CHAPTER-III

IMPORTANT PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS BY UNITED NATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNT
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The term peace keeping was first used when the United Nations General Assembly, under a United for Peace Resolution, established the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in 1956 to supervise the withdrawal of the Israeli, British and French forces from Egypt.

Since its inception in 1948 and upto 1988 i.e. with in a span of about forty years, 13 peace keeping operations were launched by the United Nations and which resulted in the evolution of a body of principles, procedures and practices which gradually came to constitute a corpus of case law or customary practice.\(^1\)

Since 1988 there has been a dramatic increase in the number of United Nations peace keeping operations. Simultaneously United Nations forces have become involved in a series of qualitatively new tasks, ranging from electoral assistance and human rights monitoring, the protection of humanitarian relief operations, to the disarmament and demobilization of armed forces. This revival of the United Nations peace keeping operations is closely linked with the disappearance of the cold war tension, resulting in decoupling a long standing regional and internal conflicts from East-West rivalry.

Since 1989, due to change in law on humanitarian intervention, as evidenced by the Security Council action in Iraq, Somalia and former Yugoslavia, the scope of United Nations Peace Keeping Operations has further broadened and matters previously deemed to the "essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of member states are falling within the United Nations sphere of influence.

The United Nations worldwide peace keeping operations are very vast in number. Some of the important peace keeping operations are enumerated below.

CONGO

In July 1960, the Congo was declared independent by Belgium. Shortly afterwards, serious disagreement arose between the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. There was also a revolt in the military forces of Congo called Force Publique. At the same time, the province of Katanga which had rich mineral resources declared its independence. A peace keeping force in the Congo (now Zaire) was thus established. In February 1961, the Prime Minister was assassinated under the order of the President. Meanwhile there was a serious erosion of the military strength of the United Nations forces in Congo, because a number of African Countries decided to withdraw their contingents as a protest against United Nations failure to protect the life of the constitutional Prime Minister. The ability of the United Nations forces in Congo to carryout the Security Council mandate was therefore greatly reduced. At this point the Secretary General appealed to then India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to provide a full brigade for service in Congo. It is a matter of history that the Indian brigade was mainly responsible for ending the session of Kataga in 1961-62.

In August 1999 the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of up to 90 military liaison personnel to support implementation of a cease-fire agreement for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) which had been signed in Lusaka, Zambia, in July. Technical officers were also to be
dispatched to Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, all signatories of the Lusaka accord to assess the security of any future UN presence in the sub-region. The Security Council approved the establishment of MONUC in late November, with an initial mandate until 1 March 2000. The mission was, in co-operation with Joint Military Commission comprising representatives of the parties to the conflict, to oversee the implementation of the agreement, including monitoring the cease-fire and the disengagement of forces. The mission was also mandated to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Initially MONUC was to comprise liaison and technical assessment officers, as well as other multidisciplinary personnel, previously authorized by the Council. In February 2000 the Security Council extended MONUC's mandate to the end of August and authorized the expansion of the mission to comprise up to 5,537 military personnel, including up to 500 observers. MONUC's mandate was subsequently further extended, to October, to December and then to 15 June 2001. However, by February 2001 the Lusaka Cease-fire accord had yet to be implemented and only a small contingent of MONUC observers had been deployed in the DRC. In mid February the Security Council adopted a resolution demanding that the parties to the conflict commence the phased disengagement of their forces by mid-March and stipulating that plans for the full withdrawal of foreign troops and the disarmament, demobilization and resettlement of militia must be prepared and adopted by mid-May.

At 1st January 2001 MONUC comprised 24 troops and 183 military observers, assisted by 360 international and local civilian personnel. The proposed budget for the mission amounted to US $ 141.3 m. for the period 1 July 2000 to 30 June 2001.
Keeping the Indian Brigade performance in the past in view, the United Nations under Secretary for Peace Keeping Marie Guehemo, has once again requested India for deployment of Indian contingent worth 3000 troop in Congo.

