According to Sāmkhya, there are only three pramāṇas or means of cognition by which the reality of a thing can be cognised. These are Perception, Inference and Verbal Testimony i.e., Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda respectively. ¹ But for this reason, one should not firmly believe that there are only three Pramāṇas and nothing else. Besides the above-mentioned three Pramāṇas, there are other sources of knowledge which find their place in different systems of Philosophy. These are Upamāna (Comparison or Analogy), Arthāpatti (Postulation), Anupalabdhī (Non-apprehension), Sambhava (Probability), Aitihya (Tradition) and Cheṣṭā (Gesture). Sāmkhya is not prepared to assign a separate place to them, because the three Pramāṇas include all other means of cognition. ² This system includes some of them under 'Perception', some under 'Inference' and the rest under 'Verbal Testimony'.

¹ drṣṭānānumānām āptavacanaḥ ca - (SK, Kā, 4)  
² sarvapramāṇa siddhātvāt (Ibid, Kā., 4).
Upamāṇa Pramāṇa is accepted by the Naiyāyikas, Mimāmsakas and the Advaita Vedāntins. So, let us discuss the definition of Upamāṇa as given by them one by one.

**Nyāya view of Upamāṇa:**

Upamāṇa or comparison is the means by which we get the knowledge of a thing from its similarity to another thing previously known. Hearing from a forester that a wild ox (gavaya) is like a cow, we go to the forest and find an animal resembling the cow. We then remember the forester's statement that a wild ox is like a cow, and know that the animal which we find like the cow is the gavaya. In the Sutra, Prasiddha means well-known and by means of resemblance to that sadhanam, i.e., knowledge of that which is not well known, is the analogy or comparison. The knowledge of the gavaya thus attained is by Upamāṇa or comparison. Two factors are involved in such argument by comparison, viz., (i) the knowledge of the object (gavaya in this case) to be known; and (ii) the perception of similarity. The modern Naiyāyikas attach more importance to the perception of similarity. But mere resemblance is not enough to justify an agreement by comparison. If there is complete resemblance

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3. prasiddha sādhamyāt sādhyā-sādhanam upamānam-
   NS, 1.1.6
4. sanjñāsañjñi sambandhajñānam upamiti. TS, p. 434.
between the two, they become identical, and there is not any new knowledge. There is no meaning in saying that a cow is like a cow. If, again, there is considerable resemblance, then also the argument by comparison may not be valid. A buffalo resembles a cow in many respects, though the buffalo is not a cow. If the resemblance is very slight, then also it cannot lead to any valid knowledge. We cannot argue that a mustard seed is like Mount Meru, because both have existence. Thus it is evident that the amount of resemblance does not count much. The resemblance must be in essential points.

Upamāna is a means of knowledge by comparison, and the knowledge yielded by it is called upamiti. Upamiti is defined as the knowledge of the relation between an object and its name. Comparison involves the following steps: (1) A person hears an authoritative statement, e.g., 'the gavaya is like a cow' (2) He observes similarity of a gavaya with a cow. (3) He remembers the statement received from the reliable person. (4) He argues by comparison that this kind of object is denoted by the word 'gavaya'.

5. Upamitikaraṇam Upamānam. TS, p. 434.
Mīmāṁsā view of Upamāna

The Nyāya accepts Upamāna (Comparison) as a unique source of knowledge. The Mīmāṁsā also recognises upamāna as an independent source of knowledge, but accepts it in a different sense. Śavara defines comparison as the knowledge of similarity subsisting in an unperceived object (e.g., a cow) on the perception of a similar object (e.g., a wild cow). Kumārila defines it as the knowledge of similarity subsisting in a remembered object (e.g., a cow) with an object (e.g., a wild cow) perceived. 'The cow which was perceived by me in the past in a town is similar to this wild cow perceived in a forest at present'. This is an example of comparison. The Prabhākara also defines comparison as the knowledge of similarity subsisting in a remembered object, which arises from the perception of similarity. A person, who perceived a cow in a town in the past, perceives a wild cow in a forest, perceives its similarity with the cow, and then knows the similarity of the remembered cow with the perceived wild cow. The knowledge of similarity of the remembered cow with the perceived wild cow is comparison. Prabhākara's view of comparison is identical with that of Kumārila. Both regard similarity as an object of comparison.
regard similarity of a remembered object with a perceived object as known by comparison.°

