CHAPTER - V
LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY AFTER WITTGENSTEIN
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Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, both earlier and later, have tremendous impact on the linguistic philosophy after him. Schools like logical positivism emerged in Vienna in the year 1930 taking Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* as the model. On the other hand in the individual level we find philosophers like G.Ryle, P.F.Strawson, J.L.Austin many others to be enormously influenced by Wittgenstein’s later model of analysis of ordinary language. Here we shall have a peep into the philosophies of this philosophers and try to enumerate to what extent were they influenced by Wittgenstein. Logical positivism as a philosophical movement comes into existence with the Vienna circle. This movement consists of a group of philosophers cum mathematicians like Ernst Mach, H.Feigl, Mortiz Schlick, Friedrich Waismann, Rudolf Carnap, H. Reichenbach, Otto Neurath, Viktor Kraft, Hans Hann, Karl Menger, Kurt Godel, A.J. Ayer etc.

I

Logical positivism:

These scientific philosophers found Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* to be acceptable almost in toto. Similarly, Wittgenstein also points out that if we cannot conclusively verify the meaning of a sentence then, we cannot understand anything by the sentence. In fact the sentence does not say anything.

The positivists put forward their view against metaphysics. Because hard-core metaphysicians like Bradley, Spinoza, Descartes derive the
whole universe from one Reality, which is all-inclusive harmonious whole. They advocate the deductive model in terms of explaining the universe. In contrast to this the logical positivists denigrate this view and employ a criterion of meaning which is so called as the verification principle.

This principle entails that the meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification. According to this theory only two types of sentences are meaningful, viz. analytic sentences and empirically verifiable sentences. However, there are different versions of this verifiability thesis. But metaphysical sentences do not fall under any of these categories of meaningful sentences. Hence they are regarded as nonsense. That is why the logical positivists maintain that they assert nothing at all. They are neither true, nor false, but meaningless. As for instance, God exists, is a metaphysical statement. As it is a metaphysical statement cannot be experienced. So, in the language of the logical positivists it is non-sensical. Mathematical as well as logical propositions can be verified analytically. Apart from these two cases, all empirical propositions are verifiable in the sense that they can be tested as true or false by sense experience.

Like Russell and Wittgenstein logical positivism is also a revolt against idealism. Because idealism talks about unseen nature of reality, which is transempirical or unverifiable. But in the opinion of the logical positivists we cannot search for the reality in any trans-empirical world.

Logical positivists are also critique of ethics or epistemology. Because assertions about values fall within the scope of transcendental metaphysics. That is why the logical positivists like Carnap, Ayer disagree about
the assertion of ethics. Regarding epistemology too, logical positivists react. As it means the knowledge of transempirical entities, like God, Absolute, soul, ego, that is why the logical positivists discredit the view put forward by philosophers regarding epistemology.

Logical positivism utilizes logical analysis as an analytical tool in order to derive the underlying structure of language. In this context there is a resemblance between early Wittgenstein and the logical positivists. Although Wittgenstein himself was not a logical positivist, still his analytical tool, that is logical analysis of language, has immensely influenced the movement of logical positivism. The early positivists refute the metaphysical speculations because their truth cannot be proved. On the other hand the new positivists base their philosophy on logical analysis. They hold that logical analysis of metaphysical propositions reveal the meaninglessness of all metaphysical propositions. And as a result they develop the anti-metaphysical attitude and dismiss the metaphysical questions as non-sense. This anti-metaphysical attitude of the positivists can be said to be due to Wittgenstein’s celebrated work *Tractatus*. His picture theory of meaning is the best example of the employment of logical analysis of propositions to show the logical form of propositions. In this context Wittgenstein corroborates the doctrine of logical atomism and arrives at elementary propositions the ultimate residue of language analysis. His assertion —“We must bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use” makes clear that he was not in favour of metaphysical discussion. Rather he wants to state that metaphysical questions are meaningless in the sense that metaphysical questions go beyond the limits of the world. That is why he puts it significantly in *Tractatus*, ‘The world is everything that is the case’, and ‘The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.’
Hence it is perspicuous that early Wittgenstein has an anti-metaphysical outlook. The early Wittgenstein and the positivists employ the same technique of logical analysis in order to establish that metaphysical propositions or questions are meaningless or unanswerable. Wittgenstein's last sentence of *Tractatus* (Where of one cannot speak there of one must be silent) also implies that.

