‘भारतीय भाषाओं में महानगर’—ईस्वरसंहिता | 1.271
नारायणभाषारी पपिलका

में वर्तमान मनोरंजन है। यदौ पारस्राव को हैडिक, यदौ वेदांतक और वेदविद्वार गौरित करते हैं।

जो शास्त्रविवाहम् पुराण पारस्राव का सम्बन्ध है और उसकी बेदधार्मिकता प्रभावित गरते हैं, अग्नि विभु, मानमण, नारदेश, ग्राम, गद्य, गद्य, गद्य, गद्य और त्रिविद्वार शास्त्रक पुराण ग्रन्थ बनमा, धार्मिक, ग्राम, नारदेश, पारस्राव, जार्याव भाषा शुद्धविवाहम् प्रमुख है। पारस्राव और जार्याव शैली में तो यह कर देना है कि पारस्राव के यह वेदविद्वार गौरित की जाते हैं। यदौ पारस्राव की यह गणना कि मानवता वा पारस्राव का स्वरूप, दर्शन वा त्वरित करने से नारदेश भी पवित्र हो जाती है। पारस्राविद्वार के यह शैली भी महामायें, प्राकृतिक, जीव, भाषाकृति, शिक्षा, प्रजातन्त्र, विद्वानसम्म, विधा, शुद्धार्थ, राजनायिन और जार्याव पुराण है जो किसी भी व्यक्ति के द्वारा करते हुए मानवविवाह में पारस्राव को मानवन्यन का प्रतिपादक करने का कारण किया गया है। यह व्यक्ति जार्यावविवाहात्मके वैमान मानमायें, जार्यावविवाह, शास्त्रविवाह, वाराहुराव, भागवदपुराण, शुद्धुराव, राजरंजित या वर्तमान पुराण को अपारित करने बनाकर गौरित गौरित गौरित गौरित करते हैं। पारस्राव, यदौ वा शब्दपुराण का

6. 'चाराके वेदधार्मिक पारस्रावीमेऐवा' या—वाराहुराव, २६६।११।
10. वाराहुराव, २१२, २२।
11. 'प' २२४, २३३, २५४, २६१, १५१।
12. शुद्धुराव, २०२।
13. १०६, २३६।
17. ग्राममायें हरिद्राव शास्त्रीयों में सम्बन्धित ज्ञानशक्ति की प्रस्तावता।
18. 'प' २२२, २२३, २२४, २२५, २२६, २२७।
6४. (अ) पारस्राव च वाराहुराव तथा जावामुखिजसति च।
शाब्देन वि धार्मिक वृद्धिं वेदविद्वाहम्॥—वाराहुराव।
(ब) पारस्राव महाशिवरात्रिः कैलितर वेदविद्वाहम् छुँदे।
कैलितराणम् महाशिवरात्रि कैलितर वेदविद्वाहम् छुँदे।
अन्तर्गत्य वि धार्मिक विद्वाहम् महामायें।
वाराहुरावमायाएः वेदविद्वाहम् छुँदे।
शाब्देन अर्थम् वृद्धिं विजातवन्।
आशाश्च महामायें तुमालो शुद्धपुरावस्तुः॥—पारस्राव पुराण।
मायामचारियों चित्रका

का ही मिलेते हैं। पद्मपुराणः१, मायामचारियों २, मायामचारियों ३, सुधारीतः४, दारीशुरुवार्शस् ५, वैदिक पर्याय वांगनिर्माण के दोनों साधारण दोषों मार्गो का प्रक्षेपण करते हैं, परन्तु वे जैसा प्रक्षेपण में सबसे अधिक साधन नहीं कहा गया है कि मायावाद का वैदिक पर्याय धर्म को ही अनुवर्तन कर्णा 
वांगनिर्माण एवं विचार के मध्य संगठन वृद्ध की वांगनिर्माण करना वांगनिर्माण १, की रचना विश्वसुधारियों शीर्ष वराहपुराणः६ में भी, वैदिक पर्याय वांगनिर्माण के साधनों मार्गो को संविदार किया गया। मायामचारियों का अपना में वे वैदिक संविदार करते हैं ६, परंतु वक्ता कहते हैं कि वैदिक, सूविकिरहित वा तथ्य ज्ञान के में वृद्धि वांगनिर्माण (१२वें अध्याय) में प्रथम पढ़ाई को ही अपना वांगनिर्माण, प्रकाश स्वरूप । प्रथम विचार की नहीं। देवीमायामचारियों में कहा गया है कि वृद्धि वांगनिर्माण वांगनिर्माण के प्राणियों हैं और दुर्गा उत्तरक वह है। 
के हर तीनों में शीर्षक विचार गया है भी धम हैं। इसके अलावा भ्रमण वह परम है। वह नया है शाश्वत ने सुधारीतःविचार सर्वस परम है। दिल के द्वारा लोगों की सुलभयों में साधन के विश्वसुधारियों से दिल के १०। परंतु हमें कहीं धम पर स्वस्थ देविक
विमर्श

