I.1. Language and Meaning:

Language is a means of communication and it is only the meaningful signs through which communication is possible. The term communication involves two primary factors: the communicator and the communicated, and the relation between the two is expressed through language. In order to communicate the speaker has to use such language that can be understood by the hearer. The gestures of a dumb person cannot communicate with an ordinary man who does not understand the
meaning of such gestures; but such gestures are the language of the dumbs among themselves, since they are acquainted with such gestures and their meanings. Even in case of the same language shared by both the speaker and the hearer; the hearer may not understand what the speaker desires to express. Hence, meaning becomes an important issue.

Moreover, language is not like the logical constants; it evolves. New terms enter into the sphere of language with a definite significance and lots of words and phrases decay together with the change of society. Not only that words decay, some of the words lose their original meaning and acquire new meanings. In case of some of the words the acquired meaning becomes opposite or contradictory to the original one. This is natural in case of the evolution of language and this situation makes the problem of meaning necessary to deal with. If there be no universal criterion of meaning it would be impossible to understand the sentences of the past in future. But the present is influenced or ever made by the past and directs the future. Hence, in order to cope up with the present and to prepare for the future the past must be comprehended which is possible through proper understanding of language and its meaning.

The words are the smallest meaningful units of language. A word is a meaningful combination of letters. All words, which are capable of being used as components of language have meaning. Language as a means of communication contains words as its primary unit and sentences are formed out of the words. The letters which are constituents of words are not by themselves meaningful although words are meaningful combinations. But where a single letter composes a word like
"I" then it becomes meaningful. It is to be noted that words are although primary units, not always simple. There are compound words composed of other words like "postman", "hotpot". These compound words also have unitary meaning. The unitary meaning of the compound words is determined directly or indirectly by the meaning of constituent words. In case of the compound word like 'postman' it is clear and direct, but in case of the compound word like 'black-book' the word does not mean a book of darkest colour, rather it means the book of recording punishment. The basic point to be noted here is that in any case words do have meaning.

The fundamental problem we have to deal first is the concept of words, which are constituents of language. A word consists of letter or letters, which is structural to the word. But the question of meaning arises when we hear or write them. A word is not simply a noise when it is spoken nor, simply a set of written signs. A word includes all these, but not that only these things are words. "A word is a spoken noise or set of written marks with meaning."¹ It thus indicates that a word must have meaning in order to get the status of a word. This meaning need not necessarily be spoken or written; it may be expressed by physical expression or gesture also. Whatever the type of expression may be meaning is essential to a word. But that words must have meaning cannot be said in reverse way – that all meaningful things are words. There are logical and mathematical symbols having meaning which are not words. At this level we are not concerned with whether meaningful symbols are words or not, rather we are concerned with the nature of relation between words and their meanings. Words are also symbols and not meaningful by themselves; it is only the human being who attributes meaning to the words.
Words are conventional signs, not natural which indicates that words do not bear meaning by nature; it is a convention that meaning is given to the words. That one and the same word can be used for different meaning and two different words can be used to mean the same thing justifies that man gives the words their meanings. In Sanskrit language the word ‘saindhava’ is used to stand for two different meanings - the horse and the salt. It is not that saindhava means both horse and salt at the same time; but either of them in one particular situation. If the speaker is in dinner table and utters the word saindhava, it would mean salt; and if the speaker is in battlefield the word would mean horse. Meaning of words, therefore, have become vital for communication. The words without meaning are simply noises or hopeless signs. In course of development of human society, the words acquire meaning because of human effort to give words the meaning. The origin of the process of meaning is not such that some people sat down together and determined the meaning of words. In fact, in the mists of history, the origin of language is lost. It is better to accept that language is a system of words than to speculate how it is stated. Language is a system of conventional signs and we have to learn the meanings of those signs in order to know language.

To understand meaning is to understand language. Language and meaning belong to the same logical space as logic and logical form. Therefore, investigation of one leads to the investigation of the other while understanding language, we understand its structure, organization and above all its meaning. Thus the syntax of language goes hand to hand with its semantics. Traditionally semantics investigates meaning while syntax studies linguistic structure and rules. However, the investigation of meaning presupposes that language has a syntactic structure which
must be displayed in a rule-structure grammar. Meaning is a collateral phenomenon, which accompanies the structure of language. The structure of language brings out the meaning when interpreted suitably. Meaning and structure of language are interdependently related in the same logical space. Meaning is the expression of thought expressed by language in its logical structure.

Gotlobb Frege holds that language is the primary vehicle of thought and the logical form of language expresses the logical form of thought. He is the first to hold that meaning or sense is involved in the logical structure of language. According to him, sense is the thought that is expressed in the logical structure of language. Frege made logical syntax and semantics the study of sense. Syntax studies the logical structure of the vehicle of sense, i.e. Language. Semantics studies the interpretation of language in the domain of external objects, i.e. the world. Thus semantics brings the notion of reference as the method of interpretation of the syntactic structure, Frege’s famous distinction between sense and reference, therefore, arises, as the basis of logical semantics.

