CHAPTER VI

LANGUAGE AND MEANING: MIMAMSA

VI.1. Epistemology of Mīmāṃsā:

The philosophical system of Mīmāṃsā has its foundation in Mīmāṃsā sūtra compiled by Jaimini. The most famous commentary on this sūtra is written by Sabara which is known as Sabara-Bhāṣya. This bhasya of Sabara is the basis of the later Mīmāṃsā works¹. On this Sabara-Bhāṣya Prabhakara wrote another commentary Brihati on which Salikanath writes another commentary Rijuvimālā. Salikanath again writes a compendium on Prabhakara interpretation of Mīmāṃsā entitled
Prakaraṇapaṇcikā. Kumarila Bhatta wrote another commentary on Sabar-Bhāṣya in
three parts known as Ślokavārtikā, Tantravārtikā and Tuptikā. Mandana Misra, the
follower of Kumarila wrote Vidhiviveka, Mīmāṁsānukramani and a commentary on
Tantravārtikā. In the same line of thought Parthasarathi Misra, wrote Śāstradipikā,
Tantraratna and Nyayaratnamālā. All these writings of different philosophers from
different points of view contribute to the philosophical system of Mīmāṁsā which is
also known as Purvamīmāṁsā.

Mīmāṁsā as a Vedic system of Indian philosophy emphasizes much on
the proper understanding of Vedic language so that the rituals can be performed
properly. The Mīmāṁsā sutras deal mostly with the Principles of the interpretation of
the Vedic texts in connection with sacrifices. The Vedas are the works of God and
hence impersonal. The Vedas are eternal and self-existing. The Mīmāṁsakas uphold
the theory of self—validity (svataḥ-prāmāṇya) of knowledge with a view to establish
the validity of the Vedas. According to the theory of svataḥ-prāmāṇya, all knowledge
is valid by itself. It is not-validated by any other knowledge. The validity of
knowledge arises from those causes from which knowledge arises. The Māṁmāṁsakas
advocate svataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda both in respect of origin (utpatti) and ascertainment
(jñāpti) of knowledge. The validity of knowledge arises together with the knowledge
itself. The validity of knowledge and knowledge of that validity arise together with
the knowledge. Validity, therefore, is not due to any external condition and it does not
require any verification for it by anything else.

"Prakāśastu prakāśātmakatva hnaṇyamapekṣate............

Kincasvata eva yadupapādyate, na tatra parāpekṣā yukta.²
Valid knowledge has been defined by Kumarila Bhatta as firm or assured cognition of objects which does not stand in need of confirmation by other cognitions.

"tasmāddridham yadutpannam nāpi saṁvādamricchati
Jñāṇāntaren viśnānam tat pramāṇam pratiyatāṁ”

Kumarila and his followers use the term ‘pramāṇa’ for valid knowledge and prāmāṇya in the sense of validity. This definition of valid knowledge excludes doubt by the use of the term ‘ḍṛḍha’. The term means that there can be no uncertainty; whatever is valid knowledge is sure. According to Parthasarathi Misra, valid knowledge is the apprehension of an object not previously apprehended which is devoid of defects in its source and which is not contradicted by any other knowledge.

Karaṇadosabādhakajñānarahitamagrhihtagrahijñānam pramāṇamiti pramālaṅkaṇāṁ sucitam”.

Valid knowledge adds something to our present stock of information which is indicated by the fact of apprehension of previously non-apprehended object. It is free from doubt and therefore, true. Valid knowledge is not contradicted by any other knowledge.

According to Prabhakara, knowledge manifests itself and needs nothing else for its manifestation. Knowledge is therefore, regarded by the Prabhakaras as self luminous. (atah svayam prakāśa śīnviditi siddham)². Knowledge arises and vanishes and therefore, not eternal. Knowledge manifests itself and at the same time it manifests its subject and object. There involve three factors in every knowledge situation prāmātā (subject), prameya (object) and pramiti (cognition). These three factors are apprehended together; but while the object is apprehended as possessing a form, the other two subject (prāmātā) and cognition (pramiti) are apprehended without form. The Prabhakaras also use the term pramāṇa to stand for
both valid knowledge and means of valid knowledge. Both Kumarila and Prabhakara admit the intrinsic validity of knowledge.

Jaimini, the founder of *Mīmāṃsā* system admits three *pramāṇas* — perception (*pratyākṣa*) inference (*anumāna*) and testimony (*śabda*). Prabhakara adds two more *pramāṇas* — Comparison (*upamāna*) and implication (*arthāpatti*) and raises the numbers of *pramāṇas* into five. Kumarila admits all these five and adds another *pramāṇa* — non- apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) and thus we find six *pramāṇas* there in *Mīmāṃsā*.

Perception as an instrument of valid knowledge is accepted by almost all the philosophical systems both Vedic and non Vedic. Jaimini in the fourth *sūtra* of the first chapter of his *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* defines perception, *satsamprayoge purusasyendriānāmbudhijanma tat pratyakṣamanimittam vidyamānopalambhanāt*. Perception is the knowledge produced in the self by the right intercourse of sense organs with existing objects. It is produced by real objects existing at present and acting upon the sense organs. Kumarila Bhatta points out that the use of ‘*sam*’ in the word ‘*samprayoga*’ occurring in the above *sutra* indicates ‘right’ (samyak) and serves to preclude all faulty ‘*prayoga*’. Prayoga here, according to Kumarila means the function of the sense organs with reference to their objects. Thus this *sūtra* may be taken to mean the statement of the definition of perception. Kumarila Bhatta, on the basis of this *sūtra* defines perception as a knowledge which is he result of the right functioning of the sense organs with reference to their objects.

"*Samyagarthe ca sanīśabda , dusprayogamivāraṇāḥ*

*Prayoga indriyānāṃ ca vyāpārōrtheṣu kathyate"."
Perception has been defined by Salikanath Misra as the direct apprehension which cognizes the apprehended object (Meya), the self (Mātā) and the apprehension itself (Mitī). In *prakaranapancikā* he states *sākṣātpratitih pratyakṣāṁ meya-mātṛ-pramāṣu sa*. In every perception the idea of each of these enters as its constituent factors. According to this theory these, three factors are revealed in each act of perception. Salikanath is a follower of Prabhakara and hence in his explanation of perception the theory of triple perception of Prabhakara has been expressed. According to the Prabhakaras in a sentence like ‘ghatamaham janami’ (I know the jar), the three factors mātā, meya and miti are apprehended together and these three are known as triputi. The term ‘aham’ here refers to the mata, ‘ghata’ to the meya and ‘janami’ to the miti. In apprehending these three the meya is apprehended as having a form and the other two are apprehended without form. Thus the Prabhakaras advocate the tri-factorial theory where the miti is self revealed and at the same time reveals mātā and meya.

Kumarila and Prabhakara both recognize two stages of perception indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka). Indeterminate is the perception that arises immediately after the contact of a sense-organ with some object. *Nirvikalpaka* means devoid of determinations. The word ‘vikalpa’ means the property of discriminating like the universal etc. and when the vikalpa goes away then it is called *mirvikalpaka*. *Tatra vikalpo nāma bhedako dharmas ājatyadi ...... nirgato vikalpo yasminnirvikalpakaṁ*. According to Kumarila Bhatta, the cognition that appears first is a simple or mere perception (ālochana) called non-determinate pertaining to the object itself, pure and simple like the idea in the mind of the infant, dumb and the like (astihyālocaṇajñānam prathamam nirvikalpakam balamukadivi
Determinate perception, according to Kumarila, is the apprehension of the generic characters of an object as generic, and of its specific characters as specific. Prabhakara also regards determinate perception as the apprehension of the generic character and the specific characters of an object as generic and specific respectively. It apprehends the objects and its properties in a subject predicate relation. The object is apprehended as substance endued with particular qualities and belonging to a certain genus with particular activity and name. Perception completed thus in two stages gives knowledge of world composed of different objects.

