CHAPTER TWO

VALID AND INVALID KNOWLEDGE

All the philosophical schools in ancient India sprang up out of an urge for enquiry into the real state of things (Tattvajiñāsā). Because of such an approach, Indian epistemology involves four basic factors. They are: Pramā (Pramiti), Prameya, Pramāṇa and Pramātā.

(i) The Pramā or Pramiti— the valid knowledge (of the object).

(ii) The Prameya — the knowable, the object known, the object of valid knowledge.

(iii) The Pramāṇa— the chief instrument or organ of knowing the source of valid knowledge.

(iv) Pramātā— the knower or the cognizer of valid knowledge.

In Indian epistemology, two words are used to mean knowledge. They are jñāna and Pramā. Jñāna means all kinds of knowledge, true or false. When reality reveals true knowledge it is called Pramā or valid knowledge and when this revelation is false it is called Apramā.
The word 'Prama' is used only in the sense of true knowledge or Yathārthajñāna which is distinct from false knowledge. In other words, while the word 'jñāna' is used to denote knowledge from the psychological standpoint that helps in cognition of an object, the word 'Prama' means true knowledge in the logical sense which is able to recognise an object with its real nature and character.

Knowledge in its strict sense means a true belief that carries with it an assurance of its truth. Therefore knowledge is always true. It is a tautology to speak of valid knowledge and a contradiction to speak of 'non-valid or invalid knowledge. The latter is no knowledge at all, since it does not stand for any belief which is true and which gives us an assurance of its truth. When we speak of Prama as valid knowledge, we do not forget the strict sense of the word 'knowledge'. But the word 'knowledge' has been used in a narrow as well as a wide sense. Hence in view of the facts that they make a distinction between true and false jñāna and that Prama implies something more than knowledge in its strict sense, we propose to use the phrase valid knowledge for Prama.

The term 'Prama' is derived from the root 'Ma' with a prefix 'Pra' and 'Tip' which means valid knowledge. All

philosophers attempted in their own way to analyse valid knowledge (Pramā) and the means of attaining it. Different systems of Indian philosophy have forwarded divergent opinions with regard to the nature of Pramā.

Definition of Valid Knowledge According to Different Schools of Indian System.

Bauddha definition of valid knowledge: According to the Bauddhas, the truth of knowledge consists in its practical value. They define Pramā as the knowledge that is capable of successful volition in revealing an object ² or as the knowledge which makes us reach the object revealed by it. Kamalaśīla, however, further clarifies that the valid knowledge refers to a possible successful action, though not to the actual achievement of the object. ³ In all these cases, it is common that the validity of knowledge depends upon the success in the practical activity.

The Nyāya View: According to the Naiyāyikas, the validity of knowledge consists in the objectivity or the faithfulness of the knowledge towards the object. The Pramā is

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2. pramāṇamavisamvādiijnānam; avisamvādanaśabdaniirukti, Pv, 1.2.
3. prāpakaṁ jñānam pramāṇaṁ, NBT, p.4.
4. avisamvādittvam cābhimatārthakriyāsamārthārthaprapānte saktikattvam, na tu prāpanameva pratigandhatisambhavat, TSP, p.15.
generally defined by the Naiyāyikas as the knowledge which informs the existence of something in a place where it actually exists or in other words Prama is the knowledge which predicates of something a property really possessed by it. It is a definite and an assured (asamādigha) cognition of an object, which is also true and presentational in character. Hence it is that Prama excludes all kinds of non valid knowledge, such as memory, doubt, error, hypothetical argument etc. Memory is excluded because it is not presentational (anubhava). Doubt and the rest are excluded either because they are not true or because they are not definite and assured cognitions. It appears from this that Prama has three main characteristics, namely, assuredness, truth and presentativeness.

As to the first characteristic it can be said that Prama, or valid knowledge is a definite categorical assertion as distinguished from all indefinite, problematic and hypothetical knowledge. In Prama, there is a feeling of assurance or conviction in what is known. That is, valid knowledge is always connected with a firm belief. All assurances or firm beliefs, however, are not Prama. In illusion we firmly believe in what is false. Prama implies

5. tadvati tatra prakārakānubhava yathārtha seībā prametyucyate, TS, p. 34.
something more than a subjective certainty.

The second characteristic of Pramā is that it is true or unerring (yathārtha) knowledge. Knowledge is true when it is not contradicted by its object (arthavyabhicārī). This means that knowledge is true when it reveals its object with that nature and attribute which abide in it despite all changes of time, place and other conditions. 6 What is once true of an object is always true of it, devoid of space and time. To know a thing truly is to know it as characterised by what is a characteristic of it (tadvati tatprakāraka). Hence according to Nyāya, the truth of knowledge consists in its correspondence to facts.

The Vedānta view: According to the Advaita school of uttaramīmāṃsā, the validity of knowledge consists in non-contradictariness. The followers of this school define Pramā as the uncontradicted knowledge of an object. 7 They do not accept novelty as an essential factor for valid knowledge nor do they oppose the view of considering novelty as a mark of valid knowledge. That is why Dharmarājadhvarya gives two alternative definitions viz., valid

6. NVT, pp. 5-21.
7. pramāttvamadhigatāvādhistavaśayajñānattvam, VP, p.19.
knowledge is that knowledge which apprehends an object that is not, already known and which is not contradicted. He defines Pramā with and without novelty as a mark of Pramā. Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Uttaramīmāṁsā holds that the validity of knowledge consists in both the faithfulness to the object and prompting to the fruitful activity. The valid knowledge is defined therein as that which apprehends an object as it really exists and which prompts fruitful activity. The dvaita - the Dvaitādvaita and the Suddhādvaita school of Uttaramīmāṁsā also accept conformity of knowledge to the object as a mark of valid knowledge.

The Bhātta Theory of Valid Knowledge: The Bhātta Mīmāṁsāsakas define valid knowledge as the knowledge of an unknown real object. Kumārila defines valid knowledge as: valid knowledge is a firm or assured cognition of objects which does not stand in need of confirmation by other cognitions. According to Umbeka the word ‘ārdha’ excludes

8. yathāvasthitavyavahārānuṇaṁ jñānaṁ prameti, NP, p.36 cf. UIP.
10. yathārthajñānaṁ pramā, tadvati tatprakārakatvam yathārthattvam, SKV, p.91 cf. UIP, p.8.
11. niṣcaya yathārthānunvāba, ayameva prameti vasyahryate yāthārthyaṁ cārthānativarttivam, Pra R, p.18 cf. UIP.
13. tasmātārdham yadutpannam nāpi samvādāmcchati / jñānāntareṇa vijnānaṁ tat pramāṇāṁ prattyaṁ // SV, 2.80.
doubt from valid knowledge and the word 'na visamvādamrocchhati' (which is not contradicted by other cognitions) excludes error or illusion. Pārthasāratni Miśra defines valid knowledge as the knowledge which represents the real nature of an object which was not attained earlier and which was not contradicted by subdued knowledge. Pārthasārathi mentions three distinctive features of valid knowledge, viz., (1) its object is not remembered as having been previously known (2) it conforms to the real nature of its object and (3) there is a feeling of conviction regarding its conformity or agreement with the real object. Thus novelty, non-contradictoriness and truth are the three essential marks of valid knowledge. The Bhatta like most of other schools admits two kinds of valid knowledge, that is immediate (aparokṣa) and mediate (parokṣa). Valid knowledge is one which produces some new information about something, not contradicted by any other knowledge and not yielded by defective conditions such as defective sense organs in the case of perceptual knowledge, fallacious premise in the case of inference etc. The Bhatta considers knowledge in its relation to our practical needs. There is no use in knowing what are already known. Knowledge cannot be separated from the practical value it has for us.

15. NRM, p.35.
The objects of our environment are always changing, and we have to make fresh adjustment to the changing circumstances and for this purpose knowledge must reveal the changing aspects of things.

The Prābhākarā View: According to the Prābhākarās all knowledge is valid. Experience is valid knowledge, and knowledge other than memory is experience. The Prābhākarās say that a knowledge illuminates three things, namely, the object, its knowledge and the self or knower, just as a lamp lights the things around it, itself and its wick. In every knowledge, in other words, three-fold (triputa) features, namely, the object, the form of knowledge and the knower are experienced. It is called triple perception (triputi pratyakṣa). Everywhere in substance, genus and quality there is validity and perceptibility for the elements of self and the form of knowledge. Śālikanātha, a commentator of Prabhākara, gives the definition of valid knowledge as follows: valid knowledge is experience, and it is something different.

