CHAPTER - 2

THE CRITICAL VIEWS OF HULME (1909-1912)

PART-1

Sir Herbert Read, who edited the *Speculations* in 1924, mentioned in the introduction that it was very difficult to arrange Hulme’s papers, for ‘What existed was a collection of hundreds of loose notes, varying in size from pieces of papers no bigger than a postage-stamp to complete folios of notes on one subject.’ Read also added that Hulme was in the process of completing a book on Jacob Epstein but the manuscript was lost when he died at Nieuport, Flanders in 1917. There are some essays which can be placed on a definite date for they have been dated and some can be found in *The New Age*, where Hulme was a regular contributor. When *Further Speculations* appeared in 1962, it contained essays that had been written earlier than the ones in *Speculations* and Sam Hynes had rightly classified the essays according to the subject they concentrated upon. Clearly, to trace a logical development in Hulme’s thought, the possible thing to do was to rearrange the chronology of the essays, without which the contradiction and confusion in Hulme would never be resolved.

There are few critics and writers, who having encountered a similar difficulty, have distinguished the various phases of Hulme’s interest and thought. Besides these, the essays of Hulme have been dated according to their appearance in the form of articles in *The New Age*, and *The Cambridge Magazine*, translations, review of books and letters.
An important fact remains that Hulme was always interested in philosophy and along with it he was also engaged in finding a standard for poetic expression. Sometimes, the latter took precedence over the former and he concentrated upon the writing of and the theory of poetry. Alun R. Jones has provided details about the formation of the Poets' Club in 1908 and it is more or less now conceded that this club and its activities were largely responsible for the birth of Imagism.3 ‘The Notes on Language and Style’ was first published in *The Criterion*, 3(12): July 1925, ed. by H. Read. The ‘Notes’ represent that phase of Hulme's involvement where he was concentrating upon establishing a theory of poetic expression. ‘A Lecture on Modern Poetry’4 also belongs to this same period, judging by its thrust and intention.

In these essays, Hulme advocates the visual image as a necessary ingredient ensuring exact communication in poetry. Besides the insistence on the visual, Hulme brought an order into the other requirements of modern poetry. He recognized the difficulty of conveying through language, he also urged the practise of free-verse or irregular versification which influenced the use of language, particularly the syntax and grammar and thereby, on the exactness of experience.

In 1909, Hulme was also studying philosophers like Haldane, Bax and Gaultier on whom he contributed essays in *The New Age*. While studying Ernest Belfor Bax, he realized the deeply entrenched thought of Hegel and Kant on thinkers, who, inspite of advancing towards anti-intellectualism, fell back upon them. Bax, for example, had accepted reality as unknowable in entirety but unlike Bergson, he refrained from asserting the validity of the part of known reality. He
accepted the infinitive proportions of reality and arrived at a compromise between the two points of thought. While surveying reality as a flux like Bergson, Bax thought philosophy was incapable of grasping the particular, hence the logical. Philosophy thoughts Bax could not 'get beyond universal and abstractions.'

Bergson not only asserted that the apprehension of reality could not be reduced to law, he also interpreted the flux of reality in practical terms. Bergson was careful not to use a sentimental version of the instinct or 'intuition' which did not reduce reality into concepts and models but entered it from within. This entry within retrieved for practical, artistic purposes, a part of the reality which was as much legitimate as the whole flux that was impossible to contain within the frame of concepts and laws.

Bax, Hulme found, held that 'there is always something left over, that when you dip the net of concepts and universals some of the reality always escapes through the meshes. He thus occupies a curious midway position which I think will in the end be found untenable.'

The psychology involved in Bergsonian 'intuition' was the ability of transplanting oneself into the movement and retrieving for practical purposes, a part of reality which manifested in visual forms. There were no universals to be drawn from the known but the known itself was taken as real. The value attached to 'thinking' in Descartian system had depended on the mind, thus fixing reality in universals and common experience. The mind analyzes and tries to issue a principle of order in the experience of the flux of reality. The literary use of anti-intellectualism in the faculty of 'intuition' was the use of visual concrete
language. The analysis and order sought by the intellect could never, Hulme felt, represent reality or any phenomena exactly. The reliance on system and order removed the visually felt sensation as an incessant merging of contexts that could be given literary representation. Hulme explains:

    The abstract philosopher has a great contempt for the visual one. Hence, the steadfast refusal to recognize that Nietzsche made any contribution to metaphysics. Mr. Haldane constantly informs us that the region of philosophy is not a region of pictorial images, one must beware of similies as the devil.... The counter philosopher, taking conceit unto himself, forgets that all his abstract works are merely codified dead metaphors.

Essays on Bax, Haldane and de Gaultier contain passages on poetic expression. He deals with questions of prose and poetic language. The visual as concrete language, the avoidance of stock expressions, are also dealt with in these essays. Thus, Hulme was investigating to vindicate his own critical position

    Henri Bergson's metaphysics attracted Hulme due to the fact that reality was interpreted as a flux, that was in a state of ceaseless evolution. Expression of such merging of contexts was equivalent to the poetic practise of disparate visual images resembling scraps of experience that together build up a general effect. There is no doubt that Hulme was greatly influenced by Bergson, the evidence of which is borne out by the fact that he translated An Introduction to Metaphysics in 1912. Before it, he wrote 'A Personal Impression of Bergson' in the Saturday Westminster Gazette, No. 5771, 1911. Bergson also wrote a letter of recommendation for Hulme's re-admission into Cambridge in 1912. Hulme had
certainly made an impression on Henri Bergson to warrant such a gesture. The interest and study of Bergsonian metaphysics may belong to the phase immediately following Hulme’s engagement with pure poetic theory that later gave rise to many tenets of Imagism. Karen Csengeri thinks Bergson belonged to the intermediate period of Hulme’s intellectual interests. Wallace Martin shows how Bergsonian philosophy was related to the practices of contemporary French poets, chiefly in the work *L’ Attitude du Lyrisme contemporain* by Trancrede de Visan, 1901.

Why did Hulme pay such attention to Bergson? The answer lies to a certain extent in Hulme’s own words:

> He (Bergson) has not created any new theory of art.... But what he does seem to me to have done is that by the acute analysis of certain mental processes he has enabled us to state more definitely and with less distortion the qualities which we feel in art.

The ‘mental process’ that Hulme refers to is the creative impulse, the artist’s creative moment which is impossible to analyse rationally. He points to the failure of the intellect in understanding and explaining the nature of the ‘mental process.’ The intellect, ‘always analyses – when there is a synthesis it is baffled... The intellect can’t represent it. This is a necessary consequence of the particular nature of the intellect and the purposes for which it is formed. It does not mean that your synthesis is ineffable, simply that it can’t be definitely stated.’ The function of Bergson’s philosophy was that it clearly recognized a distinction between the analyzable or mechanical and the unanalyzable or anti
vital areas of experience. It did not use the tools of rationality or the intellect to apply to the other zone of experience. Bergson, felt Hulme, had created a new vocabulary in understanding the complex nature of experience through ‘intuition.’

Hulme also believed that Bergson had been able to describe the artistic volition much more satisfactorily than Schopenhauer, for the latter ‘demands such a cumbrous machinery in order to get the feeling out.’ In Bergsonian terms the isolation of both reality from appearance and isolation of the artist’s contemplation of that reality and consequently fixing it in art constitutes all together the total process of creativity, though it is not so easily and neatly arranged in an order of progression.

The *Speculations* also has a chapter towards the end, ‘Intensive Manifolds,’ where he discusses Bergson’s conceptualization of reality. Sam Hynes, in his introduction to *Further Speculations* had called Hulme a propagandist chiefly because of this reason. But, I believe Bergson was necessary to Hulme, not so much to further his philosophy, but to search for an appropriate theoretical corpus to support his own ideas. Hulme wanted to proceed from philosophy to expression, for he was convinced that without a deep sense of belief, the art would never reflect the continuing spirit of the times. As we shall discuss later, belief in classicism (as Hulme understood it) formed the foundation of Hulme’s aesthetic theory.

