II.1. Philosophy of Language in Indian Tradition:

Philosophy of language in Indian thought begins with a particular line of approach which is entirely different from that of the West. The history of philosophy of language can be traced back to the Vedas and Brāhmanas that open with some metaphysical presupposition with which begins the scientific enquiry into life and the universe. The metaphysical presuppositions are about the root of the universe and the ultimate end of life. On this particular metaphysical background the
Indian thinkers look at language as an instrument for scientific enquiry that engages itself into the study of meaning and potentiality of expressions. For this search they developed the semantic study as a science of linguistic meaning. It includes the meanings of words and expressions verifiable by experimental means. The study, of course, does not reject the meanings of expressions that are not verifiable by experience because it leads one to go beyond the limitation of experience. The word *arthā* is never kept confined to the world of verifiable things only; it is extended so as to include the metaphysical expressions also. In order to know which metaphysical expressions are meaningful, one has to look at language as a synthetic whole, and if there is anything at all, it has to go beyond language. Linguistic symbols externalize meaning or thought. It shows that both analytic and synthetic attitudes characterize the semantic study of language.

The Vedas preach men to realize language as the highest principle (*Lord*) of universe and language is the reality according to the Vedic orientalists. This attitude is the characteristic of monistic view of language (*vaṅk*) as many languages are made to participate in the higher language (*vaṅk*). The later philosophers systematize the semantic study in logical and syntactical fashion, in which words, objects and their meanings become universal since all language (*Vāṅk*) stand for, merge into and become meaningful for the higher language. Against this linguistic monism, the positivistic attitude denies the supremacy of one language over many languages. According to them, many languages neither participate in, nor make room for, the higher language as what are spoken are not in one language. Positivism thus denies the double plane of language by holding that many languages are as real as the supreme language because there is no reason to deny the reality of many languages. Such linguistic positivism could not dominate the spirit of Indian thought for long
time. Because the Tantriks attempt at an exhaustive study of semantics so as to make language (Mantra) dominate over thought. The Tantriks, for this purpose develop a theory of evolution of language by postulating sakti (function). For the Tantriks, it is only (nada) which actually constitutes word and the sound arises from the real Siva.

The history of philosophy of language in India has acquired important achievement with this development of language. It covers the fields of phonology, morphology and semantology. Not only this, it also suggests how the spirit of language lies in going beyond the language itself. The whole history of philosophy of language in India may be studied from Vedic, grammatical, instrumental, idealistic and realistic points of view. Discussions from all these standpoints together give the actual picture of philosophy of language in Indian thought.

II.2. The Vedic & Grammarian’s View:

Language as a means of communication necessarily exists according to the Vedic philosophy. Language exists for the society as it makes communication of meaning possible. It is for the correct employment of language that the members of the society orally communicate the brahmanic mantras. The mantras, on the practical side seem to trace the direction of analytic thought towards vak which is the root of philosophical speculation. Vak is beyond language through which one can communicate with the lord and which our ordinary talk cannot glimpse. The Taittiriya Upanisad starts with the phonological interpretation of Vak that the things to be properly pronounced are varna, svara, matra, balam and santara. The Taittiriya Samhita depicts Indra as the first grammarian as he analyzes language (Vak) into roots of words and offers grammar to language. The etymological interpretation of the words like antariksa, manusa etc. was offered by Tandya Mahabrahman. The
Satapatta-Brahmana tries to analyze the words like agni, hiranya, svapna, rathaatar maghavan and so forth. Such attempts clearly show that the comprehension of meaning (artha) is the sole foundation of analysis of language in Indian tradition. This analysis of language depends upon the phonological rules.

The formal analysis of language in scientific method was initiated by Panini. He analysed language into a system of root, stems and suffixes. He did the same without enquiring metaphysical problems. The metaphysical implications of Panini was brought out by Patanjali when he says that words, whatever language they belong to, are meaningful and eternal. Katyayana points out that Panini admits the idea of eternal referent that is universal in character. For the Grammarians words have two aspects: sphota and dhvani. According to Bhartrihari, sphota, in a meaningful language refers to two aspects: (a) One that causes the articulated sound and (b) the other that produces semanticity. It expresses dichotomy between form and content of language. Every word first signifies a class (Jāti) and afterwards an individual (Vyakti). The word thus seems to be a two fold entity: (a) Outward and (b) inward. The outward relates expression - object while the inward relates content-object. The sphota is an invisible symbol for which Bhartrihari says that it is more than outward and inward directions. The grammatical study of meaning attempts at reaching the ultimately real (Śabda brahman) which is developed as monistic philosophy of language.
II.3. Instrumentalism and Realism:

According to the Mīmāṃsakas, mantra is the instrument of offering in accordance with the Vedic texts. These mantras are assertive expressions. From this view of Mīmāṃsakas, linguistic instrumentalism follows through the interpretation of the word mantra. The mantra does not enjoin any act and serves no purpose of commanding. Therefore, in this sense mantra is distinct from injunction. Kumarila is of the view that the mantra-text can serve two aims: (a) enjoining the act and (b) recalling things that are enjoined elsewhere. The mantras form an integral part of the Vedas and therefore, they should signify something needful that are prescribed in injunction by direct syntactic connection and indirect implication. The Taittirīya Brāhmana mentions that there are three kinds of mantras; (a) rākṣ (b) sāma and (c) yajus of which the rākṣ comprises the division of padas on the basis of meaning. It exposes the importance of philosophy of language in the Vedas. According to the instrumentalists, the nāmadheya - text is concerned with the exact significance of words, and its importance lies in conveying proper names of sacrificial rites. Sabara writes that the determination of the reliability of the nāmadheya - text depends upon two principles: (a) in doubtful cases the question is settled by the subsequent commendatory texts and (b) the indefiniteness can be definite only by the natural capacity of things. The entire Vedic text is made the instrument for attaining the summum bonum (puruṣārtha) of human beings and for this reason this philosophy may be called linguistic instrumentalism.

Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika advocate linguistic realism the history of which can be traced back to the upaniṣadic texts. According to the Naiyāyikas, if the world and language are created by the same will of God, then world - creation and language-
creation begins at the same time. God's will is efficiency (Sakti) of language. Language consists of words and words consist of letters. So words and letters like root (prakriti), suffix (Pratyaya) and particle (nipāta) are endowed with efficiency. The Nyāya linguists do not recognise that words are eternal (nitya). They also refuse to recognise that the relation between words and referents is impersonal. Because for them words are non-eternal as they are produced and have a beginning from the personal God. When God wills in the form of language that is endowed with efficiency, it takes the form of mantras, brāhmaṇas, Vedāṅgas etc. which become the sentient element of God.

The principle of causality is also employed by the Naiyāyikas in the linguistic plane. If the presence or absence of one word invariably follows the presence or absence of another, then the relation between the two words would be considered as cause and effect. A mere word can not be cause of verbal cognition; it is knowledge of words that may give rise to the cognition of others by means of inherence (samavāya). Therefore, the knowledge of words is the instrumental cause. The recollection (smarana) by means of denotative function is an operation (vyāpara) and verbal cognition (śabda bodha) is the result. Thus by means of recollected word-meaning, the understanding of the knowledge of words and that of relations constitutes the cause of linguistic cognition according to the Naiyāyikas.

