CHAPTER THREE

ANUMĀNA-PRAMĀNA

Though Pratyakṣa pramāṇa is regarded as the highest and foremost of all the pramāṇas, yet there are something in this world which are not cognisable by Pratyakṣa. So, in order to prove their validity we have to depend upon some pramāṇas also other than Pratyakṣa.

In the order of naming the pramāṇas in Indian Philosophy, Anumāna comes next to Pratyakṣa. Knowledge of Anumāna etc. is not possible without the aid of Pratyakṣa.

Anumāna Pramāṇa is recognised by the Baudhhas, Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyāyikas, Sāṁkhyaits, Mīmāṁsakas, and the Vedāntins. The Jainas also recognise Anumāna as a subdivision of Mediate knowledge i.e., Parokṣa jñāna.

Anumāna literally means the knowledge (māna) which we get after other knowledge. From the knowledge of the sign (linga) we get a knowledge of the object possessing it. Therefore, Anumāna means the knowledge which is
preceded by Pratyakṣa. Anumāṇa as the means of knowing a thing beyond the range of the senses through its inseparable connection with another thing which lies within the range of the senses. Thus Anumāṇa is an indirect or mediate knowledge. It is usually translated by the word 'inference', which, however, is to be taken in a comprehensive sense, as including both deduction and induction. Anumāṇa is sometimes defined as knowledge which is preceded by perception.

The definition of Anumāṇa according to different systems.

Let us begin with Nāstika schools first. The Carvākas do not admit Anumāṇa, Upamāṇa etc., except Pratyakṣa as the source of valid knowledge. They have vehemently criticised all other pramāṇas as valid source of knowledge to establish their view regarding Pratyakṣa as the only dependable source of knowledge. That which beyond the range of Perception is untrue to them. They are completely materialists indeed. Perception according to them is either external or internal. External perception is due to the intercourse of

1. pratyakṣaṁekam cārvākah......................
   Tārkkikarakṣā of Varadārāja, quoted in the Muktāvalīsamgraha, Vide Bhāp., p. 260.
the five sense-organs with their objects. Internal perception depends upon external perception. Manas, the internal organ, can work upon the material supplied by external perception. It is dependent of the external sense-organs. The perceptible world is the only reality. The things perceived by the five sense-organs only are real. The other things which are beyond the range of perception are unreal. Heaven and Hell are not real, because they are not perceived. The factual organ (skin) perceives softness, hardness, heat, cold, roughness, smoothness and the like. The gustatory organ (tongue) perceives sweet, sour, pungent, astringent and all other tastes. The olfactory organ (nose) perceives agreeable and disagreeable odours. The visual organ (eye) perceives wall, jars, posts, men, beasts, earth, mountains and the like. The auditory organ (ear) perceives various kinds of sounds. The perceptible world is real. They regard perception as the only means of valid knowledge and reject inference as a means of valid knowledge. The Nyāya believes in a five-membered inference (parārthānumāna) for demonstration to others as shown below:

1. The hill is fiery (Pratijñā)
2. Because it is smoky (Hetu)
3. Whatever is smoky is fiery, like a Kitchen (Udāharaṇa)
4. The hill is smoky (Upanaya)

. 5. The hill is fiery (Nigamana)

The first three or the last three members of the Inference are sufficient for Inference for oneself (Svārthānumāna). Inference depends upon the universal concomitance (Vyāpti) between the middle term and the major term. The middle term (e.g., fire). It must be found to exist in the minor term (pakṣa) or the subject of Inference (e.g., the hill). The middle term (e.g., smoke) is the sign (Liṅga), which indicates the existence of the major term (e.g., fire). It must be found to exist in the minor term (pakṣa) or the subject of Inference (e.g., the hill). The middle term must be invariably accompanied by the major term. The invariable concomitance of the middle term or probans (Śādhana) with the major term or probandum (Śādhyā) is called Vyāpti. It is the ground of Inference. This universal relation must be unconditional. It must not be vitiated by any conditions (upādhi). The Vyāpti does not cause Inference by virtue of its existence, but by virtue of its being known. But how can Vyāpti, the ground of Inference, be known? It cannot be known by Perception, external or internal. External perception arises from the intercourse of the sense-organs with their proper objects. There can be no intercourse of the sense-organs with all individuals, past, remote and future. Vyāpti is the invariable concomitance of all
cases of the middle term with all cases of the major term. But all instances of the middle term and the major term cannot be perceived with the external sense-organs. Nor can Vyāpti be known by internal perception. Manas is not independent of the sense-organs in apprehending external objects. It can elaborate the material supplied by external perception. Knowledge of Vyāpti is not the knowledge of invariable concomitance between the genus of the probans (e.g., the genus of smoke) and the genus of the probandum (e.g., the genus of fire) because class-characters are not known by perception. Even if they are known by it, the invariable concomitance between their class-characters does not establish the invariable concomitance between the particular instance of the probans and the particular instance of the probandum. Nor can Vyāpti be known by Inference, since it would lead to infinite regress. One Vyāpti is known by Inference, which is based on another Vyāpti. This Vyāpti is known by another Inference and so on to infinity. Nor can Vyāpti be known by testimony, because it is included in Inference. If testimony is not included in Inference, it depends upon the words of a reliable person. The words are the signs of their meanings. They denote definite objects. Comprehension of the meanings of words depends upon the knowledge of universal concomitance of words with their meanings. So Vyāpti cannot be known by testimony, which also depends on the knowledge of another universal concomitance. It involves argument in a circle. We cannot believe in another person's statement that there is invariable concomitance between the probans (e.g. smoke)
and the probandum (e.g., fire) any more than we can believe in a dogmatic assertion of Manu. If Vyāpti is known by testimony only, there can be nor inference for oneself, in which the Vyāpti is not pointed out by any other person. Nor can Vyāpti be known by comparison (Upamāna), because it depends upon the universal relation between words and objects signified by them. Comparison is the knowledge of an object (e.g., a wild cow) indicated by the statement of a forester that 'a wild cow is like a cow'. So it depends upon invariable concomitance between words and their meanings. Hence Vyāpti cannot be known by comparison. It is not known by perception, inference, testimony and comparison. Inference is not possible, since Vyāpti, which is its ground, cannot be known.

