CHAPTER FOUR

INFERENCE (ANUMĀNA PRAMĀNA)

All the systems of Indian philosophy except the Cārvākas hold that Anumāna (Inference) is a distinct means of Valid knowledge, and, hence every system has tried to discuss it in the light of its own metaphysical background. The word 'Anumāna' is generally translated in English as Inference. It is used to indicate two components viz., inferential cognition (Anumiti) and the instrument of inferential cognition (Anumiti-karaṇa). In this way, when the word 'Inference' stands for an abstraction, it means inferential cognition and when it stands for the instrument, it means a source of inferential cognition. Inference is indirectly accepted as an independent means of knowledge even by Cārvākas who deny to accept it since the rejection of Inference by Cārvākas itself implies the acceptance of Inference by them because the rejection is through the Inference itself.

Anumāna literally means such knowledge that follows some other knowledge. It is the knowledge of an
object due to a previous knowledge of some sign or mark. The previous knowledge is the knowledge of the Linga or mark as having a universal relation with the Sādhya or major term and as being present in the Pakṣa or minor term. Hence, Anumāna has been defined in the Nyāya system as the knowledge of an object, not by direct observation, but by means of the knowledge of a Linga or sign and that of its universal relation (Vyāpti) with the inferred object. Anumāna as a Prāṇa is, therefore, the source of our knowing through the medium of a sign or mark that a thing has a certain character. It leads to the knowledge of a thing as possessing a character, say fire, because of its having another character, smoke, which we apprehend and which we know to be always connected with it. Thus in Anumāna we arrive at the knowledge of an object through the medium of two acts of knowledge or propositions.

The term 'Anumāna' is derived from 'Anu' followed by the root 'Mā' with the suffix 'lyut'. 'Māna' means an apprehension or a way of apprehension of an object and the prefix 'Anu' denotes after. So, the result of 

1. mitena lingena linginorthasya paścānmanamanumānai, NBh, 1.1.3. 
2. vyāptivisistapaksadharmatājñānajanyam, TCM ,I,p.2. 
such knowledge is called Anumiti which is the knowledge of an object due to a previous knowledge of some mark having the universal relation with the Sadhya and being present in the Pakṣa and Anumititva is a kind of genus or universal. Hence, inferential knowledge is produced not by direct apprehension but by means of knowledge of proban and that of the universal relation with the inferred object. Inferential knowledge is definite knowledge produced by knowing the special coherence or proban concerning the major term that resides in doubtful substratum of major term to one who previously grasped coherence.

All systems of Indian philosophy agree in holding that Anumāṇa is a process of arriving at truth not by direct observation but by means of the knowledge of Vyāpti or a universal relation between two things.

The Views of Anumāṇa According to Different Systems:

The View of the Carvākas:

The Carvākas do not consider the validity of Anumāṇa and Sabda. The author of the Mahābhārata says that

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5. anumāṇam jñātamaṃ bhasayasyaikadesa darṣanād eka desantare sannikrṣte'rthe buddhiḥ, Mb, p.11.
the Cārvākas do not treat Anumāna or inference and Āgama or authority as Pramāṇas. He states that both Anumāna and Āgama are based on Pratyakṣa and this is the reason for which the Cārvākas do not consider them as the means of valid knowledge. The author of the epic also states that these philosophers do not recognise Anumāna as Pramāṇa for another important reason. The reason is that they cannot assert the validity of the Vyāpti or the invariable concomitance which plays the most significant part in case of Inference. The materialists do not consider this Vyāpti as infallible. Therefore, the author of the Mahābhārata observes, the materialists do not recognise Anumāna as a Pramāṇa.

Actually it is not always possible to attain the correct knowledge of something with Anumāna. Similar is the case of Upamāna etc. But it cannot be denied the fact that one cannot totally dispense with Anumāna in his practical life. Sometimes, it is found that Pratyakṣa

7. pratyakṣam hyetayormūlam..... na kiñcana, 
Śāntiparva, MBh, 218-27.


9. anumānena yad gatyādidasānām tadāpi asāti lakṣaṇe 
   jñāpake hetau...... ...... vyabhicārādārāsānāt...... 
   na kimāpi, 
   NC on MBh.
alone does not serve the purpose. The author of the Nyāyakusumāṇjali observes that if a Cārvāka depends entirely on Pratyakṣa he will invite his own miseries due to his dogmatic view. According to the author when a Cārvākas will go away to a remote place by leaving his wife and children at home, naturally he will be unable to perceive them from that place. Thus, according to his own standpoint, they will be non-existent to him and hence, he will have to lament for their loss.¹⁰ A section of later Cārvākas probably realised this problem. Therefore, Guṇaratna contends that the Cārvākas recognise Anumāna also as a Pramāṇa for practical purpose. He says that these philosophers agree to accept such an inference only as is urgently necessary for proving the existence of fire on a hill with the help of column of smoke. But they do not recognise such extra-sensory inference (Alaukika Anumāna) as is commonly accepted by some other philosophers to establish the existence of heaven, Adrṣṭa etc.¹¹ Purandara is also of the view that the Cārvākas

¹¹. cārvākair lokāyātrānirvāhena pramāṇaṁ dhūmādyanumānamisyate etc., SSM, p. 457.
recognise Laukika Anumāna or popular Inference as a Pramāṇa.\textsuperscript{12}

The Bauddha View: Diṁnāga, chief of the early Buddhist logicians and author of the Pramāṇa Samuccaya, described two means of knowing— Perception and Inference, and two corresponding objects are realised through them—the particular and the universal. The universals are recognised by Inference and the particulars by the Perception.\textsuperscript{13} Diṁnāga described the characters of the middle term (Hetu) and we may form a definition of Inference from these characters. Inference is the valid knowledge of an inferable property (Sādhyā) from the knowledge of a mark of inference which is invariably related to the Sādhyā and which abides in the minor term or subject of the Inference (Pakṣa). Dharmottora, however, states that this definition refers to the source and not to the essence of an Inference. According to Dharmakīrti, author of the well known Nyāyabindu and Pramāṇavārtika, Anumāna is of two varieties: (1) Inference for one's own sake (Svārthānumāna) and (2) Inference for the sake of others (Parārthānumāna). Dharmakīrti did not, however, care to define Anumāna.

\begin{verbatim}
12. puranderastvāna lokaprasiddham anumānam
cārvākairapisyata eva...... kamalāśīla, Tsā p.526.
\end{verbatim}
The Jain View: The Jainas, however, add Anumāna to the list of Pramanās. The definition of Anumāna according to the Jainas, is the knowledge of the major term derived from the knowledge of the middle term. Fire is inferred from smoke. Smoke is the middle term, and fire is the major term. Anumāna is based on Vyāpti derived from induction (Tarka). Vyāpti is the invariable concomitance between the middle and the major term. In inference, there are three terms — the middle term (hetu or Sādhana), the major term (Sādhyā) and the minor term (Pakṣa). The middle term is that which is definitely known to be inseparably connected with the major term. If the major term does not exist, the middle term cannot exist. If the middle term exists, the major term must also exist. This is the only mark of middle term.

