(i) A General Note on the Samkhya System

There is innate in the human heart a metaphysical hunger to know and understand what lies beyond the mysterious and illusive veil of nature. This is true from savage to savant. Each in his own way, according to his own capacity, tries to fathom the eternal mystery of life. From the beginning of time, teachers have endeavoured to bridge the gap between the seen and the unseen and to show cause for the inescapable experiences of sorrow and suffering that engulf mankind. But the questions still remain: What is the nature of Reality? What is the nature of human existence? What is the cause of pleasure and pain? How can Liberation or Salvation be attained?

The solutions and explanations offered by man range from the simplest superstitions to the most subtle philosophical speculations. In the west, man’s perceptual knowledge of the external world has been his measuring rod, his basis for theorizing. The primitive who is unable to
see beyond the physical manifestation of forces displayed by nature constructs an animism or a pantheism, the scientist examining the depths of matter with his microscope and sweeping the heavens with his telescope postulates a materialism. Nowhere is there any record. Mystery still remains.

Since the dawn of western civilization, there have been few achievements in the realm of philosophy that have been able to outlive the scientific findings of a single century. With the advent of every new discovery, we have to revise our scheme of things. The entire sea of science is strewn with theories that have had to be abandoned because the inventive genius of man has been able to bring to light new facts that would not fit into the previous theories. The latest ideas are always called improvements and 'evolution'.

The west refuses to accept the postulate that the world of mind and matter is but an appearance of a deeper reality which lies beyond the perception of our senses, regardless of how magnified these may be by powerful instruments of precision. One of the reasons for this is due to the preconceived notion that man cannot know metaphysical truths by direct experience, therefore, at best, metaphysical truths can only be speculations, inferences or ungrounded faith. Even if it were
possible, the west maintains that no man has ever attained such supreme knowledge. Another attitude is that all systems of thought must be mutually contradictory, and that, if one of them be true, the rest must be false. There is little place left for various interpretations of a single philosophy to suit different minds.

In the orient, it has been accepted that man can know metaphysical truths by direct experience. He need not depend upon speculation, inference or faith. The literature is replete with the writings of men who are said to know the whole truth of Nature and human existence, and the teachings of these men have been set forth in the philosophical systems of ancient India.

The Nature of Philosophy

Philosophy literally means 'love of wisdom'. It is an attempt to arrive at a rational conception of the reality as a whole. It enquires into the nature of the Universe in which we live, the nature of the human soul, and its destiny, and the nature of God or the Absolute, and their relation to one another. It enquires into the nature of matter, time, space, causality, evolution, life and mind, and their relation to one another. It is the art of thinking all things logically.
systematically, and persistently. It is the art of thinking rationally and systematically of the reality as a whole.

Philosophy is the rational attempt to have a world-view. It endeavours to reach a conception of the entire universe with all its elements and aspects and their interrelations to one another. It is not contented with a partial view of the world. It seeks to have a synoptic view of the whole reality, it tries to have a vision of the whole. The different sciences deal with different departments of the world. Thus, chemistry deals with chemical phenomena. Astronomy deals with the phenomena of heavenly bodies. Botany deals with the phenomena of plant-life.

Thus, sciences give us a sectional view of the world. But philosophy harmonizes the highest conclusions of the different sciences, co-ordinates them with one another and gives a national conception of the whole world. It investigates the nature of the fundamental concepts of matter, time, space, life, mind and the like and interrelates them to one another. It enquires into the nature of the universe, its stuff or material, its creator or God, its purpose, and its relation to man and his soul.

Indian Philosophy is intensely spiritual and has always emphasized the need of practical realization of
truth. It signifies a natural and a necessary urge in 
human being to know themselves and the world in which 
they, 'live and move and have their being'. A man 
cannot live without philosophy. The keynote of all 
schools of Indian philosophy is 'see the self'. And 
this is the reason why most of the systems of Indian 
philosophy are also religious sects. Annihilation 
of the three kinds of sufferings— Ādhyātmika, Ādhibhautika 
and Ādidaivika—and realization of supreme happiness 
is the end and Śravana (hearing the truth), manana 
(intellectual conviction after critical analysis) and 
nididhyāsana (practical realisation) are the means—
in almost all the systems of Indian philosophy.

1. ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ

2. Ādhyātmika sorrow is of two types: (i) Physical 
(Śārīram) and (ii) mental (mānasa), e.g., fever, 
disease, mental agony etc. Physical sorrow can be 
remedied by applying ointments etc., and mental sorrow 
can be cured up by taking food and drink as well as 
with the company of beautiful wife. Ādhibhautika 
sorrow is fear from tiger, decoits etc., and it can be 
remedied by scriptural texts etc. Ādidaivika sorrow 
is natural calamities like cyclone, flood, excessive 
coldness etc., and it can be remedied by taking 
stones (coral, pearls, etc).

(ŚTK. Kā.)
The meaning of Philosophy

Philosophy is the science of the general laws of being (i.e., nature and society), human thinking, and the process of knowledge. Philosophy is one of the forms of social consciousness. It is ultimately determined by society's economic relations. The fundamental questions of philosophy as a special science is the relation of thinking to being, consciousness to matter. Every philosophical system gives a concretely elaborated solution of this problem even if the 'fundamental question' is not directly formulated in it. Pythagoras was the first to use the term philosophy. It was singled out as a special science by Plato. The term 'philosophy' literally means 'love of wisdom' or pursuit of knowledge ('Philos' means love and 'sophia' meaning wisdom). If the term Philosophy is taken in this literal sense, then the special sciences may each be called a philosophy. Hence any branch of study was formerly called philosophy. As men were in the lowest stage of their intellectual development, they could not differentiate the different departments of the universe and consequently the different branches of knowledge. But with the advance of knowledge they came to distinguish different sciences from one another, and philosophy from sciences., and regarded
philosophy as the knowledge of the eternal and essential nature of things. Thus at first, philosophy was not distinguished from special sciences, then it was altogether divorced from them. But now philosophy, in its restricted sense, means neither the study of any particular department of the universe, nor the knowledge of the eternal and essential nature of things and alone, but that highest branch of knowledge which aims at harmonizing and systematizing all truths and arriving at a rational conception of the reality as a whole, both in its eternal and temporal aspects.

Philosophy is the criticism of life and experience.

Philosophy has three parts: (1) Epistemology, Ontology and Axiology. Epistemology is the theory of knowledge. Ontology is the theory of reality. Axiology is the theory of values. Ontology deals with matter, life, mind, and God. It deals with their essences and qualities and activities. But some philosophers lay undue emphasis on epistemology, some lay undue stress on Ontology, some lay undue emphasis on the study of the phenomena of matter, life and mind.

Purpose of Hindu Philosophy

All systems of Hindu philosophy are in complete agreement that the purpose of philosophy is the
extinction of sorrows and sufferings and that the way is by the acquisition of knowledge of the true nature of things which aims in free man from the bondage of ignorance which all teachers agree is the cause of human suffering.

Hindu philosophy does not attempt to train one to discern metaphysical truths, it offers a way of thinking which enables one rationally to understand the reality experienced by self-fulfilled personalities, and thereby to lead one to the realisation of Truth. In this light, philosophy is seen as an art of life and not a theory about the universe, for it is the means of attaining the highest aspirations of man. It is not for the discovery, but for the understanding of Truth.

There are said to be three stages by which the student can arrive at this realisation of the true nature of things. They are: (1) Faith, (2) Understanding, and (3) Realisation. The first stage is that of accepting the laws of nature as taught by the great minds of the past. In the next stage, though the process of analysis, the student arrives at a rational and logical conviction, however, reasoning and speculation about transcendental principles can never lead to more than philosophy, for there can never be certainly in reason
as a means of discovering transcendentul truths. At best, reasoning is merely a means of understanding the principles of nature and it is the purpose of philosophy to guide and aid the reasoning of the student. The last stage enables the individual actually to become one with the Ultimate Reality. This is accomplished through the practice of Yoga. The techniques and methods used for the attainment of this end have been treated at length in a book written by Theos Bernard.

These stages are not unlike those employed in teaching geometry. First the student is given the proposition that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles. This must be accepted as axiomatic, until it is finally demonstrated through reason to be an actual fact. Still it is only a rational conviction which does not necessarily carry certainty. The truth of this proposition can be verified only by actually cutting out from a piece of paper a triangle and measuring the angles, thereby actually experiencing beyond any measure of doubt that

the sum total of the three angles is 180 degrees or the equivalent of two right angles. This last procedure of obtaining direct knowledge or realisation of a geometrical truth might be said to correspond to the realization of transcendental truth through Yoga.

**Test of Philosophy**

Philosophy is one of life's noblest pursuits, although its wisdom is the reward of few, it ought to be the aspiration of all. If a philosophy is going to satisfy the intellectual life of the modern world, its conclusion must be able to withstand the acid test of analysis in the dry light of reason. Nothing can be taken for granted, the necessity of every assumption must be established. It must be capable of explaining all things from the Great Absolute to a blade of grass, it must not contradict the facts of experience, conceptual or perceptual. Its hypothesis must satisfy all the demands of our nature, it must account for all types of experience: waking, dreaming, sleeping and those moments which are claimed by the religious ascetic during his deep contemplation. It must be realistic as well as idealistic, it must not be a brutal materialism, worshipping facts and
figures and ignoring values, idealising science and denying spirituality. Nor it must be predominantly a philosophy of values which evades and ignores all connection with facts. It must be comprehensive enough to account for every new discovery of science, it must embrace all the concepts of religion and other philosophical systems. All ideas must receive recognition and find their proper place within the border of its synthesis, every fact of the universe, every aspect of life, every content of experience must immediately fall within the scope of its mould. The March of science must justify it at every step.

It is not enough merely to interpret reality as perceived by the senses, it must explain both sides of reality, the change and the unchangeable, being and becoming, permanent and impermanent, animate and inanimate. The emphasis on one or the other of these two aspects brings about many of the radical differences in philosophy. The need is to unite them in a deep abiding harmony. All these conditions have been satisfied by the philosophical systems of India.

**Different opinions regarding the number of systems**

The earliest reference to the number of systems is found in the Śiva-mahimnahstotra of
Puspadanta where it is said that there are only four schools of philosophy, namely, Sāmkhya, Yoga, Pasupatimitra and Vaiṣṇava. The author of the Ārtha-śāstra includes under philosophical systems - Sāmkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata.

The Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha attributed to Śāmkarācārya enumerates a different classification. Lokāyata, Ārhat, the four Buddhist schools of Vaibhāṣika, Saṅgāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyāmika, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, the two schools of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā viz., Bhātta and Prabhākara, Sāmkhya, Pātañjala, Veda-Vyāsa and Vedānta. In the Hayaśīrṣa-Pañcarātra, a Brāhmaṇic work, supposed to have been introduced in Bengal by Rājā Ballal Sen (about 1158 A.D. - 170 A.D.) as well as in the Guru-Gītā of the Viṣvasāra-Tantra, the six systems are, Gotama, Kanḍa, Kapila, Pātañjali, Vyāsa and Jaimini. Madhusūdana Saraswati in his Prasthānabheda divides darsāna into Āstika and Nāstika. Under the former, he includes : Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Karma-mīmāṃsā, Sāṅkara-mīmāṃsā, Pāñcarātra and Pāsūpata while under the latter the four schools of Buddhism, Digambara school of Jaina and the school of Ārya.

The author of Nyāyakośa is of the opinion that there are only six Darsānas. Namely : two Yogas, two
mīmāṃsās and two tarkas. This also is undoubtedly said regarding the \textit{Astikadarśanas} alone.

\textbf{The Darśanas}

According to Indian tradition there is only one Ultimate Reality, but there are six fundamental interpretations of that Reality. These are called the \textit{Śad Darśanas} or 'six insights', because they give man sight of the sensible verities and enable him to understand in the light of reason the super-sensible Truth attainable only through the revealed scriptures or through the experience of ṛṣis (sages). The word darśana comes from the root \textit{vṛḍṛś}, 'to see', and is the Sanskrit term used for philosophy. The six darśanas constitute the classic philosophical systems of India. They are Nyāya, Vaiśešika, Sāmkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. They are not the creation of any one mind nor the discovery of any single individual. The real founders are unknown, and there is considerable controversy as to when they were first reduced to writing, but neither of these conditions detracts from the value of their principles. Together they form a graduated interpretation of the Ultimate Reality, so interrelated that

\begin{quote}
4. Drśyate yathārthatattvamane iti Darśanam -
Śabdakalpadrumah.
\end{quote}
the hypothesis and method of each is dependent upon the other. In no way are they contradictory or antagonistic to one another, for they all lead to the same practical end, knowledge of the Absolute and Liberation of the Soul.

They have many characteristics in common. They all grew out of the Upaniṣads, the philosophical portion of the Veda which is accepted as the supreme authority, they are delivered in the Sūtra style, there is as aphorisms, as such, they are extremely concise, avoiding all unnecessary reception and employing a rigid economy of words making it difficult to understand them correctly in their original form without the use of commentaries, for they use many of the same terms, but each system gives its own meaning to the use of the term. They rest their conclusions on several common concepts, all accept the eternal cycle of Nature which is without beginning and end, and which consists of vast periods of creation, maintenance, and dissolution, all accept the principle of regeneration of the soul that maintains that life and death are but two phases of a single cycle to which the soul is bound and to which it clings because of ignorance of the true nature of things, all accept Dharma as the moral law of the universe that accounts for these eternal cycles of Nature, as well
as the destiny of the human soul, all agree that knowledge is the path to freedom and that Yoga is the method to attain final liberation.

For the purpose of study, the six Darśanas have been classified into three divisions:

- **Nyāya** .................. Vaiśeṣika
- **Sāṁkhya** ............... Yoga
- **Mīmāṁsā** .............. Vedānta

The first division lays down the methodology of science and elaborates the concepts of physics and chemistry to show how manifestation of phenomena comes into being, the second division sets forth an account of cosmic evolution on purely logical principles, and the third division critically analyses the basic principles, developing them in greater detail and furnishing arguments to substantiate, as well as making incidental contributions on points of special interest.

**Nyāya** was founded by Gotama. It is purely a system of logic, concerned with the means of acquiring right knowledge which it classifies under sixteen topics.

**Vaiśeṣika** was founded by Kaṇāda. It classifies all knowledge of the objective world under nine realities.
and discusses how the various combinations of these nine basic realities bring all things into being.

Sāmkhya was founded by Kapila who is considered the Father of Hindu philosophy. This system comprehends the universe as a sum-total of twenty-five categories. In no way does it discard the basic realities of the previous system. It only shows that they are not final, in the same way that the breaking down of the atom to electrons and protons did not discard the existence of the atom, but only showed that it was not the last possible reduction of matter. It shows that all derived things in this world are not produced from the nine realities, but from two realities, Spirit and Matter, which are considered as the Ultimate Realities. It discards the creation of the Vaiśesika system and shows that all things are evolved out of preexisting material which is the static background of the Universe and which simply upholds itself as a rose unfolds from its seed.

Yoga was founded by Patañjali. This is the individual aspect of the system laid down by the Sāmkhya doctrine. Here the concern is with the ways and means by which the individual can know Reality by direct experience.

Mīmāṃsā was founded by Jaimini. It is concerned chiefly with the correct interpretation of Vedic ritual and texts.
Vedānta was founded by Bādarāvana. It is an inquiry into the nature of the Ultimate Principle (Brahman). It does not discard the findings of Sāṁkhya but it endeavours to show that there can be only one Ultimate Reality which makes its appearance to the sense as an illusion (māyā). Its analysis of the process of cosmic evolution is virtually the same as the Sāṁkhya with only those differences which must logically follow from its original premise. It shows how the world with its infinite variety is only an appearance and that all things are one and the same, only appearing differently.

Two broad divisions of Indian Philosophy

The schools of Indian philosophy are divided into two broad classes — Āstika (Orthodox) and Nāstika (heterodox). The terms 'āstika' and 'nāstika' are used in different senses by different thinkers. In common parlance, the word 'āstaka' means theist i.e., one who believes in God. And the word 'nāstika' means its opposite i.e., one who does not believe in God. Whatever it may be, both the two terms i.e., Āstika and Nāstika, in Indian philosophy are used in quite a different sense. Here 'āstika' means one who believes in the validity of the Vedas and 'nāstika' means those who do not believe in the validity of the Vedas. The term 'nāstika' is used
in various senses: (i) one who disregards the Vedas\texttextsuperscript{5}, who denies the existence of the other world (Nāsti paralokah), this is the view of grammarians like Patañjali, Kaiyata, Ngāga Bhaṭṭa, Bhaṭṭoji Dīksita and others\texttextsuperscript{6}, (iii) who does not believe in the transmigration of Jiva or, (iv) who denies the existence of Īśvara is a nāstika (Īśvaranāstītītvādī).

Thus 'Āstika' means Orthodox school and 'Nāstika' means Heterodox school. Nyāya, Vaiśesika, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta are the six Orthodox systems whereas Carvāka, Buddha and Jaina are the three Heterodox systems.\texttextsuperscript{7}

\text{5. yo'vamanyeta te mule hetussāstra srayād dvijah /} 
\hspace{2cm} sa sādhubhirbhāṣikāryyonāstiko vedānindakah //
\hspace{2cm} — Manu.II, 11.

\text{6. Āstādhyāyī, 4.4.60, asti iti asya matih āstikah,} 
\hspace{2cm} nāsti iti asya matih nāstikah — Mahābhāṣya, 
\hspace{2cm} Parolakah asti iti matir yasya sa āstikah, tad-viparītaḥ nāstikah — Pradīpa, parolakah asti iti yasya matir asti sa āstikah, tad-viparītaḥ nāstikah — Kāśikā, asti parolakah ityevaḥ matir yasya sa āstikah, nāsti iti matir yasya sa nāstikah — sādhdhānta — Kaumudī.

\text{7. Gautamasya Kaṇādasasya Kapilasya Patañjaleh /} 
\hspace{2cm} Vyāsasya Jaiminēścāpi darsanāni saḍēba hi //
\hspace{2cm} (as quoted in Sāṃkhya-darśaner bhūmika, p.3).
The Jainas are regarded as 'nāstikas' because they do not regard the Vedas with the same reverence and esteem as the Orthodox scholars and also because they deny the existence of Īśvaras.