I.2. Meaning, Sense and Reference:

There is a close relation between words and meanings as we generally accept that words have meaning which gives meaning to the sentences. Frege points out that this relation is not only between word and meaning; rather a third entity arises which he calls the ‘sense’. “It is natural, now, to think of these being connected with a sign (name, combination of words, written mark) besides that which the sign designates, which may be called the meaning of the sign, also what I should like to
call the sense of the sign, wherein the mode of presentation is contained". Thus Frege introduces the concept of sense as different from meaning itself. For example, the meaning of ‘morning star’ is same with the meaning of ‘evening star’ as it is the same star meant. But the sense of ‘morning star’ is different from that of ‘evening star’. In this context sign is understood as figuring a proper name which has a definite object as its meaning. Everyone can comprehend the sense of a proper name provided he is sufficiently familiar with the language or totality of designations to which it belongs. But in such case only a single aspect of proper name will be accounted for. Here the presupposition is that proper name has only one aspect. The sense, the sign and the meaning of the sign maintains a peculiar relation. The relation is such that to the sign, there corresponds a definite sense and to that in turn a definite thing meant. One and the same sense has different expressions in different languages or even in the same language. Every expression has a corresponding sense; but natural languages often do not satisfy this condition. The condition does not mean that each sense has the corresponding thing meant. For example, the expression “the least rapidly convergent series” has a sense but demonstrably, there is nothing it means. For every given convergent series, another convergent, but less rapidly convergent, series, can be found. Knowing the sense does not necessarily imply knowing any meaning.

The words are used for what they mean in ordinary use. But it may also happen that one intends to talk about the words themselves or their sense. Generally, in case of quotations it happens and in such cases the words are stated within the quotation marks. Hence words within the quotation marks do not have ordinary meaning. If we are to speak of an expression’s sense, we may simply use the phrase ‘the sense of the expression’. The indication is that something about the sense
is expressed in indirect speech. Such uses of expressions in indirect speech designate their sense. There is distinction between customary meaning and indirect meaning of a word and also between customary sense and indirect sense. The indirect meaning of a word is accordingly its customary sense. "The meaning and sense of a sign are to be distinguished from the associated idea. If what a sign means is an object perceivable by the senses my idea of it is an internal image".3 This internal image arises from memories of sense impressions.

The sense lies in between ideas and object. The meaning of a proper name is the object itself which is designated by the name. The idea here is wholly subjective. The sense is not subjective like the idea, but is yet not the object itself. A proper name thus expresses its sense and designates its meaning. By using a word or sign the sense of the same is expressed and the meaning is designated. It is not that only proper names have sense and meaning, the sentences which are assertoric also have sense and meaning. An assertoric sentence contains a thought and the question arises here whether the thought contained can be regarded as the sense or the meaning of the sentence. It is difficult to say that thought is the meaning, but it can be considered as the sense of a sentence. The meaning of a sentence may be sought always whenever the meaning of its components is involved. In such cases truth value appears as consisting what the sentence means. But if truth value is regarded as the meaning of a sentence, then on the one hand all true sentences have the same meaning and so, on the other hand do all false sentences. From this it is seen that in the meaning of the sentence all that is specific is obliterated. Neither meaning can be treated separately nor thought gives knowledge, but thought together with meaning, i.e. truth-values of the sentences yields knowledge.
Reference may be said to be the relation between the word or expression and what it stands for. For which the expression stands is called the referent. The referent and the referring expression maintain, in between them, the relation of reference. In the sentence, e.g., ‘Socrates is philosopher’ the speaker refers to a certain individual and the speaker refers by means of the referring expression. The expression identifies, for the hearer correctly if the reference is successful, the individual, i.e. the referent. This idea of reference holds that it is the speaker who refers by using proper expression. However, terminologically it is convenient to say that an expression refers to its referent when the expression is used on some particular occasion and satisfies the relevant conditions. In this line of reference, the phrase ‘the expression X refers to’ means the same as “the speaker referring to by means of X. There are various ways of defining the notion of reference such that it would make sense to distinguish between these two expressions and allow for the possibility that an expression may have reference independently of speaker’s use of the expression to refer to some entity.”

In a sentence containing only one referring expression what is referred to is typically the subject of the sentence which is combined with a predicative expression. To say that a sentence contains a referring expression is to say that it contains an expression which, on some occasions of the utterance of the sentence, may be used to refer. In the above sentence “Socrates is philosopher”, ‘Socrates’ is the referring expression while ‘(be) a philosopher’ is predicative one. There are sentences which contain two or more referring expressions. In the sentence ‘Socrates precedes Plato’, ‘Socrates’ and ‘Plato’ are referring expressions, their referents being the individuals identifiable by name as ‘Socrates’ and ‘Plato’. 
The referring expressions may refer to individuals or it may refer to classes of individuals. The expression referring to individuals is called the singular and the expression referring to classes of individuals is the general expression. Again some expressions refer to some specific individual or class of individuals while some others do not. Those referring to specific individual or class are definite referential expressions while others are indefinite. The general expression sometimes refers to the class distributively and sometimes collectively, hence there are problems in the general referential expression. Indefinite reference is also a controversial matter while singular definite reference is relatively uncontroversial.

I.3. Sense Reference Distinction – Frege:

G. Frege has formulated the doctrine of ‘sense’ and ‘reference’ in which they have been explained as two different sorts of linguistic import. The distinction between ‘sense’ and ‘reference’ has been introduced in order to solve the problem of identity statement of being informative. An identity statement in ordinary form, takes the shape of a tautology; but sometimes it may add some information to our knowledge. Frege gives the example of an identity statement of the form “The evening star is the evening star” which is a tautology. But sometimes the identity is expressed by using two different designations instead of one, e.g., “The morning star is the evening star”. Frege has pointed out that the first statement here adds nothing new to our knowledge, while the second being a result of some new discovery gives new information.
Regarding reference Frege holds that an expression can designate an object which is called its reference. But an expression expresses, besides its reference, something else which Frege calls its ‘sense’. This sense is the mode of presentation of the object which is the designation of the expression. There are various ways of presenting an object before the mind and the way or mode in which object is presented constitutes ‘sense’ of an expression. An identity statement becomes informative when it states that it is the same thing that is presented in two different ways. Two expressions used in such a statement express two different senses, while the designata of the two expressions remain the same. What follows from this is that the objects presented in two different ways are not really different and when an identity statement expresses it, it conveys a new information. In this way Frege recognizes ‘sense’ and ‘reference’ to be of different sorts. According to him, a proper name stands for a definite object and is associated with a sense and thereby contains the two sorts of linguistic import. “A proper name (word, sign, sign combination, expression) expresses its reference. By means of a sign we express its sense and designate its reference”.5 The sense of a proper name depends how the referent is presented. According to Frege, this can happen in different ways and every such way corresponds to a particular sense of a sentence which contains proper name.