Nyāya View of Anumāna: According to the Naiyāyikas, Anumāna is the knowledge of an object through the medium of the knowledge of some mark by virtue of a relation of invariable concomitance between the two. Gautama does not define Anumāna. He simply holds that Inference presupposes Perception. It is of three types.14 Vātsyāyana, author of the Nyāyabhāṣya, a well known exposition on Gotama's

14. atha tatpūrvakam trividhanumūnānam pūrvavacchesāvat sāmānyatodṛṣṭam ca, NS, 1.1.5.
Nyāyasūtra deals with the etymological aspect of the term 'Anumāna' and states that it is the knowledge of Lingin arising after the knowledge of Liṅga. According to Vātsyāyana 'no inference can follow from the absence of Perception'. Only when the observer has perceived fire and smoke to be related to each other, he is able to infer the existence of the fire and on the next occasion he perceives smoke. According to Jayanta, Anumāna is the instrument of the knowledge of an unperceived Probandum through the apprehension of a Probans with five-fold characteristics together with the recollection of the relation of invariable concomitance between the two. Bhāsarvajña in his Nyāyasāra defines inference as the means of knowing a thing beyond the range of the senses through its 'inseparable connection (Samavāya sambandha) with another thing' which lies within their range.

Gangeśā following Sivāditya defines inferential knowledge as knowledge produced by other knowledge.

15. lingalinginoh sambadhyayo darśanena lingasmrāta-
.visambadhyate smṛtyā liṅgedarśanena cāpratyaksortho-
numiyate, NBh. 1.1.5.
16. NBh under NS II. 1.31.
17. lingalinginoh sambadhyayo darśanena lingasmrātirēvi
.sambadhyate smṛtyā liṅgedarśanena cāpratyaksortho
numiyate, NBh. 1.1.5.
18. TCM, ii, p.2.
19. SP, 146.
Vaishesika View of Anumana: Kanada, founder of the Vaishesika system, holds that Anumana is the knowledge of Probandum derived from the knowledge of the Probands. Praestapada defines Anumana as the knowledge which results from the apprehension of a sign (Lingga). He explains Lingga as that which is related to the Probandum and which has co-presence and co-absence with the Probandum. According to Vaishesika the knowledge of Anumana is derived from the mark, from which the existence of the Probandum is inferred as its effect, or cause or conjunct or antagonist. From a heavy rainfall in the source of a river, flood in the river is inferred. From smoke the existence of fire is inferred. From the infuriated serpent, the existence of a mongoose hidden behind a bush is inferred. Thus it can be said that mark is the means of inference which is based upon the relations of causality, conjunction etc.

Mimamsa View of Anumana: The definition of Anumana as propounded by Sabara, a renowned commentator on the Mimamsa-sutra, is that when a certain fixed relation has been known to subsist between two things, so that if we perceive any one of these things we have an idea of the other thing, this latter cognition is called
inferential knowledge.\(^{20}\) Kumārila Bhatta explains the compound \(jñātāsambandhasya\) in four alternative ways, viz., (1) as referring to a person who knows the invariable relation between two things e.g., smoke and fire or (2) as referring to the substratum where the relationship e.g., of smoke and fire is apprehended (3) as referring simply to a known relationship or (4) as referring to both the \(Liṅga\) and the \(Liṅgin\) together. Smoke and fire are parts (\(Ekadeśa\)) of a logical whole.\(^{21}\) Prabhākara on the other hand, holds that the word '\(jñātāsambandhasya\)' qualifies the term '\(Ekadeśa\)' in the compound '\(Ekadeśa-darśanāt\)' and refers to that whose invariable concomitance with another is known.\(^{22}\) Thus though there are points of difference between Bhatta and Prabhākara schools of thought, a comprehensive definition of Anumāna can be found out from the Mīmāṃsā standpoints based on Śabara's definition of Anumāna in the following form: Anumāna is the knowledge of a thing, not in contact with the sense organs from the perception of another object when an invariable relation is known to hold between them.

\(^{20}\) anumānam \(jñātāsambandhasya\) ekadesāderśanāte kaḍadesāntare sannikṛṣte arthe buddhiḥ, SB under MS. 1.1.5.

\(^{21}\) Tva, 2.3.

\(^{22}\) \(jñātāsambandhanīyamasya\) ekadesasye derśanādekadesāntare sannikṛṣte arthe yā buddhiḥ, Pp, p. 196.
Vedānta View: Inference (Anumāna), according to Vedānta, is made by the notion of concomitance (Vyāptijñāna) between two things, acting through specific past impressions (Saṃskāra). The notion of concomitance is generated by the Perception of two things together, when no case of the failure of concomitance is known (Vyabhicārājñāna) regarding the subject.

Sāmkhya-Yoga View of Anumāna: The most authentic work on Sāmkhya logic is the Sāmkhyakārikā. In the system of Sāmkhya-Yoga, the definition of Inference is influenced by the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama. The Sāmkhyakārikā defines Anumāna as the knowledge derived from Sign and Signate. Vācaspati Miśra explains the definition elaborately. He states that Liṅga means pervaded (Vyāpya) and Liṅgi means pervasive (Vyāpaka). These may in other words, be called 'Probans' and 'Probandum'. He states that in the wording of Sāmkhyakārikā Probans and Probandum stand for inferential knowledge. Thus inferential knowledge arises through the knowledge that Probans like Smoke is pervaded and Probandum like fire is pervasive. Vācaspati Miśra

23. prativiśayādhyavasāya drṣṭāni trividham anumānamākhyātām/talliṅga liṅgipūrvakamēptārūtirāpatavacanantu//
SK. K.5.
24. liṅgan vyāpyam liṅgi vyāpakaṃ, STK under SK. K.5.
25. dhūmādirvyāpya vahnyēdirvyāpaka, STK under SK, 5.
further realises that mere knowledge of invariable concomitance cannot lead to inferential knowledge. Everything like light on burnt up ashes existing on the mountain are not helpful in inferring fire from smoke. Therefore, it requires, in addition, an application of probans on the subject or the place whence probandum is inferred. Here, Vacaspati Misra states that the word 'Lirigi' in the text of the Sāmkhyakārikā should be considered as an example of Ekāsēsa. While explaining the kārikā, it should be repeated. The first gives an idea of pervasive (Vyāpaka) or probandum forming the part of invariable concomitance while the second means that (subject) which is possessed of probans, thus leading to the idea that probans is endowed with the condition of being present in subject (Pakṣadharma). The Sāmkhyacandrikā also explains Lirigē as probans and the Lirigi as probandum. The perception by the means of probans and probandum is deliberation that the Pakṣa is possessor of the probans which is pervaded by probandum. This deliberation is Inference.  

