CHAPTER V

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Gilbert Ryle declares in "The Concept of Mind", his epoch-making book on philosophical psychology, that traditionalists' idea of consciousness and introspection is a 'logical muddle'. He does not repudiate consciousness but discards self-consciousness as a method of self-knowledge. He tries to establish the identical nature of knowledge of one's own self and the knowledge of other's. Ryle points out that the traditionalists admit the theory of 'Privileged Access' to our own mental states and processes. This theory rests on the assumption that there is an internal faculty of reflection or introspection or consciousness which supplies the data about our internal life. According to Ryle, it is an imaginary assumption as it implies that the method of knowing one's own mind is quite different from the method of knowing other's. By attacking the idea of consciousness and showing that the methods of self-knowledge and the knowledge of others are identical he has cast doubt upon the cartesian theory of mind.

Now we have to examine the prevalent views of consciousness which Ryle has dismissed subsequently. At first he mentions a number of senses in which the word "conscious" is used in ordinary parlance, not used by the philosophers.  

2. Cf. Ibid., p. 156.
In the first sense it does not mean any special faculty or any particular channel of apprehension. In this sense we may be conscious about any physical fact or someone's particular state of mind. Here we want to convey our vague and indistinct apprehension of any object and situation.

Secondly, the words, 'conscious' and 'self-conscious' are used when we want to speak of the embarrassment shown by other people. Shyness and affectation are ways in which self-consciousness, in this sense, is commonly exhibited.

Thirdly, the expression 'self-conscious' is used in a more general sense when we want to pay heed to our own qualities or character or intellect. For example, when we say "I am fonder of arithmetic or some one feels that 'he is conscious of his home-sickness."

Fourthly, sometimes 'conscious' is used in a quite different meaning. In this sense 'conscious' means sensitive. For example, when we say consciousness is returning to my numbed leg.

Fifthly, it may be the case when a person is unconscious of a sensation or when he pays no heed to it. For example, 'a walker engaged in a heated dispute may be unconscious of the sensation in the blistered heel'.

But philosopher's notion of consciousness is quite different from all these senses which common men have.
As regards philosopher's notion of consciousness Ryle considers that they use it in the sense of an essence of the mental as opposed to the physical. They mean by 'mental' that which is conscious or self-intimating.

Now we have to find out how the everyday uses of the term "consciousness" are fundamentally different from the philosophers' use of the same. The different uses, as Ryle views it, in any context the term 'conscious' is used, there is a sense of awareness of the person to whom it may belong. Embarrassment is an awareness of one's awkward position. The term 'conscious' in the sense of "sensitive" means awareness of any part of the body. Again in the sense of 'paying heed' it cannot but mean awareness because it will be a contradiction in terms to say 'we are paying heed to x, though we are unaware of x'. Thus we see, our apprehension whether clear or vague, is an awareness. Once again, our awareness should be always personal or private. We can notice the sneezing of others but it is logically impossible to notice in the same way the awareness of others. That is why we describe the 'sneeze' as physical and 'awareness' as mental. This reminds us of Curt Ducasse's observation when he says that to be material or physical "... basically means to be, or to be capable of being, perceptually public".

According to him the unperceivable electrons and protons are derivatively physical for their being constituents of the things that are perceptually public. But as our awareness cannot be perceptually public in this sense, it cannot be called physical. Ryle does not admit that awareness or consciousness really exists. He substitutes awareness by 'disposition', which according to him is nothing but a kind of behaviour. Our awareness of things as distinct from any kind of bodily happenings is so obvious that one can easily say that there is no such thing as consciousness. Consciousness is the pre-condition of all our being, the pre-supposition of all assertions and denials, so that it cannot be denied. It is so fundamental that it can neither be defined nor properly described. Regarding the assertion of awareness as basically distinct from the body Price observes, "It is too fundamental, and if anyone says he cannot understand what I am talking about, I do not know how I can help him". 4

Ryle considers philosopher's popular notion of consciousness as the transformed application or an extended version of Protestant's notion of conscience. Protestants believe in God-given light of private conscience. Philosophers

also think that there is a general internal light of consciousness to reveal the mental world. But if there had been such a light within us to manifest our mental episode we would often have said, 'I have known or found it from my consciousness'. But this would never be the case. Epistemologists accept this internal light of consciousness which is infallible and regard it as the real picture of our mental states and processes. But in the actual field, we do not always make a correct estimation of all our own qualities and character. How then, Ryle asks, can any internal light of consciousness be accepted?