Vyāpti is the universal relation between the probans and the probandum free from all conditions (upādhi). A condition is that which does not invariably accompany the probans, but which invariably accompanies the probandum. The absence of all conditions, which vitiates the inference, can never be known. All conditions can never be perceived. The absence of all conditions can never be known by non-perception. If they are known by inference, testimony or comparison, the same difficulty will arise. Further, the knowledge of a condition must precede the knowledge of its absence. The knowledge
of invariable concomitance between the middle term and the major term depends upon the knowledge of the absence of the conditions. The knowledge of the absence of the conditions depends upon the knowledge of the conditions. The knowledge of the absence of the conditions depends upon the knowledge of the conditions. The knowledge of invariable concomitance, again, depends upon the knowledge of the conditions. Thus, there is reasoning in a circle. Vyāpti, the ground of inference, can never be known. Therefore inference is not possible.2

Vyāpti is said to depend on uniform and uncontradicted perception. It is an enumerative induction based on simple enumeration. It is based on observation of concomitance of the probans (e.g., smoke) with the probandum (e.g., fire) on numerous occasions. But even if they have accompanied each other on numerous occasions in the past, they may not accompany each other in future. The invariable concomitance between them observed so far may have exceptions in future. No necessary connection has been established between them. The invariable concomitance between smoke and fire in all times, in all places, and under all circumstances, can never be known. If all instances of smoke and fire in all times

2. SDS, Cārvāka.
and in all places in the whole world be not perceived, the doubt will persist that smoke may exist without being accompanied by fire. Even if their agreement in presence be known by observation of numerous instances of their co-presence, their agreement in absence can never be known by observation of numerous instances. It is impossible to observe that all cases of the absence of fire are the cases of the absence of smoke. Non-fiery things are all things in the world other than fire. The non-existence of smoke in all non-fiery things can never be perceived. Thus the universal concomitance of the middle term with the major term can never be known, since their agreement in presence and agreement in absence in the whole world in the past, the present and the future can never be observed. Their invariable concomitance cannot be known through their class-characters, because there are no class-characters or universals. So Vyāpti, the ground of Inference, can never be known. It cannot exist between all particular instances of the probans and the probandum with their infinite peculiarities due to different times, places and circumstances. Vyāpti can neither exist nor be known. So inference is not possible. It can never be valid.

The Cārvākas do not believe in causation and its universality. There is no necessary connection between
cause and effect. There is only accidental conjunction of an antecedent and a consequent. The two events are found together on numerous occasions, and therefore produce an expectation in the mind that they will always go together. But there is no surety about their co-presence. This accidental conjunction of an antecedent and a consequent cannot ensure Vyāpti, which is the ground of inference.

Perception is the only source of valid knowledge. The objects, which are perceived, exist. Imperceptible entities do not exist. If imperceptible objects were supposed to exist, then even imaginary things would exist, and the poor would remove their poverty with imaginary wealth, the servants would become masters by imagining themselves to be rich, and all would fulfill their desires with imaginary objects. The distinction between perceptible things and imaginary things would be abolished. There would, therefore, be total collapse of practical life, which depends upon the distinction between perceptible and imaginary things. Therefore imperceptible things do not exist. The perceptible world as an aggregate of perceptible things and qualities exists.

Jaina view of Anumāna:

The Jainas, however, add Anumāna to the list of Pramāṇas. The definition of Anumāna, according to
the Jainas, is the knowledge of the major term derived from the knowledge of the middle term. Fire is inferred from smoke. Smoke is the middle term, and fire is the major term. Anumāna is based on Vyāpti derived from induction (Tarka). Vyāpti is the invariable concomitance between the middle and the major term. In inference there are three terms - the middle term (Hetu or Sādhanā), the major term (Sādhyā) and the minor term (Pakṣa). The middle term is that which is definitely known to be inseparably connected with the major term. If the major term (i.e., fire) does not exist, the middle term (i.e., Smoke) cannot exist. If the middle term exists, the major term must also exist. This is the only mark of middle term.

There are two kinds of Inference, Inference for oneself and Inference for others. In Inference for oneself, a person perceives the reason or middle term, remembers the inseparable connection between the reason or middle term, remembers the inseparable connection between the reason and the inferable object or the major term determined by induction, and at once knows the major term. Inference for others consists in the statement of the middle term, the major term, and the minor term. It consists of two propositions. (1) The hill is fiery, (2) because it is smoky. The example (drstānta)
is not present here. This is intended for intelligent person. For less intelligent persons the inference includes the example and consists of three propositions: (1) The hill is fiery, (2) because it is smoky, (3) whatever is smoky is fiery, as the kitchen. The example is the object in which the middle term is perceived to be accompanied by the major term. The example (Dṛṣṭānta), the application (Upanaya), and the conclusion (Nigamana) are necessary to convince persons of dull intellect of the truth of an inference. The application is reassertion of the presence of the middle term in the minor term in which the presence of the major term is to be proved. The conclusion is reassertion of the presence of the major term in the minor term. Inference for dull persons consists of five propositions — (1) The hill is fiery (paksavacana), (2) because the hill is smoky (hetuvacana), (3) whatever is smoky is fiery, as the kitchen (Dṛṣṭānta), (4) the hill is smoky (Upanaya), (5) therefore, the hill is fiery (Nigamana). ³

Buddha view of Anumāna:

The process of deriving one knowledge from another is known as Inference is the view of the

³. PNT, 49, 51 and 53.
According to Dharmakīrti, a Buddhist logician of the seventh century and author of the well-known Nyāyabindu and Pramāṇa-vārtika, Anumāṇa is of two varieties: (1) (Inference for one's own sake) Svārthānumāṇa and (2) Inference for the sake of others (Parārthānumāṇa). Dharmakīrti did not, however, care to define Anumāṇa. Dimāgā, chief of the early Buddhist logicians and author of the Pramanā-samuccaya etc. described the characters of the middle term (Hetu) and we may form a definition of Inference from these characters. Inference is the valid knowledge of an inferable property (Sādhyā) from the knowledge of a mark of inference (Hetu or liṅga), which is invariably related to the Sādhyā, and which abides in the minor term or subject of the Inference (pakṣa).

'There is fire in the yonder hill, because there is smoke in it'— in this inference 'Smoke' is the middle term or hetu, 'fire' is the major term or sādhyā and 'hill' is the minor term or pakṣa. There is an invariable and unconditional relation (Vyāpti) between the middle term and the major term, and as this smoke is found on the hill, we infer that there must be fire on the hill.
Definition of Hetu: Middle term or Hetu is the mark by which we establish the relation between the minor term (Pakṣa) and the major term (Sādhyā). The middle term is related on the one hand to the minor term and to the major term on the other. Hence it becomes possible to establish a relation between the major term and the minor term through the middle term. The middle term or hetu possesses the following two characteristics:

(1) The invariable and unconditional relation (vyāpti) between the hetu in the Sādhyā
(2) The existence of hetu in the pakṣa Dharmakīrti enumerates three characteristics of hetu viz. (1) Hetu must exist in the Pakṣa,
(2) There must be an inseparable connection between the hetu and the Pakṣa. There must be a relation of agreement in presence between the hetu and the sādhyā.
(3) There must be a relation of agreement in absence between the two, i.e., the hetu is absent in all these instances in which the sādhyā is absent. Smoke is absent where fire is absent. Hence, according to the Buddhists, vyāpti is always a relation of agreement in presence and absence.