But the Buddhas and the Jainas may be treated as āstika since they believe in the existence of the other world (Parolokah). The Jainas do not say that the world of our perception is the only reality. They accept different planes of existence like heaven, hell etc. lying beyond the perceptible world. Further, they do not say that our life ends in death. In their opinion, there is a distinct reality called self which in its unliberated stage undergoes birth and rebirth and in its liberated stage exists for an unending time in the super-sensuous uppermost region called Siddhasāla. It is remarkable that Haribhadra Sūri in his Sad-Dārsana-Samuccaya includes the Jainas in the group of the āstikas.

8. SVM, Ka, 6
9. bhavād bhavāntara-prāptimantaḥ samsārinah — SDS, 3, Kṛṣṇa-karmavipramoksanam mokṣa iti tad-anantaram ūrdhavam gacchaty — ālokāntat —
   Ibid, see VTP, pp.19-20
10. evam āstika-vādānāṁ kṛtāṁ samksepa- kīrtanām —
   Sad-Dārsana-Samuccaya, 77
Buddha, though generally described as a nāstika is, in reality, never so, rather he is a real Āstika, since he believes in the other world and since his teachings are essentially in conformity with those of the Upaniṣads — the speculative aspect of the Vedas. There are some old thinkers also who have looked upon Buddha not as a Nāstika, but as an Āstika. Śaṅkara, Jayadeva and others describing Buddha as an incarnation of God suggest that, in their view, Buddha is not a Nāstika. 11

The Significance of the Sāmkhya Philosophy and the Origin of the word Sāmkhya

Of all the philosophical systems, Sāmkhya has been considered to be the most ancient. Nobody can gainsay the fact that this occupies a prominent place in all the Śāstras, since this is either supported or controverted by every philosophical system. Therefore, the importance of this sastra is recognised by all the systems. In the Śāntiparvan of the Mahābhārata, there is reference given by Bhīṣma to Yudhiṣṭhira that Sāmkhya is the highest and most profound of all knowledge —

11. Kesava dhrta - buddha - sārīra jaya jagadiśa hare — Gīta Govinda
'There is no knowledge like that of Sāmkhya, no power like that of Yoga. You should have no doubt as to Sāmkhya being the highest knowledge' (Sānti. 316.2)\(^\text{12}\)

Though the use of the word sāmkhya is found first of all in the Śvetāsvatara Upanisad\(^\text{13}\), Yet Sāmkhya reflections are found even in the Rgveda and the other Upaniṣads, e.g., in the Chhandogya\(^\text{14}\), in the Praśna\(^\text{15}\), the Katha\(^\text{16}\), in the Gīta\(^\text{17}\) and in the Smṛtis and the Purāṇas. This proves it's antiquity. In support of the antiquity of the Sāmkhya philosophy, we may explain another thing also. Generally it is found that books which are written in successive period, there

\begin{verbatim}
12. nāsti sāmkhyasamam jñānam nāsti yogasamam balam /
   atra bah samsayo mā bhūt jñānam sāmkhyam param
   matam //
   (Mbh. Sānti. 316.2)
13. tatkāraṇam sāmkhyayogādīghamanyam ...........
   (ŚU. VI. 13)
14. Chhāndogya VI, 4.1,
15. Praśna VI. 2
16. Katha I, 3, 10-13
17. esa te'bhihita sāmkhye (Gītā II, 39),
    sāmkhyayogau prthag vālāh............... ... Ibid, V, 4,
    yat sāmkhyaiḥ prāpyate sthānam.............. ....
    Ibid, V. 5.
\end{verbatim}
are application of excessive methods, they are large in size and there are admission of minimum padārthas. Thus Kapila admits twenty-five principles, Gotama sixteen, Kanāda seven, Jaimini six and Vedānta admits only one tattva i.e., the Supreme soul or Paramātman.18

Tradition unanimously ascribes the foundership of the Sāmkhya system to the sage Kapila. It is said that Kapila was the first man who realised through intellectual discipline and penance, the reality of the indeterminate self. For this reason he is designated as the 'Original learned'.19 We get such evidences in Śruti, Smṛti and in Śrīmadbhagavad-gītā also.20

The word 'Sāmkhya' is derived from the word 'Sāmkhya' which is again etymologically derived from the root Khyā (jñāna) preceeded by the suffix sam.

18. ślokārdhena pravakṣyāmi yaduktám granthakotibhiḥ / Brahma satyaṁ jaganmithyā jībo brahmaiva nāparaṁ:// (Brahma-Jñānāvalī - Mālā, Verse 20)

as quoted in K.P. Sinha's—Reflexions on Indian Philosophy, p. 274)

19. Ādavidvān. (YB, I. 25)

20. Rṣim prasūtaṁ kapilāṁ yastamagre jñānairvibharti / jayamānaṁca paśyet (Śruti),ŚU, 5/2 / Ādou yo jayamānaṁca kapilāṁ janayedṛṣim / prasūtaṁ vibhṛyāj jñānaṁ tam paśyet paramesvaram / sāddhānāṁ kapilo muniḥ (Gītā X, 26)
Generally Samkhya means number i.e., counting of one, two, three, four etc. The Śāstra, where there is the counting of tattvas is called Śāmkhya. This is the common derivation of the word Śāmkhya. \(^{21}\) Again the word Śāmkhya is used in the sense of thinking and counting. \(^{22}\) Thinking may be with reference to basic principles or knowledge of self. Counting refers to the twenty-five principles, three qualities, three sources of valid knowledge and advocates dualism of Puruṣa and the Prakṛti. The double implication of the word has been set forth by Vijnānabhikṣu in his preface to Śāmkhya-Pravacanabhasya, by a quotation from the Mahābhārata. \(^{23}\) So, Śāmkhya means knowledge of self through right discrimination. \(^{24}\)

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21. sāmkhyāṃ sāmkhyātmatvāc ca kapiladibhirucyate
(MP, 3/26)

22. Carca śāmkhyā vicaraṇā
(Amara 1, V. 3)

23. Śāmkhyān prakurvate caiva prakṛtīm ca pracaksate/
tattvāni ca caturvimsattvena sāmkhyāṃ prakīrtitam //
(Mbh. 306.42/43)

24. Śāmkhyā sāmyak vivekena ātmakathānam
(Vijnānabhikṣu)
Another derivation as explained by Śrīdhara Svāmin is that 'by which Vastutattva is rightly manifested is called Saṃkhyā, where there is the manifestation of the self is Saṃkhyā'.²⁵ 'Where there is the discriminative knowledge of Paramārtha is Saṃkhyā according to gāmkarabhāṣya'.²⁶

The words 'Saṃkhyā' and 'Saṃkhyāna' are two synonymous words formed with different suffixes having the same meaning i.e., Buddhi or Viveka. Thus, the application of the word 'Saṃkhyāna' is found in the Śrīmadbhagavatādīta²⁷ and in the Bhāgavata-Purāṇa.²⁸

Again, sometimes 'prakhyā' is used in lieu of 'Saṃkhyā' to convey the same sense i.e., Buddhi or jñāna in

25. Saṃyak khyayate prakasyate vastutattvamanaya iti samkhya, saṃyak jnanam, tasyam prakasamanatmatattvam samkhya (Śrīdhara Svāmin)

26. Sāmkhya paramārthavastuvivekahavye (ŚB)

27. Procyante guṇasaṃkhyāne (Gītā, XVIII. 19)

Vyāsabhāṣya of Yogasūtras Somewhere again the word 'Prasamkhyāna' or 'Parisamkhyāna' in the same sense is found where the formation of the word is the root 'Khyā' with two prepositions 'Pra' and 'Sam' and 'Pari' and 'Sam' respectively. Examples are found in the Yogasūtra and in the Mahābhārata respectively. Patañjali uses the term 'Prasamkhyāna' in his Yogasūtra in the sense of supreme knowledge. In the Yogasūtra-Bhāṣya also we find the same term used in the same sense. Even in the Kumarasambhava, Canto III by Kālidāsa, the usage of the word 'Prasamkhyāna' is found in the sense of highest knowledge.

Even it is seen that in ancient India, both the two words i.e., Śāmkhya and Jñāna were used as convertible terms. That is why in Śrīmadbhagavatī Gītā, the

29. cittam hi prakhyāpravṛtāsthitisilatvat trigunāṁ
tatparam prasamkhyānem ityācakṣate dhyañinaḥ
tatparam prasamkhyānem ityācakṣate dhyañinaḥ
tatparam prasamkhyānem ityācakṣate dhyañinaḥ
(Vyāsabhāṣya of YS.I.2)
30. prasamkhyānepi akusādasya sarvathā vivekahātah
dharmameghah samādhiḥ, (YS, 4/29)
sāmkhya-jñānāṁ prabakṣyāmi parisamkhyān-adarśānam
(Mbh. 306.26)
31. viśayadosadarsināḥ prasamkhyānavatāt....
.... vairagyam — YSB, I,15
prasamkhyānāgniña dagdhaviyākatvan — YSB, II,2
32. hare prasamkhyānaparo babhyva
(Kumar, III, Sl. No. 40).
alternative name of jñāna-yoga is Sāṁkhya. The same work is also called Sāṁkhya as Kṛta i.e., Siddhānta-śāstra. 'established conclusion' and hence it shows that the Sāṁkhya was systematised before the composition of the Gītā.

A chart of the twenty-five principles of classical Sāṁkhya

1. Puruṣa (Consciousness or spirit) → 2. Prakṛti (Cosmic substance)
3. Mahāt or Buddhi (universal intelligence) ↓
4. Ahamkāra (ego) or Abhimāna ↓
5-9 five organs of perception ↓ 10 mind ↓ 11-15 five organs of action ↓ 16-20 five tabāntras or, subtle elements (sound, touch, form, taste and smell) ↓
Ear, Skin, Eye, Tongue and Nose ↓
10 mind ↓ 11-15 five organs of action ↓ 16-20 five tabāntras or, subtle elements (sound, touch, form, taste and smell) ↓
From sound - space ↓ touch - wind ↓ form - fire ↓ taste - water ↓ smell - earth ↓

The Śrīmadbhagavad-Gītā, which is the essence of all the Upaniṣads also admits these twenty-five principles of the Sāṁkhya-system.

33. jñānyogena sāṁkhyanām (Gītā, III, 3), yat sāṁkhyaīḥ prāpyate sthānam (Ibid, V, 5)
34. Sāṁkhye kṛtānte proktāni (Ibid, XVIII, 13).
Samkhya Teachers

Names of twenty-six Samkhya teachers are met with in the Smṛtis, in the Mahābhārata, as well as in the Kārikās etc. They are as follows:


Among the above mentioned teachers, seven teachers are recognised as the sons of Brahmā Himself.35

A few words about the Samkhya-teachers

Kapila, the great sage, is regarded as the propounder of Samkhya. In the Samkhya tradition, he is held to be the first among the wise (Adividvān) and he appears at the beginning of each cycle of creation. Virtue, wisdom, dispassion and power are natural to him.

35. sanakaśca sanandaśca tritiyaśca sanatanaḥ / kapilaścāsuriścaiva vodhu pañcaśikhastathaḥ / saptaiśe mānasah putrā brahmaṇaḥ paramaṃsthinaḥ //
(Purāṇa)
and he is the foremost of the Siddhas. His siddhi or perfection is regarded as an instance of what is called Janmasiddhi i.e., he was endowed with perfection from the very moment of his birth. It is stated that out of compassion he imparted the knowledge of Śāmkhya to Āsuri, his first disciple. The term 'nirmanacitta' in the foot-note deserves special attention. It shows that the teacher assumed a form by dint of his supernatural power and appeared before Āsuri to impart to him the knowledge of Śāmkhya. This shows that Kapila had no physical body and thus he cannot be regarded as an historical person. The Mahābhārata also mentions him to be the propounder of Śāmkhya. But he is somewhere stated as the incarnation of fire, somewhere as the light residing in the orb of the Sun and elsewhere as one of the mind-born sons (māhasa-putra) of the god Brahman. The Bhāgavata Purāṇa mentions him to be the fifth incarnation of Viṣṇu.

36. Siddhanām kapilo muniḥ (Gītā, X, 26)
37. ādīvidvān nirmanacittam adhiṣṭhaya kāruṇyāt bhagavān paramārsirāsurāye jijnāsamānāya tantrām provacā. as quoted in the yoga-bhāṣya (i.25)
38. sāmkhyasya vaktā kapilāḥ paramaṛṣiḥ sa uchyaṭe (Mbh.)
39. pāncamanāḥ kapilo nāma siddheśāḥ kāla viplutam / provacāsuraye sāmkhyam tattvayā mavinirṇayam // (BP, i. 3.10)
All these facts clearly point to his mythological origin and he may not be taken as an historical personage.

Āsuri: The initiation of Āsuri by Kapila as depicted by Paramārtha, Māthara (Kā, 1) and Jayamaṅgalā (Kā, '70), is also fanciful. All these authorities declare unanimously that Kapila appeared thrice before Āsuri—each time after a lapse of a millenium. Perhaps the story come down to these teachers from the works of ancient authorities on the subject. Thus we find that mythological element is prominent everywhere and as a result of this, the historical fact has totally disappeared. Further, the commentators as mentioned above characterise Āsuri with the epithet 'Vṛṣasahasrayājī', i.e., one who had performed sacrifices for thousand years. This shows that before his initiation, he was a staunch advocate of the Vedic sacrifices. The fact whether he was identical with Āsuri of Satapatha Brāhmaṇa is not possible to ascertain. The Purāṇas read his name along with Kapila and such other mental creations of the god Brahman, but Māthara (Kā,1) and the Jayamaṅgalā (Kā,70) mention the pupil of Kapila as a Brahmin, belonging to the clan of Āsuri. Hence it appears that some of the commentators regarded him as an historical person. The Mahābhārata states him to be the upholder of the doctrine of Brahman.

Pancaśikha: In the hierarchy of the Sāṅkhya teachers, Pancaśikha comes next to Āsuri from whom he is said to
have obtained the knowledge of Sāmkhya. Like Kapila and Āsuri, he is also portrayed mythologically in the Purāṇas. He is an authority on the Sāmkhya philosophy. His view are preserved and he is supposed to have flourished sometime between 100 and 300 A.D. Asvaghosa in his Buddhacarita, XXI, 10, also in one place mentions Āsuri and Pañcaśikha as celestial beings.

Vārsaganyā is a distinguished teacher of Sāmkhya, but unfortunately none of his systematic works has come down to us. All that we can know of him are a few references to his views scattered in the Sanskrit literature. However, he is a very ancient authority on Sāmkhya for the Mahābhārata even mentions him as a teacher on the subject. The name also appears in the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, but it is not certain whether the particular teacher is referred to there. In our opinion, he rewrote the original Saṣṭhītantra of Pañcaśikha.

Vindhyavāsa: Vindhyavāsa is one of the celebrated exponents of Sāmkhya whose views are referred to here and there in the Sanskrit Literature. He is somewhere mentioned as Vindhya-nivāsa and elsewhere as Vindhyavāsa.

40. Yuktidīpikā, pp. 72, 108, 130, NVTT, I, i.4, YB, iii, 44
41. XII, 318.59
42. Pā, I, i.51 (Varttika, 2)
Study of Sāṃkhya abroad

At one time, the western scholars were also found to have been interested in the study of the Sāṃkhya system. It is seen that, before 1831 A.D. Henry Thomas Colebrooke, published some articles on Sāṃkhya in the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society. Probably, in Europe, it is the first entrance of Sāṃkhya-Light. Colebrooke was a man of sincerity and wisdom and of great intellect. Prof. Goldstukar designated him as Prince of Orientalists. Really, it is not an exaggeration because under his smooth deliberation, the Sāṃkhya philosophy became clear and mostly elaborated. He made all arrangements for publishing the original Sāṃkhya-Kārikā with its English version but premature death took place the way of his great aspiration. In 1837 A.D. Sir Horace Hayman Wilson, with his own Commentary published the work. But, in the meantime Prof. Lassen published the original Sāṃkhya with its Latin Version in Germany in 1832 A.D. and in 1833 A.D. Prof. Panthere published the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā in Roman syllable with French translation in Paris. Even then the Pravacanasūtra was unknown in Europe. In 1854-55 A.D. Prof. Hall published Sāṃkhya-pravacanasūtra with the commentary of Vijnānabhaṭṭa in Bibliothica Indica. Later on, in 1862-65 A.D. Prof. Ballantyne published the English translation of Sāṃkhya-Sūtra under the title Sāṃkhya Aphorisms of Kapila. Then in 1894 A.D.
'Die Sāṁkhya philosophie' by Garbe was published in German was published in German language. It is the best book on Sāṁkhya in foreign countries. It is heard that there is the brief discussion on Sāṁkhya in Cousin's History of Philosophy by Cousin - a French Philosopher. Next, Prof. Max Muller in his Six Systems of Hindu Philosophy has discussed Sāṁkhya tenets on the basis of Tattvasamāsa and on the commentary of Āsuri. After that, in 1919 A.D. the interesting book entitled the Sāṁkhya System was written by Prof. A.B. Keith.

A Short account of Sāṁkhya System
with relation to Yoga

The Sāṁkhya is a system of realism, dualism and pluralism. It recognises the reality of the world as independent of spirit. It maintains a clear-cut dualism between Purusa and Prakrti and further maintains the plurality of Puruṣas and is silent about God. It is a pluralistic spiritualism, an atheistic realism and an uncompromising dualism.

In the Mahābhārata, there are clear references to the Sāṁkhya system. It seems highly probable that the Sāṁkhya in the beginning was based on the Upaniṣads and had accepted the theistic absolute, but later on, under
the influence of the Jaina and the Buddhistic thought, it rejected theistic monism and was content with spiritualism, pluralism and atheistic realism.' The Mahābhārata mentions the Sāmkhya and the Yoga as two eternal systems of thought.43

The Sāmkhya and the Yoga are described as allied systems. The philosophical basis of Yoga is the Sāmkhya. The Yoga adopts the Sāmkhya metaphysics and engrafts the concept of God upon it. It is called the theistic Sāmkhya, while the Sāmkhya system is called the atheistic Sāmkhya. The Yoga recognizes the reality of Prakṛti and its evolutes, countless individual souls (Puruṣa), and God. Prakṛti is the material cause of the world, and God is its efficient cause. He is not the creator of Prakṛti, nor is He the creator of souls. Prakṛti and souls are co-eternal with God. He disturbs the equilibrium of sattva, rajas and tamas, and starts the evolution of Prakṛti. He is the creator of the Vedas and reveals them for the enlightenment of souls at the end of each cycle. He associates and dissociates souls and prakṛti in accordance with their merits and demerits, and brings about evolution and dissolution

43. Sāmkhyaṃca yoganca sanātane dve, xiii, 30.
of the world. He removes obstacles to the evolution of Prakṛti, and to the achievement of liberation by souls.