Ryle's important argument against the concept of consciousness is the argument of infinite regress. The theorists held that consciousness is 'phosphorescent' or self-luminous. It reveals itself as well as its objects. When we are conscious of something, we at the same time become conscious of our consciousness of that thing. According to them consciousness of an object and consciousness of that consciousness are simultaneous. Ryle here maintains that by accepting philosopher's notion we have to admit that there is an unlimited series of consciousness in us. According to Ryle, "My consciousness is of a process of inferring, but my inferring is, perhaps, of a geometrical conclusion from geometrical premises".  

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When I infer something the verbal expression of my inference might be that "because so and so, therefore such and such". But the verbal expression of our consciousness of that apprehension would be 'Here I am reducing such and such from so and so'. As my consciousness of the apprehension is again mental it must also be self-intimating. Hence we must be aware that 'Here I am spotting the fact that here I am reducing such and such from so and so'. This awareness being again mental it must lead to another self-awareness and thus ad-infinitum. To avoid such a conclusion we have to reject philosopher's notion of consciousness. For Ryle, "If this conclusion is rejected then it will have to be allowed that some elements in mental processes are not themselves things we can be conscious of, namely those elements which constitute the supposed outermost self-intimations of mental processes; and then 'conscious' could no longer be retained as part of the definition of 'mental'."6

Besides this argument of infinite regress, Ryle has raised another objection from the linguistic point of view. He argues that if consciousness is to be conceived on the analogy of light, as held by the theorists, it cannot be stated that consciousness enables us to 'know' the mental states and processes. His objection relates to the fact of the meaning

6. Ibid., p. 163.
of the word, 'know'. Ryle argues that we only 'see' things in light, but we do not speak of 'knowing' those things. In Ryle's language ... knowing is not the same sort of thing as looking at, and what is known is not the same sort of thing as what is illuminated.  

Ryle's basic objection to the theorists notion of consciousness is that there is no mental happenings which can be consciously known or felt. In his language, "The radical objection to the theory that minds must know what they are about, because mental happenings are by definition conscious, or metaphorically self-luminous, is that there are no such happenings; there are no occurrences taking place in a second-status world, since there are no such status, and no such world and consequently no need for special modes of acquainting ourselves with the denizens of such a world".  

Now it is with this notion of mind and the mental that Ryle keeps on using the word, 'ghostly' for whatever is said to occur in the 'private theatre'.

Next, regarding Ryle's account of introspection we find that like consciousness he has also denied introspection almost on the same line. He asserts that introspection is a term of

7. Ibid., p. 162.
8. Ibid., p. 161.
art and has little use in our everyday life. Ryle rejects introspection on another ground. If introspection means scrutinizing one's own private experience it would involve two things, namely, the act and the object of scrutiny that we have to attend to at one and the same time.

According to Ryle, there is another charge of infinite regress. We have seen that mental is known or ascertained by introspection; introspection being again mental has to be known by another introspection and so on ad-infinitum. To avoid such a conclusion we have to admit that there are some mental processes which are unintrospectible. From this it would follow that a person's knowledge about his own mental states and processes could not always be based on introspection.

Ryle brings another objection to introspection. Introspection as psychologists held, is the act by which we can know the mental episodes of our internal life. Also it is said to be unerring in informing us about our mental life. Here Ryle argues that if it is true, why are there conflicting opinions among psychologists in this respect? They have reported variously about the workings of mind. Thus we see that infallibility is an extravagant claim on the part of introspection.

Following Hume Ryle raises another objection on the ground that the act of introspection does not always give us the true picture of all our emotional experiences. The intensity of fear
will be reduced after it is studied. That is why the introspectionist fails to give the correct picture of our mental life. Ryle says it is retrospection which supplies the data for our mental life. Here he argues, why we should not say retrospection alone can give us the data needed for our self-knowledge? For him, "If retrospection can give us the data we need for our knowledge of some states of mind, there is no reason why it should not do so for all?" Ryle believes that what we call introspection is an authentic process of retrospection. He thinks that by substituting retrospection for introspection he can eliminate the ghost.

Further, Ryle substitutes 'person' for 'mind' by holding that it is person but not mind that knows, feels, and thinks. "Assertions about a person's mind are therefore assertions of special sorts about that person".  