Definition of Vyāpti: Vyāpti is the inductive relation. It is the relation of invariable concomitance between the middle term (Hetu) and the major term (Sādhyā).
Legitimate vyāptis are of two kinds: (1) Sphere of
Causation: we can connect smoke always with fire, because the connection is based on the law of causation. Smoke is caused by fire. (2) Sphere of identity: When we know that a thing is Simśapā, we also know that it is a tree. A tree may or may not be a Simśapā, but a Simśapā must necessarily be a tree, for otherwise we shall be questioning the law of identity. According to the Buddhists, thus amongst relations of succession, it is only that of cause and effect (Taduṭpatti) that warrants inductive generalisation, and amongst relations of co-existence, it is only the identity of essence (Tādātmya) that does so. By thus restricting the scope of Vyāpti, the Buddhists insist not only on the condition of invariable concomitance, but also on that of an inner necessity connecting the two terms of the relation.

The Buddhists reject the five membered syllogism of the Naiyāyikas and accept three-membered syllogism in its place. The three members are the conclusion, the minor premise and the universal major premise with an example. Inference is based on Vyāpti or inseparable connection between the hetu and the sādhyā. The inseparable connection between them is based upon causality or identity in essence.

But how can we establish causal relation between two phenomena? The early Buddhist says that if A precedes
B, and the disappearance of A means the disappearance of B, other things remaining unaltered, then A is the cause of B. Later Buddhists state the full doctrine of casual inference in five steps, whence it is called Pañcakāraṇī:

1. In the first stage we perceive neither the cause nor the effect
2. The cause appears
3. The effect appears
4. The cause disappears
5. The effect disappears.

Nyāya view of Anumāna:

According to the Naiyāyikas, Anumāna is the knowledge of an object (e.g., fire) through the medium of the knowledge of some mark (e.g., smoke) by virtue of a relation of invariable concomitance between the two. The constituents of inference are three viz., Sādhyā, Pakṣa and Hetu as well as three propositions. The propositions constituting the body of the Anumāna are called its avayavas or constituents. 'The hill has fire, because the hill has smoke, and whatever has smoke has fire'. In this inference there are three terms viz., hill, fire and smoke which are in serial order Pakṣa, Sādhyā and Hetu. The knowledge of Pakṣa, Sādhyā and Hetu are essential for the knowledge of Inference or Anumāna.

Vātsyāyana, author of the Nyāya-bhāsyā, a well known exposition on Gotama's Nyāyasūtra holds that 'no inference can follow in the absence of perception'. Only
when the observer has perceived fire and smoke to be related to each other is he able to infer the existence of the fire on the next occasion he perceives smoke.\(^4\)

Uddyotakara, author of the *Nyāya vārtika*, a work on Nyāya Philosophy mentions some points of distinction between perceptual and inferential knowledge: (1) All perception is of one kind, if we exclude yogic intuition, while there are different types of inference, (2) Perception is confined to objects of the present time and within the reach of the senses, while inference relates to the past, the present and the future (3) Inference requires the remembrance of a vyāpti, or a universal relation, which is not the case with perception.\(^5\) Where perception is available, inference has no place.\(^6\) We need not reflect much to know objects present to our perception.\(^7\) Inference operates 'neither with regard to things unknown, nor with regard to those known definitely for certain, it functions only with regard to things that are doubtful'.\(^8\) It is employed to know that part of the real which does not fall within the directly

\(\text{N.B. Under NS II. 1.31}\)

\(\text{N.V.11.31}\)

pratyakṣatvād anumānāpravṛttah (Śaṃkara, D.S.V., p. 88n)

Ghatoyam iti vijñātam nityamah ko nyapeksate

\(\text{N.S.}\)

\(\text{N.B. under I.1.1.}\)
What is perceived points to something else, not perceived, with which it is connected. Bhāsarvajña in his Nyāyasāra defines Inference as the means of knowing a thing beyond the range of the senses through its 'inseparable connection (Samavāya sambandha) with another thing', which lies within their range. Gāngesa, following Śivāditya, defines inferential knowledge as knowledge produced by other knowledge.

In Nyāya, there are two kinds of Inference—Inference for oneself (Svārthānumāna) and Inference for others (Parārthānumāna). The first kind is a psychological process which does not require the formal statement of its different members. A person knows the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire by repeated observation. He perceives smoke in a hill, and doubts that a fire may exist there. Then he remembers the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire: 'whatever is smoky is fiery', from this he infers that 'the hill has a fire.' This is the psychological analysis of Inference for oneself. In this inference there is the requirement of three-membered syllogism.

9. TCM, ii. p.2
10. SP, 146
But in the second kind of Inference, there is the requirement of all the five members of a syllogism. Inference for oneself is a psychological process, while Inference for others is a logical one. The second kind of Inference i.e., parārthānumāna is intended for convincing others. It is a demonstrative Inference which requires five members of a syllogism. As a matter of formal statement, the first step in an inference, according to Nyāya, is the predication of the Sādhyā with regard to the Paksā, e.g., 'The hill is fiery'. The second is the affirmation of the Hetu as related to the Paksā, e.g., 'Because there is smoke on the hill'. The third is the affirmation of the Hetu as invariably related to the Sādhyā, e.g., 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in the kitchen.' In this way we get a syllogism consisting of three members or propositions in case of svārthānumāna or, Inference for oneself. The Parārthānumāna or Inference for others consists of five members, instead of three. The five members of the syllogism are: (1) Pratijñā or the proposition is the thesis to be established, which makes a statement, (2) Hetu or the reason states the reason for the statement, (3) Udāharana or exemplification is the universal proposition which shows the invariable concomitance between the reason and the inferable predicate supported by an example, (4) Upanaya or the application is the application of the universal proposition to a particular instance,
(5) Nigamana is the conclusion drawn from the preceding members. The following example illustrates the five members of the Inference:

1. The hill is fiery (Prajña)
2. Because there is smoke on the hill (Hetu)
3. Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, e.g., a kitchen (Udāharana)
4. The hill is smoky (Upanaya)
5. "'. The hill is fiery (Nigamana)

All the five members are categorical propositions.