Regarding inference Sabha holds that when a permanent relation between two things is known to exist, we can have the idea of one thing when the other is perceived. Anumānam jñātasambandhayaika desadārśanādeka – desāntare sannikṛste 'rthe buddhih. The meaning is that the cognition of the permanent relation between two things helps in the inferential cognition by affording to the agent the idea of the other member when one member is cognized. When the observer perceives a certain thing and remembers the permanent relation that it has been known to bear to another thing, the recalled idea of the relation presents to the mind the apprehension of the other member of the relation and the name given to this apprehension is inference (anumāna). (jñātah sambandhanīyamo yasya tasyaikadesāsya darśanadekadesāntare sannikṛste 'rthe yā buddhiḥ sānumānamityart hah) This inference has its basis in perception and on the basis of this Kumarila holds that when in a large number of cases two things are noticed to subsist together in a third thing in some independent relation, inference becomes
possible. The two things like smoke and fire co-exist in a third like kitchen etc. should be experienced in such a way that all cases of existence of the one should also be the case of existence of the other. When a permanent relation is perceived, the relata constitute one whole together. Then when one is perceived, the other can be inferred. When the smoke is seen in the hill, it is inferred that there is fire in the hill. The permanent relation may be a case of co-existence or identity or cause effect or otherwise, but must be a necessary relation.

Inference proceeds from perception, not from general proposition. It involves the memory of a permanent relation subsisting between two things in a third thing. This third one is remembered in the way that the co-existing things must have a place where they are found associated. Due to this memory the perception of the basis (e.g. hill) with the vyāpaka (e.g. smoke) brings to the mind that the same basis must contain the Vyāpya (e.g. fire). Kumarila says that inference gives the minor with the major, but not the major alone, i.e., it is about the fiery mountain not about fire. Thus inference gives new knowledge about the fiery mountain. Memory, according to Kumarila, is not a hindrance to the validity of inference as memory is not invalid. Regarding the number of propositions necessary for the explicit statement of inference Kumarila and Prabhakar holds that three premises are quite sufficient. The first three premises pratīṇā, hetu and udāharaṇa may serve well the purpose of inference. Like Kumarila, Prabhakara also admits the notion of permanent relation but he does not lay any stress on the third thing in which both the relata subsist.

Comparison (upamāna) is non-perceptual means of valid knowledge. Upamāna has been defined by Sabara as resemblance that brings about the knowledge of an object not in contact with the senses. Upamānamapi sādṛsyasannikṛṣte arthe
According to Kumarila Bhatta, *upamāna* is the knowledge of similarity subsisting in a remembered object (e.g. a cow) with the perceived object (e.g. a wild cow).

*Tasmādyat smaryate tatsyat sādṛṣyaṇa visēṣitāṁ*

*Prayemupamānasya sādṛṣyaṁ vā tadanvītam*\(^{14}\)

When one object is perceived to be like another object perceived in the past, it is known that the remembered object is like the presently perceived object. For example, on seeing a rat one perceives that it is like a mouse perceived in the past, and hence one gets the knowledge that the remembered mouse is like the perceived rat. This knowledge is obtained from comparison. The Prabhakaras define comparison as the knowledge of similarity as subsisting in an object not in contact with the sense organs brought about by the perception of similarity in some other object which is perceived by the senses. For example, a person who perceived a cow in a village in the past, perceives a wild cow in a forest, perceives its similarity with the cow and then knows the similarity of the remembered cow with the perceived wild cow. (*Sādṛṣyadarśanothāṃjñānaṁ sādṛṣyavisayamupamānaṁ*).\(^{15}\) Both Kumarila and Prabhakara regard similarity as an object of comparison and similarity of a remembered object with a perceived object as known by comparison (*upamāna*). The *upamāna* is neither perception as the relation is not a matter of perception, nor memory as the similarity to the present object is not in memory; nor is it an inference as no inferential process involves here. Thus comparison (*upamāna*) gets recognition as an independent means of knowledge.

The *Mīmāṃsakas* emphasizes much on testimony or *Śabda* or *Śāstra* as a means of knowledge. According to Sabara, *Śabda* is the means of knowledge
which is due to the knowledge of words (śāstraṁ śabdavijñānāda
sannikṛṣṭeṛthe vijñānam).\textsuperscript{16} This definition of śāstra or śabda is followed by Kumarila also. Salikanath, a follower of Prabhakara, defines śabda almost similarly to that of Sabara. According to him, verbal testimony is the knowledge of facts which lie beyond the range of perception and is due to the knowledge of words (śāstraṁ śabdavijñā
nāda
śannikṛṣṭa
ṛthavijñā
nām)\textsuperscript{17}. In all these definitions, the common thing is that śabdapramāṇa is the knowledge through sentences by understanding the meaning of words of which the sentence is made. The sentences may be of two types: the sentences uttered by men and the sentences uttered by God or the Vedic sentences. The sentence uttered by man becomes a valid means of knowledge only when it is not uttered by untrustworthy persons. The Vedic sentences are valid by themselves. ‘The meaning of the sentences involving a knowledge of the relations of words cannot be known by any other acknowledged means of proof and it is for this that we have to accept śabda as a separate means of proof.’\textsuperscript{18}

Śabda includes two types of authority the trustworthy person i.e., personal or pauruṣeya and Vedas i.e., impersonal or apauruṣeya. (Tacca dvividhām-pauruṣeyaṁ apauruṣeyaṁceti. Tatra pauruṣeyamāptavākyam apauruṣeyam ca vedavākyam)\textsuperscript{19}. The Mīmāṁsā is primarily interested in the impersonal authority of the Vedas. It is due to the fact that the Vedas give direction for performing sacrificial rites. The Mīmāṁsakas look upon the Vedas as the Book of Commandments and here lies the value of the Vedas. All the meaningful sentences of the Vedas are shown as directing performance of rituals. They either persuade people to perform or dissuade them from forbidden activity.
According to Prabhakara all sounds are in the form of letters, or they can be understood as combinations of letters. Of course the constituent letters of a word can not yield any meaning; they are regarded as elements of auditory perception which serve as means for understanding the meaning of a word. The letters have the potency by which the denotation of a word may be comprehended. The perception of each letter-sound vanishes at the moment it is uttered, but leaves behind an impression which combines with the impressions of the successively dying perceptions of letters. This brings about the whole word which contains the potency of bringing about the comprehension of a certain meaning. As the potency of the word originates from the separate potencies (śakti) of letters, both Kumarila and Prabhakara admit that the potency of letter is the direct cause of verbal cognition. The words, according to Mīmāṃsā are eternal not produced by any person or God and have their own denotative powers by which they refer to certain objects. In case of proper names only the convention is admitted to be the cause of denotation. According to Prabhakara only the Vedas can be called śabda pramāṇa; but for Kumarila the words of all trustworthy persons as well as the Vedas are śabda pramāṇa

Arthāpatti or postulation is a peculiar means of knowledge introduced by Mīmāṃsā philosophers. It is the necessary supposition of an unperceived fact, which alone can explain a phenomenon that demands explanation. When a given phenomenon is such that we cannot understand it without supposing some other facts, we have to postulate the other fact by way of explanation. Arthāpatti is the process of explaining an otherwise inexplicable phenomenon by the affirmation of the explaining fact. Sabara defines postulation as

arthāpattirapi ārṣṭaḥ śruto vāḥthonyathānopapadyateītyārthakalpanā

yathā jivati devadatte gṛhabhāvādārśanena bahirbhāvāvadṛṣṭasya kalpanā
Arthāpatti or postulation, for him, is the assumption of an unperceived among perceived facts without which inconsistency among perceived facts cannot be reconciled. For example, it is found that Devadatta who is alive is not in the house and this absence in the house leads to the presumption that Devadatta is somewhere outside the house. Regarding the views on postulation Kumarila and Prabhakara differ from each other. According to Prabhakara in a case where the well ascertained perception of a thing can not be explained without the assumption of another, thing and it is that presumption which constitutes postulation (arthāpatti). According to Kumarila and his followers, when something is otherwise unintelligible, the assumption of what will make it intelligible is arthāpatti and they claim it to be the only correct definition of postulation as stated by Sabara. Prabhakara holds that there is an element of doubt in postulation, while Kumarila denies it. Knowledge through arthāpatti is distinct from perception and inference, and hence arthāpatti gets independent recognition as means of valid knowledge. Kumarila admits two types of arthāpatti – drṣṭārthāpatti and srūtārthāpatti. Postulation from what is seen is drṣṭārthāpatti and postulation from what is heard is srūtārthāpatti. But Prabhakara does not recognize srūtārthāpatti. Drṣṭārthāpatti is used to explain something which is perceived such as fatness in a man who is fasting by day. Srūtārthāpatti is used to explain the meaning of words heard such as, “Industry is the key to success” where ‘key’ must be ‘means’ and not the real key of a lock. It is to be noted that arthāpatti is not the hypothesis as understood in Western logic. Arthāpatti is not a hypothetical supposition, but is taken to be the only possible explanation.