Bergsonian philosophy considered reality as a state of becoming. This implied multiplicity of sensation and an equal number of responses. Hulme felt he could be accommodated within this state of flux. Experience and sensation of
abstract categories could be fitted into this philosophy and access to difficult areas of experience would not be forbidden from being taken into account. This pluralism could be seen reflected in the 'Imagist' poetry that he had advocated. But the abstraction of experience could not be allowed to remain abstract in communication; abstraction could by no means be communicated in language. Here, Hulme inserts the clause for concrete expression governed by the visual element:

A man cannot write without seeing at same time a visual signification before his eyes. It is this image which precedes the writing and makes it firm.\textsuperscript{15}

You get continuously from good imagery this conviction that the poet is constantly in presence of a vividly felt physical and visual scene.\textsuperscript{16}

The visual element emphasized by Hulme, as also by Bergson, had the scope of ontological pluralism, which again, could be included with the other requisites of poetic expression.\textsuperscript{17} The production of a general effect, the avoidance of regular metre for the purpose of fixing an impression and the use of juxtaposed images in different lines are all tenets that did not come to clash with Bergsonian 'intensive manifolds.' On the whole, the philosophy of Bergson, particularly the concept of penetrating appearance in an intuitive moment and seizing upon a complex experience to retrieve and express through art, could be counted within the context of poetic theory that Hulme attempted to formulate.
The image, which Hulme thought would definitely ensure concrete effect was after all a representation of a particular object or sensation.

A representation taken from a certain point of view, a translation made with certain symbols, will always remain imperfect in comparison with the object, of which a view has been taken, or which the symbols seek to express. But the absolute is the object and not its representation, the original and not its translation, is perfect, by being perfectly what it is.18

Thus, we find that Hulme picked up Bergsonian principles that would help to establish a standard regarding the creative urge. Critics have acknowledged Hulme’s insistence on concrete and exact representation but they have found it difficult to accept the intellectual faculty of intuition.

Frank Kermode in *The Romantic Image* admits that Hulme was one of the first of the English critics to discover a crisis in human history during the Renaissance and this crisis was a moral catastrophe. Kermode also believed that Hulme was uncompromising in his demands on literature and art; he summarily rejected the idea of human-centrality in philosophy and art. But Kermode discusses two aspects, which according to him are glaring inconsistencies in his aesthetic theory. The first is the generalization of historical periods and the second is Hulme’s concept of the image. The second, Kermode says, was derived from the notion of discontinuity and the rejection of the empathic and the vital. But it is a confused conceptualization and perhaps more akin to the old Romantic Symbolist theory based on the discontinuity between reason and imagination.
Kermode saw a closeness between Coleridge's and Wordsworth's 'reason' and Hulme's 'intellect' and their objective and aspiration for precision.

An examination of Hulme's idea of the image has to be conveyed through visual meaning and secondly, the image is conveyed through intuitive language. Kermode thought Romanticism was given a philosophical vocabulary by Hulme. Further, French symbolism was given 'a new philosophical suit.' What Kermode was objecting to was the apparent inconsistency between concrete representation and the consideration that poetry had 'special access to truth.'

Kermode's criticism is valid in the sense that, in the absence of chronological ordering of 'Humanism,' 'Romanticism and Classicism' and the exposition of Bergson's philosophy, it is expected to give rise to certain conflicting thoughts. Moreover, one has to remember that Hulme was quite clear about the function of the image. He was consistently placing the image within the context of achieving exactness and accuracy in expression. And this can be seen even when he was discussing Bergson's theory of art.

Murray Krieger found a paradox in Hulme, he thought it strange that 'an imagism which is markedly romantic and a neo-Humanism which is anti-romantic somehow manage to meet' in Hulme. Krieger considered Coleridge to be the originator of the theory of the psychology of creative imagination and that Bergson's philosophy and idea of the poet's intellectual preparedness is equivalent to Coleridge's transcendental function of the imagination. In the light of these assumptions, Krieger feels that T.E. Hulme presents a classic example of the dichotomy between romanticism and classicism. The inconsistency also stretches to other implications of the anti-romantic stance of Hulme. Krieger
identifies them as the conflict between imagination and organicism and vital art against the mechanical complexity. If all art is to be vital, then Hulme was certainly confusing his aim for fixing an impression with the natural tendency of intuition to capture the infinite and the indefinite.

In the words of Richard Shusterman, 'Krieger seems strangely unaware that the notion of organic unity is not the invention of Coleridge, Bergson, or romanticism, but was originally an important classical concept, clearly formulated in Aristotle's Poetics and frequently employed and interpreted in pre-romantic thought.'

Though Krieger himself identifies Hulme's primary contribution to modern poetic theory as the return of 'linguistic responsibility' to the poet, we must remind ourselves that Hulme's objective was exact communication whatever may the nature of experience or sensation. The fidelity to the object under consideration marks him as distinct from Coleridge's faculty of imagination which was a synthesizing power rather than the capability of holding on to the original.

We have observed that Bergsonian philosophy and the attempt to establish an aesthetic backed by a concept of intuition had given rise to criticism and conflict. T.E. Hulme was never a systematic writer; his papers were retrieved in a disorderly state and therefore the consequence was that the papers were expected to be simultaneously linked to one another. The result was a sense of disbelief that they could be accepted as plausible. At the same time, it is undeniable that Hulme's contribution in formulating a theory of modern poetic practice was remarkable.
Sam Hynes felt that Hulme was disillusioned by Bergsonian philosophy and turned towards German philosophy and the philosophy of George Moore of Cambridge. This had been indicated by Hulme himself in 'A Personal Impression of Bergson' *Saturday Westminster Gazzette*, No. 5771, 1911. The impression that Bergson made, possibly in the Philosophical Congress at Bologna, held in 1911, on Hulme was that his delivery was not 'fluent'. The German, on the other hand, were 'emphatic, continuous and fluent.' Hulme felt, 'They expressed not the attitude of a man who with difficulty sees a new shape, but on the contrary gave one the certain conviction that they saw nothing at all. There was no question of vision. Vision breeds dissatisfaction with ready-made phrases and an attempt to supplement the inadequacies of language by new metaphors.... The concepts which they perpetually arranged in different orders, like a set of counters, were perfectly adequate to them for the representation of all the mysteries of thought.' Bergson, thought Hulme, had expressed his ideas so often that he had 'to a certain extent made them external to himself, and in dealing with them his manner loses that characteristic quality I have described and approximates to that of the Germans.' Bergson had become tired of giving illustrations and metaphors, which earlier had been convincing, and began to repeat them in popular form. The difficulty of expressing a philosophical issue in adequate language struck Hulme. He also realized that philosophers did not completely accept Bergson's ideas, primarily because of the kind of approach and language he used. Whatever be the reservations against Bergson's 'delivery,' it does not disprove his extraordinary ability to put forward different and unusual phenomena in a language that could be understood by men.
Bergsonian metaphysics explained the artistic process beginning from the contemplation of an idea to the translation of the idea into literary and art form. He did not reject the notion of being in the presence of a mental idea, complex and entangled in time and contexts. But, he proceeded to describe the process in such terms that suggested psychological methods at explaining complex conditions of the mind and the senses. Sensations and phenomena that were difficult to describe, but undeniable in their existence were adopted as valid encounters for literary and artistic adaptations.

The artist, Bergson said, began in the presence of the construct and gradually moved towards associations and disassociation or analogies in order bring about concreteness and stability to the particular state of contemplation. In this context, Bergsonian philosophy of art did not carry the transcendental into the concrete medium. The transcendental element involved in the act of installing within the complexity of phenomena was dispelled by the use of ontological visual description through inter-contextual positioning. The entire attempt at such a process of rendering exactness was a check on the 'intellectualism of associationist determinism.'

Bergsonian philosophy had cast a deep influence upon visual art of the early 20th century mainly because of its redefinition of ontological perspectives. It produced fresh insight into things and phenomena and a new understanding of the complexity of experience and the subsequent literary and artistic manifestation. The intuitive moment was also a moment of radical shift in established ideas of space and time. The transcendentalism inherent in Bergsonianism was curiously a moment of concretization or objectification too. The heightened sense of
apprehending a special kind of ontological truth equally produced a special type of literary and artistic forms. The element of transcendentalism was actually involved in creating a new expression and representation. As we know, Bergsonian metaphysics and theory of art had definitely determined abstract art, even cubism. It would be simplistic to conclude that Bergson’s philosophy and theory of art urged piercing the veil of appearance and retrieving a part of phenomena as the truth or reality. Bergson believed in not only piercing appearance or the deep-rooted prejudices of habit but also releasing the senses by depicting that phenomena which removes the conventional concepts of space and time. Thus, transcendentalism in so far as representing experience in its total perspective is concerned, was certainly present in Bergson; but transcendentalism commonly understood as the vague but strong mystical experience was certainly not the objective.