II

In his later work Wittgenstein changes his approach to philosophy. He amends his early technique of logical analysis and instead of it he advocates the technique of ordinary language analysis in order to solve the philosophical problems. He critically shows that there is not one function of language that is to dig out the logical form of propositions, but that language has diverse functions just like instruments.

Wittgenstein puts the view that the very problem of philosophy emerges due to misunderstanding of language. He claims that the problems of philosophy will be removed when language is used properly. Wittgenstein in this connection brings out the importance of ordinary language. He considers ordinary language as an instrument and maintains that it plays the key role in our forms of life. Ordinary language is a medium of mass communication. Wittgenstein's this insistence on ordinary language has brought out a renaissance or revolution like Kantian Copernicun revolution especially in the context of analytic philosophy.
Wittgenstein's ordinary language philosophy flourished at Oxford. As a pioneer of ordinary language philosophy he wants to repudiate the legacy of Frege and Russell due to the very reason that they put importance on only formal language or artificial language. Wittgenstein makes an important point about ordinary language that it involves what he calls "language-games" which is indispensibly related with our life. This game of language cannot be played artificially or mechanically. Because it is natural or part of our life.

III

Wittgenstein's ordinary language philosophy has been carried out by other philosophers who were also mainly interested in ordinary language and ordinary way of thinking. Among them, Gilbert Ryle, P. F. Strawson and J.L.Austin are closely associated with ordinary language philosophy.

Gilbert Ryle :

Gilbert Ryle is one of the most influential figures in 20th Century British philosophy. His most profound work The Concept of Mind published in 1949 has occupied an important place in the domain of philosophy. Ryle's critique of Descartes' dualism has proved his philosophical outlook to be more consistent. His attempt here is to remove the age-long philosophical problem of mind and body by paying attention to the daily use of words.

Ryle in his book The Concept of Mind brings out a very interesting concept in philosophy, i.e., category mistake. He holds that mistake in use of words in sentences leads to category mistake. As for instance, 'so and so is
in bed’, is an absurd sentence. Ryle shows that if we make the above sentence as ‘Saturday is in bed’, it results in a category mistake. Because ‘Saturday’ and ‘bed’ belong to different categories. While if we put ‘John’ in place of Saturday, the sentence will be significant. So, Ryle formulates that to be a significant sentence we must use words belonging to the same category. The traditional philosophers tried to assimilate the abstract concepts to the ordinary meaning of words. And as a result they committed category mistakes. Wittgenstein’s saying-‘We must bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use’ also reminds his awareness of the dichotomy between the metaphysical concept and the ordinary concepts. For confirming the concept of category mistake, Ryle brings out some interesting and comprehensive examples.

(A) A foreigner is visiting Oxford University for the first time and he is shown a number of colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific departments and administrative offices. He then says, I have seen where the members of the colleges live, where the registrar works, where the scientists experiments and the rest. But I have not seen where the university is? then it is said to him that the university is not another institution apart from colleges, laboratories and offices which he has already seen. Rather the university is just the way in which all that he has seen is organized. Therefore, Ryle asserts that the foreigner commits a category mistake because he assimilates the university to another institution over and above whatever was shown to him.