The philosophy of language of the Naiyāyikas is also supported by their logical theory. According to them words have power to signify existent objects. The term padārtha (category) in Nyāya means the meaning of words (Padasya artha). The categories like substance, quality, action, class, particularity, inherence, non-existence are objects (arthas) that are denoted by words. The Nyāya categories like
pramāṇa, prameya, saṁsaya, prayojana, dristānta, siddhānta, avayava etc. are also the meanings of one word or other as they are signified by means of efficient words. Determinate perceptions also depend upon the language units like subject, predicate, this, that, difference, relations etc. So as to afford a fuller knowledge of an object. Nyāya is mostly known for its realistic logic in the philosophical world. Logic as a whole is purely oral and linguistic in character which expresses Nyāya concern about philosophy of language. Nyāya has developed its philosophy of language effectively on the ground of the presuppositions of realist metaphysics. Reality, according, to them, can be known by means of linguistic analysis. The Neo-Naiyāyikas like Gangesa’, for the sake of establishing clarity defined each name carefully by means of avyāpti (too narrow), ativyāpti (too wide), Saṅkara (cross) and asambhava ((impossibility). This attempt of clarification, making free from ambiguity, is an important step in the philosophy of language.

II.4. Philosophy of Language in Vedānta:

The philosophical system in Indian tradition has to adopt linguistic analysis at least for the sake of establishing own philosophy. Each and every system has to refute opponent’s views in order to establish their own views and this refutation is one of the fundamental features as found in the development of Indian philosophy. For this purpose linguistic analysis becomes highly essential and Vedānta also has to adopt such analysis. The Advaita Vedāntins by way of forwarding their own views and refuting others have taken recourse to the analysis of language. Samkara, in the Tarkapāda chapter of the Bhāṣya, has successfully, refuted the views of Śaṁkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhists etc. through the analysis of language. The phenomenon of manana which is taken as one of the means of the self-realization reflects that it is the
sacred duty of the *Advaitins* to critically judge and refute opponent's view in respect of doubt as to a particular meaning of a word. *Manana* is a kind of mental phenomenon which causes knowledge in the form of *Tarka* (Reductio-ad-absurdum) in the case of removing doubt as to a particular meaning of a word adopted by the opponents. It becomes clear from this that *Advaita Vedāntins* analysed language of the opponents and thereby put their own standpoint in a linguistic form which makes their philosophical position compact and vivid.

The *Advaita Vedāntins* used their analysis of language as a means to attain the knowledge of the *Brahman* or Absolute. They deal with both ordinary and philosophical language in their analysis. The criteria of meaningfulness of a sentence have been discussed by the *Advaitins*. They have emphasized on ākārīṣā, yogyata, āsatti and Tātparya as criteria of determining the meaning of a sentence. They also discussed and analysed ordinary linguistic forms which have primary meaning (*sakyārtha*), secondary meaning (*lakṣyārtha*), meaning through intention (*tātparya*) etc. This tendency of analysing ordinary language is highly essential in order to establish their philosophical conclusion. If *tātparya* is not taken as a criterion of meaning, the proper meaning of the statements like “*Tat tvam asi*” (Thou art Brahman) etc. would not be ascertained, as the essential identity between an individual self and the *Brahman* which is the proper meaning of the statement does not follow from the literal meaning. They analysed each and every concept like the definitions and the terms used in the *sūtras* in their philosophy of language. Even if linguistic analysis means the analysis of ordinary language as used by social beings, the *Vedāntins* do not hesitate for the same; rather they do it very carefully. Samkara is found to analyse the ordinary language like ‘This is mine’ etc. which are commonly used by social beings. The aim of such analysis is to justify the philosophical position
of such sentences. The acceptance of an implicative power behind a sentence by the Vedāntins finds justification in the face that it can explain both Vedic and secular sentences. This expresses that the Vedāntins give importance on the meaning of both Vedic and secular sentences.

But this analysis of language is not the ultimate goal; it might only help to attain the knowledge of the Brahman. The linguistic analysis done by the Vedāntins might help to go through the prescribed means like hearing (Sravana), thinking (Manana) and meditating (nididhyāsana) for the realization of self. These activities are not possible without being aware of the meaning attained through the analysis of knowledge. But, according to the Advaitins all things except Brahman are false; Brahman is only real. It implies that when an individual is identified with Brahman, he loses his own identity and submerged in Brahman. At this stage all objects of the universe appears to him as manifestation of the Brahman. The objects are not vanished, but the awareness of their existence ceases for which all existence except Brahman becomes meaningless. This type of experience is purely subjective and therefore not communicable to others. When an individual attains this stage, he becomes seer (Ṛsi) and there remains no room for linguistic analysis. In other words, when Brahman is realised all linguistic forms on analysis becomes contradicted. After self-realization the notion of duality ceases and leads to the falsity of language and linguistic analysis. So linguistic analysis is true only before attaining Brahman and it is the means to attain the ultimate goal i.e., self-realisation. In western philosophy Bertrand Russell used linguistic analysis to arrive at metaphysical atoms like the Vedāntins; but as a realist admits plurality of reals and does not refuse language at any stage.
The Advaita Vedāntins start their journey with the analysis of language. But this analysis does not get priority as it is not the goal but only means. Hence the linguistic analysis of the Vedāntins is teleological. Analysis is done not for the sake of analysis but to facilitate others to realise Brahman. The other systems like Nayaya, Miśāmsa etc. also do linguistic analysis; but they do not describe it as illusory or Māyā just after attaining liberation. Language is useful as well as meaningful till Brahman or self realization is not attained. The advaitins admit implicative meaning (Laksyārtha) through implication (lakṣaṇa) that follows from analysis of primary meaning. In a particular situation when some one utters the word ‘door’ (Dvāram), it implies saying either to close or to open the door. Here an implicative meaning is found from a single word. It is on the basis of lakṣaṇa that one word may mean something other than what is presented directly. The words constitute sentence under the conditions of ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā, āsatti and tātparya.

In view of Vedānta, the chance of ambiguity gives rise to tātparya. In order to understand tātparya of a sentence particularly used in Vedānta or Śruti, the context under which it is spoken or the intention of the speaker has to be taken into account. If tātparya in the sense of speaker’s intention is not known, some statements may seem to be non-sensical. If the statement ‘Tattvamasi’ is uttered by some one in the context of Vedānta, it means the essential identity between Jīva and Brahman. The same statement will not mean same if not uttered in this context. In case of the non-ambiguous sentence the inherent power (sakti) existing in word gives rise to meaning. When the direct meaning of a statement becomes inconsistent, the implicative or suggestive meaning is to be known. It is the context that determines whether the implicative or direct meaning is to be taken in to account. The question of conveying meaning by either a standard form of a word or a dialectical form also
refers to human factors. Thus the context of the intention of the speaker is essential for the attainment of the meaning. In fact, the implication would not at all be possible if there were no speakers’ intention. The non-realisability of the speakers’ intention is the root of implicative meaning.