Gotama, distinguishes Inference into three categories: pūrvavat (a priori), sēsavat (a posteriori) and sāmānyato drṣṭa' (based on general observation), and Vātsyāyana offers slightly different explanations of this division, which indicates that even before Vātsyāyana there were conflicting interpretations of the Nyāya aphorisms. In Inference we pass from the perceived to the unperceived with which it is related; and this relation may be of three kinds, according as the element to be inferred is either the cause of the element perceived or its effect, or as the two are joint effects of something else. When we see the thickening clouds in the sky and expect rain, we have a case of Pūrvavat Anumāna, where we perceive the antecedent and infer the consequent
i.e., here we infer from the cause to the effect. It is, however, used to indicate not merely inference from a cause but also inference based on previous experience. When we see a river in flood and infer that there was rain, we have a case of gesavat inference, where we perceive the consequent and infer the antecedent from the effect to the cause. It is also used to cover the inference of one member of a pair of correlatives from the other, or inference from a part or from elimination. The inference of the nature of sound as quality is given to illustrate the principle of exclusion or elimination. We prove that sound is not generality, particularity or inference, not even substance or action, and so conclude that it must be a quality. When we see a horned animal and infer that it has a tail, we have a case of sāmānyatodṛṣṭa type of Anumāna. That which lies beyond the range of sense-perception is to be cognised by sāmānyatodṛṣṭa; as from the previous knowledge of the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire in numerous instances, the existence of fire can be inferred from the smoke in the distant hill. Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa type of Anumāna is based, not so much on causation as on uniformity of experience. Uddyotakara agrees with this and gives as an illustration the inference of the existence of water in a particular place from the appearance of cranes. There is
no causal relation between them. It is also used to indicate Inference of supersensible truths (sāmānyatodrṣṭa). Examples: we perceive the different places of the Sun, and infer that the Sun must be moving, though we do not see it. Perceiving aversion, affection, etc., we infer the existence of a soul which we do not perceive.

These illustrations are sufficient to bring out the necessity of a universal concomitance or Vyāpti. Each vyāpti relates the two elements of a vyāpaka or the pervader and the vyāpya or the pervaded. Anumāna derives a conclusion from the ascertained fact of the subject possessing a property which is pervaded or constantly attended by another property. We ascertain that the mountain is on fire from the fact that the mountain has smoke, and smoke is universally attended by fire. By the contemplation of the sign, middle term, smoke, we infer that the object which has smoke has also fire. Anumāna, according to Uddyotakara, is the argument from sign as aided by remembrance, or the knowledge which is preceded by the perception of the hetu (middle term) and remembrance of its invariable concomitance with the sādhya or the major term.

The New School of Nyāya (Navya Nyāya) recognizes three other kinds of Anumāna: Kevalānvayī, Kevalavyati-rekī and Anvayavyatirekī. This classification is based
on the nature of induction by which we get knowledge of vyāpti.

Where there is sādhana or the middle term there is also sādhyā or the major term, e.g., where there is smoke (sādhana) there is fire (sādhyā); This is Kevalānvayī Anumāna.

Where there is absence of sādhyā (major term); there is also the absence of sādhana or the middle term e.g., where there is no fire, there is no smoke. Or, we may say, absence of cause is the absence of effect is Kevalavyatireki.

Anumāna is Anvayavyatireki when it is based on a middle term which is both positively and negatively related to the major term, e.g., If there is smoke there is fire and if there is no fire there is no smoke.

Vaiśesika view of Anumāna:

Anumāna, according to Vaiśesika is the knowledge which is derived from the mārk, from which the existence of the probandum (sādhyā or major term) is inferred as its effect, or cause, or conjunct, or antagonist or inherent. From a rainfall in the source of a river (cause) a flood in the river (effect) is inferred. From smoke
(effect) the existence of a fire (cause) is inferred. From a body (conjunct) the existence of the factual organ (conjunct) conjoined with it is inferred. From an infuriated serpent the existence of a mongoose (antagonist) hidden behind a bush is inferred. From the heat of water the existence of a fire (inherent) is inferred. Heat inheres in fire, but not in water. The mark is the means of inference, which is based upon the relations of causality, conjunction, opposition and inherence. The causal relation between the probans (sādhana or middle term) and the probandum (sādhya or major term) is shown by the members of an Inference. A mark or probans e.g. smoke preceded by the knowledge of a well-known and well-established general principle leads to the knowledge of the probandum e.g. fire.¹²

Mīmāṃsā view of Anumāna:

According to Śabara, a renowned commentator on the Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra, when a certain fixed relation has been known to subsist between two things, so that if we perceive any one of these things we have an idea of the other thing, this latter cognition is called inferential.¹³ Śabara divides Anumāna into two

¹². VS. ix, 2, 1-2 and 4; VSU, ix, 2, 1, VS, iii, 1, 14-15
¹³. jñātāsambandhayaikadesādarśanād ekadesāntare sannikṛṣṭe rthe buddhiḥ PP., p. 64.
varieties: pratyakṣatodṛṣṭa and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa. Pratyakṣatodṛṣṭa Anumāna is that where the invariable relation holds between objects which are perceptible, as smoke and fire, and Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa Anumāna is that, where the invariable relation is not apprehended by the senses, but known only in the abstract, as in the case of the sun's motion and its changing position in the sky.\textsuperscript{14} Kumarila, founder of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā, explains the relation to be the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between the middle term (vyāpya) and the major term (vyāpaka). Smoke has been perceived to be accompanied by fire in the kitchen and at other places. Smoke is subsequently perceived on a hill. So the existence of fire on the hill is inferred. Here 'smoke' is the middle term, 'fire' is the major term and 'hill' is the minor. The major term alone is not the object of inference, because it is already known. The minor term (hill) as qualified by the major term (fire) is the object of inference.

Vyāpti or invariable concomitance between the middle term and the major term, is the ground of inference. It is known by repeated observation of the concomitance of

\textsuperscript{14.} The sāmānyatodṛṣṭa of Sabara is identical with Vatsyayana's first explanation of it, while Vatsyayana's purvavat and Sesavat answer to Sabara's pratyaksatodṛṣṭa.
of the two general properties of the objects denoted by the middle term and the major term, strengthened by non-observation of contrary instances of their non-concomitance. In short, vyāpti is established on the basis of uniform and uncontradicted experience. According to Prabhākara, the invariable relation must be unfailing, true and permanent, such as that which subsists between the cause and its effect, whole and part, substance and quality, class and individuals. The general principle is not derived from perception, since the latter operates only with regard to things in the present and in contact with sense-organs. It is not due to Inference or implication, since these assume it. The general principle is established on the basis of experience. We observe cases where fire and smoke are present together as well as cases where they are not so present, and then infer a general principle which covers all the cases. When a permanent relation of co-existence, identity or causal nexus is fixed up in the mind, one term of it reminds us of the other.

Unlike the Naiyāyikas, inferential argument, according to both the schools of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā i.e., the Prabhākara and the Bhāṭṭa, has only three members: pratiṣṭhā or statement of the case, the major premise, which gives the general rule with the corroborative
instance, and the minor premise. These three members may be stated in any order. As for example:

The hill is fiery;
Because it is smoky;
Whatever is smoky is fiery.

Or

Whatever is smoky is fiery;
The hill is smoky;
The hill is fiery.

Both Prabhākara Mīmāṃsaka and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka admit two kinds of Anumāna, i.e., pratyaksatodrṣṭa and sāmānyatodrṣṭa. The characteristics of which has already been discussed. The Mīmāṃsakas admit the distinction between inference for oneself and inference for others. The object of inferential cognition is of two kinds: drṣṭasalaksana, or that which has its specific character perceived, as the Inference of fire from smoke, and adṛṣṭasalaksana or that which has its specific character unperceived, as the Inference of the burning capacity of fire.