However, the distinction between sense and reference is not confined to the simple symbols or proper names only. The complex symbols like sentences also maintain the distinction, according to Frege. He holds,” So far we have considered the sense and reference only of such expressions, words or signs, as we have called proper names,. We now inquire concerning the sense and reference for an entire declarative sentence.”6 This sense-reference distinction (in short SRD) though
introduced to solve the problem of identity statement, forms the basis of a theory of meaning. Moreover, the sense of an expression which represents the mode of presentation of the reference is distinct from the object in the physical world as well as from the mental image in the psychological realm.

The object which is designated by a proper name is the reference of the proper name. It means that a proper name means what it refers to. There arise an idea in the mind in referring to which is wholly subjective. The sense is neither an idea which is subjective nor the object itself. The sense lies in between the two idea and object. The sense of an expression is to be distinguished from the associated image in the mind. The image is subjective and therefore the same image cannot be shared by different persons. But the same ‘sense’ can be grasped at the same time by different individuals.

That idea is subjective means that the idea of one man is not that of another. The idea remains in the mind of individuals alone for which the approaches become different and as a result there arises variety of differences in the ideas associated with the same sense. From this comes out the distinction between the idea and the sense of a sign. This doctrine of sense leads Frege to hold that it is by virtue of this ‘sense’ that an expression is related to its reference. “The regular connexion between a sign its sense, and its reference is of such a kind that to the sign there corresponds a definite sense, and to that in turn a definite reference”. Hence signs are related to their corresponding objects by virtue of their sense that appear in between the sign and its reference. This doctrine of Frege has been clearly represented by Wittgenstein. In the Blue and Brown Books, Wittgenstein states; “Frege’s idea could
be expressed thus: the propositions of mathematics, if they were just complexes of dashes, would be dead and utterly uninteresting, whereas they obviously have a kind of life. And the same, of course, could be said of any proposition: without a sense or without the thought a proposition would be an utterly dead and trivial thing...... And the conclusion which one draws from this is that what must be added to the dead signs in order to make a live proposition is something immaterial, with properties different from all mere signs.8

Linguistic symbols are used in ordinary contexts and Frege attempted to explain the use of those symbols. He holds that it is the doctrine of SRD (sense-reference distinction) that stands as an explanation for the use of linguistic symbols. In ordinary context, when an expression is used, it refers to the object which it denotes. "If words are used in the ordinary way, what one intends to speak of is their reference".9 In spite of this Frege admits that it might be the case that the speaker intends to speak of the word itself or about the 'sense' of the expression. In such case the speaker wants to refer to the customary sense of an expression and not to its customary reference. This happens when a word occurs in an oblique indirect context. Frege suggests that when a person wants to speak about the customary sense of a word, he has to use that word within quotation mark. One cannot speak of customary sense by using the word as it is. If there be an expression X, in order to speak of the sense of the expression, one may simply use the phrase 'the sense of the expression X and this is sufficient to express the customary sense of the expression. At the same time it is clear that such mode of speaking words do not have their customary reference. It simply designates what is usually their sense. Hence according to Frege, words are used, in ordinary context, to speak about the objects which constitute their
customary reference. But in indirect context, when words are used within quotes, they are used to speak about their customary sense. This customary sense constitutes the reference of the expression in indirect context. In other words, the customary sense of an expression becomes the indirect reference of the same expression used within quotes.

I.4. Meaning of Meaning:

The words have meaning which constitute language and language is used as means of communication. Meaning as a word, therefore, must have meaning and what the word 'meaning' stands for is the basic question to be death with in this chapter. Ogden and Richards in their 'Meaning of Meaning' suggested that there are twenty three distinct senses of meaning. In the later period number of this sense increases up to fifty one; but this is not so important. What is important is what the word 'meaning' really means. Counting the number of the sense will not help in determining the meaning of "meaning". Therefore, an elaborate explanation of the term becomes essential.

The ordinary concept of meaning has been treated as ambiguous by the writers concerned with the problem of meaning. They also tried to discover ambiguity in the ordinary concept of meaning since middle ages. In order to make the term disembogues they have introduced a pair of terms - extension and intention. Customarily the extension of a term is simply the set of things the term is true if the term 'rabbit' in its common English sense, is true of all and only rabbits; so the extension of the term 'rabbit' is the set of rabbits. Even this notion of extension
although least problematic, has its problems. Apart from the problems it inherits from its parent notion of truth, the above example of ‘rabbit’ in its most common English sense illustrates one such problem; strictly speaking, it is not a term but an ordered pair consisting of a term and a sense that has an extension. Another problem is this a ‘set’ in the mathematical sense is a ‘yes-no’ object. Any given object either definitely belongs to S or definitely does not belong to S; if S is a set. But in natural language words are not generally ‘yes-no’. There are things of which the description tree is clearly true and things of which the description tree is clearly false. Thus the idealization involved in the notion of extension – the idealization involved in supposing that there is such a thing as the set of things of which the term tree is true – is actually very severe.

