VII.1. Language is an Instrument:

Bertrand Russell is a mathematician as well as a metaphysician. The philosophy of language as treated by him has already been discussed in chapter III. According to him, there is a close relationship between language and reality, and language is the only means to arrive at reality. Philosophy has the long-running attempt to arrive at reality and Russell shows the means. Language is the means through which nature of the world can be described. But a consistent and precise description of the
world will be possible only when there is similarity in structure between language and the world so that language can picture the world. He thought that ordinary language could not fulfill this purpose since the language, which we use, is ambiguous and defective. To serve the purpose the language should be ideal and logically sound; it should be capable of picturing the world unit by unit. With this end in view Russell tried to develop an ideal system of language in his philosophy of logical atomism.

The aim of Russell was to develop a metaphysical system based upon logic. From the relation between language and reality Russell maintained that there is close relationship between logic and metaphysics. The structure of the world or reality can be understood from the structure of statements in logic. According to Russell, we must use language when we describe the nature of reality. Language is the only medium through which the nature of the reality can be described. Therefore, he maintained that in order to know the reality we must know the nature of our languages. Moreover, in order to describe reality through language, the language must be rich enough to do the job. Thus, the study and analysis of language is of paramount importance in the study of the nature of reality. Russell points out that in order to describe reality through language there must be correspondence between language and reality. In other words, there must be one to one correspondence between the units of reality. Russell in agreement with Wittgenstein maintains that language pictures reality. Hence, in order to perform the function of picturing the nature of reality, we should understand the nature of language. According to Russell, a language that can describe reality should be truth functional or existential in structure. He points out that the ordinary language that we commonly use is defective because it is ambiguous. Therefore, ordinary language cannot describe logically the nature of reality. In order to describe reality an ideal and perfect system of language is essential. He claims that only truth functional language will be able to
describe reality logically. In persuasion of Wittgenstein's thesis that language pictures reality, Russell proceeds to analyze language for determining the nature of reality.

According to Russell, the simplest unit of logical thinking is simple proposition. Compound propositions are made by combining more than one simple proposition. A simple proposition expresses a simple statement and the compound proposition is a combination of more than one simple statement so that the expression becomes complex and thus truth functional. Russell holds that an ideal language should be truth functional and analyzable in terms of simple statements. The simple proposition which Russell calls "atomic proposition", represents simple fact in nature. The simple fact represented by atomic proposition is called by Russell atomic facts. According to Russell and Wittgenstein (Tractatus) the world is made of facts and hence they are the ultimate constituents. Facts are always atomic and the nature of atomic facts can be understood by analyzing atomic propositions. Therefore, the study of the nature of atomic proposition is essential which can be used as instruments to know the nature of reality. Thus, the study of language becomes instrumental in Russell's philosophy of language.

Such a treatment of language, that language is an instrument, is found in the *Mīmāṁsā* system of Indian philosophy that has been elaborated in Chapter VI. The *Mīmāṁsā* treatment of philosophy of language has two aspects epistemological and metaphysical. When it admits *sabda* as a means of valid knowledge, it becomes epistemological and when it becomes concerned with the meaning of the questions like end of life, cause of universe etc.; it becomes metaphysical. The Indian philosophers view language from metaphysical attitude as an instrument. The *Mīmāṁsāsakas* introduce philosophy of language in order to understand *Vedic* injunctions. *Mīmāṁsā* is purely a
ritualistic system and comprehension of Vedic language is the sole aim of the Mimamsakas. They treat language as an instrument for scientific enquiry that engages itself into the meaning and potentiality of expressions. The Indian thinkers have developed the semantic study as a science of linguistic meaning. This includes the meaning of both empirically verifiable and non-verifiable words and sentences. As the Indian philosophers are concerned with the origin and the end of life, they extended linguistic analysis to metaphysics. In western philosophy, Bertrand Russell did almost the same thing. Russell used analysis of language to find out the real whereas the Mimamsakas used analysis to find out the proper way of life through rituals by comprehending the Vedas.

