Wittgenstein came to philosophy under direct influence of Bertrand Russell, more specifically, his reading of Russell’s *Principles of Mathematics*. His profound interest in mathematics led him to study Gottlob Frege also. On his advice he later came to Cambridge to study with Russell. There he spent long time attending to Russell’s lectures and participating in serious discussions with him. His first published work *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* may be viewed as a direct product of his Russellian way of philosophizing. However it is not the case that Wittgenstein was a mere disciple of Russell, far from this he was a co-philosopher of Russell. Russell himself admits of being influenced at times by Wittgenstein’s thoughts.

Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* is recognised by all philosophers and interpreters of Wittgenstein as a very hard nut to crack. It is mostly because of the style he uses in writing the numbered sentences of the *Tractatus*. They are so concise, short and ambiguous that sometimes their meanings become very obscure; still one can read out the linguistic analytic scheme that he projects through that treatise.

Wittgenstein starts philosophizing in the *Tractatus* with the heavily loaded metaphysical statement. “The world is all that is the case.”¹ The world which is “all that is the case” is again the “totality of facts, not of things.”² The distinction he draws between ‘facts’ and ‘things’ is such that facts are complex entities which necessarily depict certain configuration,
certain arrangement and combination. Facts may be said to be composed of things, but things are abstractions seen apart from facts. There cannot be for example, a chalk pencil independent of the fact ‘the chalk pencil is white’. This insistence upon the logico ontological primacy of facts over things has a strong suggestion that things are essentially relational in nature. The facts into which the world is ultimately analysed are simple or atomic facts. There are however complex facts which are but results of various combinations of atomic facts. But although Wittgenstein begins with a seemingly ontological statement about the world, his arrival at atomic facts as the ultimate unanalysable residue is not the result of any physical analysis of the world, but a necessity demanded by his logical analysis of language. Indeed it is the same Russellian scheme of looking at the world in linguistic terms.

Russell called his philosophy ‘logical atomism’. Here Russell is very clear that the atoms he is dealing with are not physical but logical atoms. The philosophy of logical atomism is a tool in Russell’s hands to refute and reject the traditional logic which accepted all propositions to be of subject-predicate form—there by leaving no room for relational propositions and condemning them, consequently the whole external world, to be illusory. Traditional logic, “an unfortunate legacy from theology” provided foothold to the metaphysical systems of Leibnitz, Spinoza, Hegel, Bradley and others. Hence a refutation of traditional logic will amount to, Russell thinks, a refutation of these idealistic philosophies.

The most striking defect of the traditional logic, according to Russell, is its recognition of the subject predicate form to be the only valid
form of proposition. The theory of the subject predicate logic led the philosophers to hold that there can be only one subject and that subject was allowed to include everything else within. Consequently they had to accept but one reality, i.e., the Absolute and anything coming short of the Absolute was not recognised as real in true sense. Again, conversely, since everything, including contradictions, found a place in the Absolute, nothing could be unreal altogether. Consequently they were led to formulate the theory of ‘degrees of reality’ which made reality of all other things, excluding that of the Absolute Reality. The most awkward corollary of the theory is that it led them to deny the reality of the external world.

Russell thinks that in order to get rid of such awkward conclusions we have to change the logic of our philosophical enterprises. Throwing off traditional logic as inadequate he himself took up to develop logic mathematically along the lines of Frege and Peano. Indeed, it was Russell who streamlined the course of development of modern logic based on mathematics.

Mathematics being his first love and ideal, Russell sought for mathematical clarity in philosophical discourses also. And he thought it could be achieved if the philosophical problems were viewed either as pseudo problems or as problems of logic. For this reduction of philosophy either to logic or to a pseudo discipline he took up the method of logical analysis. Since philosophizing was done on the linguistic plane it was the language that Russell chose as his object of analysis.

In his analysis of language Russell found the ordinary language to be most imperfect and inadequate as it was full of ambiguities and obscuri-
ties. Moreover the presence of the so-called "definite descriptions" expressed in phrases like "the so and so" seemed to create a lot of trouble for Russell. In his famous theory of definite descriptions Russell had shown that corresponding to these descriptive phrases there was no real entities. A proposition containing such a phrase although appear to be a simple proposition was actually a complex one and could be analysed into its constituent simple propositions where the definite descriptions did not have a place. Those simple propositions being incapable of any further analysis were called by him 'atomic propositions.'