Prabhākara holds that Anumāna involves a previous knowledge of the general relation and refers to things already known. Kumārila makes novelty an essential
feature of Inference. Though it is true that the smoke is seen and the perception of smoke carries with it the generic idea of fire as related to the smoke, the object of the inferential cognition is something that is not already known, i.e., the subject is qualified by the predicate, the hill as possessing fire in the usual example.

Advaita view of Anumāna:

Anumāna is produced by the knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyāptijñāna) of the sādhana or middle term with the sādhyā or major term as such. The knowledge of vyāpti is its instrumental cause of inference. The residual impression of it is the intermediate function which generates Inference. The Nyāya regards the knowledge of the existence of the sādhana or middle term (e.g., smoke), pervaded by the sādhyā or major term (e.g., fire), in the subject of Inference as the instrumental cause of Inference. But the Advaita Vedānta does not regard it as a cause of Inference, far less an instrumental cause. Vyāpti is the co-existence of the middle term and the major term in all the substrata of the middle term. It is known by observation of concomitance of the middle term with the major term and non-observation of their non-concomitance.¹⁵ The number of instances is not material.
to Inference. Concomitance may be observed once or many times. Observation of concomitance only is the ground of Inference. Vyāpti does not depend upon the agreement in absence between the middle term and the major term. Inference is of one kind. It is Anvayī and depends upon the agreement in presence between the middle term and the major term. It is founded on their positive concomitance. There is no Anvayavyatireki Inference, which is said to be based on agreement in presence and agreement in absence between the middle term and the major term since knowledge of vyatirekavyāpti, agreement in absence, is not a cause of Inference. There is no Kevala-vyatireki Inference, for knowledge of negative concomitance of the absence of the major term and the absence of the middle term cannot generate inference. What is called Kevalavyatireki Inference is nothing but Arthāpatti or Presumption. Thus the Advaita Vedānta rejects the three kinds of Anumāna, i.e., Kevalānvayi, Kevalavyatireki, and Anvaya-vyatireki, which are recognised by the Navya Nyāya. The Advaitin admits the distinction between Inference for one's own sake (svārtha) and Inference for the sake of others (parārtha). The former is generated by the subconscious impression of vyāpti. The latter consists of three members only, which may be either proposition, reason and example or example
application and conclusion. Three members can show vyāpti and existence of the middle term in the subject of Inference. The two other members of the Nyāya syllogism are redundant.\textsuperscript{16}

Yoga view of Anumāṇa:

Anumāṇa is the mental operation regarding the sphere of relation which shows the connection with the same class and the disconnection from the different class of the inferrable object, and is the determinative chief of generic nature.\textsuperscript{17} As for example — on account of the changing of places, the moon and the stars are inferred to have motion like Caitra (some person), the Vindhya (mountain) is inferred to be motionless owing to the absence of its movement.\textsuperscript{18} Another example — the concept of mortality means that everything which lives must die sometime or the other. So an animal, a man, a fish and a reptile, are all mortal. Similarly a rocket, a ship, a car and a submarine have this in common that they all move.

\textsuperscript{16} VPB., Ch. ii

\textsuperscript{17} anumeyasa sapakṣeṣu anuvṛttam vipakṣavinivruttāṁca liṅgam yaṭadvīsayā dhanmaparavruttiranumāṇam

\textsuperscript{18} anumeyasya tulyajātiyeṣu anuvṛtto bhin ajātīyehyo vyāvṛttāṁ sambandho yastadvīsayā sāmānyā-avadhāraṇa-pradhānavruttiranumāṇam. Yathā desāntaraprāptah ātmāt ca candra-rākṣakām caitravat, vindhya-saprapāpti ragatiḥ — Vyāsabhāṣya on YS. i.7.
Sāmkhya view of Anumāna:

We have discussed one by one the conception of Anumāna or Inference as given by different schools of Indian system both Āśṭika and Nāstika. Now comes the turn of Sāmkhya 'Anumāna', according to the early school of Sāmkhya is the establishment of a fact on the basis of a relation perceived previously. Just as perceiving the relation of mutual extermination in the case of the snake and the mongoose, it can be inferred that snakes are absent in a place where mongooses abound. In this connection, the said school of Sāmkhya is found to speak of the seven sorts of relations, and the presence or absence of something is to be inferred on the basis of some one or other of these relations. Vācaspati quotes a verse wherein all these seven relations are mentioned.

Jayamahgalā also enumerates and illustrates all the seven relations in course of commenting on Īśvara -kṛṣṇa's view of Anumāna (Kā, 5), but with little variation.

19. sambandhādekaṃ māccheṣaśaiddhiranumānam. This seems to be the definition of Vārsaganyā - Referred to in the YD, p.4
20. mātrā-nimitta-sāmyogi-virodhi-sahacāribhibhi / swasvāmi- vadhyaghātā - dhyai sāmkhyānāṃ saptadhānumānā // (NVIT, I.l.5)
Though the definition mentioned above is not severely criticised by the commentators of Indian Philosophy; but the previous knowledge of a 'relation' is absolutely necessary in the knowledge derived from Inference. The author of Yoga-Bhāṣya also supports it. According to him, 'Anumāna', is that fluctuation of the thought-stuff which is based on the relation present in things belonging to the same class as the subject of Inference and absent from things belonging to classes different from the subject of Inference. For example, the moon and the stars get from one place to another like Caitra, hence they possess motion; (negatively) the Vindhya mountain does not get from one place to another, hence it does not possess motion. Unlike perception, it is predominantly concerned with the generic knowledge of the object.

According toĪśvarakṛṣṇa, Anumāna is the knowledge of the liṅgin from the liṅga or the sign or more
clearly, it is led up to by the knowledge of the Middle Term (sādhana) and the Major Term (sādhyā); the Middle Term is that which is less extensive (vyāpya) while the Major Term is that which is more extensive (vyāpaka). Again, Middle Term is that whose natural concomitance with the Major Term has been duly recognised after all suspected and assumed adventitious accidents have been eliminated, and that with which the Middle Term is so concomitant is the 'more extensive' Major Term. The terms 'Middle Term' and 'Major Term' which are really denotative of the objects of knowledge stand for the knowledge or cognition of those objects. Thus, when we derive the knowledge of fire from the perception of smoke, the smoke is the sign or linga or the Middle Term and fire is the lingin or signate or Major Term, since the sign exists in it. The very derivation of the term says that which has linga is called lingi as who has body is an embodied being.