**CYPRUS**

Cyprus was a British Colony in the Mediterranean and became independent in 1960. It has a predominantly Greek Cyprus population of 80% and a Turkish minority population of 20%. There was some tension between the two communities, which came to a head in 1964. As a result, the Security Council established a peace keeping force in Cyprus called UNFICYP in March 1964, for three months in the first instance. Since then the peace keeping force in Cyprus remains in place and has been extended periodically by the security council. Some of the important highlights of the mission are:

(a) Firstly, the reason for the short mandate of the peace keeping force was to make it necessary for the Secretary General to come repeatedly to the Security Council for the extension of the mandate of the force.

(b) Secondly, since UNFICYP was established at the height of the financial crisis of the United Nations, the Secretary Council decided that it should be funded entirely by voluntary contributions from member state.

(c) Thirdly, it has been an article of faith during the days of Hammarskjold that the permanent member of the Security Council should not be called upon to give actual peace keeping forces in any given situation.
In August 1996 serious hostilities between elements of Greek and Turkish Cypriot community in the UN controlled buffer zone resulted in the deaths of two people and injuries to many others, including 12 UN personnel. Following further intercommunal violence, UNFICYP advocated the prohibition of all weapons and military posts along the length of the buffer zone. The Force also proposed additional humanitarian measures to improve the conditions of minority groups living in the two parts of the island. A new series of direct negotiations between the leaders of the two communities was initiated, under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General's Special Adviser, in July 1997. However, the talks were suspended at the end of that year. In November 1999 the leaders of the two communities agreed to participate in proximity negotiations, to be mediated by the UN. The first round of these talks took place in New York, in December, A second and third round were convened in Geneva, Switzerland, in February and July 2000, respectively. A fourth round of proximity talks was held in New York in September and a fifth round in Geneva, in November.

At 1st January 2001 UNFICYP had an operational strength of 1,213 military personnel and 33 civilian police officers, supported by 187 international and local civilian staff. Over the period 1st July 2000 to 30 June 2001 the proposed cost of maintaining the force amounted to US $43.4 m. of which some $23.1 m. was to be met by assessed contributions from UN member states, with voluntary contributions from the Governments of Cyprus and of Greece to amount to $13.8 m. and $6.5 m. respectively.

LEBANON

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established by UN Security Council Resolution 425 in March 1978, following an invasion of
Lebanon by Israeli forces. The force was mandated to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, to restore international peace and security, and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in Southern Lebanon. UNIFIL also extended humanitarian assistance to the population of the area, particularly followed the second Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. UNIFIL has provided civilians with food, water, fuel and medical and dental services.

In April 1992, in accordance with its mandate, UNIFIL completed the transfer of part of its zone of operations to the control of the Lebanese army. In April 1996 Israel initiated a large-scale offensive against suspected targets pertaining to the Hezbollah militia in Southern Lebanon. During the offensive Israeli artillery shells struck a UNIFIL base at Qana, which was temporarily being used to shelter civilians displaced by the hostilities, resulting in the death of some 100 people. The UN Security Council condemned the attack and demanded the respect by all sides for UNIFIL’s mandate and for the safety and freedom of movement of its troops. In May a UN inquiry concluded that the UN site had been deliberately targeted during the offensive, owing to the presence of Hezbollah activists in the camp. In June 1997 the UN General Assembly resolved that Israel should contribute US $ 1.8 m towards UNIFIL’s operational costs, as compensation for the Qana incident.