Russell's theory of definite descriptions is the best example of his application of the logical analysis of language. Descriptions make an analysis of denoting phrases, which includes not names but descriptions. He in the context of definite descriptions makes a distinction between complete and incomplete symbols. And denoting phrases, which include definite or indefinite descriptions are incomplete symbols. As for instance, 'The author of Waverley', 'The present king of France', 'The last candidate who came into the room' etc.

Russell employs the model of analysis to determine the meaning of sentence. His logical analysis of propositions bring out the clear picture of a sentence. Russell shows that the sentence-"The present King of France is bald" is a conjunctive statement. So, the above statement can be analysed into three propositions.

a) There exists at present at least one king in France.
b) There exists at most one king in France.
c) Whoever is the king in France is bald.
This interpretation shows that the original sentence is meaningful and the proposition expressed by it is false. The above proposition is false because the first of the analysed proposition is false. So, Russell seems to accept the correspondence theory of truth to determine the meaning of sentence. Analysis brings out the factuality of sentences. Therefore, he mentions that—"the present king of France is bald" is a meaningful statement, but the same is false. Logical analysis brings out the fact that a sentence can be true if there is a correspondence between language and reality, and if there is no correspondence between the two, the sentence will be false. Therefore, it is clear that the sentence—'The present king of France is bald' is a false sentence, because there is no king of France at present.

Russell in his theory of definite descriptions distinguishes between grammatical form and logical form. He holds that the analysis of a proposition gives us its logical form. But he shows that the grammatical form is misleading because it leads to subject-predicate formula of formal logic which cannot properly picture the real situation.

Wittgenstein was highly influenced by this analysis of Russell. He acknowledged his debt to Russell in realizing the fact that there was difference between the apparent logical form and the real form of propositions. Corresponding to the Russelian 'atomic propositions', Wittgenstein speaks of 'elementary propositions'. An elementary proposition is the limit of analysis, that is, it is incapable of any further analysis. However it can be analysed into its constituent parts but these components are not themselves propositions.
"An elementary proposition consists of names. It is a nexus, a concatenation of names."³

"A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition; it is a primitive sign."⁴

Wittgenstein is here in perfect agreement with Russell in not regarding either 'cow', and 'square' on the one hand or 'Socrates' on the other to be logically proper names, since, while a cow or a square is obviously capable of being defined, Socrates and other so called proper names are also but concealed, abbreviated or truncated definitions. Hence none qualify for being a name in this special sense. A term in order to qualify for being called a name must not allow any possibility of being defined except by ostensive definition, i.e., by pointing out a thing like 'this'. It follows therefore that a name must denote something observable. It must also be simple without any part or component.

"A name means an object."⁵

"Objects are simple."⁶

And an elementary proposition is a concatenation of such names that denote simples. But it is quite interesting to note that although Wittgenstein was speaking of names as observables, definable only by pointing at the object as 'this', still he kept himself carefully away from citing any example either of a simple or of an elementary proposition. He insisted on their existence because he saw the a-priori logical necessity of their existence, and he was contented with it. Finding actual examples was the task of an empirical investigation in which he, being a formal logician, was not interested. But Russell tried
to explain what an “object-word” is: “First: their meaning is learnt by confrontation with objects which are what they mean... second: they do not presuppose other words. Third: each of them, by itself, can express a whole proposition; you can exclaim ‘fire!’ but it would be pointless to exclaim ‘than!’.”

Object words have meaning independent of their occurring in a sentence. It is through them that language is connected with non-linguistic occurrences.

Elementary propositions consist of names which denote simples. So, Wittgenstein’s analysis of proposition asserts that there ought to be simple things which the names denote.

The analysis of proposition into simpler kinds is based upon two assumptions. (A) It gives the real meaning of the proposition. (B) The meaning of a term is what it denotes. However the second assumption does not mean that the phrases like ‘the golden mountain’ also denote some real thing. On the contrary here Wittgenstein accepts the Russellian way of analysis of descriptive phrases. On this view the terms of a proposition signify something indirectly, that is, via the terms of the simpler propositions into which it is analysed. So, the meaning of the terms of the complex proposition is dependent upon the meaning of the terms of the simpler proposition. These terms of the simpler proposition may be thought to be analyzable to still simpler and more basic terms, and then again the latter to still simpler terms. But this process cannot go on ad infinitum. Because in that case the ordinary terms mean nothing. Hence Wittgenstein thinks that there must be some residue in the process of analysis, namely elementary propositions which consist of nothing but names that directly denote some objects. They are not further analyzable.
As regards the complex such as 'a person' or 'a table' designated by a term Wittgenstein says that they are not logically proper names because they invite description or definitions. This is what Wittgenstein means indeterminateness of a proposition's sense. This indeterminateness is characterized by the indefiniteness concerning the exact description of the complex. It is indeterminate in the further sense that the description is always general and so it is not possible to determine which particular individual is referred to by the complex. So, propositions in their ultimate analysis must consist of only simples, otherwise they will be indeterminate. Wittgenstein maintains—'what a proposition expresses, it expresses in a determinate manner, which can be set out clearly; a proposition is articulated.'