The Sāmkhya believes in the reality of twenty-five principles, prakṛti, mahat, ahamkāra, manas, ten external sense organs, five tanmātrās, five gross elements, and souls. The Yoga assumes the reality of these twenty-five principles and adds the principle of God to them. It recognises the reality of twenty-six principles. It adopts the Sāmkhya ontology with slight variations. It agrees with the Sāmkhya in holding that bondage is due to non-discrimination between the self and Prakṛti, and that liberation is due to discrimination between them. But it lays stress on the practice of Yoga as an indispensable means to discriminative knowledge. This is the special feature of the Yoga system.

The Sāmkhya and the Yoga are so much inter-related in the Sanskrit literature that whenever any occasion arises of explaining or referring to the tenets and doctrines of the Sāmkhya, those of the Yoga also are not generally overlooked. The two systems do not vary in their essentials. The Sāmkhya lays emphasis upon knowledge which is regarded as the only means for attaining to the supreme reality, whereas the Yoga gives its whole-hearted support to meditation by which the mind is
progressively stilled and thus gradually becomes fit for achieving the supreme stage. The former is specially busy with the theoretical investigation, whereas the latter deals with the practical side. Speaking briefly, the two systems are nothing but the concave and convex side of the same sphere. Kautilya, in his *Arthasastra* mentions both Sānkhya and Yoga, and describes them to be the Ānvīksakīs, i.e., the systems which try to establish defects and merits of something by means of reasonings.

Some appreciations of the Sānkhya

1. tatkāraṇam sāmkhyayāgādhiṣṭhityam (SU, VI, 13)
2. sāmkhyam yogam samābhyaṃset
   puruṣam vā pāñcavimśakāṃ (Nirukta)
3. samsāramanādṛtya sāmkhyajñānāṃ
   samāsṛitya............. anīmādyaiśvāyapraśpanāṃ (BDP)
4. Sāmkhyāḥ sidāhāḥ (AGTP)
5. dvividhām niñśreyasāṃ sāmkhyayogāvīti (Devalavacanam)
6. sāmkhyāścādhyātmatattvajñāhī (VYVS)
7. nāsti sāmkhyasamāṃ jñānām nāsti yogasamāṃ balam
   (Mbh Śānti. 316.2)

44. Sāmkhyam yogo lokāyatām
cetyānvīksakī—kautilya under Vidyā-samuddeśā.
The important tenets of the Śāmkhya system

The important tenets of the Śāmkhya system are as follows:

(1) Padārthas - twenty five in number (Mahat etc.)

(2) Pramāṇas - three in number (Perception, inference and testimony)

(3) The theory of causation - satkāryavāda (i.e., the effect pre-exists in the cause)
(4) The theory of gunas - three in number (Sattva, Rajas and Tamas)

(5) Establishment of the multiplicity of the self (Puruṣabahutva)

(6) The theory of change (Pariñāmavāda)

(7) The theory of liberation or Mokṣa (Kaivalya)

SĀMKHYA

The Sāmkhya is the oldest school of Hindu philosophy, for it is the first attempt to harmonize the philosophy of the Vedas through reason. The unique position of the Sāmkhya in the history of thought is the fact that it expounds by careful reflection the first systematic account of the process of cosmic evolution which attempts to comprehend the universe as a sum total of twenty-five categories. This exposition is no mere metaphysical speculation, but is a purely logical account based on the scientific principles of conservation, transformation and dissipation of energy. The Sāmkhya is held to be the most notable attempt in the realm of pure philosophy.

The term Sāmkhya is derived from the word Sāmkhyā, 'number'. This name is used because the Sāmkhya enumerates the principles of cosmic evolution by rational analysis, and in the philosophical sense, the term is used because
this system teaches discriminative knowledge which enables us to distinguish between spirit and Matter.

The founder of the Sāmkhya was Kapila. Very little is known of this renowned sage and there is much controversy as to his actual date, however, the weight of authority places him in the sixth century B.C. According to tradition his father's name was Kardama and his mother's name was Devahūti. His father was an Rṣi (inspired sage), but Kapila is believed to have learned the rudiments of philosophy and the nature of the soul from his mother. A likeness of Kapila is carved in the cave temple of Anurādhāpura in Ceylon. The latter part of his life was passed on an island called Sāgara, situated in the mouth of the Ganges River ninety miles from Calcutta. Each year on the last day of the Hindu month Māgha (January–February) thousands of devotees visit the place where Kapila meditated and gave the fruits of his meditations to his disciples. In this manner the tradition of his life is still kept. Throughout India the memory of Kapila is worshipped as a Great Sage and Philosopher.

The purpose of the Sāmkhya is to provide that knowledge which will forever remove the cause of misery and thereby release the soul from its bondage. According to this system misery is threefold: (1) Ādhyātmika, i.e., proceeding from intrinsic causes, such as disorders of the
body and mind, (2) Adhibhautika, i.e. proceeding from extrinsic causes, such as other men, beasts, birds or inanimate objects, (3) Adhidaivika, i.e., proceeding from supernatural causes, such as the influence of the atmosphere or planets. It is undisputed that misery constitutes the real torment of the soul. The problem arises, how to terminate misery? If known means were sufficient, there would be no need to seek further, but all known means fail to be absolute. Medicine cannot cure forever, no more than a banquet can banish hunger for all time, therefore, it is necessary to search for that knowledge which will forever terminate misery.

The Sāmkhya argues that if misery is an attribute of the soul, there is no need to seek further, but it is universally agreed that the soul is free and devoid of all suffering, therefore, misery must belong to the body. The misery of the soul is said to be caused by its intimate association with the body. When the true nature of the soul is understood, bondage will no longer exist, and the soul will be forever free from all suffering. Bondage is claimed to be purely an illusion caused by incorrect knowledge of the true nature of things. The release and bondage of the soul depend solely upon knowledge and ignorance, therefore, it is believed that discriminative knowledge will forever release the soul from all misery.
The Sāmkhya deals exclusively with the empirical world which is governed by the rules of reason and can be known. It leaves the more transcendental speculations to other systems, maintaining that questions pertaining to the beginning of things are not conducive to enlightenment, concerning itself solely with the evolution of the existent universe.

The Sāmkhya teaches that the world-order is reason and is an expansion of the highest kind of intelligence, that there is no part without an assignable function, a value, a purpose, that there is always an exact selection of means for the production of definite ends, that there is never a random combination of events that there is order, regulation, system and division of function.

The phenomenal universe is considered as a dynamic order, an eternal process of unfolding, without beginning or end. All has evolved out of an Uncaused cause which is postulated in order to evade the fallacy of regressus infinitum, which is not consistent with a rational solution. The Sāmkhya leaves the Uncaused Cause undefined as being impossible to be conceived by the intellect. This absolute is beyond time, bay and space, beyond thought, it is without difference, without attribute, and without form. It is forever removed from
empirical knowledge, which concerns itself with the phenomenal world.

True evolution, according to the Sāmkhya system does not exist in the phenomenal world, but only in the chain of causation from the cosmic substance (Prakṛti) to the gross elements (mahābhūtas). The manifestations of the physical and biological world, such as insentient objects and animal bodies, are only modifications of five gross elements (mahābhūtas) and are not new modes of being. The gross elements (mahābhūtas) are classified as evaluates, which means that they are incapable, by definition, of producing a new mode of being. All their effects, from a ball of clay to a cow, are not new modes of being, they are only modifications of those gross elements (mahābhūtas). All such manifestations are just as gross as the matter from which they came, they are perceptible by the same organs of cognition, they have the common properties of grossness and perceptibility. This is not evolution, it is only modification.

For the investigation of the causal process, the Sāmkhya recognizes three means of correct knowledge, perception, inference and verbal testimony. According to the Sāmkhya, all known means of correct knowledge are comprehended in these three. As to which of these means
of knowledge in to be used in a particular instance depends solely upon what is to be known. Perception is used for objects which are in contact with sense-organs, inference is used when only the characteristic marks are known, verbal testimony is used for knowledge of these things that are beyond the perception of the senses and beyond the logical analysis of the mind.

The Sāmkhya is said to be the philosophical foundation of all Oriental Culture, the measuring rod of the entire mass of Hindu literature, the basis for all knowledge of the ancient sages (rṣis) and the key to all Oriental Symbolism.

For the purpose of study, the Sāmkhya postulates two ultimate realities, spirit (Purāsa) and Matter (Prakṛti), to account for all experience. They exist as logical principles and serve as the source out of which all things evolve. The Sāmkhya views the evolution of matter from its cosmic cause as a process of unfolding, a projection of potentialities into realities according to fixed laws that can be understood and controlled by man. This chain of causation is based on the fundamental tenet of the Sāmkhya that creation is impossible, for something cannot come out of nothing, change implies something to change, whatever is, always is, and whatever is not, never is.
For the sake of analysis, the Sāmkhya divides the process of cosmic evolution into twenty-five categories which are classified under four headings:

(1) That which is neither produced nor produces.
(2) That which is not produced but produces
(3) Those which are produced and do produce
(4) Those which are produced and do not produce.

The first is called Purusa (cosmic spirit). It is the unevolved which does not evolve, the uncaused which is not the cause of any new mode of being. The second is called Prakṛti (cosmic substance). It is the unevolved which does evolve, the uncaused cause of phenomenal existence.

The third group consists of seven categories called evolvents which are caused and serve as causes for new modes of being. They are Mahat (cosmic intelligence), Ahamkāra (Individuating principle) and five Tanmātras (Subtle Elements).

The fourth group consists of sixteen categories called evolutes which are ceased, but do not serve as
causes for new modes of being. They are Manas (Cosmic Mind), five Jñānendriyas (Abstract knowing-senses), and five Karmendriyas (Abstract working senses), and five Mahābhūtas (sense-particulars).

Puruṣa

The first principle postulated by the Sāmkhya system is called Puruṣa and is used to mean the soul of the universe, the animating principle of nature, the universal spirit. It is that which breathes life into matter, it is the source of consciousness. It is frequently identified with the deities Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva and Durgā.

By logical implication, Puruṣa is postulated to account for the subjective aspect of nature. It is the universal spirit, eternal, indestructible and all pervasive, it is pure spirit, without activity and attribute, without parts and form, uncaused, unqualified and changeless. It is the ultimate principle of intelligence that regulates, guides and directs the process of cosmic evolution, it accounts for the intelligent order of things, why the universe operates with such precision, why there is cosmos and not chaos. It is the efficient cause of the universe that gives the appearance of consciousness to all manifestations of matter, it is
the background that gives us the feeling of persistence, it is the static background of all manifest existence, the silent witness of nature.

The existence of Puruṣa is supported in the text by the following grounds:

'Spirit exists (as distinct from matter), since callocations serve a purpose of some (being) other than themselves, since this other must be the reverse of (what is composed of) the three constituents and so on, since there must be control (of the callocations), since there must be an enjoyer and since there is activity for the purpose of release (from three-fold misery)'.

These arguments can be further explained in the following manner:

1. Since everything that is produced is for the use of something other than itself (e.g., a chair is for another not itself), there must be a universal spirit to use the products of the cosmic substance (Prakṛti).

2. Since all manifestations of the Cosmic substance (Prakṛti) are objects composed of the constituents

45. The sāmkhyakārika, xvii.
(gunaś), there must be, by definition, a knower of these objects, devoid of the constituents (gunaś).

3. Since everything of the objective world is composed of the three constituents (gunaś) there must be something that controls them for the same reason that a car needs a driver.

4. Since the Cosmic substance (Prakṛti) is incapable of experience, there must be something else to account for universal experience.

5. Since all scriptures promise release, there must be something that transcends the cosmic substance (Prakṛti) out of which all things came.

The characteristics of Purusa described in the text are given as follows:

'And from the contrast with that (which is composed of the three constituents, etc.), there follows, for the spirit, the character of being a witness, freedom (from misery), neutrality, percipience and non-agency.'

Prakṛti

The second principle postulated by the Sāmkhya system is called Prakṛti. This is a Sanskrit word

46. Ibid., XIX
composed of the prefix pra 'before or first' and the root kr, 'to make or produce'. Here the term means that which existed before anything was produced, the primary source of all things, the original substance out of which all things have come and into which all things will eventually return. It is also called prādhāna, 'primary matter', and avyakta, 'non-manifest matter'. In English Prakṛti is called Primal Nature or Cosmic substance. The Tattvasamāsa-sūtravṛtti which is the oldest among the existing commentaries on the Tattvasamāsa-sūtra, refers to the following verse (mentioned in the foot-note) in connection with the definition of Pradhāna.

Prakṛti is established on purely logical grounds. The central argument used by the Sāṃkhya system is that something cannot come out of nothing. This view is technically called Satkāryavāda and is the distinguishing feature of this system. Upon this principle the material universe is traced back to a first

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47. prakṛṣṭavācakah pras'ca kṛtiśca srṣṭivācakah /
srṣṭau prakṛṣṭā ya devī prakṛtiḥ sā prakīrtita //
STK on SK, Kā, 3, p. 89

48. aśabdāmasparsāmarūpamavyayaṁ tathā ca nityaṁ
    rasagandhavajratām /
anādīmadhyam mahatāḥ param dhruvam prādhānam etat
    pravadanti surayaḥ //
cause. This first cause is Prakṛti (Cosmic substance).
To avoid infinite regress, Prakṛti is postulated to be
an uncaused cause. It is paramount to keep in mind that
Prakṛti is merely a logical assumption for the sake of
analysis. It is only a condition in Nature. It is
beyond the mind and can never be perceived by the mind,
no more than a surgeon can see the soul. It can be
understood through reason, but it can be known only
through the practice of Yoga.

The existence of Prakṛti (Cosmic substance) is
supported in the text by the following arguments:

"The effect subsists (even prior to the opera-
tion of the cause) since what is non-existent cannot be
brought into existence by the operation of a cause, since
there is recourse to the (appropriate) material cause,
since there is not production of all (by all), since
the potent (cause) affects (only) that of which it is
capable, and since (the effect) is non-different from
the cause." 49

The arguments can be further explained, thus:

1. The effect must have existed in the cause, because
whatever does not exist can never be brought into
existence, e.g., milk cannot be extracted

49. The Sāṃkhya-kārikā, IX.
from sand.

2. The effect must have existed in the cause, because every effect has its appropriate material cause, e.g., when butter is wanted, milk is sought, and not water.

3. The effect must have existed in the cause, because there must be a causal relationship between things that exist, otherwise, any cause could produce any effect, which is contrary to the cause.

4. The effect must be potentially contained in the cause, because only a particular cause can produce a particular effect, otherwise, any cause could produce any effect.

5. The effect must have existed in the cause, because the effect is never different from the cause, e.g., a cloth is of the same quality as the thread from which it is woven.

Cause and effect are only different states of the same thing, there is only a change of form, never of substance, therefore, the distinction is only the marking of two events in time. The cause is unevolved, and the effect is evolved. Both are real. The manifestation of the phenomenal world is only an evolution of the Cosmic substance (Prakṛti), and the dissolution of the phenomenal world is only an involution of the Cosmic substance (Prakṛti).
Nothing now is created, all is but a manifestation of what already existed. According to the Sāmkhya system the eternal process of nature is without beginning or end.

The characteristics of Prakṛti are described in the text, thus:

'The evolved is caused, non-eternal, non-pervasive, mobile, manifold, dependent, mergent, conjunct, and heteronomous, the unevolved is the reverse (of all these)'.

By logical implication, Prakṛti (Cosmic substance) is the uncaused cause, therefore, it is eternal, indestructible, and all-pervasive. It is formless, limitless, immobile, and immanent. It has position but no magnitude, its centre is everywhere; and its circumference is nowhere'. It is inanimate and unintelligent. It is an ultimate and not a derivative principle, it is the root principle, the seat of all manifestation; the normal cause of the phenomenal world, the potential power of becoming, the instrumental cause of the world, the substance in which all attributes and action inhere. It is not produced, yet it brings every thing else into existence, it is the support of all

50. Ibid, X.
things, yet it is unsupported, it absorbs all things, yet it is not absorbed by anything else.

The Guṇas

Prakṛti (Cosmic substance) consists of three constituents,51 powers called Guṇas. These are postulated to account for the diversified objects of experience. The word guṇa is derived from the Indo-European base gere 'twirl, wind'. Here the term is used to mean a single thread or strand of a cord, that is, a constituent of Prakṛti (Cosmic substance). The Guṇas are as essential to Prakṛti as heat is to fire, for one cannot exist without the other. The three constituents are called Sattva-Guṇa, Rajo-Guṇa and Tamo-Guṇa and each has its characteristic function.

Sattva-Guṇa is derived from Sat, 'that which is real or existent'. Here it is used to connote that power of nature that illuminates and reveals all manifestations. It is responsible for the lightness of things, the upward movement of fire, and the blowing across of wind. It is devoid of excitement and is the cause of equilibrium. It

51. sattvarajastemāsām śāmyāvasthā prakṛtiḥ.
has no motion of its own, therefore, it is incapable of
action or reaction. It manifests itself as light.

Rajo-Guna is according to one authority, derived
from rañj, 'to be coloured, affected or moved,' and must
be a homonymn of rajas, 'darkness'. Hence it is used to
connote that power of nature which affects and moves the
other two constituents. It is the activating and exci-
ting potency without which the other constituents could
not manifest their inherent qualities. Its function is
to move things, overcome resistance, do work. It is
responsible for all motion and change that goes on
throughout nature. It gives matter its force and impetus
and imparts motion to air and fire. It manifests itself
as the force of the winds.