16. (a) anubhūti pramāṇam sa smṛter anyā...... PP.5.1. p. 104.
(b) smṛti-vyavṛttam pramātvam, VP, p.5.
from memory which is the name of that cognition which arises solely from the impression left by some previous experience. In a continuous perception the later cognitions arising from sense-object intercourse, like the first cognition, are different from memory, and hence they are valid. Recognition too is valid, because it is not produced solely from impression. It is an experience aided by impression. Memory is not valid inasmuch as it depends on a former experience. It does not determine an object independently.

The Vaiśeṣika View: The Vaiśeṣikas consider certainty (lack of doubt), non contradictoriness and definiteness as the marks of valid knowledge. Prāśastapāda in his Bhāṣya on the Vaiśeṣika sūtra nowhere defines valid knowledge, but he distinguishes between Vidyā and Avidyā, the former includes perception, inference, ārṣa and memory, and the latter includes doubt, illusion, indefinite cognition and dream. Śrīdhara commenting on the Bhāṣya defines Vidyā as firm uncontradicted and definite cognition. Thus the definition introduces definiteness

18. anubhūtih pramāṇam sā smṛteranyā smṛtiḥ punah / pūrvavijñānasaṃskāramātrajām jñānamucyate // PP,p.127.  
19. niḥsandīgdaḥ vādhu dhayavasāyātmikā pratitirvidyā tadviparitā cāvidyeti, NK, p. 414.
as a mark of valid knowledge. It is plain that Vidya is valid knowledge and Avidya invalid knowledge and that memory is valid knowledge. This definition mentions an additional mark of valid knowledge viz., 'adhyabasaya'.

The Jaina View: According to the Jaina logicians definiteness is the essential mark of valid knowledge. Vādidevasūri defines valid means of knowledge as a definite knowledge which reveals itself and the other objects. 20 The characteristics of definiteness here, however, does not differ essentially from the view of the Naiyāyikas because definiteness is further stated by Jaina logicians themselves to be the determination of an object in the form in which it really exists. 21 Siddhasena considers non-contradictoriness in place of definiteness as a mark of Pramā. 22 The definition of Pramāṇa offered by Aklanka 23 reveals that he considers non-contradictoriness and novelty as the marks of valid knowledge.

The Sāmkhya Yoga View: In Sāmkhya and Yoga philosophy the term 'Prama' carries different meanings than in other

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20. svaparasyavasāyi jñānam pramāṇam, PNT, 1.2.
21. vastutathābhāvagrhakattvam niścayātmakattvam, PKM, p. 27.
22. pramāṇam svaparabhāsi vādhāvivarjitam, NVV, 1.2 cf JTF, p. 22.
23. pramāṇamvisāmvādi jñānamananadhigatārthā dīghamalaksana- ttvāt, AS, p. 175.
philosophies. Pramā in Sāṁkhyā-Yoga philosophy is explained briefly with examples in the following way: when an object is viewed by eyes (or conceived by means of other sense-organs) the sense-organs assume the form of the object. The mind reacts due to the changes brought by sense-organs. The mind transmits the form of the object to the Ahamkāra (ego) with the help of the sense-organs. The ego modifies the form of the object in its own way and transmits the same to the intellect. The intellect gets modified, determines the form of the object in its own light and eventually undertakes the process to know the object. An example will clarify the topic: say a jar is in view and the eye comes in contact with the jar, as a result of which there are certain indriyavṛttis which are presented to the mind. The mind analyses and synthesises those vṛttis and presents them to the intellect. Then through the functioning of the mind and the external organ the intellect assumes the form of the jar. Finally the consciousness of the self is reflected on this objectified form of the Buddhi and the object is immediately revealed. Then one will be able to perceive the jar. According to Vācaspati Miśra, the intellect which is endowed with the qualities of sattva gets reflected by Puruṣa. According to Sāṁkhyā philosophy, Puruṣa is immutable and imprudent. When the intellect conceives the reflection of Puruṣa and the form of the
object is revealed, then this revelation is called Pramāṇa, and the means which remain unrevealed is called Pramāṇa.

The Sāmkhya-Yoga holds that the validity of knowledge consists in certainty (undoubtedness), correspondence to the object and novelty. Vācaspati Miśra defines Pramāṇa as the Cittavṛtti (modification of Citta) which apprehends an object that is undoubted, real and unknown. Thus all the philosophical thinkers unanimously hold validity or truth as the characteristics of Pramāṇa but differ in respect of the mark of validity or truth. Prof. D.M. Datta seems to be perfectly right in his observation that “Pramāṇa is generally defined as a cognition having the two-fold characteristics of truth and novelty (abādhītattva and anadīghatattva) and that as regards the first characteristics—‘truth’ all schools of Indian philosophy are unanimous”. The above discussion of the nature of Pramāṇa further reveals that according to some schools like the Sāmkhya-Yoga and the Purva-mīmāṃsā, novelty also is an essential part of differentia of valid knowledge. Some philosophers like the Vaiśeṣikas and the Jainas do not

24. taccāsandīgadhīvāpariṣadādīghatavīśayā cittavṛttih,
STK under SK. K. 5.
consider novelty as a mark of valid knowledge since they include remembrance (smṛti) into the case of valid knowledge. Some schools like the Advaita are indifferent to the controversy. Dharmarājadhvarindra defines Pramāṇa in two ways i.e., with and without validity as the mark of valid knowledge. The Mīmāṃsakas and the Sāmkhya-Yoga have accepted novelty as a mark of Pramāṇa to exclude remembrance from the domain of valid knowledge. The Jainas accept remembrance among the forms of valid mediate knowledge. The Advaita Vedānta is indifferent to the problem. The Naiyāyikas consider the presentative knowledge (anubhuti) as a mark of Pramāṇa and exclude remembrance (smṛti) which is not the presentation of an object but reproduction of previous experience solely caused by the impression (Samskāra) of the past experience.

The recognition of novelty as an essential factor of valid knowledge further enquires about the inclusion of persistent knowledge of the same object (dheerāvahika jñāna) into the valid knowledge, because the persistent knowledge is considered as a form of valid knowledge by all schools of Indian philosophy.

The Sources of Valid Knowledge:

When reality reveals true knowledge it is called Pramāṇa or valid knowledge and when this revelation is false it is called Apramāṇa or invalid knowledge. When one comes
across various convictions regarding an object one feels to verify their validity through various methods which may be roughly termed as Pramāṇa. The special source of Pramāṇa or valid knowledge is called Pramāṇa. Pramāṇa derivatively means the instrument of valid knowledge (pramāyāḥ karaṇam). Hence generally speaking we may say that Pramāṇa is the means or source of right knowledge. It is that which gives us valid knowledge and only valid knowledge of objects. So it has been said: 'There cannot be any right understanding of things except by means of Pramāṇa. A subject arrives at the valid knowledge of objects by means of Pramāṇa, for the existence and nature of objects are to be ascertained only by such cognitions as are based on Pramāṇa.' Again it is said 'Pramāṇa is the cause of valid cognition of objects inasmuch as it gives us a knowledge of objects as they really are and exist in themselves.' Pramāṇa has a real correspondence with objects in the sense that 'the nature and attributes of objects, as revealed by Pramāṇa, uncontradictorily true of them, despite all variations in time, place and other conditions.'