Language has to be treated as a synthetic whole in order to find out meaningful metaphysical expressions. Thus, meaning is externalized by the linguistic symbols, which implies that both synthetic and analytic attitudes characterize the semantic study of language. According to the Mimamsakas, grammar cannot explain the ritualistic aspect of the mantras. The mantras have the aim of final deliverance (dharma). Dharma cannot be attained by any other means than sabda. It cannot be attained by perception as perception operates only with regard to sense-object contact. The other means like inference, analogy, postulation and non-apprehension also face the same fate, as they are dependent on perception. Not all these, therefore, can lead to dharma for dharma cannot exist in relation to sense organ. It is only sabda that can be regarded as means of knowing dharma. In the form of injunction sabda provides the cognitive instrument of knowing dharma. The word mantra brings instrumentalism in the Mimamsa system. The Mimamsakas define mantra to be the instrument of offering.
The Russellian attempt to use language as a means towards reality gets strong support from the picture theory advocated by Wittgenstein in his "Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus". The theory brings out the logical structure of the world in and through the structure of language. The structure of the world is represented in the logical structure of language. Wittgenstein clearly stated that the world can not be mapped without language. Thus, language becomes the ground of the possibility of our knowledge of the world. The basic principle of picture theory is that language pictures the world. The underlying logical structure of language and the world is same as held by Wittgenstein. This is the basis of the semantics and the syntax of the picture theory. Wittgenstein lays down the logical conditions of the linguistic symbols and their interrelations. The important point is that the theory exposes the meaning of symbols or what the symbols stand for. Through the picture theory Wittgenstein made the semantic conditions rooted in the world. Wittgenstein does not admit any possibility of representing the world otherwise than through language. Thus language is used as an instrument to picture the world as well as reality.

In his later philosophy expressed in the "Philosophical Investigations", that language is an instrument, is better exposed when he advocated that language is a game. Language is nothing but a game where words are used as tools just like pieces of chess. Wittgenstein has treated language as vehicle of life. By language, he means not only the speech activities; it is much wider than speech activity. Language includes speech behaviour as well as non-speech behaviour. The later belongs to impure language game that has been emphasized much by Wittgenstein. Thus in his latter philosophy language is an instrument for playing games where as in the early period language is an instrument for picturing the world.
Like Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya also admits sabda as one of the pramāṇas in its epistemology. Nyāya epistemology consists of pramāṇa, pramātā, prameya and pramā where pramāṇa dominates over pramātā and prameya to achieve pramā. Within pramāṇas Nyāya admits pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference) sabda (testimony), and upamāna (comparison) as means of knowledge as a result of which we find different kinds of pramanas. As we are concerned here with the philosophy of language, sabda is the central matter of concern. Sabda is the knowledge of objects derived from words or sentences. But the words or sentences by themselves do not give rise to knowledge about objects, even mere perception of the words or sentences is not sufficient. It is only when the words are perceived and their meanings are understood that one can acquire knowledge from verbal statement. Hence, the possibility of valid knowledge depends on the understanding of the meaning of that statement. Thus, sabda as a source of valid knowledge consists in understanding the meaning of the statements of trustworthy persons and the problem of meaning arises as an epistemological issue. Nyāya philosophy of language develops as a part of sabda pramāṇa and enters into the field of meanings of words and sentences.

The Naiyāyikas maintain that words are non-eternal as they are produced and begin from the personal god. Language is created out of God’s will and this will is the efficiency of language. When god wills in the form of language endowed with sakti (efficiency), it takes the form of the mantras, the brāhmaṇas, vedāṅgas etc. In the linguistic plane of the Naiyāyikas, verbal cognition can not be caused by simply a word, it is the knowledge of the words that gives rise to verbal cognition. Thus the knowledge of words is instrumental cause, the recollection by means of denotation is an operation, verbal cognition is the result and the understanding of the knowledge of words and their relations constitute linguistic cognition. Nyāya philosophy of language
is supported by its logic. The categories of Nyāya are the objects (arthas) denoted by words.

The category (padārtha) means meaning of the words –padasya artha–padārtha. The categories of substance (dravya), quality(guna), action(karma), class(sāmānya), particularity(viṣeṣa), inherence(samavāya) thus become arthas. Moreover, the Nyāya categories like pramāṇa, prameya, sāṁśaya, prayojana, dṛṣṭanta, siddhānta, avayava etc. are also meanings of words since they are signified by means of efficient words. Thus, the Naiyāyikas through their logic epistemology and metaphysics deal with philosophy of language. It is based on the pre-suppositions of realistic metaphysics as reality according to them, can be known by means of linguistic analysis.