Tamo-Guna means 'darkness'. Hence it is used to
connote the power of nature that restrains, obstructs and
envelops the other two constituents by counter-acting
the tendency of rajas to do work and Sattva to reveal. It
is the restraining and binding potency of nature. Its
function is to resist motion. It is responsible for the
attraction and downward pull of the earth and the tendency
of water to descend. It is the cause of mass, weight and
inertia. It makes it possible for us to feel
These three constituents are the sum and substance of Prakṛti (Cosmic substance). They are the root of all change, the foundation of reality, the essence of all things. Before the manifestation of the objective world, they are in a state of perfect balance, equipoise. When this condition of equilibrium is disturbed, the phenomenal world begins to make its appearance. The predominance of one or the other of these three constituents accounts for the various stages in the process of Cosmic evolution.

During the potential condition of Prakṛti (Cosmic substance) the three Guṇas are in a state of constant motion within themselves without affecting one another. This inherent subtle movement is the nature of the Guṇas and exists without effecting any objective result. Because of this inherent movement, no external cause is necessary to upset this triune state of balance. The initial stress in nature is the result of past action (Karma).

In the process of Cosmic evolution, the three Guṇas are never separated, they co-exist in everything.

52. sattvam laghuprakāśakamistam upastambhakam ca rajāḥ guruvaraṇakameva tamaḥ

Parallel verses are found in Śrīmad-bhāgavatam also in Ch. XIV in sl. Nos. 6, 7 and 8.
Never do they function separately, but one or the other may predominate. They always support one another and intermingle with one another. They are as intimately conjoined as an electron and proton, the constituents of an atom. As the arrangement of atoms accounts for all the elements known to science, so does the arrangement of the Guṇas account for all the manifestations of nature.

When the balance of nature is first disturbed, Rajo-Guṇa is activated and tries to make sattva- Guṇa manifest, but this is restrained by Tamo-Guṇa. With the first manifestation, Sattva-Guṇa predominates in varying degrees down to a point where it is equalised by Tamo-Guṇa, which then remains in control down to the manifestation of gross matter. Sattva and Tamo Guṇas interact as expansion and contraction by the power of Rajo-Guṇa. This give rise to the motion and pause witnessed throughout nature. It is this interaction of the Guṇas that accounts for the diversified objects of the manifest world.

The three Guṇas lose their individual characteristics during the potential condition of Prakṛti (Cosmic substance) when they are in a state of perfect balance, however, they never coalesce, but ever remain
potentially ready to emerge as distinct aspects when the conditions for the next manifestation arise. Never are they non-existent, nor is their power diminished or altered in any way.

Puruṣa (spirit) and Prakṛti (Cosmic substance) with the three Guṇas (constituents) constitute the soul and substance of the universe. Actually, they are two aspects of a single thing, which is a mere abstraction of thought that exists only in the mind. They co-exist and are separated only for the purpose of formal demonstration, for they do not have any separate existence. All manifestation is the interaction of these two principles. Neither has independent function. The formless spirit (Puruṣa) cannot act by itself because it has no vehicle, the Cosmic substance (Prakṛti) can have no urge to action because it is inanimate, therefore, it is only by the union of spirit (Puruṣa) and Matter (Prakṛti) that existence can manifest. They are dependent upon one another and come into existence by the inseparable attribute of one another. Both are eternal realities, unmanifest, without beginning or end, all pervading with and omnipotent. These features are the salient points of this doctrine and must be correctly understood.

The original polarity appears as consciousness and unconsciousness, subject and object, knower and known.
creation is the first logical operation by which consciousness becomes disposed to remain as such on the one hand, and appear to cease to be as such on the other, however, consciousness never ceases to be, no matter how heavily veiled by Cosmic substance. The process of creation, maintenance and dissolution unceasingly recurs as an eternal rhythm of life and death, two phases of a single process.

As the result of past action (Karma), the great Cosmic substance (Prakṛti) quickens under the influence of the Spirit (Puruṣa). When the karmic stress appears, the Cosmic substance (Prakṛti) becomes massive as milk becomes massive when it condenses into curd. This is the first manifest condition of nature.

**Mahat**

The third principle postulated by the Sāmkhya system is called Mahatattva, the 'Great Principle', or simply Mahat. Here the term is used to mean Cosmic Intelligence. In this instance, intelligence is understood as the capacity to expand, reveal and ascertain. Here there is no ideation, relationship or identity.

Mahat (Cosmic Intelligence) is the first motion that arises in the supreme ideal universe, the first stage away from the original condition, the first product of the
Cosmic Substance (Prakṛti). It is the first appearance in the universe, the order that fulfills the ultimate destiny of nature, the first birth of intelligence. It prevades all space and permeates all manifestations. It is the stage when the previously undifferentiated energy determines upon a definite direction, towards a well-defined line of evolution. It is cosmic volution, will, or urge to satisfy a want that has been created by a disturbance of the perfect balance of nature. It is likened to the swollen state on the surface of the ocean just before the appearance of a wave. It is caused by a spirited (Karmic) stress that upsets the equilibrium of the Cosmic substance (Prakṛti) and sets in motion Rajo-Guṇa, the activating aspect of the causative constituents. This brings into being Sattva-Guṇa which manifests itself as pure light. It is classified as an evolvent, because it is produced and it produces a new mode of being.

Ahamkāra

The fourth principle is Ahamkāra. This term is composed of the personal pronoun aham, 'I', and the root Kr 'to do', make or perform'. Here it is used to mean the Individuating principle. It is responsible for the limitations, separation, and variety that come out of harmony. It is the state of active consciousness in
which the 'I' or illuminating aspect of consciousness identifies itself with the total 'this' and forms the dualistic state of the yet unmanifest universe. It is a state of Self-Realisation where the universal will resolves to act, a necessary condition before any act can be undertaken. It is classified as an evolvent, because it is produced and it produces new modes of being.

**Manas**

The fifth principle is Manas, derived from the root man, 'to think'. Here the term is used to mean the Cosmic Mind, the principle of cognition. It is important to understand the distinction between Mahat (Cosmic Intelligence) and Manas (Cosmic Mind). Mahat (Cosmic Intelligence) is classified as an evolvent, that is, it is produced and produces new forms of being, while Manas (Cosmic Mind) is an evolute, that is, it is produced, but does not produce new forms of being.

Manas (Cosmic Mind) is that state when the ideal universe becomes the object, emerging into view and forming a clearly defined picture. Ahamkāra (Individual Principle) was concerned with the 'I', Manas
(Cosmic Mind) is concerned with the 'this' aspect of the universal relationship, 'I am this'.

These three stages, Mahat (Cosmic Intelligence), Ahamkāra (Individuating Principle), and Manas (Cosmic Mind) are not marked out in time, but arise simultaneously. They are the outcome of the unbalance of the three causative constituents, they are universal, and ultimate by time and space, by name and form. Each step is discussed separately only for the purpose of understanding, but as to content of transcendental experience, they are identical.

**Indriyas**

The next ten principles are called Indriyas, meaning power, force or capacity. They are divided into two groups, five Abstract knowing Senses or powers of cognition called Jñānendriyas and five Abstract Working Senses or capacities for action called Karmendriyas. These powers are evolved to construct the world as a system of purposes or objects of desire. Their function is to give position to the objects.

The Jñānendriyas (Abstract knowing senses) are the power to Hear (Śrotra), the power of Feel (Āvak), the power to see (Caksus), the power to Taste (Rasanā), and
the power to smell (Ghrāṇā). The Karmendriyas (Abstract Working-Senses) are to power to express (Vāk), the power to procreate (Upastha), the power to excrete (Pāyu), the power to Grasp (Pāṇi), and the power to move (Pāda).

It must be kept in mind that these Abstract Sense-Powers (Indriyas) are only inherent capacities on the part of the Cosmic Mind (Manas) to cognize and act in one of five ways. They are powers which need instruments through which to function. All the Indriyas (Sense Powers) arise simultaneously with Mind (Manas), and are classified as evolutes since they are produced and do not produce new modes of being.

These ten-fold Abstract Sense-Powers (Indriyas) could have no real existence without objects. For example, the power to hear could have no meaning without something to hear, that is, sound. Similarly, with the other sense-power of feeling, seeing, fasting and smelling. They must have something upon which to operate. So the moment these ten-fold Abstract Sense-Powers (Indriyas) manifest themselves, their correlated Subtle Elements (Tanmatras) came into being.

Tanmatras

The next five principles are called Tanmatras. This term is composed of the pronoun tad, 'that', and
the root mā, 'to measure', used here in the word mātra, meaning, 'an element or elementary matter'. Here it is translated as 'merely that' or 'thatness'. They are the Subtle Elements of the Indriyas (Sense-powers). They are the essence of sound (Śabda), Touch (Sparśa), Form (Rūpa), Flavour (Rasa), and Odour (Gandha).

These Subtle Elements (Tanmātras) are the five-fold extensions of the formless manifestation of energy, the first conceivable division of matter, the subtlest form of actual matter, without magnitude, super-sensible, and perceived mediately only through particular objects. They are classified as evolvents, for they are produced and produce new modes of being. From these the universe comes forth, continues, and finally disappears.

Through a further increase of the restraining aspect of the Tamo-Guna, there is produced in the five Subtle Elements (Tanmātras) an accretion of mass which forms the five Sense-particulars (Mahābhūtas).

Mahābhūtas

The last five principles of the Sāmkhya system are called Mahābhūtas, derived from the root bhu, 'to be, to come into being, to exist'. They are the five forms into which Cosmic Substance (Prakṛti) differentiates
itself, namely: Ether (Ākāśa), Air (Vāyu), Fire (Tejas), Water (Āpas), and Earth (Prthivī).

The five Sense-Particulars (Mahābhūtas) are postulated in order to account for the vehicles through which the Subtle Elements (Tanmātras) manifest themselves, for example the Tanmātras of sound (Śabda) cannot be heard if it does not have the Mahābhūta of Ether (Ākāśa) to serve as its vehicle. Each Sense-Particular (Mahābhūta) is conditioned and evolved from the one immediately preceding it, and has a special property in addition to the general qualities of the others from which it was evolved. For the sake of discussion, each can best be considered separately.

The first Sense-Particular (Mahābhūta) is Ākāśa (Ether), derived from the prefix ā and the root Kas, 'to appear'. Here it is used to mean the principle of vacuity. It has the special property of sound, therefore, it can be heard, but cannot be felt, seen, tasted or smelled; i.e., a clear sound has no touch, no form, no flavour, no odour. It is only a sound beyond the range of the four senses.

The second Sense-Particular (Mahābhūta) is Vāyu (Air), derived from the root va, 'to blow'. Here it is used to mean the principle of motion. Its function
is pressure or impact. It has the special property of touch and the general quality of sound, therefore, it can be felt and heard, i.e., a gust of pure air has a touch and a sound, but no form, no flavour, no odour, therefore, it cannot be seen, tasted, or smelled.

The third sense—Particular (Mahābhūta) is Tejas (Fire), derived from the root tij, 'to be sharp'. Here it is used to mean the principle of luminosity. Its function is expansion. It has the special property of form and the general quality of touch and sound, therefore, it can be seen, felt, and heard: i.e., a pure blue flame has a form, a touch, and a sound, but no flavour or odour; therefore, it cannot be tasted or smelled.

The fourth sense—Particular (Mahābhūta) is Āpas (Water), derived from the root word ap, 'water'. Here the term is used to mean the principle of liquidity. Its function is contraction. It has the special property of flavour and the general quality of form, tough, and sound, therefore, it can be tasted, seen, felt, and heard, i.e., a glass of pure water has a flavour, a form, a touch, and a sound, but no odour, therefore, it cannot be smelted.
The fifth sense - Particular (Mahabhuta) is Prthivī (Earth), derived from the Indo-European base plet (h)e, 'broad, flat, extended'. Here it is used to mean the principle of solidarity. Its function is cohesion. It has the special property of odour and the general qualities of flavour, form, touch and sound, therefore, it can be smelled, tasted, seen, felt and heard, i.e., an apple has an odour, a flavour, a form, a touch, and a sound, therefore, it can be known by the five senses.

The following outline shows the relation of the five Sense-Particulars (Mahabhutas) to one another:

- Ether has sound
- Air has sound and touch
- Fire has sound, touch and form
- Water has sound, touch, form and flavour
- Earth has sound, touch, form, flavour and odour.

There is a thorough discussion about it in the Manusamhitas, Chap.I.
With the manifestation of the Sense-Particular (Mahābhūta) the process of Cosmic evolution comes to rest, therefore, these principles or tattvas are classified as evolutes, that is, they are produced and do not produce any new mode of being. All manifestations in the phenomenal world are said to be modifications of these principles and not the creation of anything new.

Some important Śāṅkhya-works

The oldest account of the Śāṅkhya system, according to some authorities, is given in the Śāṅkhya Pravacana-sūtra and the Tattvasamāsa. These works are generally attributed to Kapila, but there is no tangible evidence to support this claim. According to tradition, Kapila left no written works, but passed his knowledge on to Āsuri, who, in turn, taught Pañcasikha, the reputed author of the works just mentioned.

(a) Tattva-Samāsa: An work of note on the system is the Tattva-Samāsa, which, as its name indicates, is very brief—hardly more than a table of contents, as it has been characterized Tattva-Samāsa, attributed to Kapila, is a catechism on Śāṅkhya Philosophy, written before 1600 AD. It was regarded by Max Muller as the oldest work on the subject, but that view is not generally accepted now.
(b) **Sāmkhya-Sūtra**: A second work of importance on the system is the *Sāmkhya-sūtra* or the *Sāmkhya-pravacana-sūtra*, ascribed to Kapila himself, but the work, though much of its material may be really old, is clearly a very late production and cannot be assigned to a date earlier than the fourteenth century A.D. It has not been used in the *Sarvadarśana Sāmaṇḍraha*. It consists of six chapters. Of these, the first three give an exposition of the Sāmkhya principles, the fourth gives illustrative stories, the fifth refutes rival views and the sixth rounds off the discussion with a recapitulation.

(c) **Sāmkhya-Kārīka**: The classic text book on the Sāmkhya system is the *Sāmkhya-Kārīka* by ĪsvaraKrṣṇa, is the earliest available as well as the most popular text book on Sāmkhya Philosophy. The *Sāmkhya Kārīka* claims to be merely a condensation of an earlier text called the Saṣṭītantra, leaving out only the parables and the refutation of rival systems. There is considerable controversy over the Saṣṭītantra, and the available data are not sufficient to allow for any definite statement. There is divergent opinion regarding the actual date of the work, *Sāmkhya Kārīka*. Some authorities assign it to the first or the first half of the second century A.D., while others contend that it belonged to the third century A.D. and some place it in the fifth century A.D. But, roughly
speaking, we may take its author Isvarakṛṣṇa to have been a contemporary of Kālidāsa. The work consists of seventy stanzas and is on that account sometimes designated as the Sāmkhya-Saptati. It contains a brief but exceedingly lucid exposition of the theoretical teaching of the system and has been described as 'the pearl of the whole scholastic literature of India'.

This book with a commentary whose identity is not quite certain, was translated into Chinese language under the name of 'the Golden Seventy Discourse'—most popularly known: as 'Hiranyasaptati' or 'Suvarnasaptati' by one Paramārtha, a Brahmin of Ujjayain who went to China in A.D. 546 on the invitation of its then Emperor and spent the rest of his life there. It has been commented upon by several, including Vācaspati—the well-known advaitic scholar of the ninth century A.D. Most important commentaries on Sāmkhya are Yuktidīpika (Author unknown) Mātharavṛtti of Māthara, Tattvekaumudi of Vācaspati Miśra, and Jayamangalā of Sāmkarācārya. Another important commentary on Sāmkhya-Kārika is Gaudapāda's Bhāṣya (8th century A.D.) is held to be based on the Mātharavṛtti, but there is able argument to the contrary.

(d) Sāmkhya-tattva-Kaumudi: It is a philosophical work by Vācaspati Miśra. Vācaspati is supposed to have based his account of the sixty topics on the Rājavārtika. The
Sāṃkhyā-tattva-Kaumudi is an excellent exposition of Sāṃkhyā Philosophy. The commentary is very lucid and expressive, and like the Yukti-dīpikā it is not found to raise any hair-splitting argument in elucidating the text of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

(e) Sāṃkhyā-pravacana-bhāṣya: The most important commentary on the Sāṃkhyā-pravacana-sūtra is Vijñāna-bhikṣu’s Sāṃkhyā-pravacanabhāṣya. It is assigned to the sixteenth century A.D. In it the author endeavours to minimise the distinction between the Sāṃkhyā and the theistic Vedānta, which he regards as the genuine Vedānta, while the Advaita Vedānta is its modern falsification.

(f) Yuktidīpikā: The Yuktidīpikā is the earliest available commentary on the Sāṃkhyākārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. It is the most extensive in extent and the most comprehensive in import. It expounds the system of Sāṃkhyā in all possible details and justifies it with all possible arguments. It tries its best to save the theories of Sāṃkhyā from the intellectual onslaught at the hands of the other systems. The unique feature of the Yuktidīpikā, which raises it to the height of importance, is the reference to the views of pre-Īśvara kṛṣṇa Sāṃkhyā teachers the works of which are lost to us. It easily fills the gaps in the literary continuity of
of Sāṁkhya. It is rightly termed the illuminator of Reasoning (to justify the system of Īśvarakṛṣṇa). This makes the study of the Yuktidīpikā essential for the complete understanding of Sāṁkhya.

(g) Sāṁkhya-Sāra: A brief introduction to Sāṁkhya philosophy, by Vijnānabhikṣu.

(h) Sāṁkhya-Candrika: It is a commentary based chiefly on the work of Vācaspṭi Misra written by Nārāyaṇatīrtha. Truely speaking, it is a sub-commentary as it is written on the basis of Sāṁkhya-tattvavāmudrī of Vācaspṭi Misra which is an important commentary on Sāṁkhya Kārīka by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Some authorities say that it is a treatise on Gauḍapāda's work.

(i) Sāṁkhya-taruvāsantah - The latest commentary is the Sāṁkhya-taruvāsantah by Muḍumbā Narasimhasvāmin, who tries to relate the Vedānta and the Sāṁkhya.

Other works of interest are Aniruddha's Sāṁkhya-vṛttī (15th Cent. A.D.), Mahādeva's Sāṁkhya-vṛttisāra (17th Cent. A.D.), Nāgeśa's Laghusāṁkhya-sūtravṛttī, of minor importance, and Vijnānabhikṣu's Sāṁkhya-pravacanabhāṣya (16th Cent. A.D.) which is the most important work on the Sāṁkhya-pravacanasūtra. Other important works by Vijnānabhikṣu are Sāṁkhyaśāra,
Yogavārttika, Yogasārasamgraha and Vijnānāmṛta, a commentary on the Vedāntasūtra. Two latest works of philosophical value are Śūmānanda's Samkhyatattvaviveca and Bhāvāgāneśa's Samkhyatattvavāṭhārthyaḍūpana.