(B) Similarly, a child witnessing the march past of a division has been shown the various battalions, batteries, squadrons and the like. He then says, I have seen all the division related things, but where is the division? Ryle in this respect asserts that the child also commits ‘category mistake’. Ryle
asserts that interesting category mistakes often occur in philosophical discourses. He in this context gives example of Descartes' dualism. Descartes assertion is that mind (ghost) and body (machine) are two independent substances. So, they are diametrically opposed to each other in the sense that mind possesses inward qualities like thinking, feeling, willing etc. Descartes attempts to show that man has a body and a mind. The body is in space and subject to mechanical laws. While the mind is not in space and not subject to mechanical laws. So, Ryle mentions-"there is thus a polar opposition between mind and matter, an opposition which is often brought out as follows. Material objects are situated in a common field, known as 'space' and what happens to one body in one part of space is mechanically connected with what happens to other bodies in other parts of space. But mental happenings occur in insulated fields, known as 'minds', and there is, a part may be from telepathy, no direct causal connection between what happens in one mind and what happens in another." It can be said that mind and body are connected together, although bodily actions are public and mental acts are private. So, from the mind-body discussion it can be asserted that the world is divided into two, one is physical world and the other is mental world. But the question remains in Descartes philosophy i.e., how both body and mind unite to impart the concept of man? this question cannot be solved if we assume mind and body as diametrically opposed to each other. Ryle's main purpose in his 'Descartes' Myth' is to show that how the mind-body problem can be eliminated through proper analysis of ordinary language. He therefore, mentions that the concept of 'intelligence' is not a non-physical private occurrance. Because if we admit 'John is intelligent', we will see that John's intelligence will manifest in his performing of certain acts like winning a chess match, passing in exam securing high marks etc. So, the concept of intelligence consists in the way of performing certain
acts. He emphatically asserts that the concept of intelligence is not hidden in man. Rather it manifests in outward behaviour of man. It is not a private occurrence, rather it is a public behavior. If the concept of ‘intelligence’ is a private non-physical phenomenon, Ryle asserts that—"the operation which is characterised as intelligent must be preceded by an intelligent acknowledgement of these rules or criteria.... if the agent must go through the internal process of avowing to himself certain propositions about what is to be done."³

Therefore, Ryle makes clear that the concept of intelligence does not require a prior act of rule-making or theorizing before it can be performed. If it were so, there would be required an infinite number of acts of theorizing or rule making activities before any intelligent act could be performed. So, it is clear that the concept of ‘intelligence’ is not a private non-physical phenomenon. Ryle brings out the view that ‘intelligence’ is a dispositional property of the agent, just as brittleness is a dispositional property of glass. It is clear that there is no water-tight compartment between the agent and his intelligence and glass and its brittleness. Finally it can be opined that Descartes’ ‘mind body’ concept is not correct in the language of Ryle. Ryle’s opinion is that ‘Descartes’ myth’ leads to category mistake. He writes –

"It is one big mistake and a mistake of a special kind. It is, namely, a category-mistake. It represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or categories) when they actually belong to one another. The dogma is therefore a philosopher’s myth."⁴
Descartes' dualism has also been criticized by idealists and realists alike to establish their theories—idealists, in order to reduce matter to mind, while the materialists in order to reduce mind to matter. Ryle for the first time discusses the two concepts thoroughly and concludes that both belong to different categories. In this context he derives a new technique, i.e., ordinary language analysis. This technique shows that the Cartesian dualism leads to an illegitimate question. That is whether mind exists or bodies (but not both)? Ryle maintains that this disjunction is illegitimate and the question is not meaningful and entertainable. Hence, it can be viewed that Ryle's work lays emphasis on ordinary language analysis and has a major role in spreading the method of linguistic analysis.

From the above discourse it can be opined that like later Wittgenstein, Ryle also launches the technique of ordinary language analysis in order to dissolve philosophical puzzles. Ryle therefore, technically includes the concept of category mistake through the strategy of ordinary language analysis. Thus, it can be viewed that Wittgenstein's ordinary language philosophy has a major impact in Ryle's philosophy.