A word may have more than one sense and the standard treatment of this problem is to consider each of the sense as different from words. This again involves at least two idealizations – That words have discretely many senses, and that the entire repertoire of sense is fixed once for all. Both of these according to Paul Ziff distort the actual situation in natural language. Hillary Putnam also makes such idealizations and points to the intension of terms. The terms like ‘creature with a heart’ and ‘creature with a kidney’ point to same extension as every creature with a heart possesses a kidney. But the two terms differ in meaning. Supposing that there is a sense of meaning in which meaning is equivalent to extension, there must be another sense of meaning in which the meaning of a term is not its extension but something else. This something may be the concept associated with the term. H. Putnam calls this the “intension” of the term. The concept of a creature with a heart is
clearly different from the concept of a creature with the kidney. The two terms thus have different intension and here meaning is equivalent to intention.

This exposition of the notions of ‘intension’ and ‘extension’, according to Putnam, is not at all satisfactory. He holds that there is no evidence for the fact that ‘extension’ is a sense of the word ‘meaning’. “The canonical explanation of the notions ‘intension’ and ‘extension’ is very much like ‘in one sense “meaning” means extension and in the other sense “meaning” means meaning. The fact is that while the notion of ‘extension’ is made quit precise, relative to the fundamental logical notion of truth, the notion of intension is made no more precise than the vague notion concept”. Putnam points out that the extension/intension explanation of meaning is unclear. Most of the traditional philosophers thought of concept as something mental. Thus the doctrine that the meaning of a term is a concept carried the implication that meanings are mental entities. Frege and more recently Carnap and his fellow positivists rebelled against this ‘psychologism’ as they termed it feeling that meanings are public property that the same meaning can be grasped by more than one person and by persons at different times. For them concepts are identical with abstract entities rather than mental entities. However ‘grasping’ these entities is still an individual psychological act.

The example of the two terms ‘creature with a kidney’ and ‘creature with a heart’ shows that two terms can have the same extension and yet differ in intension. But it is taken to be obvious that the reverse is impossible: that two terms can not differ in extension and have the same intention. Interestingly no argument has been offered for this impossibility. Probably it reflects the tradition of the ancient and
medieval philosophers who assured that the concept corresponding to a term was just a conjunction of predication. Therefore, the concept corresponding to a term must provide necessary and sufficient condition for falling into the extension of the term. According to Carnap the theory corresponding to a term provided, in ideal case where the term had 'complete meaning', a criterion for belonging to the extension. Thus, on this point, the positivists are perfectly happy to retain the traditional view. So, for Putnam, the theory of meaning stands on two unchallenged assumption: “(i) That knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain psychological state.

(ii) That the meaning of a term in the sense of intension determines its extension in the sense that sameness of intension entails sameness of extension.”

H. Putnam holds that these assumptions are not jointly satisfied by any notion of meaning. The traditional concept of meaning is a concept which, according to him, rests on a false theory. Putnam shows that the extension of a term is not fixed by a concept that the individual speaker has in his head. This is true because extension is in general determined socially and because extension is, in part, determined indexically. Extension of terms depends upon the actual nature of the particular things, which is in general not fully known to the speaker. Traditional semantic theory leaves out only two contributions to the determination of extension – the contribution of society and the contribution of the real world.

Meaning is not identical either with extension or with the intension if intension is something like an individual speaker’s concept. Now regarding what to do, we have two plausible routes. One is to retain the identification of meaning with concept. In this point, it is admitted that water has the same meaning on earth and
twin earth, but a different extension. This is a correct route to take for an absolutely
indexical word like I, but seems incorrect for the word like "meaning". Therefore it is
preferable to follow a different route and identify meaning with an ordered pair of
entities, one of which is the extension. Doing this makes it trivially true that meaning
determines extension, but totally abandons the idea that if there is a difference in the
meaning, then there must be some difference in our concepts. All this means that the
tokens of the word he utters have a different extension that the tokens of the word I
utter; but this difference in extension is not a reflection of any difference in our
individual linguistic competence considered in isolation.

If we stand with Putnam to regard this as correct, the traditional
problem of meaning splits in to two problems:

(i) The first problem is to account for the determination of extension. Extension in
most of the cases is determined socially and therefore, it is a problem of
sociolinguistics. Solving it would involve spelling out in detail exactly how the
division of linguistic labor works. Kripke's causal theory of reference for proper
names which is extended by Putnam to natural kind words and physical magnitude
terms falls into this province.

(ii) The other problem is to describe individual competence. Extension may be
determined socially in many cases. But the standard extension is not assigned to a
word no matter how it is used. The utterer has to have some particular ideas and skills
in connection with the word in order to play his part in the linguistic division of labor.
Once the idea that individual competence has to be so strong as to actually determine
the extension is given up, the same may be studied in a fresh frame of mind. The
study of the first problem belongs to sociolinguistics and the second is a topic in psycholinguistics.

The study of meaning is known as semantics. The semanticists emphasize on the belief that 'meaning', whether in the form of a noun or a verb have many distinguishable meanings. Ogden and Richards in their classic treaty entitled “The Meaning of Meaning” (1923) strongly supported this position. John Layors has stated the following sentences to show the different meanings of the term meaning (or to mean) :-

1. What is the meaning of 'sesquipedalian'?
2. I did not mean to heart you?
3. He never says what he means.
4. She rarely means what she says.
5. Life without faith has no meaning.
6. What do you mean by the word 'concept'?
7. He means well, but he’s rather clumsy.
8. Fame and riches mean nothing to the true scholar.
9. Dark clouds mean rain.
10. It was john I meant not Harry.