List of most available works on Śāmkhya System:

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<tr>
<th>Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>Śāmkhyaśūtram or Śaḍadhyaśīyi Śūtra</td>
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<td>or Śāmkhya-pravaca Śūtra(1400 A.D.)</td>
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<td>Tattvasamāsa (Probably 1400 A.D.)</td>
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Reference of Śāmkhya in Upaniṣads

Mahābhārata and Śrīmadbhagavatgītā

Although the principles of the Śāmkhya in their details are not to be found in the Upaniṣads, yet the presence of Śāmkhya-ideas in germinal forms in the Upaniṣads is an undisputed fact. Of course, the main theme of all the Upaniṣads is both idealistic and monistic, as each one of them seeks to establish the supremacy of one infinite spirit, but there are passages here and there, indicating the growth of ideas which were knitted into systematic form in the philosophy of Śāmkhya. The Śāmkhya philosophy advocates the existence of dual principles of Puruṣa and Prakṛti and this
dualistic tendency is not totally absent in the Upanisads. The leading Upanisadic conceptions, however, are not in favour of establishing dualism as final and ultimate. So, though spirit and matter, ātman and prakṛti are admitted in many places, still the main tendency of the upanisadic literature always flows in the direction of monism or absolutism and not in the direction of rigid dualism or pluralism.

Sāmkhya in the Mahābhārata:

Like the Upanisads, the Mahābhārata also contains within itself valuable suggestions, expositions and lucid analysis of Sāmkhya concepts which may suitably be knitted together for the development of a Sāmkhya stand. Of course, these ideas are so scattered and so diversely explained that the task of spinning out only one coherent system of thought is fraught with great risks. Both theistic and atheistic versions of the Sāmkhya system can be gathered from these materials, without much strain and twist. The most common view of the Sāmkhya, that has been frankly and openly admitted in several chapters of the 'Sānti Parva' of the Mahābhārata is, however, theistic and monistic, although an atheistic tendency, too, represented by the teachings of Pañcaśikha boldly hovers round this theistic conception.
Sāmkhya in the Śrīmadbhagavadgītā:

In the Śrīmadbhagavadgītā, the word Sāmkhya has been used in many contexts, but nowhere it has been used in the sense of Kapila Āśāmkr̥ṣa or any other form of Sāmkhya. There is a reference of the word Sāmkhya in the second chapter of the Gītā, but here, it cannot be interpreted in any manner except 'pursuit of true knowledge'. In other words, in this context, the word Sāmkhya is clearly used in the sense of the path of philosophic wisdom, leading to the realisation of the essential nature of the soul or ātman. Lord Kṛṣṇa says that so far he has explained, in details, the doctrine of self-knowledge to Arjuna, his favourite disciple, and that now, he is going to give him instruction regarding the path of duties (Karma-yoga). His subsequent instruction thus refers actually to Karma-yoga or the disinterested performance of duties. Sāmkhya-yoga or 'the path of knowledge' directly destroys ignorance which is the root-cause of human misery and is, therefore, meant for those blessed seekers who are endowed with keen intellectual and volitional power for discrimination and renunciation.

In a passage in the third chapter, the word Sāmkhya is definitely used in the sense of 'wisdom', as it

53. Gītā, Chap. 2.39.
has been stated that the Samkhya (wisemen) follow the path of knowledge for attaining liberation from the miseries of the world. Both Śaṅkara and Śrīdhara Swāmi have taken the word Samkhyānam in the sense of wise people. These wise people are born, as it were, with a thorough and clear knowledge of ātman, and their earnest devotion to knowledge helps them to renounce the world for the sake of direct realisation of the highest truth. Again, it has been stated in the Chapter XIII that there are persons who perceive the self in accordance with the Samkhya-yoga. Śaṅkara and Śrīdhara Swāmi have interpreted the word Samkhya as the doctrine of the discriminatory knowledge of Purusa, Prakṛti and the Guṇas. Śaṅkara has explained the meaning of the word Samkhya only, but the word Yoga is left unexplained. Śrīdhara Swāmi has tried to make his position better by identifying the word Yoga with the Aṣṭāṅga Yoga of Patanjali but Prof. S.N. Das Gupta has

54. The Bhagavad Gītā, Chapter 3-3
55. Śrīdhara Swāmi: Samkhyaśāstra, Śrīdhara Swāmi
57. Ibid, Chap. 13-25.
pointed out in his *History of Indian Philosophy* (Vol. Ii) that Śrīdhara Śrīmī has failed to explain how this Ṭhāṅga-Yoga can be identified with the philosophy of the Sāmkhya. Indeed, Patanjali's Ṭhāṅga-Yoga is not totally identical with Kapila's Sāmkhya and for that reason, while identifying these two, one is undoubtedly required to give a rational justification for his own stand. The Gītā again says, 'Ignorant people only think that Sāmkhya and Yoga are different, but the wise men always realises fully the unity between the two'. The followers of Sāmkhya reach the same goal which is also reached by the followers of Yoga, so he, who perceives them as identical, perceives the truth.58 The fact that here too Sāmkhya and Yoga do not refer to the traditional Sāmkhya and Yoga doctrines, is clearly made evident by the following words of Prof. S.N. Das Gupta. 'In these passages, Sāmkhya and Yoga seem, from the context, to refer respectively to Karma-sannyāsa and Karma-Yoga. Sāmkhya here can only in a secondary way mean to renunciation of the fruits of one's actions. The person who realises the true nature of his self, and knows that the self is unchangeable and infinite, cannot feel himself attached to the fruits of his actions and cannot be affected by ordinary mundane desires and

58. Ibid, Chap. 5-4.5.
earnings. As in the case of the different uses of the word Yoga, so here also the word Sāmkhya, which primarily, means true knowledge, is also used to mean renunciation, and since Karma-Yoga means the performance of one's duties in a spirit of renunciation, Sāmkhya and Yoga means practically the same thing and are, therefore, identified here and they are both regarded as leading to the same result.\footnote{59} Thus, Sāmkhya and Yoga are regarded as identical only in the sense of renunciation and not in the sense of the traditional Sāmkhya-Yoga doctrines of Kapila and Patañjali schools.

From the above discussions, it is clear that the word Sāmkhya has been used in a special sense in the philosophy of the Gīta, although this sacred book too, aims at imparting to us a thorough knowledge of Purusa, Prakṛti and Gunaṣ.

(ii) Prama and Pramana

**What is Epistemology?**

The theory of valid knowledge or Pramāṇa goes by the name of 'Epistemology' in philosophy. So, before going to discuss the Pramāṇas we must have a clear knowledge about the Epistemology. So to say, 'what does it

\footnote{59. History of Indian Philosophy, Vol.II, p. 457.}
mean' ? 'what is it's subject-matter'? Relation of it with Logic etc. and such and such.

The term 'Epistemology' has been derived from 'Episteme' meaning knowledge and 'Logos' meaning science of theory. Epistemology, therefore, is the theory or science of knowledge. Epistemology is a science which enquires into the nature, origin, range and conditions of knowledge.

Epistemology is a term used in English, American and, more rarely, in French and in some trends of German bourgeois philosophy. The introduction of this term is attributed to the Scotish philosopher J.F. Ferrier (Institutes of Metaphysics, 1854), who divided philosophy into Ontology and Epistemology. The word 'Epistemology' denotes the theory of valid knowledge, an important province of philosophical theory, the doctrine on man's ability to cognise reality, on the sources, forms and methods of cognition, the truth and the ways of attaining it. The approach to the fundamental question of philosophy is the point of departure in Epistemology. It 'includes what is now called the theory of knowledge, or epistemology, which, too, must regard its subject-matter historically, studying and generalising the origin and development of knowledge, the transition from non-knowledge to knowledge'. Knowledge in general is analysable
into ideas, - ideas about things of the external world, about other men and about one's own self. The ideas about everyone of the three categories mentioned above constitute knowledge only when they have all been systematized and absorbed by the 'subject', the knower. It will at once be noticed that not all ideas are of the same value and validity. This is evident from our reference to some ideas as true and some others as false. The awareness of such a distinction between true and false knowledge, what is also referred to as valid and invalid knowledge, presupposes an enquiry into the origin and validity of all knowledge. The study whose concern is a systematic reflection about knowledge, a reflection which is solely centred round knowledge itself is Epistemology.

**Epistemology and Ontology or Metaphysics**

Epistemology enquires into the conditions under which knowledge is possible. It means the 'science of knowledge'. It is an enquiry into the nature, origin, range and conditions of knowledge. It seeks to answer following questions. Is knowledge of reality possible at all or not? What is the nature of knowledge? What is the origin and source of knowledge? What is the range, extent or limit of knowledge? What are the
conditions of the validity of knowledge?

What, then, is the relation of epistemology to ontology or metaphysics? Epistemology is the theory of knowing, while ontology is the theory of being or reality. Ontology must be preceded by epistemology, since we cannot investigate the ultimate nature of the reality that is known, unless we already justify our claim to do so by a prior criticism of the organ of knowledge and prove that knowledge is possible. If we are constituted in such a way that we cannot know the reality—if knowledge is absolutely impossible, it is quite useless to investigate the nature of the reality. Epistemology, thus, is the fundamental basis and groundwork of Ontology or metaphysics. Ontology is the theory of reality.

Formerly philosophers dogmatically assumed an ultimate reality and sought to deduce everything of the universe from it, without a previous enquiry into the possibility of knowledge. But this is sheer dogmatism. But though epistemology is an indespensable preliminary of philosophy, it must not be identified with philosophy. As a matter of fact, epistemology and ontology are so intimately related to each other, that one cannot stand without the other. A particular theory of knowledge leads to a particular theory of being, a particular theory of being presupposes a particular theory of knowing. In order
to ascertain whether knowledge reveals to us any reality we must know that knowledge itself is, and the nature of reality cannot be understood unless we know how it is related to knowledge. The question of the nature and validity of our knowledge and the question of the ultimate nature of what we know are in reality two sides of the same enquiry—two aspects of the same study.

**Epistemology and Logic**

Epistemology is the theory of knowledge. It enquires into the origin, nature, validity, and extent of knowledge. It is specially concerned with the conditions of the validity of knowledge. It cannot enquire into validity of knowledge without enquiring into the nature of the reality comprehended by knowledge. The nature of the reality is investigated by metaphysics. So, epistemology is closely connected with metaphysics.

Epistemology enquires into the general conditions of the validity of knowledge. It does not enquire into the details of the various processes of proof. Logic is the special enquiry into the estimation of evidence. It enquires into the various kinds of proof, or evidence and the conditions of their validity. It investigates the nature and validity of the various kinds of inference,
deduction and induction. It does not discuss the general conditions to which evidence must conform in order to prove its conclusion. It avoids metaphysical discussions. Epistemology is a general enquiry into the conditions of valid knowledge. Logic is a special enquiry into the nature of proof or evidence and its validity. Epistemology is a more general study than Logic. It is closely connected with metaphysics. Logic avoids metaphysical discussions. But it cannot successfully tackle the foundations of reasoning without some metaphysical discussion. Epistemology is more metaphysical than Logic.

**place of Epistemology in Philosophy**

Epistemology or the theory of knowledge has acquired special importance in European philosophy in the modern period, particularly in the philosophies of Leckie, Hume and Kant. Kant thought that without a prior critical examination of the elements, sources and limits of knowledge we should not engage in metaphysical discussion. So he regarded all previous philosophy as dogmatic as contrasted with his own critical philosophy. In no more recent times, however, the American neo-realist have tried to oppose the general modern European trend, initiated by Kant, that the theory of knowledge should precede the theory of reality. They have chosen to be consciously dogmatic. They are led to this position by a kind of
reaction against the use of epistemology made by most modern idealists for establishing idealistic theories of reality.

But in India the position has been otherwise. From the very beginning of the different systems of philosophy until recent times, discussions on the problems of knowledge (including those of doubt and error) have formed an essential part of philosophy. The reason for this striking and continued unanimity can be found in the fact that all schools of Indian philosophy, without exception, regarded ignorance as the root-cause of human suffering, so that they were all bent upon discovering the means and processes of true knowledge by means of which reality could be known and life could be so lived as to overcome misery or minimize suffering. Vātsyāyana voices the feelings of all Indian thinkers on this matter when, in commenting upon the first sutra of Gautama, he says that the study of the sources of knowledge (Pramāṇa) is necessary, because through it alone can we properly known reality and thereby guide our actions so as to be able to attain desirable ends and avoid suffering.

Epistemology thus becomes closely linked up with ontology and both of them again with ethics. Knowledge and moral perfection are regarded as necessary to each other in almost all systems of Indian thought. Sometimes
knowledge is regarded as the means to the good life, sometimes again moral purity is regarded as indispensable for perfect knowledge, so that morality and knowledge are regarded as the two inseparable aspects of perfection.

In the course of the development of the Indian systems interest in epistemology increased and it began to claim a large share in the philosophical discussions of almost every school. The motives were sometimes theoretical, sometimes practical, sometimes simply polemical. But all led to the enrichment of epistemological thought and literature.

Analysis and Sources of Knowledge

The factors constituting and connected with knowledge (jñāta or pramā) are usually analysed into the subject (jñātṛ or pramātṛ), the object (jñeya or prameya), and the means of knowledge (pramāṇa). But consciousness is not always regarded as the product of any relation between the subject and the object. The Sāmkhya, the Vedānta and the Jaina schools conceive the self as possessed of intrinsic consciousness, so that knowledge is nothing more than the relation of the object to an already existing consciousness of the self. The Sāmkhya, the Yoga and the Vedānta assert the possibility of the existence of consciousness even when there is no object. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsaka hold, as do some western
thinkers, that consciousness — and so knowledge — is a product of the relation of the self, previously unconscious, to some object in some appropriate way. The Buddhists also regard consciousness, like every other phenomenon, as a momentary product of several conditions.

A distinction is maintained, however, by the Saṃkhya-Yoga and the Vedānta between consciousness as it is in itself (Svarūpa-Caitanya) and empirical consciousness or consciousness of objects (Vṛtti-Caitanya). With the help of this distinction these schools can also maintain the common-sense notion of knowledge (as beginning in time and depending on the relation of the self to some object), because such knowledge only means empirical consciousness of some object. But they point out, like Green, that consciousness in itself is original and eternal, and it transcends time and space. In fact, such intrinsic consciousness is regarded as identical with the self (Ātman) itself. According to the Saṃkhya and the Yoga, the self as the knower is real, and it is distinguished from objects as known. The relation of the self to objects is not possible, according to these schools, unless the object produces through the senses and manas some image of itself in the intellect (buddhi). This modification of buddhi (technically called Vṛtti) is illuminated by the self or consciousness, resulting in the
knowledge of the object. But as the Advaita regards the
distinction between the knower and the known as a practi-
cal make-shift, untenable in the ultimate analysis, it
does not hold, like the Saṃkhya, the reality of even the
role of the self as the knower. The knower and the known
are but the two apparent aspects of one basic reality, the
real Self or Brahman. Knowledge should not be considered
therefore to be really an external relation. It is only
the self-shining consciousness that is the very nature of
existence, including the apparent subjects and objects.
But to explain knowledge in terms of the dualistic beliefs
of the ordinary man, the Advaitān adopts to a certain
extent the Saṃkhya theory of knowledge, with the important
difference that he does not regard knowledge as an
external relation. The object in contact with the external
sense or directly present to the internal sense
(antahkaraṇa) causes a modification (Vṛtti) of the latter.
This Vṛtti only serves to remove, though to that extent
and in that respect only, the illusory distinction between
the knower and the known. For the Buddhist idealist, the
Vijñānavādin, every objective knowledge, is an illusory
externalization or external projection of a subjective idea.

Knowledge, in the strict sense of correct cognition,
is called prāmaṇa and a source of knowledge is called a
prāmaṇa. Unlike western logic that generally admits two
chief sources of knowledge, perception and inference,
Indian epistemology admits, in the different schools, one to six sources of knowledge. Brief discussion will be given later on.

**Nature of Knowledge**

The problem of knowledge is the most comprehensive of all problems in philosophy. Its comprehensive character is due to the conditions and factors that have been suggested by different schools of thinkers, not only in the present age but also at the different periods of the history of philosophy. Knowledge is the basis of all practical activities. The function of knowledge is to illuminate things other than itself. Knowledge inherently refers to an object that is known and it always belongs to a subject that knows. There can be no knowledge existing independently by itself without implying a knower and a thing known. Knowledge is a self-transcending property of the self. It reveals certain objects to the self which has certain ends in view. It argues the self to act with regard to the objects thus revealed. The knowing activity helps the self in fulfilling its practical purposes. The self appropriates or avoids objects in accordance with the character of the objects that is revealed to it by the act of cognition.

The self is essentially a spiritual substance. It is the

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60. *pratityā vastantaraprakāśāsvabhāvā*

NR on SV, *Nirālambanavāda*, 44.
abode of intelligence (Caitanyāsraya). Intelligence or sentience is an essential property of the self, which differentiates it from the material substances. Desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and cognition are the specific properties of the self. These can never belong to matter which is non-intelligent. Intelligence implies consciousness, purposes and the capacity of adopting means to ends. No intelligent being acts without some end in view. However, dull a man may be, he always indulges in action with some conscious purpose. Intelligence is the capacity of the self to 'enjoy', which implies desire, cognition and effort. Thus the self is essentially a purposive entity and sentence is its inseparable property.

