CHAPTER I
WITTGENSTEIN AND THE ANALYTIC MOVEMENT IN PHILOSOPHY
Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein was born in Vienna in 1889. He began his education at the age of 14 years. He from his childhood developed an interest in engineering and so in 1908 entered as a student of aeronautical engineering at Manchester University. But this interest did not remain for long. He shifted his interest to mathematics and then to philosophical questions about the foundation of mathematics. This brought him to study Bertrand Russell's *Principles of Mathematics*. And this relationship with Russell established through his interest in mathematics led him finally to choose philosophy as his ultimate career. In accordance with Frege's advice he became a student in the Cambridge University in 1912. In 1918 he completed his first book *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* which he later submitted for the Ph.D. and in 1929 he was awarded the degree. *Tractatus* had a tremendous effect on the Vienna circle of the logical positivists.

Russell was already an exponent of the analytic movement that emerged as a revolution against the Bradleyan idealistic trend. Wittgenstein with a similar bent of mind came and joined Russell and soon emerged as a vital force in the analytic movement. He viewed that metaphysical and philosophical problems could be dissolved through analysis of language. Like logical atomism of Russell, Wittgenstein tried to bring out the logical essence of language. Therefore, his earlier philosophy is labelled as essentialism. He declared that philosophical business was to deal with the logical clarification of
language. He therefore, explicitly referred to the logical analysis of language in order to represent the structure of reality. He found that logical propositions were verifiable or testable, but metaphysical propositions were not empirically verifiable. Hence they were meaningless. So, he in his earlier work viewed that the philosopher's aim was not to explore the truth of the cosmos, but to show that philosophical problems were either meaningless or in-expressible.

Wittgenstein asserts that there is an essential structure of language which can focus on the actual structure of the world. If philosophy follows the logical order of language, problems like scepticism, problem of other minds will evaporate. He agrees with Frege in this context that logical analysis of language is conducive to explore the essential structure of the world.

Wittgenstein's revolutionary view in philosophy is that philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. This epoch making thought of Wittgenstein trembles the metaphysical programme. Because traditional metaphysicians were engrossed in theory making activity. But in theory, we are always within a scope or province. It entails that we can not transcend this boundary or scope. But philosophy is not that type of study which can limit or restrict our thought. Therefore, Kant significantly remarks that his method of philosophy is "Transcendental". Wittgenstein too, writes-

"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces anything. Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions."
If we turn over the pages of history of philosophy we will see that traditional philosophers advocated explanation-oriented philosophy presupposing a Reality which was all-inclusive, a harmonious whole. They viewed that the world was derived from this type of Reality. But, Wittgenstein replaces description-oriented philosophy for explanation-oriented philosophy. So, he writes-

"Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it can not give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is."

The linguistic analysis in Wittgenstein's philosophy is divided into two phases. The first phase is related with his earlier philosophy and the second phase is concerned with his later philosophy. And so far as the first phase is concerned, he discovers the technique of logistic analysis of language in Tractatus and in the second phase the technique of ordinary language analysis is emphasised in Philosophical Investigations. His earlier technique of philosophy brings out the underlying structure of language which is so called as logical form of language. In contrast to this his later technique of philosophy is concerned with the use of language. This radical technique entails that philosophical activity is concerned with language-games or diverse use of language or forms of life.

II

Philosophical analysis is concerned with the study of language. Analytic philosophers not only study language but also engage in answering
philosophical problems through the technique of analysis. Although the task of all analytic philosophers is the study of language, they are not all interested in a single language. However, the basic point of agreement among them is the technique of analysis.

Among the analytic philosophers, there are mainly two groups: The first group is associated with artificial or symbolic or logistic analysis of language. Just as sciences search for accurate or final result, so also this group tries to explore the perfect logical order of language so that it can be the mirror of all things. The supporters of this kind of analysis are known as artificial language philosophers.

"Artificial language philosophers are called logical positivists while the ordinary language philosophers are called linguistic analysts."3

The second group is related with ordinary language analysis. The aim and objective of this group is to project the world as it is. The supporters of this group are Moore, Later Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, Strawson, Quine, Wisdom etc.