Comparison is not perception, since its object known to be similar (e.g., a cow) is not in contact with a sense-organ. Nor is comparison inference, since it does not depend upon the knowledge of invariable concomitance between the two objects, which are similar to each other. It may be reduced to an inference in the following manner. 'The cow is similar to the wild cow, because it is the substrate of similarity with another object is found to be similar to it, as one of the twins is similar to the other.' This is wrong, because the cow and the wild cow, which are similar to each other, were never perceived together in the past. So, comparison is not inference. Nor is it Testimony, since it does not depend upon verbal authority. So it is an independent means of valid knowledge. 7

Advaita view of Upamāna:

Upamāna is the means of the knowledge of similarity. A person, who has perceived a cow in a town, goes to a forest, and perceives a wild cow. He has an

6. ŚBh., i.1.5, p. 107; ŚD, p.74; PP., p. 110
7. ŚD, pp. 75-76; TNR, p. 13; PP, p. 111.
apprehension 'this animal is similar to a cow' owing to the intercourse of his eye with the animal. Then he has an apprehension 'my cow is similar to this animal.' This knowledge of similarity of a cow with a wild cow is acquired by comparison. The knowledge of similarity existing in a wild cow with a cow is the instrumental cause of comparison. The knowledge of similarity existing in a cow with a wild cow is the result. The knowledge of similarity cannot be acquired from perception, since the cow is not present to the eyes. Nor can it be acquired from inference, for similarity existing in a wild cow with a cow cannot serve as a mark of inference as follows: my cow is similar to this wild cow, because she is the correlate of similarity existing in this wild cow, whatever is the correlate of similarity with another thing is similar to it, as Caitra, the correlate of similarity existing in Maitra, is similar to Maitra.' The Advaita Vedānta contends that the reason or mark kust exist in the subject, but that the reason 'similarity existing in a wild cow with a cow' does not exist in the subject 'my cow'. Therefore, it cannot prove the existence of the probandum 'similarity existing in my cow with a wild cow. Therefore, the knowledge of similarity existing in my cow with a wild cow cannot be acquired from inference.
acquired from comparison, which is neither perception nor inference, but a distinct means of valid knowledge. The Advaita Vedānta view of comparison is similar to the Mīmāṃsā view.

**The Śāṅkhyā criticism of Upamāna:**

It has already been stated that Upamāna or comparison is not accepted as an independent pramāṇa by the Śāṅkhyas. Thus 'Upamāna' (comparison) may be included under 'Verbal Testimony' and 'Inference' and 'Perception'. Thus 'Upamāna' has been illustrated by means of 'Verbal Testimony'. As 'gavaya is like the cow'. This is purely verbal when it is uttered by an elderly-experienced people (Vṛddhavyavahāra) to cognize an unexperienced people about the unknown animal 'gavaya'.

Secondly, 'Upamāna' is purely 'Inferential' in so far as 'when experienced persons use a certain term with reference to a particular thing, it should be regarded as denoting it — specially, when there is no function other than Direct Denotation — (through which the term could be applicable to that thing);— as is found in the example 'gavaya is like the cow' — here 'cow' is applied to the animal genus 'cow' is Major Premise.

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8. VPB, Ch. iii.
'The word 'gavaya' is used by experienced persons with reference to the animal similar to that of cow' is Minor premise.

'Therefore, the word 'gavaya' must be regarded as denotative of that animal' is conclusion.