26. SC under SK.K. 5.
Māthāra and Gauḍapāda also establish the necessity of both Probans and Probandum for Inference but they draw further conclusion that sometimes Liṅga leads to the knowledge of Liṅgi and sometimes Liṅgi to the knowledge of Liṅga. For example, sometimes Liṅga like tridanda lead to the knowledge of mendicant and sometimes Liṅgi like mendicant leads to the knowledge of Liṅga like tridanda.

The Śaṅkhyasūtra defines Anumāna as knowledge of invariably associated (Vyāpaka) through the knowledge of invariable association. It seems that the Śaṅkhyasūtra defines it in terms of inferential knowledge of which invariable association serve as the cause. The definition is similar to the definition offered by Vindhyavāsin. Aniruddha, however, offers a different interpretation. He interprets Pratibandhadṛśaḥ as 'a case of a man who has

27. tāllingalīṅgipurvakamiti liṅgena tridandaṁ dārśaṁ

28. liṅgena liṅgir ānunīyate yathā daṇḍena yathā liṅgine śaṅkhyasūtraṁ ānuṁnumīyate yathā dṛṣṭvā yatimaṁ samyedam tridandaṁ, SS. 1.100.

29. prativedhadṛśaṁ pratibaddhaṁ jñānānumānāṁ, SS. 1.100.
known the invariable association'. He imports the word 'Vyapyajñānāt' (through the knowledge of pervaded) in his interpretation. The Inference according to Aniruddha is 'the knowledge of pervasive after knowing the pervaded in case of one who has observed the invariable concomitance between the two'. Vijñānabhikṣu interprets the Sūtra as 'Inference is the knowledge of pervasive, through observing the invariable concomitance.

In the system of Yoga, the definition of Anumāna is found in the Yogabhāṣya of Vyāsa. Vyāsa defines Inference as modification of Citta brought about by the relation which exists in objects of homogeneous nature and does not exist in objects of heterogeneous nature, and ascertains chiefly the generic nature of an object. The distinguishing factor of Inference lies in the fact that such modification is caused by the knowledge of relation. The knowledge of Sembandha and Pratibandha (relation) is

30. avinābhāvedarāino vyapyajñānādanu vyāpakajñānam
    nanumānam SSV, 1.100.
31. vyaptidarānād vyāpakajñānamanumānam, SPā, 1.100.
32. anumeyasya tulya jātiyesu anuvṛttau bhinna jātiyebhya
    vyavṛttatā sambandho yastadvissayā sēmānā vadhāraṇa
    pradhānā vṛttirunanumānam, YB, 1.7.
the commonly used expression in definition of Inference by Vārṣaganya, Vyāsa and the Sāmkhyasūtra. Sambandha means relation or invariable concomitance. Hence, it can be said that the definition of Inference in Sāmkhya-Yoga means the modification of Citta brought about by invariable concomitance.

**Distinction between Perception and Inference**

Both Perception and Inference are equally valid source of knowledge. But Perception is independent of any previous knowledge, while Inference depends on previous perception. Inference is a knowledge which is preceded by Perception. It depends on perception for the knowledge of Līṅga or the middle term as subsisting in the Pekṣa or the minor term. It depends on Perception for the knowledge of Vyāpti. Thus Inference is knowledge derived from some other knowledge. That is, Inference is mediate knowledge and perception is immediate knowledge of an object. All Perception is of one kind that is the knowledge of what is given. But there are different kinds of Inferences based on different kinds of Vyāpti or universal relation. Perception takes place between the contact of sense organs with the objects. It gives the knowledge of only those objects which lie within the range of the senses. Hence it is limited to present objects.
the knowledge of Inference is due to the knowledge of Vyāpti or universal relations among objects. It is by means of such universal relations that Inference gives us knowledge of objects beyond the reach of our senses. It extends our knowledge from the present to the past, distant and future.

The Constituents of Inference: From the definition of Inference it is noted that an Inference is a distinct means of knowledge, because it gives us knowledge concerning things we are not immediately acquainted with, but the things in question must be such that we can immediately be acquainted with them. From the definition of Inference it will appear that there must be three propositions and three terms in any Inference. In Inference one arrives at the knowledge of some unperceived character of object through the knowledge of some Linga or sign in it and Vyāpti or a universal relation between the sign and the inferred character. There is first the knowledge of Linga in relation to the Pakṣa or the subject of Inference. Secondly, Inference requires the knowledge of Vyāpti or a universal relation between the Linga and the Sadhya or the middle term and major term. This knowledge of the Linga or middle term as always related to the Sadhya or major term is the
result of the previous experience of their relation to each other. Thirdly, the inferential knowledge as resulting from the previous knowledge of the Linga and that of its universal relation with the Sadhya.

Corresponding to the minor, major and middle terms of the syllogism, inference in Indian logic contains three terms, namely, Pakṣa, Sadhya and hetu. The Pakṣa is the subject in the course of the inferential reasoning. It is that individual or class about which we want to establish something or predicate an attribute which is suspected but not definitely known to be present in it. While the Pakṣa is the subject, the Sadhya is the object of Inference. It is Sadhya which we want to know or prove by means of any inference. The Sadhya is that character of the Pakṣa or minor term which is not perceived by any one but indicated by some sign present in it. Regarding the exact nature of the Sadhya, there is some difference of opinion among the different systems of Indian philosophy. According to the Advaita Vedānta what is inferred is the unperceived character of the subject or minor term of Inference. In the inferential knowledge that the hill is fiery, it is not the hill