19. श्रीदयावर वेयन्द्रनाथ सेरा: शाक्तस्वरूप ।

20. मायासुर भ्राताभाषा प्रचारिणी निरक्षण ।।

21. कविता: खंडा प्रभास विचारे। — जुआसुक।

22. बायक, वर्ग, परमेश्वर, श्रीनाथरत्न पितामहों में पंचाश्रम की प्रमाण वेद के नाम से भविष्यत, किया गया है (एक पुस्तक की प्रमाण प्रकाश में पुस्तकों की अवस्था है)। मात्र नाम एवं एक प्राचीन शब्द का मत है कि पुस्तक पृष्ठ पर आया द्वितीय का नाम वाचना हैै। काय्यप्रशासन स्वामित्वादि (दाैविक, श्रीदयावर वेयन्द्रनाथ सेरा: शाक्तस्वरूप ।।

23. यह दश का सम्पन्न मानन्त्व में मिलता है।
भागाधीत स्वभाविक पत्रिका

थमन है और दृष्टिकोण विश्वास परूबें वैदिक व्यवस्था छाप रखने की संवाद है। परंतु एक नाट उल्लेखनीय है कि स्मृति भौगोलिक ओर संसार भिन्नता का ध्यान से नानाभाषी भाषाओं के लिए शीर्षक व्याख्या और न केवल भर्ती भाषा से बहुधी भाषा।

महान भाषा का स्थान है कि युद्ध वर्म्यात्मक शिक्षा से ही हो सकता है और वैदिक वर्ण ही अंतिम ओर कोसमबित है। जो नमूने पुरावशेष में प्रकट है वह निम्न विचार का ही है। ।\text{136} इसी तरह, देखिये -

स्वतंत्रता की पारंपरिक परिणामों की कौशल्यता पर ध्यान देना आवश्यक है। यह सराहनीय बाबु, सेवाएं देने वालों की स्वीकार नहीं करते। यह मत निश्चित रूप से परांपरिक वर्ण है जिसके अनुसार शास्त्रकाल के आयात के परमाणु की संहिता है, विशेष रूप से सर्वोपरिक परांपरिक के नारे में आमतौर पर होती है, यह रूप से विद्वान है जब परांपरिक मानक की विज्ञान तथा मानक के निम्न रूप से संस्कृत भाषा का प्रतीत है। \text{137} कथाही ने वर्ण द्वारा पांच रूप का तत्त्वांतरित किया गया था। इसके निरीक्षणों के अनुसार, यह परांपरिक प्रतीक्षक भाषा का प्रतीत है।

(२) अवस्थान वाद जो पारंपरिक के प्रति आधार पर तत्त्वांतरित के लिए त्यस्तात्वी की विद्यमान दिशा है, वह है कि परांपरिक वर्ण के अनुपयोगी अनुप्रयोगी कस्तोत्तरों को बताते हैं कि ओर से यह उन्मत्त शुद्ध भाषाओं के विशेषताएं से जुड़ने की आवश्यकता है। \text{138}

१६. धर्मदृष्टि विद्वान समस्त विद्वान धर्मदृष्टि

१७. २३?'३२-३३

१८. बुध ६८ 'पुरावशेषक स्वतंत्र विद्वान दशाराम शुद्धताकर दशाराम

२०. २३.?३२, २३-३४, २३.३२,७०, २०।

२५. २३.'३२-१६।
नागरीप्रचारियों की पत्रिका

करते हैं। १३२ दृश्य देवसूर से भाषाकार व्यापारी करते हैं तत्त्व, संस्कृत, भारतीय भाषा के कहने में बहुत-ही देह, दीन, बिंदु, भित्ति, सुझाव, यह जाना भारत सत्ता करने वाले किया और इसके साथ देश की दृष्टि देखने वाला भी पार माना है। ४७ वर्षों ने शोधकार्यों का यात्रा पर चढ़ाने का तरीका किया है। इस पदवी में वे परिपक्वता का एक स्वीकार करते हैं जिसने यह बताया है कि भाषाकार देवसूर भाषाकार के लिए नहीं करते हैं इक्किन हंसविलास में हार्दिक है। ४५

(४) धीर गर्व गाय शीर्षक पर मौखिक प्रभाव, मानवता व निर्माण का प्रभाव है। इसमें कहीं कहीं तो मौखिक का 'पंचमुखार्थ' या सार्थ के अंत में दी गान लिखा गया है। इसके निर्देश वैदिक परंपरा में मध्यम भाषा की उपयुक्त गान प्रदान करते हुए भी ज्ञान भावना या भविष्यत के लिए कहा है। यहाँ मौखिक के सद्य हर में 'पाँच' भाषा में शोधकर्ता के मध्यम में पुनर्गठित किया गया है।