Thirdly, 'Upamana' may be purely 'Perceptual as when the knowledge arises in this way—'the animal before our eyes is similar to the cow'. Thus then, when the cow is remembered, and its remembrance is seen in the gavaya, this is perception pure and simple, certainly the resemblance or similarity in the cow is not something different from that in the 'gavaya', for it is regarded to be a case of 'Resemblance' only when some portions of the component parts of the body of one animal is found to be almost the same as that in the body of another. And these points of similarity must be one and equal so that the direct perception of one cow can indirectly denotes the perception of another (gavaya).

Thus, Upamāna Pramāṇa has been found, to be either verbal or inferential or perceptual. 'Upamāna' is by no means of fourth pramāṇa according to the Sāmkhya. Therefore, it may be concluded that 'Upamāna' or comparison is not a distinct means of cognition.
Next comes 'Arthapatti' i.e., Presumption or Postulation. So, let us see first what is the definition of Arthāpatti as given by the different schools of Indian system, who has accepted it as a distinct source of cognition. Arthāpatti as an independent Pramāṇa is accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas and the Advaita Vedāntins.

Mīmāṃsā view of Arthāpatti:

It is admitted by the Mīmāṃsakas as a new source of knowledge (pramāṇa). Śabara, the renowned commentator of the Mīmāṃsā sūtra, defines 'Arthāpatti' as assumption of some unperceived fact in order to reconcile some inconsistency in the perceived facts. Thus when we know that a person Devadatta is alive and perceive that he is not in his house, we cannot reconcile these two facts, viz., his remaining alive and his not being in his house without presuming his existence somewhere outside the house. This method of cognising the existence of Devadatta outside the house is called 'Arthāpatti'. Another example which is very often used to illustrate is that of a person who, though not eating by day continuous to be healthy and strong, which leads to the assumption that he should be eating by night. It is also called
implication. Kumārila and Prabhākara differ from each other in their views on presumption. Prabhākara maintains that there is an element of doubt in presumption, while Kumārila denies its existence in it. There is doubt, according to Prabhākara, as to the truth of the two perceived facts which cannot be reconciled with each other. The assumption of another fact removes the doubt, and reconciles the apparently inconsistent facts. We know that Devadatta is living, and perceive his absence from his house. This perception generates a doubt, about our knowledge that he is living. In order to remove this doubt we assume that he must be outside his house. This presumption removes the doubt as to his living, and reconciles the two apparently inconsistent facts of his living and non-existence in his house.

The element of doubt, according to Prabhākara, distinguishes presumption from inference. There is no element of doubt in inference. From the undoubted perception of smoke we can infer the existence of fire. The sign is free from doubt. But the perceived absence

9. ŚBh, p. 110, ŚD, p. 76; PP., p. 113.
of Devadatta from his house leads to the presumption of his living outside his house only when it has made the fact of his living doubtful. Thus there is doubt in presumption, while there is no doubt in inference. Presumption removes doubt, and reconciles two apparently inconsistent facts, and cannot be regarded as inference.

There is no element of doubt according to Kumārila, in presumption. We perceived the absence of Devadatta from his house. We know for certain that he is alive. In order to reconcile these two well-known and undoubted facts we assume that he has gone out of his house. Without this assumption the apparent inconsistency between his being alive and his absence from his house cannot be reconciled. If the knowledge of his living were doubtful, it could not be the sound basis of presumption. It removes the mutual inconsistency of two well-ascertained facts. The presumption of a third fact reconciles the two well-known facts perceived, which appear to be inconsistent with each other.

**Advaita view of Arthāpatti:**

Arthāpatti or presumption according to Advaita is the assumption of a fact to account for another

10. PP., pp. 113-15; SD, pp. 77-79.
inexplicable fact. The postulation of a hypothesis to explain the inexplicable fact is called arthāpatti. It is presumption, postulation or implication. The knowledge of the fact to be explained is the instrumental cause of presumption. The knowledge of the fact that explains is the result. A person is known not to eat in the daytime, and yet gets stout. His stoutness is to be explained. It cannot be explained without postulating his eating at night. In the absence of his eating at night his stoutness cannot be explained. Eating at night explains the unintelligible fact. This assumption of a hypothesis is called presumption.