Hulme’s interests were varied and they diversified into fresh territories represented by the contemporary philosophical concerns of the Germans and English philosophy of Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore. He also began to take keen interest in the visual arts as it marked a definite shift from the style and treatment of naturalism and positivist knowledge. The gradual progress of T.E. Hulme into subjects other than Bergsonian metaphysics did not imply a total and final separation of his intellectual interests in well-defined parts. However, the need to work towards establishing moral and ethical standards in poetry and other forms of art also made him realize that mere pronouncement of such categories did not necessarily imply validity. The truth that existed besides mechanical and rational categories had to be substantiated through the use of some borrowed
tools. The objective and absolute nature of the inorganic world, i.e., of the zone of physical science and mathematics is similar to the world of ethical and religious values. Hulme stated in ‘Humanism’:

The scientific element in philosophy is a difficult investigation into the relations between certain very abstract categories. Though the subject matter is absolute, the method employed should be as purely scientific and impersonal as that of mathematics.²⁶

Hulme was convinced that philosophy could enquire into abstract subjects, like ethical and religious values. The durability and permanence of their tradition made them entities in their own right. It was perhaps these thoughts and sense of pursuit that prompted him to be a member of the Aristotelian Society in 1910. This philosophical society, writes A.R. Jones in The Life and Opinions of T.E. Hulme, was at that time chaired by G.E. Moore.²⁷ Though T.E. Hulme never succeeded in acquiring a University degree, he was sincerely interested in the intellectual concerns of the times. He was assimilating knowledge and as H. Read observed in the ‘Introduction’ to Speculations, ‘at least six works or series of works were taking shape.’ Among them were, ‘A philosophy, or Weltanschanung, in an allegorical form.’ Read further adds that this particular objective of T.E. Hulme was to be achieved through the means of ‘notes’ which he maintained ‘over a considerable period – perhaps ten or fifteen years – and were constantly rewritten and amended. They were never given any final form...²⁸
Thus, T.E. Hulme was studying philosophy and philosophical advances. Philosophy allowed him to formulate what he considered, a legitimate plane for absolute ethical values. Poetry and art reflected the objective character of ethical values. This strong bond was sought to be given a theoretical support by means of the tenets of classicism and the absolute.
THE CRITICAL VIEWS OF T.E. HULME (1912-1917)

PART-2

This period of Hulme's intellectual development is multifaceted. Though he gave up writing poetry, he continued to be engaged in defining the attitude that made up poetry. The essay 'Romanticism and Classicism,' written around 1912, contains the nucleus of Hulme's thoughts on the philosophy behind creative impulse and literature as an extension of the attitude of the times. The essay, according to Hulme was aimed at proving that a classical revival was inevitable and that fancy would be the tool of verse, not imagination.

Hulme was aware that a discussion of classicism and romanticism entailed caution since the words have been used to denote different types of meaning and interpretation. He demarcates his area as the principle working in literature; influenced to a great degree by the political understanding of the terms as used by Charles Maurras of the L'Action Franchaise movement.

The 'classical' point of view I take to be this. Man is by his very nature essentially limited and incapable of anything extraordinary. He is incapable of attaining any kind of perfection, because, either by nature, as a result of original sin, or the result of evolution, he encloses within him certain antinomies... The best results of a certain discipline which introduce order into this internal anarchy.

'A Tory Philosophy' was first published in the Commentator 4, 1912. The political understanding of the term classicism is just one of the many meanings
emerging from it. Another meaning has been in the context of projecting an antithesis of Romanticism. Friedrich von Schegel coined the term 'as an attempt to express infinite ideas and emotions in finite forms.' It adds that the general use in 20th century criticism has been the understanding that classicism denotes a distinct emphasis on poetic form and conscious craftsmanship as opposed to the free use of the imagination faculty and personal expression in romantic poetry. It is in this sense that T.E. Hulme uses the term. Classicism, as Hulme conceived, was the restrain and discipline exercised on the creative impulse.

What I mean by classical in verse, then, is this. That even in the most imaginative flights there is always a holding back, a reservation.

According to Hulme, attitude is germane and shares a straight, direct relationship with creative expression. Classicism has to be considered as an antithesis of the romantic attitude. What we see before us, whether an object or the perception of the object, depends upon our philosophical orientation. The importance of an attitude can be well appreciated when we consider the efforts of Hulme to replace the empathic and humanistic considerations that influenced creativity with an attitude and belief in the absolute nature of ethical values.

Romanticism was thought to be based on the conception of man as an 'infinite reservoir of possibilities.' This naturally strengthened man's position at the centre in the scheme of things or rather built up the notion of 'Personality.' The moral outlook of Hulme envisaged the world as the consciousness of limit. This limit could be seen working in poetry and the visual arts, lending them a new and different critical attitude and reflecting the exhaustion of the romantic
perspective. While drawing a connection between the philosophical aspects of Romanticism and their literary expression, Hulme realized that a fundamental principle tied them together. In his introduction to Sorel’s *Reflections on Violence* which he translated in 1914, he observed the connection between them:

> From the pessimistic conception of man comes naturally the view that the transformation of societies is an heroic task requiring heroic qualities... virtues which are not likely to flourish on the soil of a rational and sceptical ethic. This regeneration can, on the contrary, only be brought about and only be maintained by actions springing from an ethic which from the narrow rationalist standpoint is irrational, being not relative, but absolute.35

The belief in the absolute nature of ethics gave the impetus and determined the literary expression of any particular age. Classicism, as understood by Hulme, found similar interpretations in T.S. Eliot. Though Eliot was greatly influenced by Irving Babbitt on the question of classicism, he was also definitely influenced by T.E. Hulme. Eliot admired this in effect in *To Criticize the Critic*. John Bayley is of the opinion that ‘Whatever Eliot’s present views may be, his insistence on unified sensibility should be seen as part of the movement towards classicism which Hulme had begun.’36

Irving Babbitt’s classicism was directed at reorganizing society, a role that had long been played by the Church. He wanted an individual to unite with other individuals by combining the common interests and isolating the competing ones. He wanted to replace tradition with the kind of conservatism that only a
unique class of the elite could attain through moral discipline and 'inner check and discipline.' 'Babbitt had to locate his standards between the extremes of modern naturalism on the one hand and medieval idealism and religion, "which tended to isolate man entirely from man and his nature," on the other.... Between two rejected traditions Babbitt had no recourse but to abstract standards.37

The 'authority' in Babbitt terms was vested with a homogeneous group. This group was a form of institutional hierarchy which, having attained higher values could guide and steer other people.