In late March 1998 the Israeli Government announced that it recognized UN Security Council Resolution 425, requiring the unconditional withdrawal of its forces from Southern Lebanon. It stipulated, however, that any withdrawal of its troops must be conditional on receiving security guarantees from the Lebanese authorities. A formal decision to this effect, adopted on 1st April, was rejected by the Lebanese and Syrian
Governments. In mid April 2000 the Israeli government formally notified the UN Secretary General of its intention to comply forthwith and in full with Resolution 425. Later in that month the UN Secretary General dispatched a team of experts to study the technical aspects of the impending implementation of Resolution 425, and sent a delegation, led by both his Special Co-ordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Terje Road Larsen, and the Commander of UNIFIL, to consult with regional Governments and groupings. The withdrawal of Israeli troops commenced in mid-May, and the final contingent was reported to have left Lebanon on 24 May. Meanwhile, the Security Council endorsed an operational plan to enable UNIFIL to verify the withdrawal. All concerned parties were urged to co-operate with UNIFIL in order to ensure the full implementation of the resolution. In accordance with its mandate, UNIFIL was to be disbanded following the resumption by the Lebanese government of effective authority and the normal responsibilities of a state throughout the area, including the re-establishment of law and order structures. In mid June the UN Secretary-General confirmed that Israeli forces had been fully evacuated from Southern Lebanon (Soon afterwards UNIFIL reported several Israeli violations of the line of withdrawal: the Israeli government agreed to rectify these by the end of July, and on 24 July the UN Secretary General confirmed that no serious violations remained. Further violations of the line, however, were recorded in subsequent months). From mid 2000 UNIFIL, reinforced with additional troops, patrolled the area vacated by the Israeli forces, monitored the line of withdrawal and continued to provide humanitarian assistance. From early August Lebanese security forces were stationed in the area, in co-operation with UNIFIL, although by January 2001 Lebanese military personnel had still not been deployed at the line of withdrawal. UNIFIL's mandate has been successively extended; in January 2001 the UN Security Council extended it
further, until 31 July, and authorized a reduction in the Force’s strength to 4,550 troops, to be effected by that date.

At 31\textsuperscript{st} January 2001 the Force comprised 5,802 troops, assisted by some 50 military observers and also by some 483 international and local civilian staff. The General Assembly appropriation for the operation for the period 1\textsuperscript{st} July 2000 to 30 June 2001 amounted to US $ 233.6 m.

SOMALIA

While the United Nations and the International Community achieved great success in eliminating mass starvation in Somalia, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) has experienced a mixture of success and set-backs. UNOSOM succeeded in facilitating talks among all Somali political and faction leaders aimed at achieving national political reconciliation. These leaders had hitherto steadfastly refused to engage in any all – Somali dialogue to resolve the political problems that have afflicted their country for so long and with disastrous consequences. Yet Somalia is still without a central government\textsuperscript{d}.

The important aspect which emerge with regard peace keeping operations in Somalia are:

(a) The futility of using United Nations peace keeping forces to contain what is a civil war situation.

(b) The other is to keep the forces of the major power out of participation in peace keeping exercises. For example, in Somalia both India and Pakistan troops suffered casualties and fatalities but there was no big outcry, but the moment American lives were lost there was a big outcry, in the US congress, that the peace keeping operations had to be brought to a half.
IRAQ – KUWAIT

United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) was established by a UN Security Council resolution (initially for a six month period) in April, 1991, to monitor a 200 km demilitarized zone along the border between Iraq and Kuwait. The task of the mission was deter violation of the border, to monitor the Khawr Abd Allah waterway between Iraq and Kuwait and to prevent military activity within the zone. In February 1993 the Security Council adopted a resolution to strengthen UNIKOM, following incursion into Kuwaiti territory by Iraq personnel the resolution enabled the use of physical action to prevent or redress violations of the demilitarized zone or the newly defined boundary between Iraq and Kuwait. UNIKOM provides technical support to other UN operations in the area, particularly the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission and has assisted with the relocation of Iraqi citizens from Kuwait, which was completed in February 1994.

At 31 January 2001 UNIKOM comprised 903 troops and 193 military observes, assisted by some 213 international and local civilian observes. The UN General Assembly appropriated US $ 52.7 m. for the maintenance of the mission for the period 1st July 2002 to 30 June 2001, two thirds of UNIKOM's total cost are funded by voluntary contribution from Kuwait.