He further goes on to say that to ask about the relation between a person's mind and body is as much absurd as to ask about the relation between House of Commons and the British Constitution or between University and its Registrar's office. According to Ryle, the fact that the person himself knows this and chooses that can be called mental facts about that person. We would not say that my eye is seeing this or my nose is smelling this, rather than 'I see this' or 'I smell this'.

9. Ibid., p. 166.
10. Ibid., p. 167.
These assertions carry with them some facts about eyes and nose. But this analogy is not proper. Because like eyes and nose mind does not stand for another organ of sense. "It signifies my ability and proneness to do certain sorts of things, and not some piece of personal apparatus without which I could or would not do them." 11

Ryle, throughout, 'The Concept of Mind' argues to establish that the theorists talk in terms of mind and body involves a series of breaches of logical rules. In order to avoid such breaches he refers to the doings of novelists, biographers and the diarists. "Where logical candour is required from us, we ought to follow the example set by novelists, biographers, and diarists, who speak only of persons doing and undergoing things". 12 These people do not exhibit any kind of dualism in their writings. But we find that the novelists' Tragedy or Comedy is a clear description of the inner and outer side of his character's personality. Ryle himself has admitted the fact that novelist's characters have a private world of their own. Ryle, while referring to Boswell's description of Johnson's mind says that the description was incomplete, "... since there were notoriously some thoughts which Johnson kept carefully to himself and there must have been many dreams, day dreams, and silent babblings which only Johnson could have

11. Ibid., p. 168.
12. Ibid., p. 168.
recorded and only a James Joyce would wish him to have recorded. 13

Ryle admits the fact that there remains something private to a person. Silent imagination, silent calculations and recollection are indeed private. But his objection lies in the fact of 'Privileged Access' theory of privacy, the theory according to which only the agent has access to workings of his mind. He holds that mental is private in the same way in which the entries of diary kept under lock and key are private. He maintains that "I can pay heed to what I overhear you saying as well as to what I overhear myself saying, though I cannot overhear your silent colloquies with yourself. Nor can I read your diary, if you write it in cipher, or keep it under lock and key". 14 Thus for Ryle mental is private not in the strict sense of the term, but it could be made public. Mind is actually open or public but if someone prefers he can keep it private or secret.

According to Ryle what we know and how we know about our own selves are not different from what we know and how we know about other people. In this connection he remarks, "The sorts of things that I can find out about myself are the same as the sorts of things that I can find out about other people, and the methods of finding them out are much the same". 15 We know about ourselves

13. Ibid., p. 58.
15. Ibid., p. 155.
almost on the same line as we know about others. To have the knowledge about ourselves and others we must know how to establish and apply certain law-like propositions about overt and silent behaviours of ourselves as well as of other people.

The establishment of the motives or inclinations or qualities of character is, according to Ryle, an inductive process. We establish and apply them in our own case as well as in the case of others. According to Ryle, self-knowledge, though not private by nature, is made private under some circumstances. Thus Ryle concludes that there is no intrinsic difference between self-knowledge and knowledge about others. Whereas dualists had based self-knowledge on consciousness and introspection and knowledge of others mind on inference, Ryle bases it on induction.

From the above exposition of Ryle's view it becomes clear that there is nothing secret or ghostly about man. But now the question arises what does the word 'I' stand for? As generally known it is the subject or knower as opposed to the body or material substance. But according to Ryle, 'I' does not mean any soul substance, it means only an index word. Just as 'now' refers to the time when the word is uttered, similarly 'I' refers to the person by whom the word 'I' is uttered or written. So also 'you' refers to the person who hears one say 'you' or reads the word 'you'. Thus for Ryle, 'I' or 'you' cannot be names of ghostly substances in me or in you. And thus for Ryle, "'I' is not an extra name for an extra-being; it indicates, when I say or write
it, the same individual who can also be addressed by the proper name 'Gilbert Ryle'. 'I' is not an alias for 'Gilbert Ryle'; it indicates the person whom 'Gilbert Ryle' names, when Gilbert Ryle uses 'I'.

So there is no question of self and at the same time 'I' as naming the self or standing for the self. Actually I or myself is used in different senses in different contexts. For example, when I say, 'I am warming myself before the fire'. here the word myself refers to the body. But when I say, 'I collided with the police car', here 'I' is used to mean 'the car' which is more inferior than human body.