In the above, we have discussed the status of linguistic analysis in Russell and Wittgenstein in the 20th century as well as Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā in classical Indian philosophy. In all these, language has been used as means towards something. The difference among them lies in the ‘something’ towards which the analysis has been directed. It is the ultimate constituent of the universe that can be arrived at through the analysis of language according to Russell. The universe is composed of facts, facts are stated in proposition, simple propositions express simple fact, which is unanalysable, and it is the ultimate constituent of the world. To such a process of arriving at metaphysical entity, Russell tried to give a sound logical basis. Thus, his analysis of language is logical, epistemological and metaphysical. In Nyāya philosophy of language also we see these three dimensions. Here in Nyāya it is found that language consisting of non-eternal words is the medium through which knowledge becomes possible and the categories or padārthas are the objects of knowledge. The categories are real entities which are represented by the words just as simple facts are real
represented by simple proposition in the analysis of Bertrand Russell. Early Wittgenstein also held the same view with Russell through his picture theory. The *Mīmāṁsakas* hold that the words are eternal and have the aim of final deliverance or *dharma*. For them the words have ritualistic aspects. *Dharma* cannot be attained by any means other than the words. The difference between Russell and the *Mīmāṁsakas* lies in the fact that where as Russell aimed at metaphysical entity, the *Mīmāṁsakas* aimed at liberation or *mokṣa*, but both the systems agree on the point that language is cognitive instrument.

We may observe here that although all of the above use language as an instrument with some variation in styles and treatments; they differ among them selves in various respects. In the first it may be pointed out that what provoked towards the study of philosophy of language was not linguistic in case of Russell and early Wittgenstein; it was only *Mīmāṁsā* where the starting point was purely linguistic. The primary question for Russell was what the ultimate constituents of the universe are. The next question for Russell concerns with how to arrive at the ultimate constituents. Here in this context, Russell holds that it is only language through the analysis of which we can arrive at the ultimate constituents or what may be called ultimately real. Wittgenstein by his picture theory explains how language pictures reality and this becomes a strong support for Russell in his philosophy of language. But in case of *Mīmamsa* the first question is regarding the meaning of sentences which is the central problem of philosophy of language. As *Mīmāṁsā* is purely a *Vedic* system of philosophy, its concern is the meaning and comprehension of *vedic* sentences. The basic objective of Jaimini in formulating "*Mīmāṁsāsūtra*" was to present in systematic form the idea of *Dharma* as revealed by the scripts. For this purpose he had to interpret the texts available and to formulate the principles on the basis of which the language of the
scripts could be interpreted. As the *vedic* injunctions have to be obeyed, they must be understandable and the principles formulated for understanding the meanings of words and sentences constitute the basis of *Mīmāṃsā* philosophy of language. It is surprising to see that when philosophers were hankering after metaphysical reality and philosophy was almost identified with metaphysics, *Mīmāṃsā* had constructed a sound philosophy of language by laying down the rules for meaning comprehension.

Secondly, Russell-Wittgensteinian objective of the study of the analysis of language is basically different from that of *Mīmāṃsā* and *Nyaya*. Russell through his philosophy of language attempted to disclose the metaphysical reality that constitutes the world and tried to give a sound logical background to metaphysics. But the *Mīmāṃsa* had the objective of salvation which is possible, according to the *Vedas*, by performing the rites prescribed by the *Vedas*. In order to perform the rituals such as *jajna*, the meaning of the injunctions of the scripts has to be comprehended. Therefore, the question of determining meaning arises for the realization of the end of life, i.e. salvation. Whereas Russell did linguistic analysis for the basis, the ultimate unanalyzable constituents; *Mīmāṃsā* did the same for the ultimate end salvation. The former is concerned with the basis the ground while the later is with the end. Again, for the *Naiyāyikas* the analysis of language is purely logical and epistemological, not metaphysical at all.