(५) मथुरा कस्बा वह है जो मार्ग मानवदर्शिकार के संवादार है। इसमें मानव के तत्त्व तथा कार्यान्वयन के लिए अन्य रूप से कृति रहे हैं। मानव वह यूनिट साहित्य, जिन्होंने अनुशासनी भी, नागरिकरण का स्थान नहीं निष्पक्ष करने के लिए जड़हाल में यूनिट है।

४५ यादुनाथान्द 'ग्राममानसाधार' (४५ ६) में श्रीधरान्द को उद्योग किया है जिसमें यह कहा गया है जि सामाजिक भाषा में मन्देर में पुनर्जन्तृत है। यहाँ यादुनाथान्द 'सागर' करते हैं जो सागरीय के नाम से पुकारने वाले 'देवसूर' करते हैं। यहाँ 'राजार' पुनर्जन्तृत भाषा वहीं यहीं निवास है।

स में देशहो नाम सर्वसाधारण मानित है। (४५ ६)

(७) देशवाणी आयोजन मानव देशवाणी "पूर्व था। काशि नाम दिखाया नाम रूप था। पाठमान साहित्य विषयों में भ्रान्ति है। पूर्ववर्तिका राज्य स तु मानवविश्वास सार्थक नि। जगुरु।

(८) विविशेष वर्ण व वृद्ध प्रसंसक वर्ण 'साहित्य पुरस्कार' वर्ण। सुभाषी देवसूर वर्ण। धार्मिक "प्रति। धार्मिक देवसूर नाम 'साहित्य पुरस्कार'। पाठमान साहित्य बहुविषयक पाठमान सार्थक वर्ण।

४७ मध्यप्रदेश व उत्तरप्रदेश की सुरम्य बुद्धिभोजन, या।

४८ युवेनिक तुल्यार्ध साधारण प्राण।

४५ अर्थशास्त्र आधा 'दिनों', धर्म की धार्मिक, धार्मिक, दुर्गा १६७।
नवालम द्वारा लिखित ग्रन्थ का संग्रह है, जिसमें शास्त्रीय भाषा में लिखी गई है। इसमें विभिन्न विषयों के प्रस्तुति हेतु, वेदों के सूत्रों और ग्रन्थों के तत्त्वों का प्रयोग किया गया है।

(२) पारमाण्व के विरासत का वूहार कारण दर्शाये तात्विक बिजय का प्रवेश है।

(३) एक तीव्रताओं का सन्धान है कि वह वायू मन्त्र का आरोग्य है, वर्तमान मन्त्र में तत्त्वों के प्रयोग में तात्विक रूप से देखा जा सकता है।

(४.२६) वायू में विभिन्न विकल्पों में श्रीकार निर्देशन गया है और गीता (४.२६) को पारमाण्व के संदर्भ में विशेष रूप से महत्वपूर्ण माना गया है।

सन्दर्भ और विवरण

• कुछ तंत्र, जिसमें वैदिक मुद्दों हैं।
• वेदों की विस्तार की गति की रिखत के लिए एक शिल्प है।
• वेदों में सन्धित स्वतंत्र के वैदिक बिजयों से विस्तृत रहने का उपरेश व्यक्ति है।
• इस संबंध में पारमाण्व है (वायविस्तारक की रोचकता), जिसमें प्रत्येक प्रकार वेद में मुख्य रूप से रखा गया है।

इनके बाद कुछ अन्य विषयों का दर्शावने हैं।

1. उपनिषद: उपनिषदें में काव्यकला में भावार्थ द्वारा अभिव्यक्ति है।
2. भाषाविश्लेषण: भाषाविश्लेषण से निवृत्त बिजय है।
(1) इतिहास का यह भाग तद्दुल्ल के लिए सुल्तान मुहम्मद और उसके उत्तरवर्ती शासकों के भाग को स्वीकार किया गया।

(2) इतिहास का यह भाग तद्दुल्ल के लिए सुल्तान मुहम्मद और उसके उत्तरवर्ती शासकों के भाग को स्वीकार किया गया।

(3) इतिहास का यह भाग तद्दुल्ल के लिए सुल्तान मुहम्मद और उसके उत्तरवर्ती शासकों के भाग को स्वीकार किया गया।

(4) इतिहास का यह भाग तद्दुल्ल के लिए सुल्तान मुहम्मद और उसके उत्तरवर्ती शासकों के भाग को स्वीकार किया गया।

(5) इतिहास का यह भाग तद्दुल्ल के लिए सुल्तान मुहम्मद और उसके उत्तरवर्ती शासकों के भाग को स्वीकार किया गया।
राजस्थानी माता और बोलियाँ

रूपचार पारिक, एम.सी. एस.