Presumption cannot be regarded as an inference, since the universal major premise cannot be based on positive concomitance. Negative concomitance is not admitted by the Advaita Vedānta. The Kevalavyatirikī inference based on negative concomitance is nothing but presumption.11

But Sāmkhya criticises it and gives opinion by saying that, as a matter of fact, however, this is also a case of Inference. In the case of our own body we easily recognise the premise that when a finite object is not present in one place, it is present elsewhere—

11. VPB, Ch.V.
and vice versa. Therefore, when we find that the living Devadatta is not in the house, we deduce the conclusion that he must be somewhere outside the house; — this is a clear case of Inference or Anumana. So, it is conclude that, Arthāpatti or Presumption is not a separate form of cognition.

Similarly, 'Abhāva or Anupalabdhi (Non-apprehension) is included under 'Perception'. Absence is only a form of Perception. Absence means non-apprehension i.e., non-apprehension of a thing which is absent. It is supported by the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins as a distinct form of Pramāṇa.

The Mīmāṃsā view of Anupalabdhi:

According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, anupalabdhi or non-apprehension is an independent source of knowledge, by which we immediately cognise the non-existence of an object. When we say 'there is no jar in this place' we cognise the absence of the jar. Absence or non-existence (abhāva) cannot be apprehended by perception, which stands in need of sense-contact with a present object, which is not possible in this case. Non-existence cannot also be apprehended by other pramāṇas. Non-existence of the jar in this place is known from the absence of its
cognition, i.e., from its non-apprehension or anupalabdhi. We judge that the jar does not exist in this place, because it is not perceived. Non-existence of the jar is not inferred from its non-perception, because such an inference is possible if we already known that there is a universal relation between non-apprehension and non-existence. But this would be begging the question, i.e., assuming the very fact which we want to prove. The knowledge of the jar's non-existence is neither derived from comparison, nor from testimony, nor from postulation. Thus anupalabdhi(non-apprehension) has to be recognised as a separate and independent source of knowledge of a thing's non-existence.

But all cases of non-apprehension do not prove the non-existence of what is not perceived. A table exists in a room, but in the darkness of the room it is not perceived. There are atoms, ether, virtues and the like which are imperceptible. But we do not say that they do not exist. If a thing should have been perceived under certain conditions, then only its non-apprehension under those conditions proves its non-existence. This appropriate non-apprehension (Yogyānamupalabdham) is the source of our knowledge of non-existence.
Prabhākara does not accept non-apprehension as an independent source of knowledge. He does not accept the category of non-existence (abhāva) recognised by Kumārila. So he does not admit non-apprehension as a distinct means of knowledge. When we perceive the jar on the ground, we perceive the ground as related to the existence of the jar. But when the jar is absent, we perceive the bare ground or mere space. The non-existence of the jar is nothing but the existence of its bare locus, the ground. The apprehension of the mere locus (tanmātradhi) is erroneously called non-apprehension by Kumārila.

Kumārila disputes this view of Prabhākara. We may perceive not merely empty space, but space filled up by bricks and other things, but that will also give us knowledge of the non-existence of the jar. The mere perception of the ground cannot give rise to a knowledge of the non-existence of the jar, because the ground is perceived even where there is jar. So the ground must be perceived as negatively qualified. This means that we have already the notion of non-apprehension.

Advaita view of Anupalabdhi:

Non-existence is known by non-apprehension. It cannot be known by the other means of valid knowledge. Non-apprehension is the unique pramāṇa which cognises non-
existence. The non-existence of a jar on the ground is known by non-apprehension. When the jar is removed from the ground, we perceive the ground, the locus of the non-existence of the jar, but we do not perceive the non-existence itself. We know the non-existence by non-apprehension. Though the locus of non-existence is perceived, the non-existence itself is not perceived. Non-existence is known by non-apprehension. It can never be known by perception. The perceptive process is directed only to the locus of the non-existence, but not to the non-existence itself. The non-existence is known by appropriate non-apprehension. The object, which is absent, must be fit for being perceived. If it is not capable of being perceived, its non-existence cannot be known by non-apprehension. A jar is capable of being perceived. If the jar had been present, it would have been perceived. Merit and demerit are supersensible and cannot be perceived, so their non-existence cannot be known by non-apprehension. The thing that is absent, must be of the same order of reality as its locus which is perceived. The negation must not be absolute negation, but it must be the negation of something perceptible. 12

But it is already mentioned that, Abhāva or Anupalabdhi is not accepted as an independent knowledge.