**VII.2. Meaning—Russell and Sabara**

A word means what it refers to, is the principle of referential theory. Because of the natural economy and simplicity, the referential theory becomes popular.
This theory is also known as "Word-object Theory" of meaning. The theory has been defended and supported philosophically in the 20th century by Bertrand Russell in his "Philosophy of Logical Atomism", Rudolf Carnap in "The Logical syntax of Language", and Wittgenstein in his "Tractatus". The history of this theory can be traced back to Plato's 'Catylus' or Augustine's support in the confession, Gilbert Ryle has named it as, "The Fido-Fido theory of meaning", since for many it has seemed transparently clear that words function like names, e.g. 'Fido'. The word 'Fido' stands for, refers to or names the object, e.g. the dog itself and the meaning of the word is constituted by the fact that it names the animal, the object or the fact. The implication is that words are names of "things" even though "things" do not have to be concrete, observable thing like the dog, Fido. The supposition is that a word or expression has certain meaning if we can note that there is something to which, the word or expression refers.

In principles of mathematics, Russell holds "Words all have meaning in the sense that they are symbols that stand for something other than themselves". The referential theory gets different exposition in different philosophers, but the common thing is that for an expression to have meaning is to refer to something. This "something" is other than the statement itself. The referential theorists locate meaning in different areas of reference. The naïve version identifies meaning with the referent, the sophisticated version identifies meaning with the relationship between the expression and its referent; the significance is that the referential connection constitutes the meaning. The view that meaning is identified with the referent has to face the charge that the expressions having different meanings may have the same referent. Russell's classic example of "Sir Walter Scott" and "The Author of Waverley" makes the point clear. The meaning of the phrase "Sir Walter Scott" is the individual Scott himself. The
phrase is the name of the individual and the relation between the individual and the phrase is naming. But "The Author of Waverley" is not a name but qualifying expression. The relation between the meaning and the phrase here is not the same as that of Sir Walter Scott. The meanings of the two phrases therefore, are not same, but the referent is same since Sir Walter Scott is the author of Waverley. In fact, different statements carrying different meanings can express the same referent. Even its converse is also possible, i.e. same meaning but different referent. Each and every utterance of a term may refer to different referent, but may mean the same. The indexical terms like, "I" "you", "this", etc. point to different referents though bears the same meaning, whereas the individual X utters "I", it, refers to X, when the individual "Y" utters "I", it refers Y and so on. The meaning in all such statements of "I" is the speaker himself, though the referents differ.

Due to these difficulties, the referential theory takes the form that it is only referential connection, which constitutes the meaning. Even though Russell often talks as if the meaning of an utterance is what it stands for, we find Russell in "Analysis of Mind" as, "when we ask what constitutes meaning ...............we are asking not who is the individual meant, but what is the relation of the word to the individual which makes the one mean the other"\(^3\). By this statement Russell overcomes the difficulty arising out of two statements of different meaning but same referent; and one and the same statements having different referent but same meaning. In all such problematic situation it is generally seen that the type of relation between expression and referent is not same in all cases. The fundamental thing is that reference dose not necessitate concrete observable physical object to refer to. The expression at least refers to something; may be it is an observable physical object, or a quality or form or at least a relation. Expressions are used to refer to something in different varieties of contexts,
William P. Alston states “the function of making explicit what a sentence is about may be considered as the defining characteristics of referring”. This function is simply a form in which expressions become meaningful.

A word denotes configuration of an object and this configuration constitutes the meaning of words as Sabara thinks. Sabara is of the opinion that there is a necessary relation between a word and its meaning. According to him, a word always denotes configuration. This configuration is not identical with universal (jāti) or individual (vyakti); rather the basis. Without configuration, we can not have the idea of universal and individual. Whenever a word is uttered, the hearer immediately remembers the form or ākṛti as it is the meaning of the word. The meaning and a word is permanently related (nitya). It follows from this, that a word is invariably related to configuration which is actually perceived.

Sabara describes configuration (ākṛti) as a qualifier (viśeṣa). The knowledge of the qualified object (Viśiṣṭa) presupposes the knowledge of the qualifier (viśeṣa). The main function of qualifier is to distinguish the qualified object from the rest. When the term ‘cow’ is uttered, it means a particular form (ākṛti) which distinguishes it from other things and beings. Hence, ākṛti is the distinguishing mark of an object (itaraḥbhedaka). As the word is the cause of the awareness of the form of an object, it is called visiṣṭa and the ākṛti is the distinguishing factor.