The basic aim of stating these statements is to expose the distinguishable meanings of the noun 'meaning' and of the verb 'to mean'. It is not that the different meanings are unrelated but how they are related is a matter of dispute. In some cases the distinction can be shown by using substitute words in the same context. If the meaning of a sentence does not changes even after using
substitute word for ‘meaning’ or ‘to mean’, then the distinction between two sentences occurring the term becomes clear thereby expressing the difference in meaning in using the same term. The word ‘intend’ can be substituted for ‘mean’ in the sentence. “I did not mean to hurt you” without any change in the meaning of the sentence; but the same substitution can not be applied in the sentence “what is the meaning of ‘sesquipedalian’ without any change in the total meaning. In the sentence (3) above ‘indicate may be the substitute for mean. The notion of intention seems to be relevant to the understanding of the sentences (4), (6), (7) and (10) above where each use of the verb ‘mean’ appears to be somewhat different from the others, and substitution of ‘intend’ for mean will effect some change in the meaning of the sentence. In the context of (5) above ‘significance’ or ‘value’ is equivalent to ‘meaning’. The sense in which ‘meaning’ is used in (5) above is close to the sense of ‘mean’ in the sentence (8) above. The sentence (5) is roughly equivalent to “Life without faith means nothing” and the sentence (8) to “Fame and riches have no meaning for the true scholar”. Thus this list of sentences involving ‘mean’ or ‘meaning’ shows that the term ‘meaning’ or ‘mean’ has different meanings.

In the above list the third sentence, i.e., “He never says what he means” and the fourth, i.e., “she rarely means what she says, “express that what is said is not meant. Both presuppose that there is possibility of saying one thing and meaning another. But, though each of them presupposes the same possibility, the notion of meaning in each case is different. This difference does not express that the notion of meaning in sentence (3) is unrelated to that in (4). The same case may also be applicable in other sentences. There are similarities and difference among the
notions of meaning involved in various utterances. These similarities and differences are subject to variations with circumstances of utterance.

Regarding the meanings of ‘meaning’ John Hospers states, “whenever A is a sign of B, we say that A means B; but since A can be a sign of B in a number of different ways, A can mean B in a number of different ways.”15 By this he holds that the word meaning is not such that it signifies uniquely only one thing; nor that it is related only in one relation always to the signified. The term ‘meaning’ has a lot of meanings used for different purposes in different contexts. There are some important ways in which the word meaning is used as pointed out by John Hospers.

1. The word ‘meaning’ is used in the sense of indication. The ringing of bell in the railway station indicates that the train is coming. A twister in the sky means (indicates) that a tornado is coming. In such cases the word ‘mean’ or ‘meaning’ is used for indication.

2. Meaning is also used for cause. When we ask the question “what is the meaning of this crack in the wall?” We generally search the cause “What does India’s defeat mean?”. Here also the word mean starts for cause. The expression is what the cause of India’s defeat is.

3. Dark clouds mean rain. Denial of American guideline means war for Iraque. In these sentences ‘mean’ is used to mean effect. The above examples state that meaning of dark cloud is rain: rain is the consequence followed from cloud. In the same way war is the consequence, for Iraque, of the denial of America’s guideline. This points that ‘mean’ stands for effect is also admitted by John Layors as has been stated already.
4. The word 'meaning' is also used for intention. The sentence stated by Layors, "I did not intend to send you "without any change in the meaning of the sentence. Hovers also stated clearly when he says, "I meant to wash the dishes" means the same as "I intended to wash the dishes." The word 'meaning' may thus have the meaning 'intention'.

5. The verb 'to mean' also means 'to explain'. The sentences "what do you mean by the word concept?" given by John Layors and "what does it mean?" given by Hovers express that 'meaning' also means explanation. Explanations are put forward to the question "why?" Explanation does not always mean causal explanation. Some explanations are causal in nature sometimes explanations are given for meaning also. As answer to the question raised by Layors and Hovers we have to give explanation. To the question "what do you mean by the word 'concept', we have to explain the word concept. Again to the question "What does it mean", also we have to explain the object signified by 'it'.

6. We have already stated intention as one of the meanings of 'meaning'. Intention is the purpose related with animate objects like man. But purpose may also be attributed to inanimate things just like "the purpose of knife", 'the purpose of hammer' etc. This purpose also constitutes the meaning of a 'paper weight', the meaning of knife etc. We express the purpose of them and nothing else. Therefore, 'meaning may mean purpose also.

Meaning is also used as synonymous with implication. Spending rupees five out of ten means that rupees five has been left. This sentence can be properly expressed as spending five rupees out of ten implies that five rupees has been
left. In other words the first statement implies (or means) the second. The meaning of the statutory warning 'smoking is injurious to health' is the same as its implication that smoking should be avoided. Thus we see that in many cases 'to mean' is synonymous with 'to imply'.

Meaning, according to Layors and Hospers, also means significance. The word 'significance' stands for something which is important. Importance is of course a very vague term when speak 'meaning of life', we mean significance of life. A research scholar should do meaningful work means that the work should be significant.