26. kaḥ punarayam nyāya? pramāṇairarthaparikṣanam, NBh under NS, 1.1.
27. NBh, 1.1.1, 4.2.29.
28. Ibid.
29. NMT, 1.1.1, 4.2.29.
The term 'Pramāṇa' consists in the root 'Ma' with a prefix 'pra' and suffix 'lyut'. Pramāṇa is defined as the Kārana or the extraordinary cause of a Pramāṇa or right knowledge. Now the question is what is Kārana and how is it constituted? In order to answer the first part of this question we should follow the distinction between Kārana and Kārana means and cause. A cause has been defined as the invariable and unconditional antecedent of an effect. Conversely, an effect is the invariable and unconditional consequent. There are three kinds of causes, namely, the constituent (samaṇyāyī), the non-constituent (asamaṇyāyī) and the efficient (nimitta). The constituent causes is the substratum in which the effect inheres, e.g., the threads of the cloth. The non-constituent cause is the mediate cause of an effect. It determines the effect only insofar as it stands as an inherent attribute of the constituent cause. In relation to the effect, 'cloth', the contact of threads is the non-constituent cause. So also the colour of the threads is the mediate cause of the colour of cloth. The efficient cause is different from both the constituent and non-constituent causes. It is not merely the passive substratum in which the effect inheres, nor any inherent attribute of the substratum that indirectly determines the effect.
Rather it is the agency that acts on both the constituent and non-constituent causes and makes them produce the effect. In relation to the cloth, the loom and such other agents constitute the efficient cause. It is the efficient cause that is to be regarded as Karana or means. Now reverting to the definition of Pramāṇa, it is said that Pramāṇa is the unique operative cause (kāraṇa) of right knowledge.

Though all accept Pramāṇa as the Karaṇa or the extraordinary means of Pramāṇa yet there is difference of opinions about the characteristics of Karaṇa or Pramāṇa. Thus the philosophers have different views regarding the nature of Pramāṇa.

The Bauddha View of Pramāṇa: It has been generally admitted by all the schools of Indian philosophy that Pramāṇa is the true knowledge and Pramāṇa is the source of such knowledge. But there is much difference of opinion among them as to the nature of the truth which each of them claims for its Pramāṇa. The Buddhists generally take the truth of knowledge to consist in its capacity to produce successful activity. Pramāṇa or true knowledge is harmonious in the sense that there is no conflict between the cognition of an object and the practical activity to obtain it. In short, Pramāṇa is practically useful knowledge.
and Pramāṇa is the source of that knowledge. The Buddhists define Pramāṇa as uncontradicted experience.

**The Jaina View of Pramāṇa:** The Jainas also take Pramāṇa in a general sense so as to make it applicable to both immediate presentational knowledge (pratyakṣa) and mediate knowledge (parokṣa) so far as they are true. Under mediate knowledge they include sense-perception, inference, memory and recognition. In this general sense, pramāṇa is knowledge that reveals both itself and its object in a way that is not liable to contradiction. The Jainas define pramāṇa as knowledge which reveals itself and its object and which must be determinate.

**The Vaiśeṣika View of Pramāṇa:** Kanāda who occupies the first place in the traceable history of the epistemological tradition states that the general definition of Pramāṇa should be based on the principle that the cause of cognition should be free from defects. The Vaiśeṣika system defines Pramāṇa as the unique operative cause (kāraṇa) of both true presentational knowledge and memory.

30. NBT, Ch.I.
31. pramāṇaṁ evisaṁvādhijñānaṁ, PVT, 1.3 cf JTP, p.22.
32. svaparāvijñānaṁ pramāṇaṁ, PNT, 1.2.
33. adustam vidyā, VS, 9.2.12.
34. smṛtyanubhavasādhāraṇaṁ pramākaṁva pramāṇam, TK, cf. NTK, p.59.
It would take memory as a distinct Pramāṇa or method of knowledge like perception and inference.

The Nyāya Definition of Pramāṇa: According to the Naiyāyikas Pramāṇa is the unique operative cause (Kāraṇa) of right knowledge. Pramāṇa is that it is the complex of specific conditions, other than the subject and the object, which does not normally fail to produce valid knowledge.35

The Naiyāyikas explain the term 'kāraṇa' in the sense that is most conducive to the production of the effect. There is, however, difference of opinion regarding the nature of kāraṇa between the old and the new Naiyāyikas. According to the old Naiyāyikas the kāraṇa is a cause which is peculiar and operative.36

The modern Naiyāyikas on the other hand define kāraṇa as the cause which is invariably and immediately followed by the product. Thus kāraṇa, according to the ancient Naiyāyikas, is the nature of the substance while, according to the modern Naiyāyikas it is the nature of operation (vyāpāra) itself. For example, in the case of cutting the wood with an axe, the kāraṇa, according to the ancient Naiyāyikas, is the axe itself, while according to

35. cf. NM, p.15.
36. vyapārevadādharāṇaṁkāraṇaṁ kāraṇaṁ, Ts., p. 87.
the modern Naiyāyikas, it is the operation of the axe. Among the Naiyāyikas, Jayanta Bhatta does not accept the popular view of his school and defines Pramāṇa as the totality of causal conditions. The Pramāṇa, according to Jayanta, is the totality of all the sentient and non-sentient factors which lead to the knowledge of an object which is in turn different from illusion.  

The Bhaṭṭa View of Pramāṇa: In the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, Pramāṇa or true knowledge is defined as primary and original knowledge (Anadhigata). Hence Pramāṇa is that which gives us new knowledge, i.e., a true cognition of objects of which we have no knowledge in the past. Every case of knowledge should be original in character. Real knowledge is a synthetic process adding new contents to the old stock of knowledge. Pramāṇa is the means of acquiring knowledge and so must lead to the acquisition of such knowledge as is not yet attained but is still to be acquired. The method of knowledge, therefore, must be concerned in knowing what has not been previously known. It follows from this that memory (smṛti) cannot be Pramāṇa or true knowledge, insofar as it is not a new experience. It has no new contents but refers only to the already

37. avyabhicārinīmasandigdhāṃ arthopalabdhi vidadhāti bodha bodhasvabhā, NM, 1.12.
acquired contents of knowledge.\textsuperscript{38} According to the Bhāttas, Pramāṇa is that which gives us new knowledge i.e., a true knowledge of the past.\textsuperscript{39}

The Prabhakara View of Pramāṇa: The Prabhakara Mīmāṃsakas define Pramāṇa or valid knowledge as immediate experience (Anubhūti). It is different from memory which is the impressions of past experiences. All immediate experiences have intrinsic validity. There cannot be any question as to the validity of immediate experience, because that is self evident. Memory, however, is mediate knowledge, being conditioned by past experience. Hence the truth of knowledge (Pramāṇya) is guaranteed by its having the character of immediacy.\textsuperscript{40} Śālikanētha states that Pramāṇa is an experience which is different from memory.\textsuperscript{41}

The Advaita View of Pramāṇa: The Advaita Vedānta defines Pramāṇa as the operative cause (Kāraṇa) of Pramāṇa or true knowledge. It defines Pramāṇa in two ways. First Pramāṇa means knowledge that has both the characteristics of novelty and uncontradictoriness. This means that true knowledge is

\textsuperscript{38} yathārthamagrhistapāhiṣṭhānam pramāṇamiti, SD, p.45.
\textsuperscript{39} anadhigatārthābhūtārthaniṣceṣayātmakam pramāṇam, SD, p.123.
\textsuperscript{40} pramāṇam-anubhūtiṃ sa smṛteranyā, PP, p.42.
\textsuperscript{41} anubhūtipramāṇam sa smṛteranyā smṛti punah, PP, p.127.
uncontradicted and original, i.e., it gives us new information. Secondly Pramā, is taken to mean simply uncontradicted knowledge of objects. The result is that Pramā is made to exclude or include memory according as we accept the one or the other way of defining pramā or true knowledge.42

The Sāmkhya-Yoga View of Pramāna: The Sāmkhya-Yoga concept of Pramāna is different from all these. Patanjali holds that Pramāna is the function of Citta.43 Patanjali, however, shows the superiority of yogic practices and consequently the yogic perception acquired through them over the ordinary means of knowledge. He says that the Buddhi through the discipline of Yoga gets truth bearing knowledge (Rtambharā) having no trace of wrong or perverted knowledge. This knowledge comprehends the particularity (Viṣeṣa) residing in the Puruṣa or in the subtle elements, which is not known through any of the worldly means of knowledge.44 Īśvarakṛṣṇa does not define Pramāṇa explicitly in his Sāmkhya-kārikā though he uses the term 'Pramāṇa'. He defines

42. VP, ch.I.
43. pramāṇaviparyayavikarāpanidrśmṛtayon, YS, I.6.
44. rtambharā tatra prajñā, YS, I.48.
45. sa viṣeṣā bhavati bhūtasūkṣmamagata vā puruṣagata vā, YB, I.49.
Buddhi as ascertainment of an object. Isvarakrsna defines perception as ascertainment of an object brought about by sense-object contact. If the two statements are correlated, it can be deduced that Pramāṇa, according to Isvarakrsna is ascertainment of an object which is nothing but a characteristic function of Buddhi not different from Buddhi itself. Nor does Vyāsa explicitly defines Pramāṇa. He, however, remarks that Pramāṇa apprehends a real object (bhutārtha viśaya) in opposition to erroneous knowledge which is later on contradicted by the former. The Yuktidīpikā states that since the Citta is one, the Pramāṇa is also one only. It is through limiting adjuncts that it is said to be threefold. Vācaspati Miśra also accepts the usually accepted meaning of Pramāṇa as the means of valid knowledge. He defines Pramāṇa as modification of Buddhi (Buddhivṛtti) the object of which is not doubtful, contradictory and the like.