भाषाविज्ञान में मातामाता का शब्दकर्म शास्त्रीय काल से हीता रहा है परंतु इस शब्दकर्म के विकास का व्यापक भाग धर्म, साहित्य और साहित्यकला के अर्थ के साथ उसका विकास तत्कालीन सन्तों द्वारा आरंभित था। इसके खिलाफ इसके शास्त्रीय प्रतीत करने वाले अनुसार तथा तत्कालीन परीक्षण नहीं किया गया था। भारतीय साहित्य के अभिनव रूपों में भारतीय पर्यावरण और भारतीय समस्याओं को उचित प्रतीत करने वाला तत्कालीन शास्त्रीय साहित्य ने इस शब्दकर्म का उपयोग किया। तत्कालीन साहित्य के लिए उपयोगी विषयों का विकास पर भी विशेष ध्यान केंद्रित किया गया।

(१) नामकरण

साहित्य का राजस्थानी की 'दिल्लिया' का परिभाषण भवन साहित्य में समान रूप से माना जाता है परंतु विविध कालों में शास्त्र के रूप में हरी विद्वान के रूप में अनेक महाभाषाओं के लिए इस शब्द का समान अर्थ है। राजस्थान का एक महान्यक मुख्यतः शास्त्रीय और साहित्यिक रूप से पहले माता माता का नाम है। इस माता का इसी नामकरण ने राजस्थान के लोक संस्कृति को साधारणतः 'कुलसंस्कृत' नामक रूप में प्रसिद्ध किया।

१. राजस्थानी माता : झा० सुभाषिकुमार घटंजी, पृष्ठ ६६।
BHAKTI AS A MEANS OF EMANCIPATION IN RAMANuja

S. R. BHATT

Every system of thought in India is a felt need of an age, and in view of the circumstances it was high time for Ramanuja to systematize and expound the doctrine of the God of grace and devotion. He provided the love of God with an enduring philosophy and philosophy with an abiding love of God.

There are two prominent ways (though often a triple method is described, viz., of karma, jñāna and bhakti) to liberation, viz., jñāna and bhakti. In jñāna — also called avyaktopāsana — attainment of brahmāsthi is necessary as is described in the Bhāgavad Gīta. This state can be achieved only by great efforts and long practice. In it actions are to be surrendered to the Lord (Bhramārpana). But this path is very difficult and strewn with many hazards and hardships. In Bhakti yoga, which is easier than jñāna yoga, the self is to be surrendered to the Lord. Sāṅkara has advocated the latter and Rāmanuja has preferred the former.

The origin of the cult of bhakti in Hinduism is shrouded in mystery. But it is quite evident that its germs are found in the Vedic hymns. The Vedic hymns are replete with sentiments of piety and reverence in the worship of the gods. The upāsāna kānda of the Aranyakas and the Upaniṣads have laid the foundation of the bhakti mārga, way of devotion and faith. It is impossible to read some of the soul-stirring Vedic hymns to Varuṇa, Savitṛ and Uśas and not feel the presence of true devotion, however inadequate may have been its philosophical background. The doctrine of devotion is clearly evident in the later Upaniṣads like Kaṭha, Mundaka, Svetāvatara. In the Svetāvatara the doctrine of grace is emphasized and the doctrine of self-surrender is suggested. Thus the cult of bhakti adumbrated in the Vedic hymns and the Upaniṣads and developed in the Gītā, Mahābhārata and Viṣṇupuruṣa, blossoms forth fully in Rāmanuja.

According to Rāmanuja bhakti alone is the means to emancipation. He defines bhakti as a meditation on God accompanied by love. Bhakti as a loving meditation is also described by him as a steady remembrance. This steady remembrance is compared to an uninterrupted flow of oil. Such remembrance is of the same character as intuition, as testified by Mundaka and Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣads. Rāmanuja writes that this view is supported by the Vākyakāra, as well. This steady remembrance is a high state of consciousness in which there is complete immediate presentation of the beloved God, cultivated and at last attained by the uninterrupted contemplation

1 Gītā, II. 72.  
2 Ibid., IV. 18-23.  
3 Ibid., IV. 24.  
4 B. N. Seal, Comparative Studies in Christianity and Vaisnavism, P. 8.  
5 Belvalkar and Ranade, H.O.I.P. Vol. II. P. 409.  
6 II. 23.  
7 III. 2.3.  
8 III. 20, VI. 21.  
9 VI. 18.  
10 सौवन्धमुन्मत्स्यां महारिषिष्वरस्य दुर्गुणः।  
11 Here Ramanuja quotes Sve. III. 8; Tait. Ary 3.12.7., and Gītā VIII. 22, XI. 53-4  
12 एवं च भवानुभवित भजनदेवनानिधिभये।  
13 S.B. 1.1.1.  
14 चतुर्वारां विद्यालोकितां विद्यायतातामार्जय।  
15 उद्देश्ये पराक्षे 2.2.8.  
16 भाष्यमार्जन परीक्षाय 2.4.5.  
17 S.B. 1.1.1.
of His perfection. He who possesses this remembrance marked by the character of immediate presentation, is chosen by the Highest Self, and by him is the Highest Self gained. This remembrance is also called svapndhigamya, i.e., to be attained as a cognition similar to a dream.