W.P. Alston states that the problem of meaning is a vital problem of philosophical analysis and the word 'mean' has various uses. In each use the word gets different meaning. Like Layors and Hopers, Alston also gives some sentences as example to show the various meaning of the word 'meaning' or 'mean' as follows.16

1. That is no mean accomplishment.
2. He was so mean to me.
3. I mean to help him if I can.
4. The passage of this bill will mean the end of second class citizenship for vast of our population.
5. Once again life has meaning for me.
6. What is the meaning of this?
7. He just lost his job, that means he will have to start writing application all over again.
8. Keep of the grass. This means you.
9. Lucky Strike means fine tobacco.
According to Alston, the word mean or meaning used in the above sentences means insignificant in sentence (1), Cruel in (2), Intend in (3), result or effect in (4), significance in (5), explanation in (6) and implies in (7). The sentence (8) and (9) are of particular type. In (8) ‘This’ does not refer to the sentence “Keep of the grass”, nor that the meaning of the sentence is stated. In this use ‘mean’ means something like ‘refer’. In the sentence (9) ‘Fine tobacco’ is not placed as the literal meaning of ‘Lucky strike’, rather ‘means’ gives an indication here. In both the sentences whatever is stated is not the meaning; the antecedent either refer to or indicates the consequent.

From the above discussion, it has been clear that philosophers have been trying to explore the various meanings of the term meaning. It must be admitted that ‘meaning’ is used to mean various things and ideas in different senses. The different meanings we get from the above discussion about meaning are indication, implication significance, intention, explanation, effect, cause, purpose, refer, cruel, etc. Moreover, it should also be admitted that there may be a lot of other meanings of the term ‘meaning’ and they might be primary in the days to come. The history of language and its development makes us aware to be open minded in this respect.

David E. Cooper expresses that there are various senses of the word ‘meaning’.17 “There are cases where meaning is apparently ascribed to linguistic expressions, but where this is an illusion. Suppose a headmaster called Smith sees the words ‘smith is a fool’ written on the blackboard. He asks his class ‘what is the meaning of these works?’ Assuming that he is not ignorant of the English language, his question concerns not what the words mean, but what the action of writing them means (i.e. what its purpose was, or what its explanation is)”.18 Here in this contexts
meaning stands for purpose or action. It is not the words but the action or purpose which has meaning.

David Cooper also takes the help of a slogan in order to express that meaning means prediction also. 'Beanz meanz Heinz' is a slogan where meaning consists in reference to prediction. The word bean does not bear any meaning related to Messrs Heinz & Co. What is claimed in the slogan is that if we see a tin with 'Heinz' written on it, we can predict that the contexts will be good beans. Here 'mean' means something like prediction.

H.P. Grice holds that it is a mistake to confuse meaning with reference. But this is a misleading way of putting it; for there is a perfectly good sense of 'mean' in which it can be replaced by 'refer'. At same time it must be admitted that there is another good sense of 'mean' which is distinct from that of 'reference'. This sense is intention. Besides intention reference and connotation, the word 'mean' means different things in different contexts that leads to accept plurality of 'meaning'. Moreover, we should be liberal to accept that in course of evolution of language the term 'mean' may acquire some new meanings not associated till now.

I.5. Theories of Meaning:

That words have meaning is not enough, it also has to be admitted that some of the words refer to things around us and some others can be used to describe
what there is. If language refers to none but the other expression, it would not be able to serve the purpose of communication about the world. Therefore, to understand language it is just as necessary to understand reference and predication as it is to understand meaning. The philosophers are interested in references for various reasons. In referring, the words are directly related to the world and any thesis about reference, also becomes the foundation of philosophical schools like ‘logical atomism’ which was propounded by Bertrand Russell.

The referential theory of meaning owes its origin to J.S. Mill. Russell says that all or most of all words are names for which this theory is also known as the naming theory. He regards simple and complex expressions as names. But by name he does not understand proper names alone. According to J.S. Mill, if an expression is to be a name it is necessary to be capable of being used either as the subject or as the predicate of a subject–predicate form of sentence. They are called names as they denote some actual existent entity in the world. According to this referential theory, there is one to one correspondence between language and reality. As the bearers of names constitute the only meaning of names, so the meaning of every linguistic symbols is the object denoted by it. The metaphysics of logical atomism propounded by Russell and early Wittgenstein is the origin of this type of referential theory. Russell says, “I have maintained as a principle which still seems to me completely valid, to the effect that, if we can understand, what a sentence means it must be composed entirely of words denoting things with which we are acquainted, or definable in terms of such words”.

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Analysis is possible with regard to what is complex. It always depends in the last analysis, upon direct acquaintance with the objects which are meanings of certain symbols. In fact, the ultimate stage of any empirical analysis consists of some acquaintance data as products of analysis. The point is such that the meanings of complex symbols are the names of certain objects of acquaintance for which this theory is known as the naming theory of meaning. The meaning of a symbol is constituted on ultimate analysis by its reference which is a simple datum of acquaintance.

Thus Russell’s philosophy of language takes the form of a purely referential theory of meaning in its extreme form. Language, on ultimate analysis, consists only of names denoting particulars which are the objects of acquaintance alone. Linguistic symbols are of only one single variety, which are names of particulars and language in its essential nature need not have a structure. Such language as has been suitably described by Alice Ambrose as, “such a language to use it would merely be to label what is known without the label. And the label would not serve for future reference, since that evanescent particulars can be named but once”.21

Wittgenstein locates meaning in the same locus with language just like logic and logical form. Comprehending language is to comprehend meaning. The syntax of language thus goes collateral with its semantics which studies meaning. The syntax of language thus goes collateral with its semantics which studies meaning. Meaning as the expression of thought in relation to the world can be called the representational concept of meaning. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus has very eminently
made the concept of representation the logical basis of understanding of language and meaning.