Kumarila Bhatta admits that non - perception or anupalabdhi is also a means of knowledge. Anupalabdhi is the immediate cognition of the non - existence of an object.²¹ Kumarila argues that non - existence of a thing cannot be perceived as
there is nothing to have contact with the senses. For example, there is no blackboard in the classroom. Here the non-existence of the blackboard is not perceptible, but can be known by anupalabdhi of the board in the room. It cannot be known through inference, for such an inference necessitates the knowledge of a universal relation between non-perception and non-existence. But this relation itself has to be proved by inference which will again depend on inference and involves infinite regress. The knowledge of the non-existence of the blackboard in the classroom cannot be explained by comparison or testimony as it is not due to any knowledge of similarity or of words and sentences. Therefore, anupalabdhi or non-perception has to be regarded as an independent means of knowledge. But all non-perception does not mean non-existence. An object in the dark cannot be perceived visually, nor can the objects like atoms, ether, virtue etc. be perceived; yet they are not non-existent. It is therefore, appropriate non-perception (Yogyanupalabdhi) which is the source of the knowledge of non-existence.

VI.2. Language as Instrument (Karana):

Jaimini through his Mimamsasutra gives foundation to the Mimamsa system of philosophy. His basic objective in writing the Mimamsasutra was to present a systematic form of the idea of Dharma as revealed by the scripts. For this purpose he had to interpret the texts available and to formulate the principles on the basis of which the language of the scripts could be interpreted. Sabara follows Jaimini in what Jaimini has done; but as a bhasya-kara he does not rest satisfied with simply explaining the sutra of Jaimini. Sabara goes a step further and fully discusses and illustrates not only those principles actually introduced by Jaimini, but also those that have been merely indicated by him.
The basic concern for Indian philosophers is the metaphysical questions like ‘what is the cause of the universe?’, ‘what is the end of life?’ etc. On the basis of such metaphysical attitude they look at language as an instrument for scientific enquiry which engages itself in to the study of meaning and potentiality of expressions. The Indian thinkers develop the semantic study as a science of linguistic meaning, which include the meaning of empirically verifiable words and sentences. However, they do not reject the meanings of such expressions, which are not verifiable in experience. As the aim of the Indian thinkers was not to confine their thought but to go beyond, they discussed about the meanings of non-verifiable statements. Linguistic analysis was extended to metaphysical field also. In order to find out meaningful metaphysical expressions language has to be treated as a synthetic whole. Hence, meaning or thought becomes externalized through the linguistic symbols. It implies that both analytic and synthetic attitudes characterize the semantic study of language.

The Grammatical study of language, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, fails to keep up the ritualistic aspect of the mantras of which the aim is final deliverance (dharma). For the Mīmāṃsakas dharma stands for the whole duty of man and performance of dharma is conducive to the welfare of the performer in this world during present life and even after death. It does not stand for merit brought out by good deeds, but for what should be done as indicated by the Vedic injunctions. Sabara states that Vedic injunction is the proof for Dharma. Yadyapi autpattiko nityah ābdaḥ samandhasca tathāpi na condona laksanāḥ dharanāḥ.23

In order to understand the meaning of the Vedic injunctions there must be certain processes followed. The meaning of the Vedic injunctions like swargakāmo
yajeta can be properly understood only through such processes. Therefore, the Mimāṃsakas have developed their own philosophy of language or process for the comprehension of the meaning of the sentences. The Mimāṃsakas, although started with the method or process of comprehending the meaning of the Vedic sentences, they were not confined to these only. This method of comprehension is also applicable to the laukika (secular) sentences like sveto dhāvati etc. Dharma cannot be attained by means of perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna) postulation (arthāpatti), analogy (upamāna) and non-apprehension (anupalabdhi). Because perception is operative only with regard to sense - object and inference, analogy, postulation, non-apprehension are dependent on perception. Therefore, all these are not means to dharma. It is not possible for dharma to exist in relation to sense organ. According to the Mimāṃsakas, śabda is only means of knowing dharma. Śabda (Vedic authority) is not conventional but intrinsic, injunctive and authoritative. Śabda in the form of injunction provides the cognitive instrument of knowing dharma.

From the interpretation of the word mantra, the concept of instrumentalism (Karanatā) comes out as the Mimāṃsakas define mantra to be instrument of offering. Offering is made in accordance with the Vedic texts. For Kumarila mantra text is as injunctive as the brahmaṇa text. As the mantras form an integral part of the Vedas, the mantras should signify something needful. They signify in two ways - by direct syntactic connection and indirect implication. Arthavāda texts do not contain any injunctive feature, yet this arthavāda text is as much authoritative and Vedic as the injunctive texts. Nāmadheya text, according to the instrumentalists is concerned with the exact significance of words. Its importance lies in conveying proper names of the sacrificial rites. According to Sabara, reliability of nāmadheya text is determined by two principles:-(a) in the cases where there is doubt, subsequent
commendatory texts settle the problem; (b) the natural capacity of things makes indefiniteness definite.

Regarding *Vedāṅgas*, *Mīmāṃsakas* account the auxiliary portion only that includes *śīkṣā*, *kalpaśūtra*, *vyākaraṇa*, *nirukta*, *chanda* and *yotis*. *Śīkṣā* is concerned with pronunciation, accents and *metre*. *Kalpaśūtra* is concerned with the explanation of the real import of the injunctive texts, which are deducible from rules. *Vyākaraṇa* provides the knowledge of correct form of words while *nirukta* helps to regulate the correct sense of using words. The *chanda* relates the correct differentiation of *mantras* that serves as the connection between *Vedas* and experience. *Yotis* provides the dates, asterisms those are based upon mathematical calculations in order to fix dates for sacrificial rites. The entire Vedic texts is thus made the instrument to achieve the ultimate goal - summum bonum of mankind. Therefore, we may call this philosophy as linguistic instrumentalism. (*Karanatāvāda*)

**VI.3. Meaning of Words and Sentences (Śabdārtha and Vākyārtha):**

Regarding the relation between *śabda* and *artha* Jaimini and Sabara clearly declares that the relation between them is eternal or *nitya* or *apauruṣeya*. Due to this eternal relation between word and meaning, a word can express one and only one meaning with which it is naturally connected. There is no third entity relating word and meaning, for the existence of such an entity can not be proved by any *pramāṇa*. According to *Mīmāṃsā*, *śabda* is an unquestionable *pramāṇa* since, it is not contaminated by *puruṣāṃpravesha*. The *laukika śabda* is found sometimes to be *apramāṇa* because it is so contaminated. If any of word or meaning or their relation is regarded as *pauruṣeya* i.e., by human, the *prāmāṇya* of the Veda would suffer. But when all these three are conceived to be *nitya* and therefore *apauruṣeya*, the validity
of the *sabda* or the Veda remains unchallenged. For *sabda* in itself is always *pramāṇa*. In *laukika vyavahāra* it sometimes becomes *apramāṇa* due to its being employed by an *apramāṇapurusa*. But in the case of the Veda there is no *puruṣasambandha* and hence there is no possibility of its being open to *aprāmāṇya* in any way.