Rāmānuja regards this bhakti as synonymous with upāsanā. In the Vedic literature we find both these words used for devotion. Bhakti, derived from the root bhaj, appears in the Vedic passage, ‘mahāste visnoh sumati bhajdharme.’ The root ās with the prefix upa, is also used side by side with the root bhaj, as we find in the Yajurveda passage, ‘yasya visva upasati’.

Rāmānuja emphatically maintains that this devotion is not an unintellectual, fervent glow of emotion or exuberance of feeling and erotic element. He holds that it is essentially a specific form of cognition. That knowing and meditating are synonymous is expressed in the Taittirīya Aranyaka (3.12.7), Chāndogya (3.18.1. & 3., 4.1.4., 4.2.2), and Brhadāranyaka (1.4.7). Rāmānuja writes that it is only knowledge in the form of meditation which being daily practised and constantly improved by repetition and continued upto forsaking the mortal frame, becomes the means of liberation. In Vedartha Samgraha he writes that bhakti is a kind of knowledge so excellent, precious and exclusive that it robs everything else of its interest. He that has acquired this knowledge is elected by the Supreme Person, and so he can grasp Him. It is through bhakti yoga, furthered at first by karma yoga and subsequently by jhāna yoga, that such knowledge in the form of supreme bhakti arises. In the Gītā bhasya Rāmānuja makes it clear that the knowledge, of ātman combined with karma yoga leads to jhāna yoga. Through knowledge one arrives at the true contemplation for realizing ātman (prāpta ātman) which results in the knowledge of God. Rāmānuja quotes Chāndogya (7.8.1.) to corroborate his view that the contemplation of ātman is auxiliary to the attainment of God. In the first invocatory verse of Śrī Bhāṣya Rāmānuja beseeches the Lord — bhavaṃ mama parasmin śrīnaṃ bhakti rūpāṃ —, i.e., ‘May my mind be filled with devotion towards the Highest Brahman’.

Rāmānuja makes it quite clear that mere knowledge is not sufficient for liberation. It is the meditation which takes the form of devotion that is required. This meditation is of the form of knowledge which is prescribed by the Vedānta. But this knowledge is not mere vākyārtha jhāna, but that which is denoted by dhyāna, upāsanā, and similar terms. Here Rāmānuja derives support from the Brhadāranyaka (1.4.15, 4.4.21., 4.5.6.), Chāndogya (3.7.1.), Mundaka (2.2.6.) and Katha (1.3.15.) Upaniṣads. On this basis Rāmānuja distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge, one lower knowledge based on the scriptural sentences, and the other higher knowledge which is of the nature of devout meditation and consists of direct intuition of Brahman.

Bhakti is synonymous with upāsanā.

16 Ibid, 1.1.1. 17 ब्रज: ब्रह्मचारस्यस्युद्धिः। स एव परेः दासामाना वर्णी समीतिः। इदाय यथो परमात्मेषुपयुक्तं ग्रंथिः। इति। 18 Manus uses this word (XII. 122) and Ramanuja in Vedartha Samgraha borrows it.
19 उपासना पररस्यार्थ मक्ति गुणम्। 20 रू. I, 156. 3. 21 XXV. 13. 22 मक्ति च दासानिषेध्य एव। Vedartha Samgraha 144.
23 वेदार्थासमाधिसिद्धविषयं एव। 24 ध्येयतम स्म व्याक्तिकंपद्याय समाधिशास्त्रमय स्म पश्चात् व्याख्यायादविद्यायमय अन्यातित्त्राचारगतः। S.B. 1. 1. 1.
25 ब्रह्मचारस्यस्युद्धिः मन्त्रिकोष। Gītā Bhāṣya, Intro. 26 II. 53. 27 This word is derived from Ch. 7 8. 1. 28 मन्त्रिप्रभावानामेव। Vedartha Samgraha, 91. 29 वेदान्तविभिः वेदान्त रूपोध्यायम्। 30 वेदान्तविभिः वेदान्त रूपोध्यायम्। 31 S.B. 1. 2. 23.
Thus Ramanuja believes in the mystic love of God. The system of Ramanuja, from this point of view, culminates in a lofty mysticism in which the soul seeks to realize its freedom in a loving union with the Whole, and finds its highest life in the intellectual love of God, where view of God becomes vision of God and in which the finite is infinitized. That means wisdom must mature, fructify in the love of God. This, in other words means, the infinite expansion of the consciousness of the soul so as to realize fully its loving affinity with the whole creation.