Wittgenstein from this analysis of language comes to conclude that there must be simple things that is objects, denoted by the names that constitute elementary proposition. Otherwise the elementary propositions would mean nothing and since the meaning of all propositions (language in general) depend upon the meaning of the elementary proposition, no proposition would have any meaning at all.

Wittgenstein through his analysis of propositions makes clear that elementary propositions are the ultimate analysis of propositions which do not require any further analysis. The regress of analysis comes to an end in elementary proposition, which denote the simple objects. Concerning the simple object, Wittgenstein seems to endorse the technique of classical and modern philosophers. The classical philosophers like Thales, Anaximenes, Paremenides regard the simple object as the ultimate substance of things etc. Modern
philosophers also like Descartes, Leibnitz, Locke, and Hume also put enormous emphasis on reaching out simple object out of complex things.

"To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true."9

A proposition then can have meaning even though it does not correspond to any fact. (a false proposition, for instance). But the constituents of a proposition, viz names cannot have meaning unless they represent some objects. Here Wittgenstein distinguishes between Bedeutung of a name and Sinn of a proposition. These two words are translated as 'meaning' and 'sense' respectively. However these two words were not inventions of Wittgenstein, they were used by Frege earlier, but Wittgenstein has fixed their uses to names and propositions strictly separately so that a name cannot have Sinn nor can a proposition have Bedeutung. 

So, a proposition describes, and not names, a situation. The sense of a proposition is the situation it describes. A proposition is a "logical picture" of the situation. The 'situation' and the 'state of affairs' may be either actual (existent) or merely possible (non-existent). A false proposition depicts a possible situation, a non-existent state of affairs.

A state of affairs is the objective counterpart of an elementary proposition-the latter depicts or describes the former. States of affairs are therefore unanalysable basic entities. They consist entirely of simple objects. A state of affairs is an atomic situation; there can however be non-atomic or
molecular situations. "A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things)."¹⁰

These combinations of objects or things may either exist or not exist. Existent combinations are associated with positive, and non-existent ones are associated with negative facts. An existing state of affairs is identical with a positive atomic fact; and the world is the totality of these positive atomic facts only.¹¹

But Wittgenstein’s reality includes negative facts also. A negative fact is a state of affairs that does not exist. It is exemplified by the negation of an elementary proposition- ‘S is not P’. If true, this proposition asserts the non-existence of the state of affairs that S is P.

The totality of existing states of affairs determines which states of affairs do not exist. A non-existent state of affairs is a non-actual arrangement or combination of existent objects. It cannot however refer to ‘non-existent’ objects, because a name that does not denote an existent object is meaningless, so any talk of non-existent object is impossible. Hence “all possible or conceivable worlds must consist of precisely the same objects that this actual world of ours consists of.”¹² The only difference between the actual and any possible world is the difference in arrangements of the same stock of materials.

Russell and early Wittgenstein carry on the referential theory of meaning in their respective philosophical works. The referential theory of meaning starts from concentration on the proper name as the typical unit of
meaning. It holds that every meaningful expression names something or at least stands for something. Russell writes-“words all have meaning, in the simple sense that they are symbols that stand for something other than themselves.” This view indicates that Russell in his early work advocates one word one object theory of meaning.

The referential theory of meaning differs over whether the meaning of a word is to be identified with-1) what refers to or 2) the relation between the word and its referent.

The first form of the referential theory of meaning holds that the meaning of an expression is that to which the expression refers. On the other hand the second form holds that the meaning of an expression is to be identified with the relation between the expression and its referent, that the referential connection constitutes the meaning. Both the forms state that for an expression to have a meaning it must refer to something other than itself. But they differ in the process of determining the meaning in different areas of the situation of reference.