According to Jamini and Sahara, configuration (*ākṛti*) is the meaning, the real import of a word. Jaimini and Sabara try to lay down the means and criteria which, according to them, help to determine the meaning of a word (*sabdārtha*). In this connection they emphasizes on what the immediate useful purpose the word serves and what the intention of the speaker is. There may be several meanings of a particular word, but in a particular context, it will mean only one thing in the primary sense. Therefore, they give the criteria as ‘whatever sense is conveyed and is also intended to be conveyed is the real signification of a word’.24 Sabara very well explains the view in the following words; *Yasya cāgama yad upajāyate sa tasyārtha iti gamyate.*25

Jaimini also considers the *śāstras* as another criterion of determining artha-jñāna or knowledge of the meaning. According to him the *śāstras* are to be looked upon as the sole authority on the question of *sabdārtha*.26 Sabara has stated this as, *yahśāstrāsthānāṁsa śabdārthāḥ*. Sabara in various places frequently refers to this source of *sabdārthajñāna*. Regarding *śāstras* he holds that their tradition and acquaintance with the Vedas and *śāstras* is unbroken and therefore, they are to be looked upon as an authority in matters regarding words and their meanings. In case these two criteria are not applicable to determine the meaning Sabara states another class of sources i.e. *nigama, nirukta* and *vyākaraṇa*. When some
words appear to convey no sense or appear to be unintelligible by the method of intentional sense and śāstras, then either of these three may lead towards the meaning of words.

Jaimini and Sabara extend their outlook even towards the borrowed words, i.e., the words which do not belong to the language of the Āryas. According to them, the meaning of such words can be determined by looking at their original sense, the sense which they are used to convey in the language from which they are borrowed. Sabara also states that when such a situation arises where one word may show different usages among different peoples, it is reasonable to hold the wider sense. For the wider sense may include the narrower. He emphasizes much on the subject that the meaning should be understood exactly as they are understood in ordinary language.

The meanings of words may be divided into primary (Mukhya) and secondary (Gauna). What is directly conveyed by a word is the primary meaning and what is indirectly implied is the secondary meaning. When the primary meaning does not suit the expression, it becomes necessary to look for secondary meaning, which is also called laksana. Laksana is resorted to only as a means to avoid meaninglessness of a statement. The words used in a statement have two types of power namely, śrut (or abhidhā) and laksana. Abhidhā is more conventional and direct for which it is stronger and preferable. Sabara in his commentary repeatedly stressed on this principle in slightly varying expressions. Whenever abhidhā is not possible, laksana comes to front. It is the power to indicate and therefore, it is a great weapon against meaninglessness. Mukhyaḥāva or abhidhāḥāva (lack of primary meaning) is the most important pre-requisite of laksana.
The *Mīmāṃsā* philosophy is known as *vākyasāstra* which expresses that the main concern of *Mīmāṃsā* is sentence. Jaimini defines sentence in the words, “So long as a single purpose is served by a number of words which on being separated are found to be wanting i.e., incapable of effecting their purpose, they form one sentence” (*Arthaikatvādekaṁ vākyam sākāṛṣa ca dvidhāga syāt*)\(^{28}\). From this, it is clear that a sentence is a group of word in which the words have expectancy for one another, they are uttered or placed together and they serve one purpose or yield one meaning. A group of words, according to Jaimini and Sabara, can be called sentence only when they satisfy the conditions of *saninidhi*, ākāṅkṣā, aikārthya.

*Sannidhi* is the immediacy of words used in a sentence. Sabara says that *sannidhi* may be said to be present as long as the two parts or words remain capable of expecting one another. For a group of words to form a *vākyā* the first requisite is *sannidhi* which means immediate sequence. But in spite of immediate sequence the group of words cannot form a *vākyā* if ākāṅkṣā or aikārthya lacks. This in other words means that *sannidhi* presuppose ākāṅkṣā and therefore, continues to operate as long as the akanksa can be realised. This ākāṅkṣā must be satisfied, as Sabara holds, by ekavaśyata or oneness of the sentence in meaning. Ākāṅkṣā is the expectancy among the words for one another. It also has the capacity of being satisfied by the other word or words, according to Jaimini. The rhetorians explicitly express this idea by laying down ākāṅkṣā and aikārthya as two requirements. They must not only have expectancy, but also must have compatibility for one another as well. Sabara explains when commenting upon M S,IV. 3. 11, ‘words even if separated from one another are connected with one another on account of their being possessed of some *arthaḥ* which are suitable for one another; but words that are not thus compatible with one another from the point of the view of their *artha*
cannot connect themselves with one another even if they are possessed of immediacy (ānantaryā). Sabara shows that akanksa is meant, not only for expectancy but also meaning capability (arthaśāmarthya) which is only another name for yogyatā. Mere akanksa is therefore nothing by itself; it must be aided by yogyatā. For the unity of sentence (ekavākyatā) akanksa is more important than samnidhi. It is the main basis of ekavakyata. Sabara goes a step further and holds that expectancy (sakanksatva) is the very form of ekavākyatā. While there is exception to the requisite of samnidhi and also to that of aikārthya, there can be no exception to this requisite of expectancy. This very well shows the importance of expectancy for the unity of sentences.

The oneness of meaning or ekārthatva is another condition of the unity of sentence or ekavākyatā. The term ekārthatva literally and apparently means the state of having one significance. A sentence involves more than one words of which each contains different meaning of its own. But when the words are used in a sentence they serve one single purpose. This act of serving one single purpose is called ekārtha. Thus for a group of words to constitute one vakya they all together must serve one purpose. Ekārthatva is the capacity to serve a single purpose. This idea is expressed by Sabara while commentsssing on Mīmāṃsāsūtra, II. 2.27. It is on the strength of the principle of samnidhi, ākānksā and aikārthya that arthavāda texts are proved as forming a syntactical unit together with the vidhi texts.

Thus from the various illustration and remarks made by Sabara, the Mīmāṃsā view of vakya may be summarised as follows :- (a) In order to form a vakya, the word must satisfy three conditions of samnidhi, ākānksā and aikārthya. (b) ākānksā is the most essential condition which cannot have any exception. (c)
Samnidhi without ākāṅkṣā can not bring about ekāvākyatā, (d) ākāṅkṣā means mutual expectancy and implies the idea of yogyatā or capacity of niralanksikarana. (e) ākāṅkṣā in the absence of yogyatā cannot bring about ekāvākyatā. (e) The condition of aikārthya has to be relaxed in some cases.

Words, meaning and the relation between word and meaning is not man made, but eternal. This view of Jaimini has been extended so as to include vākya and vākyārtha (sentence meaning) also. According to the Mimāṃsakas sentences are also not man made and the relation between sentence (vākya) and sentence – meaning (vākyārtha) is eternal (nitya). According to Jaimini and his commentator Sabara, the meaning of a sentence is perceived from the meaning of its constituent words. It is natural or nitya and hence always pramāṇa as regards dharma. The meaning of a sentence does not come out of nothing, but out of the several words (terms) which constitute the sentence. For there is nothing to prove that independently of the padartha (word meaning) the vakya is endowed with some special power to convey its meaning. The phenomenon of the perception of vākyārtha from vākya can be explained on the basis of the padartha and therefore, there is no necessity of admitting a special power.