46. adhyavasāya buddhiḥ, SK. K.23.
47. prativiśayādhyavasāya drstam, SK.K.5.
48. bhutārthaviśayattvatpramāṇasya, tatra pramāṇena vādhana premāṇasya drstam, YB, I.8.
49. tadekameva buddherekattvabhyupagamat, YD, 4.
50. upādhibhivasāttubhinnemāśriyate pratyakṣamanumāṇamityādi, YD, 4.
51. taccasandigate dhāviradhitānadhigatavaisayā cittavṛttiḥ, STK under SK, K.5.
Vācaspati further gives an alternate definition of Pramāṇa as apprehension of Puruṣa which forms the result of Pramāṇa\(^5\). This corresponds to the statement of Vyāsa regarding the result of Pramāṇa. The commentators of the Sāmkhyatattvavākaumudī have exercised their minds to reconcile the two definitions of Pramāṇa offered by Vācaspati. Balarama Uḍāsīna holds that the earlier definition speaks of Bauddha or Āmukhya (subordinate) Pramāṇa and the latter explains the nature of Mukhya (principal) Pramāṇa. The first is located in Buddhi through the instrumentality of sense-object contact while the latter arises in Puruṣa through the instrumentality of the operation of Buddhi.\(^5\) The earlier, states Sivanārāyan Śāstri, is of the form 'This is pot' and the latter is of the form 'I know the pot'. From this Sivanārāyan Śāstri further deduces that in the Sāmkhya system some objects like the senses are the means only since they are the means of the Pramāṇa in the form of the operation of the buddhi while the operation of Buddhi is both the Pramāṇa and Pramāṇa. It is the means of the apprehension of Puruṣa and is Pramāṇa in the form of the knowledge of an

\(^5\) bodhaśca pauṟuṣeyaphalam pramāṇa, STK under SK.K, 5.
\(^5\) evomindriyasannikarsajanyāmāmukhyām bauddhapramāṇa mākhyāya cittavṛtti phalabnūtām mukhyām pauṟuṣeyapra-

mamākhyāti, VT on STK, K, 5.
object. The apprehension of the Puruṇa is the Prama only. The Puruṇa reflected into Buddhi is the cogniser only because it is the locus of the Prama.\textsuperscript{54} The consciousness (Puruṇa) conditioned by Buddhivṛtti is the witness only.

Śrīkṛṣṇa Vallabhācārya adds when both the function of Buddhī and the apprehension of Puruṇa are said to be Prama, the Pramāṇa will be both function of Buddhī and the function of the sense organ.\textsuperscript{55} Puruṇa is never the direct cogniser but it is the witness of Prama.

The Sāmkhya-sūtra defines Pramāṇa as that which is most conducive to the Prama which is again defined as the determination of an object which is not previously cognised by either of the two.\textsuperscript{56} Vijnānabhikṣu further explains that the expression Asannikṛṣṭa (not previously cognised) excludes memory, the term 'artha' excludes mistake or illusion (Bhrama) and the term 'paricchittī' excludes doubt from the domain of Prama.\textsuperscript{57} The complete

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{54} visāyākāraḍhārīṇā buddhitattvena cetanaśakteḥ
\item \textsuperscript{55} Kir on YS, 1.7.
\item \textsuperscript{56} dvayorekatarasya vāpyasannikṛṣṭārthaparicchittīḥ pramaṭ tat sādhakatamaḥ yat tat trividham pramaṇam, SS, 1.87.
\item \textsuperscript{57} smṛtivyavartanāyānadhigatetī bhramavyavartanāya vastvīti sāmsayavyavartanāya tvavadhāranamiti, SPB, 1.87.
\end{itemize}
definition comes to mean that the Pramāṇa is the novel knowledge of a real object. The part of the definition 'not cognised by either of the two' is subject to manifold interpretation. Aniruddha interprets it as not cognised either through the presence of the two, viz., the sense and the object, a case of direct means of knowledge or through the presence of one, viz., the Probans or a word (śabda) in the case of Inference and Verbal testimony. Thus the Pramāṇa according to Aniruddha comes to mean the cognition of an uncognised object.

Vijñānabhikṣu defines Pramāṇa as the Vṛtti of Buddhi and the Pramāṇa as the reflection of the Buddhi having the form of the object into Puruṣa. Vijñānabhikṣu further suggests that Buddhivṛtti may also be taken as Pramāṇa. He clarifies thus: when the result of knowledge is considered to be located in the Buddhi, the Pramāṇa will be the sense-object contact, etc., and when the result of knowledge is considered to be located in Puruṣa, the Pramāṇa will be the function of Buddhi.

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58. dvaya-vidyārthayorvidyāmānayoh pratyakṣe, ekatarasya vāpīti vidyāmānasya limgasya śabdasya vānumāne śabdā ca, SSV, 1.87.
59. etenānavagatārthaganṭr pramāṇamityuktam, SSV, 1.87.
60. .. pramāṇam vṛttireva naḥ, pramārthākāra vṛttinām cetone pratīvimbānam, SPB, 1.87.
61. yadi pramarūpam phalām puruṣanīṣṭhātramācucyate tadā buddhivṛttireva pramāṇam, yadi cā buddhinīṣṭhātramācucyate pramāṇaṃ, SPB.1.87.
of fact, Puruṣa is the witness of knowledge and not a real cogniser. He also makes it clear that the use of Pramāṇa with reference to the senses etc. is always indirect. The statement of Vijnānabhiṣku requires further clarification: The Kāraṇa can be defined in two ways: 1) the cause which is peculiar and operative and 2) the cause which is invariable and immediately followed by the product. The former definition applies to the material object as a Kāraṇa while the latter definition implies the intermediate operation as Kāraṇa. Vijnānabhiṣku favours the second meaning of Kāraṇa because the acceptance of first will imply the Buddhi as a Kāraṇa of Pramāṇa and it would contradict the earlier authorities like Patañjali and Īśvarakṛṣṇa who consider function of the Buddhi as Kāraṇa of Pramāṇa. However, Vijnānabhiṣku favours the theory of considering the operation of Buddhi as the Pramāṇa and the Pramāṇa as located in Puruṣa. He quotes the authority of Vyāsa that Pramāṇa is the Bodha located in the Puruṣa. He further argues that it is right to consider the knowledge as located in Puruṣa because it is held in the Sāṁkhya that the operation of organs is to serve

62. purusastu pramāsāksyeve na pramāteti, SPB, 1.87.

63. caksurādiṣu tu pramāṇavayavahārāḥ paramparaiva sarvatheti bhāvah, SPB, 1.87.
the purpose of Purusa. He further quotes the authority of Vyasa that the Purusa is the Pratisamvedi of Buddhi, which according to him means that Purusa is the location of the reflection of the samvedana of the Buddhi.

This also holds that Vijñānabhikṣu does not go against the immutable and the all pervasive nature of the Purusa. The Purusa knows the object only through the Buddhi with which he is associated and knows the object reflected into the Buddhi which is reflected back into the Purusa. As such it does not involve the undesirable contingency of knowledge of everything at all the times. The Purusa is unattached and as such it does not undergo modification into the form of the object. The reflection is really a modification of Buddhi and is reflected into the Purusa just as the object gets reflected into the water but does not bring about change in it.

64. pātanjalabhāsyē tu vyasadevaiprametyuktah,
   puruṣārthameva karaṇānām pravṛttā phalasya
   purusaniṣṭhatāyā evaucityāt, ato astrāpi sa eva
   mukhyasiddhāntaḥ, SPB, 1. 87.