According to the Viśīṣṭādvaitavādins language is divine and this divinisation brings up language from the second grade importance given by Advaitavādins to the primary one. For the viśīṣṭādvaitavādins the linguistic analysis is not illusory or Māya but as real as Brahman after the self-realization. The different types of attitudes towards linguistic analysis have been expressed by the means of the bhāsyas given by Samkara and Ramanuja. Samkara gives the name Śārirakabhāsyā as it is related with the body which shows that it is as earthly as the body and not real. But Ramanuja gives the name Śrībhāsyā to his commentary which indicate that this is not ordinary earthly object but should be traced back as Divine form (ŚRI). Thus although the Advaitins consider language only as means towards Brahman, it is for them not real; the Viśīṣṭādvaitavādins place language and the linguistic analysis in real and Divine status.

II.5. The Problem of Meaning in Indian Philosophy:

The central problem in the philosophy of language is that of meaning. How to determine the meaning of word and sentences and what they mean are the basic questions in linguistic analysis. The objective of linguistic analysis in Indian tradition is to comprehend the meaning of Vedic sentences as well as the sentences of everyday life. The sentences are the units of language and they are constituted by words. Hence the meaning of words has occupied an important position together with the meaning of sentences. The philosopher belonging to different schools put forward
different explanations regarding the meaning of words and sentences. The grammarians again have different opinions and all these discussions and views with difference in attitude enrich linguistic analysis in Indian philosophy.

*Sāṅkhya*, the oldest system of Indian philosophy also joins in the discussion of the primary meaning of a word. Whether a word means an individual (*vyakti*) or universal (*jāti*) or a particular form (*Ākṛti*) is the central issue in the discussion about the meaning of a word. The *Sāṅkhya* philosophers hold that a word denotes an individual (*vyakti*). An individual is a composite material body which possesses specific properties. As the possessor of the qualities like colour, taste, smell, touch etc, it is a substance. The individual is manifested and open to sense perception. In other words the individual is quantitatively determined matter and must have a manifest body. This view that word denotes individual becomes evident from the ordinary usage like ‘that cow stands’ etc. This statement refers to an individual cow not genus or universal. The reference to any individual object can be explained only with the view that words denote individuals.

But this view is not proper and sufficient to explain the meaning of a word. If a word denotes only the individual without universal then any word could mean any and every individual which is not justifiable. A word, in order to mean a particular individual, must somehow refer to a class or universal. The expression ‘that cow stands’ denotes only the ‘cow’ not any other like horse etc. Hence the property of being that object, e.g. being a cow or cowness must be implicitly there in the expression and this property or cowness is the universal. On this very ground the *Naiyāyikas* reject this view and hold that a word means not only the individual but also the generality of being that particular individual. According to them the words by
themselves do not mean individuals alone; they mean individuals as possessing or belonging to universal. The words may refer to individuals as the individuals are associated with the primary meaning which is universal.5

According to the Jainas a word denotes the particular form or configuration of individuals.6 The form of a thing consists in the particular arrangement of its component parts and the constituent particles of this parts. The form of a thing is that which indicates generality and its characteristics. It distinguishes one thing from another. The ‘cow’ is distinguished by its form from other animals. A word expresses a form or configuration in space and denotes object. This form determines the nature of the object and also the individuality of object. Sabara, the Mīmāṃsā philosopher also speaks of configuration as the meaning; but this configuration is not only spatial as held by the Jainas. Configuration in Sabara includes the universal essence of objects; while the Jainas admit only individual configuration. This view of the Jainas has been criticised on the ground that the form by itself is not sufficient to constitute the nature of a thing. For example, the clay model of a cow is not what is meant by a cow although it possesses the form of a cow. Therefore, it can not be granted that a word means only the form or physical shape of an individual apart from its class-essence.

The Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntists hold that a word means the class-character or genus of individuals. This genus is the basis of similar cognitions with regard to different individuals. Words primarily mean such universal as distinguished from the particulars of experience and at the same time capable of explaining the particulars by way of the knowledge of the genus. If a word means the individual then it must have as many meanings as there are individuals meant by it. This, however
goes against the law of parsimony which requires that a word primarily mean universal and also refers to individuals; because universal and individual are inseparable in respect of both knowledge and existence. Whenever the universal is known the individuals are also known simultaneously. In other words the universal and the individual may be said to be the primary and secondary meaning respectively. The word 'cow' means 'cowness' as well as the individual possessing the attribute of cowness.

The Nyāya philosophers hold that a word means the universal, the individual and the configuration at a time. Mere universals are not the meaning of words since they can not be understood apart from individuals and their particular form. The same is the case with the individual and configuration. Hence the Naiyāyikas hold that these three together constitute the meaning of a word. It cannot be said that the word directly means the universal and indirectly the individual, for the word has only one primary meaning. All the three factors enter into the full meaning of a word which does not exclusively mean any of them. In the meaning of a word all these three factors, -the individual, the form and the universal, are present in the same way though with different degrees of prominence. Among the modern Naiyāyikas, two different views are found regarding the meaning of a word. Some modern Naiyāyikas hold that a word means an individual as characterised by the universal, while others hold it means an individual as qualified by both the universal and the configuration. From this it may be concluded that the meaning of word has three aspects- the pictorial, the denotative and the connotative. When uttered, a word calls up the form, denotes the individual and connotes the universal (genus).
The words constitute sentence (vākya). Like the problem of meaning of words, the meaning of sentence also becomes a philosophical issue. What the meaning of a sentence is, by which the meaning of sentence is determined, and what the relation between the words and the meaning of sentence is, are the fundamental questions in this regard. As answer to such questions we find two different theories in Indian philosophy- abhihītānvyavāda and anvītabhidhān avāda. According to abhihītānvyavāda, the separate meanings of the constituent words determine the meaning of the sentence. This theory is advocated by the Nyāya, Bhattamīṃśa and Vedānta system. The meaning of a sentence, according to them, is merely the synthesis (anvaya) of the meaning of constituent words. After going through a sentence, the meaning of words is understood first one by one and then by patting them together according to yogyatā, sannidhi, ākāśa and tātparya, the meaning of the whole sentence is understood. The other view i.e., anvītabhi dhān avāda holds that the meaning of a sentence is not merely the synthesis of the meaning of constituent words. A sentence possesses a unitary meaning of its own and it cannot be resolved to the complex meaning at its own. Every sentence means an action and words possess meaning only as they are related to that action. This action or verb is the central unit of a sentence and all other words develop the action. Hence in a sentence, there is first a construction of the words with one another and then an expression of the construed meaning of the whole sentence. There is, however, difference of opinion among the propounds of this theory. The Prabhākara Mīṃśakas and the grammarians. According to the grammarians the constituent words have no separate meanings of their own. On the contrary, the Prabhākaras hold that the constituent words perform two-fold functions. They convey both the separate meaning and the construed meaning of sentence. The meaning of sentence, according to the Prabhākaras, is
neither an aggregate of nor quite independent of the separate meanings of words. The sentence is in fact, a new combination of the individual meanings of the words and conveys a new meaning. Supporting this prof. S.C. Chatterjee says, “Of the different views about the meaning of a sentence, that of the Prabhākaras seems to be the best.”10 Again Bertrand Russell’s view goes in favour of abhihitavayavada when he writes, “a sentence may consist of a single word, or a wink; but generally it consists of several words. In that case it has a meaning which is a function of the meaning of the separate words and their order.”11 The problem of meaning of words and sentences thus becomes central issue in the philosophy of language in Indian tradition also.