Frege’s sense and Wittgenstein’s representations are significant concepts of logical semantics. As a result of representational semantics, meaning becomes a matter of logical representation of the world and a line of representation between language, thought and world has been proposed. The representational semantics of Frege involves the problem of relating sense with language. Frege could not solve the problem as to how sense, being a real entity in the ontological sense, can be expressed in the linguistic medium which is contingent in the world. The linguistic medium being primarily a medium of expression of sense or thought, it could be the case that thought remains independent of language and goes completely unexpressed. According to Frege, there is no way sense or thought could be made language dependent, so long as language, in the ordinary sense is highly ambiguous and so unfit for being an effective medium of sense. The language which is contingent in this sense can not express ‘sense’ which is necessary.

In Tractatus Wittgenstein advocates stronger role of language in representational framework. It is language and language alone which plays the role of cementing the gap between language and thought. In Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, Wittgenstein holds that thought and language are in the same logical space and both possess identical logical structure for which thought is completely reflected in language. The logical form of language is the same as the logical form of thought. On this basis Wittgenstein argued that sense is fully language dependent and therefore, there is no problem of thought or sense being unrepresented. Thus language
can transparently express thought. This view leads Wittgenstein to uphold autonomy of language. The theory of autonomy of language establishes that language is already there before we could understand thought or sense. Sense, therefore, must be language dependent. In this sense, no semantic interpretation is possible in the absence of language. Language is fundamental, because it is the home of thought or sense.

Wittgenstein’s picture theory, in various versions, holds that the underlying logical structure of language and the world is same. This is certainly highly metaphysical thesis and it is the basis of the semantics and the syntax of the picture theory. The theory lays down the logical conditions of the linguistic symbols and their interrelations and thereby becomes a syntactic and semantic thesis. Moreover, the theory tells what the symbols mean and stand for, which is the key to the theory of meaning.

The semantic conditions in Wittgenstein, are on the surface since the grammatical structures of the propositions are so articulate that they take care of the sense and truth conditions as well. Thereby the semantic conditions are not rejected but are made logically secure. There is both a syntactic and semantic guarantee that sense is related to the world through the propositions which are the representations of the world. The language which represents the world is meaningful if and only if it has all the syntactic and semantic resources required. This includes a theory of logical grammar and also a theory of sense. In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein stresses centrally on language games where words are the instruments and they have meaning in their application by human being. In another way it may be said that words have meaning in their “use”. In order to determine meaning from this
point of view, Wittgenstein states, "what we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their every day use".22

The meaning of a word is determined by its use. In his own words, "For a large class of cases -though not for all in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus : the meaning of a word is its use in the language".23 The uses are different in different cases. Wittgenstein clearly states the different uses cannot be assimilated 'they are absolutely unlike'.24 These different uses give different meanings to the words or signs. The signs by themselves are not meaningful, it is only use which gives meaning to them. Among the three main aspects of language syntax, semantics and pragmatics, Wittgenstein seeks to explain the notion of meaning in terms of the pragmatics of language. It is the pragmatics that helps one to learn about the other two aspects also. Therefore, Wittgenstein takes pragmatics as the most fundamental aspect of language.

In Indian philosophy of language Mimamsakas hold that the word and meanings has eternal relation. Due to this eternal relation, a word can express one and only one meaning with which it is naturally connected. There is no third entity relating word and meaning. According to Jaimini and Sabara, the configuration (Ākriti) is the meaning. Ākriti is the real import of a word. Jaimini and Sabara lay down the means and criteria to determine the meaning of a word (Śabdārtha). In this connection they emphasizes on what the immediate useful purpose the word serves and what the intention of the speaker is. There may be several meanings of a particular word, but in a particular context, it will mean only one thing in the primary sense. Therefore, they give the criteria as "whatever sense is conveyed and is also
intended to be conveyed is the real signification of a word". Another criterion of determining artha-jñāna or knowledge of the meaning is the śāstrāsthas according to Jaimini. The śāstrāsthas are to be looked upon as the sole authority on the question of sabdārtha. Sabara in various places frequently refers to this source of Sabdārtha-jñāna. Regarding Śāstrasthas he holds that their tradition and acquaintance with the Vedas and Śāstras is unbroken and therefore, they are to be looked upon as an authority in matters regarding words and their meanings. In case these two criteria are not applicable to determine the meaning Sabara states another class of sources i.e., nigama, niruktā and vyākaraṇa. When some words appear to convey no sense or appear to be unintelligible by the method of intentional sense and śāstrasthas, then either of these three may lead towards the meaning of words. The meaning may be either primary (mukhya) or secondary (gauna). What is directly conveyed by a word is the primary meaning and what is indirectly implied is the secondary meaning. When the primary meaning does not suit the expression, it becomes necessary to look for secondary meaning which is also called laksāṇā. Laksāṇā is resorted to only as a means to avoid meaninglessness of a statement. The main concern of Mīmāṃsā is sentence and Jaimini defines sentence in the words, “So long as a single purpose is served by a number of words which on being separated are found to be wanting i.e., incapable of effecting their purpose, they form one sentence”. From this it is clear that a sentence is a group of words in which the words have expectancy for one another, they are uttered or placed together and they serve one purpose or yield one meaning. A group of words, according to Jaimini and Sabara, can be called sentence only when they satisfy the condition of sannidhi, ākāṅkṣā and aikārthya.
The relation between sentence and sentence meaning is eternal. According to Jaimini and Sabara, the meaning or a sentence is perceived from the meaning of its constituent words. It is natural or \textit{nitya} and hence always \textit{pramāṇa} as regards \textit{dharma}. The meaning of a sentence comes out of the several words (terms) which constitute the sentence. For there is nothing to prove that independently of the \textit{padārtha} (word meanings), the \textit{vākya} is endowed with some special power to convey its meaning. The phenomenon of the perception of \textit{vākyārtha} from \textit{vākya} can be explained on the basis of the \textit{padārthas} and therefore, there is no necessity of admitting a special power. The meaning of words causes the meaning of a sentence and this fact is proved by the method of agreement and difference (\textit{anvaya-vyatireka}). If the meanings of words are not perceived, from the words, the \textit{vākyārtha} cannot be understood.