12. VPB, Ch. VI.
by the Śāṃkhyas. It is nothing but a kind of perception only. Thus, 'the absence of the jar, at a certain place' — according to the Śāṃkhyas, this absence is not regarded as a distinct pramāṇa but can be included in the Perception. When a jar is placed on the ground, we say 'Ghatabat Bhūtala' i.e., ground with jar and when the jar is removed only ground remains. Therefore, 'the absence of jar on the ground' is the result of diverse modification only. All material substances are ever-changing and this is the subject-matter of sense-organs. The transformation which arises at the result of things having forms is perceptible through eyes, so the absence of jar on the ground is included under perception. So they (the Śāṃkhyās) feel the necessity of admitting 'Anupalabdhī' in case of excessive distance, proximity, destruction of the sense-organs, absence of mind, intensity, intervention, suppression (of other objects) and inter-mixture with other like objects.¹³ Thus a bird flying high, though existing, is yet not perceived by the eye on account of its extreme remoteness. Due to extreme nearness, the callyrium applied to the eye, is not seen. Destruction of organs — e.g., blindness, deafness etc. From absence of mind e.g., under the influence of strong emotion a person, even in bright day-light does not perceive anything.

¹³ atidūrāt sāmīpyat indriyaghatanmano'navaśthānato saukṣmyātāya avadhānāt abhibhavat sāmānābhīhārāceṣeṣaḥ (SK, Kā, 7).
not perceive a thing. From extreme subtlety one can never perceive atoms or such other things, though they may be under one's very eyes. From Intervention, one cannot see the face of a girl which is covered with a veil. From suppression one cannot see the planets and stars during the day, because they are suppressed by the brighter rays of the Sun. From intermixture, one does not perceive drops of rain-water, disappearing in a tank.

The non-perception of these is due to its subtlety and others but not to its non-existence, since it is actually apprehended through its effect.¹⁴

'Sambhava' or 'Probability' has been regarded as a distinct means of cognition, as leading to such cognitions as that of the presence of the lesser weights — such as the 'Droṇa' the 'Āḍhaka', the 'Prastha' — in the heavier weight the 'Khāri' — This also is a case of Inference only. Another example: where there is thousand there is must hundred. Because ten hundred makes one thousand. So it will be a fool's question, if one asks 'Is there hundred in a thousand'? Again, in one kilogram, there is the presence of hundred grams.

¹⁴ sauksmyāttadanupalavdhīrnābhāvāt, kāryatastadupalav-
- dheḥ / (SK, Kā, 8).
As a matter of fact, the heavier weight of the Khārī has been found to be invariably concomitant with lesser weights of the Drona etc.; and it is this concomitance that leads to cognition of the presence of these lesser weights in the heavier weights. Though 'Sambhava' or 'Probability' is recognised by the Paurāṇikas as a separate source of valid knowledge, to the Sāmkhyas it is included in Inference or Anumāna. Because there cannot be 'Khārī' without Drona etc., there cannot be thousand without hundred. Therefore, it is to be inferred that there is the presence of 'Drona' in a 'Khārī'. So, 'Sambhava' is purely an inferential pramāṇa.