The distinction between the two groups of philosophers has been of special importance in the twentieth century philosophy. Artificial language in the philosophical sense are also sometimes called formal, formalised, symbolic, or ideal language.4 On the other hand the analysis used by the second group is ordinary language or natural language analysis. Logistic language cannot be cultivated in all respects. So, artificial language has limitation. As A.Church once put it—"Speaking in principle, and leaving all questions of
practicality aside, the logician must declare it a mere historical accident that you and I learned from birth to speak English rather than a language with less irregular, and logically simpler, syntactical rules, similar to those of one of the familiar logistic systems in use today. The difference of a formalised language from a natural language lies not in any matter of principle, but in the degree of completeness that has been attained in the laying down of explicit syntactical and semantical rules and the extent to which vagueness and uncertainties have been removed from them.7

Ordinary language is again full of complexity. Sometimes we see that one word has more than one meaning. It makes us puzzled as to which meaning we ascribe to the word. But this problem is solved to the contemporary linguistic analyst, when we are well up in using the technique of words or grammar. In this context Wittgenstein Writes:

“To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique.”6

On the other hand the symbolic logic has also the same problem. Symbolic language or logistic analysis of language has a fixed order like that of Aristotelian formal logic. In contrast to this, ordinary language has no fixed form. It is mobile, dynamic or multidimensional. Although grammatical investigation is going on in logistic analysis of language, still its investigation can continue up to a certain limit. But in case of ordinary language that is not the case. Corresponding to the diversified use of ordinary language the scope of its analysis is also multidimensional and flexible.
Since the ancient time analysis had occupied a pre-dominant place in philosophy. If we proceed from Plato up to 19th Century, we come across many prominent philosophers including Spinoza, Leibnitz and the empiricists who put much importance on analysis. Leibnitz and Spinoza employed deductive model of analysis in their philosophical discourses. But this model of language analysis did not last long.

Hegel deduced the structure of the entire universe through his dialectical method. In the 18th century, empiricists like Locke, Berkley and Hume put forward their views that every idea must originate in sense impressions. According to Hume, physical things are bundles of perceptions. Locke as the founder of empiricism maintained that ideas correspond to things, Berkley put importance on ideas, rather than on things. But the climax of this trend is found in the philosophy of David Hume. Locke more or less advocated an objective analysis in respect of knowing and Berkley’s analysis was more subjective than objective and therefore it led him to solipsism while Hume’s analysis was fully subjective and psychological and culminated in scepticism, that is the impossibility of knowledge.

Around the end of the 19th century philosophical revolution came to emerge in a drastic form. F.H. Bradley, the modern exponent of idealism denigrated the analytic trend and put his view that analysis was not important for philosophy. His view is that reality is all-inclusive, systematic, harmonious, whole, so, it is not necessary to explain the relation between what and that through analysis. He asserts that the qualities or attributes are appearances and the substance is the Reality. So, their relation is internal. He holds that analysis
distorts the relationship between the two. Therefore, Bradley discredits the analytic approach in philosophy.