The first form of the referential theory of meaning is untenable because two expressions can have the same referent but different meanings. Frege’s classic example shows clearly that the expressions “the morning star” and “the evening star” refer to the same extra linguistic entity, i.e., the planet venus, but they do not have same meaning. If they possess the same meaning, one could know that the morning star is the same entity as the evening star just by understanding the meaning of the term “the morning star”. But this is not the case. It was an astronomical discovery that the morning star and the evening
star are the same. Similarly in Russell’s example, “Sir Walter Scott is the au-
thor of Waverley” we see that the two expressions ‘Sir Walter Scott’ and ‘The
author of Waverley’ refer to the same individual but they do not have the same
meaning. So, it is clear that meaning can vary without a corresponding vari-
ation in referent. Again a certain meaning cannot consist in referring to a cer-
tain object.

Due to these difficulties the second form of the referential theory
of meaning is formulated by Russell in his ‘Analysis of Mind’. According to
him, when we ask what constitutes meaning of a term we are asking, not who
is the individual referred to but what is the relation of the word to the indi-
vidual which makes the one mean the other. So, this theory points out that the
meaning of an expression consists in the referential relation which subsists
between this expression and the person or the object when it denotes.

But this theory is also not free from difficulties over the assump-
tion that every meaningful expression does refer to something. Because there
are many classes of words including prepositions, conjunctions which do not
refer to anything in the extra linguistic world as a name is connected with the
thing named. So, it can be viewed that the referential theory is using reference
in a general type of word-world relation without paying proper attention to the
linguistic and the non-linguistic element in the concept of meaning.

Wittgenstein, too in his earlier work *Tractatus* advocates the
word-world relation or one word—one object relation through his most impor-
tant concept of names. He holds that a name means an object. The object is its
meaning. This signifies that early Wittgenstein corroborates the naive view of
the referential theory of meaning. His picture theory of meaning establishes beyond doubt that he was a staunch advocate of the referential theory of meaning.

The most important theme in Wittgenstein's early philosophy is the picture theory of meaning. This theory claims that there is a hidden structure or essence in every form of propositions or sentences. The picture theory of meaning came to his mind when he saw in a magazine a motor car accident being represented in a law court by means of small models. They also could be used to construct different types of propositions for the exposition of the accident. This pictorial representation stimulated his mind to formulate the picture theory of meaning.

According to the picture theory of meaning, "A proposition is a model or picture of reality." It maintains that the truth or falsity of a proposition can be evaluated through the picture or model it represents of the situation. Wittgenstein writes- "A proposition can be true or false in virtue of being a picture of reality."

Language displays the structure or form of reality. He talks about the logical structure of proposition embedded in language. He writes - "A proposition communicates a situation to us, and so it must be essentially connected with the situation. And the connection is precisely that it is its logical picture. A proposition states something only in so far as it is a picture." Wittgenstein presents his picture theory of meaning as a paragon to focus on the underlying structure of language. The underlying structure manifests the reality, which is not conspicuous in proposition.
Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning is a theory of the meaning of propositions. All propositions are analysed into ultimate proposition i.e., elementary proposition. This kind of proposition focuses on the inarticulate structure of proposition. He asserts that an elementary proposition is constituted by names. An elementary proposition is nothing but the conceptual or logical structure of a proposition. He explores the essence of a proposition through the picture theory of meaning. He called it by different names like pictorial form, pictorial relationship, representational form and logical form.

Wittgenstein holds that our natural language or colloquial language cannot express the logical form of language. So, Wittgenstein feels that an artificial language or symbolic logic is required to disclose the inward form of thought which is regarded as the essence of proposition. He writes-“In order to understand the essential nature of a proposition, we should consider, hieroglyphic script which depicts the facts that it describes.” And he again says-“A proposition shows how things stand if it is true. And it says that they do so stand.” As for the relation between the proposition and the state of affairs (situation) Wittgenstein asserts-“a proposition communicates a situation (state of affairs) to us and so it must be essentially connected with the situation. And the connection (between the proposition and the state of affairs) is precisely that it is its logical picture.” Russell in this connection writes-“The logical picture of a fact, Wittgenstein says, is a gedanke. A picture can correspond or not correspond with the fact and be accordingly true or false, but in both cases it shares the logical form with the fact.”