Ramanuja is of the opinion that such a bhakti requires a reverent concentration, and as such, is an effect of devout remembrance. In this connection he quotes Katha wherein it is said that pravacana, medha and sruti, being the sources of direct cognition, it follows that only a product of smrti, can single out a devotee for election by the Supreme. That product of smrti says Ramanuja, is bhakti.

It is to be noted that this bhakti is not an outer form of worship, but is an inner spiritual attitude produced and enriched by virtues. It is not an emotionalism, but a training of the body, will and the intellect. The flower of bhakti can be produced by a scheme of 'Sadhana saptaka'. These seven means to steady remembrance resulting in bhakti, are borrowed by Ramanuja from the V[bhikara, and for this he also derives support from the Upanisads and the Gita.33 The first is viveka, i.e., discrimination or purity of food. This dialectic purity promotes the purity of being or satiwa-suddhi, and sativa-suddhi again promotes clear and determinate knowledge. The second is vimoka, i.e., freedom from desire, resulting in detachment and tranquillity. The third is abhyasa, i.e., frequent repetition or continued practice. The fourth is kriyd, i.e., performance of the pa[namah[vainas according to one's own ability. The fifth is kalyana, i.e., virtuous conduct. It comprises of truth, simplicity, charity, benevolence and non-maliciousness etc. The sixth is anasvato, i.e., constant vigilance and absence of despondency. The last is anudharsa, i.e., absence of exultation. Equipped with these the devotee enters on the life of devotion and cultivates the love of God. Along with these seven aids, Ramanuja suggests also yajna and other karmas.34

The bhakti which is the result of this sadhana saptaka and other aids, has three stages and nine phases. The three stages are diruvanamsruti (firm meditation), asekrdvrtti (frequent repetition) and darsana samanakarat (orison of union). Its nine phases are as follows:—stuti (glorification), sruti (remembrance), namaskrti (homage), vandana (salutation), yittana (mortification), kirtana (exaltation), gunasravana (listening to the attributes of the Lord), vacana (narrating them), dhyana (meditation), arcana (adoration) and pranama (prostration). Though the Vedas, Upanisads, Gita and Vishnu purana do not expressly enumerate all these at one place, they contain many references to all of them, so it can safely be said that Ramanuja’s bhakti is based on the Vedas.

In Ramanuja, as well as in the early literature, the exuberance of feeling and the erotic element in devotion were never allowed. The devotion in Ramanuja is quite restrained and contemplative, and consists of calm meditation and serene contemplation.

Solid devotions resemble the rivers which run under the earth—they steal from the eyes of the world to seek the eyes of God; and it often happens that those of whom we speak least on earth, are best known in heaven. —Caussin
Did Ramanuja Advocate Pancharatra and Sri-Vaisnavism?

by

S. R. Bhatt

The object of this paper is to examine the view, held by all ancient and modern scholars, that the theism of Ramanuja is an outcome of his conscious effort to blend the Vedantic metaphysics with the Vaisnavite religion of the Alvars, Srí Vaiṣṇava Āchāryas and Pāñcharātra Samhitās.

I

This examination is mainly based on the following three points:

(1) The trend of thought in the works of Ramanuja does not support this view; and the Sri-Vaiṣṇava tradition which lends support to it does not seem reliable.

(2) There is no reference to these Alvars and Āchāryas in his works; and the reference to Pāñcharātra in Śrī-Bhāṣya alone, assists us rather to disprove this view.

(3) There is sufficient evidence to prove that the theistic interpretation by Ramanuja was no innovation, nor does it betray any non-Vedantic influence.

There seem to be four factors responsible for the view that we are to examine.

(1) As Grierson rightly points out,1 Bhandarkar R. G.,2 who among the modern scholars first promulgated this view, bases his account upon Artha Pañchaka and Yatindramata Dipikā only. This makes it certain that it came to be held in total ignorance of Ramanuja’s own works.

(2) There is a strong tendency among Ramanujists of regarding Viśiṣṭādvaita and Śrī-Vaiṣṇavism as identical. This misconception is due to a failure to dissociate the Viśiṣṭādvaita of Ramanuja from the Viśiṣṭādvaita of his followers. The former is a

direct outcome of the Vedāntic tradition established by Bodhayana and strengthened by the “Pūrvāchāryas”. It may be true, as S. N. Dasgupta contends, that the Śrī-Vaiṣṇava movement might have existed before the birth of Rāmānuja (though I have genuine doubts about it); and further, it is true that it was highlighted by the followers of Rāmānuja; but on this ground it can not be asserted that it has exerted its influence upon him. The Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja is poles apart from Śrī-Vaiṣṇava cult (which is sectarian in character, practising ritualism as enjoined by Pāṇcharātra Samhitās). The two have been incoherently mixed in the writings of Rāmānuja’s followers.