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). In February 1992, the UN established Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in response to the escalating conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which become one of the largest operations ever mounted by the UN. UNPROFOR assumed responsibility for monitoring the withdrawal of anti-aircraft and
heavy weapons by both Bosnian Muslims and Serbs to agreed locations within Bosnia and Herzegovina, the delivery of humanitarian assistance and monitoring compliance with the prohibition on military flight in Bosnian airspace. In December 1995 leaders of the warring parties in the former Yugoslavia signed a peace accord, which had been concluded in the previous month in Dayton, USA. UNPROFOR's mandate was terminated a few days later, when a new multinational force under NATO Command (The Implementation Force-IFOR) assumed authority for implementation of the peace accord, for a 12 months period, on 20 December.

On 21st December 1995 the Security Council agreed on the establishment of the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) and a UN civilian office in accordance with the Dayton peace agreement. The operation subsequently became known as the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). The IPTF's task included monitoring, observing and inspecting law enforcement activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the training of police officers and person, assessing threats to public order and advising on the capability of law enforcement agencies to deal with such threats, and accompanying the Bosnian police forces in the execution of their duties. The UN co-ordinator was to exercise authority over the IPTF commission and to Co-ordinate other UN activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to humanitarian relief and refugees, demining, elections and economic reconstruction. UNMIBH was to cooperate closely with IFOR and later, with its successor operations, the Stabilization Force (SFOR), which became operational in December 1996. In early 1996 the UN was criticized for slow deployment of the IPTF, at the start of February fewer than 300 out of a total authorized strength of 1721 police officers had arrived in the country. The force was charged with maintaining an observer presence in Serb dominated suburbs of Sarajevo that were due to come under the administration of the
Bosnia Federation in March, a presence that was intended to provide encouragement to Serbs to stay in these areas. However, the vast majority of the Serbs took flight into the Republika Srpska prior to the transition of authority. In March the Security Council authorized the deployment of five military liaison officers, in order to strengthen liaison arrangements with IFOR. In August the mission reported failure on the part of Bosnian Federation Police to protect political opponents of the Muslim nationalist Party of Democratic Action (PDA) from attacks by PDA loyalists in advance of the forthcoming all Bosnia legislative elections. Prior to and during the elections, which were held in mid September, the IPTF assisted IFOR in providing protection to refugees and displaced people returning to vote in their towns of origin. At the international conference to review implementation of the Dayton agreement, which was held in mid-November, it was agreed that the IPTF's mandate was to be strengthened, granting it enhanced powers to investigate the Bosnian police in both sectors in the community. In February 1997 the IPTF criticized police officers for using excessive force against civilian during recent unrest between, the Muslim and Croat population in Mostar. In the following month the Security Council demanded that the Mostar authorities suspend and prosecute those officers responsible for the attacks. Also in March the Council authorized the strengthening of the IPTF by an additional 186 Police Officers and 11 civilian monitors in order to monitor, re-structure and train the local police force in the contested North-Eastern city of Breko, which was temporarily under international supervisions. In August UNHIBH criticized the forcible evacuation of some 500 Bosnian from the Muslim Croat federation and initiated an investigation into the role of the local police in the incidence. In Breko, in August, 58 IPTF monitors had to be evacuated by SFOR troops after coming under attack by Bosnian Serbs demanding control of the local
police station. During September UNMIBH cooperated with SFOR and an election monitoring group to assist safe and democratic voting in municipal election in the Bosnian federation and monitored the movement of voters within the region and across boundary lines. In May 1998 the Security Council authorized the deployment of an additional 30 IPTF monitors to conduct a series of internal training Programmes for the local police in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In July the Security Council endorsed the establishment of a new programme, within UNMIBH’s mandate, to assess and monitor the judicial system in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to promote the rule of law. The Council authorized the deployment of 26 legal experts to undertake the program. UNMIBH has endeavoured to ensure adequate minority representation in the Bosnian police in both sectors of the country. The Security Council has successively renewed UNMIBH’s mandate, including that of the IPTF. In June 2000, the missions’ mandate was extended until 21st June 2001.  