33. samādipṣaḥ sadhyāvāḥ pakṣaḥ, TS, p.44.
which is inferred though it is perceived. Actually 'the fire' is inferred. According to Buddhists 'the fire' cannot be the object of Inference from smoke. One can know it just when one knows the smoke as related to fire. The term 'relation' cannot be used unless there are two things to be related. But in Inference only one thing i.e., the hill is perceived. The hill being perceived cannot be said to be the object of Inference. Therefore, 'the hill as possessed of fire' is inferred. According to Mīmāṃsakas the subject or minor term which is related to the predicate or the major term is inferred. The Naiyāyikas, however, maintain that the object of Inference may be different in different cases. What is inferred may be either the subject or minor term as related to the major term or the major term as related to the minor, or the middle term taken as a particular individual and related to the major term. The third term of Inference is called the Linga or sign because it serves to indicate that which one does not perceive. It is also called the Hetu or Sādhana insofar as it is the ground of the knowledge of Sādhya or what is inferred. It is found once

34. tasmiṣtād dharmaviśistasyā dharminaḥ syāt prameyata, SV, ch. on Inference.
35. NBh, 1.1.36.
in relation to the Pakṣa or minor term and then in relation to the Sādhyā or the major term. It is through a universal relation between the Hetu and the Sādhyā or the middle and major terms that the Pakṣa or minor term which related to the middle, becomes connected with the Sādhyā or major term. There are five characteristics of the middle term. The first is Pakṣadharma, or its being a character of the Pakṣa. The middle term must be related to the minor term. e.g., the hill is smoky. The second is Sapaksattva or its presence in all homogeneous instances in which the major term exists. e.g., all smoky objects are fiery. The third is Vipaksattva or its absence in all heterogeneous instances in which the major term is absent, e.g., whatever is not smoky is not fiery. The fourth is Abādhitaviśayatva or the uncontradictori- ness of its object e.g., the middle term must not establish absurd and contradictory objects as the coolness of fire etc. The fifth character of the middle term is asatpratipakṣatva or the absence of counteracting reasons leading to a contradictory conclusion.

The logicians have put forth several views regarding the number of these components. A variety of opinions is also observed in the system of Sāmkhya-Yoga. The Yuktidīpikā enumerates ten components of Inference. Māthara records five components of Inference.
Vijnanebhiksu and Aniruddha also recognise the five components of Inference. The ten components of Inference enumerated by Yuktidīpikā are the following — inquisitiveness, doubt, purpose, conjecturing, to throw aside doubt, proposition, probans, example, application and conclusion.

The Ground of Inference

In Inference the knowledge of the Sādhyya or major term as related to the Pakṣa or minor term depends on the knowledge of Vyāpti between the middle and major terms. It is on the ground of Vyāpti or a universal relation that the middle term leads to the knowledge of the inferred object. Vyāpti and Pakṣadharmaṇṭā are the two main grounds of Inference. If fire is inferred on the hill when smoke is perceived in it, it is Pakṣadharmaṇṭā and when universal relation between fire and smoke is taken into consideration it is called Vyāpti. Vyāpti literally means the state of Pervasion i.e., one of the facts pervades (Vyāpaka) and the other is pervaded (Vyāpya). A fact is said to pervade another when it always accompanies the other. Contrariwise, a fact is said to be pervaded by another when it is always accompanied by the other. Etymologically Vyāpti is a special relation between two facts which is universal in its
nature. This special relationship has been referred to by various seemingly synonymous words such as Linga-Lingi Sambandha, Sādhyasādhanabhāva, Gamakagamayabhāva, Avinābhāvaniyāma, Prasiddhi, Pratibandha, Avinābhāva, etc. Though the Indian thinkers who regard Inference to be a means of knowledge unanimously accept the principle of invariable concomitance (Vyāpti) as an indispensable condition for Inference, yet they differ with regard to its function, denotation, nature and the ways of its ascertainmment. According to the Jainas, Anumāna is based on Vyāpti derived from induction (Tarka). Vyāpti is the invariable concomitance between the middle and the major term. According to the Buddhists, Vyāpti is the inductive relation. It is the relation of invariable concomitance between the middle term (Hetu) and the major term (Sādhyā). Arcata, the buddhist philosopher in Hetubindutikā, states that Vyāpti is the character of the Probans as well as of the Probandum. Kanāda seems to be aware of invariable concomitance of the Probans with the Probandum and its necessity for Inference. He, however, calls it Prasiddhi.36 Praśastapāda mentions Vidhi as a general principle of invariable concomitance derived from the observation of particular instances of copresence and co-absence of the Probans and the Probandum.37 The Naiyāyikas

36. prasiddhipūrvakatvādaspadesāsya, VS, 3.1.14.
37. vidhistu yatra dhūmastatāgnirniragnyabhāve dhūme api na bhevati, VB (Anu).
hold the necessity of invariable concomitance or vyāpti. Udayana holds the invariable concomitance Vidhi as non-separateness of the Probans from the Probandum. Uṣṇīśa Čandra Ādiśeṣa holds the Vidhi as subsistence of the Probans from the Probandum. Śābara introduces the element of invariable relation in the definition of Inference. Kumāra Bhātṛi holds that the term 'Sambandha' in the definition of Anumāṇa in the Śābarabhāṣya refers to the invariable concomitance (Vyāpti) of the middle term with the major term. According to Advaita Vedānta Anumāṇa is produced by the knowledge of invariable concomitance (Vyāptijñāna) of the Sādhana or middle term with the Sādhyā or major term. The knowledge of Vyāpti is the instrumental cause of Inference. According to them Vyāpti is the co-existence of the middle term and the major term in all the substrata of the middle term. It is known by observation of concomitance of the middle term with the major term and non-observation of their non-concomitance.

In Śāṁkha-Yoga philosophy, Vācaspatiśa's discussion of pervaded and pervasive gives an idea of Vyāpti. He explains the term vyāpya (Pervaded) as that which is

38. vidhistu avinābhavagrahaṇaprabhāṣaḥ, KV, p. 295.
40. sa ca vyabhicārajñāne sati sahacāradarśanena gṛhyate, VP, ii.
invariably and naturally associated with the nature of an object, without involving certain condition suspected or ascertained. The term Vyāpaka (Pervasive) is that with the nature of which the former is related. The relation stands here for invariable association which is denoted by the term Vyāpti. The case of relation involving condition can be explained thus: One infers smoke from fire. But it is observed that fire is not naturally related to smoke. If fire would have been invariably associated with smoke, it would always be accompanied with smoke and would never have been found without smoke. But in some cases like iron ball fire exists without smoke. Therefore, the association of fire with smoke involves condition. The fire requires wet fuel in addition to itself to give rise to smoke. Thus, fire does not accompany the smoke naturally. On the contrary it involves further condition of wet fuel. It may be clarified with one example. The example given in the sub-commentary of Balarāma Udāsina on the Tattvakaumudi is very appropriate. Suppose a lady named Maitreyi has nine sons. One comes to

41. samkitasamāropitopādhinirākaraṇena vastusvabhāva
prativaddham vyāpyaṁ, STK under SK. 5.