II.6. Philosophy of Language in the West:

Philosophy of language as a distinct scheme of study is a 20th century development, but its history can be traced back to classical philosophy both in East and West. Whatever is now discussed and studied under this head was also dealt with by the classical philosophers, the peculiar character possessed by the philosophy of language is the non traditional methods and techniques in dealing with language. In this particular trend language is the centre of all discussions, but all the problems of language is not the problems of philosophy of language; it does not enter into the field of grammarians, linguists and so forth. Language here is considered as a means of communication and the problems arising in this particular context belong to philosophy of language. It is in other words philosophy of analysis - analysis of language.

Language is used in every branch of study. The philosophers are concerned with language in metaphysics, epistemology, logic, linguistic behaviour or activity and analysis. In Socrates we find the analytical treatment of language though
not like that of to-day. Plato deals with language in metaphysical purpose, Aristotle in logic. Roughly speaking, metaphysics is the study of reality which constitutes a part of philosophy. Attempts have been made here by different philosophers to find out fundamental facts and general principles through the analysis of language. Plato draws our attention to language when he says, "Whenever a number of individuals have a common name. We assume them to have also a corresponding idea or form."\textsuperscript{12} The implication is that a common noun or adjective can be applied to a large number of different individuals in the same sense, if there be some general terms to which these nouns and adjectives belong and only with these general principles phenomena can be explained.

The use of language in Aristotle is found to express something about a certain subject which is the substance and substance is an ontologically fundamental category. In 19\textsuperscript{th} century, Meinong holds that each meaningful statement, if it is to be meaningful; must have a referent. If the referent is not existent in the real world, it must be something subsistent. In any case it is a metaphysical treatment of language which reappears in the philosophy of Logical Atomism of Russell and Wittgenstein (early) in 20\textsuperscript{th} century. Russell uses language as a medium to find out the ultimately real. He speaks of an identity between logically perfect language and the metaphysical structure. In logic again the philosopher's concern with language becomes prominent. Logic is the attempt to find out principles to distinguish valid from invalid inferences. All inferences are expressed in language and the analysis of inference is in fact the analysis of statements, which figure as premises and conclusions. Here analysis is of the forms of statements. For this form of the two inferences looked very much alike, one is valid and the other becomes invalid. It is the method of applying form to the arguments as a consequence of which they become either valid or invalid.
Language is also related with epistemology, which is a branch of philosophy. The epistemologists are concerned with language from various points of view. In case of apriori knowledge where there is no ground of experience, a statement is true by definition or by virtue of the meaning of the terms involved. Whether this account of apriori knowledge is justified or not is a matter of controversy; whatever is clear is that we become concerned with the meanings of terms. W. P. Alston states, “How is it that we are able to know with certainty, apart from observation, measurement etc. that the angles of a Euclidian triangle all together equal 180 degrees, and that 8 plus 7 always and invariably equals 15?”

That 8 plus 7 equals 15 is a part of what is meant by ‘8’, ‘7’, ‘15’, ‘plus’ and ‘equals’. To deny this statement would involve changing the meaning of one or more of these terms as pointed out by Alston.

The deficiency of language has been disturbing the philosophers and therefore, they are concerned with constructing efficient language. Philosophy is a purely verbal activity. The philosopher puts his ideas in to test in the verbal discussion for which verbal discussion may be called the laboratory of philosophers. There are different objections to language from the philosophers. Plotinus and Bergson regard language as unsuitable for the formulation of fundamental truth. The interesting fact is that when the philosophers complain about language they do the same by using language. In fact the objections are against the present state or condition of language and attempts may be made to remedy such condition. The philosophers here, are divided into two groups. The “ordinary language” philosophers hold that the language of everyday discourse can perfectly serve philosophical purposes. It is due to the deviation of the philosophers from ordinary language that philosophical problems arise. Wittgenstein in his later works maintains this position and holds that
philosophers have misused some crucial terms like 'know', 'see', 'free', 'true', 'reason' etc. from which arise most of the problems of philosophy. The other group of philosophers holds that ordinary language itself is in adequate for philosophical purposes. Bertrand Russell, Leibnitz, Carnap etc. are the philosophers of this group. According to them ordinary language is vague, ambiguous inexplicit, conditional and misleading which should be substituted by an artificial language free from all these defects. In this position general conceptions of language and meaning are involved; even the mystic has no way out except presupposing some idea of nature of language.

II.7. Philosophy of Language- LEIBNITZ:

Leibnitz adopted a two-fold approach to language- artificial and natural. He on the one hand represented artificial language- the "universal characteristic" and on the other numerous historical and philological investigations of natural language. In adopting two very different approaches there seems to be a tension between the aims and assumptions of them. One of the objectives of universal characteristic is to rectify the deficiency of natural language by means of symbolism. This approach has a critical attitude as its basis and critical attitude is towards the powers of natural language. The universal characteristic enables to construct linguistic characters which are transparent representation of intelligible thoughts. Such a concept of universal characteristic is the core of Leibniz's understanding of language. In his investigations of natural language, Leibniz appears to opt for an approach which is relatively independent from that opted in the case of the universal characteristic, treating natural language as a distinctive form of linguistic phenomenon. It follows that if Leibniz's ideal language is the complete and perfect representation of thought and there by of reality, in a formal characteristic, he
nevertheless recognizes that in practice language must be seen as grounded in the contingency of human needs, capacities and interests. This explains the potential, value of a study of natural language. Thus the two-fold approach of Leibniz forms the ground of his philosophy of language.

The universal characteristic is considered by Leibniz as one of his most important inventions. In a letter to Oldenberg, Leibniz writes, “To any one who wanted to speak or write about any topic, the genius of his language will supply not only the words but also the things. The very name of anything will be the key to all that could reasonably be said or thought about it or done with it”. He also describes the characteristic as great instrument of reason which carries the forces of the mind. Leibniz very briefly discusses the basic relation of expression or representation that unites a character and what it signifies. There is a necessary condition for an adequate characteristic such that any character representing a complex concept should be constructed from simple characters in way that exactly corresponds to the composition of the complex concept from its simpler conceptual parts.

In speaking of universal characteristic or symbolism, Leibniz never denies the importance of natural language. Leibniz’s explanation of how linguistic expression acquires meaning is strongly influenced by his commitment to the principle of sufficient reason as pointed out by Walker. 14 He rejects the doctrine that words acquire meaning in an arbitrary or conventional manner. Word, for him, are not so arbitrary and accidental in origin, for there is nothing accidental in the world except owing to our ignorance, when the causes are hidden to us. With this assumption Leibniz proceeds by advancing a series of tentative conjectures about the origin of meaning in natural languages. These are aimed at drawing out the causal
roots of the signification of linguistic expressions. Language arises in the from of interjections which express an immediate agreement between uttered sounds and human emotions, Even in the derivative languages, a consonance of sound and perception is the natural root of meaning.

Leibniz intends to trace out the varied and complicated routes by which the meanings of natural language expressions have evolved. The principle of sufficient reason is the ground of his etymology. Words have not acquired their meaning arbitrarily, but always as a consequence of some identifiable cause. Leibniz speculates that meaning arises, in a pattern common to all; languages, as the result of natural harmony between human emotion or perception and uttered sounds. The evolution of meaning is to be explained as the product of a complex array of environmental and linguistic factors. In mature language, “various accidents and transformation have left most words greatly changed and for removed from their original pronunciation and signification.” The process of acquiring meaning by the words cannot be explained by any single account. The words pass from one signification to another as a result of evolution of language. In all this, Leibniz advocates a scientific approach to the study of language.