At 1st January 2001 UNMIBH comprised 1808 civilian police officers and five military liaison personnel assisted by 1772 international and local civilian personnel. The General Assembly appropriation for the period 1st July to 30 June 2001, which included the budgets of the UN Mission of observers in Prevlaka and of UN liaison offices in Belgrade and Zagreb, amounted to US $ 158.7 m.

ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA

United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). At the end of July 2000 the Security Council authorized the establishment of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) to facilitate compliance with and verify a cease fire agreement that had been signed by the governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia in mid June (having been mediated by the organization
of African Unity) with a view to settling a two year border conflict between the two countries. In mid September the Security Council authorized the deployment of up to 4200 military personnel (including 220 military observes) to the operation, which was given an initial six month mandate. The Security Council emphasized that UNMEE’s mandate would be terminated on completion of the process to delimit and demarcate the Eritrea-Ethiopia border. In December the Eritrean and Ethiopian authorities concluded a full peace accord. In February 2001 the Military Coordination Commission (which had been established in accordance with the cease-fire accord and had met for the first time in December, 2000) agreed a timetable to enable Eritrean and Ethiopian forces, monitored by UNMEE to redeploy in order to establish a 25 km temporary security zone. Following the creation of the security zone UNMEE was to coordinate and provide technical assistance for demining activities in the vacated area and adjacent areas.\textsuperscript{8}

At 2\textsuperscript{nd} February 2001 UNMEE comprised 3301 troops, 188 military observes and 226 international local and civilian personnel. The proposed budget for the mission amounted to US $150 m. for the period 1\textsuperscript{st} July 2000 until 30 June 2001.

SIERRA LEONE

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). In July 1998 the Security Council established a UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) to monitor the military and security situation in that country following the restoration of a democratically elected government. UNOMSIL was authorized to oversee the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants, as well as the voluntary disarmament of members of the civilians defense force and to assist in monitoring respect for international humanitarian law. The Special Representatives, with the civilian component
of the mission, was authorized to advise the Sierra Leonean authorities on police practice, training and reform and to help to address the country's human rights needs. UNO was to work closely with forces of the Economic Community for West African State (ECOWAS) in promoting peace and national reconciliation. In January 1999, following a sudden escalation of hostilities, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of UNOMSIL for a further two months, although acknowledged that several UNOMSIC military observes, together with civilian support staff, would withdraw to Conakry, Guinea, condemned the ongoing violation of human rights in Sierra Leone and urged all neighboring countries to prevent the cross border supply of armaments to anti government forces. None the less, the council extended the mission's mandate until mid-June and subsequently, until mid December. In August the Security Council authorized a provisional expansion of UNOMSIL of up to 210 military observers, in order to support the implementation of a peace agreement which had been signed by the parties to the Sierra Leone conflict in July, in Lome Togo. In October the Council authorized the establishment of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), comprising up to 6000 military personnel to help to consolidate peace in that country. UNAMSIL was mandated to cooperate with the Sierra Leonean government and all other parties to enforce the cease-fire accord and Lome peace agreement to implement a plan for the disarmament and demobilization of all former combatants and facilitate the delivery and humanitarian assistance. The mission was to assume responsibility for all civilian political and military components of UNOMSIL, the mandate of which was terminated with immediate effect. In February 2000, the Council expanded UNAMSIL's mandate to include the provision of security at key locations and government installations, assistance to the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities, and the safekeeping and subsequent disposal of
military equipment collected from former combatants. The council also
enlarged the missions' authorized strength from 6000 to 11100 military
personnel. During early 2000, in contravention of the Lome accord, Sierra
Leone rebels repeatedly obstructed the implementation of the disarmament
and demobilization plan. In May, following an attack on a contingent of
UNAMSIL troops in the previous month, rebels killed several mission
personnel and captured and detained a large number of others (reportedly
as many as 500), these were all released later in the month. In response to
the breakdown in security the United Kingdom deployed a force in Sierra
Leone in early May, with a mandate to evacuate British Nationals; the
presence of the British troops was also regarded, however, as a deterrent to
any escalation in rebel activities pending the arrival of UNAMSIL
reinforcement. In mid-May the Security Council approved a further increase
in the mission's authorized strength providing for a total of 13000 military
personnel. In mid July, UNAMSIL mounted a successful operation to release
233 of its personnel, who had been surrounded by rebels in Eastern Sierra
Leone since the end of May. In August the Security Council recommended
that the mission should be strengthened to enable it to secure approach
route to the Lungi and Freetown peninsulas and to counter continuing
attacks by armed rebels. The Council asked the Secretary General to assess
the number of additional troops that would be required to achieve this.
UNAMSIL's mandate has been successfully extended at short intervals most
recently until 31st March 2001.10