42. yena ca pratibaddham tad vyāpakaṁ, Ibid.
see eight of them and finds all of them are black in complexion. From this he comes to the conclusion that black complexion is associated with the fact of being the son of Maitreyī. But, however, such a conclusion i.e., the black complexion is associated with the son of Maitreyī is based upon a wrong notion. The eating of green vegetables etc. are conditions for black complexion. This fact is deduced from the fact that the ninth son of Maitreyī is of fair complexion. If there would have been natural and unconditional relation between being the son of Maitreyī and darkness of complexion the ninth son would also be dark in complexion. The condition involved in this can be conjectured or ascertained. In the case of the complexion of son of Maitreyī the condition, viz., eating green vegetables is conjectured because it is not ascertained through some means of knowledge or reasoning. The case of ascertained condition is the inference of smoke from fire. It is ascertained through Perception that smoke is invariably

43. yathāmitrātanāyatvena śyāmātve sādhya
    sākādyāhāra pariṇatijatvam iti
    sa śyāmo mitrātanāyatvādṛṣṭa śyāmatva,
    visiṣṭamitrā tanayavat, VT on STK 5.
associated with wet fuel while fire exists without that also. It may be observed that Vācaspati Miśra assimilated the view of the Bauddhas and the Naiyāyikas while offering the definition of Vyāpti. According to the Bauddha, Vyāpti means the natural relation (Svābhāvikasambandha) while according to the Naiyāyikas it is the unconditional relation (Nirupādhikasambandha). Both of these views are brought together in the Sarabodhini while discussing the definition of Vyāpti. 44

The Sāmkhyasūtra defines Vyāpti as invariable concomitance of properties in case of two or one of them. 45 The part of the definition in case of both refers to the case of equal pervasion (Samavyāpti) while the latter half viz., in case of one of them refers to the cases of unequal pervasion (Viṣamavyāpti).

The Jayamāṅkāla enumerates seven kinds of relation between Sign and Signate: 46 (i) Master and Servant, (ii) original and its modification, (iii) cause and effect as between cow and cat, (iv) pot and its possessor

44. Vide, STK, pp. 136-137.
45. niyatadharmasāhityemubhayorekatarasya vā vyāptih, SS, 5. 29.
46. kadācillinga pūrvakam kadācillingipurvakam
dṛṣyate......... gamyagamakatvaṁ satisambandhe,
JM on SK, 5, p.8.
(v) association as between Cakra bird and its mate
(vi) opposition, as between cold and hot and (vii) the object and the being for which it is meant as between an object of enjoyment and its enjoyer.

In the Śāmkhyasūtra, some more details are found regarding pervasion (Vyāpti). According to them Vyāpti is not a different category from the coexistence of properties otherwise it would lead to the cumbrousness of self evident fact as it would compel to consider Vyāpti as an independent category. According to Aniruddha, if Vyāpti is considered as an independent category the invariable association would require separate mention. Therefore, it is said that invariable association itself is Vyāpti. 48 Vijnānabhikṣu adds that if Vyāpti is an additional entity to those admitted by Śāmkhya, it would lead to the acceptance of the substratum of Vyāpti as another additional entity and it would be difficult to carry. 49

47. na tatvāntaraṁ vastu kalpanāprasaṅkataṁ, SS, 5.30.
48. tatvāntaraṁ vikāre apavyabhcāro vaktavyaṁ, SSV, 5.30.
49. niyatadharmaśāhityātirikta vyāptiṁ bhavati vyāptitvāśrayasya vastuṇopi kalpanāprasaṅgam, SPB, 5.30.
In the opinion of some Acāryyas Vyāpti is the result of the power of objects and as such an additional entity which is quoted in the Śāmkhyasūtra⁵⁰. On this point Aniruddha states that Vyāpti is the power in pervasive and pervaded and is observed through observing the two. In the opinion of Vijnānabhikṣu Vyāpti should be considered as arising of power of pervasive and pervaded and not that of objects. Pañcaśikha holds that Vyāpti means the relation connected with power of being sustained.⁵¹ In the Śāmkhya system every effect exists in its cause before its manifestation and after unmanifestation. So the cause is having a power of sustaining the effect while the effect has got a power of being an object located. Vyāpti is the power of being associated in the pervaded. Aniruddha justifies the meaning of the word 'Ādheyaśakti' in the definition. It should be the power of being related as pervaded and not the object itself, otherwise just after seeing the object even a person ignorant of particular power of a particular object would consider the object capable for a particular thing. According to Pañcaśikha, Vyāpti means possession of power of being related as a sustained and, hence, not an

⁵⁰. niṣaṃsaktyudbhavam ityacāryaḥ, SS, 5.31.
⁵¹. ādheyaśaktiyogena iti pañcaśikhaḥ, SS, 5.32.
independent category in form of the power essentially belonging to objects, before its manifestation. In fact, the view of Pañcaśikha differs from that of the other teachers mainly in two respects. Firstly, unlike other teachers, Pañcaśikha does not consider Vyāpti as a separate concept. Secondly, Pañcaśikha considers that Vyāpti is Vyapakatva or the state of being pervaded and is found in case of pervaded only. The other teachers, however, relate Vyāpti to both the associates.

Ascertainment of Vyāpti: Indian systems of philosophy take inference as a process of reasoning which not only formally valid but also materially true. This inference depends on Vyāpti (universal relation). So, the most vital question regarding Inference relates to the way of getting the universal proposition. One intends to know the process of knowing Vyāpti so as to realise how one can pass from particular cases of the relation between smoke and fire in the kitchen etc. to the universal proposition such as all cases of smoke are fire.

The Cārvāka View: All Indian thinkers but the Cārvākas have discussed the ways of ascertaining Vyāpti. The Cārvākas do not accept Anumāna as a source of Valid knowledge. For them Perception is the only source of knowledge. In their opinion, it is impossible to
ascertain that smoke is invariably and universally accompanied by fire because if it is accepted that a person knows all cases of smoke in the past and present, future cases will remain outside the limits of his knowledge. So, in their opinion, a universal relation i.e., Vyāpti cannot be ascertained.