(3) The whole mistake lies in the fallacy that since Rāmānuja was born in the South where Śrī-Vaiṣṇava and Pāṇcharātra sects flourished and where these doctrines were much professed and practised, Rāmānuja was influenced by them. But no such influence is found in the works of Rāmānuja.

(4) It is only the Śrī-Vaiṣṇava tradition that mentions Rāmānuja in the spiritual lineage of the Tamil Saints and Sages. Some of the followers of Rāmānuja, who perhaps established this tradition, could not resist the allurements of being devoted disciples of their master, at the same time appreciating and accepting the enamouring utterances of these saints and sages. They tried—and apparently succeeded too—to associate the two, by dragging Rāmānuja’s Viśiṣṭādvaita within the fold of Śrī-Vaiṣṇavism. They attributed to Rāmānuja those doctrines of their sect which are not at all found in his writings and which he would never have accepted.

It is well to bear in mind in this connection that Rāmānanda, who is said to have been 9th in the apostolic succession from Rāmānuja, being dissatisfied with his brother-followers, had come to the North. This points to cardinal differences among the followers of Rāmānuja. From the fact that Rāmānanda did not preach or practise Śrī-Vaiṣṇava and Pāṇcharātra doctrines, whereas the Southern section did so, one can easily conclude that the point of difference between the two sets of followers must be the ques-

3. Śrī Bhāṣya, III, p. I.
5. Satyavrata Singh, Vedanta Desika, a study; p. 422.
6. Following Govindāchāryya, I have used saints for Ālvār and sages for Śrī Vaiṣṇava Achāryas.
7. Vide Macnicol Indian Theism, p. III; Religious Thoughts and Life in India (p. 124) M. Williams; Outlines of Indian Philosophy, pp. 95 and 185.
tion whether Rāmānuja has enjoined the practice of Śrī-Vaiṣṇava and Pāñcharātra doctrines. Since Rāmānanda, who differed from the rest, could not stand the opposition of the powerful orthodox section, he had to go to the North and establish a new sect. And lest his followers, under the old influence, should smuggle in Śrī-Vaiṣṇava and Pāñcharātra practices, he altogether replaced the Deity Narāyaṇa by Rāma.

II

As a matter of fact, as we said above, the school which Rāmānuja professes to follow, had a venerable ancestry commencing almost from the times of the author of the Sūtras. Rāmānuja in expounding the sutras professes to follow, and expresses his indebtedness to, the "ancient teachers" whom he enumerates and quotes. We may mention here that Rāmānuja does not enumerate either the Ājvārs or the Achāryās whom tradition regards as his spiritual teachers. He begins his Vedartha Sungraha and his commentary on Gītā by paying his tribute of respect to Yāmuna. A work of the latter, Siddhitraya, is frequently quoted by him and he generally follows the same line of argument as we find in Siddhitraya. This Yāmuna, we believe, is not the same Yāmuna who is regarded as the author of Agamāprāmāṇya and is revered as the celebrated Achāryā in Śrī-Vaiṣṇava tradition. As the tradition itself holds that Rāmānuja did not meet the Śrī-Vaiṣṇava Yāmuna, the latter cannot be his guru; and the Yāmuna, who is paid tribute by Rāmānuja, is some one else. Even if we regard Śrī-Vaiṣṇava Yāmuna as his guru, Rāmānuja does not seem to follow his guru or else this Yāmuna is not the author of Agamāprāmāṇya. Further, even if this Yāmuna be the author of Agamāprāmāṇya and as such has advocated Pāñcharātra, this does not provide us with sufficient reason to conclude that Rāmānuja has also done so. Even if we further admit that being born in the same lineage he must have been indirectly influenced, this does not prove the thesis of "conscious synthesis."

In fact not only Rāmānuja belongs to an ancient and strongly defined theistic tradition of the Vedānta, but his theology purports to be a faithful representation of the Vedāntic teaching as enshrined in the Prasthāṇa Trayī. Within the intellectual theosophy of the Vedas and Upaniṣads we find distinctly theistic and devotional tendencies gradually developing, which find their culmination in Rāmānuja Vedānta. Certainly we do find a happy reconciliation of Absolutism and Theism in Rāmānuja, but such a synthesis is already reached in Gītā and Viṣṇu Purāṇa. It may here be said,
when the synthesis was already achieved, where lies the innovation of Rāmānuja who merely reproduces the same? The answer may be that in order to contradict the Māyavādins, he had to make fresh attempts to restore that synthesis. It is the height of injudiciousness on the part of a scholar like Kumārappā to hold that though Rāmānuja claims that his views are taught by the scripture, i.e. the Upanīsads, he (Kumārappā) could find no such basis for Rāmānuja's doctrines in the Upaniṣads. He therefore concludes that Rāmānuja has obtained them from Pānchārātra and Śrī-Varṇa works. Prof Kumārappā himself accepts that Rāmānuja cites Upaniṣadic passages in his support, but he argues that these citations are few and uncertain. This thesis in our opinion cannot be substantiated. The attempt of the learned professor to falsify the account of Rāmānuja himself by imputing to him what he disowns is not justifiable.