Peter Frederick Strawson:

Peter Frederick Strawson is one of the leading philosophers of Oxford. He is mainly concerned with analytical and linguistic philosophy. His two articles, respectively 'Truth' and 'On Referring' are the most important works in ordinary language philosophy. He in the article 'On Referring' has explicitly disregarded logical analysis of language and endorsed the technique of ordinary language analysis.
Peter Frederick Strawson is a critique of Russell’s theory of descriptions. As a staunch supporter of linguistic philosophy, Strawson brings out a gap between natural language and formal language through his dissatisfaction over Russell’s theory of definite descriptions. He claims that Russell’s application of formal language in his theory of definite descriptions confine the scope of referential expressions. According to Russell, the meaning of an expression depends on its use on a particular occasion. According to Russell, the sentence *The present king of France is bald* has meaning but is false. It is false because there is no such thing as the present king of France. But Strawson rejects this Russellian view and makes an important distinction between a sentence and its use in the context of determination of meaning. He holds that the truth-value of a sentence comes to light through a distinction between a sentence and its use by a speaker in a context. He in this regard makes clear that sentence or expression cannot itself give us truth-value unless and until the sentence or expression is used by a speaker in a context. Strawson gives an example that the sentence *The king of France is wise* is meaningful, but the question is, is it true or false? Strawson holds that the sentence itself is neither true nor false. Because the sentence itself cannot express its truth-value, but the use of it determines its truth-value. Again its truth-value depends on the situation. Suppose one person uttered the sentence during the reign of Louis xiv and another used the sentence during the reign of Luis xv. In the first case it might be held to be a true assertion and in the second case it might be false assertion. That is why Strawson puts the view that the sentence itself cannot be true or false. Rather its truth value depends on its use. That is why Strawson writes-
“Meaning is a function of the sentence or expression; mentioning and referring and truth and falsity, are the functions of the use of the sentence or expression. To give the meaning of an expression is to give general directions for its use to refer to or mention particular objects or persons; to give the meaning of a sentence is to give general directions for its use in making true or false assertions. It is not to talk about any particular occasion of use of the sentence or expression.”

Again Strawson points out the mistakes of Russell. Firstly, Russell holds that *The king of france is wise* is a false sentence. Secondly, he holds that *The king of france is wise* is an existential sentence. Strawson rejects the two points and views that *The king of france is wise* is a false sentence is mistaken because sentences are not true or false but only meaningful or meaningless. Again he holds that the sentence *The present king of france is wise* is an existential sentence is mistaken because it is based on the erroneous assumption that the sentence is false. In this context Strawson holds that only the use of the sentence can be true or false. Therefore, the sentence *The king of france is wise* can only be false if the king of france is not wise, but it is not false on the ground that the king of france does not exist. He points out that the meaning of a sentence is connected with the rules, habits, conventions which govern the use of a sentence. So, Strawson writes-

“…..the meaning of expression is not the set of things or the single thing it may correctly be used to refer to; the meaning is the set of rules, habits, conventions for its use in referring.”
It is clear that Strawson’s use theory of meaning explores the rules, habits, and conventions in respect of the determination of meaning. It also implies that meaning is independent of the truth-values of sentences. His use theory of meaning discredits the referential theory of meaning especially advocated by Russell. Russell holds that meaning consists in the reference of logically proper name. His assertion is that logically proper name directs to its objects which is so called referent or objects. Strawson repudiates the Russellian programme of meaning, because the Russellian programme of meaning paves the way to construct ideal language or artificial language. Philosophers namely Russell and early Wittgenstein disregarded ordinary language. In contrast to this, Strawson embraces ordinary language to disqualify formal language or artificial language and taken it as a medium or way to solve or dissolve philosophical problems.

Here Strawson seems to be in company with later Wittgenstein in admitting that ordinary language has diverse functions. Therefore, Strawson does not endorse logical language or artificial language in his philosophy. According to him, there is no specific function of language. Rather the function of language is multidimensional. That is why he makes a distinction between a sentence and use of a sentence. He also like later Wittgenstein holds that use determines meaning of a sentence.

V

According to Strawson, there is no real opposition between linguistic analysis and some kind of metaphysics. He in his book *Individuals* mentions that the certain conclusions about the world can be derived through analysis. He mentions the two sorts of metaphysics in his book *Individuals*. 
The first one is descriptive metaphysics and the second one is revisionary metaphysics.

Descriptive metaphysics informs the actual structure of our thought and the world. He defines descriptive metaphysics as-“It is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, while revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure.” The revisionary metaphysics describes the inner structure of human thinking.