In his New Essays Leibniz points out that a language can not function if it contains proper names only and no general term. This is because new individuals and accidents and actions are being discovered all the time, and we could never keep up with the task of assigning each one a unique proper name. Moreover, in so far as proper names do occur in present day natural languages, it is certain that they were originally appellative or general. Here Leibniz seems to make a purely historical claim about the origin of proper names. These proper names are distinguished solely
by the fact that they signify complete concepts which are sufficiently complex that they pick out single individual. Leibniz, in contrast to the position of J.S. Mill, maintains that proper names, as much as general terms, do possess a determinative sense or meaning. Here Leibniz agrees with Frege. Frege associates with each proper name a content sufficient to determine the bearer or reference of that name. However, Leibniz unlike Frege, does not explicitly draw on the notion of reference as a distinct semantic relation uniting proper name with their bearers.

Leibniz's account of the meaning of natural-kind terms bring him near to the modern philosophy of language. He strongly argues against Locke's claim that natural kind terms signify only "nominal essences": abstract ideas that mind forms from its observation of particular things. In such cases a term may mean different things to different people. Leibniz rejects this view strongly. He argues: "The name 'gold' signifies not merely what the speaker knows of gold, e.g., something yellow and very heavy, but also what he does not know, which may be known by some one, namely: a body endowed with an inner constitution from which flow its colour and weight, and which also generates other properties which he acknowledges to be better known by the experts." Leibniz here anticipates the recent argument of Putnam concerning the division of linguistic labor and relevance of hidden structure or essence in determining the meaning of natural kind terms. Like Putnam, he claims that it is not what any one person conceives in connection with a term like 'gold' which fixes the meaning of the word, but rather the collective beliefs of a linguistic community, including experts with the latest knowledge and techniques available for distinguishing what is and is not gold. Moreover like Putnam, Leibniz maintains that underlying structure is crucial factor in determining the meaning of natural kind terms. Leibniz has the tendency to prefer artificial language to natural kind language.
II.8. Philosophy of Language – Locke:

John Locke's philosophy of language develops as part of his attack on Platonism and Aristotelianism. Locke proposes a theory that is intended to show that the scope for confusion is an inherent liability in the nature and classification of language and that this imperfection can be remedied only if this fact is clearly understood. The discussion of Locke about nature and classification of language and the discussion about imperfection are part of one single argument. As part of his attack on Platonic Ideas. Locke discussed the meaning of words in general. His more specific discussion of classification is an essential part of attack upon the Aristotelian world-view. According to Locke, confusion arises out of the false assumptions about the meaning of general terms. In the book iii of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke tries to replace both Platonic and Aristotelian assumptions with a more accurate account of the meaning of general terms and names. On the basis of this Locke then diagnoses imperfections in the use of language. He wants to undercut philosophical confusions arising from a false view of language, especially classificatory language and also tries to show that a true view of this use reveals inherent liabilities in the ideal of perfect communication through language.

Communicating and recording are the primary functions of language, according to Locke. The primary function of words is to stand for ideas. Whatever is communicated is the idea about thing. Locke does not want to say that our words refer only to our ideas rather than to things. He argues that we refer to things by means of the ideas of them. He clearly states, “The ends of language in our discourse with others, (are) chiefly these three: First, to make known one man’s thoughts or ideas to another. Secondly, to do it with as much ease and quickness, as is possible; and
thirdly, thereby to convey the knowledge of things. Language is either abused, or deficient when it fails in any of these three.\textsuperscript{17}

Locke believes that our words refer to objects, not just ideas and also that it is a fundamental use of them, even if not their ‘primacy signification’ to convey information about such objects. He also admits that the connection of words to things is indirect or secondary rather than primary. “Recent historical research has made it clear that Locke’s term ‘signification’ does not mean the same as our contemporary term’ reference.”\textsuperscript{18} Therefore, it should not be supposed that Locke tries to argue that our words primarily reference to our own ideas. In fact, ‘signify’ is technical term used from late medieval philosophy of language. It has been used to mean something quite general representing something in some way to the faculty of cognition. Signification does not include speaker’s intention as part of its general notion.

According to the scholastic authors there are several possible significates for words including the word itself, the speaker, the speaker’s idea and the objects referred to. Regarding the priority of significates the authors differ among themselves, some argue that a speaker makes his idea known by. First making a thing known to another, while others hold that a speaker makes a thing known by making known his ideas. In the latter case the idea becomes the primary significant and the thing secondary significant. Franco Burgerdijk held that “Articulate utterances signify the concerts of the mind, primarily, that is, and immediately; for they also signify things, but by means of concepts,”\textsuperscript{19} Locke attaches himself to this tradition. His view that words have ideas as their primary signification and thing only as their secondary signification has its root at the most fundamental level of his philosophy. It is rooted
in his theory of ideas itself according to which ideas are always the immediate objects of our thought.

Ideas are natural signs of things and the words which are conventional signs of ideas become conventional signs of natural signs of things. Locke's view about the signification of words implies that nothing can be said about things without having ideas of them and that what can be said about things is determined by what ideas one can have of them. Regarding signification of words Locke holds, “But though words as they are used by men, can properly and immediately signify nothing but the ideas, that are in the mind of the speaker; yet they in their thoughts give them a secret reference to two other things.

First they suppose their words to be marks of the ideas in the minds also of other men, with whom they communicate: For else they should talk in vain, and would not be understood ........ But in this men stand not usually to examine whether the idea they and those they discourse with have in their minds, be the same: But think it enough, that they use the words as they imagine in the common acceptation of that language ........ Secondly, Because Men would not be thought to take barely of their own imagination, But of things as really they are : therefore they often suppose their words to stand also for the reality things. Locke in this way holds that although the word of individual speakers “properly and immediately” signify only the ideas of these speakers by a ‘secret reference we also suppose that they stand for both ideas in the auditions and the reality of things. Locke discusses the secret reference of our words in his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. The principle of this discussion is that the very nature of words makes it almost unavoidable for many of them to be doubtful and uncertain in their significations.
Locke holds that the words have no natural connection to things. But the words signify thing through ideas. Language is the only instrument for the communication of ideas; yet it can not give direct access to the ideas of others for which it can not be thought of as transparent medium. Locke also believes that there are certain abuses of language; but the imperfection inherent in the very nature of language is more important. These impetrations can be remedied to some extent but can not be simply avoided. Locke's claim that the immediate signification of a speaker's word is always his own ideas is a controversial one. For in that sense language cannot work as a medium for communication. The purpose of language is expand the knowledge of each individual through the communication of ideas; but as we have no direct access to the ideas of others, there is no guarantee of using language for the expansion of knowledge.

II.9. Philosophy of Language - Hume:

David Hume also follows the theory of meaning introduced by Locke. Locke stated, "But so far as words are of use and signification so far is there a constant connexion between for is there a constant connexion between the sound and the Idea and a designation, that the one stands for the other; without which application of them, they are nothing but so much insignificant noise."