**The Buddhists View:** The Buddhists accept Vyāpti as a ground of Inference and have propounded the theory of identity and causality in this regard. They maintain that a universal relation can be ascertained without considering all its past, present and future cases if it is proved that the referred cases are related either through causality or through identity of essence.

**The Jaina View:** The Jaina logicians refers to Tarka as a means of ascertaining Vyāpti. Tarka is regarded as a way of knowing the invariable concomitance of the middle term with the major term in the past, in the present and in the future arising from the observation of their co-presence and co-absence.

**The Vaiśesika View:** Praśastapāda holds that the invariable concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum is known by the repeated observation of their agreement in presence and agreement in absence.
The Bhatta View: According to Kumārila Bhatta, Vyāpti is known through repeated observation. By Vyāpti he means a necessary relation generally between two particulars. Vyāpti is established by the joint method of agreement and difference. Kumārila holds that Vyāpti is induction from a limited number of observed cases.

The Prabhākara View: According to Prabhākara, though the knowledge of Vyāpti is gained by a single act of sense perception in the very first observation e.g., of smoke and fire, subsequent observations confirm the Vyāpti apprehended in the first observation. The Prabhākaras refer to repeated observation but they assign separate roles to the first and the subsequent observation.

The Vedānta View: According to the Vedānta, Vyāpti or a universal proposition is the result of an induction by simple enumeration. It rests on the uncontradicted experience of agreement in presence between two things. When one finds that two things go together and that there is no exception to their relation, one may take them as universally related.

The Nyāya View: The Nyāya agrees with the Vedānta in holding that Vyāpti is established by means of uncontradicted experience of the relation between two things. It
is based not on any principle like causality or identity, but on the uniform experience of concomitance between two objects. The Nyāya goes further than the Vedānta and supplements the uncontradicted observation of agreement in presence by that of agreement in absence and tarka or indirect proof.\textsuperscript{52}

The Sāmkhya-Yoga View: In Sāmkhya-Yoga philosophy also question naturally arises that how can such an invariable association between two objects be ascertained. One cannot personally experience all the cases of two objects found together. In the opinion of Vijñānabhikṣu such an invariableness should be apprehended through appropriate confutation (Anukūltarka).\textsuperscript{53} He explains in this way: If one has to know the relation of smoke with fire, one observes smoke associated with fire and starts thinking that smoke is invariably associated with fire, if smoke would not have been invariably associated with fire, it would have been perceived without fire, but such a case is not observed, there is no possibility of smoke without fire. Therefore the invariableness is ascertained through such a confutation.

\textsuperscript{52} VP, Ch.II.  

\textsuperscript{53} niyamāscānukūlatarkeṇa grāhya iti na vyāptigrahāsambhava iti bhāveḥ, SPB, 5.29.
As regards the kinds of Vyāpti, the Sāmkhya-Yoga texts do not discuss the problem explicitly. While discussing the nature of Inference, the Yogabhāṣya differentiates the Vyāpti into positive invariableness (Anvayavyāpti) and negative invariableness (Vyātirekavyāpti). Inference is said to be caused by the relation which is found present in the similar cases and absent in the dissimilar cases. The difference between Anvayavyāpti and Vyātirekavyāpti is simple. In the case of the Anvayavyāpti, existence of Probans and Probandum at the same place is stressed and illustrated, while in the case of the Vyātirekavyāpti, their negation is stressed and illustrated. While discussing the nature of Vyāpti, the Sāmkhya-sūtra gives another division of Vyāpti. Aniruddha and Vijñānabhikṣu enumerate two kinds of Vyāpti as Samavyāpti (equal pervasion) and Viṣamavyāpti (unequal pervasion). When the space or time of the pervader and the pervaded is similar it is Samavyāpti and when the pervaded occupies lesser space or time it is termed as Viṣamavyāpti.

The Types of Anumāna:

In Indian logic, Anumāna has not been divided into Formal and Material or Deductive and Inductive or Mediate.

54. tulyajātiesyvanuvṛttā bhinnajātīyebhyo vyāvṛttatḥ sambandho, YB, i.7.
55. ubhāyoritī samavyāptikayoh.... visamavyāptikasya, SSV, 5.29.
56. ubhāyoritī samavyāptipakṣe proktaṁ, SPB, 5.29.
and Immediate or Pure end Mixed types. The Indian logicians are, no doubt, aware of its varieties and subvarieties of Anumāṇa. But the principle upon which the varieties of Anumāṇa are based are different from those of Western Inference. In Indian philosophy, Anumāṇa has been classified in various ways, for example (a) Pūrvavat, Śeṣavat and Śāmāṇyastodṛṣṭa, (b) Kevalānvayī, Kevalavyātirekī and Anvaçavyātirekī, (c) Svārtha and Pārārtha and (d) Vīta and Avīta.

Various divisions of Anumāṇa based on various principles are found in the system of Sāmkhya-Yoga. The Sāmkhyakārikā refers to the division of Anumāṇa into three kinds, which according to its commentators refer to Pūrvavat, Śeṣavat and Śāmāṇyastodṛṣṭa. In addition to the above three kinds, Aniruddha mentions other three kinds, viz., Kevalānvayī, Kevalavyātirekī and Anvayavyātirekī raising the number of kinds of Anumāṇa to six. While discussing Anumāṇa, the Yuktidīpikā and Māthara divides Inference into one's own self (Svārtha) and that for others (Pārārtha). However, the Yuktidīpikā and Vācaspati

57. trividham anumānānāmākhyātām

58. anenaṁnvayī, vyātirekī, avayāvyatirekī, pūrvavat, śeṣavat, sāmāṇyastodṛṣṭānca semgrihitām

59. tatra prayogamātre bodhit dvāvividhān vītāṁ avītāṁ iti

60. tabaddvividhāṁ vītāṁvītāṁca
incorporate division of Inference into Vītā and Avītā.

Pūrvavat, Šeṣavat and Sāmānyatodrśta

The Sāmkhyakārikā refers to the division of Anumāna into three kinds which is propounded by Gautama in his Nyāyasūtra. Vatsyāyana offers two alternate explanations of the nature of Pūrvavat etc. The commentators of the Sāmkhyakārikā follow either of the two explanations offered by Vatsyāyana. Therefore, it will be worthwhile to discuss Vatsyāyana's explanation of the nature of these varieties before discussing them on the basis of the commentaries of Sāmkhya-kārikā.