At 1st January 2001 UNAMSIL comprised 10137 troops and 249
military observers, assisted by 34 civilian police and 399 international and
local civilian personnel. The proposed budget for the mission amounted to
US $ 504.4 m. for the period 1st July 2000 to 30 January 2001.
EAST TIMOR

United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). In May 1999 Indonesia and Portugal signed an accord, under UN auspices providing for a 'popular consultation' to determine the future status of East Timor, a former Portuguese colony which had been governed by Indonesia since 1976. The poll was to be organized by the UN, offering eligible voters a form of political autonomy or full independence from Indonesia, the outcome of which would then be endorsed by the Indonesia government and implemented by a UN transitional authority. Under the agreement, Indonesia was to be responsible for maintaining peace and security in the territory and to ensure that voting was conducted without intimidation or violence, while the UN was to provide additional unarmed civilian and police personnel. In time the Security Council formally authorized the establishment of a UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) which was to comprise up to 280 police advisors and 50 military liaison officers, with an initial mandate until 31st August (later extended). The poll which was initially scheduled for early August was twice postponed, owing to security concern; however, registration of voters commenced in mid July. In late August the UN Security Council condemned the violent attacks and intimidatory tactics of militia groups favouring support for Indonesia and acknowledged reports that Indonesian officers had failed to prevent the decline in law and order, but determined that the vote should proceed. The Council also resolved to expand UNAMET's presence in September to 460 police officers and 300 military liaison officers. The popular poll was conducted on 30 August. International and local UN Staff supervised some 800 polling stations, established by UNAMET in 200 locations throughout the territory and estimated that votes were cast by 98.6% of the 451792 East Timorese who had been registered. The security situation in the territory declined
dramatically following the popular consultation and on 1st September the Security Council convened an emergency meeting to condemn, and demand the arrest of those responsible for violent attacks on UN Staff, pro-independence supporters and foreign journalists. The civil unrest and indiscriminate killings escalated after the announcement of the results of the poll, which identified some 78.5% of East Timorese voters in favour of independence and resulted in mass population displacement. A further meeting of Security Council members, held on 5 September resolved to send a five member mission to discuss the situation with the Indonesian government. The failure of a curfew, imposed by the Indonesian authorities a few days later, to restore security prompted the UN to evacuate almost all its remaining staff. In mid September, following international condemnation of the situation and intense diplomatic pressure, the Indonesian government had agreed to permit foreign troops to help restore order in East Timor. The Security Council subsequently authorized the establishment of a multinational force, under unified command, with a mandate to restore peace and security in the territory, until replaced by a UN peace keeping operations. The so called International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) was also mandated to protect and support UNAMET and to facilitate humanitarian operations. In late September INTERFET assumed formal control of the territory while UNAMET re-established its headquarters in Dili. In later October, following satisfaction of the results of the popular poll by the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly, the Security Council voted to establish a UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to oversee the transition to independence and govern the territory on an interim basis. UNTAET was to exercise all judicial and executive authority in East Timor. The Transitional Administration's mandate authorized it to provide security and maintain law and order in the territory, to assume responsibility
for the coordination and provisions of humanitarian assistance to establish an effective administration; to assist in the development of civil and social services and promote capacity building for self government and to assist in the creation of condition for sustained development. The responsibilities and personnel of UNAMET were incorporated in UNTAET. Military command was transferred from INTERFET to UNTAET in February 2000. In January 2001 the UN Secretary General presented a report to the Security Council outlining recommendations to enable elections to a new permanent East Timorese Legislative structure to be staged later in 2001 (These were subsequently scheduled for 30 August). The report envisaged the attainment of full independence for the territory by the end of the year. In late January an East Timorese court passed sentence on the first Indonesian militia member to be found quality of crimes relating to the insecurity which had prevailed at the time of the popular referendum on the future of the territory. UNTAET’s mandate which had an initial duration until 31st July 2001 was extended in that month until 31st July 2001, until 31st January 2002.