Wittgenstein holds that the logical form of propositions becomes prominent through analysis. He asserts that logical picture makes clear the
relation between the proposition and the states of affairs. And it can bring out the true or false picture of propositions. The logical form is the common structure of all propositions. Every proposition is analysed into that form, which can depict the logical form, the essence of all propositions. Warnock writes that the account of language Wittgenstein gives in the *Tractatus* is intended to be an exposition of the essence of language; an account of its concealed foundation; an excavation, so to speak, to its deepest level.\textsuperscript{21}

It is primarily the similarity of the concatenation that makes anything a picture. All pictures, even the pictures in the ordinary sense have the form of the objects they picture. There is a correspondence between a picture and the pictured fact. This common feature between the picture and the object is indicated as the form of representation. He writes,–

"If a fact is to be a picture, a fact must have something in common with what it depicts."\textsuperscript{22}

Edward Paul maintains that there are different kinds of pictures, different methods of projections. But all pictures must have the same logical form in order to be able to picture reality at all, either truly or falsely. The logical form is called ‘the form of reality’.\textsuperscript{23}

Wittgenstein in his picture theory of meaning shows the correspondence between the picture and the model of reality. He holds that a proposition is true when the state of affairs reflected by the picture exists. Otherwise the proposition will be false. He in this context lays emphasis on the relation
between language and reality. Reality becomes conspicuous through logical analysis of language.

The picture theory is an account of the nature of thought. Wittgenstein writes—'A thought is a proposition with a sense.' Similarly he points out—'The totality of propositions is language.' Language becomes accessible through thought-process. Again the thought-process is related with the logical picture, which is embedded in the propositions. So, he insists upon analysis of language into elementary propositions which represent the logical picture of reality. It is the underlying structure of the proposition hidden in the thought process. So, Wittgenstein frequently uses words like thought, proposition, language, sense etc. to radiate the picture theory of meaning.

Wittgenstein employs his picture theory to clarify the obscurities in language through logical analysis. The business of philosophy, according to him, is not to solve the philosophical problems, but to dissolve them by showing that they are pseudo problems. So, he views—'Philosophy is a critique of language.' He confirms this view in this way—

'Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but non-sensical. Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language.'

Russell clarifies that philosophical problems emerge due to not understanding properly the logical form of language. He divulges that philosophical problems can be resolved through grammatical investigation. He as-
sers that Philosophical problems emerge because certain kinds of philosophical statements are clothed in misleading grammatical forms. According to him, "we must examine the grammar of the statement. We will find, in some cases, that when we reformulate the statement in terms of its 'logical form', the problem will be solved." Wittgenstein too in his earlier work lays much emphasis on grammatical similarity or surface grammar. His assertion is that philosophical problems are engendered by surface grammar. Because surface grammar insists on the similar or uniform structure of propositions, i.e., uniform grammatical form.

Wittgenstein through his critique of language has put a demarcation between ideal language or artificial language or logical language and colloquial language. He in his *Tractatus* insists on the former, because his view is that ordinary language creates puzzlement and ambiguities. Again natural language or ordinary language deals with the diverse functions of language or language-games. Therefore, Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus* stops the process of using natural language. Because he supports only one function of language in his earlier philosophy i.e., to extract the logical form. He, therefore, corroborates the logical analysis of language. Because it represents the logical picture of the world. He believes that propositions are analyzed into elementary propositions that represent the structure of the facts or the states of affairs.

Russell also employs logical analysis of language to arrive at the final residue, i.e., atomic propositions which represent the structure of the world. Russell's belief is that when a proposition corresponds to a fact then the corresponding proposition is true. Otherwise the proposition will be false. Russell's approach to get the picture of reality through analysis is known as
logical atomism. So, there is a similarity in this context between Russell and earlier Wittgenstein. Because both put importance on logical analysis of language to focus on the logical form of propositions, which, they thought, represented the reality.

Wittgenstein's critique of language asserts that the logical analysis of language is the strategy through which philosophical problems can be resolved. The proper task of philosophy is to clarify the logical form of language. Because it removes the puzzlement and confusions rooted in philosophy. So, he writes —“Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thought. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.”29 He completely abandons the time-honoured conception of philosophy as the pursuit of reality and values. The traditional efforts of metaphysicians to find meaning in their statements on the basis of non-empirical methods and criteria, i.e., by combining the intuition of self-evident truths with deductive methods or by postulating the ground work of metaphysical systems as necessary pre-suppositions of experience, are rejected.30

Therefore, it is clear that Wittgenstein is not only a critique of language but also a critique of traditional philosophical problems. His critique of language makes it clear that he was a staunch advocate of logical analysis of language. His main purpose in his *Tractatus* is to excavate this form of language. Logical analysis indicates the pictorial form of language. Because it can depict the hidden form of language. So, his view is that when we fail to make a relation between the picture and the fact then philosophical problems emerge. That is why he talks about the importance of logical form of propositions. We are told —
"The goal of philosophical critique is the discovery of the real logical form of language. The logical form is the most important aspect of language, that has to be brought into the open by analyzing language." 