In fact after knowing the meaning of words the meaning of sentence is automatically apprehended. The universals like white, black etc., which are qualities have the potentiality to provide the notion of substance possessing these qualities. Hence, an individual, in order to understand or make understand some entity makes use of the word denoting quality. The individual can convey without any difficulty whatever he wants to convey through the use of such words denoting quality. The meaning of a sentence is thus constituted by the notion of qualified objects.\textsuperscript{28} The meaning of a word is technically called \textit{padārtha}. The \textit{Mimamsakas} in order to establish that \textit{padārtha} gives the comprehension of a sentence takes the help of the method of agreement and difference which are known as '\textit{Tatsattve tatsatta}' and '\textit{Tadasattve tadasatta}' respectively. When one hears a word the knowledge of the meaning of the word arises. If this knowledge of the meaning of the word (\textit{padārtha})
exists, it can give the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence (vākyārtha). If the knowledge of a padartha is not remembered, knowledge of the meaning of sentence can not be arrived at. The implication is that the knowledge of the meaning of sentence is not completely separated from that of words. Word-meaning and sentence-meaning are not two different things completely separable from each other; rather have an interrelation.

Regarding the nature of words the Naiyāyikas stand against Mimāṁsā and hold that the words are non-eternal. A word is a particular kind of sound and sound according to Nyāya is a physical phenomenon. Sound is the attribute of akasa or ether which is an intangible and all pervading substance. Air is the medium of its transmission. Śabda or sound is a produced phenomenon which has origin and decay. It is produced out of the conjunction of two bodies or of the disjunction of the parts of one composite body and hence it is non-eternal. A words according to the Naiyāyikas has three types of meaning abhidha Paribhasa and lakṣaṇa. These three kinds of meaning follow from the relation of a word to the objects signified by that words. That a word is a group of letters arranged in a fixed order is simply the structural definition of word. The essential nature of a word lies in its meaning. Logically a word is a sound that bears certain meaning. A word may have different meanings corresponding the different ways in which it may be related to objects. The meaning signified by the internal potency of a word is called abhidhā or primary meaning. It is also called sakyārtha as the word itself has the potency to mean the particular object directly. The word-meaning relationship may be either sanketa or lakṣaṇa. Sanketa is the direct relation between a word and its meaning.
Whether a word means an individual (*vyakti*), or a particular form (*ākṛti*) or a universal (*jāti*) has been explained differently by the philosophers from various points of view. It is the primary meaning with which such questions are concerned. According to the *Sāṅkhya* philosophers a word denotes an individual (*vyakti*). *Vyakti* stands for composite material body with some specific properties. It is a substance possessing the perceptible qualities and limited dimension. *Vyakti* is manifested and therefore, open to sense perception. From this it follows that the principle of individuation is quantitatively determined matter and the individual must have a manifest body (*Mūrti*).\(^\text{31}\) It is evident from the usage of man kind, like “that cow stands” etc. in such cases whatever is meant is always the individual cow; for the universal ‘cowness’ cannot be used as this or that as the universal is one and eternal. In order to explain the reference to individual objects this view is held by them.

The *Naiyāyikas* hold that an individual is individual only in relation to a class or belonging to a class. Individuals bear the class character to which it belongs. In the sentence ‘that cow stands’, the individual cow is characterized by the generality of cowness. It is one of the important contribution of the *Nyāya* philosophy that for them the universal resides in the individual. They therefore, do not admit that a word denotes individual only. The words may refer to individuals on the basis of individuals’ association with the primary meaning.\(^\text{32}\) Individual without universal (*jāti*) can not be conceived. The form or *ākṛti* of a thing consists in the particular arrangement of its component parts and the constituent particles of those parts. The form of a thing is that which indicates the generality and its characteristics. Every thing has a peculiar form and by virtue of this form a thing is distinguished from other things. A cow is not a horse, for the form a cow is different from that of a horse.
Words denote objects only as they express their forms or configuration in space by which their nature is determined. Therefore, a word must primarily mean the form determining the individuality of an object. This view of the import of a word is also rejected by Nyāya. The Naiyāyikas hold that the form by itself is not sufficient to constitute the nature of a thing. The clay model of cow has the identical form with that of a cow, but it is not what is meant by cow. Thus only the form apart from its class essence cannot be taken as the meaning of a word according to the Naiyāikas. The Vedāntists put a third view that a word means the genus or the class character of an individual. The genus is the basis of similar cognitions with regard to different individuals. All the similar things can be comprehended on the basis of the genus. This similarity must be in the essential points. Words primarily mean such universal as distinguishing the particulars of experience. The primary meaning of a word is universal, but it also refers to individuals. The individual can be known together with the universal. Therefore, a word means all these three – the individual, the configuration and the universal. New Naiyāyikas hold that particular as qualified by universal constitutes the meaning of a word.
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