The function of ākṛti is two fold —— first, it gives rise to the knowledge of individual (vyakti), and secondly, it can expose the inherent similarity among the individuals by way of integration them. That a particular cow is not different from other cows is known only through its ākṛti. Here ākṛti serves the function of a universal. Thus
Mīmāṃsakas try to show that ākṛti is the key factor which ultimately points to both individual (vyakti) and universal (jāti). The Naiyāyikas maintained that a word refers to universal, individual and configuration. But the Mīmāṃsakas and specially Sabara by considering ākṛti as the meaning of a word made use of the law of parsimony (lāghava). As the ākṛti of an object itself can refer to both individual and universal there is no strong reason behind accepting three as the meaning.

The relation between ākṛti and individual is a permanent one. Ākṛti and individual are the two relata for this relation. Here the knowledge of one of the relata, i.e. ākṛti gives rise to the knowledge of the other, i.e. vyakti. It is a self-evident fact that as soon as a word is uttered, an individual is understood through it. It is very difficult to differentiate whether this awareness of an individual arises from the word or from the ākṛti denoted by the word. The more important in this context is to be understood with the help of methods of agreement and difference (anvayavatireka). When the ākṛti of an object is known, the individual is also known simultaneously. Because, ākṛti serves as a differentiating element of a particular individual from others. On the other hand, when a word is uttered and corresponding ākṛti is not remembered due to some mental disposition, it cannot give rise to the knowledge of vyakti. From this Sabara intends to say that it is ākṛti alone, which constitutes the meaning of a word.

Ākṛti, according to Sabara is the meaning of a word. There is no scope for thinking of any opposition or subordinate relation between ākṛti and meaning. Ākṛti is the meaning itself. The words expressing objects having ākṛti remain in the visible world. But all words or sentences can not express things having ākṛti as meaning. The injunction like “Swargakāmo Yajeta” can not express the meaning in the form of ākṛti. These words do not bear any visible character. Injunctive sentence can not refer to ākṛti.
or vyakti. It implies that akṛti as meaning is not applicable to the non-visible dimension of reality. After considering this non-visible dimension of reality, the Mīmāṃsakas have accepted that the relation between a word and its meaning is apauruṣeya, i.e. not caused by any person. The imperceptible object cannot be described by name. Because the particular features are not known, as the object is imperceptible. Therefore, the relation between a word and its meaning is described as not caused (ascribed) by any person, i.e. apauruṣeya. Sabara has accepted the eternal character of a word due to the reference to its akṛti. If uttered, a word produces a particular akṛti without fail. Here the term ‘nitya’ (eternal) is to be taken as conveying the sense of permanence, consistency and continuity.

The Mīmāṃsakas have used the word ‘nitya’ in a completely different sense. For them nityatva of an object is capable of being perceive. Due to this perceptible character it can neither be taken as beginninglessly eternal (anādinity) nor unchangeably eternal (kutasthanitya). Nityatva, therefore, can not be taken in metaphysical sense, but in the sense of permanent and consistent which is perceptible. The nityatva does not refer to the temporality, but it refers to the consistency between a word and its meaning i.e. akṛti. This notion of nityatva leads the Mīmāṃsakas to accept that akṛti is denoted by a word. Akṛti has got unity (aikarupya) and without parts (Niravayavatva) which are the marks of Nityatva. According to kumarila, akṛti, which is denoted (vācyā) by a word, is nothing but jāti. For kumarila it is jāti alone through which vyakti is determined, jāti ascertaining vyakti is called akṛti. This sense points to niravayavatva and thereby proves nityatva of a śabda. According to the Mīmāṃsakas both vācyā and vācaka (signified and signifier) are taken to be nitya. Though each and every individual cow is different from each other, there are common features among all the cows through which a cow is differentiated from a ‘horse’ etc. These common
features described as ākṛti are perceptual and hence the position of Mīmāṃsakas become very strong here as the truth realized through perception cannot be challenged.