According to the first explanation, the Pūrvavat is that in which an effect is inferred from its cause, e.g., from the rise of cloud it is inferred that it will rain. The Šeṣavat is that in which the cause is inferred from its effect, e.g., seeing the water of river as different from that in past, as also the fulness of the river, i.e., stream and the swiftness of the current it is inferred that it rained. The Sāmānyotodrśta is illustrated as the perception of something at some other place is caused by movement, the sun is observed at different places.

61. atha tatpūrvakām tridhāmanumānaṁ purvacche śeṣet-śāmānyatodrśtam ca, NS, 1.1.5.
Therefore, it is inferred that there is movement of the sun, though imperceptible. Another interpretation of the term 'Pūrvavat' as suggested by Vātsyāyana is that it is a type of Inference in which out of two things one that is not perceived is inferred from the perception of the other on the basis of a former perception of both of these things together, e.g., Inference of unperceived fire from perceived smoke on the basis of the previous perception of fire and smoke together. As an alternative interpretation of the term 'Seṣavat', Vātsyāyana states that it may also signify as remainder. There could be many possibilities with regard to the explanation of a fact. When all the possibilities except one are rejected, the remaining one is cognised through the means of Seṣavat Inference, e.g., sound is distinct from the categories of generality, individuality and inherence. The second explanation offered by Vātsyāyana refers to Sāmānyotodrṣta as an Inference in which the relation between the antecedent and the consequent, not being a matter of perception, is established. On the ground of an abstract similarity with something else, e.g., Inference of soul on the basis of the fact that desire, etc., are qualities and that qualities must abide in some substance namely, the self.

The Yuktidīpikā states that the term 'Purva' means cause and Pūrvavat means that which has a cause as a
Probans. It means the Inference in case of which after observing the cause one comes to know the future effect. For example, one apprehends future rains after observing the rise of cloud. The author of Yuktidīpikā, however, realises the difficulty in the above example. The valid probans by its very nature should necessarily lead to the Probandum and failing it the Probans ceases to be a Probans. But the above example lacks in the above condition and, hence, ceases to be a proper example. The rise of cloud is not necessarily the cause of rain. There is no invariable relation between rise of clouds and rains, because there is the possibility of obstruction by wind and the rest. Hence, the Yuktidīpikā defines Purvavat thus—Purvavat is that through which observing the causal power arrested amongst the assisting powers free from obstructing elements one comes to know future rise of effect just as after observing the clay possessed by the potter who is active and having the instrument like the iron rod and the rest one comes to know the future preparation of a pot. According to Vījnānabhikṣu and Māthara, Purvavat depends upon the past experience. For example, one infers the future rain through particular rise of cloud.

62. tatra purvavat yadā karaṇamavyuditaṁ drṣṭvā bhavisyattvam kāryasya pratipadyate, YD under SK.K.5.
of cloud, Gaudapāda follows the Yuktidīpikā in explaining it as the inference which has cause as the probans.

Śeṣevat is variously interpreted in three ways: (i) from effect to cause (ii) from one part to the rest, (iii) through elimination. The Yuktidīpikā gives the first interpretation. The Yuktidīpikā defines Śeṣevat as that in which after observing the accomplishment of an effect one comes to know the prior existence of its cause. For example, one comes to know the meeting of the couple after seeing a boy. The Yuktidīpikā however, feels that such an example is also not faultless. There is no invariable relation between meeting of a couple and birth of a boy. The birth of Drona is heard to be without meeting of the couple. Therefore, the example is rejected by the Yuktidīpikā. The Yuktidīpikā gives a faultless example as after seeing the leaf one comes to know the root of water lily or after seeing the sprout one comes to know the seed. Māṇḍara and Gaudapāda give the second

63. pṛṣṭvā śeṣulakāṃ pratipadyate aikuraṃ vā 
   drṣṭvā vijamiti tadā śeṣavat, Yu under SK. K.5.
64. samudrodakavindum prāśyasŚeṣasya lavanásāda
   anumiyate iti śeṣavat, NV under SK. K.5.
65. samudrādekaṃ jalavelaṃ lavanamāsaḍya śeṣasya pyasti, 
   Gā under SK. K.5.
of the interpretations mentioned above. For example, after finding a drop of water from the sea to be saltish one infers that the rest of the water is also saltish. Vācaspatī Miśra gives third of the above mentioned interpretation. He quotes the Nyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana that Śesavat is the definite knowledge with reference to the residual after eliminating the undesirably involved objects when there remains no undesirable involvement of something else.66

The Sāmānyotodrṣṭa type of Anumāna is understood in two ways : (i) based upon analogy and (ii) inferring a characteristic in other cases after observing it in one case. Some of the commentators of the Sāṃkhyaśāstra give both of these interpretations while some give one of them. Māthara gives the latter interpretation. For example, observing the mango tree having flower, one infers the flowers on other trees as well.67 Gauḍapāda gives both of the above interpretations. For the former he gives the following example: the moon and stars have movement because they change the place. Whatever changes the place has movement just as Caitra.68 For the latter

66. śiṣyate pariśiṣyate iti śesah sa eva visayatayā yasyāstyanumānajanānasya taceṣāsavat, STK under SK, K.5.

67. puspātāmradarśanāt anyatra puspīta āmarā iti, MV under SK, K.5.

68. desāntarāddesāntaram draṣṭāṃ gatimaccandrestārakāṃ, Caitravat, GB under SK, K.5.
he gives the same example as offered by Māthara. The Yuktiḍīpikā discusses the Sāmānyatodrṣṭa more elaborately. It states that after observing the invariable association of the two objects one comes to know the invariable association of the objects of the same group at some other place at some other time.69 For example, after observing the relation of smoke and fire one comes to know at other time the existence of some other fire through some other smoke.

**Svārtha and Parārtha**

Though the division of Anumāna into Svārtha and Parārtha is not found in the Nyāyasūtra or Vaiśeṣika sūtra, but Prāṣastapāda has mentioned it on the Vaiśeṣikasūtra. This division is accepted by Buddhist also. Etymologically what is intended for oneself is Svārthānumāna and what is intended for others is Parārthānumāna. In the Svārthānumāna premises are known from our own experience while in Parārthānumāna premises are discovered by one man and imparted to another through the medium of language. Parārthānumāna is,

69. sāmānyotodṛṣṭam nāma yatracikadā arthayorvyabhicāra
mupalabhya deśāntare kālāntare ca tajjātiyayorvyabhicāram pratipadyate,

YD under SK. K.5.
however, based upon Svārthānumāna in the sense that one can not convince other if he himself is not convinced. The Śāṅkhāyānikā does not discuss the division of Anumāna. The Yuktidipikā and Māthara seem to imply such a division in their discussion of Inference.