Following Locke, Hume argues that every idea is caused by an impression. Impressions are sensations, passions and emotions as they make their first appearance in the soul and ideas are the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning. Ideas may be understood as the mental tokens with which we reason. The impressions may be understood as the immediate and unavoidable sensations or feelings that cause ideas according to Hume.
Hume's transition from causal claim to semantic claim is very important in his philosophy of language. That ideas are the effects of impressions is the causal claim which he first accepts. But then without any argument Hume shifts his position to the semantic claim that ideas refer to impressions. The meaning of a term, according to Hume's theory, is ultimately given by a set of impressions that the idea it names, as a term names cause and the idea this theory of meaning constitutes a criterion of cognitive significance. Hume view is similar to the earliest attempt of the positivist to frame a principle of verifiability. According to this every meaning terms required a set of observationally necessary and sufficient conditions of application Hume of counsel, did not recognise the limitation given by the later positions in his verifiability criterion of meaning. Hume used it mainly to condemn varieties types of concepts of traditional philosophy like substance, mode, essence etc. as without cognitive significance. In this process Hume fallowed a tradition that rejects the central concept of Aristotelian metaphysics

II. 10. Philosophy of Language - G.E. Moore:

Philosophy of language in the west gets a new turn in the early 20th with the publication of G.E. Moore's article "The Refutation of Idealism". Moore is a common sense realist and therefore, there is nothing to be astonished in his attempt to refute Idealism; but the method he employs is really surprising. He does not take the attempt from traditional realistic point of view; rather picks up the fundamental principle that Berkeley has established, in the form of a subject-predicate proposition by the analysis of which he crashes down Idealism. It is for the first time in the history of philosophy that a certain school is attacked by nullifying its fundamental proposition; and Moore thus introduces the way to analytical philosophy.
Berkeley has established the dictum "esse est percipi" as the foundation of Idealism. Moore takes this proposition as a logical one in which 'esse' is the subject, 'percipi' is the predicate and 'est' is the copula. Moore holds that in a subject-predicate proposition the copula may express three different meanings none of which is adequate to the proposition and as a result the proposition is not a logical one. Hence Idealism either stands on an illogical foundation or it does not stand at all, and in any sense Idealism cannot survive.

The positivists used philosophy of language in order to eliminate metaphysics. They introduced a new theory of meaning so as to serve their purpose. The positivistic movement was led by M. Schlick, Otto Neuroth, R Carnap, A. J Ayer etc. who developed a very interesting trend where the empiricism of Hume positivism of Comte and Mack and the logical analysis of the type initiated by Moore, Russell, Whitehead, Wittgenstein are found together in one string. They employed the method of logical analysis of language, for the purpose of providing a secure foundation for the sciences and to demonstrate the meaninglessness of metaphysics. The positivists by their theory of meaning express all metaphysical propositions to be meaningless and thereby develops the anti metaphysical trend radically. According to them, "the sense of a proposition is the method of its verification." This theory of meaning is known as verification or veridicality theory of meaning. A proposition is meaning only if it is verifiable in sense experience.
II.11. Philosophy of Language – Russell:

Bertrand Russell used philosophy of language as an instrument to give solid and logical foundation to metaphysics. He held that simple facts are the ultimate unanalyzable units and they are expressed through propositions. The propositions are complex as they are made of words. But the propositions which express only one fact are simple. By reflecting the simple facts, simple propositions express reality. According to Russell, there is a close relationship between language and reality. Language is the means through which we can describe the nature of the world and a precise consistent description is possible only when there is similarity in strictness between the language and the world such that language can picture the world. In view of Russell ordinary language can not fulfill this purpose since ordinary language is ambiguous and defective. For this purpose the language should be ideal and logically sound being capable of picturing the world unit by unit. With this end in view Russell tried to develop an ideal system of language in his philosophy of logical atomism.

Russell uses language to describe the nature of reality. He therefore holds that in order to know reality we must know the nature of our language. To describe reality language must be rich enough for the purpose. The study and analysis of language is of paramount importance in the study of the nature of reality. Russell also pointed out. That for describing reality through language there must be correspondence between the two, i.e. one to one correspondence between the units of reality. In agreement with Wittgenstein Russell also maintains that language pictures reality. Therefore, in order to understand function of presentation or picturing the nature of reality, the nature of language must be understood. The language that can
describe reality should be truth functional in character, which is known as Russell's thesis of extensionality of language. According to him, ordinary language that is commonly used is defective, because it is ambiguous and does not reveal extensionality in structure. Therefore, ordinary language cannot describe logically the nature of reality. In order to describe reality an ideal and perfect system of language is essential and Russell holds that only a truth functional language is capable of describing reality logical. In persuasion of his thesis that language pictures reality Russell proceeds to analyse language for determining the nature of reality.

Simple propositions are the simplest units of logical thinking, according to Russell, and by combining two or more propositions, we can make a compound one. The compound propositions are truth-functional and this truth-functional language is ideal which is analyzable in terms of simple statements. The simple unanalyzable fact which is expressed in a simple proposition is called atomic fact and they are the ultimate logical constituents of the world. The simple propositions representing the atomic facts are called atomic propositions and the atomic facts can be understood by analysing atomic proposition. Hence, the study of the nature of atomic proposition is essential which is the simplest units of language. Russell thus uses language as the means to the study of metaphysics and this is for the first time in the history of philosophy that analysis of language has been shown as the means to achieve metaphysical reality.
II.12. Philosophy of Language - Wittgenstein:

Wittgenstein steps towards a new dimension when he declares that all philosophy is the critique of language in his *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*. By this declaration, he marks a complete departure from the traditional view of nature of philosophy. Wittgenstein’s view in his early period expressed in the Tractatus is that it is the task of philosophy to analyse and clarify the language of science. Here he holds that “A proposition is a picture of reality as we think it to be”\(^\text{22}\). But in the “Philosophical Investigations” he gives up this view and holds that language is used as tools. Here he states that language is a form of life, a way of performance and behaviour a kind of game. Language is not only for picturing facts but also for asking, thinking, greeting cursing praying commanding guessing joking and so his conception of language as game shows his emphasis on ordinary language. Language for him is the vehicle of life and the words which may be called speech activity plays the most important role in his latter philosophy and this is called by him language game. But the term language game is used much more broadly than speech activity. By language game he means both the pure speech activities such as telling a joke and the activities as constructing an object from a description, obeying orders which involve non-linguistic activities or behaviour as essential components. Thus, language game is of two kinds pure language game and impure language game. The difference between the two is one of degree only. Impure means to have slightest regulative force and Wittgenstein considers this to be the basic upon which pure language game is a parasitic one in a crucial way. He thus establishes the inter relation between pure and impure language game.

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II.13. Meaning - The Basic Problem:

A thorough study of the history of philosophy shows that conceptual analysis has been occupying a primary position in philosophy. It has always become philosopher's concern to analyse the basic concepts. Socrates is found to spend a great deal, as Represented in Plato's dialogue, of his time asking questions like "what is a justice ?" and "what is knowledge ?" The attempt of Aristotle to arrive at a proper definitions of terms like 'cause', 'good', etc, are also forms of conceptual analysis. The basic concepts in any discipline should be clear and explicit and this can be made possible only through the analysis of those concepts in terms of which we think about the world and human life. Philosophical activity, there fore, has become analytical which is concerned with philosophy of language. Analytic philosophers are involved in dispute regarding the meaning of a given word. It is philosophers business to bring out features of use or meaning of various words and forms of statement for which the philosopher has to proceed on the basis of some general conception of the nature of linguistic use and meaning. When such disputes are not settled, the philosopher is forced to develop some explicit theory of what it is for a linguistic expression to have a certain meaning. So for as philosophy deals with conceptual analysis, philosophy of language remains prominent in philosophical study.