The main objective of Bradley’s philosophy is to catch hold of Reality, which is all-inclusive, harmonious and sentient whole. His book *Appearance and Reality* is a model for those philosophers whose philosophy too spins around the circle of Reality. Bradley’s view on Reality is—“Reality is one, individual experience, and above all ideality and relations.”7 In *Appearance and Reality* he shows that whatever we have in this world are nothing but appearances and that appearances fall short of reality. Thought-products are called appearances. Reality is super-relational whole and thought is relational. Bradley shows that—“Reality is one Experience, self-pervading and superior to mere relations.”8 So, Bradley indicates that plurality implies external relation. But this type of relation is not possible, because this type of relation makes no difference to terms and leads to infinite regress. Therefore, he denies external relations. He also rejects internal relation which in the end is self-contradictory. He asserts that Reality is super relational whole. Bradley’s philosophy leads to monistic idealism. His concept that ‘Thought Commits Suicide’ is an important formula to show that thought cannot comprehend Reality unless it gives up its relational nature. According to him, ‘thought is relational and discursive and, if it ceases to be this, it Commits Suicide and yet, if it remains thus, how does it contain immediate presentation?’9 Bradley’s philosophy goes against scientific formulations because they deal with external relation. As for example, heat expands, cold solidifies water, but scientific assertions, to Bradley, cannot properly answer the inherent cause or implicit cause of heat’s expanding or cold’s solidifying water etc. So, to Bradley external relation is nothing but the contiguity of different relations.
Therefore, it cannot satisfy human curiosity. So, it is clear that Bradley wants to distinguish philosophy from sciences. Wittgenstein too, like Bradley took philosophical issues seriously. Both of them agree on the point that even if all scientific questions are solved, the problems of life may remain untouched, and unsolved. So, Both Bradley and Wittgenstein want to distinguish philosophical issues from scientific ones. Bradley opines that experience cannot satisfy our intellect. It satisfies only momentary need. To him, man's ultimate aim or goal is to realise the nature of ultimate Reality. Therefore, he in his philosophy prescribes immediate experience which shows the technique to comprehend the internal structure of Reality. So, it is clean that his philosophy goes against empirical epistemology, pluralism, hedonism, pragmatism and psychologism. Bradley criticises the theory of pluralistic, sensationism and atomism, advocated by Moore and Russell. He shows that the theory of atomistic sensationism fails to account for system, order and universality in knowledge on the basis of associationism. He in this context repudiates the technique of analysis in philosophy. To him, the technique of analysis distorts or mutilates the whole. So, to Bradley it goes against the realm of Reality. Pluralism admits that truth consists in correspondence but monism admits coherence theory of truth which supports a system, order or universality. Pluralism follows sense experience; while Bradley's monistic philosophy advocates immediate experience. He rejects the S-P formula because it admits of a distinction between ‘S’ as grammatical subject and the predicate. So, he modifies this formula into another form which places the subject as all-inclusive whole.

G.E. Moore & B. Russell both were trained for quite sometime along this Bradleyan line. They were taught that the reality was spiritual and that the world of sense was not real; that all relations were internal. However,
the two exponents could not silently accept all those Bradleyan teachings and came up with a revolutionary zeal to demolish the unscientific and non-common sensical philosophy.

Russell's theory of logical atomism is a critique of Bradley's denial of analysis. For Russell reality is nothing trans-empirical all inclusive whole, but it is the empirical reality. Empirical reality cannot be perceived as a whole, we have experiences of its parts only. So the reality must be a combination of these parts. Conversely, the reality can be analysed into its constituent parts-smaller & still smaller ones, which he calls atoms. So, analysis into logical atoms or facts represent the embedded structure of reality. Russell, therefore, advocates ontological realism through the doctrine of logical atomism or logistic analysis of language which goes against monistic view of the world. Idealists uphold Reality as all inclusive, harmonious whole which cannot be analysed into parts.

Russell protests against the denigration of analysis. He clarifies that the process of analysis unfolds the underlying structure of reality. So, it paves the way to discover a new picture about the indistinct reality through the logistic analysis of language.

Russell's philosophy of logical atomism is a corollary of his technique of logistic analysis of language. He employs it as an instrument to dig out the ultimate constituents of the world.

"The reason, I call my doctrine logical atomism is because the atoms I wish to arrive at as the sorts of last residue in analysis are logical atoms and not physical atoms. Some of them will be what I call par-
Russell shows that logical atomism is the theory which shows the get down process to get the ultimate constituents of the reality through the programme of analysis. He, in this context launches his best device i.e., logistic approach to accomplish his attempt.