Kevalānvayī, Kevalavyātirekī and Anvayavyātirekī:

Uddyotakāra is the first logician to introduce Kevalānvayī, Kevalavyātirekī and Anvayavyātirekī as the varieties of Inference. If a middle term is positively related to the major term it is called Kevalānvayī. If the middle term is negatively related to the major term it is called Kevalavyātirekī. If the middle term is positively and negatively related to the major term in an Inference then it is called Anvayavyātirekī. Aniruddha mentions Kevalānvayī, Kevalavyātirekī and Anvayavyātirekī in addition to the three kinds of Inference i.e., Pūrvavat, Śesavat and Sāmānyatodrṣta. In the case of Kevalānvayī the Vyāpti is affirmative only and there is no possibility of counter example. In the case of Kevalavyātirekī the Vyāpti is negative only and there is no possibility of homogeneous example while in the case of Anvayavyātirekī the Vyāpti can be stated in both the forms. The example of Kevalānvayī is: Man is mortal because he is

70. trividhamiti anvayī vyātirekī anvayavyātirekī ceti, NV, 1.1.5.
The example of Kevalavyātirekī is: the cloth does not differ from threads, because it is of the nature of threads. In this case there is no possibility of homogeneous instance. An instance of the third kind of Inference i.e., Anvayavyātirekī is fire through smoke.

**Vīta and Avīta**

Vīta and Avīta mean direct Inference and Inference through elimination. The Sāmkhya texts specially the Yuktidipīka has given importance to Vīta and Avīta type of Anumāṇa and has discussed the characteristics of these two in detail. In his Sāmkhyatattvakeumudi Vācaspati discussed the division of Vīta and Avīta types of Anumāṇa correlating it with the other division of Anumāṇa like Pūrvavat etc. But the discussion of Vīta and Avīta types of Anumāṇa is not found in some other texts of Sāmkhya-Yoga. The division has found an important place in the system of Nyāya also. In the system of Nyāya, Uddyotakāra is the earliest logician to discuss the division of Anumāṇa into Vīta and Avīta. The Vīta gives rise to the knowledge of an object when employed in its own essential form while the Avīta does so through refuting other's stand. The former establishes an object in a positive way. The Avīta, however, works through rejection or negation.
The Sāmkhya has given importance to the division of Anumāna as Vīta and Avīta. The Yuktidīpikā in its opening verse compares the Sāmkhya system with an elephant having Vīta and Avīta as its tusks and thus easily enjoying in the forest of subject (Pakṣatā). The Yuktidīpikā divides Anumāna into two types: Vīta and Avīta. According to the Yuktidīpikā, Vīta is that when the Probans is applied in its very form and the Avīta is through elimination when other possibilities are eliminated. The Yuktidīpikā states that the essential form of Probans can be of two kinds—generic and particular. In the case of Vīta the Probans is employed in its essential without a reference to the exclusion of other's stand. This is Vīta division of Anumāna. In the case of Avīta the Probans does not prove the Probandum directly but wards off other possible alternatives.

Vācaspati Miśra in his Nyāyavārttikatātparyāstikā and also in his Sāmkhyatattvakaumudi mentions the two-fold division of Anumāna viz., Vīta and Avīta. According to him Vīta means that which is available in various ways, i.e., besides its presence in Pakṣa it is present in Sapakṣa and is absent in other dissimilar cases (Vipakṣa) e.g., whatever is smoky is fiery, the hill is smoky, therefore, the hill is fiery. The Avīta is different from it. Avīta is not found in Sapakṣa. In the system of Nyāya,
however, they are Anvayī and Vyātirekī. Vācaspati Miśra reconciles the above division with the other three divisions i.e., Pūrvavat, Šesavat and Sāmānyatodrṣṭa. According to him Anumāṇa is firstly of two kinds, Vīta and Avīta. He defines Vīta as that which gives rise to the inferential mainly through positive invariable concomitance and which leads to positive result. Vīta should not be understood as identical with Kevalānvayi. It is applicable to both the Kevalānvayī and Anvayavyātirekī. The Vīta is of two kinds, Pūrvavat and Sāmānyatodrṣṭa. The Avīta is opposite to Vīta in nature. It is defined as that which gives rise to the inferential knowledge through negative invariable concomitance and which stresses the negative aspect. Vācaspati states that it is a case of Kevalavyātirekī. He further states that Avīta is identical with Šesavat type of Anumāṇa. For example, sound is specific quality of ether because it is not a specific quality of earth, water, fire, air, space, time, manas and the self. By elimination of other alternatives it is inferred that sound is the specific quality of ether which is the only remaining substance.

Fallacy

The term fallacy is associated with reasoning. Reason is regarded as true or valid when it has threefold property or character, lacking one of which means false
or invalid reason. The triple nature of valid reason is as follows: [1] Its definite presence in the subject of Inference, substratum, e.g., smoke must be present in the hill. It means that reason must be present in the subject of Inference. The presence in the subject, i.e., Pakṣadharmatā, is the first characteristic of valid reason, [2] Secondly, its definite presence must be in all the objects similar to substratum (Pakṣa). The middle term must be present in all positive instances as in the kitchen where fire exists. [3] Thirdly, its definite absence in the negative instances, that is, the middle term must be absent in the negative instances. This is the third nature of valid reason named Vyātireka. Thus the three characteristics are conditions of valid reason. Therefore, their inversion of either one or two characteristics turns the Probans, as Kanāda observes, into fallacy. According to Gāgābhatta, the valid knowledge of the counter correlate which prevents as inferential knowledge is called fallacy. The discussion on fallacy is not found in the Mīmāṃsā-sūtra and Śābarabhāṣya. Kumārila and Prabhākara explain it. Kumārila admits three types of fallacy. Gautama in his Nyāya philosophy finds five varieties of fallacy.

But in the extant text of the Sāmkhya-Yoga, the subject 'fallacies in Anumāna' is not discussed.
The Matharavrtti makes reference to them without explaining them. The Matharavrtti states that there are thirty-three fallacies of Anumana. Further discussion about these fallacies are not found in the extant texts of Sāmkhya-yoga. Various important issues on Inference are not discussed in the Sāmkhya-yoga text. However, it seems that such a silence could be due to the fact that these problems were discussed by some earlier texts of the Sāmkhya-yoga unfortunately lost to us.