The meaning of words causes the meaning of a sentence and this fact is proved by the method of agreement and difference (anvayavyatireka). If the meanings of words are not perceived from the words, the vākyārtha cannot be caught. But on other hand if whiteness is perceived, the idea of the qualifier of whiteness is found even in the absence of the word. This shows that the existence or non-existence of vākyārtha is co-eval with the existence or non-existence of the word – meanings. But such a relation does not exist between word and sentence meaning as it exists in
between word – meaning (sabdārtha) and sentence – meaning (vākyārtha). This shows that the word- meanings and nothing else is the means of the knowledge of sentence- meaning. Jaimini himself declares it in the sutra, \textit{toddhūtānāṃ kriyārthena samāmāyah arthasya tannimittatvā}.\textsuperscript{30} Hence there remains no scope for other ways of arthakalpanā. Sabara, in several places, has referred to the view that ‘words yield us the perception of their significations and from these in their turn it is that we arrive at the vākyārtha.’\textsuperscript{31} He also clearly declares that a \textit{padārtha} (word - meaning), if it is not connected with another \textit{padārtha}, cannot give rise to vākyārtha.\textsuperscript{32} This is obvious because in the absence of any such connection the word by itself will yield only its own signification and not the vākyārtha.

The view of Jaimini and Sabara regarding vākyārtha may thus be summerised as follows:

1. Sentence meaning is derived from word meaning.
2. Whatever is not conveyed by words cannot be regarded as meaning of sentence.
3. Only such sentence-meaning as we get from word-meaning can be accepted as \textit{pramāṇa}.
4. Unless there be any connection between words and words there can be no sentence-meaning.

The \textit{Mīmāṁsakas} have developed their philosophy of language in order to have proper understanding of the meaning of Vedic sentences. The important thing is that the \textit{Mīmāṁsakas} started philosophy of language for the comprehension of the meaning of Vedic sentences; but they were not confined to the Vedic sentences only. The method of comprehension of the meaning of sentences, they applied to the ordinary (\textit{Laukika}) language also. They started citing examples from the ordinary
sentence like ‘svetodhāvati’ etc. The Mīmāṁsakas are not seen to have an attempt to offer a definition of meaning; rather they are found to be busy in explaining the nature, content and constituents of meaning.

According to the Mīmāṁsakas the comprehension of the meaning of sentences is not an artificial one; although it does not follow from a word or collection of words. The sentence depends for its meaning on the constituent words. It is not possible for a sentence to express its meaning independently of the meaning of its constituents. Jaimini and his commentator hold that vākyārtha is perceived from padārthas only and that it is as such akṛtrima or nitya and hence always pramāṇa as regards dharma. The vākyārtha comes not out of nothing, but out of the several padas that constitute the vakya. There is nothing to prove that independently of the padārthas the vakya is endowed with some special power to convey its artha. Sabara holds that as the meaning of the words is taken to be the basis it is not necessary to accept sakti in the sentence. Moreover, the words cease their function after expressing their meaning. The meaning of a sentence can be apprehended through the apprehension of the meaning of words. In fact, after knowing the meaning of words the meaning of sentence is automatically apprehended. The universals like white, black etc. which are qualities have the potentiality to provide the notion of substance possessing these qualities. Hence, an individual, in order to understand or make understand some entity makes use of the word denoting quality. The individual can convey without any difficulty whatever he wants to convey, through the use of such words denoting quality. The meaning of a sentence is, thus constituted by the notion of qualified objects.
The meaning of a word is technically called padārtha. The Mīmāṃsakas in order to establish that padārtha gives the comprehension of a sentence takes the help of the method of agreement and difference which are known as ‘Tatsattve tatsattā’ and Tadasattve tadasattā’ respectively.\(^\text{35}\) When one hears a word the knowledge of the meaning of the word arises. If this knowledge of the meaning of word (padārtha) exists, it can give the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence (vākyārtha). This is the principle of Tatsattve tatsattā. Tadasattve tadasattā is the negative aspect that stands for the method of difference. If the knowledge of a padārtha is not remembered, knowledge of the meaning of sentence cannot be arrived at. The implication is that the knowledge of the meaning of sentence is not completely separated from that of words. Word-meaning and sentence-meaning are not two different things completely separable from each other; rather have an interrelation. If sometimes the meaning of word is not comprehended at the time of its utterance due to loss of memory; the meaning of sentence would also not be comprehended. It follows from this that the meaning of word and the meaning of sentence are intimately related. Just as the knowledge of quality gives rise to the object possessing that quality; so also the knowledge of meaning of words gives the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence.\(^\text{36}\) Kumarila stands for this view that padārtha is the cause of vākyārtha.\(^\text{37}\) The words of which meaning gives meaning to sentence must be component words of the sentence; not that from any group of words the meaning of sentence can be known.

Regarding the relation between padārthas the two schools of Mīmāṃsakas led by Kumarila Bhatta and Prabhakar differ from each other. According to the Bhāṭṭa school, separate meaning is attained by separate word. Then
through another knowledge, *visēṣanavīsesyabhāva*, relation is established among the *padārthas* which gives rise to the meaning of a sentence. It is to be admitted that among the *padārthas* which are apprehended one is qualifier. The refusal of this admission leads to the impossibility of sentence - meaning; because then the relation among *padārthas* would be impossible. Prabhakara gives different view such that a word can give meaning only when it is related with a verb (*kriyā*) or action. The meaning of two or more words cannot be known independently of one another. Due to this difference the view of Kumarila and Prabhakara are discussed here separately.

**VI.4. Ākṛtivada – Sabara:**

A word denotes configuration (ākṛti) of an object and this configuration constitutes the meaning of words as Sabara thinks. Sabara is of the opinion that there is a necessary relation between a word and its meaning. According to him a word always denotes configuration. This configuration is not identical with universal (*jāti*) or individual (*vyakti*); rather the basis. Without configuration, we cannot have the idea of universal and individual. Whenever a word is uttered, the hearer immediately remembers the form or ākṛti as it is the meaning of the word. The meaning and a word is permanently related (*Nitya*). *Gosabda uccarite sarvagavisu yugapatpratyayo bhavati. Ata ākṛtivacanoyāṁ. Na cākṛtyā śabdasya sambandhaḥ sakyate kartum. Nirdisyā hyakṛtim kariṁ sambadhiyāt........... Nitye tu sati gasābde vahukṛtā uccāritaḥ śruta pūrvaścānyāśu govyaiktisvanvayavyatirekbhāyāṁ ākṛtivacanam avagamayisyati tasmādapi nityāḥ.*

It follows from this that a word is invariably related to configuration which is actually perceived.
Sabara describes configuration (ākṛti) as a qualifier (visēsāna). The knowledge of the qualified object (visēṣṭa) presupposes the knowledge of qualifier (viṣēsāna). Nahyapratite viṣēsānān kecana pratyetumarhantiti.39 The main function of qualifier is to distinguish the qualified object from the rest. When the term 'cow' is uttered, it means a particular form (ākṛti) which distinguishes it from other things and beings. Hence ākṛti is the distinguishing mark of an object (itārabarheda). As the word is the cause of the awareness of the form of an object, it is called visīṣṭa and the ākṛti is the distinguishing factor.

The function of ākṛti is two-fold - first, it gives rise to the knowledge of individual (vyākṛti), and secondly, it can expose the inherent similarity among the individuals by way of integrating them. That a particular cow is not different from other cows is known only through its ākṛti. Here akṛti serves the function of a universal. Thus Mīmāṁsakas try to show that ākṛti is the key factor which ultimately points to both individual (vyākṛti) and universal (jāti). The Mīmāṁsakas and specially Sabara by considering ākṛti only as the meaning of a word made use of the law of parsimony (Lāghava). As the akṛti of an object itself can refer to both individual and universal, there is no strong reason behind accepting three (vyākṛti, jāti and ākṛti) as the meaning.

The relation between ākṛti and individual is a permanent one. Akṛti and individual are the two relata for this relation. Here the knowledge of one of the relata, i.e. akṛti gives rise to the knowledge of the other, i.e. vyākṛti. It is a self-evident fact that as soon as a word is uttered, an individual is understood through it. It is very difficult to differentiate whether this awareness of an individual arises from the word or from the ākṛti denoted by the word. The more important in this context is to be
understood with the help of methods of agreement and difference (anvayavyatireka). When the akṛti of an object is known the, the individual is also known simultaneously. For, akṛti serves as a differentiating element of a particular individual from others. On the other hand, when a word is uttered and corresponding akṛti is not remembered due to some mental disposition, it cannot give rise to the knowledge of vyakti. Antarenāpi śabdam vā ākṛtimavabudhyeta avabudhyetaivāsau vyaktim. Yastuccārīte'pi śabda mānasādapacārāt kadā- cidākṛtrim nopalabheta na jātucidasāvīnām vyaktimavagaccheta. ⁴⁰ From this Sabara intends to say that it is ākṛti alone, which constitutes the meaning of a word.