In protests against the idealistic or monistic logic upheld by Hegel & Bradley, Russell maintains that reality is matter-oriented. Apart from matter, reality has no significance. So, reality consists of things and their relations. It cannot be expressed in what-that (substance-attributes) type of propositions as Bradley maintains. He also points out that the worldly things are externally related. He speaks of three types of relation to strengthen his point, symmetrical relation (A is equal to B), ii) asymmetrical relation (A is larger than B) b) Non-symmetrical relation (A may be equal to B or may not be equal to B). These three types of relation confirm that realists logic goes against monistic logic. So, he mentions—

"The logic which I shall advocate is atomistic, as opposed to the monolithic logic of the people who more or less follow Hegel. When I say that my logic is atomistic, I mean that I share the common sense belief that there are many separate things; I do not regard the apparent multiplicity of the world as consisting merely in phases and unreal divisions of a single indivisible Reality."
Russell is not talking about ordinary language analysis in his theory of logical atomism. He tries to bring ordinary language to the purview of logical language. He throughout his philosophical research follows the principle of Ockham's razor which insists on minimal use of language to focus on the structure of reality and to eliminate the doubtful notion of substance. He says:

"The whole question of the meaning of words is very full of complexities and ambiguities in ordinary language. When one person uses a word, he does not mean by it the same thing as another person means by it. I have often heard it said that it is a misfortune. That is a mistake. It would be absolutely fatal if people meant the same thing by their words. It would make all intercourse impossible, and language the most hopeless and useless thing imaginable, because the meaning you attach to your words must depend on the nature of the objects you are acquainted with, and, since different people are acquainted with different objects, they would not be able to talk each other unless they attached quite different meanings to their words...... it would be altogether incredibly inconvenient to have an unambiguous language, and therefore mercifully we have not got one."12

Russell's theory of logical atomism is a result of his theory of definite descriptions. Definite descriptions are nothing but incomplete symbols, what Frege names 'names of a function' as distinct from complete symbols, i.e., proper names. Definite descriptions proceeds by breaking down the proposition into atomic propositions disclosing the inherent structure of the proposition. It is called by D.F. Pears 'horizontal analysis'. Russell points out that—"the author of Waverley is Scot"—is conjunction of three atomic propo-
sitions. It is meaningful when the statement is analysed into atomic propositions. The statement cannot express its meaning by itself unless and until the same is analysed into constituent atomic propositions. The logical analysis of the statement will be- 1) At least one person wrote Waverley whoever is Scot. ii) Atmost one person wrote Waverley whoever is Scot. iii) Whoever authored Waverley is Scot. Russell shows that his theory of definite descriptions is a technique to bring out the unmanifested pictures of reality. So, he employs it as a tool in his philosophy.

The logical structure of language represents the logical picture of the world. For Russell logic is the mirror of the world. Wittgenstein too in his earlier work believes that propositions are analysed into ultimate constituents i.e., elementary propositions which represent the structure of the facts or states of affairs. So, Wittgenstein too endorses logistic analysis of language in his philosophy in order to represent the structure of reality. He writes in the *Tractatus* as such—"Every proposition has a perfectly determinate or definite sense which can be set out clearly." 13 He also writes: "Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world. Logic is transcendental." 14

Russell’s theory of logical atomism leads to correspondence theory of truth. This theory of truth is complementary to logical atomism. According to this theory, we can justify truth when a mentioned proposition or statement corresponds to the states of affairs or facts. If the proposition or statement is compatible with the facts, the judgment is going to be true, otherwise false. As for example, if it is said, ‘*The present king of France is bald*’, the above proposition according to Russell will be significant, but false, because the statement does not correspond to fact, since there is no monarchy in France now.
Russell’s Logical atomism goes towards scienticism. Just as physicists do in the laboratory, so, his view is mechanical or artificial. But the question remains, will the logistic or mechanical analysis of atoms be the sufficient ground for explaining the final constituent of the world?