At 1st January 2001 UNTAET comprised 7765 troops, 1398 civilian police officers and 124 military observers, supported by 2655 international and local civilian personnel. The cost of the operation for the period 1st July 2000 to 30 June 2001 was estimated at US $ 536 m. this was to be funded mainly from assessed contribution, although a trust fund has been established to channel voluntary contributions for specific purposes.

WESTERN SAHARA

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO): in April 1991 the UN Security Council endorsed the establishment of MINURSO to verify a cease-fire in the disputed territory of Western Sahara (claimed by Morocco), which came into effect in September
1991, and to implement a settlement plan, involving the repatriation of Western Saharan refugees (in co-ordination with UNHCR), the release of all Sahrawi political primonora, and the organization of a referendum on the future of the territory. The referendum, originally envisaged for January 1992, was however, postponed indefinitely. In 1992 and 1993 the Secretary General's Special Representative organized negotiations between the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamray Raiode Oro (Frente Polisario) and the Moroccan Government, who were in serious disagreement regarding criteria for eligibility to vote in the referendum (in particular, the Moroccan Government insisted that more than 100000 members of ethnic groups who had been forced to leave the territory under Spanish rule prior to the last official census in 1974, the results of which were to be used as a basis for voter registration, should be allowed to participate in a referendum). Nevertheless, in March 1993 the Security Council advocated that further efforts should be made to compile a satisfactory electoral list and to resolve the outstanding differences on procedural issues. An Identification Commission was consequently established to begin the process of voter registration, although this was obstructed by the failure of the Moroccan Government and the Frente Polisario to pursue political dialogue. The identification and registration operation was formally initiated in August 1994. However, the process was complicated by the dispersed nature of the Western Saharan population. In December 1995 the UN Secretary General reported that the identification of voters had stalled, owing to persistent obstruction of the process on the part of the Moroccan and Frente Polisario authorities; at the end of May 1996 the Security Council endorsed a recommendation of the Secretary General to suspend the identification process until all sides demonstrate their willingness to co-operated with the
mission. The Security Council decided that MINURSO’s operational capacity should be reduced by 20% with sufficient troops retained to monitor and verify the cease-fire.

In early 1997 the new Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, attempted to revive the possibility of an imminent resolution of the dispute, amid increasing concerns that the opposing authorities were preparing for a resumption of hostilities in the event of a collapse of the existing cease-fire, and appointed James Baker, a former US Secretary of State, as his Personal Envoy to the region.\textsuperscript{13}