Kapila defines Anumāna as the knowledge of the sādhyā or the Major Term derived from the knowledge of the invariable concomitance between it and the Hetu or the Middle Term. Hetu is the mark by which we derive

23. alpadesāvṛttitvam vyāpyatvam
24. adhikadesāvṛttitvam vyāpakatvam
25. liṅgamasti iti liṅgin as dehamasti iti dehin
the knowledge of the unperceived term. The unperceived term is called the sādhyā and the term in which the mark is found to exist is called Pakṣa or the Minor Term. Thus the perception of the Hetu or the mark in the Pakṣa or the Minor Term leads to the knowledge of sādhyā or the Major Term. In the example cited above, the smoke is the Hetu or the Middle Term, the hill on which smoke is perceived is the Pakṣa or the Minor Term and the fire is the sādhyā or the Major Term. The definition of Anumāna, according to the Sāmkhya Sūtra, is that knowledge of vyāpaka (more extensive) after the knowledge of vyāpya i.e., less extensive.

Anumāna that has been just defined in its general form has three special forms, called (1) 'Pūrvavat', A Priori, (2) 'Sesavat', A Posteriori and (3) 'Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa', based on general observation. With regard to this classification of Inference, the Sāmkhya adopts the Nyāya view.

But the ancient teachers used to classify Anumāna primarily into two heads (1) Vīta or affirmative and (2) Avīta or negative. It is called Vīta or affirmative

26. sandīgdhāsādhyāvān pakṣa .... TS, p. 407
27. pratībandhadṛśāḥ pratibaddhajñānām anumānam - SS, I. 100.
when it is based on a universal affirmative proposition and Avīta or negative when based on a universal negative proposition. Or, we may say that which functions through an affirmation is the Viṇa, affirmative; and that which functions through negation is the Avīta i.e., negative. The Viṇa is again sub-divided into two — Pūrvavat (a priori) and Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa (based on general observation). A Pūrvavat Inference is that which is based on the observed uniformity of concomitance between two things. The term 'Pūrvavat' means well-known, i.e., that 'universal' of which the 'specific individual' has been perceived. This is illustrated when one infers the existence of fire from smoke because one has observed that smoke is always accompanied by fire, which, has been previously perceived in the kitchen. In Yuktīdīpikā Pūrvavat Anumāṇa is explained as — when after observing that the cause is ready i.e., (has come to sight) one comes to know the futurity of the effect. As for example, one comes to know the futurity of rains after observing the rising of the clouds. The opponent may say that this is not a proper example because it is non-conclusive. The rising of the clouds does not necessarily become the cause of rains because there is the

28. tatra pūrvavat yada kāraṇamabhudditaṁ drṣṭvā bhaviṣyattvam kāryasya pratipadyate. tad yathā meghodaye bhaviṣyattvam brṣteth.
possibility of obstruction by the causes of it (i.e. obstruction), like the wind. In reply to this a proponent may argue that a priori or pūrvavat Anumāna is that when after observing the causal power seized amongst the assisting powers and free from obstructing element, just as after seeing the clay possessed by the potter who is active and having the instruments like the iron rod, one comes to know the future manifestation of the pot. Sāmānyatodrṣṭa Anumāna, on the other hand, is not based on any observation of the concomitance between the middle and the major term, but on the similarity of the middle with such facts as are uniformly related to the major. How do we know that we have the visual and other senses? It cannot be by means of perception. The senses are supersensible. We have no sense to perceive our senses with. Therefore, we are to know the existence of the senses by an inference like this: All actions require some means or instruments, e.g. the act of cutting, the perceptions, of colour, etc. are so many acts, therefore, there must be some means or organs of perception. It should be noted here that we infer the existence of organs from acts of perception, not because we have observed the organs to be invariably related to perceptive acts, but because we know that perception is an action and that an action requires a means of action. The existence of the senses, which cannot be
perceived, is inferred by Sāmānyatodrṣṭa. In the Yuktidīpikā it is explained as—where after once observing the invariable association of two objects one comes to know the invariable association of the objects of some groups at some other place and at some other time. Briefly, it is the Inference through analogy.29 For example, after observing sometimes the relation of smoke and fire, one comes to know at some other time the existence of some other fire through some other smoke. But the opponent's view is that it is not a proper example because it involves the undesirable contingency of lack of differentiation (ati śesapraśaṅgat). Everywhere in the case of Inference it happens that after observing somewhere the invariable association of the two objects, one comes to know the invariable association of the object of that genus at some other place. For example, after observing the production of pot from the lump of clay accompanied with the instruments at some place, one comes to know production of some other pot from some other lump of clay accompanied with the instruments. Similarly, after observing at one place the rains through flood in river

29. samānyatodrṣṭam nama yatraikada rthayoravyabhicāramupalabhyā desantare kalantare ca tajjati nyorav-yabhicāram pratipadyate.
one deduces the other rains at some other place through some other flood in river. In this case there will arise the undesirable contingency of lack of differentia among the three above mentioned kinds of Inference. The answer may be given thus - the Inference through general observation is found when after observing the distinguishing characteristics of one of the objects taking place simultaneously the same characteristic is inferred as possessed by the rest. For example, after observing the ripeness of one fruit from a tree, the ripeness of fruits of other trees is inferred. But this is also not a proper example of Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa Anumāna according to the opponent because of non-conclusiveness (anekāntāt). The ripeness of all the fruits does not take place simultaneously in all the trees because they are sprung up at different times and because of the differentiation of the other causes of fruition. The argument is that the inference through general observation is when after tasting one drop from the ocean the saltiness of rest of the water is inferred. Or, when after observing one boiled grain in the cooking pot, the boiling of rest of the grains is inferred. This is not a proper example because it does not comprehend all the objects. The authority himself states afterwards, 'the knowledge of the supra-sensuous objects is obtained through the Inference based on
general observation. If it is supposed to be the nature of this means of knowledge, there may arise the knowledge of the subtle elements, the principle of egoism and the cosmic matter through the observation that the cause, its effects and the composite objects are of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference, but the knowledge of the conscious entity will not arise because no object similar to it is available. The argument is that the inference based on general observation is that when after observing the invariable association of the characteristic with some characteristic, later on observing the one characteristic, there arises the knowledge of some other unobserved characteristic in some dissimilar case. For example, after observing Devadatta's attaining to some different place through movement, the movement is inferred in case of the invisible planets through their attaining to some different place. Similarly, after observing that the length in case of the castle, etc. is caused by growth, the growth is inferred in case of the medicines and trees by observing their length. This is also not a proper example because there is no differentia from the former (Pūrvenāviśesāt). It is admitted earlier that the knowledge of cause from the

30. śāmānyatastū dṛṣṭāt atindriyāṇāṃ pratītiranumāṇāt.
- SK, Kā, 6.
effect is posteriori Inference. In the present case also
the cause in the form of movement is known from the
effect in the form of attaining to some other place.
Hence, there arises the undesirable contingency of the
non-difference of posteriori Inference and the
Inference based on general observation. The argument
of proponent here is that 'No because there is no fixed
rule (na aniyamāt). The sense intended by us is that
the posteriori inference is there where the cause as a
rule is inferred from an effect. This does not hold good
in case of the Inference based on general observation.
Because the establishment of the objective nature is
observed to be proved from the common quality of being
composite. As it is stated also - the particular renown-
med objects are effective in proving on account of
constancy. The constancy is observed in case of the
object to be proved and the general means of establish-
ing it. As for example, the word is non-eternal because
it is produced. This being the case, the original posi-
tion of the upholder of the fixed rule is abandoned. By
this only are rejected the apparent probans (sādhana or
middle term) which are non-established, contradictory and
non-conclusive. Since they are the cause of doubt,
perverted knowledge and absence of knowledge respectively.