Arnold, unlike Babbitt, did not wish to do away with everything that was 'Romantic.' 'His concern was to suggest a way of salvaging what was good, enthusiastic and stimulating in the romantic view, but of learning how to live through and go beyond it to some more control and in the most ampler sense reasonable way of life.'38 Poetry, thought Arnold, could project a reasonable attitude and provide what religion had been doing for the society. In both Babbitt's and Arnold's cases, the primary concern seems to have been to look for a substitute of religion. Where the former worked on the lines of organizing an institutional elite which had attained higher realization, the latter wanted poetry to replace religion. Hulme position was in contrast and appeal to the absolute idea of values, something that was like a cannon, a truth nobody could contest. He called not only for a belief in the futility of human enterprise and potential but also emphasized the idea of an absolute that could sanction authority. The private conviction of the absolute nature of values would certainly cast influence on the artistic expression.
Romanticism has been associated with the goodness of man, as preached by Rousseau who held that any imposition of tradition, authority or discipline thwarted the ‘progress’ of man.\textsuperscript{39} Romanticism has been referred to as ‘split religion’ or the belief that man needs to be deified for the immense potential residing within him. In the essay entitled ‘A Tory Philosophy,’ Hulme explains why he ‘can’t stand romanticism’ and why he was a ‘certain kind of Tory.’ Hulme felt that ‘The classical attitude, then, has a great respect for the past and for tradition, not from sentimental, but on purely rational grounds. It does not expect anything radically new, and does not believe in any real progress.’ Thus, the spirit of classicism and of romanticism have distinctive features when translated into verse or other aesthetic mediums. In politics, romanticism is the basic principle behind the notion of progress, liberty, equality and universalism. The dismissal of romanticism is based on the rationale that works from the classical point of view. Hulme believed that ‘An extraordinary solidarity is given to one’s beliefs. There is great consolation in the idea that the same struggles have taken place in each generation, and that men have always thought as we think now. It gives to religion a great stability, for it exhibits it as a permanent part of man’s nature and the nature of man being constant, it takes these beliefs beyond all change.’\textsuperscript{41} This, then is the ‘absolute nature’ of beliefs, unshakable and constant. The great colossal structure of authority contains in itself a monumental stability. It supplies conviction in all spheres of our work. Discussing the classical element in poetry, Hulme proclaimed a revival in the representation of dry hardness, restrained emotion in verse. He objected to the ‘sloppiness’ of the critical attitude that considered a poem as a proper one only
because it 'moaned' and 'whined' about something like 'unsatisfied emotion.' The dry hard verse that Hulme urged upon was determined by the faculty of fancy. He maintained that, 'Fancy is not mere decoration added on to plain speech. Plain speech is essentially inaccurate. It is only by new metaphors, that is, by fancy, that it can be made precise.' The use of fancy removed the necessity of high seriousness in subject matter. The most essential thing was a proportional representation, convincing and concrete. Hulme complained that the Romantic poets (with the exception of Keats) had allowed poetry to escape to the contemplation of infinite things. It was 'always the light of ordinary day' that would inspire modern poetry, Hulme emphasized. In the same essay, the objection to imagination is further explained. The classical verse was a perfectly legitimate medium of expression of sensibility. Hulme distinguishes the conceptualization of beauty from the imagination point of view and the fancy point of view. He quotes Ruskin from 'Modern Painters' who was a champion of the romantic school to illustrate the distinction. Imagination trails along with not only the contemplation of the infinite, it also intends to see more than what is obvious, it tries to seek 'seriousness' as though without it, poetry or any other form has no meaning. Hulme rejected this attitude and he firmly believed that it was the primary reason behind distortion of truth and beauty by actually camouflaging empathic considerations behind theory. Fancy was the surest way of holding on to what was concretely available. It also tested the artist's capability of reaching exactness without the intervention of the imaginative faculty. Precision in representation meant avoiding the long winded path towards approximation. Language as a tool in the hands of the poet ought to be used by
overpowering the tendency to slide into well-worn phrases. The poet had to firmly establish control over his medium and make it work in accordance with his intention. In order to do so, a reference point was required and the image of the object provided it. Fancy, according to Hulme, would definitely help in holding expression on the appointed path. Fancy did not interfere like imagination did; it saw and marked analogies without tampering the connection. Therefore, the dry, hard classical verse would express and satisfy a particular type of sensibility and concept of beauty.

While on the discussion of imagination and fancy, one cannot but refer to Coleridge’s use of the terms. *The Critical Idiom* states that the ‘fundamental principle of Coleridge’s philosophy is organism.’ The organic principle of the German idealism expounded that a segment of experience could be linked to a whole i.e., they saw the whole as being made up of the segments. The particularity of experience was, according to them suggestive of a totality of experience. In other words the principle of organism submitted the imagination to search a reality without any check, so that ‘the great poet achieves a vision of the whole of life by grasping the essential and unchanging characteristics of mankind.’

Hulme refuted this view because his principle of classicism stood on the foundation of denying any resemblance between the particularity of experience to the wholeness of experience. As an artistic principle, he considered it as an unmanageable concept. The depiction of sensation or experience could only be like snapshots, upholding objective reality and never endeavouring to penetrate to ‘higher realities.’ His classicism was the belief in limiting the artistic imagination
from realms that was beyond human scope. Therefore, Hulme not only resisted
the organic principle as expounded by the German idealists and Coleridge, he
also developed the concept of 'fancy' to ensure the objectification of any
sensation, scene or experienced and thereby accuracy in representation.

The Coleridgean principle of creation assigned imagination a superior
function over fancy, which was a simple mechanical act of counting
resemblances. Imagination, of course, was classified as 'primary' and 'secondary'
depending on the gradual progress towards creation. Coleridge defined primary
imagination as an 'agent of all human perception' and secondary imagination as
that which 'dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create... its struggles to
idealise or to unify.'\textsuperscript{47} Primary imagination worked within the ordinary and the
usual, whereas the secondary imagination worked towards establishing an
organic connection between the assembled elements. Fancy did not bring about
any organic unity between things, but only noted the similarities available on the
surface. Fancy thus was merely a faculty of association. It was a 'romantic'
necessity to find a 'harmonious whole.'

Critics like Murray Krieger held that 'even Hulme, who, as an anti-
romantic, explicitly leads away from the Coleridgean imagination, must, end by
returning to a markedly similar theory of poetic creativity.'\textsuperscript{48} Krieger finds
Hulme eventually matching to a large extent, Coleridge's theory of imagination.
Bergsonian philosophy provides a transcendentalism that hovers over inspite of
Hulme's claim of 'exact, accurate description.' In the essay, 'Romanticism and
Classicism,' Hulme states that language being a 'communal' medium had to
shake off the ordinary qualities of common speech and be a visual, concrete
medium. This idea of visual, intuitive language perhaps prompts Krieger to believe that Hulme was close to the idea of organic unity as propounded by Coleridge. Fancy and Bergsonian principle of penetrating appearances through intuition seems to Krieger rather strange companions aimed at objective description.

Krieger’s own stand of romanticism, Frank Lentricchia pointed out, contains such oppositions that the romanticism is actually ‘existentialism’ or one of ‘aesthetic isolationism.’ In The New Apologists, Krieger talks of unique vision, unique consciousness and at the same time considers a contextualist theory instead of an organic or generic theory of poetry. The uniqueness of vision and consciousness make poetry the expression of an isolated and elevated mind. But, the language appropriately required to communicate this is not discussed by Krieger. He, on the other hand, calls for a ‘special, inconsistentical language that will carry, as it fully engenders, the poet’s vision, which is nothing less than a recovery of an origin that is prior to history.’\(^\text{49}\) Krieger is against the referential or organic discourse and at the same time representational responsibility. Therefore, there is a distinct dualism in Krieger’s romanticism. The self sustaining nature of poetic discourse may only be the poet’s attempt at a contextual or internal reflection and not a recovery of experience. Though Krieger did not want to use any sign, his support for a non poetic language makes his position a difficult one, particularly in managing the ‘inevitable dualism in our normal sense of language, to make poetry into that magically monistic effigy that is not merely an empty sign through which we are directed to things, but rather both the sign and the substantive thing itself... word and thing... indeed word and world – are one.’\(^\text{50}\)
Thus, in the light of Krieger’s discussion of poetry’s objective to penetrate into a realm not visible and comprehensible except by unique consciousness and its embodiment in the linguistic frame of poem, we will understand his appreciation of the intuitive penetration of the veil. But the explanation of the creative process as developed by Hulme, does not reside with the intuitive faculty only. The recovery, the holding on to the moment and conveying the particular concrete, make his theory widely different from Coleridge’s.

The inconsistencies and contradictions, as pointed out by Krieger in the essay, reveal the obvious confusion stated at the beginning of this chapter: that Hulme’s corpus in Speculations has been followed after H. Read and that Further Speculations has been considered to contain essays written after the ones in Speculations. Krieger concludes that Hulme interchanged the term fancy for Coleridge’s idea of imagination and developed it further by discussing the question of language in the process of creation.