Philosophy of language, in 20th Century begins with the works of Russell and Moore. They insist that philosophical problems can be solved or properly formulated after due concern with aspects of language. There are of course, many styles of linguistic philosophy like logical atomism, logical positivism, ordinary language philosophy, formal analysis, informal analysis, linguistic phenomenology etc. All these trends, however, share a common concern with language whether it be a
natural language like English, or an artificial language like Russell’s logical calculi and at the same time they are largely distinguished from one another. This difference is due to their different views of language and the relevance of language to philosophy.

L. Wittgenstein says, “philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.” According to him, the task of the contemporary philosophers is to show how past thinkers have gone astray as a result of having failed to understand a bit of language whether it is the meaning of some important word like ‘know’, or more pervasive feature of language, such as the way in which terms serve to refer. This can be achieved only by the minute analysis of how words are employed in ordinary language according to Wittgenstein. Some other philosophers doubted the value of minute analysis of ordinary language, but still insisted upon the linguistic nature of philosophy Rudolf Carnap, one of such philosophers, describes his philosophy as construction theory. In his own words “It is the main thesis of construction theory that all concepts can ... be derived from a few fundamental concepts...... An object (or concept) is to be reducible to one or more other objects if all statements made about it can be transformed in to statements about these other objects.” The attempt of Carnap is to show that statements about material objects can be transformed into statements about mental sense impressions, so giving a linguistic form to the traditional claim that material objects are just collection of ideas’. Whatever the trends may be, in contemporary philosophy, we find the reformulation of traditional question, time and time again, in a language vein.

David E. cooper states, “for some years, linguistic philosophy got along without any systematic attempts to explicate some of the concepts, like meaning
and reference, to which appeal was constantly being made, in an optimistically intuitive manner in the course of various philosophical investigations. It was quickly realized, however, that for these analyses to be adequate, philosophers could not play fast and loose with these crucial concepts. And so we get back to philosophy of language. In order to employ various concepts in discussions of other problems philosophers had to get clear about the linguistic concepts. When philosophers did try to understand these concepts, this began to influence their approach to problems in philosophy.

The most immediate and important problem in the philosophy of language is the problem of meaning. The definition and characteristics of meaning criterion of meaningfulness, meaning of words, meaning of sentences etc. are predominant content in the philosophy of language. Philosophers are not united in the explanation of all these points as a result of which various theories of meaning grow up. Besides meaning philosophers of language is also concerned with the problem of reference and predication. When language performs the task of communication it refers to things and describes what is referred to. What, exactly is it to refer and to predicate is not so easy to explain and therefore, it gets a particular position in the philosophy of language. Again, the problem of the relation between language and our mental and social life is also brought under philosophy of language. Benjamin Lee Whorf insists that language determines our thinking and influences our social life. When words play their role, we must have acquired the ability to organise them in to a particular for according to certain rules and principles. But what must the human mind be to acquire such ability is another problem discussed by Noam Chomsky in the philosophy of language. Moreover, the question of truth of judgment and multiplicity
of the functions of language are also the problems dealt with within the scope of philosophy of language.

II.14. Meaning - Different Approaches: An Evaluation

In course of development of philosophy of language, meaning the central problem gets various responses from different group of philosophers as a result of which we get different theories. The prominent among them are ideational or mentalistic, referential, behavioural, verification, use and speech act theory. The origin of ideational theory can be traced back to John Locke. In his "Essay Concerning Human understanding" Locke states, "the use, then, of words is to be sensible marks of ideas; and the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate signification". According to this view words and sentences are meaningful in virtue of their association with mental items. The advocates of this view maintain that synonymy is to be explained in terms of the identity of such mental items. Ogden and Richards hold, "The meaning of a word is a recurrent set of mental events peculiarly related to one another so as to recur, as regards their main features with partial uniformity". This moralistic approach of meaning arises due to the inadequacies of the popular view known as 'fido-fido' theory – that the meaning of a word is the things or set of things, which that word refers to or names. The ideational theory maintains that a linguistic expression acquires meaning due to the fact that it is regularly used in communication. The expression is used as marks of certain ideas that makes thinking possible. Language is necessary to convey thoughts to each other and language bears meaning in the sense of ideas.

Each linguistic expression becomes distinguishable from other by its own meaning, i.e., idea. In any expression, there remains an idea such that when an
expression is used in that sense it is used as an indication of the presence of that idea. An expression, according to this theory, in order to mean an idea, the idea must remain there in the mind of the speaker. Also the speaker will have to make his audience realize the idea of the speaker's mind and the expression would have to call up the same idea in the mind of the audience. But all these conditions in fast can not be satisfied for which philosophers have to think of other options.

The communication aspect of language has been emphasized by the behaviourists. The behaviourists try to explain meaning in terms of stimulus-response relation. Leonard Bloomfield defines meaning as "the situation in which the speaker utters it and the responses which it calls forth in the hearer". Since his time a lot of attempts have been made by linguists, philosophers and psychologists to give an account of meaning in terms of stimuli and responses. Some of them are B.F. Skinner, C. Osgood, C. Morris, and W.V. Oüine. In view of behaviourism, meaningful speech involves an intimate connection with behaviour or in other words speech itself is a kind of behaviour.

The behaviourists' account of meaning is found in two forms - the crude one the sophisticated. The crude form is such that the meaning of an expression is the responses it elicits when uttered. But this view cannot be considered seriously. Because the utterance of an expression may produce different responses or may not produce any response at all, yet it cannot be said to be vague or meaningless. Within the sophisticated form C. Morris introduces the notion of preparatory stimuli which does not itself elicit any responses, but sets up the disposition to respond to future stimuli. According to him, all meaningful symbols or signs including words are preparatory stimuli. Morris's theory holds that the meaning of word or sign contains
two components - denotatum and significatum. Denotatum is that which completes the response sequences to which the interpreter is disposed. The essential properties for which something can be denotatum are called significatum of sign. This sophisticated form of behaviourists account of meaning avoids the obvious objections leveled against the crude form. But this attempt of the behaviourists is also not beyond objection as a result of which we find some other theories in the field.