Thus we see there are various types of selves within the human body. 'I' or 'myself' refers to the same person although in different contexts. When I say 'I found myself guilty'. Here the terms 'I' and 'myself' means the same person but in different contexts. But here the same person would be judge and culprit both. Ryle explains this fact with reference to what he calls higher order acts. There are some acts which are concerned with some other acts. For example, when a person steals ornaments send him to the police. Here the act of sending him to the police is a higher order act and is directed against the act of stealing the ornaments which is called as a lower order act. Generally we direct our higher order acts to the lower order acts of other people. But sometimes we also direct our higher

16. Ibid., p. 188.
order acts upon our own lower order acts. So by knowing how to find others guilty I also know how to find myself guilty. Therefore no mysterious ghost lies in the judgement like, 'I found myself guilty'.

According to Ryle, the self of every past minute can be described but the self of the present cannot be described because here we still need one to describe it who remains undescribed, that is a pure knower. That is why many schools of philosophy have described the soul as the pure knower, the pure ego or the ultimate consciousness. Ryle argues that the fact of 'systematic elusiveness' does not presuppose any fact of soul, any extraordinary being in men, mysteriously existing in human body. Ryle argues that all the acts of a diarist cannot be recorded in the diary for the last act of making entry remains to be recorded. Similarly the 'self' or 'I' is describable. There is no question of pure ego or pure consciousness as opposed to the body.

If we inquire some inconsistencies in Ryle's exposition can be detected. Mind or consciousness for Ryle means nothing more than a 'dispositional behaviour'. But consciousness or awareness can never be identified with behaviour. A robot may behave like a human being yet it is not conscious at all, again a paralysed man is unable to behave like other conscious human beings, but it is true that he is conscious. There is simply a correlation between behaviour and consciousness, but yet they cannot be identified with each other.
Again it is historically untrue to say that philosopher's notion of the internal light of consciousness is only an outcome of Protestant's faith. The history of philosophy does not verify the fact that the dualism between mind and body was introduced after the days of Protestants. Again the fact of denial of consciousness on the ground that people do not mention it in common conversation is hardly satisfactory. In fact, consciousness is so obvious and basic a fact that it need not be described in order to be understood. Again Ryle's rejection of consciousness on the ground that it does not give us sufficient and infallible knowledge of our mental life as held by the philosophers also does not carry much weight. We may say that it cannot be an infallible and sufficient source of knowledge, but for this we cannot reject it altogether. Consciousness may not always give us true knowledge about our mental life, as the major part of our mind lies beyond the reach of our consciousness which is called 'unconscious'. The fact that we do not know many of our own mental qualities may be due to the fact that unconscious is not open to our private examination.

Again it should be remembered that the difficulty of infinite regress in philosopher's notion of consciousness which has been pointed out by Ryle occurs due to his inability to distinguish between two senses of the term 'conscious'.
The word 'conscious' is sometimes used in the sense of vague feeling, and sometimes again in the sense of particular distinct awareness. As regards the first sense while having the headache we are not always distinctly aware of the headache by saying that, 'Here I am suffering from headache'. But on the other hand we are vaguely conscious of our headache as we may remain engaged with many other things at the same time. Now, the way I am conscious of my headache is the way of my self-awareness. Self-awareness is implied in all our conscious activities but is vaguely known or felt. We simply say, "Because so and so, therefore such and such". We need not be distinctly aware of our self-awareness and say that, 'Here we are deducing such and such from so and so'. But Ryle has overlooked this point. He maintains self-awareness to be a distinct kind of awareness which occurs along with every piece of our apprehension. The two senses of the term 'conscious', namely, 'I am conscious of an object' and 'I am conscious of my consciousness' should be clearly distinguished. Hence it is for Ryle's failure to distinguish between the senses of the term, 'conscious' that the problem of infinite regress arises in the notion of consciousness.

Ryle rejects introspection on the ground that if introspection be the mental act of scrutinizing the private experiences of one's own, it would mean that we can attend to two things at once. But actually we cannot attend to an act
and the object simultaneously. It is difficult to attend to
two disconnected things at a time. But in introspection the
act and the object are fused together into one whole. Then
the charge of double attention may not be applicable here.
Again if the charge is accepted the question will arise
that how can we know that we cannot attend to two things
at once? This fact can be ascertained only through intros-
pection.