Richard Shusterman replies to Krieger’s criticism that Bergson’s influence was not a ‘continuously dominant factor in Hulme’s poetic theory.’ He also argues that Hulme was primarily concerned about ‘concretely perceived things and visual impressions’ and not with ‘transcendental higher truth,’ and that the organism of Hulme does not make him a romantic but reflects the philosophy of objective truth found in the neo-realism of G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell.51

While developing a theory of classicism in verse, Hulme possibly realized that there was a need to establish a valid counter to the conventional outlook. The moral tones implicit in classicism had to be consolidated through an evaluation of the historical perspective, particularly an understanding of the Renaissance ethos.
The moral control or the 'reservation' that Hulme refers to can be historically traced to the middle ages. This exercise, however, does not in any way imply that Hulme was urging a return to medievalism. The spirit of the middle ages, the critical outlook evident in the creative arts had reflected a particular kind of stability and permanence mainly because it did not require human contexts. The Renaissance had replaced the critical outlook with humanistic considerations. According to Hulme, the spirit of the Renaissance was responsible in weakening the place of absolute values in the life of man. He believed that all forms of knowledge, by whatever name they may be called, were in reality the presentation of the broad Renaissance perspective: that man was fundamentally good and there was scope for progress. History, as Hulme analysed, was a study of attitude. Based on this fundamental principle, human history could be classified into two broad categories: humanism and classicism. Romanticism was the expression of humanistic influence upon creativity. Progress was inevitable and inherent in the romantic perspective. As such the moral quest was unnecessary. The moral quest was essential in the classical attitude; man's corporeal development had no relation to moral growth. The constant nature of man's position meant the veritable perpetuity of sin and evil. Philosophical accounts, whether rationalism, idealism, pantheism or empiricism were actually the anthropomorphic study of the world. Against these conceptualization, Hulme's religious attitude marked the beginning of a new and different ideology.

I am not, however, concerned so much with religion, as with the attitude, the "way of things", the categories, from which a religion springs and often survive it.52
The religious attitude was not determined by man's 'desire and feelings,' it was above any relative scale. Hulme fully realized the difficulty of installing the religious attitude, as 'most explanations of the religious attitude deal with the consequences of that attitude rather than with the attitude itself; they are concerned more than they ought to be with the statements about the ultimate nature of things, which it, as it were projects out from itself.'\textsuperscript{53} The requirement was a belief in absolute, objective ethics represented by the dogma of 'original sin.' The doctrine regulated the entire lives of men in the Middle Ages. Kathleen Nott had objected to this parallel with the medieval times. Her observation was that 'classicism has been a benefit of limitation based not merely on men's unconscious acceptance of a set of conventionalized beliefs about the behaviour of mankind and its significance, but on men's real ignorance of their actual fellows.'\textsuperscript{54}

Wyndham Lewis, with whom Hulme never enjoyed an 'easy relationship'\textsuperscript{55} remarked that 'no one else in England at that time had ever heard of it, or would, I am persuaded, have done so since, had it not been for him.'\textsuperscript{56} The dogma was merely used as an illustration of the absolute values regulating the very existence of mankind and civilization. The mention of the dogma of original sin created misgivings in Michael Roberts, who commented that Hulme had stretched beyond the rational by avoiding the word 'naturally good' within the context of the romantic understanding of man's position. According to Roberts, Hulme goes to the other extreme and says that man is naturally bad,\textsuperscript{57} because of the selective borrowing of the Christian doctrine. Christianity, Roberts said, laid equal emphasis on redemption, and Pascal, who had influenced
Hulme's perception of man's subordinate status had also believed that it was possible to rid oneself of original sin. Hulme had already clarified his conception of the religious attitude: it was to serve the purpose of establishing the absolute nature of ethics. Kishler understood that Hulme referred to the dogma of original sin only to 'conceptualise the idea of man's separateness from nature and to emphasize his inability to harmonized with and to find perfection in the universe in which he lives.' The religious attitude was not the holding on to the sentimental. Hulme states:

I hold, quite coldly and intellectually as it were, that the way of thinking about the world and man, the conception of sin, and the categories which ultimately make up the religious attitude, are the true categories and the right way of thinking.

The dogma of original sin was an expression of this religious attitude. The religious attitude that was so strong in the middle ages, affecting the whole civilization, had also been faced with secondary insight into the dogma. Pelagius was prominent among those, who despite having belonged to the religious period, propounded a ‘progressive’ theory of redemption.

While on the subject of religious attitude, Hulme realized that his kind of metaphysical understanding of the world and man's position in it was an attitude towards existence itself and this philosophy constituted a valid portion in 'Weltanschauung.' Renaissance was an outlook, a Weltanschauung. Having already declared in his article on Richard Haldane in *The New Age* (also found in the 'Searchers After Reality,' *Further Speculations*) that 'Science constrains us... we are free in philosophy,' Hulme sought to establish his new way thinking, i.e.,
the religious attitude as a Weltanschauung or unsystematic philosophy that expressed an attitude which was as possible and legitimate as that of scientific philosophy. Philosophy could be broadly divided into the systematic, logically developed philosophies and the unsystematic, irrational but legitimate religious attitude which however satisfied those instincts that remained untouched by the scientific explanations.

In fact, T.E. Hulme was, in Read's account, planning to write an allegorical form of Weltanschauung based on his thoughts of ten to fifteen years in 'Cinders.' The unsystematic character of 'Cinders' is evident:

The truth is that there are no ultimate principles upon which the whole of knowledge can be built once and for ever upon a rock. But there are infinity of analogues, which help us to along, and give us a feeling of power over the chaos when we perceive them.60

'Humanism and The Religious Attitude' reflects the mature thoughts of T.E. Hulme. After 'Romanticism and Classicism,' he arrived at a definite extrinsic standard regulating the expression in verse, art and philosophy. He had already formed an opinion that the Renaissance attitude was at the bottom of the conceptualization and representation of human existence and the Renaissance ethos was built upon the view that man need not struggle and restrain himself in the search for a proper place within the creation. There was no cause for continuous quest for the meaning of life, man enjoyed a perfect relationship with all other things. But the value of objective standard of ethics that Hulme sought to inscribe recognised an unstable relationship between man and his environment.
Though 19th century developments had shattered many traditional beliefs, this consciousness was real but could not be explained with the theories at the disposal of science. As a man of the late 19th century, the result of the Darwinian theory of 'Natural Selection' and the mechanistic theory of evolution had a powerful impact on him. The advancement of scientific investigations and findings were gradually undermining the ethical anchor. The debate revolved around the question whether the concepts and external extension of knowledge that served to frame practical techniques of controlling the vital, organic world were complete and comprehensive representations of reality. The reach of analysis based on empiricism remained outside the domain of certain beliefs, e.g. the domain of absolute values.

To Hulme, the most satisfying province of investigation, i.e. absolute values were a testimony to the understanding and conceptualizing of the meaning of life as it permeated in a person's association with abiding principles. A Weltanschauung according to Hulme's preference would be that which studied this category of abstract thought. Investigation into abstract categories was necessary to have a total apprehension of reality. Hulme's assumption was that reality was divided into three regions, each a separate and a distinct entity. The first region comprised of the inorganic world represented by mathematics and physical science. The second was the organic world into which biology, psychology and history could offer explanations. The third zone was that of ethical and religious values sharing objectivity of knowledge as a characteristic with the first zone. The examination and enquiry of the third zone along the lines of the first zone was based on the scientific element of philosophy and not what
Hulme called the tools of a 'personal Weltanschauung' where philosophy assumed 'acting as a pale substitute for religion.' Implicit in this approach was a contradiction, viz., recognition of the zone of absolute values on the same lines as that of the physical sciences and mathematics; and the installation of the third zone as a view of the world and man's place in it, i.e. a Weltanschauung. A Weltanschauung as a general principle does not use the method of scientific, objective knowledge, but reflects the personal element. Since, the zone of absolute values was 'not life at its intensest,' it shared, in essence, the objective nature of knowledge with the first zone.

This particular view was also dealt with by Edmund Husserl, Wilhelm Dilthey, Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore. The separation of the scientific element from the personal or Weltanschauung formed a considerable part of their thought. However, as Hulme says, "They want the Weltanschauung separated from philosophy because they think it has often injuriously affected the scientific part of the subject. I, on the contrary, want it separated because I think it also forms part of a separate subject, which has in reality no connection with philosophy." For Hulme, a Weltanschauung did not necessarily mean emphasis on personality as was generally thought to be; he wanted to establish the religious view and the knowledge of absolute values as a legitimate, impersonal, objective subject of inquiry and investigation.

Hulme's interest in continental philosophy particularly represented by Husserl and Dilthey coincided with his stay in Berlin in 1913. His knowledge of German enabled him to grapple with the key ideas of contemporary German
philosophy much before those works in original German were translated into English.\textsuperscript{64}

Husserl is first mentioned in ‘Humanism’ within the context of scientific philosophy as distinguished from Weltanschauung. Hulme seemed to have been greatly encouraged by Husserl’s division of the scientific element and the personal element in philosophy in ‘Philosophic ab strenge Wissenschaft’ Husserl is quoted from the same article to elaborate on the issue followed by the distinction with himself. Bertrand Russell gets equal attention from Hulme, though there is a clear difference between Russell’s concept of scientific philosophy and Weltanschauung and his stand on pacifism.\textsuperscript{65} Russell’s realism, based on the concept of knowledge acquired by acquaintance and description was in fact a development of the ‘idea of a non-discursive, direct knowledge,’ Shusterman points out in ‘Remembering Hulme.’\textsuperscript{66}

To Hulme, Husserl’s importance lay in the fact that he had been able to create a separate area for ethical values in so far as they constituted an independent entity from human desires and feelings. This reaction to the humanist tradition meant a great deal to Hulme, who was scanning the horizon for corresponding views to uphold absolute values.