As regards the allusion to Pānchārātra Samhitās and Rāmānuja's favourable attitude towards them, as we noted above, one should interpret what he says only in the light of the particular context. Rāmānuja regards Mahābhārata as an authority, which is composed, according to him, by Sūtraṅkara himself and which upholds the validity of Pānchārātra. He explicitly says that it is only on this ground that he contends that the author of the Sūtras intends to favour and not to impugn the Pānchārātra. Rāmānuja, on his own account, does not plead for Pānchārātra but simply repudiates the Sāṅkarite contention, and further corrects the critics by presenting the right view. We cannot even say with certainty whether he had studied the available Samhitās. The verse which Rāmānuja cites from Parama Samhitā is not found in it. This makes us think that perhaps he had not read the Samhitās and had quoted from them indirectly.

Had Rāmānuja been an advocate of Pānchārātra and Śrī-Varṇavaisnavism, he would have championed their cause as vigorously as Yāmuna, the author of Āgama-Prāmāṇya or Vedānta Deśika, did. Whenever he asserts or denies, confirms or refutes, he derives his support from Prasthān Trayī, Mahābhārata and Purāṇas only. He never quotes from Pānchārātra Samhitās nor even mentions Tīrūvaimoli, Divya Prabandhas or other writings of Ālvārs and Āchāryas. It is a matter of some interest and importance to note that there is a tradition which maintains that Ālvārs were born

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after the death of Rāmānuja. If this is true, then there is no foundation for the view which we are examining. Furthermore, had he been influenced by them, he would have certainly and unhesitatingly expressed his indebtedness to them. Not only this. While describing scriptures which are authoritative for him, he does not even mention Pāñcarātra Samhitās, Divya Prabandhas or Tiruvoimoli which is extolled by Vedānta Deśika as Dravīḍopaniṣad.

There are cardinal differences in the doctrines of Rāmānuja on one side and those of Pāñcarātras and Śrī-Vaṁśavism on the other. We shall, for want of space, take only two examples and conclude.

Rāmānuja never emphasised the exuberance of feeling or erotic element in devotion as we find in Śrī-Vaṁśa and Pāñcarātra sect. As R. G. Bhāndārkar rightly observes, in his system bhakti means constant meditation, and it corresponds to the upāsanā of the upaniṣads. Devotion in these sects is not called bhakti but prapatti, which is conspicuously absent in Rāmānuja. Rājagopālachārya says, “This doctrine (prapatti) is considered to have some slight basis in Upaniṣads, but is not referred to in the Śrī Bhāṣya of Rāmānuja”. The word prapatti, as prapadyate or prapadyante, thrice occurs in Gītā itself, and accordingly Rāmānuja also uses it; but he explains prapadyate as upāsanā, and Govindachārya also translates it as ‘worships’. Groisen opines, “I have not seen Gadyātraya but it is plain that in his commentary on Bhagavadgītā Rāmānuja either ignored modern prapatti altogether or else considered it as included in the term bhakti”.

The teachings of Pāñcarātra Samhitās, says Śrīnivāsa Aiyangār, tend towards Advaitism, and the concept of the Ultimate Reality is more that of Nirguṇa; but in Rāmānuja just the opposite is the case. Moreover, apparently all the extant Samhitās are full of the so-called tāntric element, but no such tāntrism or ritualistic details are to be found in Rāmānuja.

12. Vaṁśavite reformers of India, p. 3.
13. VII. 14, 19, 20.
15. Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 184-5.
In fact there is nothing sectarian in the philosophy of Rāmānuja. "The only sectarian feature of Rāmānuja," remarks Thibaut, "is that it identifies Brahman with Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa, but this in no way affects the interpretations put on the Sūtras and Upaniṣads. Nārāyaṇa is in fact nothing but another name of Brahman." As Thibaut makes it clear the word Nārāyaṇa does not have any sectarian tinge.

We may state the positive thesis of our paper thus:

The theism propounded by Rāmānuja is not an outcome of his conscious effort to blend the Vedāntic metaphysics with Śrī-Vaiṣṇava and Pāṇḍhārātra religion. As a matter of fact, we do not find any element in him which may be regarded as non-vedāntic.