It can be asserted that propositions cannot represent or focus the logical form unless it is analyzed by the logical analysis of language. Logical analysis of language reflects the logical form or hidden structure of proposition. So, he shows that it is the panorama of all propositions. Wittgenstein's technique of logical analysis of language can remove the philosophical problems engendered by linguistic confusions. So, his technique to dissolve the philosophical problems can be regarded as the therapy. Therefore, his philosophy is called therapeutic.

Anders Wedberg in the context of the picture theory of language mentions that there are properties of, and relations among, things in the world, which cannot be named in language. But the picture theory itself speaks of these properties of, and relations among, things. Thus, the picture theory is itself an attempt to say the unsayable and therefore an instance of higher nonsense.

The picture theory of language violates the conventions of the language we use. The sentences of the languages we use are of linear structure. They are not maps of the facts they describe. This interpretation, thus concedes that the picture theory is inconsistent with the characteristic feature of language. Maps are no doubt perspicuous representations. We find in a map or a diagram an ideal case of a one to one correspondence between a
picture and the situation depicted. But the essential difference between a map and a proposition is that while the former is two-dimensional, the latter is one-dimensional. Wittgenstein describes propositions as pictures. But a proposition may be a picture of a situation without being a two-dimensional structure. So, we are in a dilemma—if the propositions are one-dimensional structure, they cannot express all the possible modes of configuration of a given number of objects; if on the other hand, they are two-dimensional structures, then they cease to be linguistic propositions and become maps. If we accept the first, it makes language poorer; and if we accept the second, it makes the picture theory inconsistent with the general nature of language.34

The picture theory of language cannot give us a proper reply in case of understanding a sense of proposition. But he writes that—“a proposition should be able to communicate a new sense to us.”35 This may imply that we can understand a sense of a proposition without any early acquaintance with it, without its sense being explained to us. But this is possible only when we know the names of a proposition. Because the propositions are the pictures of the states of affairs. The states of affairs denote the configuration of objects stated by the proposition. George Pitcher remarks that this view is not entertaining in the context of picture theory of language. So, he views—

“The assumption is that, in all possible states of affairs, objects are configured only spatially, i.e., that all possible states of affairs are purely spatial arrangements of objects. In that case, the spatial arrangements of the names in the proposition might conceivably be a picture of the spatial arrangements of the objects in the state of affairs.”36
D.N. Dwivedi points out that Wittgenstein's picture theory is indefensible. This follows not only from the linguistic considerations, but also from the ontological considerations. If we grant the view that elementary propositions are representational pictures of states of affairs, we cannot compare a proposition with the fact it pictures, unless names are directly nailed to objects. If an object is to be named it must be observable; but if it is observable, then it is not simple. There seems no way out of this paradox. There is no doubt that the *Tractatus* account of proposition is wrong. He underestimated the conventional character of language, and wrongly assumed that propositions have some fixed form which they share with reality, and which can be revealed only by analysis. It is said –

"Wittgenstein's picture theory was an exercise in armchair logic. He analyzed the concept of a picture and then deduced from this what reality must be like in order to be a picturable entity and what language must be like in order to be a picturing entity. It did not upset him at all that his conclusions were not empirically testable. His starting point was pre-supposition that a proposition is a picture of reality."

Wittgenstein in his earlier work has discredited the role of ordinary language. Instead of ordinary language he advocates logically perfect language. But later Wittgenstein abandons this view of language. He holds that it will be wrong to say that language follows some fixed rules. Hence later Wittgenstein makes a distinction between surface grammar and depth grammar. Surface grammar tries to focus on uniform appearance or structure of a
sentence which leads to logically perfect language. But later Wittgenstein changes this style of philosophizing in the context of language and views that language is instrument and has diverse use. Here his view is that philosophical problems emerge when language goes on holiday. By this metaphorical sentence he implies that when words are to be used from the outside of ordinary context, then philosophical problems come to light. Hence it can be emphatically asserted that Wittgenstein's later work encompasses around the circle of ordinary language.

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