Peter Koestenbanm’s introductory essay to Husserl’s \emph{The Paris Lectures} states that the latter’s philosophy took shape from mathematical and logical studies. Phenomenology was the study of essences in a state of presuppositionless, ‘thus leading to specific and cumulative results, as in the case of scientific researches... it does not make inferences nor does it lead to metaphysical theories.’\textsuperscript{67} Absolute ethical values could constitute the
phenomenological ideal structures of essences or Wessenchan. This consideration of direct mental grasp, 'independent of origin and causal explanation' was a priori discipline as it lead to certainty of knowledge. Absolute ethical values were matters of faith, close to Husserl's belief that consciousness of any experience did not require empirical understanding. As such the creative impulse could be said to be inspired by direct grasp of things. (Imagism in essence was the minute detailed description of available objects and the sensation they evoked). There was a suspension of judgement in the process of consideration of an object; the objects existed in consciousness, freed from the psychical act.

The liberation of certain forms of knowledge and experience from humanistic determinism, which Hulme wanted to acquire as a valid subject of interest could be traced in phenomenology. Epoche or bracketing, the cordon of presupposition reduced the object or experience within the frame of logical truth aesthetic. In Logical Investigations, Husserl identified three ways of comprehending an object: the pictorial, perceptual and signitive. 'In pictorial consciousness the impressions are like those made by the object, but not identical with them; perceptual consciousness is founded on impressions made by the object itself and signitive consciousness is founded on impressions that can be totally unlike those given by the object.' This classification of awareness can be connected to the visual representation aimed at accuracy and concreteness, emphasized by Hulme in his poetic theory. Hulme, himself, urged the recognition of the objectivity of science in philosophy in order to restore it to the realm of experience through its single and steady focus on the intended object or the
experience encountered by consciousness in its pure form. All experience were legitimate subjects of inquiry.

The basic concepts of all ontology are now taken over in phenomenology. The basic concepts of all ontologies are held to belong in the universal descriptive science of phenomenology which is eidetic.\textsuperscript{70}

The objective world was as it exists is not a fictitious world. It is, according to Husserlian view, possible to know this world from experience. The clarity depends upon the description of the experience during the experience itself. The similarity of this notion can be traced to Hulme's faculty of 'seeing things as they really are.' Hulme points out that the very act of viewing things in their objectivity is in itself a rare feat because we are all oriented with many presuppositions. Another crucial aspect in the determination of good art is 'the concentrated state of mind, the grip over oneself which is necessary in the actual expression of what one sees.'\textsuperscript{71}

The phenomenological science of description of the eidetic imagination also removes the element of irrationality because of the constant hold on the detailed and the aim to reach the exactness of experience. The prospect of slipping into the impossible lurks in studies other than scientific analysis and investigation. This was countered by the Husserlian reversal of the subjectivism of 'Idealism.' The senses do not interfere with the experience, they simply grasp the particular without attempting to unravel the generalized law lying deep within it. This particular approach has literary implication. The poet displays the consciousness of the particular by 'the placing of the perceiving mind or subject
within, not above or beyond, which confers a universality upon the individual and rescues from accusations of solipsism the artist absorbed in his own subjectivity.72

Husserl distinguishes between material, natural ordinary factors that science and common sense takes cognizance of and matters of consciousness or essences, which can be factually and concretely described. The objectivity of phenomenological consideration rests on the kind of intended focus. Husserlian intuition was the comprehension of the object in its direct presence. (Perhaps Hulme realized that the transcendental Bergsonian faculty of intuition could enjoy the status of an objective and scientific understanding and apprehension of experience). An object may be distinct or vague, present or absent. Indistinctness can be regarded as absence but not pure absence where the intention is clear. However, the unintended indistinct absence has other implications such as the problem of identification of the object of reference and its articulation. The distinction between intended absence and unintended indistinct object is a fundamental phenomenological finding that has a connection with Hulme’s concept of visual attention.

The transcendental subjectivity of phenomenology entailed a wider scope of scientific inquiry into states of experience even those in the abstract domain.

Husserl’s work ranged from 1891 to 1913, i.e., from the publication of Philosopie der Arithmatic to Ideen. It needs to appreciated that though the English translations appeared much later than the dates of their publication; Hulme kept abreast of German analytical philosophy. His attempts to forge a link between English and German thought was remarkable when considered against
the backdrop of a foreign language. The year 1913 seems to have been very important, as it coincided with Hulme's interest in German philosophy. J. Kamerbeek Jr. felt that there were sufficient indications suggesting Hulme's revived interest in German philosophy after 1912.  

1913 was incidentally the year of Husserl's *Philosophie ab strenge Wissenschaft* and the posthumous publication of Dilthey's *Weltanschauung and Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance and Reformation*. Kamerbeek's paper 'T.E. Hulme and German Philosophy: Dilthey and Scheler' assigns great importance to *Speculations* and *Further Speculations* as they bear the 'remarkable feat' of a 'young Englishman,' who could see the importance of both the painter (Picasso) and the philosopher (Edmund Husserl).

Wilhelm Dilthey figures only once in the *Speculations*, but Kamerbeek's paper indicates that Hulme made use of *Gesammel te Schriften*, volume (5), which was already available in 1907 in the collected work: *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*. Kamerbeek also provides a comparative reference to the German texts, particularly the article 'Das Wesen der Philosophie' to show that Hulme had borrowed the tools of Dilthey, like 'Weltanschauung,' 'interpretation of life,' and 'attitude' for 'attaining his ultimate aim: the critique of satisfaction.'

Dilthey's *Philosophy of Existence: Introduction to Weltanschauung* *Slehre* shows striking resemblance with Hulme's view that the scientific explanation of phenomena and its corollary inferences about the coincidences in space and time and categorizing them under general laws is an unsatisfactory and incomplete view of the world. Dilthey stressed the radical difference between natural sciences (German word: Naturewissenschaft) and the human or cultural
sciences (Geisteswissenschaft). Subjects like history, psychology, philology, philosophy belonged to the second category. The first group of study sought explanations for causes and the latter sought to understand through experience. The cultural sciences occupy a region where the mind is not subject to restrictions and the understanding of life is free and sovereign. There are no laws that make it subservient to practical feasibility, therefore actual freedom is experienced in this form of world view.

According to Dilthey, the world views represented by religion, poetry and metaphysics are valid. They give a rare insight into life, a commission that cannot be accomplished by science. The historical approach of Wilhelm Dilthey reinforced an understanding of man’s own ideas as they unfolded in history. H.P. Richman writes in the introduction to *Meaning in History* that Dilthey’s ‘preoccupation with history deserves special consideration. It followed from his conception of the place and importance of historical knowledge, that, in addition to pursuing historical research for its own sake, he approached the understanding of almost any problem, any idea, any cultural manifestation, in terms of its historical development and its place in a historical context.’ Dilthey’s historical approach analysed the relation of individuals in their encounter with institutions, organizations, traditions, beliefs, habits etc. The goals, aspirations, achievements of an individual can be read within these contexts.

Hulme construed history as a study of the structure of society based on the religious, ethical and moral manifestations in literature and art. The connection between events and thoughts explained why a particular event or trend took place in history. Dilthey’s analysis inspired Hulme to offer a critique of the
Renaissance ethos, demonstrating that the phenomena was but, an outlook of life and there were signs of break up in that outlook, or in other words, the humanist tradition was heading towards historical crisis. Like Dilthey, Hulme believed that world views offered deeper insights into history and life. The ‘types of world views’ also includes the ‘place of world views in poetry.’