Strawson shows that the actual structure of thought can be divulged through ordinary language or natural language. But ordinary language or natural language implies that language pre-supposes a fundamental or basic structure of thought which can be understood through ordinary language. That is why the aim of the descriptive metaphysics is to unfold the basic structure of thought by the technique of ordinary language. The basic structure of thought reminds one of Kant’s transcendental deduction of categories which too, speak about the a-priori structure of our thought.

The business of descriptive metaphysics is to deal with the actual use of language. It also lays stress on the grammatical structure of language in order to focus on the basic structure of thinking. Descriptive metaphysics deals with the ordinary language and differs from construed or symbolic language. The shortcoming of symbolic language is, it is unable to bring out the underlying structure of conceptual realm. Therefore, Strawson uses the term metaphysics in case of linguistic analysis. His effort is not to revise the actual structure of thought but to clear the difficulties involved in the path of conceptual structure through ordinary language. He mentions that descriptive meta-
physics can restore the actual structure of language which remains same in the midst of variable structure of human mind. On the other hand revisionary metaphysics fails to give us an actual account of language. Rather it is busy to go on building or revising the new structures and so it fails. But descriptive metaphysics is not that because it lays emphasis on the depth analysis of language.

According to Strawson, fundamental concepts or basic concepts go beyond any specific boundary of science. The search of a general concept in the terminology of Strawson is a metaphysical enquiry under the medium of ordinary language. The general concept or basic concept shows the unity behind the different disciplines. So, Strawson writes-

"But it would be a great blunder to think of metaphysics only in this historical style. For there is a massive central core of human thinking which has no history—or none recorded in histories of thought; there are categories and concepts, which, in their most fundamental character, change not at all. Obviously these are not the specialities of the most refined thinking-------------.. It is with these, there interconnexions, and the structure that they form, that a descriptive metaphysics will be primarily concerned."

It can be assumed that Strawson through his concept of revisionary metaphysics indicates the concept of private language. Just as private language is confined to the speaker only and cannot be communicated to others, so also revisionary metaphysics deals only with our ‘private’ thinking, in the sense that it does not deal with public objects, which are subject to change at any moment in case of a search for a better structure of thought. Therefore,
revisionary metaphysics very much deals with our private thinking or private language, which is not public in the sense that it cannot be verified or justified. Rather it is stated in private language. While descriptive metaphysics is not private because it is stated in public language. Again it relates to actual structure of our thought. Therefore, it can be viewed that descriptive metaphysics deals with the objectivity of our thought. That is why it can be stated in public language. It is obvious therefore that Strawson’s distinction between descriptive metaphysics and revisionary metaphysics can be compared to Wittgenstein’s distinction between private language and ordinary language. Private language is private in the sense that it cannot be understood or communicated to others. Therefore, Wittgenstein puts so much importance on public language or ordinary language in his later philosophy. Similarly Strawson also in this context seems to endorse the technique of ordinary language analysis as the vehicle to discuss the philosophical problems more clearly through the concept of descriptive metaphysics.

John Langshaw Austin:

John Langshaw Austin is a leading spirit of ordinary language philosophy or linguistic philosophy. His book *How to Do Things with Words* introduces himself as a genuine supporter of ordinary language philosophy. He as a supporter of ordinary language philosophy views that the business of philosophy is not puzzle solving. His emphasis on ordinary language can be discussed under the distinction between constatives and performatives. Austin’s speech act theory bears a very close affinity in technique and style with Wittgenstein’s theory of language-games.
Austin's philosophy of language rests on the concept of speech act. He holds it as the technique of ordinary language analysis. His view is that acts are performed with the help of words or sentences. There are different kinds of acts. Just as acts are performed in playing football or cricket or making ornaments or in building houses etc, so also there are various types of speech acts like stating, swearing, reporting, questioning etc. In this context David E. Cooper points out two important points of Austin's insistence on speech act—i) To discover what the sentence was being used to say, we must look at the total act performed by the speaker with the aid of the sentence ii) there is the pragmatic justification that by etuding sentences as parts of total speech acts, unsuspected contributions to various philosophical debates may be derived.