By the logistic or positivistic standpoint the question cannot be answered satisfactorily. The world is not mechanical or artificial as thought by the logical analysts or positivists. We cannot ignore the naturalistic approach to explain the evolving world. We cannot be mechanical or artificial in every walk of life i.e., thinking, feeling, willing. So, men want to entertain a way of life that is so-called natural life. But the so-called logistic approach subdues our natural way of living. So, we cannot peruse a mechanistic or artificial or logistic approach in our discourse. Linguists or ordinary language philosophers believe that there is a natural way of living or collocation which we cannot suppress or ignore. It comes naturally or automatically since the beginning of our life up to the end. So, ordinary language philosophers advocate natural or ordinary forms of life, which are easily communicable or accessible for human being. Later Wittgenstein, Strawson, Quine, Austin and John Wisdom endorse this view.

Russell through the doctrine of logical atomism tries to restrict the scope of logic. It implies that logic cannot go beyond experience. It is grounded in experience. So, the question arises, can logic be confined to experience? Wittgenstein very aptly answers that logic is transcendental. Logic is not restricted by experience. Rather experience is grounded in logic. Empiricistic outlook or positivistic outlook depends on logic. Logic can go beyond experience. Although, Wittgenstein seems to support Russell’s logical
atomism in respect of his picture theory or photocopy theory still his view is to some extent different. Wittgenstein’s philosophy turns from ontology to metaphysics, while Russell’s philosophy takes rest on ontological realism.

Moore explores a new strategy for criticising the idealistic trend that is the commonsense theory. This theory shows that matter is not spiritual or mental or subjective. Rather matter is objective in the sense that it can be experienced. Moore in this context employs the technique of ordinary language analysis for explaining the external world. Idealists deny the objective world and believe that the world spins around the spiritual entity which is independent of external objects. External objects are appearances in the language of Bradley. Moore’s defence of common sense proves a new way to establish that there are external objects indeed. To prove this point through the common sense theory he makes a distinction between sense data and external objects. Moore holds that perceptual knowledge gives us only the surface knowledge of external object, which are really not things. But, if we perceive external objects through microscopes then we can determine or locate its exact nature. But the problem is that we cannot perceive external objects in that microscopeic way. Moore says-

“It is not given to me, in the sense in which this sense-datum is given. If there be such a thing at all, it is quite certainly only known to me by description, in the sense in which Mr. Russell uses that phrase; and the description by which it is known is that of being the thing which stands to this sense datum in a certain relation.”\textsuperscript{15}
Moore says that sense data or sense datum is the immediate apprehension of object. His distinction between the existence of a thing and its perception asserts that perception cannot provide us with actual knowledge of an object. In case of the distinction between the two Moore talks about Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. The former is nothing but the immediate apprehension of a thing. It provides sense data like smoothness or colour of a thing. So, sense data or datum indicates only the partial knowledge of the object. The later gives us the proper knowledge of the thing or object which can be acquired by description. Moore in his article 'Defence of Common sense' shows that our common sense beliefs such as "the earth existed before I was born", "there exists at present a living human body which is my body", need no proof. Common sense belief unfolds the fact that ordinary language is the medium through which we can explain the things of the world. Common sense beliefs are part of our ordinary language. So, Moore employs his radical technique of ordinary language analysis to prove the external world. His 'proof for the external world' explores this technique to focus that there are external objects indeed.

Later Wittgenstein as a supporter of ordinary language analysis advocates this technique. The main effort of Wittgenstein's later technique in Philosophical Investigations is to find out the diverse function of words. Here he modifies his earlier technique of logical analysis of language to a refine form of ordinary language analysis. This new technique entails that philosophical activity is concerned with language-games. He maintains that the meaning of language is determined by its use. And the technique of using words in language is activity. So, different activities are nothing but language-games. The meaning of a word does not consist in the objects it names, but in the way
it is used in language. So, it is lucid that Wittgenstein discovers the technique of ordinary language analysis in order to remove the naming theory of meaning. He employs ostensive definition to remove misunderstanding of language. But this definition is not sufficient, because pointing to an object cannot give us the actual knowledge about the object if we do not know the actual uses of language. Wittgenstein clears that the problem of misunderstanding can be removed only through the careful analysis of language-games which he performs through the technique of ordinary language analysis. He emphatically asserts that his later technique of philosophy is concerned with forms of life.

References:
2. Ibid. Sec. 124.
9. Ibid. p.150.