65. yogabhāṣyaνca buddheḥ pratisamvedi puruṣa iti
   pratidhvanivat pratisamveda samvedanaprativimba
   tasyāśraya ityārth, SPB, 1.87.

66. prativimvaśca buddhereva parināmaviśesa
   vimbākārō jalādigate iti mantavyam, SPB, 1.87.
On the Pramāṇa put forward by the Sāṃkhya-Yoga school the criticisms offered by Jayantabhatta and Vādi-devasūri, the representative of the Nyāya and the Jaina systems are taken into account. Jayantabhatta does not find the theory of the Sāṃkhya as convincing. The theory, states Jayantabhatta, implies two substrata of knowledge. The knowledge belongs partly to Puruṣa and partly to Buddhi and completely to neither. The Manśa which knows the object cannot be aware of it since it is non-sentient and the Puruṣa which becomes aware of the object cannot know because being immune to modifications it cannot be modified into the form of the object.67 Vādideva also states that the agent of awareness does not know and the agent of knowing being insentient in nature cannot be aware of the object. Thus the knowledge is not located in the Puruṣa and awareness of the object which is the result of Pramāṇa is not

67. yehi jāmēti buddhye adhyavesyati na tasya
tetphalamarthadarśanam acctanettvāmanetāḥ, yasya
cārthedarśanam na sa jāmēti na buddhyate nādhy
avasesyātiti bhinnādhikarsṇattvām pramāṇaphalayōḥ
jñānādīchhermayogeḥ pramāṇam puṃsi na vidyate
tetphalamarthadarśanam buddhaunāstiti, Ny, p. 24.
Jayantabhatta further states that the theory of the Sāmkhya involves the impossibility of rise of knowledge. On the same hand Vādideva also states that the Sāmkhyāits themselves hold that the exchange of qualities between the Buddhi and the Puruṣa is not actual but apparent.

Reviewing the above criticism we find that the main objection is against the locus of knowledge of Sāmkhya-Yoga school which involves the problem of the relation of the Puruṣa with the Buddhi and the attempt of the Sāmkhya to retain the immutable nature of the Puruṣa and the modifiable nature of the Buddhi. It may be admitted that if the knowledge is related exclusively either to the Buddhi or the Puruṣa, it becomes impossible to supply a proper explanation for the rise of knowledge. The Sāmkhyas, however, consider knowledge as belonging to the Buddhi only which though essentially insentient acts like a sentient entity with the sentience of the Puruṣa reflected upon it. Vijñānabhiṣṣu, however, goes a step

68. api ca yojānati na tasyārthadarsānaṁ phalamece
tanattvānmaḥastāḥ, yasya vārthadarsānaṁ na sa jānātiti
bhinnādhikaranattvām pramāṇaphalayo,

SVR Quoted in SYDP, p. 108.
further and holds that the Buddhi having the reflection of the Puruṣa is again reflected back into the Puruṣa. In this way, the Sāṃkhyaś retain the immutable nature of Puruṣa and the combined activity of the sentient and the non-sentient entities. Jayantabhatta, of course, derive a wrong implication from the statement of the Sāṃkhyaś that the Buddhi is essentially non-sentient and the Puruṣa non-active. It does, however, not mean as thought by Jayantabhatta, that the Buddhi can never act like a sentient entity even when it comes in contact with the sentient entity. The mirror can illumine an object with the light of the lamp. An object can perform some activities with the properties of some other object. Vādideva also strains too much while deriving the implication that the Sāṃkhyaś themselves have spoken of the untrue nature of Pramāṇa and Pramāṇa.

From a closer study of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga epistemology it seems that the so-called valid knowledge is only valid in the limited sphere of existence. From the metaphysical standpoint, the so-called valid knowledge is illusory since transcendental consciousness is devoid of all attributes and changes. The above condition of the contact between the Buddhi and the Puruṣa, according to Sāṃkhya refer to the empirical level of experiences and
its denial by the Sāmkhyas is always from the transcendental point of view. The reality of Pramāṇa and Pramē cannot be denied at the empirical level also.

According to the Buddhists, the distinction between Pramē and Pramāṇa is only imaginary. The author of Yuktidīpika and Vācaspati Miśra draw a real distinction that between Pramē and Pramāṇa is fundamental. Pramāṇa is the unconscious mode of the intellect whereas Pramē is the same mode illuminated. The relation of causality does not hold between Pramē and Pramāṇa, but Pramāṇa is the logical condition of Pramē. The Buddhist hold that a transient phenomenon of consciousness seizes the form of an object and Pramē is the same consciousness that reveals the form. Therefore the distinction between Pramē and Pramāṇa is only imaginary from the Buddhist point of view. But from the Sāmkhya-Yoga point of view such distinction is not tenable since Pramāṇa requires the grace of transcendental consciousness for its illumination. Thus we see that the followers of Sāmkhya and the Yoga school do not follow the footsteps of the buddhist though they adopt the represent- etive view of empirical consciousness. Thus, Sāmkhya and Yoga systems offer a original definition of Pramāṇa as the function of the Buddhi or the Citta.
The number of Pramanas according to different systems:

The schools of ancient Indian philosophy are not unanimous in their choice of the Pramanas. In the matter of recognising different Pramanas, different schools of Indian philosophy adopted divergent schemes. The number of Pramanas accepted by them vary from one to eight. The Carvakas accept Pratyaksa (perception) only as a single means of knowledge. The Vaisesikas and the Buddhists recognise two—Pratyaksa (perception) and Anumana (inference). Sankhya, Yoga, Visistadvaita, Dvaita, Suddhadvaita and Dvaitadvaita schools of Uttaramimamsa recognise Pratyaksa (perception), Anumana (inference) and Sabda or Agama (verbal testimony) as the three means of knowledge. The Naiyaikas recognise the above three with an addition, Upamana (comparison) as fourth. The Prabhakara school of Purvamimamsa adds Arthapatti (presumption) to it. The Bhatta school of Purvamimamsa and the Advaita school of Uttaramimamsa recognise the above with

9. pratyaksamaka-carvakaka kanadsugatau punah anumanaenca taccatha sakhya sabdaucate api nyayakadesainoapryavamu pamanaenca kecanaarthapattyah sanaitani catyavyaha prabhakaraah, abhava sasthanyetani bhattv vedantina sthatha samvavatihiyuktani tani pauranikajaguh,

the addition of Abhāva (negation or non-apprehension). The Paurāṇikas admit the above six with the addition of Sambhava (probability or inclusion) and Aitihya (tradition or rumour). Some Tantrikas recognise Čestā (indication) also in addition to the above as the source of valid knowledge. Others add Pratibhā (vivid-imagination) as a source of valid knowledge to the list and thus the total number of pramanas is ten in number.

The different Pramanas in short are as follows:

(1) Pratyakṣa (perception): Knowledge which is produced by the contact of a sense-organ with an object. Perception gives a direct knowledge of reality, because by it we directly apprehend the reality, whereas other means give only an indirect knowledge. For example, when a jar directly comes in contact with the sense-organ i.e., eye, there arises a perceptual knowledge of jar.

(2) Anumāna (inference): Anumāna means literally measuring after something. Anumāna depends on previous experiences. This knowledge follows other knowledge, e.g., where there is smoke there is fire.

(3) Śabda (Verbal testimony): Knowledge depends on reliable authority and also depends on Ākāmśa, Yogysta and Āsatti of a sentence or different sounds arising from musical instruments, bamboos etc.
(4) Upamāna: The knowledge of similarity is generated by Upamāna. Knowledge which arises from the presence of some common factors in a thing which was experienced previously in another thing e.g., A citizen hears the word 'Gavaya' when he intends to go to a forest for the first time. Then he is instructed by an experienced inhabitant of the forest that a cow is similar to a 'Gavaya'. On seeing an unfamiliar deer resembling a cow he remembers the instruction of the forest dweller. He then ascertains the meaning of the word 'Gavaya' that the animal seen is denoted by the word 'Gavaya'.

(5) Arthāpatti (postulation): Arthāpatti is the presumption of something for the explanation of a known fact. When one notices apparent contradiction in various forms of knowledge he presumes something to remove the apparent contradiction in it. What is presumed is said to be a distinct source of knowledge. e.g., when a particular person named Caitra known to be alive is not found in his house it is assumed that he must be somewhere outside.