It is evident that Austin's concepts of speech acts like constatives and performatives explore extrinsic and intrinsic structures of language. He identifies that speech act may be constative or performative. He by the performative utterance explicates that it is the utterance of doing an act. It is not true or false, rather it is an act-oriented utterance. While constative utterance is an utterance of a sentence or statement which is either true or false. As for instance, 'the dog is on the mat', can be asserted to be true or false, but the utterance like 'I promise', 'I swear', 'I apologize', are neither true nor false, but the speaker performs some act thereby. These utterances are performative. In the context of performative utterance an act is performed by the speaker immediately when the utterance is made. In case of performative utterances the verbs like 'to apologize', 'to swear', 'to guarantee' are not used to describe or report something like 'he is apologizing', or 'I am swearing', but are
used to perform certain acts. Austin has given two characteristics of performative utterances. They are respectively—

i) A: They do not ‘describe’ or ‘report’ or constate anything at all, therefore, are not ‘true or false’; and

ii) B: The uttering of the sentence is a part of the doing of an action, which again would not normally be described as, or as; saying something.

Austin puts—“we must ask: is there something precise way in which we can definitely distinguish the performative from the constative utterance? And in particular we should naturally ask first whether there is some grammatical criterion for distinguishing constative from the performative utterance.” There are two distinct criteria given by Austin. They are as followed:

The first criterion is grammatical criterion. According to this criterion, the using of the verb in the sentence/statement must be in the first person present tense. This criterion implies that performative utterances are used in the first person present tense. As for instance, ‘He is swearing’, ‘I apologized’, are not considered as performatives. Because the mentioned utterances are not made in the first person present tense. It also entails that acts are not performed immediately by uttering the sentences. Again the sentences like, ‘I apologized’, ‘He warned’, are not considered as performative also because the above sentences/statements serve to describe or report the action performed by the speaker or somebody else in the past tense. Therefore, performative utterances are made to perform an act in the first person present
tense alone. As for instance, 'I name this road Lacit Borphukan Road', here the utterance is not used by the assertor to report or describe. Rather it is used to perform the act of naming the road after Lacit Borphukan.

The second criterion is vocabulary criterion. According to this criterion, the word 'hereby' is used in the sentence/statement. As for sentence-

(i) You are 'hereby' authorized to pay...
(ii) He is 'hereby' ordered to vacate...........
(iii) Passengers are 'here by' warned to cross...

Austin by the word 'here by' shows that it is utilized as instrument for effecting the act of 'warning', 'authorizing', or 'ordering' etc. So, he writes that the word 'hereby' is a useful criterion that the utterance is performative.12

An utterance is an act. What we talk or speak is an activity or act. So, the utterance is an act means performing or doing an act. But there is a difference between the utterance as an act and the utterance as content. As for example, the sentence, 'this day is very hot' can be explained from the two directions. One is from the utterance as an act and the other is from the utterance as content. The former identifies that the utterance is happy or unhappy, felicity or infelicity, fire or misfire. While the latter holds that the utterance as content is true or false.

Truth and falsity are the distinguishing marks of constatives, while happy or unhappy, felicity or infelicity are the distinguishing marks of performatives. Austin says-
"Performative utterances are not indeed false but in general unhappy. And for this reason we call the doctrine of the things that can be and go wrong on the occasion of such utterances, the doctrine of infelicities." \(^\text{13}\)

Austin gives some necessary conditions for the smooth functioning of performatives.

\[(A-1)\] There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further,

\[(A-2)\] The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.

\[(B-1)\] The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and.

\[(B-2)\] Completely.

\[(T-1)\] where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further.

\[(T-2)\] must actually so conduct themselves subsequently. \(^\text{14}\)
Austin holds that making an utterance is a speech activity. Activity comes into light when the utterance made by the speaker is performed. Speech acts denote various activities (stating or warning or promising etc.). Austin’s both performative and constative utterances imply speech acts. Therefore Austin, dissolving the distinction between the two propounds the new concept, i.e., speech act theory.