In the same way, Aitihya or Tradition can never be an independent source of pramāṇa because it is a mere continuity of a vague assertion of which the original source cannot be traced. It has no particular speaker but has come from mere tradition. It is recognised as an independent source of valid knowledge by the Paurāṇikas alone. 'Tradition' generally appears in the form 'the old people have said so and so' for example 'there is a ghost living on this banyan tree'. As its original source being undetermined, it can never be regarded as a distinct means of cognition. There is doubt indeed. And where there is doubt, it is not
case of pramā or valid knowledge. This is Apramā or invalid knowledge. So, 'Aitihya' cannot be included either in Prat, ṣa or in Anumāna or in Śabda. However, it can be included in Śabda or Verbal Testimony if its original source is known and known to be trustworthy, then only, it is a pure and simple case of 'Śabda' or 'Verbal Testimony'.

Next comes 'Cheṣṭā' or 'Gesture'. Gesture is explained as the operation of the limbs of the body; like beating the belly and placing the hands side by side and slightly hallowed which is indicative of some intention. That conveys hunger and the like which are not otherwise known, and hence, is said to be a means of knowledge. That is inference only. Why? Because if the performance of bodily operation, which is associated with the desire for meals, etc., gives rise to the knowledge of its associate, it cannot be declared to be different from inference.

'Pratibhā' or 'Imagination' also cannot be accepted as an independent source of valid knowledge. In this beginningless world there arises the sense of what to do in the presence of knowledge differentiated by the

15. Cheṣṭā नाम abhiprāyaśucaka — YD, p. 145.
form of the objects like dead body, desired lady or eatable object in gods, men or insects, etc., due to the past impression of the common external objects like women. That is called imagination.

In the one who has repeatedly experienced the particular objects as giving rise to pleasure, etc., the knowledge of that object arises merely through the utterance of the word denoting that object even without the presence of that object. For example, when it is stated that a tiger lives here, the actions as sweating and trembling of the body take place even without the external object merely through the earlier practice. Therefore, being a part of means giving rise to the sense of what to do with reference to gods, men and insects, imagination is a means of knowledge. As a matter of fact, it is not supported as an independent pramāṇa by the Sāmkhyas. Because, if the knowledge caused by the impression of past experience is admitted to be imagination, it comes to be either of perception, inference and verbal testimony i.e., is included in them only. Because we do not get some sort of knowledge through the means other than perception and the rest. Hence, imagination is not something different from those. The archaic knowledge also cannot be caused by imagination. Because it is stated that the knowledge of the
illustrative Supreme seer is of accomplished nature. Therefore, it does not stand in need of some means of knowledge. The sense is that the knowledge was already in him at the time of birth and hence he did not acquire it through means of knowledge. It cannot be the knowledge of Yogins, because it is not held accepted (anabhyupagamāt). It cannot be worldly knowledge, because it is not ascertained (aniścitatvāt). There arises no ascertainment as to whether the substance standing before me is manifest or not. The knowledge which is not ascertained is not accepted to be a valid knowledge. The reason is not far to seek. Because there are infinite defects in the mind, because uncertainty as whether right or wrong caused by desire, anger, avarice, fear and infatuation gives rise to various alternatives in the same knowledge. Hence, the imagination is not the worldly knowledge (Laukikām jñānam). Hence, it is proved that because of the lack of possibility of some form of knowledge by means other than perception, etc., the imagination should not be mentioned as a separate means of knowledge.

Thus it becomes established that there are three pramāṇas or Means of Cognition according to the Sāṁkhya system and all other pramāṇas which find their place in different systems of philosophy can be included under
Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda. The Sāṃkhya firmly believes that besides the three pramāṇas no other pramāṇas are necessary. We are thus left only with the three and only three means of Right Cognition, viz. Perception, Inference and Valid Assertion.

Thus, the Means of Cognition have been defined for the proper knowledge of 'Manifest' (Vyakta), Unmanifest (Avyakta) and the 'Knowing' (Spirit). Because with the help of the means of cognition, even an ordinary person, say a dirty-footed ploughman also can gather knowledge about the three which are nothing but the gate-way of liberation to each and every person.

16. drstamanumanamāptavacanam ca, sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt
   SK, Ka, 4.
17. vyaktāvyaktajñāvijñānāt
   SK, Ka, 2.