Of all the arts poetry can claim a special relationship to all world views, language, its medium, permits lyrical expression and epical as well as dramatic representation of all things seen, heard, or experienced... poetry liberates the soul from the burden of reality through its medium, a chance happening is lifted out of the nexus of volitional relations and its poetic representation in this world of phenomena is transmuted into an expression of the very nature of life... Let us conclude. Since poetry originates in life, it must express its view of life directly from the nature of life... The writer shows the boundless possibilities of looking at life, of evaluating it, and of creatively shaping it anew. The one-time event becomes symbol, not for a particular idea but for a complex seen in life-yet seen by the poet from his life’s experience.

Dilthey’s contention was that every world view is ‘genuine’ and it is in this context, T.E. Hulme could have drawn sustenance to construct a metaphysic of absolute values and ethics.

T.E. Hulme referred to Max Scheler in the note to the introduction of Sorel’s Reflections on Violence and in the article ‘On Liberty’ which he wrote
from the front in World War I denouncing pacifism and upholding a militarist point of view. This article has been published in *Further Speculations*. Both the references can be dated in the year 1916. Kamerbeek thought that the fact “that Hulme in wartime went out of his way to read what was published in the enemy’s camp seems to me a remarkable fact in itself.”

Hulme’s reading of *Der Genius des Krieges und der Deutsche Krieg* is obvious, says Kamerbeek, in his argument against Russell’s pacifism which he believed to be based on the lack of understanding the actual implication of the war with Germany. In the note to Sorel’s *Reflections on Violence*, Hulme refers to the original title ‘Uber Ressentiment and Moralisches Werturteil,’ instead of ‘Das Ressentiment in Aufbau der Moralen,’ which is evidence enough that Hulme was familiar with Scheler’s treatise in 1912 when it ‘appeared in the first volume of the *Zeitschrift fur Pathopsychologie*.’

Besides this, Hulme was also familiar with Max Scheler’s *Der Formalimus in der Ethik and die materiale Wertethik*, the English version of which reads as *Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values*, a new attempt towards the foundation of an ethical personalism by Max Scheler. Since, Hulme does not provide any date of his reading of this treatise, the confusion persists regarding chronology. As Kamerbeek points out, the ‘Notes on Bergson’ published in *The New Age* in 1911 suggests that Hulme was alive to the attempts made by philosophers (without naming Scheler) to deal with ethics and values in an objective, scientific manner. Therefore, it implies that Hulme must have had knowledge of *Der Formalimus in der Ethik and die materiale Werethik* before 1912. What seems continuously evident is that T.E. Hulme confined his
interest to philosophy, particularly that allowed him to consolidate the 'objective standard' of values and ethics. This continued even when he was writing for *The New Age* and *The Cambridge Magazine*, presenting an alternative view of the war.

Like Husserl, Max Scheler recognized the knowledge of essence of things as a fundamental aspect of enquiry. It was opposed to the knowledge of control which sought the laws of coincidence in space and time and laws of fortuitous realities in the world. The knowledge of essence of things investigated the basic phenomena and ideas of the world by excluding all attitudes based on the senses and drives. It was independent of the quantum of experience thus leading towards an insight into things imagined and the knowledge derived was valid for being itself and in itself. The knowledge of culture too is the pursuit of the varieties of human knowledge in history. It is the study of essence of phenomena of any cultural group in acquiring thought and perception, including 'love, hate, taste and feeling for style, value judgement and desire.'

Scheler arranges forms of knowledge in a hierarchial order, putting the knowledge of control and causal relations at the bottom of the three tier system. It leads to the next higher purpose i.e. knowledge of culture which is the knowledge of the self or person. This further leads to the knowledge of salvation which is the participation of the being in the totality of the world. The highest type of knowledge, thought Scheler, took us closer to the very source from which we derive life and knowledge. It is similar to Indian philosophy where the development of the inner life brings an understanding of the life of the world and finally rests with the ultimate truth the source merging and working through the self in furthering knowledge of the self;
the truth of the ultimate being and the self uniting at the level of realization of the essence of things.

In *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*, Scheler argues that values depend upon our emotional quotient. This reflects the phenomenological concern with essences. He says “All values (including the values of good and evil) are non-formal qualities of contents possessing a determinate order ranks with respect to ‘higher’ and ‘lower.’ This order is independent of the form of being into which values enter – no matter, for instance, if they are present to us as purely objective qualities, as members of value-complexes or as values that ‘a thing has.”

Distinguishing goods, i.e., ‘value things’ and ‘thing values’ or mere values that things have, Scheler observed that ‘only in goods, values become real’ and ‘a value is objective.’ He arranges the value of ‘good’ as the highest in the hierarchial order of values and ‘evil’ as the lowest value. They are objective because they are independent variables, they are liberated from the bearer. Scheler’s view was “the less we take active possession of our spiritual person, the more values are given as mere signs for goods that are important in terms of our bodily needs. The more we live ‘in our stomachs,’ as the apostle says, the poorer in values the world becomes, and the more values that are still given become present to us only within the confines of their possible symbolic functions for vital and sensuously ‘important’ goods.”

Thus, the hierarchy of values must have appealed to T.E. Hulme. The objective standard of values, as we have seen in Hulme, could be applied to understand the nature of violence and peace.
An important aspect, pointed by Kamerbeek, is the connection of attitude to economic behaviour. This, he says in his essay on the influence of German philosophy on T.E. Hulme, had found mentioned in the essay ‘Humanism and The Religious Attitude’ suggesting Max Scheler’s application. According to Kamerbeek, Scheler’s essay ‘Der Bourgeois und die religiösen Machte’ definitely influenced the evolution of Hulme’s idea that religious and ethical values have a sociological bearing even on the economic activities of a given age. Therefore Hulme derived that there were a link ‘between the ideology of St. Thomas Aquinas and the economic life of his time.’ Extending the same theory, Hulme argued against pacifism, maintaining that war was not a matter of material gain or loss, it implied a change, modification and threat to values a country held. If England were to lose to Germany, Hulme warned, it would lead to supplanting English values with German ones.

‘The peculiarity of Ethics is not that it investigates assertions about human conduct, but that it investigates assertions about that property of things which is denoted by the term ‘good’ and the converse property denoted by the term ‘bad’. It must, in order to establish its conclusions, investigate the truth of all such assertions, except those which assert the relation of this property only to a single existent.’

G.E. Moore believed that the province of ethics was the investigation into the definition of ‘good,’ a property which though indefinable had an ‘intrinsic value’ or ‘intrinsic worth.’ It was precisely because of these considerations that Hulme had thought Moore worth mentioning in the essay ‘Humanism.’ Moore had
broken with the humanist traditions, Hulme thought, joining Husserl in freeing ethical values from humanist moorings and discussing them as an entity on their own. G.E. Moore separated philosophy from idealistic concerns, taking an interest in things that appealed to common sense. This naturally threw up a division between what the ‘truth and meaning that philosophers say’ and what ‘most of us commonly and ordinarily mean and believe.’ Moore had aimed at analyzing entities often concealed behind what is considered to be ‘good’ as well as the word ‘good.’ In doing so, he cast aside the layers of meaning associated with it, getting to the core of analysis. His clarity and single minded aim at accuracy of meaning, especially in moral and ethical concepts had an impact on T.E. Hulme. ‘Good,’ thought Moore was quite distinct from what we understand as ‘goodness,’ the former had an indefinite quality but it could be analysed through objective standards. It was also Moore’s attempt to construct a comparative degree of analysis of ‘good’ that found appreciation in the view of T.E. Hulme. In *Principia Ethica*, Moore maintained that ‘In considering the different degrees in which things themselves possess this property (the good), we have to take account of the fact that a whole may possess it in a degree different from that which is obtained by summing the degrees in which its parts possess it.’ Moore’s argument was that ‘Although we cannot hope to discover which, in a given situation, is the best of all possible alternative action, there may be some possibility of showing which among the alternatives, likely to occur to anyone, will produce the greatest sum of good.’

Hulme confessed after initial difficulty in comprehending Moore, he gradually began to understand the ‘intellectualist, non-empirical method’ even
though he dealt with logic and ethics. The argument, Hulme realized was not confined to the verbal, it went deeper, analyzing propositions as they appeared in linguistic form, urging precision in the matter. The arbitrary character of language, words and their development into propositions, as scrutinized by Moore, showed Hulme that ethical concepts could be dealt with objectively, after being distanced from human inferences. He saw that Moore defined ethical criterions as those possessing objective and intrinsic qualities. However, Moore’s stress, in *Principia Ethica*, on human pleasure and enjoyment could have been in conflict with Hulme’s classicist stand. It is Moore’s objective analysis and scrutiny of the verbal to reach the intrinsic worth that interested Hulme.