Knowledge, according to Nyāya, is the manifestation of objects. Knowledge is revelatory of reality (Arthapraékśa). Knowledge is the apprehension of objects. Padārthā is an object of valid knowledge (Premitivistya) according to Vaiśeṣika. The Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā philosophy is an advocate of triputīsaṁvit, according to which the knower, the known and the knowledge are

61. prayojanamanuddisya na mando'pi pravartate.
   SV, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra, 53

62. Ibid, 100

63. SV, Ātmavāda, 26
given simultaneously in every act of cognition. Knowledge reveals itself as well as the knower and the known. In the consciousness, 'I know this' we have the three presentations of the 'I' or the subject (ahamvittti), 'this' or the object (Viṣayavittti), and the conscious awareness (Svasāmavittti). All consciousness is at the same time self-consciousness as well as object-consciousness. In all knowledge the self is known directly through the agency and the contact of the mind. But there is not always a direct knowledge of the object. Knowledge is of the nature of light or illumination according to Prabhākara school of Pūrvamīmāṁsā, Vijñānavādins (Buddhists) and also of Advaita Vedāntins. Knowledge as the nature of light does not require anything to manifest it. Knowledge is self-illumined, and is neither perceived as object, nor known by another knowledge. If knowledge is known as an object, then each individual knowledge may require another knowledge to know it, and so on ad infinitum (without limit).

But to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas knowledge is not self-luminous. According to them, knowledge is like the eyes which illumine everything but itself remain in curtain. Kumārila Bhāṭṭa admits the independent existence of external objects. Every act of knowledge implies a certain relationship between the knower and the
known, which involves some activity on the part of the knower. Knowledge reveals the object but cannot reveal itself. According to Kumārila, knowledge is not directly known, but is inferred from the knowness (jñātā) of the object produced by knowledge.

Vācaspāti's view on knowledge is that, the self is, by nature, inactive. All activity belongs to Prakṛti. Yet the self due to its proximity, is reflected in buddhi and through non-discrimination identifies itself with the modes of buddhi and thinks itself to be the knower and the experiencer. When an object comes into contact with the sense-organ, it produces certain modifications, in the sense-organ. These modifications are analysed and synthesised by the mind and are presented to buddhi, which becomes modified or transformed into the form of the object. Buddhi, being unconsciousness in nature, cannot by itself know the object. But as buddhi possesses an excess of Sattva in it, it reflects the consciousness of the self- and appears as if conscious. With the réfléction of consciousness of the self in buddhi, the unconscious modification of buddhi into the form of the object becomes illumined into a conscious state of perception. This is called knowledge. Just as a mirror, due to reflection of light in it, appears to have the light within it, in the same manner, buddhi, due to a natural excess of Sattva in it, reflects the
consciousness of the self or Puruṣa and illuminates or cognises the object. This interpretation is offered by Vācaspati Miśra.

According to Vijñānabhiptu, however, when an object comes into contact with the sense-organ, the buddhi becomes modified into the form of the object. Due to the preponderance of Sattva in buddhi, it reflects the self and appears to be conscious, as a mirror reflects the light and becomes illuminating. Next, buddhi, which is modified into the form of the object is reflected back in the self, and the modification becomes manifested. Without this mutual reflection, the apparent experiences of pleasure and pain in the self, which is pure consciousness and free from pleasures and pains, cannot be explained.

Types of Knowledge (Valid and Invalid)

Knowledge is the revelation of the objective world to a subject. It is a subjective phenomenon representing the world of reality. It is the basis of all our practical activities in relation to objects. Our activities are not blind reactions to objects. A successful activity presupposes a correct knowledge of objects. We proceed to act in a particular way with reference to
an object on the belief that our knowledge correctly reveals its nature. But at times we do not find a thing and how we expect it to be, and thus we are shocked to learn that knowledge is not always a correct representation of reality, and that it frequently misguides us and leads to painful results. Thus we come to distinguish between truth and falsehood i.e., valid and invalid.

Knowledge is of different types. First, we have valid knowledge or Pramā which is again sub-divided into Perception, Inference etc., etc., as accepted by different schools of Indian philosophy, though their opinions regarding the valid knowledge vary from one another. Secondly, we have invalid knowledge or Apramā including memory, doubt, error etc.

Valid knowledge: (i) Valid knowledge is a true and definite knowledge of some new fact (ii) valid knowledge is the apprehension (anubhava) which agrees with the real character of the object apprehended.64 (iii) valid knowledge is the certain and unerring presentation of the object. (iv) Valid knowledge is the knowledge of an object as endowed with qualities which really exists in the object.65 When one apprehends a jar as possessing the

64. yatra yadasti tatra tasyānubhavah pramā
65. tadvati tatprakārokanubhavo vā (Ibid, p. 401)
quality of jarness which really exists in it, one's knowledge is valid. In short, valid knowledge is the certain knowledge of the real nature of an object.

Invalid knowledge: If any knowledge lacks in definiteness or certitude or does not convey any new information or does not represent things as they really are, it is invalid. When we perceive a snake in a rope, we apprehend a quality, viz., snakeness which does not actually exist in the rope. Hence the knowledge is invalid.

According to Kumarila, there are three kinds of invalid knowledge viz., error or illusion (mithyājñāna), non-cognition or ignorance (ajñāna) and doubt (Samsāya). In this statement, there is no mention of memory which is definitely invalid according to him. Elsewhere he says that validity consists in knowing something new and that if a knowledge does not give anything, new, it is memory. It is strange why he does not mention memory as a form of invalid knowledge together with the other forms. It appears that in the section in which he mentions the three forms of invalid knowledge, truth is

66. SV. 2.54
67. SV. 5.11
his only concern, and as memory is not untrue, it is not mentioned by him. Illusion, ignorance and doubt are definitely false, while memory is not false. All knowledge may be classified into that which is valid and that which is invalid. Invalid knowledge, again, may be classified into that which is false and that which is true, and ignorance, doubt and illusion belong to the former class while memory belongs to the latter.

Memory (Smrti): is not valid knowledge, since in it the remembered object is not directly presented. It depends on previous experiences. Memory is the revival of past experiences. It always refers to the past. When some object or events is remembered, it is always known to have existed or occurred in the past. Memory presupposes a direct experience of the remembered object on some past occasion. None can remember a thing which was not experienced by him. The basis of memory is some impression (Samskāra) left on the soul by an experience. Our experiences modify the soul in some way and these modifications are preserved in the soul. These modifications of the Soul-substance are called impressions and they are the direct cause of recollection. The

68. samskaramatrajanyam jnanam smritih
   — TS, Ka 27 (Pratyakṣa khaṇḍa), p. 203
69. bhavanatmakastu samskara atmadravyabarti vishaṣagaṇah
    purvanubhavo'sya karanam smrstitu karyam
   — MM, p. 254
impressions are usually dormant and inactive. However, active they may be in influencing our conduct, we do not consciously feel their presence. But when they are aroused by certain external or internal causes (udbodhaka) and our past experiences reappear in consciousness, we indirectly know their presence.

Some memories require an effort and some are spontaneous. The former are voluntary and are the result of mental concentration (manahpranidhāna). The latter memories crop up automatically in consciousness due to the perception of similar things (Sadṛṣādarśanāt) or to some peculiarities of place and time. External objects help the reappearance of past experiences. Some memories are due to the agency of merit and demerit. Such memories cause pleasure or pain to us and thus they serve a moral purpose.

Not only the experiences of the present life are remembered, but even those of past lives can be remembered by persons advanced in the practice of concentration.

Memory proves the identity and the continuity of soul. It is not possible unless the person who remembers

70. pāṇārthyaṇātmārthatvena ca vaśīkṛtā -
NR on SV, Nirālambana, 190-93

71. Ibid
be the same who had the original experience in the past. Memory proves the existence of the inner sense-organ. The external sense-organs cannot explain memory, because we are able to recollect something, e.g., colour of an object, even when the external sense-organs, e.g., the eye, are lost. The inner sense organ that is operative in causing memory is the manas. Memory is different from recognition which is an original experience helped by some impression (Sāṃskārasaciva). Sometimes an old experience is revived without the consciousness of its past character. Dream is an instance of this. A dream occurs as if it were an original experience. But in fact it is nothing but false memory. Dreams appear in the absence of the objects that appear in them. They are caused neither by the activity of the sense-organs which are operative in perception, nor by marks (lāṅga) which give rise to inference. There can be no other cause of dreams except latent impressions. From the points of view of causation dreams are allied to memory, but from that of appearance they are allied to sensory illusions.

Memory may be true or false according as it reveals a past fact accurately or inaccurately, but it

72. mano hi smṛtyutpaṭtau kāraṇam
73. KK on Sv, Śunya, 160.
is not a form of valid knowledge, because it does not give a truth hitherto unknown. The ideal knowledge according to the Bhāṭṭa is that which is not only true to reality but also definite and new knowledge ought to be a progressive system and not a static one. Memory may be true to reality, but it does not realize the ideal of knowledge completely. Memory is not necessarily false, yet it cannot acquire the status of valid knowledge, because it is not progressive.

We have already referred to the other views of memory and have also shown that the other reasons for rejecting memory as invalid knowledge are ultimately reduced to the reason that memory does not give new knowledge. Here we may again refer to Jayanta's view. He holds that memory is invalid because its object is non-existent at the time of its remembrance. But this does not seem to be a proper reason. It is true that the object of memory is past, but memory does not claim that its object is present. True memory always apprehends a past object as past. Jayanta's statement may be taken to mean that memory is not directly verifiable, because the fact or event that is past cannot now be perceived and compared with the content of memory. But this too is not a reasonable ground, because

74. tadarudasya vastunah tadāṁśatvāt —
NM, p. 23.
there are cognitions of future objects or events and of invisible things which can never be directly verified and they are not rejected as invalid on this account.

The only reasonable ground for the rejection of memory is the absence of novelty in it and we have already hinted at the inappropriateness of considering novelty in judging the validity of cognitions. Elaborate theories and hypothesis may be examined in the light of Kumārila's ideal of knowledge, but in the case of solitary cognitions it is better not to go beyond their contents. In practice too nobody cares whether a proposition is derived from memory or from some other source of knowledge. If someone asserts that the first atom bomb was dropped in Hiroshima, the epistemological value of the assertion is estimated on the basis of its being a fact. Whether the man asserting the proposition was one of the eye-witnesses now remembering his experience or he learnt it from some reliable source, is irrelevant in considering its validity. Therefore, the whole controversy about the validity of memory seems to be a futile exercise.

Doubt (Samāsāya) is an indefinite cognition (anavādhāraṇāt-maka pralyakṣa), which characterizes an object in mutually conflicting ways. Something is seen, but there does not arise a fixed notion about it whether it is one thing or
another. In doubt, the mind is undecided between two alternatives about the same object. The yonder thing appears at one time as a lamp-post and at the next moment as a man, and the mind is oscillating between the two alternatives. In a doubtful cognition two or more interpretations of an observed thing are offered, but the mind does not arrive at any fixed decision. Thus doubt is marked by a lack of assurance or belief. It is an unpleasant state of mind in which the mind swings between two or more alternatives without being able to reconcile them. This gives rise to a further exploratory activity of the senses and usually some differentiating mark is found out which ends this unpleasant state. Doubt is not confined to sense-level alone. It is very frequent on the level of higher thought. On the sense-level it occurs under insufficient conditions of sensibility. Sometimes we are confronted by a situation demanding a prompt adjustment which prevents us from making a fuller use of our cognitive faculties and consequently there occurs a doubt.

Kumarila mentions three causes of doubt, viz., the existence of some common quality, the existence of an uncommon quality and the existence of two apparently

75. ekasmin dharmini viruddhanādhamvaisistya jñānām

76. NR on SV, 2.54.
contradictory qualities. As an example of the first, the existence of the quality of knowability in words leads one to the doubtful notion whether words are eternal or non-eternal, because this quality is found to exist commonly in eternal objects, e.g., the soul, as well as non-eternal objects, e.g., the lightning. A common property leads to no conclusion, because it reminds of two mutually incompatible notions. An uncommon property leads to doubt as follows: Odour is an uncommon property of the earth. It is found neither in eternal things nor in non-eternal things, so that it leads to the negation of both eternity and non-eternity and thus gives rise to a doubt like a common property, because the negation of both eternity and non-eternity is incompatible. The existence of two different properties associated with two contradictory things leads to doubt as follows: Air, for instance, is known to be shapeless and having touch, the former being associated with imperceptibility and the latter with perceptibility. But perceptibility and imperceptibility being contradictory to each other, cannot reside in the same air and consequently there arises a doubt. 77

Among the three commentators of Kumarila, Umbekā accepts these three causes of doubt, while Sucaritamiśra

77. SV, Anumāna, 84-95.
and Parthasarathi reject uncommon property as one of the causes of doubt. They say that uncommon property is recognised by the Buddhist while Kumārila himself does not recognise it. Sucaritamiśra expresses his view of doubt as follows: Doubt arises from the perception of a common property together with the non-perception of a specific property and the remembrance of objects possessing the common property. For example, from the perception of a vertical height, which is commonly possessed by a man and a post, which are remembered while their differentiating property is not perceived, an indefinite cognition arises in the form 'is it a man or a post'? An uncommon property is not the cause of doubt. Doubt arises when two notions are suggested simultaneously, and the mind cannot decide between them. But as an uncommon property, e.g., the odour of the earth, is not concomitent with anything else, it does not suggest anything to the mind, and thus the appearance of doubt is not possible. An uncommon property is merely the cause of curiosity (jījñāsāmātrahetuh) and not of doubt. When we observe an uncommon property in something, we simply want to know further details about the thing, it does not suggest conflicting notions to the mind. 78

78. KK on SV, Anumāna, 86, 88.
Doubt is not valid knowledge, because it lacks belief or firmness which is an essential mark of validity. Doubt neither asserts anything nor denies it positively. It is not a judgement, but a questioning attitude of the mind making no claim to truth.

Error or Illusion (Bhrama or Viparyaya) is no doubt knowledge and is presentative in character. But it is not valid knowledge, because it is not true to the character of its object.  

Illusion or error represents an object in a form which does not belong to it. It reveals an object differently from what it actually is. We have instances of illusion in dream which reveals objects which are not actually present, in a jaundiced person's cognition of everything as yellow, in the cognition of a double moon and so on. In a dream an object which is really absent is perceived as present, so that it cannot but be false. Dream-objects exist at other times and places and so far they are real. In dreams objects are recalled due to the revival of memory-images and they falsely

79. mithyājñānam viparyaya
TS, Sabdakhaṇḍa, Kar(a) 15, p. 447

80. anyathāsaṁtadakamāramanvathā grhnāti - NR on SV, Nirālambana, 118
appear as existing 'here' and 'now'. Actually they have no relation to the particular time and place in which the sleeping person dreams, but due to defects caused by sleep they appear to be related to that place and time. It is only when one returns to the normal waking state that the falsehood of dreams is realised. Dreams not only represent objects existing at distant times and places as present 'here' and 'now', but also reveal objects that we cannot remember as having ever existed. In such cases too, the objects are not absolutely non-existent, they existed and were cognized during some past life. Sometimes we dream of such impossible events as our own decapitation. In such a case there is a revival of some experience of decapitation relating to some person and is falsely imagined to be related to the dreamer. Dreams distort reality. They falsely combine together the real elements of waking experience. 81

In the illusion of nacre as silver or of a rope as a snake the eye is actually in contact with a piece of nacre or a rope, but the appearance is of a piece of silver or a snake. The nacre represented by 'this' is real and the silver too is real as existing elsewhere, but

81. SD, p. 58
their identity is false. The falsity consists in perceiving silver 'here' and 'now', while it actually exists in a distant place. The cause of the illusion is the similarity between nacre and silver and the defective contact of the eye. The similarity suggests 'silver', while the difference between silver and nacre is not observed, and thus the nacre appears in the form of silver. The silver is the form of cognition, which is super-imposed on the perceived 'this', and this super-imposition is not detected till one is prompted to pick it up and is disappointed. In the illusion of mirage, water is falsely perceived, while the contact of the eye is actually with sand heated by the sun's rays. The illusion is caused by a two-fold defect, viz., the subjective feeling of thirst and the semblance of water due to heat. The sand and the water due to heat. The sand and the water are real, but their connection is unreal. These are instances of illusion which persist so long as the real character of the object is not recognized. In these as soon as the illusory nature of cognition is detected the object begins to appear in its real form.

82. yādṛṣṭam hi jñānasya svarūpam tādṛṣṭam evārthe'dhyāropa- yatīti yāvat — KK on SV, 2.85
83. KK on SV, Niralambana, 110.
There are some illusions which persist even after the revelation of their falsehood, though they cease to delude us afterwards. The illusion of a double moon is of this nature. The illusions of this type differ from others in one more respect. They have all the elements of a sensory character, while others have an element of memory. When the eye is pressed slightly with finger the single moon appears to be double. This also occurs in a disease affecting the eyes. This cognition is false and there is no element of memory in it. There is a double error here. First the single moon is perceived in two places and then the doubleness characterizing the places is transferred to the moon which is really one. In the illusion of a white conch as yellow the mind superimposes the percept of the 'yellow' on that of the 'conch', thereby establishing a relation which is not there. The yellowness caused by bile really belongs to the rays that go out from the eyes to the object which is not yellow. Similarly in the illusion of a red crystal, the percept of red and that of crystal are related together due to the nearness of the red jabā flower to the crystal. In the illusion of a firebrand circle (alātacakra) the cause is the quick circular motion of the firebrand. The firebrand and

84. SD, p. 59
85. Ibid.
Illusion is a form of invalid knowledge like doubt and memory, but it is different from them. Doubt is invalid not because it is false but because it lacks certitude. It makes neither a definite assertion nor a definite denial. Illusion, on the other hand, makes a definite assertion such as 'this is silver'. There is a feeling of confidence in it as it is there in a valid cognition. The illusory silver is perceived as definitely as the real silver. The difference between the two is discovered only when our attempt to pick up the silver fails. We are as confident of perceiving 'water' in a mirage as of the real water, and it is only on a closer inspection and when there is frustration in the attempt to quench our thirst with it that its illusory character is detected. Unlike memory an illusion is a new experience of some present object. It is invalid because it reveals a present object in the form of a different object. It misrepresents a fact. It distorts the nature of reality and consequently misleads us in practical activity. The object of illusion does not correspond with the real object.

86. ŚV. Nīralambana, 109.
The Theories of Illusion in the different Schools of Indian System

Among the Indian Philosophers the ways of explaining error widely differ. They advocate a theory of illusion suited to their respective metaphysical views. The Bhatta and the Naiyāyika approach the problem in a purely empirical and psychological way and they are also supported by common-sense. Most of the other philosophers suffer from some metaphysical bias which vitiates their treatment of error. The Bhatta theory of illusion is known as Viparītakhyātivāda. In the works of different writers of the Bhatta school there are references to Prabhakara's theory of Akhyāti, the Advaita Vedānta theory of Anirvaca-nīyakhyāti and the Buddhist theories of Asakhyāti and Atmakhyāti, but there is no reference to Rāmānuja's theory of Satkhyāti. Besides these, the Nyāya theory of Illusion is known as Anyathākhyāti.