(6) Anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) knowledge by which we immediately cognize the non-existence of an object, e.g., absence of rainfall indicates that the connection of cloud and the wind has not happened.
(7) Sambhava (probability): The Paurānikas are the propounders of Sambhava as an independent means of knowledge. If one says that he has a hundred rupees in his pocket, listening this the listeners remark that it is highly probable that he has ten rupees in his pocket. The Paurānikas call this process of knowing as sambhava.

(8) Aitihya (Tradition): The Paurānikas are the propounder of Aitihya as an independent means of knowledge. 'There is a ghost in this tree' is an example provided to explain the nature of Aitihya.

(9) Cesta (Indication): Some Tāntrikas recognise Cesta also in addition to the above as the source of valid knowledge. Thus by the movement of the hand one can make understand another 'to go', or 'to come' or by raising finger or fingers one can make understand another, the numerical number 'one', 'two' 'three' etc.

(10) Pratibhā (Vivid imagination): Others add Pratibhā as a source of valid knowledge to the list of Pramāṇas.

**Forms of Invalid Knowledge**

Knowledge is a quality of the self, which inheres in it. It has the nature of manifestation. It manifests
an object, physical or mental. The genus of knowledge inheres in it.\textsuperscript{70} There are innumerable cognitions apprehending an infinite number of objects. But knowledge is mainly of two kinds, valid knowledge (Vidyā) and invalid knowledge (Avidyā). Valid knowledge is what apprehends an object in its real nature. Invalid knowledge is what apprehends an object as different from it.\textsuperscript{71} Valid knowledge is a true and definite knowledge of some new facts. If any knowledge lacks definiteness or certitude or does not convey any new information or does not represent things as they really are, it is invalid.

There are some cases of knowledge which are presentational in character but not valid. These constitute the class of apramā or non-valid presentation (Ayathārthā:ubhava) which includes all cognitions that are either false or not true but not false. Hence under Apramā Nyāya includes doubt (Samsāya), with its varieties of conjecture (Ūha) and indefinite cognition (Anadhya:vasā:ya) as well as error (Viparyaya) and hypothetical reasoning.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{70} buddhitvasāmānyaveti ātmāśravyaḥ prakēśo buddhiḥ, SP, p. 47.
\textsuperscript{71} tattvānubhabah pramā, atattvajñānām apramā, SP,p.59.
\textsuperscript{72} ayathārthānubhavastrividhah samsāyaviparyayatarkabhādāt, TS.
According to Kumārila there are three kinds of invalid knowledge viz., error or illusion (Mithyājñāna) non-cognition or ignorance (Ajñāna) and doubt (Samsāya)

According to Vaiśeṣika philosophy invalid knowledge is of four kinds: (1) doubt (samsāya) (2) illusion (Viparyaya) (3) indefinite perception (Anadhyavaśāya) and (4) dream (Svāpna).

The Viśīṣṭādvaita theory of error is discussed by many exponents of the Viśīṣṭādvaita school and all of them, in common, hold that all judgements are true.74 Viśīṣṭādvaita is not a distinct school of philosophy like Nyāya or Sāṁkhya or such other schools. It is only a particular interpretation of the original Vedānta school. The differences that are there among the various sects of the Vedānta are mainly rooted on some religious views regarding life and its destiny. While one sect, for instance, believes in creation to be an essential part of God (Rāmānuja), the other has a firm faith in complete difference between creation and God.

So far as Viśīṣṭādvaita is concerned, here it is not necessary to discuss its specific religious view of

73. SV, 2.54.
74. yathārtha sarva vijñānam iti veda vidēm matam, SaB, I.I.I.
life. The main aim is to show how a problem like error is tackled by the Viśiṣṭādvaitins. In Indian philosophy generally the term 'jñāṇa' is used in a wider sense so as to include true as well as false cognition. It is only the term 'Prama' which is exclusively used for true judgement. All cases of Aprama, hence, mean just the reverse. The Viśiṣṭādvaitins remark 'All judgements are true,' (yathārtha sarva vijñāṇam) seems to be directly opposite to this general trend of Indian philosophy. In fact they do not distinguish between Prama and Aprama. But how can so called Aprama be interpreted to be the same as Prama? Here the Viśiṣṭādvaitins resort to what is known as the famous doctrine of Pañcikarana. This doctrine suggests that there is unity in everything. All things share in all things and contain, common characteristics. Everything involves every other thing (sarvam sarvātmaścī). Things of same element have structural affinity along with their own distinguishing features. The objects of the physical world, which are all compounds contain all the five bhūtas or gross elements, though in varying proportions. Thus in the case of the 'mirage' what is being looked at is a heated sandy water which contains not only earth which is the preponderating part of it, but also water, however slight, and the apprehension of water there, it is said, is therefore only of what is actually presented to the eye.

75. pancikaraṇa aprakāryā prthvyādi sarvobhutānām sarvatra vidyamānātvāt, 'YmD,' p. 12.
76. IPS, p. 58.
Any discussion of error in the context of Indian philosophy cannot be said as comprehensive unless one takes the Advaita account of error into discussion. In fact, it is Advaita alone which is found to have given maximum importance to the discussion of error for the construction of its own philosophical position. Māyā, the popular expression for error, has been so elaborately analysed and discussed in the entire Advaita literature that the whole system is called by many as Māyāvāda.

Māyā, in the usual sense of the term, stands for cosmic illusion. It is very often taken for granted that the Advaita, by the very discussion of error, comes to the conclusion that the whole cosmic existence is Māyā or illusory in essence. Even the rivals of the Advaitins take this Māyā to be the central thesis of the Advaita system. As the man, in the actual process of illusion, sees a second moon which does not exist, so also men see a visible world of many objects, which do not exist. The Advaita, as a distinct philosophical tradition, owes its origin mainly to the writings of Śaṅkara. Before him, one of course finds the writings of Gauḍapāda, who is also known as the advocate of the Advaita doctrine of nonduality. But the account of error in particular has not been so elaborately discussed by Gauḍapāda as it is found in
Samkara's works. In fact Samkara insists that any enquiry into the knowledge of brahman must necessarily be presupposed by a clear analysis of the concept of error, what he calls as adhyāsa.

In the Śāmkhya and Yoga system of thought apart from Pramāṇa many other states such as — Viparyaya, Smṛti, Nidrā and Vikalpa are mentioned. From a closer study of the Śāmkhya and Yoga epistemology the so-called valid knowledge is only valid in the limited sphere of existence. From the metaphysical standpoint the so-called valid knowledge is illusory since transcendental consciousness is devoid of all attributes and changes. When the mode of an intellect is revealed by catching the reflection of transcendental consciousness, transcendental illusion takes place. As a result of transcendental illusion the properties of the intellect are attributed to transcendental consciousness and consciousness is attributed to the mode of the intellect i.e., experience of an object. This transcendental illusion is unavoidable in all cases of empirical experience. Therefore, empirical experience being based on transcendental illusion is invalid from the metaphysical point of view. In this respect the Śāmkhya and the Advaita Vedāntins of the Samkara school advocate the one and the same hypothesis.
Illusory knowledge is, in Sanskrit, termed either as bhrama or as Viparyaya. It is undoubted knowledge indeed, which does not agree with the true nature of the object. Error (bhrama) is the reverse of valid knowledge. While valid knowledge is the presentation of an object as what it really is (Tattvānubhava), erroneous knowledge is the cognition of an object as what it really is not (Atattvajñāna). In error an object is cognised as having certain characteristics that really fall outside of its being. Hence it has been described as the wrong apprehension (Mithyopalabdhi) in which an object is taken for what it is not. The cognitions of a shell as silver, of a rope as a snake, of a post as a man, are all cases of error or wrong cognitions. In each cases there is the cognition of an object as other than what it really is. Hence it may be said that error consists in attributing such characters to an object as are not to be really found in it. Illusion or Error represents an object in a form which does not belong to it. It reveals an object differently from what it actually is.