Shusterman maintained that the ‘notion of organic unity and intuition’ that were important matters in Moore’s discussion on ethics was a definite influence on Hulme. He was also of the view that Bertrand Russell’s ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ which was close to Moore’s notion of ‘sense-data’ or direct knowledge also had made an impression on Hulme’s thought. The sense-data that Moore and Russell used as a term applied to all senses, was ‘mainly visual sense data’, Shusterman believed. Their realism enlarged the scope of philosophy, taking into account all forms of knowledge as meaningful as long as they were real, direct and physical.

Russell, like Moore, confronted the ambiguity or vagueness of language as a fundamental problem in the consideration of the objects of perception. Hulme’s interest in the exhaustive nature of language, as we have seen reflected in ‘Romanticism and Classicism’ confronted the same problem while formulating a theory of poetic practice founded on restraint and fancy. It would have been a
matter of time before Hulme would develop a more comprehensive theory of language, because the indications from his interest in the scientific enquiry of Russell and Moore are firmly in that direction.

Hulme was working towards narrowing the gap between approximation and exactness in literary expression. He was drawing upon the resources of philosophical analysis of the school of realism represented by the most important contemporary thinkers like Russell and Moore. He wanted support for his own developing views on language and the associated characteristics. Beginning from the imagistic principles of visual exactness and minutae, Hulme wanted to depend on the real, the tangible and the physical so that, the accuracy of the perception could be transported from the mental to the linguistic. The mental perception of an object could present multiple possibilities; the same in poetry could be extended through the use of pluralistic metaphors, each independent yet complementary to each other. To describe such an intricate and complex experience through the medium of language was a daunting task. It was his steadfast commitment to precision that kept him on the path of objective analysis.

Hulme’s knowledge of Russell’s philosophical thought is obvious from the quotations he provides to underline the two facts. The first is Russell’s insistence upon scientific philosophy and Weltanschauung as separate subjects. He quotes from ‘On Scientific Method in Philosophy’ and The Philosophy of Leibniz to introduce philosophy as a scientific subject and discuss the vagueness of language or propositions. In ‘Philosophy of Logical Atomism,’ Russell states that ‘a proposition is a sentence in the indicative, a sentence asserting something, not questioning or commanding or wishing... A proposition is just a symbol... In
Hulme thought that ordinary language was predominantly vague. Russell also felt that vagueness was a property of language. 'Vagueness and precision alike are characteristics which can only belong to a representation, of which language is an example.' He also added that "Vagueness in our knowledge is, I believe, merely a particular case of a general law of physics, namely the law that which may be called the appearances of a thing at different places are less and less differentiated as we get further away from the thing. When I speak of 'appearances' I am speaking of something purely physical – the sort of thing, in fact, that, if it is visual, can be photographed." This observation may provide helpful indications regarding Hulme's insistence on the visual. Perhaps, the visual in poetic theory can be connected to the philosophy of realism. In *Analytic Realism*, 1911, Russell had defined concepts and sense-data (the former as known universal and the latter as known particular) both crucial to the understanding that certain propositions like that of mathematics can be taken as absolute for they are not subject to the inaccuracies of sensory knowledge and which is not constrained by subjective variations... The proximity of Hulme's third independent zone of ethical values to that of the absolute character of mathematical assertions can be appreciated in this context.

The wide range of Hulme's interest in philosophy was determined by the need to construct a durable aesthetic foundation. Hulme must have realized that philosophy was not an alien subject, restricted to subjects that could not relate to practical wants. He found that German and English analytical philosophy offered
an interesting insight into the nature of things; they provided an impetus to his notion of absolute values and strengthened the classicist stance as opposed to humanistic principles.

The final picture of T.E. Hulme’s theory of poetry based on philosophical thought would take into account relevant contemporary developments in confronting Descartian and Hegelian emphasis of the mind and the consequent implication on thought and form. That intensity of apprehending experience and communicating the sensation within the limits of form of poetry constituted the real challenge. Poetry and art, both present, the complete translation of our struggle with the intensity of experience and its representation.

It is evident that Hulme condemned the romantic imaginative power, but it seems quite improbable that he would reject the primary awareness of the world as it existed in the deepest recess of our mind. The initial seed of the creative mechanism began there, in the awareness and consciousness of the world around us. In the event of an encounter between the world of which we are aware and the external available evidence, poetic discipline would proceed from the latter, as the truth of ontology can not be denied. The encounter between the two poles of the senses was somewhat resolved by phenomenological understanding. It not only took account of those experiences of which we are conscious, but also gave a description of the consciousness, thus reducing the inscrutable into the physical and comprehensible. Here, it transpires that analysis was rendered unnecessary in the circumstance. Absence of analysis implied that all perspectives could be presented. The presentation involved a certain requisite of internal preference and interpretation. In other words it was determined by one’s
attitude to life. The entire complex process was a fusion of the rational and the irrational aspects of the apprehension of the reality of phenomena and experience. As such, they would be a corresponding counter movement reflected in poetry. The need to reshape like the romantic imagination could be countered by the tendency to depict the world as it is. In evoking sensation and consciousness, the poet eventually would restrain them to the level of experience. Hulme did not want to look for something beyond the thing itself; he preferred the object in itself and the transmission of the moment of contemplation. This was a reductive theory of poetry i.e., reducing poetry to the single vision of the object and paradoxically suggesting the manifold insights gained from it. The totality of the grasp of experience is represented, in Hulme’s term, in the concreteness of expression in poetry.
Notes:


6. ‘Searchers After Reality: Bax,’ 5.

7. ‘Searchers After Reality: Haldane, 11.

8. The said article is provided in *The Life and Opinions of T.E. Hulme* by A.R. Jones.


12. ‘Bergson’s Theory of Art,’ *Speculations*, 143

13. ‘Romanticism and Classicism,’ *Speculations*, 139.

14. ‘Bergson’s Theory of Art,’ *Speculations*, 149.

15. ‘Notes on Language and Style,’ *Criterion*, 3(12): 486, 1925.

17. Reference may be made to note no.16 in the previous Chapter.


27. Jones, 76.


29. Karen Csengari in 'T.E. Hulme's Borrowings from the French' *Comparative Literature*, 34(1): Winter 1982 is of the opinion that the essay was written at that time.

30. The L'Action Franchaise Movement called for a return to hierarchial and non-republican order, even if it entailed the use of violence.


33. Hulme, 'Romanticism and Classicism,' *Speculations*, 120.

34. Hulme, 'Humanism,' *Speculations*, 33.
35. ‘Appendix A,’ Speculations, 257.


41. Jones, 201.

42. Hulme, ‘Romanticism and Classicism,’ Speculations, 126-127.

43. Hulme. ‘Romanticism and Classicism,’ Speculations, 137.

44. Hulme. ‘Romanticism and Classicism,’ Speculations, 127.


52. Hulme, ‘Humanism, A Programme,’ Speculation, 46.

53. Hulme, Speculations, 32.

55. Hynes, Sam (ed.). ‘Introduction,’ *Further Speculations*. Sam Hynes recalls an incident where Hulme and Lewis got in to an argument, which was quite common between them, xi.


59. Hulme, ‘Humanism,’ *Speculations*, 70.

60. Hulme, *Speculations*, 233.


63. Hulme, ‘Humanism,’ *Speculations*, 29.


65. Pacifism was opposed by Hulme as a theory and practice in the articles contributed to *The New Age* under the pseudonym ‘North Staffs’ which Hulme wrote from the front in World War I.

66. Shusterman. 565.


71. Hulme, ‘Romanticism and Classicism,’ *Speculations*, 133.


74. Kamerbeek, 193.

75. Kamerbeek, 200.


78. Dilthey, 37-38.

79. Kamerbeek. 203.

80. Kamerbeek. 205.


82. Scheler, Max. *Philosophical Perspectives*, translated from German by Oscar A. Haac, Boston, Beacon Press, 37, 1958.


84. Scheler, Max. *Formalism in Ethics and Non Formal Ethics of Values*, 21.

85. Scheler, Max. *Formalism in Ethics and Non Formal Ethics of Values*, 268.

86. Hulme, *Speculations*, 51.


89. Moore, 36 and 149.