We are now going to discuss these theories thoroughly as far as possible.

87. ātmakhyāti rasaśakhyātiḥ sakhyāti khayātiranyathā/ tathā anirvacanīyamītystat khyātipaścakam // Vedānta samjñāvalī, Samjñā, 170.
Anyathākhyātivāda — The Nyāya theory of illusion is known as Anyathākhyātivāda. The Naiyāyikas mention two kinds of ordinary perception,— nirvikalpa and savikalpa. Nirvikalpa is a state of undifferentiated, non-relational consciousness, free from the work of assimilation and discrimination, analysis and synthesis. Savikalpa, on the other hand, is differentiated, relational mode of consciousness involving the results of assimilation and discrimination. It is articulate, concrete and determinate. Since, nirvikalpa, which does not transcend immediacy, is dumb and unanalysed, the distinction between true and false does not apply to it. There is no possibility of error in nirvikalpa perception. An erroneous nirvikalpa is a contradiction in terms. Error may, however, creep in when we relate two or more objects, i.e., in Savikalpa perception.

If the complex content of our knowledge has a complex corresponding to it in the objective world, we have truth, otherwise error. Thus we see a white object before us and take it to be silver, pick it up and find it to be as shell. The new experience of the shell contradicts our previous expectation of silver. The Nyāya holds all error to be subjective. What is set aside by true knowledge is the wrong apprehension of silver, and not the object. Taking the instance of mirage, the Naiyāyika observes that the object all the while remains what it actually is. It is not that the rays are not rays nor that the flickering is
not the flickering, the error lies in the cognition, as it is the cognition which instead of appearing as the cognition of flickering rays, appears as the cognition of water, i.e., as the cognition of a thing as something which it is not. Water is not absolutely non-existent, as the sky-lotus is. Water is not existent here and now, though it is imagined to exist. In illusory perception of the shell as the silver, or the flickering ray as water, the shell, or the flickering rays is wrongly perceived as silver or as water due to a defect (doṣa) in the sense-organ and subconscious impression of silver or water, as the case may be, revived by the perception of similarity. According to the Nyāya, in the illusory perception, e.g., 'this is silver', the subject 'this' is actually given or directly perceived. The predicate silver is elsewhere, and given or presented in an indirect way through the instrumentality of its past cognition. Error is due to Jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa. There is an extra-ordinary intercourse here through the medium of the idea of silver revived in memory. No wrong apprehension is entirely baseless. Error is the apprehension of a object as other than what it is.\textsuperscript{88} This theory of error or illusion, advocated by the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika, is known as Anyathākhyāti.

\textsuperscript{88} sarvam jñānaṁ dharminyabhrāntam, prakāre tu viparyayah as quoted in Indian Philosophy by Sanyal and Mallick, p.149
An error or illusion is the apprehension (Khyāti) of an object as otherwise (anyathā) or as a different object. This theory of error is also called Viparītakhyāti.

Viparītakhyātivāda: The Bhāṭṭa theory of illusion is known as Viparītakhyātivāda. According to it an illusion manifests a real object in the form of a different object which too is real. This theory is practically the same as the Nyāya theory except that the Bhāṭṭa does not account for illusion through extra-normal sense contact (alaukika sannikāra). In the illusion, 'this is silver', 'this' or the brightness of the shell, which it has common with silver, is perceived, and 'silver' is remembered. So far Kumarila agrees with Prabhākara. But Kumarila further holds that the 'shell' is then perceived as 'silver' owing to some defect. Illusion, according to Kumarila, is not mere non-apprehension of the distinction between the perceived element and the remembered element, but a positive wrong knowledge due to false identification of the remembered element with the perceived element. Prabhākara regards error as due to omission, while Kumarila regards it as one of commission.

According to the theory of Viparītakhyāti the object of an illusion is real, though its connection with

89. NR on SV, Nirālambana, 117.
the place and time in which it is seen is unreal. To this
the Buddhist objects: How can the absent object, e.g.,
the 'silver', give rise to its cognition 'here' and 'now'?
Sucaritamiśra's answer is as follows: An absent object
has the power of producing its cognition though it has
no: power to inspire other fruitful practical activities
in relation to it. In an illusion due to defective
sense-functioning an absent object appears to be present
through the impression left in the mind by its past
experience. A past object, e.g., the 'silver', is not
capable of producing its present cognition directly; it is
capable of it indirectly through its impression residing
in the soul. It could not have the said causal potency
if it were absolutely non-existent. The 'silver' that is
seen does exist in other places and so there is no
absurdity in attributing causal potency to it. In the
original experience the object 'silver' was the direct
cause of its impression produced in the soul. Thus the
cognition producing power of the object was indirectly
transferred to the soul, which now gives rise to the
cognition of 'silver'.

Akhyātivāda: Prabhākara as a staunch believer in the
Mīmāṃsā doctrine of self-validity of knowledge reduces
all error and doubt to simply an absence of knowledge.

90. KK on SV, Niralambana, 115-18
He asserts that all experience is valid. Now if all apprehension is valid, whence do we have the distinction of valid and invalid knowledge? Prabhākara says that so far as the element of apprehension is concerned all the so-called invalid cognitions are valid, while the element that is invalid is no apprehension at all. An illusion is not a unitary cognition but a composite of two cognitions whose diction is not apprehended. Illusion is not a positive misapprehension but a negative non-apprehension. When we fall a victim to illusion and are misguided by it, the error on our part is not an error of commission but an error of omission. The error occurs not because we misapprehended reality but because we fail to apprehend and thus we miss some relevant feature of reality.

Prabhākara's theory of illusion is called Akhyātivāda because it interprets illusion as the absence of Khyāti or knowledge. Prabhākara like the Advaitin holds that the object of a cognition is that alone which is manifested by it. In the illusion 'this is silver' what is manifested is the silver, so its object is the silver and not the nacre as the Viparītakahyātivādin says. Thus the theory that it manifests an object, the nacre, as a different object, the silver, is disproved by experience.
Prabhākara does not recognise error as error. He regards it as mere non-apprehension of the distinction between the given element and the ideal element. He does not distinguish between truth and error from the logical point of view. He distinguishes them from practical standpoint. The knowledge that leads to successful activity is true and the knowledge that does not is false. Kumārila also holds that so long a person experiences illusion, it is quite valid for him. But its validity is destroyed by subsequent knowledge of its disagreement with its object and defects in the causes of cognition.

Anirvacaniyakhyatīvāda: The Advaita vedānta theory of knowledge is known as Anirvacaniyakhyatīvāda. Error or illusion consists in the appearance of a thing as what it is not. Śaṅkara explains the appearance of the world in the light of illusory perception. Everyone is aware of the difference between a percept and an image. When nacre is cognized as silver or rope as snake, we are not conscious of a mental image but of a percept. What is cognized in the illusion appears to be a given fact and not an imagined one. The Yogācāra cannot explain the presentative character of illusion. The Advaitin offers the explanation that so long as the illusion of a snake or silver lasts there comes into being the corresponding object which is logically indefinable (anirvacaniyā). The
Viparītakhyātivādin maintains that in the rope-snake illusion the rope is the object of the perception of snake. But this is absurd. The object of a cognition cannot be other than what is revealed in it. So, the object of the cognition of snake cannot be anything but the snake. The Naiyāyika tries to explain the presentative character of the snake by assuming an extraordinary form of sense-contact with the distant snake. But, when the snake is perceived it is known to be 'here' and not in a distant place, e.g., the jungle. Thus the Advaitin arrives at the conclusion that in the rope-snake illusion the snake must actually be present where it is seen, though it enjoys merely a temporary existence so long as the illusion lasts, and because it can be neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal, nor both together, it must be indefinable. That which is absolutely real, e.g., the self, can never be sublated and that which is absolutely unreal, e.g., a man's horn, can never be perceived. The illusory snake is perceived for some time and then sublated by a correcting experience. Therefore, it cannot be absolutely unreal or absolutely real. It cannot be both simultaneously, because two contradictory predicates can't qualify the same entity. Hence the illusory snake is indefinable. As this snake cannot be the object of our practical
activities, it cannot belong to the order of empirical existence to which the real snake belongs. It belongs to a relatively less real order of being called the Prātibhāsika sattā or illusory reality.

If it is asked: How can an illusory snake be produced in the absence of a cause at the time? The Advaitin's answer is that an illusory object belongs to a different order of being. So it need not be produced by the same cause as produces the empirical object and the desired cause is present in the form of nescience (avidyā), impression (Samskāra) and defective sense-organ which combine together to produce the illusory object on the one hand and the corresponding illusion on the other. 91

Satkhyātivāda: Rāmānuja's theory of illusion is known as Satkhyātivāda. According to him all knowledge are true. According to Upaniṣadic theory though it is admitted that everything presents in everything yet the idea of a snake in a rope is not completely true. The thing which is partly true if taken as completely true is this idea is known as error or illusion. This is called Satkhyāti in so far as in it there is the partial knowledge of a real matter.

91. VP, p. 50.
Asatkhyātivāda: The Mādhyamika 'nihilist', according to all the Indian systems, advocates the voidness (śūnyatā) of all existence. He arrives at this conclusion by way of a dialectical examination of all the categories of thought. Accordingly he explains error as the apprehension of non-being (asat). Pārtha-śarathi says that the upholders of Asatkhyātivāda negate the relata together with the relation, while the upholders of Viparītakhyātivāda negate the relation only.92 In the illusion 'this is silver' 'this' is real and 'silver' too is real, but their relation is totally unreal. But, according to the 'nihilist' 'this' and 'silver' are as unreal as their relation. Thus the object of illusion for the 'nihilist' is absolutely unreal, while for the Bhatta it is real in a different place and time. But how can an absolutely unreal object give rise to its direct apprehension?93 We know that a sky-flower is absolutely unreal and however, much we try to think of it, it can never be the content of our immediate consciousness. Therefore, the 'silver' that is directly perceived in the nacre-silver illusion, cannot be absolutely unreal like a sky-flower as the 'nihilist' holds.

92. asatkhyātivādinastu samsargino'hpyapālapayantīti visēṣa — SD, p. 58
93. nirūpakhyānasyāparaoksābhāsagocaretvānupapattāh — SC, p. 50.
Here we may refer to Dr. Maitra's interpretation of the asatkhyātivāda. He says:

Now when the cogniser is in error, he cognises, according to the Buddhist nihilist, an absolute nought in one or the other of the above two senses (i.e., the factually non-existent or the logically impossible), for what he cognises is a combination of incompatibles which is without its parallel in experience ........................

He thus perceives what nowhere exists; the snake may exist, but a rope-snake is nowhere found except in cognitions of the false. 94

This seems to be a wrong interpretation because the 'nihilist' not only negates a rope-snake as absolutely non-existent, but also the rope and the snake. And even if this interpretation be allowed, it goes against experience, because the rope-snake is not at all the content of consciousness in the said illusion. What is perceived in the illusion is the snake alone just as it happens in the perception of a real snake, so that the question of reality or unreality arises only regarding the snake and not the rope-snake, and so far as the absolute non-existence of a thing which is a rope and a snake in one is concerned there can be no disagreement

among the Indian philosophers.

Atmakhyātāvāda: The Yagācāra idealist is dissatisfied with the metaphysical position of the Mādhyamika. He holds that even if everything be accepted to be absolutely non-existent it cannot be proved unless the absolute reality of consciousness apprehending this fact is accepted. Therefore, consciousness cognition or idea is the only metaphysical reality. The Yogācāra, consistently with his subjective idealism, explains error or illusion as the externalization or objectification of a subjective idea. In the nacre-silver illusion the subjective silver-form of cognition appears as the form of an external object. The 'silver' is not absolutely unreal as the nihilist says. It is real as a form of the internal cognition, but the mistake consists in taking it to be the form of an external object. The 'silver' is a mental fact whereas in the illusion it is taken for an extramental fact. The Yogācāra does not recognize any cognizer other than the momentary idea. So according to him in illusion a momentary idea cognizes itself as 'external'.

But this view cannot explain the consciousness which sublates an illusory cognition. After the cognition 'this is silver' has occurred it is subsequently contradicted in the form 'this is not silver', and thus
the former cognition of silver is rejected as false. But if in illusion a cognition wrongly cognizes itself as 'this', the sublating consciousness, which corrects the mistake, must appear in the form 'I am silver' instead of the form 'this is not silver'. Actually 'this-ness' (idantā) is never sublated, which points to the fact that in illusion a real external object appears in the form of another external object. Thus the Yogācāra theory is wrong.

Again, the metaphysical position of the Yogācāra is that the illusory cognition of silver and the so-called right cognition are equally objectless (nirālambana). Accordingly he abolishes the universally recognized distinction between a right and a wrong cognition which is the bases of all practical activities. The Yogācāra tries to justify this distinction by asserting that the objects of cognitions producing practical efficiency (arthakriyā) are sāmāyātisatya (empirically real) while the objects of illusion are mithyā (absolutely unreal), though both are equally non-existent as external to cognition. But this is only a verbal device to mislead people and not a proper solution. Satya and mithyā are

95. purovartitvena rajatasya dhāde'ham rajatamiti syāt
— Sc, p. 50
mutually exclusive terms. If Samvrti is not mithyā it must be satya in the same sense in which cognition is taken to be, and if it is not, Satya it must be mithyā like an illusion. The existence of an intermediate entity, partly satya and partly mithyā is logically impossible. Therefore the distinction between a right and a wrong cognition is ultimate and the latter is not an illegitimate projection of the subjective idea, but the appearance of one real thing as another real thing.

In conclusion comparing the different theories of illusion we find that everyone of them is deficient in one or more respects. The Asatkhyāti theory, finding that the object that is perceived in illusion is not actually present in the place where it is observed, draws the exaggerated conclusion that it is absolutely non-existent. The Atmakhyāti theory asserts that there exists something corresponding to the illusory object, but it is not an objective fact, it is a subjective idea that wrongly appears as an objective fact in illusion. This theory is wrong in holding that the illusory object has no objective basis and that it is purely a creation of mind. It fails to explain the perceptual character of

96. SV, Nirālambana, 8.
illusion. The Anirvacanīyakhyāti theory tries to explain the perceptual character of illusion by assuming the temporary production of a real object corresponding to illusion, but it misses the fact that illusion is a false cognition. The Akhyāti theory offers a good psychological analysis of illusion and it is right in pointing out that in illusion there is some objective fact which is viewed incompletely and there is the memory image revived due to similarity, but it fails to explain how the memory image is synthesized or fused with the given fact. In fact it denies that there is any synthesis at all and it also denies the falsity of illusion, thereby explaining away a fact of experience. The Nyāya theory of viparītakhyāti is more satisfactory except that it makes the unintelligible assumption of an extra-normal sense-contact in order to explain the perceptual character of illusion. Like the Vedānta theory it introduces an extra-ordinary factor in its account of illusion. While, according to the Vedānta, the object of illusion is extra-ordinary, according to the Nyāya the sense-functioning is extra-ordinary. The Bhāṭṭa theory is right in rejecting the assumption of an extra-ordinary factor and in holding that illusion has an objective basis, but it too fails to explain the perceptual character of the illusory object.

Hypothetical argument (Tarka): is also another type of invalid knowledge according to the Nyaiyāyikas. It is
invalid in so far as it does not give us any definite knowledge of objects. It only shows that a wrong assumption leads to absurdity. If one sees a mass of smoke and says that there is fire, and he is contradicted by somebody, he may argue that 'if' there were no fire, there could be no smoke. This argument beginning with an 'if' and laying bare the absurdity of the opponent's position and thereby establishing the exponent's own stand is called Tarka. It is not valid knowledge, because to argue like this is not to know the fire. It is only a confirmation of the previous inference of true from smoke.

Knowledge is true when it agrees with the real nature of object and it is false when it does not agree with the object. When we apprehend the qualities of an object, which really exist in it, our knowledge is true. When, again, we apprehend qualities of an object, which do not really exist in it, our knowledge is false. One, for example, perceives something and thinks that it is a snake. This knowledge will be true if snakeness really exists in the object. The knowledge will be false if it does not. Therefore, according to Nyāya,

97. vyāpyāropena vyāpakāropastarkah
(TS, Saṭṭhakhaṇḍa, Kā, 15, p.447).
truth is correspondence of knowledge with reality, and
error is the absence of agreement of knowledge with
reality correspondence is truth and noncorrespondance
is error. The Nyāya gives us a realistic definition of
truth and error.

Samvāda: Sucaritamśra mentions Samvāda as a form of
invalid knowledge, suppose some reliable person tells
that there is fire at a distance. Now I go further and
see smoke rising skywards and then I infer fire from the
smoke. Now I approach the place where smoke was seen
and actually perceive the fire. According to Sucaritamśra
the inference and the perception of fire simply
restate what I have already learnt from the trustworthy
person, and because they do not add anything new to what
I already know, they are invalid while the first
cognition is valid. Thus Samvāda is invalid like
memory. Samvāda and memory are alike in that they
do not reveal any new truth, but they are different in
that the former is presentative while the latter is
representative.

Definition of valid knowledge according
to different schools of Indian System

In determining the true meaning of Pramāṇa (the
means of valid knowledge) one must understand the true

98. KK on SV, 274
meaning of the word pramā (valid knowledge). Pramā or valid knowledge is the knowledge of a thing as it is, it is the knowledge of the generic nature as abiding in its own subject, that is, abiding in every one of its individual embodiments. For instance, to know a piece of silver to be as such, is valid knowledge in as much as 'silverness', which is a generic nature, really abides in the individual silver which is its subject.