77. avadhāraṇa rūpātattvajñānam viparyayam, SP, p. 72.
78. atasminstadditipratyayam, NV, 1.1.2.
79. tadabhāvavatisatprakāraka, TS.
80. anyathāsantamākāramanyathāgrhnāti, NR on SV, p. 118.
Swami Dayananda, a great philosopher of the nineteenth century, opines that illusion is due to ignorance, which arises because of defects or faults in senses and mental impressions (Sanskāras). Further elaborating the notion of true knowledge and ignorance, Swami Dayananda points out that 'that which creates awareness of the real nature of substances is true knowledge, while that which does not provide real knowledge of the substance or that which produces the knowledge of some other thing in some thing, is called ignorance.'

If then ignorance is defined as false knowledge, such an argument amounts to dependent reasoning. Vyāsa declares in his commentary on the Yoga that 'knowledge which is contrary to true knowledge, is ignorance.' The Vaiśeṣika refers to it as defective knowledge. Sāṃkhya calls it non-discrimination and therefore considers it the cause of bondage.

But how does ignorance arise and what is its nature? Neither of these two questions is satisfactorily answered by such definitions. This question remained unanswered by Saṅkara's philosophy. The Sāṃkhya philosopher Kapila

81. SP, p. 236.
82. kintu vidyāviparitam jñānāntaramāvidyēti, YB .on Y.S.2.5.
83. tad duhsatam jñānam, YS. 9-2-11.
84. tad yogaapyavivekānnaśamānātvam, S.S., 1-55.
attempted a solution. He states that 'non-discrimination is the nature or innate tendency of internal organ and because of this it becomes conjoined with prakṛti or matter and the other false apprehensions arise because of the companionship with matter.'

In the Yogasūtra illusory knowledge is defined thus—Viparyayo mithyājñānāmatadrupe pratiṣṭham. Here the most common synonym of Viparyaya is Bhrama. The definition Mithyājñānam which denotes such knowledge as does not correspond to the object it reveals. The explanation of Mithyājñānam has been given by the compound 'Atadrupapraatiṣṭham'. This compound word denies that the reference of the knowledge to its object is absurd, i.e., it does not refer to the object which should be well presented to consciousness.

The classification of illusory knowledge has been given in a detailed manner in the Yogasūtra, Sāmkhykārikā and Sāmkhyasūtra. The Asmitā is the first effect of basic illusory knowledge which mistakes the objects

85. SS, 1-57.
86. YS, I.8.
other than the soul for the soul and so on. In case of Asmitā the modes of the intellect which are illumined are represented as identical with the experiencer i.e., the subject represented in the narrow field of illusory knowledge. The illusory knowledge extends beyond the narrow sphere. We misidentify the soul with Avyakta i.e., Primordial Matter, the Intellect, the Empirical Ego and five subtle elements. They envelop the true knowledge and consequently it acquires an appropriate designation viz., Tamas (darkness). As darkness veils all the objects so the illusory knowledge covers the true object i.e., the soul and it admits of eightfold division.

Mohe follows Tamas as its corollary. The term 'Mohe' denotes misrepresentation of the properties of the intellect as those of the soul such as—a faculty of being very small or being very great and so on. The objects have been stated as ten. The passion for the enjoyment of these objects is called Mahāmohe. This Mahāmohe admits of ten-fold division. Love is invariably connected with hatred. When one passionately loves an object of enjoyment he is afraid of its hindrance and the enjoyer generally becomes suspicious of molestation by other rivals and cherishes hatred against them. This hatred has been termed as tāmiśra. This hatred admits of eighteen subdivisions.
Fear apprehensive of loss of enjoyments has been expressed by the term 'Andhatāmśra'. The term 'Kleśā' means such states of mind which afflict the soul. This Kleśā admits of five broad divisions—Avidyā, Asmitā, Rāga, Dveṣā and Abhiniveśā. From a different angle of vision illusion has been treated by the Vedāntins, Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists. According to the Sāmkhyists illusion has been divided into two broad divisions. It must be either conditional or unconditional. The conditional illusion has been termed as Sopādhika. When an object is placed in close proximity to a transparent object the property of the object appears to be transferred to the transparent object. The transparent object is coloured by the colour of the adjacent object. This adjacent object which transfers its colour to another object is called 'Upādhi'—an adjunct. Under this condition the illusion takes place. So it is called conditional illusion or Sopādhika Bhrama. Let us take an illustration. A red flower is placed on a spot where a piece of crystal exists. The piece of crystal appears to be red. When the red flower is removed from the spot it gets back its original transparent colour. In order to remove such illusion removal of the adjunct is essential. Simply true knowledge cannot dispel illusion.

Another type of illusion is called Nirupādhika Bhrama i.e., unconditional illusion. For example the blue
colour of the ocean. If we collect some portion of water in a bottle and pour it on our folded hands, we shall see that the water is not blue. No condition is found to explain it. So it is called as Nirupēdhika Bhrama.

From the different point of view illusion may be classified namely Āhārya and Aupādhika āhārya. Āhārya means a deliberate misinterpretation of a fact in spite of our true knowledge of the fact. When we see a lean and thin person and we say deliberately that he is very strong and stout, it is a case of Āhārya Bhrama. Again if a man knows for certain that the Moon is one but, deliberately wishes to see the double vision by pressing the eye ball with the tip of finger, it is an illustration of Sopādhika-āhāryabhrama.

The conditions of illusions have not been thoroughly discussed in the Sāmkhya and Yoga literature. In the Nyāya and Vedānta literature this topic has been discussed to a great length. Sāmkhya and Yoga literature does not throw sufficient light on the topic of illusion.

In Indian philosophical literature the typical theories of illusion have been discussed. The technical term they use is known as Khyētivēda. The term 'khyēti' from the philosophical point of view, implies knowledge,
the faculty of discriminating objects by appropriate designation. In case of mithyājñāna it is the discriminative faculty of knowledge which goes wrong and hence the knowledge becomes false. To put it in a different manner, in all cases of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) there is the appropriate discrimination or judging; and in cases of invalid knowledge there is misdiscrimination or misjudging. In this light it can be seen that the different khyātivādas are merely different ways of explaining the discriminative or judging aspect of knowledge.

The classical philosopher, Vimuktātman mentions five theories of error out of which one is known as Asatkhyāti and all the rest are Ātmakhyāti, Akhyāti, Anyathākhyāti and Anirvacaniyakhyāti.

Asatkhyātivāda: The Mādhyamika Buddhists hold a mistaken view dubbed asatkhyāti, according to which error means judging something non-existent as existent.

Asatkhyāti means that in erroneous perception there is merely the perception of something which is unreal (asat). In the shell-silver illusion the silver that is

88. ātmakhyātir asatkhyātinsatkhyātiranyathā tathānirvacaniyakhyātir iti stat khyātipancakam, Vedānta Samjñāvali, Samjñā, 170
89. anye(=sunya vādino bauddhāḥ)as ādviṣayam jñānam cf. I.T.E. NVT, p. 72 (1.1.2).
perceived is neither real as something external nor even real as something internal. Therefore, it is absolutely unreal. If the silver would have been externally real then there would not have been any scope for erroneous perception. If the silver would have been merely an internal idea then also there would have been no explanation with regard to its external manifestation. It is, as such, asat or sunya.

The Śāmkhyasūtra criticises this view in its aphorism — Nāsataḥ khyānām nṝṁgāṁ vat. An unreal object is never presented to our consciousness. No body perceives the skyflower, the horn of a man and so on. Similarly 'rejatābhinnasūktih' being unreal cannot be experienced. The very premise of Asatkhyaṭivāda is baseless.

Ātmakhyāṭivāda: Yogācāra, the idealist holds the theory of Ātmakhyāti. They are not satisfied with the metaphysical position of the Mādhyamika. According to them consciousness cognition or idea is the only metaphysical reality. Yogācāra states that error or illusion is the externalization or objectification of a subjective idea. Yogācāra Buddhists explains that the yields of externalisation of the reports of consciousness

90. SS, V.52.
According to Yogacāra, all knowledge of the external world is erroneous and hence in error 'this is silver' the internal form of knowledge i.e., consciousness itself is externalised as the silver.

The opponents deny the statement by saying that the knowledge which contradicts such error (bādhakapratyaya) can only show that the so-called external object (i.e., silver) is not present there, but it cannot demonstrate that it is all internal consciousness and there is no external consciousness.