The most popular and widespread view about meaning is that an expression means what it refers to. Bertrand Russell has advocated such a view what is known as the referential theory of meaning which was introduced by J.S. Mill in the form of naming theory. It provides very simple answer to the problem of meaning. The meaning of a statement lies in the object it names or refers. A statement has meaning means that it refers to something other then itself. The sophisticated view explains that the meaning of an expression is to be identified with the relation between the expression and its referents. The meaning of an expression is constituted by the referential connection between the expression and its referent. Russell states, "when we ask what constitutes meaning, ......... we are asking not who is the individual meant, but what is the relation of the word to the individual which makes the one mean the other". The referential theory stands on the assumption that all meaningful linguistic expression refer to something other then the expression itself. According to Russell the referent need be necessarily a physical object, it may be a class or a concept, a relation even. Wittgenstein in his ‘Philosophical Investigations’ strongly place the idea that meaning is a function of use, the function of the way in which it is used by speakers of language. He status, "for a large class of cases-though not for all-in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language". The very interesting point here is that
for some philosophers advocating the use theory, the meanings of words can only be explained in terms of use; sentence do not have any use at all. According to them words or phrases are used to make sentence and that is why sentences are said to have no use. Such a view is held by Gilbert Ryle in his 'Use' Usage and Meaning'.35

This particular approach was initiated by Wittgenstein according to whom the past philosophers had gone badly astray by failing understand how certain crucial words were used in everyday life. “A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words”.36 This remark plays an important role in the field of ordinary language philosophy. Wittgenstein also employed the slogan “Meaning is use” which implicitly denied that meaning was to be explained in terms of inner, private, mental processes. The slogan also stands for denial of the view that meaning are abstract entities named or expressed by words. But the primary question here is to explain the term use. Gilbert Ryle states that use here is not taken in the senses of usage or utility in terms of which meaning is to be explicated. Enquiry about meanings is neither enquiry in to utility of words nor enquiring in to facts about the usage of words; it is rather an enquiry into the standard or stock uses to which works may be put. Whether a word is a good one to shock people with or whether it is more commonly uttered in one place than another has nothing to do with its standard non-deviant proper use. It is such use in terms of which meaning is to be explained. To find out what these stock uses are, it is beneficial to look at deviations from these and this shows that we are not interested in utility or usage. According to Ryle, “usage is a custom, practice, fashion, or vogue there cannot be a misusage any more than there can be a miscustom or a misvogue”.37
For the use theorists the basic problem is to find out the sense of the term 'use' in terms of which meaning is to be explained. There are several types of linguistic use which are not relevant to meaning. One of such examples is the proper names which has use but no meaning. There are so many aspects of use irrelevant to meaning which lead us to conclude with Paul Ziff as, "It is wrong to say 'the meaning of a word is its use in the language' for the use of a word depends upon many factors many of which have nothing to do with questions of meaning". It is not difficult to find out and eliminate such uses which are irrelevant. Ryle Tries to come out of the problem by distinguishing between use and usage or utility. But yet the theory could not come out of trouble. As all aspects of use are not relevant to meaning, the theory has been reduced to claiming that memory can be explained in terms of relevant uses only and this is patently circular Findlay points out, "The notion of use as if ordinarily exists and is understood, presuppose the notion of meaning (in its central and paradigmatic sense) and .......... it can not therefore be used to elucidate the latter".

The use theory of meaning can be made adequate only as result of developing a sophisticated theory of the uses of language and such a sophisticated form is found in the theory of speech-acts which was introduced by J.L. Austin. The basic point on which Austin emphasized was that philosophers should take as the basic unit of study, the act which a person performs with the aid of words or sentences; but the words or sentences themselves should not be treated as basic units. The theory of language is to become a branch of the theory of action, just as there are acts performed in different fields like game war and so on, so there are speech acts like stating, reporting, questioning etc. The basis of introducing speech-act theory can be exposed as that in order to discover what a sentence is being used to say, it
becomes necessary to look at the total act performed by the speaker. Moreover, there is pragmatic justification that by studying sentences as parts of total speech act, various philosophical debates may be derived. Austin intended to exhibit the variety of acts that can be performed with language, and to lay down a framework for the assessment of speech acts. Also to reveal the different aspects of speech act was the objective of Austin.

In the first phase of his theory Austin distinguishes between constative and performative utterances. A constative utterance is that which serves to state a fact, report that something is. A performative utterance is that which do not describe or report or constate anything and is neither true nor false. Again a performative utterance is doing an action which would not normally be described as saying something. The next stage in the account of Austin, is that it would be a great mistake to suppose that an utterance is the performance of a single act, rather than a complex of acts. According to him, any speech act comprises at least two, and typically three, sub-acts. These are locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts involved in a total speech act. When the sentence 'I promise to come to dinner' involves a certain grammatical construction, making a promise and the addressee is made cheering up. Employing grammatical construction is the performance of locution, making promise is the performance of illocution and cheering up the addressee is the perlocution. Austin was aware that this tracheotomy was not clear enough, but yet he had to admit the distinctions and thus rut forward a sophisticated form of the theory of meaning which according to some philosophers is an advanced from of behaviouristic view.

The logical positivists advocate the theory of meaning which is known as verifiability theory of meaning. According to this theory giving the meaning of a
sentence is simply giving the description of the ways in which it would be verified, Moritz Schlick, one of the founders of positivism says, “whenever we ask about a sentence “What does it mean? .......... we want a ascription of the conditions under which the sentence will form a true proposition, and of those which will make it false.......... The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification, 40” According to the positivists a sentence is verifiable only when it can be shown to be true or false by sense-experience. Sense-experience is the only criterion of verification. If a sentence can be verified by sense experience then it is meaningful and by verification a proposition is qualified as true or false. The principle of variation is for any sentence to be meaningful it must be empirically verifiable. According to M. Schlock, “No sentence has meaning unless we are able to indicate a way of testing its truth or falsity.” 41

Thus the positivists uses the method of empirical verification to determine meaning, the objective of which was to eliminate metaphysics from philosophy by showing that metaphysical sentence are meaningless as they cannot be empirically verified. Alfred Ayer introduces the strong and weak sense of verifiability in his “Language, Truth and Logic”. A sentence, according to him is verifiable in the strong sense when it can be immediately proved to be true or false by sense experience. When a sentence can not be immediately proved to be true or false but has the possibility of being proved with the help of sophisticated instrument it is called weakly verifiable. But there are sentences which are neither strongly nor weakly verifiable such sentences are metaphysical and considered as nonsensical.

The positivists attempted a difficult task of excluding as meaningless what we want to regard as meaningless while preserving what we want to regard as
meaningful. The problems they had to face are of various types of which the first is to justify the meaning of 'empirical' and the second is to decide the meaning of 'verifiable' regarding the meaning of empirical all the positivists agree upon one point that what is done through the normal senses on introspection is empirical. The positivist differ among them selves regarding what is absented, physical object, properties, or sense impressions. Leaving all such disputes aside it may be assented that the principle claims that a sentence is meaningful only if it can be verified through the use of normal senses or introspection. Regarding the meaning of 'verifiable' it is clear that the sentence is meaningful become it verifiable, does not mean that it should be verifiable in practice. What is required is that meaningful sentences should be verifiable in principle. Provided the observations which would verify a sentence can be described, them it is meaningful, whether or not observation is a actually made. Schlock states, “It must be emphasized that when we speak of verifiability we mean the logical possibility of verification, and nothing but this.”

The positivists did not overlook the fact that there are some sentences which are meaningful but neither conclusively verifiable non conclusively falsifiable, e.g., there exists a unicorn which never falls down. The positivists therefore, retreated to the notion of weak verifiability which suggests that a sentence is meaningful provided that some observations would count as deviant evidence for or against its truth. But then the concept of 'relevance' lee comes problematic and without any proper account of what is meant by relevant we can not give any comment on weak verifiability also. Any nation of verification in principle widens the scope of positivists' criterion of meaning but they could not clearly explain the same.

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