Austin in this context brings out three types of speech acts. They are respectively –

(i) Locutionary act
(ii) Illocutionary act
(iii) Perlocutionary act

Locutionary act can be exposed as such whenever we make an utterance, we perform an act, what Austin calls locutionary act. As for instance, ‘what is your name?’, here we perform an act i.e., locutionary act. Austin says—“Locutionary act includes the utterance of certain words in a certain construction, and the utterance of them with certain meaning.”

In saying something (performing a locutionary act) we perform another kind of act. It can be shown through examples as such-If I ask, ‘what is your name?’ I have performed in this context a locutionary act. But locutionary act can produce different kinds of speech acts (i.e., in making a promise or in issuing an order or in asking question etc.) in the context of utterance of a statement. Austin calls such acts illocutionary act. So, locutionary utterance is the initial stage to perform illocutionary act. It provides a force to perform illocutionary act. Therefore, illocutionary act is known as illocutionary
force. So, he writes—"to state is surely every bit as much to perform an illocutionary act as, say, to warn or to pronounce."\(^{16}\)

The last act can be explained as such—when we say something we perform a locutionary act and in performing locutionary act we perform another kind of act, i.e., perlocutionary act. It imparts certain effect upon the feelings, thoughts or actions of the audience or of the speaker. Therefore, it is perlocutionary act. So, Austin mentions—

"Saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons. We shall call the performance of an act of this kind the performance of a 'perlocutionary' act or perlocution."\(^{17}\)

As for example when I say—"Do this work", I perform an act i.e., locutionary act (utterance of the statement). And in performing the locutionary act I order someone to perform the intended act (illocutionary). And by this utterance (ordering) I see that the act is performed (perlocutionary). To sum up, here I have performed locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary act.

Austin’s performative and constative utterances and his speech act theory are basically dealt with ordinary language. His locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts are the best device to unveil the defects of ordinary language.
Austin's three types of speech acts namely locutionary act, illocutionary act, or perlocutionary act imply the different functions of language. Like Wittgenstein's language-games or forms of life he wants to show that language is not confined to one function. Here Austin also like later Wittgenstein seems to corroborate the depth grammar through the illocutionary or perlocutionary force of language. Austin involves the speech act theory in order to bring out the different functions of language. Similarly Wittgenstein also involves the concept of language-games or forms of life in order to point out the multifarious functions embedded in language. Hence it can be opined that Wittgenstein's language games and Austin's speech act theory are same from the standpoint of its aim and objective.

It is clear from the above discourse that Gilbert Ryle, P.F. Strawson, and J.L. Austin are out and out ordinary language philosophers. Because their philosophical works revolve around the circle of ordinary language. Wittgenstein too, formulates the later philosophy through the revolutionary concept of ordinary language. His concept of language-games or forms of life or use theory of meaning underlie the technique of ordinary language. His analysis of ordinary language provokes the view that there are no private or hidden objects. This signifies that private language is impossible in the sense that it is not accessible or communicable by people. That is why he regards ordinary language as a medium of philosophical discussion. According to Wittgenstein, philosophical problems emerge due to misunderstandings of ordinary language. Therefore, ordinary language has an immense role in our forms of life. Forms of life are guided by ordinary language. It is a leading force of human life. Life cannot be regulated without the proper use of ordinary language. Wittgenstein's use theory of meaning also points out the important clue
that use is a central part of meaning (Ordinary language). Strawson also like Wittgenstein formulates the use theory of meaning under the domain of ordinary language. 'Do not ask for meaning ask for use', the famous dictum of Philosophical Investigations brings into prominence the fact that we use ordinary language as a vehicle of communication in our forms of life. Therefore, ordinary language is a living practical affair. In a nutshell, ordinary language is a living, social and practical human affair which deals with concrete situations of life.

References:


3. Ibid. p. 29.

4. Ibid. p.17


6. Ibid. p. 224.


8. Ibid.p,10.


10. Austin, J.L: How To Do Things With Words p.5.

11. Ibid. p.55.
12. Ibid. p.57.
15. Ibid. p.94.