(1) The Bhātta definition of Validity:

Knowledge may be true or false, valid or invalid. So, naturally the question arises as to what constitutes the validity of knowledge lacking in which knowledge becomes invalid? In the Nyāya system, valid knowledge is called 'Pramā' and validity is called 'Pramātvā' or 'prāmānya'. The later Mīmāṃsā writers adopt these terms. But Kumārila and his commentators are not known to have used them. They have used the terms 'pramāṇa' and 'prāmāṇya' for valid knowledge and validity respectively and 'apramā' and 'aprāmeyā' to express the opposite meanings. The latter two terms have been invariably taken in the same sense, while the former two have been used rather indiscriminately. The term 'pramāṇa' sometimes stands for a means of right knowledge whose result is termed 'pramiti' or 'mīti' and 'prāmāṇya' then means the capacity of a means to
generate a correct knowledge. Kumārila defines valid knowledge as: 'Valid knowledge is a firm or assured cognition of objects which does not stand in need of confirmation by other cognitions'. Umbeka says that the word drdha excludes doubt from valid knowledge and na visāmādīratvatati (which is not contradicted by other cognitions), which he reads in the place of nāpi saṃvādamrcchhati, excludes error or illusion.

Sucaritamiśra comments that valid knowledge is not contradicted by a subsequent knowledge in the form 'this is not so' and that it contains some new information about its object. Valid knowledge, therefore, is a certain, true and informative cognition of something.

Parthasārathi extracts from Sūtra 1.1.5 of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā the definition of valid knowledge as an apprehension of a previously unapprehended object, which is devoid of defects in its source and is not contradicted by subsequent experience. Later on, he defines valid knowledge as 'a true cognition which relates to something previously unrecognized. This definition is

99. tasmātṛddham yadutpamam nāpi saṃvādamrcchhati / jñākāntāreṇa vijñānam tat pramāṇam pratīyataḥ // (SV, 2.80)
100. kāranadosabādhakajñānaraḥ itamagrhitagrāhi jñānam pramāṇam — SD, p. 45
101. Ibid.
practically the same as the former except that in the former one the source from which discrepancy may creep in knowledge, viz., the defects of the sense-organs etc. is mentioned and the possibility of the falsification of a valid knowledge in future is precluded. Pārtha-śārathi mentions three distinctive features of valid knowledge, viz. (1) its object is not remembered as having been previously known, (2) it conforms to the real nature of its object, and (3) there is a feeling of conviction regarding its conformity or agreement with the real object. Thus, novelty, freedom from doubt and truth are the three essential marks of valid knowledge and if anyone of these is absent in a knowledge, it ceases to be valid.

A knowledge which does not add something to our present stock of information, cannot be valid. Validity consists in discovering new objects or new features of known objects for thought. Valid knowledge is an advance on what we already know. The Bhāṭṭa considers knowledge in its relation to our practical needs. There is no use in knowing what we already know. Knowledge cannot be separated from the practical value it has for us. The objects of our environment are always changing and the social conditions never continue in the same form. We have to make fresh adjustment to the changing circumstances,

102. NRM, p. 35
and for this purpose knowledge must reveal the changing aspects of things. The practical side of knowledge cannot be neglected when we consider its epistemological worth. Thus, according to the Bhatta, a valid knowledge is essentially useful and hence it must reveal something new.

(2) The Prabhakara View: Prabhakara's definition of valid knowledge is the same as that of latter Nyaya except that he does not feel the necessity of including the term 'yatharthatva' in the definition. Sālikanātha, a commentator of Prabhakara, gives the definition of valid knowledge as follows: 'Valid knowledge is experience, and it is something different from memory which is the name of that cognition which arises solely from the impression left by some previous experience'. In a continuous perception the later cognitions arising from sense-object intercourse, like the first cognition, are different from memory, and hence they are valid. Recognition too is valid, because it is not produced solely from impression. It is an experience aided by impression. Memory is not valid inasmuch as it depends on a former experience. It does not determine an object independently. Sometimes a past experience reinstates

103. anubhūtiḥ pramāṇam śā smṛteranyā smṛtih punah /
pūrvavijñānam saṃskāramātrajam jñānamucyate //

(PP, p. 127)
itself and its past character is forgotten and thus it appears to be a new experience instead of a recollection. It also is invalid because it depends solely on impression for its birth. ¹⁰⁴

The Samkhya and the Vedānta systems also define valid knowledge along the Bhatta line. They recognize novelty as a mark of valid knowledge and try to justify the novelty of successive cognitions in a continuous perception similarly. But unlike the Bhatta they offer an alternative solution of the difficulty. They assert that the continuous perception of an object, for instance a jar, is one cognition and not a series of successive cognitions, because the mental mode (antahkaranavṛtti) that assumes the shape of the jar is one and lasts till another mode arises. Thus, the cognition is one and has one object throughout its duration. The numerical difference among cognitions should be based on that of their objects and not on the moments of time. If I perceive a jar continuously for five seconds, I do not have five cognitions but one. If I perceive a jar continuously for the first three seconds and then a flower for the next two seconds, I have two different cognitions and not five. This seems to be a better solution and it must be accepted.

¹⁰⁴. PP, p. 42.
by the objector. If the number of cognitions is supposed to depend on the number of time-units merely there is a serious difficulty.

(3) The Sāṁkhya view: The Sāṁkhya defines valid knowledge as the mode of 'buddhi' which apprehends on object, undoubted, real and not known before. The definition, like that of Bhaṭṭa one, recognises novelty, absence of doubt and truth as the essential marks of valid knowledge. Both the Sāṁkhya and the Bhaṭṭa are realists. But there is one important difference between the two. According to the Sāṁkhya 'buddhi' or cognition assumes the form of the object. Thus the truth of a cognition consists in its being a faithful copy of the object. Valid knowledge has correspondance to its object in the sense in which a true copy has it to its original. But the Bhaṭṭa is opposed to the copy-theory of knowledge. According to him, cognition is formless. Knowledge reveals objects, but it does not assumes any form. Knowledge is judgemental. It arises in the form of such judgements as 'this is a jar', 'this is blue' etc., but not in the form of pictures. When one sees a rose, he judges it to be a rose is actually there, not because he has a picture in his mind which faithfully copies the rose.

105. SK, Kā, 4, asandīgdhābīparītānadhi-gata biṣaya cittavṛttiḥ, vodhaśca pauruṣeyah phalāmi prāma. STK, Kā, 4.
The Vedānta view: The Vedānta definition of validity has more points of disagreement. Dharmarājādhvarīndra gives two alternative definitions, viz., 'Valid knowledge is that knowledge which apprehends an object that is not, already known and which is not contradicted' and 'Valid knowledge is an 'uncontradicted knowledge'. The first definition excludes memory from valid knowledge, while the second includes it. Thus the Vedāntin is not necessarily opposed to memory and he does not mention certitude as an essential mark of valid knowledge. However, both the Vedāntin and the Bhāṭṭa mention 'abādhita-vatva' or non-contradiction as a mark of validity. There is more outstanding difference between the two in that the Vedāntin distinguishes between relative and absolute truth, while for the Bhāṭṭa all truth is absolute and all that is not absolutely true is false. Dharmarājādhvarīndra says, 'The term 'not contradicted' (abādhita) means 'not contradicted' during the transmigratory state. All empirical cognitions according to the vedāntin, are true only so long as the ultimate truth, the identity of all existence, is not realised. Even the illusory cognition and dream cognition are true so long as they last. But the Bhāṭṭa is definitely opposed to the

106. tatra pramākaraṇaṁ pramāṇaṁ tatra  saṁrtivāvṛttam
pramātvamanadhi-gata-vādhitārthavaiṣayakājanaṁtvam
(VP, p.6)

107. tathā ca abādhita-padaṇa saṁsāradvayāma abādhita-vatvām
truth of illusions and dreams and to be falsehood of empirical cognitions.\textsuperscript{108}

(5) The Nyāya view: The Nyāya defines valid knowledge as an apprehension of some object (arthopalabdhi) which is definite (asandigdha) and non-erroneous (abyabhicāri).\textsuperscript{109} It does not include 'apprehension of the unapprehended' in the definition of validity. Valid knowledge is the knowledge that represents the real character of its object, or apprehends what exists in it. The knowledge which corresponds with the real nature of its object is valid and the opposite of it is invalid. Vācaspati excludes recollection from valid knowledge, and defines it as the certain knowledge of an object, which is in agreement with its real character, independent of previous perception and different from recollection. Viśvanātha defines valid knowledge as the knowledge of the generic character of an object as abiding in it, or as the apprehension of a mode (prakāra) corresponding to its object (visaya). A jar is the object of the knowledge of a jar, which is its substantive. The generic character of a jar, which is manifested is consciousness is its cognized mode. The cognized mode corresponds to its object in valid knowledge. The Nyāya definitions of

\begin{flushright}
108. SV, NirĀlaṃbana, 6.10
109. NM, p.12.
\end{flushright}
knowledge are realistic. Valid knowledge implies a knowing self, an object of knowledge, apprehension of it, and its harmony with its real character. Correspondence is the content of truth.

(6) The Vaiśeṣika view: Praśāstapāda in his Bhāṣya on the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras nowhere defines valid knowledge, but he distinguishes between Vidyā and Avidyā, the former including perception, inference, ārṣa (the intuitions of the seers) and memory, and the latter including doubt, illusion, indefinite cognition (anadhyavasāya) and dream. Śrīdhara commenting on the Bhāṣya defines Vidyā as a firm, uncontradicted and definite cognition.110 It is plain that Vidyā is valid knowledge and Avidyā invalid knowledge and that memory is valid knowledge. This definition mentions an additional mark of valid knowledge, viz., 'adhyābāṣāya'. It is meant to exclude 'anadhyābāṣāya' or indefinite cognition such as 'what this may be' which lacks in assurance like doubt, but which differs from the latter in that the object regarding which an indefinite cognition arises is not conceived in two or more conflicting ways. It is more like absence of cognition. Śrīdhara introduces some inconsistency in the Bhāṣya view by distinguishing 'Vidyā' from pramāṇa. He says that memory is Vidyā or true cognition, but it is not pramāṇa or valid cognition.

110. niḥsandigdhābdhitādhyābāṣāytmiκa pratītirvidyā,
NK, p. 172.
because it reveals an object as past and as already known. In this respect he appears to be influenced by the Nyāya view. But if this view is accepted as a correct interpretation of the Bhāṣya of Praśastapāda, it is practically indicates with the Bhāṣṭa view of valid knowledge as a definite, true and new cognition.

The meaning of the terms pramā, prameya, pramātā and pramāṇa.

Philosophical schools in Ancient India sprang up out of an urge for enquiry into the real state of things and beings (tattvajñānas). These schools are busy not only in deducing conclusions but also in determining the methods of arriving at them. Because of such an approach, the Indian Epistemology comes to involve four basic factors: The knower, the known object, the instrument of knowledge, and valid knowledge constitute the reality. (1) The Pramātā—the knower, the cogniser of valid knowledge, (2) The Prameya—the knowable, the object to be known, the object of valid knowledge. (3) The Pramāṇa—the chief instrument or means of knowing or the source of valid knowledge. (4) The Pramāṇa or pramiti—the valid knowledge of the object.  

111. NK, p. 257
112. pramāṇam pramātā prameyam pramitṛti caturvargenaiva vyavahāraḥ parisamāpyate. NVTT.
In the matter of recognising different pramāṇas, the various school of Indian philosophy may be conveniently referred to as follows:

The Cārvākas or the materialists recognise only Perception (Pratyakṣa), the Vaiśeṣikas and the Bhuddhas add Inference (Anumāna) to that (Pratyakṣa), the Sāṁkhya philosophers accept Verbal testimony (sābda) along with earlier two, some of the Naiyāyikas add comparison (Upamāna) to the earlier three viz., perception, inference and verbal testimony, the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas admit all these four pramāṇas by adding postulation (Arthāpatti) to them, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas and the Vedāntins recognise six pramāṇas as they add non-apprehension (Anupalabdhi) to the above. The Paurāṇikas add two more pramāṇas to the earlier list namely conclusion (Sambhava) and tradition (Aitihya).¹³

¹³. pratyakṣamekāṁ cārvākāṁ kaṇāda-sugatau punah / anumāṇaṁ ca taccātha sāṁkhyaḥ sābdaṁ ca te'api// nyāyaikadeśino'py evamupamāṇanāṁ ca kecana / arthāpattayā sahaitāṁ cātvāryāhūḥ prābhākaraḥ // abhāvāvaśāṃśhānyetāṁ bhāṭṭā vedāntinastathā / sambhavaitihyayuktāṁ astau paurāṇikā jaguriti//

Tārkikaraksā of Varadarāja, quoted in the Muktāvalīsaṃgraha, Vide Bhāp, p. 260.
The meaning of the different pramāṇas in short

The meaning of the different pramāṇas in short is as follows:

(1) **Pratyakṣa (Perception)** - Knowledge, which is produced by the contact of a sense-organ with an object. Perception gives a direct knowledge of reality, because in it we are face to face with reality, whereas the other means give only an indirect knowledge. For example: when a jar directly comes in contact with the sense-organ eye there arises a perceptual knowledge of jar.

(2) **Anumāna (Inference)** — Anumāna means literally the measuring after something. It is knowledge which follows other knowledge. Anumāna pramāṇa depends on previous experiences, e.g., where there is smoke there is fire. This is our very common experience from our very childhood.

(3) **Sabda (Verbal Testimony)** - Knowledge depends on reliable authority, and also depends on Ākāṅkṣā, Yogatā and Āsati of a sentence or different sounds arising from musical instruments, bamboos etc., etc.

(4) **Upamāna (Comparison)** — Knowledge arises from the presence of some common factors in a thing which was experienced previously in another thing, e.g., one who has seen an individual cow in one's own homeyard comes to have the visual perception of an individual 'gavaya'. He understands that this individual creature is like a cow.
Thereafter, he comes to conclude that his cow is like this creature.

(5) **Arthāpatti (Postulation)**—Assumption of some unperceived fact in order to reconcile some inconsistency in the perceived facts e.g., Devadatta is alive and he is not in his house, therefore, the conclusion is that he must be outside the house.

(6) **Anupalabdhi (Non-apprehension)**—Knowledge by which we immediately cognise the non-existence of an object, e.g., absence of rainfall indicates that the connection of cloud and the wind is not happened.

(7) **Sambhava (Prabability)**—If somebody has thousand coins then it is conclude that definitely he possesses hundred coins.

(8) **Aitihya (Tradition)**—Knowledge derived from tradition e.g., Once upon a time there lived a yakṣa on this tree.

(9) **Cesta (Indication)**—Some Tāṇtrikas recognise cesta also in addition to the above as the source of valid knowledge. Thus, by the movement of the hand one can make understand another 'to go' or 'to come' or by raising finger or fingers one can make understand another 'one' 'two', 'three' etc. But Annambhaṭṭa, the author of *Tarkasamgraha*, refutes it by saying that as it can be
proved by testimony so, there is no need of admitting it separately.\(^{114}\)

(10) **Pratibhā (Vivid-imagination)** - Others add Pratibhā as a source of valid knowledge to the list, and thus the total number of pramāṇas are ten in number.

**Number of Pramāṇas admitted in the Sāmkhya system**

According to the Sāmkhya Yājñikas the sources of valid knowledge are three in number. They are in order perception, Inference and Verbal Testimony. All other pramāṇas or 'means of cognition' are included in the three. It is through the 'means of cognition' that the objects of cognition are properly cognised.\(^{116}\) The 'means of right cognition' are only three in number: not more than three or less than three (na nyūnāṁ nāpyadhikā-mityarthāḥ).

\(^{114}\) *ceṣṭāpi sābdānumāna-dvāra vyavahāra heturiti na pramāṇāntaram.*

TS, p. 396

\(^{115}\) *prajñā navanavonmeṣāśālinī pratibhāmatā.*

SSED, p. 358

\(^{116}\) *tribidham pramāṇam / tatsiddhau sarvasiddheḥ nādhikyasiddhiḥ — SS, 1.88,*

*tribidham pramāṇamiṣṭam, prameyasiddhiḥ pramānāddhi — SK, Kā, 4.*
Grounds for admitting the three pramāṇas by Sāṁkhyā.

The Sāṁkhyā rejects all other pramāṇas as supported by different schools of Indian system because all the seven pramāṇas beginning with Upamāṇa to Pratibhā can be proved by either Perception or Inference or by Verbal Testimony. The recognition of three pramāṇas (as that of Sāṁkhyā) is supported by Manu also.117 Yoga, the complement of Sāṁkhyā also advocates the three pramāṇas.118 The Devībhāgavatā is also unanimous in this respect.119 The commentators have tried to show that all the seven pramāṇas apart from the three recognised by the Kārikā, fall under the latter.

(1) Upamāṇa — Vacaspati splits it up into Perception, Inference and Verbal Testimony. Māthara regards it to be Inference. Jayamaṅgalā includes it under Inference and Verbal Testimony. Gauḍapāda includes it under Verbal Testimony and Candrīkā under Inference.

117. pratyakṣam anumānam ca śāstrām ca vividhāgamam /
trayām subiditām kāryam dharmasuddhimabhīpsatā/
Manu, XII, 105

118. tatra pratyakṣānumānāgamah pramāṇāni. YS. I.7.

119. triṇyeva hi pramāṇāni pañhitāni supaṇḍitaiḥ /
pratyakṣām cānunānaṁca śabdāncaivatṛtṛtyakam/
DV, 1.8.23.
(2) **Arthāpatti** — All the commentators include it under Inference.

(3) **Abhāva** — Vācaspati and Jayamaṅgalā regard it as Perception. Māṭhara includes it under Inference. Although Gauḍapāda’s remark suggests its inclusion under Verbal Testimony, yet another remark of his, would lead us to infer that he will have it under Inference. Candrika regards it as a help-mate of perception and, therefore, no independent pramāṇa.

(4) **Sambhava** — Vācaspati, Jayamaṅgalā and Māṭhara include it under Inference, Gauḍapāda and Candrika include it under Verbal Testimony.

(5) **Aitihya** — Vācaspati opines that if it is pronounced by a reliable person, then it is Verbal Testimony. Otherwise it is no pramāṇa, Gauḍapāda and Candrika also include it under Verbal Testimony, Māṭhara includes it under Inference.

120. sambhavabhāvapratibhetihyopamāscāptavacana

Gauḍapāda’s remark on SK, STK, Notes, p.6

121. su sk adh any ad ar san ad vrsterabhavo gamyate.

Ibid STK, Notes, p.6.
(6) Pratibha — Vācaspati and Candrika do not mention it, Jayamangala includes it under Perception and Inference, when it is correct, otherwise it is no pramāṇa. Māṭhara includes it under Inference, and Gauḍapāda includes it under Verbal Testimony.

(7) Cestā - It is noticed only by Candrika and Māṭhara and included under Inference.