Ryle's charge of infinite regress regarding introspec-
tion rests on the assumption that in introspection the act
end the object must retain their individual identity. The
act of introspection and the mental act scrutinized may
form one whole and we may be conscious of a whole without
being distinctly conscious of parts. As A.C. Ewing remarks,
"so if I introspect or am in some way conscious of myself
as resolving, both introspection and resolving will be part
of my total felt state, but they need not both be objects
of distinct consciousness....."\textsuperscript{17} Ewing holds that all expe-
riences must be conscious in the sense of 'felt', otherwise
they would not be experiences. Probably Ryle has overlooked
this sense of 'conscious'. As an introspective person is
not introspecting all the time he never picks out intros-
pectively every distinguishable element in his experiences.
Mental events can be defined as conscious events, if

\textsuperscript{17} A.C. Ewing, "Prof. Ryle's attack on Dualism" reprinted
in 'Clerity is not enough' ed. by H.D.Lewis, George,
the word 'consciously' is understood to mean 'experienced' or 'felt'.

We can make an attempt to defend Ryle's objection of infallibility on the part of introspection. Introspection as we know is nothing but scrutinizing of our mental states and processes which involves judgement. There may be error in judgement but that does not mean that the judgement does not occur. As in external perception we may commit mistakes but for this reason the existence of perception itself can never be questioned.

Further he is substituting introspection by retrospection to eliminate the ghost. But it is not clear how this substitution can help one to escape the ghost. For if we do not introspect, how do we retrospect? Retrospection as it is generally understood, means scrutiny of the recent past. Also we know retrospection involves memory and memory involves our consciousness or awareness of some state or situation. Thus we see that we cannot banish altogether the fact of introspection for if we do not introspect how does retrospection take place? Hence Ryle's attempt to deny both introspection and consciousness is disputable.

Confusions may arise regarding Ryle's assertion when he believes that to ask for the relation between mind and body is as much absurd as to ask for the relation between University and its Registrar's office. It is true that no sensible man can question about the relation between University and Registrar's office, but regarding mind and body, we know doctors are often talking about mind as affecting body or body as affecting the mind. "A fracture in the skull-bone has affected the patient's mind, or 'the cause of his disease is mental rather than physical' are the significant informations given by a doctor. Such observations of the doctor surely prove some kind of mind-body relation. 20

Ryle thinks that mental is private in the same sense in which the entries of a diary is kept under lock and key are private. In this connection one thing should be noticed that it is not impossible to break the lock and go through the diary. But in the same way it is not possible to know the workings of what is going on in another's mind. Ryle himself feels this fact as when he says, "... just as you cannot, in logic, hold my catches, win my races, eat my meals, frown my frowns, or dream my dreams, so you cannot have my twinges, or my after-images."21


Thus Ryle himself admits the fact that there is private mental world because my consciousness or awareness is by nature inaccessible to others. But this fact of privacy of our mental states conflicts with his 'open access' theory of mind. That is why he makes an attempt to reconcile privacy with openness or publicity. But there are inconsistencies in his reconciliation. Sometimes he argues that mental states and processes are private simply on the analogy of a diary kept under lock and key. At the same time he assumes that if mental states are not considered as private there will be some logical absurdities. Thus we see that he is not definite regarding the nature of mental privacy. It is a fact which he wants to accept as well as deny.

Now we are concerned with Ryle's account of self-knowledge without consciousness and introspection. In this connection he boldly remarks, "The sorts of things that I can find out about myself are the same as the sorts of things that I can find out about other people, and the methods of finding them out are much the same".22 It seems quite difficult to accept the fact that we can know our own mental states as well as other's in the same way. An observer has to guess or to imagine or to infer about my pain or whether I am actually in pain. But in order to know my own pain I do not guess or infer in the same manner. When I say 'I feel depressed' nobody will ask how I know my depression. But when I say 'he feels depressed' some such questions will legitimately arise.

22. Ibid., p. 155.
So it is difficult on our part to admit that the method of knowing one's own self as well as other's are similar.

It can be said that Ryle's identification of the two methods is due to his oversimplified notion of mind and the mental. He thinks that mind is nothing but the name for a certain type of behaviour. According to him we can know other's mind by noticing other's behaviour, so also we can know our own mind by observing our own behaviour. But this cannot be the case. A robber can behave perfectly like a saint but for this reason the mentality of a robber is not that of a saint. We sometimes feel or think one thing and do just the opposite. There is such a thing as suppression, lying or hypocrisy in us. Thus in view of this split in personality we have to admit that life is a double series of events.