Now on the basis of above discussion, we may conclude that if the Russellian referential theory can be named as word-object theory; the theory of meaning propounded by Sabar may be called word-configuration theory. That word refers to external object which constitutes the meaning of the word is the principle of referential theory. The object referred to may not be external physical object as Russell himself declares. There are words in language that do not stand directly for physical objects. The class terms, the relation words etc. do not refer to any object external. Moreover, the analysis of Russell’s epistemology shows that the speaker in uttering a word does not directly refer to a physical object, because he knows the data supplied not the object itself. The data are of the objects but not the objects themselves. Hence, the speaker speaks of the data only. The same is the case with the hearer. When the hearer listens to or comes across the data, he remembers a particular form constituted by those data. This form is applied to the object to serve the purpose. Hence, the word-object theory of Russell is in fact the word-datum theory. As the datum is formal by nature, it is not wrong to call this theory the word-form theory. The Mīmāṃsaka Sabara is also of the view, though the configuration is not exactly the same as the forms of data. The meaning of a word is constituted by its reference to some form or other. Configuration stands for an object. It gives a picture of the object while in Russell the datum stands for the object itself. Knowledge of an object is produced by the datum. The datum is the object of perception according to Bertrand Russell. In fact, we perceive the datum each standing for one unique quality or content of the object all of which together give rise to the knowledge of a composite object. When we perceive “the table”, we in fact perceive its colour, shape, size etc. which are the data
constituting 'the table'. Russell holds that in perception we are immediately aware of the data not of the object. It shows that the immediate object of perceptual knowledge is the datum that qualifies the object. Whatever is perceived is the sense-datum not the object.

Sahara, the Mīmāṃsā philosopher holds that whatever is actually perceived is the form or configuration of the object. This form stands for or pictures the object. There is agreement between the two- Russell and Sahara, on the point that the objects of perception are extra-mental but not the external objects. Both are of the opinion that the meaning of a word is something other than the word itself. But the referential connection between the word and referent (meaning) as held by Russell is different from that of Sahara. For Russell the referent may be a physical object like Fido- the dog it names, or qualities, or concepts. How could Russell refer to physical objects jumping over the data which alone can be found in perception and through which alone objects can be known? On the one hand, Russell holds that physical objects can not be perceived, whatever is perceived is the data which constitute the object; and on the other hand he admits that physical objects are directly referred to by the words which constitute the meaning of the word. Here Russell could not be consistent except admitting 'proper name' of J.S. Mill. Sahara is strong enough in this point. Sahara does not admit referent to be physical object at any case nor does he classify referents into particular physical object, the qualities and the concepts as Russell does. A word refers only to the configuration, which is both particular and universal at the same time. The configuration is of the particular object containing the universal within itself to which class the particular object belongs. A particular exists only with reference to the class of which qualities it possesses. Hence, Russell's dualism of data and referent does not exist in Sahara.
VII.3. Russell and Abhihitānvayavāda:

The meaning of a word according to Russell, consists in the relation of reference as we have already discussed in chapter III of the thesis, which expresses that there is one-to-one correspondence between language and reality. A word means the object it refers to for which it is known as word-object theory. As the bearers of names constitute the only meaning of names, so the meaning of every linguistic symbol is the object denoted by it, "But before we tackle the question of the meaning of words, there is one important observation to be made as to what a word is". A word may be described as a class of closely similar noises or as a collection of letters arranged in a fixed way. But the definition of words can not be stated without mentioning the meaning, since meaning is a part of the definition of words. The important point here is that Russell holds that a word is not a single entity, but a class of entities. "What we call one word is not a single entity, but a class of entities; there are instances of the word 'dog' just as there are instances of dogs." The meaning of the words like ‘Socrates’ or ‘dog’ consists in some relation to an object or set of objects for which Russell’s view is known as word-object theory.

The Meaning of a proposition, according to the referential view of Russell, consists in the meaning of component words or phrases. A proposition is a form of words and it is a complex symbol. For example, ‘Socrates loves Plato’ is a complex symbol composed of- ‘Socrates’ ‘love’ and ‘Plato’. The meanings of these three words constitute the meaning of the proposition. It is clear from this that the meaning of a proposition depends upon the meaning of the separate words. This view of Russell resembles to the Nyāya view of abhihitānvayavāda. According to abhihitānvayavāda, the meaning of a sentence is the synthesis of the meanings of the
separate words which are the components of the sentence. When we go through a sentence, we have first an understanding of the separate meanings of the words one after another. Then by putting the meanings of all the words together we arrive at the meaning of the whole sentence. The theory of abhihitānvayavāda is advocated, besides Nyāya, by the Bhātta Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta also. But the Prabhakara Mīmāṃsakas hold the view that the meaning of a sentence is not merely the aggregate of the separate meanings of the constituent words. This view is known as a anvitābhidhānāvāda, according to which a sentence has a unitary meaning of its own and it can not be analysed in to the complex meaning of its words. Rather every sentence means an action expressed by the verb and all other words develop the function, which is the central meaning of the sentence.

