In Lieu of a Conclusion

*Habit is the ballast that chains the dog to his vomit*

Beckett (*Proust*)

In this work, we have attempted to relate Beckett’s writing to a game involving words, voices and silences. The problematization of language and discursive practises by transgressing the discourse of classical representation and its conceptual taming of difference and repetition results in endless play. Beckett’s writings disseminate forces of orgic becoming which dislodge the framework of organic representation. It produces an internal transgression of the limits of representation that compels the text to question incessantly itself and its language.

The text insistently interrogates its own status, as it is neither completely subjective nor totally objective. It cannot be objectified so as to be represented and known, nor can it safely reside within the protected interior of a subject that knows it intuitively. The postmodernity of this thought implies a condition of ignorance situated between an unknown origin and a future that cannot be predicted. Even though in Beckett thought produces itself and is in charge of its own future, thought is also self-alienated and dispossessed. Thought must
continue to produce what it cannot know, namely itself, which turns the act of narration into a game.

Beckett's oeuvre cannot be defined in terms of the dialectical epistemology which had structured western thought for the last two thousand odd years. Modernism too was not free of its stifling influence. The transference of meaning in the dialectical model is built on the binary of the subject and the tangible other outside of it. Postmodern texts try to wriggle out of this constrictive situation through transgression. The transgressive strategy involves, as we have seen in the first chapter, the transformation of all dialectical confrontations into the dynamics of endless engagement where the boundaries are problematized. There is no finality to the act; it exists as a perpetual striving towards the engulfing of all, sense, non-sense, good, bad, word, and silence, in its fold. Its great virtue is that it is not authoritarian or arbitrary but shows a democratic open heartedness.

Beckett's questioning of the structure in Watt takes the indecisive form of Hackett's hesitation between inside and outside. Underneath the static dualities, which regulate thinking in representation, the text produces a force of secret repetition triggered by a transgressive subject. This subject and its own private repetition of difference are not deliberately conceived of as a project of resistance, but are rather motivated by the feral movement of the thought of the outside.
The thought that composes (and decomposes) this thought operates underneath dualities or set oppositions (such as the subject-object opposition), preventing both their complete separation and their simple reunion in a kind of monism. This thought is itself a multiplicity, a force of dispersion that registers an interpellation. This corresponds to Watt’s transgressive appearance on the scene of representation, an event that forces thought to leave the predictable world of representation and to experience a becoming unable to be measured or understood by means of common sense and good sense. Rather, this thought is exposed to the constitutive power of non-sense; it discovers the absence of universal direction and meaning as well as the multiplication of senses and universes that produced the nomadic journey of Molloy through the consciousness of the West.

The emergence of orgic difference provides epistemology with a sure-fire transgressive tool to counter the Hegelian dialectics. Difference within the organic difference, as we have seen, paves the way to the emergence of an open field where binaries are dissolved and in its place the proliferation of voices and silences discount the certainties of all grand narratives.

In Beckett, as in Foucault, the thought of the outside constitutes a force of repetition that cannot be controlled by the thinker. Repetition, as simulacrum and as parodic repetition, proliferates and challenges the model. Simulacrum and parody have a very thin dividing
line between them, as both take off from parallel textual practices and have similar objectives. They differ, as we saw in chapter III and IV, in the way they disrupt the model; simulacrum by becoming the model and parody through annihilating it. Repetition inscribes the thinker as always a temporary relay within a multiple becoming of the subject. The thinker then expresses the temporary insistence of this thought within the finitude of a fractured language where he becomes dispersed, fragmented and dissolved.

Thought repeats the effacement of the subject, his passage into the un-ground of a language that is now his only ground. The thought of the outside produces the disquiet of language and punctures the transcendental subject. It both traps and frees the subject within an exteriority that is not a simple objective outside situated at a distance, but an inner force of dispersion and multiplicity, a terrifying interior that hurts and soothes. The thought of the outside is situated beyond representation because it cannot be objectively captured or subjectively intuited. But, it is also that which, within representation, transgresses both the subjective and the objective poles. The thought of the outside is a force of dissemination that is both ungraspable and intimately alien. In *The Unnamable*, language is the site where the subject, far from being coalesced within the interiority of a founding consciousness, finds itself dispersed and distributed.
The object of the search is also transformed incessantly by the search just as the subject of the search constantly changes, shifting the purpose of the search according to factors beyond the control of the subject. The point of origin of subjectivity in *The Unnamable* is not an essential or transcendental ‘I’ able to indicate and express itself through language. For Foucault, the personality or the absolute subject of phenomenology always securely placed within the certainty of absolute meaning gives way to a particular mode of impersonality whose meaning exceeds and eludes the grasp of common sense and good sense. In *The Unnamable*, for example, the subject is amorphous and multiple. It is within this precarious condition that *The Unnamable* is obligated not only to express the ‘I’, but also to define that ‘I’ in relation to what is not ‘I’.

The finitude engaged by postmodern thought necessitates a transgressive movement, an aimless displacement of limits coinciding with the precariousness of the subjective voice as it confronts the presence of an unconquerable otherness lodged at the heart of its very speaking. *The Unnamable* takes us to the threshold of this movement while seemingly exhausting its very logic. In Beckett, it seems impossible to go further than pursuing the implacable, elusive double that echoes in the very voice of the self.

For Beckett as for Foucault, to reinvent oneself is to denounce everything contained within that project of enlightenment as precisely
an invention: it is to divorce oneself from that project by remaining on
the outside of its interiority. Inventing oneself is related to the single
obligation that *The Unnamable*, as does the entire Beckettian oeuvre
recognizes and practices, namely, to continue to transgress.