Ākṛti, according to Sabara is the meaning of a word. There is no scope for thinking of any opposition or subordinate relation between ākṛti and meaning. Ākṛti is the meaning itself. The words expressing objects having ākṛti remain in the visible word. But all words or sentences cannot express thing having ākṛti as meaning. The injunctions like “Swargakāmo yajeta” cannot express the meaning in the form of ākṛti. These words do not bear any visible character. Injunctive sentence cannot refer to ākṛti or to vyakti. It implies that ākṛti as meaning is not applicable to the non-visible dimension of reality. After considering this non-visible dimension of reality, the Mīmāṁsākās have accepted that the relation between a word and its meaning is apauruṣeya, i.e. not caused by any person. (Tasmāt apauruṣeyah śabdasya arthen sambandhah)⁴¹ The imperceptible objects cannot be described by name. Because the particular features are not known as the object is imperceptible. Therefore, the relation between a word and its meaning is described as not caused (ascribed) by any person, i.e. apauruṣeya. Sabara has accepted the eternal character of a word due to the reference to its ākṛti. If uttered, a word produces a particular ākṛti
without fail. Here the term ‘nitya’ (eternal) is to be taken as conveying the sense of permanence, consistency and continuity.

The Mīmāṃsakas have taken the word ‘nitya’ in a completely different sense. For them nityatva of an object is capable of being perceived. Due to this perceptible character it can neither be taken as beginninglessly eternal (anādīnitya) nor unchangeably eternal (kutasthanitya). Nityatva, therefore, cannot be taken in metaphysical sense; but in the sense of permanent and consistent, which is perceptible. The nityatva does not refer to the temporality, but it refers to the consistency between a word and its meaning, i.e., ākṛti. This notion of nityatva leads the Mīmāṃsakas to accept that ākṛti is denoted by a word. Ākṛti has got unity (aikarupya) and without parts (Niravayavatva) which are the marks of Nityatva (Niravayavo hi śabdah avayava bhedānavagamanniravayavatvaccā mahatvānupapatiḥ)\(^42\). According to Kumarila, ākṛti which is denoted (Vācyā) by a word is nothing but jāti. For Kumarila it is jāti alone through which vyakti is determined. Jāti ascertaining vyakti is called ākṛti. This sense points to niravyatva and thereby proves nityatva of a śabda. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, both vācyā and vācaka (signified and signifier) are taken to be nitya. Though each individual cow is different from other, there are common features among all the cows through which a cow is differentiated from a ‘horse’ etc. These common features described as ākṛti are perceptual and hence the position of Mīmāṃsakas become very strong here as the truth realised through perception cannot be challenged.
VI.5. Anvitābhidhānavāda - Prabhakara Mishra:

Prabhakara Mishra is a Mīmāṃsā philosopher who expresses his indebtedness to the Vedas by admitting only the Vedic sentences as testimony. He also calls śabdapramāṇa as śāstra pramāṇa. According to him, the non-Vedic sentences can not be considered as verbal testimony as they are created by some one (pauruṣeya). Vedic sentences are apauruṣeya i.e. not created by any agency. Hence Prabhakara admits only Vedic testimony (gurustvāha vaidikameva śābdamasti) as real testimony. Testimony is verbal cognition and is derived from the meaning of words, which compose sentences. The Prabhakaras agree with other Mīmāṃsakas in holding that words, meaning and their relation are natural and eternal. By this view, they maintain the eternality and authorlessness of the Veda. The Prabhakaras define verbal testimony as the knowledge of facts which lie beyond the range of perception and is due to the knowledge of words (śāstram śabdavijñānādyadasannikṛṣṭaḥ vijñānāṁ). Here the word ‘śāstra’ is applicable only to the Vedic injunctions, which only bear verbal testimony. Salikanath one of the famous followers of Prabhakara explains that the word ‘asannikṛṣṭa’ means that which is not known by any other source (asannikṛṣṭa iti kimidam? Pramāṇāntarenāpratita iti). A word consists of two or more letters. According to Prabhakara it is mere aggregate of letters and not a whole, though the letters must occur in a particular order.

Prabhakara holds that when a sentence is uttered, it generates awareness in the hearer. This awareness is necessarily generated by the utterance of words or sentences which is both universal and particular at the same time. It is a fact that the word ‘cow’ occurring in a sentence generates awareness not only of cowhood but also of some cow or other. The responsible factor for the origin of this awareness
includes many causal conditions, and the knowledge of the meaning of word is certainly one among them. But this knowledge of meaning cannot be of the form that the particular alone constitutes the meaning of the word. It must therefore, be admitted that the universal constitutes meaning. A word generates the understanding of both universal and the particular and hence the problem arises in the form, what should be the specific form of the knowledge of meaning. The solution appears in two forms—that the knowledge is of the form that meaning is constituted by universal and that the knowledge is of the form that it is constituted by the universal and the particular. Prabhakara following the law of parsimony accepts that knowledge of meaning is constituted by universal.

Prabhakara brings in the epistemological considerations to decide the question of the constitutive elements of meaning. He offers explanation of how the hearer becomes aware of the particular on the basis of his knowledge that the universal constitutes the meaning of the word. Here he depends on the principle of co-content which means that if a thing is a content of a cognition, then the cognition is about another content also. This principle of co-content can be justifiably shown to be involved in the case of hearer’s awareness of the particular. The knowledge of the hearer that ‘cow’ has cowhood for its meaning gives rise to his awareness not only about cowhood but also about some of its particular inhering in which it actually exists. Prabhakara’s thesis of co-contentness of universal and particular is really sound. He claims that the knowledge of meaning to the effect that the universal is constitutive of meaning can generate an awareness about both the universal and the particular.
Now, when we confine our attention to hearer’s knowledge resulting from a sentence containing the general word ‘cow’, it can be said that the recollection and the resultant relational awareness; if they are to be about the particular as qualified by cowhood; must be about either all cows or a specific cow. If they were about ‘all cows,’ the recollection involved could not be said to be based on perception, since perception of ‘all cows’ is not possible. But if they are about a specific cow then there is no guarantee about the correctness of this identification of the content of perception, recollection and hearer’s knowledge from the sentence. Such awareness gives justification for Prabhakara thesis that it is only universal that should be taken as related to the word through the meaning - relation. It thus becomes understandable the sufficient conditions for the awareness of universal as well as particular. The conditions sufficient for the awareness of universal, are considered sufficient for the awareness of the particulars only. According to Prabhakara, in a practical context in the hearer’s awareness what appears related to the action is indeed a particular; but this particular appears as an exemplifier of some universal. In fact the epistemic process involved herein presupposes an indeterminate awareness about the universal which influences the determinate mode in which the particular taken as qualified by the universal appears in the hearer’s awareness as a term that stands related to the action in question. Such an epistemic relationship establishes that the universal also figures as something related in some manner to the action.

Prabhakara holds that though meaning is constituted by the universal only words with such meaning can generate the antecedent mnemonic representation corresponding to a word and the final awareness corresponding to a sentence in both of which the particular also figures as a content. The prabhakaras thus hold that the words of which meaning is constituted by the universal alone are capable of
generating awareness about the particular also. They also point out that the knowledge
that the meaning of a word is constituted by the universal is sufficient for generating
mnemonic representation about the particular and also for the resulting relational
awareness corresponding to a sentence. In this connection they further point out that
though neither the particular nor the content involved in cases of transfer of meaning
(Lākṣaṇika content) constitutes the meaning of words, their figuring as contents can
be accounted for by a principle other than the one involving meaning relation. Thus
the principles resorted to are: (1) the principle of co-contents and (2) the principle of
transfer of meaning. In fact it is the primary use of a word to refer to the particular
undoubtedly though it is the universal and not the particular that constitutes meaning.
Knowledge of this meaning relation directly generates awareness about the particular
if all other necessary conditions are present. In respect of this awareness, Prabhakara
assigns the status of specifier to the particular but this should not be considered as
constituting meaning.