Regarding the meaning of words, Russell’s view is known as word-object theory, since it holds that the meaning of a word consists in some relation to the object or set of objects. In the same tune the Naiyāyikas hold that the meaning of a word consists in its relation to the object which it signifies. A word may have different meanings according to the different ways in which it may be related to an object. Like Russell, the Naiyāyikas also place meaning as part of the definition of words while they hold that the essential nature of a word lies in its meaning. The Naiyāyikas distinguish between primary and secondary meaning. Where there is a direct relation between word and its meaning such that the knowledge of the word immediately leads to the knowledge of its relation to that meaning. The secondary meaning is the implied one where the primary meaning does not hold good with the context, but still the word is not meaningless. If the relation between the word and the meaning of the word is eternal, then it is called sakti. For example, the relation between the word jar and object called jar is direct and eternal relation called sakti. This sakti for the Naiyāyikas is due
to the will of God while for the Miṃśakas, it is a natural relation of a word to the object it signifies. This Miṃśā view is more akin to the Russelian referential theory.

VII.4. Prameya and Sensedatum:

Perception is the non-controversial means of knowledge among the philosophers. It is an epistemological process arising out of the sense-object contact. But mere sense-object contact is not perception, it is the first requisite of perception and then some other mental activity has to be operated so as to get perception. There is no dispute regarding the sense organs, but the ‘object’ has to be discussed in details. Sense-object contact gives rise to sensation, which in turn, after analysis, recognition etc. gives perception.

In classical Indian philosophy we find pramā as the valid knowledge, Pramāṇa the means, pramātā the subject and prameya the object of knowledge. Pramāṇa is the means and there are various pramāṇas in which pratyakṣa (perception) is fundamental. The knowing mind is called pramātā and the object is prameya. This prameya is the most problematic issue in epistemological study and bears possibility of varieties types of interpretations. The basic question with which epistemology is concerned is about the nature and status of prameya or object of knowledge. Pramā or valid knowledge implies some prameya to which the process of knowledge refers. The prameya or object of knowledge may be either existent or non-existent. Positive and negative, both facts may become objects of knowledge but knowledge takes different forms in the two cases. When the object of knowledge is existent, we get positive knowledge. Such knowledge does not depend on any object other than its own. The negative knowledge is of the non-existent object and conditioned by direct apprehension of similar object. It follows from this that the object of knowledge is as
necessary as the knowing subject. There cannot be any knowledge without an object - a thing or an attribute, a state or a process, a positive or negative fact known. In knowledge situation subject and object (pramātā and prameya) are co-relative factors. Although Nyāya distinguishes between pramātā and prameya, they are not separable in any act of knowledge.

Perception whether direct or indirect is a process of knowledge in which we know what is given to our senses and what is given to our senses is called sense-datum according to Russell. But the question arises here regarding what is actually given to the senses whether the object which is before us or the appearance of the object. Russell in his early philosophy held that it is the physical object, which is given to our senses. But physical objects are complex representation and therefore, in the later period Russell shifts his position from physical objects to sensedata. When we see an object, we see its colour, shape, size etc. and whatever we see as the object, e.g., in case of a tomato, are its red colour and round shape. Hence whatever we see is a red and round object; may be it is a real tomato or not. It may be made of wax also. What is given to our sense is the redness and the roundness which we can not doubt. In case of the object we may be illusioned, but what is given immediately to our sense is beyond doubt. This indubitable entity that we get in perception is the sense-datum and the possibility of illusion or error leads the philosophers to introduce sensedata in philosophy as objects of knowledge. The datum is that which at that moment of sensation indubitably exists, and that which is directly present to our consciousness in that particular and ultimate manner, and the datum present in sensation is called sensedata. It is distinguishable from the data present to memory or introspection, because sensedata, unlike other data, lead to conceive of and believe in the existence of certain material things.
Regarding the nature and status of sensedata the prime question is whether sense data are subjective or objective or neither. Russell in his early philosophy tends to identify sense data with physical objects, but in the later development he introduces the concept of neutral entities and considered sensedata as neutral, neither subjective nor objective. He distinguishes between sensedata and sensation. Sensedata are the things that are immediately known in sensation, the things like colour, sound etc. Sensation is the experience of being immediately aware of these things. For example, when we see a table we are directly acquainted with its appearance namely, the colour, shape, height etc. These are sensedata, not the table itself. Russell even says that sensedata are not directly properties of the object ‘table’. This distinction he gives up in his “The Analysis of Mind” when he advocates neutral monism. Then he holds that mind and matter both are composed of certain neutral entities. The entities by themselves are neither mental nor physical, with the reservation that images are purely mental. “If we admit as I think we should - that the patch of colour may be both physical and psychical, the reason for distinguishing the sensedata from the sensation disappears, and we may say that the patch of colour and our sensation in seeing it are identical”.