In June, Baker obtained the support of Morocco and the Frente Polisario, as well as Algeria and Mauritania (which border the disputed territory), to conduct further negotiations in order to advance the referendum process. Direct talks between senior representatives of the Moroccan Government and the Frente Polsario authorities were initiated later in that month, in Lisbon, Portugal, under the auspices of the UN and attended by Algeria and Mauritania in an observer capacity. In September the two sides concluded an agreement which aimed to resolve the outstanding issues of contention and enable the referendum to be conducted in late 1998. The agreement included a commitment by both parties to identify eligible Sahrawi voters on an individual basis, in accordance with the results of the 1974 census, and a code of conduct to ensure the impartiality of the poll. In October 1997 the Security Council endorsed a recommendation of the Secretary General to increase the strength of the mission, to enable it to supervise nine identification centres. The process of voter identification resumed in December 1997.\textsuperscript{14} The agenda for the settlement plan envisaged that the identification process would be followed by a process of appeal, the publication of a final list of voters, and then by a transitional period, under Un
authority, during which all Sahrawi refugees would be repatriated. The referendum was scheduled to be conducted in December 1998. In January 1998 the Security Council approved the deployment of an engineering unit to support MINURSO in its demining activities. In April the Council extended MINURSO's mandate for a three-month period. At that time there were already significant delays apparent in the identification process, owing to ongoing disputes regarding the eligibility of members of three Saharan tribal groups. In July the Security Council extended MINURO's mandate until mid-September, but warned that it would be terminated if either side significantly obstructed implementation of the settlement plan.

By early September 1998 the initial identification process had been completed, with a total of 147350 voters identified, including 87238 since December 1997. However, the issue of the eligibility of 65000 members of the three disputed tribal groups remained unresolved. Later in September 1998 the UN Security Council extended MINURSO's mandate by 30 days, to enable the Personal Envoy of the Secretary General to attempt to negotiate a solution to the problem. At the end of October the Council, extending MINURSO's mandate until mid-December, endorsed a series of measures proposed by the Secretary General to advance the referendum, including a strengthened Identification Commission to consider requests from any applicant from the three disputed tribal groups on an individual basis. The proposals also incorporated the need for an agreement by both sides with UNHCR with regard to arrangements for the repatriation of refugees. In November, following a visit to the region by the Secretary General, the Frente Polisario accepted the proposals, and in mid-March 1999 the Moroccan Government signed an agreement with the UN to secure the legal basis of the MINURSO operation, which was subsequently extended by the Security Council. In May the Council extended the mandate until mid
September. At the same time the Moroccan Government and the Frente Polisario agreed in principle to a draft plan of action for cross-border confidence measures. A new timetable envisaged the referendum being held on 31st July 2000. In July 1999 the UN published the first part of a provisional list of 84,251 qualified voters. The appeals process then commenced. In September the Mission's mandate was extended until mid December. In late November almost 200 Moroccan prisoners of war were released by the Frente Polinario authorities following series of negotiations led by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General. The identification of applicants from the three disputed Saharan tribal groups was completed at the end of December 1999. In January 2000 the second part of the provisional list of qualified voters was issued, and a six-week appeals process ensued. In December 1999, in February, May, July and October 2000, and in February 2001.

The mission has headquarters in the North and South of the disputed territory, and there is a liaison office in Tindouf, Algeria, which was established in order to maintain contact with the Frente Polisario (which is based in Algeria) and the Algerian Government.

At 31st January 2001 MINURSO comprised 203 international and local civilian personnel. The General Assembly appropriation to cover the cost of the mission for the period 1st July 2000 to 30 June 2001 amounted to US $ 49.3 m.

LESSONS LEARNT FROM PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS

Peace keeping operations evolved over a period of time, were not envisaged by the founding fathers of the United Nations in their present form and hence do not operate within the constitutional framework of the United
Nations Charter.\textsuperscript{15} Instead, as pointed out in the Bradford Peace Research Report No.31 of February 1993, Peace-keeping works on principles established through precedents, which can briefly be summed up as under:

(a) With the consent of the parties to the dispute for the mission itself, for the mandate and for the composition of the force.

(b) With non-interference in the internal affairs of the countries involved.

(c) With total impartiality towards the parties in dispute.

(d) With non-use of force except in self defense.

(e) With the continued support of the Security Council and the member states including troop contributing states.

(f) With delegation of responsibility of day to day running of the mission to the Secretary General.
REFERENCES