The Prabhakara school propounds a theory according to which words
convey their meanings which are related (anvita). This meaning is ultimately
traceable to the words (padas). Word-meanings (padārthas) are concept. They are
related (anvita) concepts as unrelated concepts are abstractions. It follows from this
that the Prabhakaras admit the existence of individual words and their isolated
meanings. For them word-meanings and their relations are qualified by another by
means of abhidhāsakti. The isolated meanings are recollected from words by
reviving function (smārikāsakti) by virtue of their intensity and recurrence. Later on
they are denoted by comprehensional function being related with verb. The
comprehensional function anubhāvikāsakti is based on akāṅkṣā, yogyata and āsatti;
and thus knowledge of the word - meaning falls within the scope of the abhidhāśakti of language.

The relation between word and meaning is a denotative relation, i.e., the relation of denoter and denoted (pratīyāyapratīyāyakabhāvaḥ)\textsuperscript{47}. The Mīmāṃsakas emphasizes much on the denotativeness of words as independent of human agency and belonging to the words by their very nature. This emphasis has been given in order to maintain the validity of sabda or śāstra. All words and their denotations are eternal everlasting independent of all conventions and agencies. It is directly cognized that there is a natural relationship between the word and its meaning. If one does not recognize it, when one hears the word for the first time, it only means that the accessories are absent. But that does not make the relationship non-existent. If the eye cannot see without light, it does not mean that the eye is incapable of seeing altogether.\textsuperscript{47} The accessory is the knowledge that such and such a word denotes such and such an object, and it is gained from experience.

According to the Prabhakaras, the meaning of words is learnt from the usage of the elderly person (vṛddhavyavahāra). The younger person observes the activity of the elder as response to a particular utterance and learns the meaning of that utterance. In such cases, the utterance is of the form of an injunction. In the case of the words where such interpretation does not hold good, the comprehension of the meaning must depend upon something indirectly connected with the injunction. It follows from this that the words denote things only as related (anvita) to the other factors of the injunction. Hence, words can be comprehended as having any denotation when taken apart from such sentence. This is the theory of the expression
of the co-related (anvitābhidhāna) advocated by the Prabhakaras. According to Dr. G.N. Jha, this theory has the tacit support of the Sabarabhāṣya.  

The meaning of a word is expressed according to the theory of anvitābhidhāna as related with some action (kārya). In a sentence, the words convey their meaning in relation to the meanings of other words involved. According to the Prabhakaras, the words have double function of giving their individual as well as collective meanings. It implies that both individual word meanings and their mutual relations are conveyed by the words constituting a sentence. A word always conveys a complete meaning and has no separate existence. Words have meaning only in relation to an action denoted by other words and this is the basic tenet of anvitābhidhānāvāda of the Prabhakaras.

VI.6. Abhihitānvayavāda - Kumarila Bhatta:

Kumarila and his followers hold that verbal testimony may be of two types – personal (pauruṣeya) and impersonal (apauruṣeya). The word of trustworthy person (āptavākya) is the personal testimony, while Vedic sentence (vedavākya) is impersonal. Tucca dvividham pauruṣeyam apauruṣeyam ceti. Tatra pauruṣeyamāptavākyam apauruṣeyam ca vedavākyam. The pauruṣeya testimony, for its validity depends upon the trustworthiness of the person. It has no intrinsic validity, rather validity has to be inferred from the trustworthy character of the person. But the apauruṣeya testimony has intrinsic validity, meaning valid in itself. As a Mīmāṃsaka Kumarila also calls verbal testimony the sāstra and follows the definition of sāstra given by Sabara. Explaining the definition of sāstra given by Sabara, Parthasarathi Misra, a follower of Kumarila, says that a verbal statement gives the knowledge of a fact through an understanding of the statement depending on the
According to Kumarila, meaning is constituted by the universal and not by particular. Knowledge of meaning generates awareness about the universal only and not about the particular. But the particular figures as the content of a further awareness that can be arrived at through the process of ākṣepa. This ākṣepa can be given a formulation corresponding to inferential argument or arthāpatti according to Mīmāṁsakas. Kumarila and his followers do not admit the view of co-contentness given by Prabhakara. For the Bhāttas the universal does not always appear as endowed with universalhood — something inhering in particulars. Therefore, there is no logical need to subscribe to the view that the universal appears as a co-content of the particular. Though the universal may appear as such in some awareness, it is not necessary that it will have to appear that way in all cases. In some act of awareness, the universal may appear undistinguished from other things while in some other awareness the universal may appear as a distinguished content. In fact, the awareness that result from hearing a word is such that the universal only figures as content in it. The universal appears in itself without being endowed with any character and therefore not as distinguished from things of other kind.

A word, according to the Bhāttas, initially generates awareness of the universal. The knower from that awareness passes to the awareness of the particular through a process of presumption (arthāpatti). It is admitted that the universal is not identical with rather distinct from the particular. Both universal and particular are positive entities. On this background the Bhāttas argue that the universal being a positive entity can figure as a content independent of particulars. Just as a horse which
is distinct from cow and which is positive can figure as a content independently of cow; the universal cowhood which is also positive and distinct from cows can figure as a content independently of the cows. This argument leads to the thesis that the universal alone constitutes meaning. Thus the Bhāttas are of the opinion that isolated awareness of the universal independent of particular is possible.

According to Bhāṭṭa- Mīmāṃsā this isolated awareness of the universal should not be identified with the testimonial knowledge. Because, the final testimonial knowledge is about the asserted relationship between the particular things referred to by different words. The question then arises about what it is that the hearing of a word and the knowledge of its meaning can generate if it is other than testimonial knowledge. The Bhāttas are of the opinion that it is in fact memory of which the hearing of word and knowledge of its meaning are two factors involved. Memory lacks the vividness of original impression, the wealth of information and richness of details and contents of original experience. Therefore, the Bhattas consider that an original experience imbibing a relational structure involving a particular and its universal may lead to the memory of the universal only. The possibility of isolated, unrelated and hence undistinguished appearance of the universal constitutes the ground of the fact that meaning is constituted by universal only. They also explain the cognitive procedure that may lead to the awareness of the particular. Taking the example of universal cowhood as constitutive of the meaning of the word ‘cow’, the Bhāttas show that one can arrive at the particular through a model argument - “cowhood inheres in particulars because it is a universal.” This particular is the particular (individual) cow in this case and the same may be applied in different cases under consideration. Alternatively if it is known that cowhood is concomitant with
cows, then awareness of cowhood as one that is so pervaded will by presumption (arthāpatti) lead to the awareness of the pervader which is a particular here.