*Nyāya* together with its correlative system *Vaiśeṣika* maintains that the objects of knowledge (*prameyas*) can be basically divided in to two kinds, namely, being and non-being (*bhāva* and *abhāva*). Being stands for all positive realities and non-being for negative realities or absence of whatever is not. The negative category is as real as the positive. Non-existence is the seventh category as admitted by the *Nyāya*-Vaiśeṣika thinkers. It is as real and important as the other categories. The other categories or object of knowledge are substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*Karma*), the universal (*sāmānya*), particularity (*Viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*). Out
of these six *dravya*, *guna* and *karma* are existents as they participate in existence (*sattva*). The other three *sāmāny*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya* are not existent fact although they are positive realities. Therefore, we find two types of being existent and subsistent.

The category of non-existence together with the six positive constitute the seven categories (*padārthas*). All objects of the world have been brought under these seven. This classification made by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* is comparable to that of the modern realists in the west. Russell in his "The Analysis of Mind" and Alexander in his "Space, Time and Deity" recognize non-existence or negation as reality. Non-existent facts are, according to them, as real and objective as positive facts. They also agree with *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* that among the positive facts, some facts have existence in a particular time and space, while other have subsistence only in so far as these are free from limitation to one particular space and time. The universals and relations, according to Russell, are such subsistent realities. But the *Naiyāyikas* claim particularity also to be a subsistent fact. Also the relation of conjunction (*Samyoga*) has existence as an attribute of the substances related by it.

The universals are objects of knowledge as admitted by both *Nyāya* and Russell. *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* advocates the realistic view of the universals. The universals are eternal entities distinct from but inhere in many individuals. The universal (*sāmāny*ya) corresponds to a general term or class concept. The *Naiyāyikas* agree with the modern realists in holding that the universals are not existent but subsistent. The universals, according to the *Naiyāyikas*, are perceived through the perception of the particulars. But Russell does not agree with the *Naiyāyikas* that all universals pertaining to sensible objects are capable of being perceived by the senses. According to Russell, we can perceive only such universals as may be called "sensible qualities" e.g. whiteness, hardness etc.
Non existence is one of the most important prameyas introduced by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The question now arises regarding the knowledge of non-existence (abhāva). According to Vaiśeṣika school non-existence is known by inference while the Bhātta Mīmāṃsakas hold non perception as the means of knowing non-existence. According to Nyāya, non-existence is known by perception, it is an objective determination of some positive entity and can be perceived by the senses where the sense object contact is indirect. This view of Nyāya resembles to that of Alexander. According to Alexander, “Negation is not merely a subjective attitude of the mind. That is only an instance of negation, in the region of mental acts. Negation or negativity is a real character of things which means exclusion or rejection. Not-white is the character which excludes or is different from white.” ¹⁴ Thus this supports the Nyāya view that non-existence is perceived as a determination of some positive entity. For Russell negative facts are real but not sensible facts.¹⁵
References

2. Russell, Principles of Mathematics, P-47
3. Russell, The Analysis of Mind, P-191
4. W.Alston, Philosophy of Language, PP-15-16
5. G.N.Jha, (ed. and translated), Sabarabhiśya, 1.1.19.
8. Russell, Logic and Knowledge, P. 290
9. Tarkabhāṣā, P. 14; Tarkasamgraha, P. 64.
10. Russell, The Analysis of Mind, P. 143
12. Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, PP-200-222
13. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Ch. IX-X
14. Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, P. 200