31. samsāyaviparyayājñānāhetuktvāt - YD, p. 175.
they cannot lead to the valid knowledge. Through sense-object contact there arises the knowledge of perception. Through invariable concomitance between sādhya and sādhana there arises the knowledge of Inference. The objects, which are suprasensuous, are not known through perception and Inference. If they are supposed to be known through revealed scriptures, it leads to the undesirable contingency of establishment of all the theories of opposite nature. Therefore, it is deduced that they are not cognised at all. Consequently, it is wrong to say that through these means of knowledge only there ensues the knowledge of all the objects. It would have been the case if the Inference would have been taught as of one kind only. On the contrary, it is three-fold. It is right to say that the priori and the posteriori Inference are having as their objects the things about which the relation of sign and signate is already cognised. Consequently, the cognition of all the objects is not admitted through them. It should be granted that through the Inference which is based on general observation the objects which are beyond the range of the senses, are organised. Naturally, the

32. āgamikatve sarvavādasiddhiprasāmgaḥ - YD. p. 177.
33. If the scripture is rejected, there remains no source to know them' YD. footnote p. 177.
34. sāmānyatastu drṣṭādatindriyāṇāṁ pratītiranumānāt SK, Kā. 6.
question arises how it is possible? For example, after cognising the invariability of production and non-eternity in the pot, the non-eternity is inferred in case of word, etc. through observing their production. Similarly, it is cognised that the fragrance is caused through sandal wood because the former is of the nature of the latter. Since both the cause and the effect are of the nature of pleasure, etc., the effects are cognised as arising from the pleasure, etc. Through the composite nature of bed, etc. their nature of serving the purpose of others is cognised, the nature of serving the purpose of others is established in case of the conglomeration of cause and effect because of their composite nature. In this way, all that is desired to be established is included. There will arise the undesirable contingency of non-cognition of the conscious entity in case of those who hold that the Inference based on general observation is identical with the posteriori Inference, for the latter serves as the means in the cognition through the effect and there is no effect of the conscious entity. If it is argued that it can be rendered faultless by taking Vṛtti (functioning) as an effect metaphorically? It can be like this. Though there is no effect from the conscious entity, yet it is stated that the specific objects like conscious entity, the unmanifest, intellect and egoism are known through
their functions occurring at present. When their power of functioning is metaphorically taken as effect, it relates to the conscious entity. That is also wrong. Because of the mention of some other reason. If the knowledge of the conscious entity could be well-attained through its function, the author would not have spoken of the nature of composite as serving the purpose of some other as the reason to establish the existence of the conscious entity. That statement is not that of function. Hence the difference between the posteriori Inference and the Inference based on general observation should be certainly admitted. Therefore, it is established that the knowledge of the objects, beyond the reach of the senses arises through the Inference based on general observation.

Only through the difference of application it is two-fold — Direct and the Inference-by-elimination (Vītā and Avītā). Their definition is — The direct Inference is that when a reason is employed in its very form, and the other i.e., the Inference-by-elimination is that when another is implied through elimination of other objects. 35 The form of the sign is of two varieties —

35. yada hetuḥ svarūpaṇa sādhyasiddhau prayujyat / sa viṭo'rthāntarākṣepāditarah parisēṣītaḥ //
YD, p. 180.
general and particular. Out of these, the general sign is that which consists with the signate and is employed resorted to in its essential form as a prabans for cognising the probandum. The particular sign is exemplified as — finite nature, homogeneity and the nature of serving others object in case of an assemblage. The direct Inference is that when the sign is employed for the establishment in the very form of the signate without eliminating the other stands. The Inference-by-elimination is when the sign is employed to prove the signate through exclusion after eliminating the topics of discourse which are other than the object to be proved. For example, if there arises the possibility of the origination of the universe by atoms, the conscious entity without cosmic matter, god, previous works, fate, time, nature, accident and then by way of elimination it is deduced that it arises of the cosmic matter only. When the direct sign is put in the form of a sentence with reference to probandum, etc., by introducing some other knowledge similar to the one held in his own mind, the sentence containing the component parts of syllogism is contrived because the meaning cannot be communicated to others without sentence.

The Anumāna, namely Avīta is what some Naiyāyikas call Ṣeṣavat or Pariṣeṣa Inference. Anumāna is called Avīta or negative when it is based on a universal
negative proposition. It consists in proving something to be true, by the elimination of all other affirmative in it. The Avīta is based upon universal agreement in absence of the middle and the major terms. The illustrations are given serially: when one argues that sound must be a quality because it cannot be a substance or an activity or a relation or anything else. The second example is what is non-different from other elements has no smell, the earth has smell, therefore, the earth is different from other elements Avīta is also called 'Sesavat' Inference. Sesa is that which remains, the residue, hence that Inference is 'Sesavat' which has this residue for its object.

Sāmkhya commentators are not unanimous among themselves about the number of the members in a syllogistic reasoning. Īsvarakṛṣṇa himself is silent in this point. His commentator Māthāra holds that an 'Anumāna' is based upon three members and it must be free from the thirty-three fallacies. The three members are (a) Pratijñā (thesis), (b) Hetu (reason) and (c) Udāharana (exemplification). Of the thirty-three fallacies, nine belong to wrong thesis, fourteen to wrong reason and ten to wrong example. The three-membered logical reasoning

36. evam trayastriṃśadābhāsaḥaratam trayavayavamanumānam Kā, 5.
is generally found to be adopted by the Buddhist-teachers. The above-mentioned thirty-three fallacies are also recognised by the Bauddhas. So, naturally the question arises, whether the Sāmkhya were influenced by the Bauddhas or not. The Chinese translation of the Madhyantānusāra śāstra, composed by Nāgārjuna and Asanga and translated into Chinese in A.D. 543 throws important light in this connection. From the evidence of this text we know that the three-membered logical reasoning was introduced by the Sāmkhyas and Pāśupatas before Vasubandhu, brother of Asanga. (4th cent. A.D. or 5th cent. acc. to some). The Jaina writer Hemacandra also in his Pramāṇa-Mīmāṁsā-sūtra Vṛtti (II. i.8) states that in the opinion of Sāmkhya, an inference consists of three-members. It, therefore, clearly shows that there had been a prominent school of Sāmkhya which used to hold 'thesis', 'reason', and 'example' as the only members of a syllogistic reasoning.