It is true that behaviour is the only source of knowledge about the mind of others. We see how other people talk, move and act before we can come to know what they want to do. But this is not applicable in one's own case. Because my mind is not open to me through my behaviour. Behaviour follows from mental phenomena without being itself a mental phenomenon. We should conceive, therefore, that mental states and processes are inseparable from outward behaviour. Ryle's difficulty is that if we do not identify mind with behaviour we

cannot know there are other minds, for we cannot observe the thoughts and feelings of others. Ryle's observation that "The ascertainment of a person's mental capacities and propensities is an inductive process, an induction to law-like propositions from observed actions and re-actions" is true with regard to other persons. Again it is also true with regard to our own selves. I can be sure of my own mental abilities and propensities by observing what I can or cannot do. Behaviour certainly helps us in the assessment of mental qualities but that does not mean that our mental qualities are those very actions and reactions.

Now one thing is to be noted here that Ryle has made a confusion between mental qualities and their tests. He has failed to distinguish between the essence and evidence of mental qualities, between the meaning of a statement and the method of its verification. This has led him to say that mind is a sum-total of various behaviours typical to human beings. Further Ryle thinks that the question about mind is not any particular question like, how do we know that there is a mind? But it involves a series of specific questions. Such as 'how do I discover that I am more unselfish than you' or that 'your action


took more courage than mine'. We are sometimes unable to solve some of them finally and we have to stop at mere conjecture. The meaning of 'unselfish' and 'courage' is constituted by behaviours. He observes "... it is part of the meaning of 'you understood it' that you could have done so and so and would have done it, if such and such, and the test of whether you understood it is a range of performances satisfying the apodosis of these general hypothetical statements." But we have seen that Ryle thinks that behaviours are the test, means for ascertainment of mental propensities and capacities. Thus Ryle has not decided whether mental concepts stand for some behaviour or they are tested by some behaviour.

It may be said that Ryle's attitude towards man's mentality as confined to his behaviour is mainly influenced by his 'one-world theory'. According to him nothing is subjective or private. Everything in man's experience is public, but if one wishes he can keep them as private. The self cannot be objectively describable. Ryle thinks that although there is a


27. Cf. his following statements in "The Concept of Mind", 'I discover my or your own motives in much, though not quite, the same way as I discover my or your abilities" (p.171). "To discover how conceited or patriotic you are, I must still observe your conduct, remarks..." (p.171). "The ascertainment of a person's mental capacities and propensities is a inductive process..." (p.172).
'systematic elusiveness of I' yet we should not assume that there is a mysterious entity within us, a soul so opposed to body, a subject as opposed to object. In his analogy of a diary kept under lock and key, it has been shown that, though an act of making entry cannot at the same time be entered in the diary still it does not mean that it is impossible to enter it subsequently. So is the case with the self. Though the self at one moment cannot be brought under the purview of description this does not mean that it is undescribable or beyond the scope of description.

But if we try to objectify the subject the main problem which will arise is the problem of personal identity. If human beings are mere collection of objective data then the question will arise that what it is that integrates them into one whole so that there can be a feeling of identity in the midst of all the changing circumstances? Two persons may objectively look alike, yet we must conceive them as two. In such a case it would be difficult for others to mark them though they would feel no difficulty in distinguishing themselves. This is so because personal identity is given in self-awareness which is other than the objective facts constituting partly the life of an individual.

There may arise another difficulty as this extreme objectivism obliterates the distinction between subject and object. His theory of 'higher order actions' is an attempt in that direction. According to him self-consciousness or self-awareness is a higher order action. And a higher order action is one which is concerned with other actions. When I cheer up 'B's playing football, my cheering up activity is a higher order action in connection with 'B's action of playing football. Again when someone praises my cheering up action, his action will be still higher than mine. Ryle thinks that just as one directs his higher order action on the actions of others, so also he directs his higher order action on his own. Just as I praise 'B's success at the examination, so I praise my own success at examination also. He argues that this fact can be expressed in one formula, "'A' praises 'B's success at the examination," and we may substitute the variables 'A' and 'B' with 'I', 'you', 'he', 'she', 'my' or 'mine', 'yours', 'his' etc. This implies that 'I' falls in the same category with 'he', 'she', 'you' etc. Consequently there is an abolishment of the distinction between subject and object. J.N. Findlay points out that man is necessarily a "two-sided person, having an outward and an inward history". John Wisdom also

29. Cf. Ibid., pp. 113-114.
asserts that "The peculiarity of the soul is not that it is visible to none but that it is visible only to one". Thus Ryle's attempt to annul mind, soul or the subject and to objectify everything is not convincing.