According to the Bhūtās, the meaning of word is comprehended through anvaya (agreement) of the denoted words (abhīhitapada). Therefore, it is called abhīhitānvayavāda. The words constituting a particular syntax convey first their isolated meanings (arthas) and afterwards they cease to function, and next those meanings that are denoted by words relate themselves in conformity with ākāhā, yogyatā and sannidhi. According to Jaimini, it is by means of the agency of words themselves that the apprehension of anvaya (connection) becomes possible. This view of Jaimini has been given a particular shape by Sabara when he says that words express their isolated meanings in rapid succession after which the meanings themselves become karāṇa (instrument) for syntactic thought. The cognition of anvaya varies in accordance with the presence or absence of the proximate cause which refers to the joint method of agreement and difference (anvayavyatireki) and this is the logical ground of this theory. According to this theory words are never used singly, nor are their meanings cognised singly; yet it does not mean that the cognition of word-meanings is a recollection (smṛti) or anubhava (experience). Rather it is similar to recollection (smṛtisāma). According to the Bhūtās, a word does not materially differ from the occasioning condition of smṛti that may communicate a known fact. Thus the theory of the Bhūtā Mimāṁsā admits two padaśakti: (a) lakṣanā for anvaya, and (b) abhidhā for the related; such that after the word - meaning arises through abhidhāsakti, these word meanings by the function of lakṣanā can bring anvaya.
VI.7. Evaluation:

Mīmāṃsakas maintain that words are eternal. They maintain such a position due to their aim of making Vedic statements eternal. This situation of Mīmāṃsa has been summed up by Dr. Radhakrishnan as, "the Vedas are eternal, since the words they are composed are eternal. The relationship between the word and its meaning is natural,...... words and objects denoted by them are both eternal." Dr. Ganganath Jha also points out that in view of the Mīmamsa, the meaning of the word cannot be comprehended except on the hypothesis of its eternity. Jaimini contends that the utterance only helps to make the already existing word perceptible.

Among the Mīmāṃsakas, Kumarila accepts śabda as nitya without any hesitation. He recognises śabda as eternal and all - pervading substance. Prabhakara Misra also accepts the eternality of śabda. According to him, all sounds heard are in the shape of some letters and it is the letter, which is the direct cause of verbal comprehension. Neither perception nor inference can give the idea of śabda apart from its constituent letters. The eternality of śabda is admitted by the grammarians also but in a different way. For, the word is a series of successive sounds called letters. A series of such letter- sounds manifests one inarticulate sound essence called sphota. This sphota is an eternal essence that exists corresponding to every word. The Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas, of course, oppose the theory of sphota of the grammarians.

In Mīmāṃsā there are two popular theories - Abhihitānvayavāda of Kumarila and Anvitābhidhānāvāda of the Prabhakaras. According to Abhihitānvayavāda, the words convey the individual meaning which, in their turn come to be mutually related. The meanings of individual words can be comprehended separately; but as far as the sentence meaning is concerned, it results from the
association of word-meanings constituting the sentence. Thus the meanings of all the words are responsible for the meaning of sentence. After getting the meaning of words through the principle of $\text{akānksā, sannidhi}$ and $\text{yogatā}$, the meaning of sentence is derived from the word meanings. In other words, the expression of the meaning of words leads to the meaning of sentence. The Naiyāyikas and Vedāntins also support this view of Kumarila.

According to Anvitābhidhānavāda, a word expresses its meaning as connected with some act to be done. The words in a sentence convey their meanings, in relation to the meaning of other words. According to Prabhakara, the words of a sentence have the double function of giving their individual as well as construed meanings. The implication is that both the individual word meanings and their mutual relation constitute a sentence. A word has no separate existence and it always conveys a complete meaning only in relation with other words. Every word, therefore, expresses its meaning as connected with an action which is denoted by other word. These cumulative expressions of all words in a sentence are called anvitābhidhāna. The Visistadvaita Vedāntins support this theory of Prabhakara.

Salikanath Misra in his Vākyārthamātrikā refutes the theory of Kumarila Bhatta and discards the objections raised by the Bhattas against anvitābhidhānavāda. The Bhattas raised the objection that the theory of anvitābhidhāna involves prolixity. But Salikanath points out that the same is found in the abhihitānvaya of the Bhattas also. He holds that even in the event of admitting abhihitānvaya, one must accept that only those padarthis aided by akānksā, sannidhi and yogatā give rise to the knowledge of vākyārtha. There is no way to avoid these three factors in case of abhihitānvaya also. He does assert that the demerit of prolixity
is common to both and one should not question the other on that point. Dr. Gaurinath Sastri, a modern scholar, maintains that the difference between *abhīhitānvaya* and *anvitābhidhāna* lies in their conception of the medium of syntactical relation. The Prabhakaras make the *pada* (word) as the medium in *Anvitābhidhāna* while the Bhattas in *abhīhitānvaya* make the *padārthas* (word meanings) as the medium of the relation. He also contends that the theory of *anvitābhidhāna* has the merit of satisfying the law of economy. It asserts that a word denotes a related meaning.

Against *anvitābhidhāna* the Bhattas also raise objection that although *anvitābhidhāna* of the second word (*pada*) in a sentence is possible, but it is not possible in case of the first word. Salikana th holds that *anvitābhidhāna* is possible in case of all the *padas* (words) in a sentence; because a word is sometimes used first in a sentence and sometimes second. There is no rule regarding the particular order of words in respect of sentence. The *abhīhitānvaya* also points out that *anvitābhidhāna* is based on the meanings found to be proximate through recollection. Recollection is based on close proximity and a word may have close proximity with many meanings. Salikanath states that the knowledge of the *padārthas* cannot be said to be different from recollection. According to Prabhakaras the words recall their meanings and hence it is to be admitted that the *padārthas* when recalled convey the syntactical relation. Thus it is better to admit that the syntactical relation is of the meanings of words that are recalled and not of meanings that are expressed.

Both these theories, according to Mukula Bhatta, contain partial advantage. The theory of *abhīhitānvaya* is preferable from the point of view of words and *anvitābhidhāna vāda* is preferable from the point of view of the *vākya*. Thus Mukula Bhatta makes a combination of both the theories and names the combination
as *samuccayavāda*. Jayanta Bhatta rejects both the theories and presents his theory of *Tātparya* by way of bringing about modifications in the Bhattacharjas’ theory of *abhihitānvaya*. According to him, the words express their isolated meanings through *abhidhā*, but so far as the comprehension of the sentence - meaning is concerned, it is accomplished through another *sakti* called *Tātparyāsakti*. Prof. S. C. Chatterjee is of the view that of the different views about the meaning of a sentence, that of the Prabhakaras seems to be best. If the meaning of a sentence is quite independent of the words, as the grammarians hold, there remains no other way of knowing it than a personal explanation from the speaker or writer of it. On the other hand if its meanings is merely the aggregate of the word - meanings, then a sentence can not convey a new meaning to meet a new situation.

Regarding the question what constitutes meaning, the *Mīmāṃsaka* Sabara holds *Ākṛti* as constituting meaning. Sabara’s view of *ākṛtivāda* considers the meaning of a word to be the generality. But this view that meaning is nothing but form contradicts *Mīmāṃsā* ritualism. If the word ‘goat’ is simply a form, then it is not possible to cut it for offering towards God or goddess as directed by *Vedic* sentences. A form can not be cut into pieces; nor can we worship with flowers even, since the word flower stands for a particular form only. Such arguments against Jaimini and Sabara although appears to be very crude, it has striking importance which leads to think of *vyakti* some where implied by the form. The critics therefore, hold that the *ākṛti* which is conveyed by a word is only the mark to perceive the *vyakti* which alone must be accepted as the real sense expressed by a word. This is the view of *vyaktivādins*. But Sabara, the *ākṛtivādin* takes *vyakti* only as the mark which leads to the perception of *ākṛti* and argues *ākṛti* to be the real significance of a word. Therefore, it is necessary to seek some more decisive grounds on which the problem
is to be solved. The fact that the same word refers to several individuals is one of such
definite grounds, which decides the issue in favour of ākṛtivāda. The very fact that
two or more individuals can be denoted by one and the same word is sufficient to
justify that it signifies some thing which is common to them all. This common thing is
the ākṛti, which is invariably associated with vyakti. It is, on account of this invariable
association between the two that on the perception of this ākṛti a vyakti can easily be
perceived. One who perceives ākṛti is invariably observed to perceive the vyakti also
even in the absence of a word. On the other hand, if one is unable to perceive the ākṛti
due to some mental disturbance even on the word being uttered, it is impossible to
perceive vyakti. This shows that the presence or absence of the perception of vyakti on
the part of the observer depends on the presence or absence of the perception of the
ākṛti, and that it has nothing to do with the uttering or hearing of śabda.
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