Though Īsvarakṛṣṇa is silent about the number of the member of a syllogistic reasoning yet it can be inferred easily from his Kārikās the five-member of a syllogism. For example, Pratijñā - 'puruso'sti' (Kā, 17), Hētu - sāmīghāta - parārthātvāt (Kā, 17), Udāharaṇa - natavad vyvatisṭhate lingam (Kā, 42), Upānaya - Kaśrasya yathā pravṛttirajñasya tathā pravṛttoprīṣṭhā pradhānasya (Kā, 17) and

37. pratijñāhetūdāharanānīti trayavayavamanumāṇanīti
sāmkhyah —
PMSV,II, i.8.
On the other hand, the author of the *Yukti-Dīpikā* supports neither of these two views. In his opinion, a purely syllogistic reasoning rests upon ten members. These are (1) Jijnāsa (desire to know), (2) Samsāya (doubt), (3) Prayojana (purpose), (4) Sakyaprāpti (possibility of a solution), (5) Samsāsayuddha (dispelling of the doubts), (6) Pratijñā (thesis), (7) Hetu (reason), (8) Drśṭānta (exemplification), (9) Upāsāmyāra (application) and (10) Nigamana (conclusion).

Vātsyāyana in his *Nyāyabhasya* criticises the ten members of a syllogism and finally says that they have no place in proper syllogistic argument.

Though they may not have any logical necessity for proving a conclusion, yet they serve a very useful purpose in the discussion and exposition of a philosophical problem. Among the ten members of a syllogism, the first five are the parts of explanation while the remaining five are meant for convincing others. The first five points may be explained in the following way. For instance,

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38. tasya punaravayavah - jijnāsa-samsāya-prayojana-sakyaprāpti-samsāsayuddha-aksanāsca vyākhyāgam, pratijñā-hetu-drśṭānta-pasāmyāra-nigamānānī parapratispadanāṅgamitī - YD, p. 47
(1) A student of philosophy approaches a Śāmkhya teacher and solicits him to explain the nature of Puruṣa. He wants to know whether the Puruṣa as conceived by the Śāmkhya exists or not (jñānaśā)). (2) The teacher asked him that what was the reason of this doubt that the Puruṣa might exist or not? (Doubt), the reply comes that the doubt is due to the fact that the existence of the self i.e., Puruṣa is not a matter of direct observation. (3) The teacher may ask that what is the necessity of this enquiry. The reply may be like this as it is laid down in the Śastras that the ultimate salvation rests upon the proper knowledge of manifest, unmanifest and Puruṣa. So, for the attainment of salvation such necessity of enquiry arises. (4) The teacher replies that this doubt to be solved i.e., there are ways of removing the doubt (5) With the help of three means of valid knowledge i.e., Perception, Inference and Verbal Testimony one can solve this problem. The settlement of this four steps thus satisfies the teacher that the enquiry is inspired by a real and honest difficulty. And it is now his duty to eliminate the doubt of the disciple, and this can be secured only by the five-fold syllogistic argument.

39. vyaktāvyaktajñānavijñānāt – SK, Ka, 2.
Already it is stated that among the ten members of a syllogism, the first five are the parts of explanation or Inference for one's ownself i.e. Svārthānumāṇa while the remaining five are meant for convincing others i.e. parārthānumāṇa. The first five component parts of a syllogism are described with illustrations. Now the remaining parts are being described. These are (1) Pratijñā (thesis), (2) Hetu (reason), (3) Udāharaṇa (exemplification), (4) Upanaya (application) and (5) Nigamana (conclusion).

Pratijñā or thesis is defined as when the position is ascertained, the affirmation of the probandum (Sādhyā) after throwing aside the doubt is proposition (Pratijñā). The probans is the brief statement of the middle term. It means that through which something is proved. It comes to mean the distinguishing mark. The term samāśa means brief. The expression sādhana-samāśāsavacanam means the brief statement of the probans. The term sādhanā is mentioned to exclude the fallacious reasons. They are not the probans because they cause the doubt and misapprehension. The term Samāśa is mentioned to provide scope for the other members of Syllogism. The probans is merely the specific mention of the middle term.

40. byudāsya samāśayām sādhyābadhāraṇām pratijñā YD, p. 182
41. sādhanasamāśāsavacanāḥ hetuh Ibid, p. 183
That which is elucidation in the form of its invariable association with the probandum is stated to be the other members of syllogism. An example is the illustration or parable. That which is the illustration of invariable association of the probans with the probandum is the example. For example, the objects functioning collectively are observed to be of the nature of serving the purpose of another, as it is observed in the case of bed, chair, chariot and the house. The counter example is included in that only because it is of the form of the inference -by-elimination which excludes the other possible qualities undesirably coming in it. Therefore, the counter example is not mentioned here. The application is to draw together the probandum and the example into the same action. For example, drawing together into the same action of the probandum in the form of the nature of serving others object by eye, etc. and the example like bed etc. The same action is not possible instantly in case of the probandum and the example because of their being different objects. Hence, on account of the non-visibility of that action the action

42. Udāharaṇām tatra nidarśanaṁ drṣṭāntāh, Ibid, p. 184
43. The example is of two kinds: showing positive concomitance and the negative concomitance. The former is based on vītā while the latter, on avītā, YD, p.185
44. sādhyadṛṣṭāntayorekakriyopasāṁhāra upanayah Ibid, p. 185
is applied to the two on the ground of similarity of the characteristics in the terms like 'as is this, so is that also. For example, just as the bed, etc. serve the purpose of another because they are composite in nature, similarly the eye etc., should also be of the nature of serving the purpose of another. That which is mentioned as other is the conscious entity. Nigamana or conclusion is the repetition of the proposition through the above-mentioned process is the conclusion. The repetition requiring probans, example and drawing together of the probans and the probandum is the conclusion. The collection of these members of syllogism carrying a special meaning due to their mutual relation is stated as the single sentence (Vākya) as 'therefore, the conscious entity exists'. When many sentences with their own sense secondary to the whole are combined due to their service which they render to the other meaning of the whole, the scripture is also resolved to be one sentence. Pratijnā, Hetu, Udāharana, Upanaya and Nigamana are the five members of a syllogism which are required for Parārthānumāna or Inference for others. In this respect Sāmkhyāits are equal to Naiyāyikas. The following example illustrates the five members of the Inference:

Pratijnā - 'Puruṣa'sti (Kā, 17);
Hetu - sāmghātaparārthatvāt (Kā, 17)
Udāharana - natavad vyavatisthate liṅgam (Kā, 42),
Thus Anumāna Pramāṇa is discussed thoroughly as far as possible in the light of Yukti-Dīpikā and other Sāṅkhya works comparing other Indian Philosophies.