Anirvacaniyakhyāti: This theory of error is of the Advaita Vedāntins. According to this theory of error an object is presented to our consciousness. It is apprehended by the perceiver whereas other perceiver may perceive it differently. Therefore the reality of the object lies in the presentation only. According to this theory when we mistake a shell for a piece of silver we are actually aware for as long as our error persists, of a piece of silver which in some sense exists. It is presented but it is not real since the knowledge is false. In the rope-snake
illusion the snake must actually be present where it is seen, though it enjoys merely a temporary existence so long as the illusion lasts, and because it can be neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal, nor both together, it must be indefinable. That which is absolutely real, e.g., the self, can never be sublated and that which is absolutely unreal, e.g., a man's horn, can never be perceived. The illusory snake is perceived for sometime and then sublated by a correcting experience. Therefore, it cannot be absolutely unreal or absolutely real. Hence the illusory snake is indefinable. This anirvacaniya theory is elaborately explained by Maṇḍana Miśra in his 'Brahmasiddhi' and henceforth the term later becomes the stock term for an Advaïta theory of error. The term is used to indicate that the superimposition cannot be described either as real or unreal.

The Śāmkhyaśutrakāra, its Vṛttikāra Aniruddha Bhatta and Viśnubhadhikṣu, the Bhāsyakāra, criticise the theory of Advaitins. According to them all supposition must be based upon facts. No indefinable fact is noticed in the universe. Therefore, the Anirvacaniyavēda of the

92. nānirvacaniyasya tadabhāvat, SS, V. 54.
93. pratyekam sadasattvābhyaṁ vicāra-padavīṁ na yat gāhate tad anirvācyam āhur vedānta vedīnāḥ, Cit, p.206.
Vedāntists is baseless.

Satkhyātivāda: Rāmānuja’s theory of illusion is known as Satkhyātivāda. According to him all knowledge are true. Even the object of illusory experience is real. In case of 'this is silver', 'this' a piece of mother of pearl is presented as 'silver'. The real silver has greater proportion of reality, whereas silver in a piece of mother of pearl has small quantity of silver. This is the implied meaning of Satkhyātivāda. Sāmkhya-Sūtra criticises this theory. According to them such a theory is not tenable. No real object in the universe is contradicted. Aniruddha Bhatta in his Sāmkhya Sūtra-vṛtti interprets the Sūtra in a different way. In his opinion Satkhyāti is the another name of Asatkhyātivāda.

According to Prabhākaraś there are extra-mental real objects in the Universe. Even illusion refers to such objects. Akhyāti means non-apprehension of differences between direct presentation and memory (smṛti). The memory of silver and the presentation of mother of pearl take place at a quick succession. These two different activities of mind are not distinctly revealed because memory of silver always involves a reference to the past experience of an object, namely silver. Here the reference to experience 'silver' is deleted, so memory
silver does not possess the distinctive feature of memory. These two pieces of knowledge appear to be identical owing to non-discrimination of difference.

Aniruddha Bhatta criticises this view. In his opinion the judgement of illusion is invariably contradicted. But if we accept the truth of the hypothesis of 'Akhyātivāda' such contradiction is not possible. No judgement can invalidate another true experience. Akhyātivāda as it stands has no element of illusion in it. Therefore, this hypothesis is contradicted by experience.

Vijñānabhikṣu in his pravacana bhāṣya on the Sāmkhyaśūtra interprets differently Satkhyātivāda. He refers to the hypothesis of Rāmānuja. Some other early Vaishnavas also hold a similar view. If the object of illusion is real it cannot be contradicted. It is admitted by all that an illusory judgement is contradicted. As the basic nature of an illusion is not satisfied by this hypothesis, it is not acceptable.

Anyathākhyātivāda: This theory is upheld by the Nyāya and Kumārila Bhatta agrees with it. Śrīdhara refers to this view of error (Viparyaya) as Viparitakhyāti. He opines that misconception can arise even in the absence of any actual substratum, and says that even here something not existing is known as existing. To enunciate this opinion we may say
that in illusion when there is an objective substratum, the similarities of things along with defects in the sense-organs cause error. Illusion according to Kumārila is not mere non-apprehension of the distinction between the perceived element and the remembered element, but a positive wrong knowledge due to false identification of the remembered element with the perceived element. Prabhākara regards error as due to omission while Kumārila regards it as one of commission. This Bhatta theory of illusion is practically the same as the Nyāya theory except that the Bhātta does not account for illusion through extra normal sense contact (alaukika sannikāra). This hypothesis has been accepted by Patañjali in his 'Yogasūtra'.

The Sāmkhyasūtrakāra criticises this view in his sūtra — 'Nānyathākhyetisvavāco vyaghātāt. According to him, an object cannot be presented to consciousness as something else. Therefore, the very title of the hypothesis involves self contradiction. An object is presented to our consciousness along with its peculiar individuality and its common element (universal). But it

94. NR on SV, Nirālambana, 117.
95. SS, V, 55.
Sadasatkhyaśītivaḍa: Śāṁkhyā's theory of illusion is known as Sadasatkhyaśītivaḍa. According to this hypothesis the sūtrakāra admits the possibility of contradiction and at the same time advocates the non-contradiction of a real object. According to the Sūtra Sadasatkhyaśītirbādhābādhāt (S.S. ch.V. 56), when an object is presented to our consciousness it has two elements, namely the subject and the predicate. The subject is called 'dharma' and the predicate is called 'vidheya'. Here the relation between the subject and the predicate is not real. Some other relation is ascribed to the subject. 'This is silver' is an illusory judgement. 'This' is the subject, 'silver' is the predicate and 'is' is the copula. In case of true perception this copula stands for the relation of identity. 'This' means the yonder object. And silver stands for silverness. 'Silverness' is related to 'this' by the relation of identity. 'Is' stands for the relation which connects the subject with the predicate. In this particular instance it is the relation of identity. Identity may be actual or it may be attributed. The attributed relation is contradicted by a subsequent true judgement. The relation is only contradicted but not silverness. Therefore in the

96. SS, v-56.
Illusory judgement the Sāmkhyasūtrakāra mentions that contradiction plays some part here. But the sphere of this contradiction is very limited. It is only confined to the small circle of attributed relation. It should be remembered in this connection that silverness is not contradicted i.e., its reality is not challenged. Silver has truth, i.e., it is a real and true object. When it is not manifested it is called 'asat'. The term 'asat' does not signify the unreal object. But it only denotes the unmanifest object. After destruction its reality is not contradicted. It simply changes its form and remains hidden in its cause. In Sadasatkhyaṭi 'asat' has not been taken to denote such unmanifest form of an effect. Therefore, contradiction and non-contradiction stand inseparably connected in the Sūtra quoted above.

According to the Naiyāyikas, a judgement is only contradicted but not the real object. Let us take an example. 'This is a silver' is a judgement. This judgement is contradicted by a negative judgement namely, this is not a silver. The first judgement is contradicted by the second one. Silver which has been used as a predicate in the above judgement is not materially contradicted. The sāmkhyists hold that only the attributed relation is contradicted. Similarly in the spiritual world when the 'soul' is distinguished from Prakṛiti it is held that the
Soul is not matter. The relation of ascribed identity is only contradicted. Matter and material world are not objectively contradicted by the true knowledge of the soul. After the realization of the soul matter will also exist to evolve intellect and other evolutes gradually in proper order. The Sāmkhyaists draw a distinction between two categories of reality—(1) immutable or unchangeable reality and (ii) changeable reality. Puruṣa is unchanging reality and Prakṛti is changing reality. The effect is also real though in its unmanifest form and destroyed form it is called 'asat'. The term 'asat' does not mean that an effect is unreal.

The hypothesis of Sadasatkhyāti is not of recent origin. Udayana in his Tātparya-parisuddhi refers to this hypothesis. Padmapāda also refers to this hypothesis. He states that the Sāmkhyaists advocate the hypothesis of Saṁsargabhrama\(^7\). Vijñānabhiṣṭu explains the śūtra in an exact manner and points out that the essence of Sadasatkhyāti is constituted by Saṁsargabhrama.

Memory (Smriti)

Memory is knowledge of one's own past. It is a representative cognition of past experience due solely

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\(^7\) atattve tattvajñānamiti śāstrakāraṇaiva darśitah saṁsargabhramaḥ, Pañcapādikā. cf. I.ph, p. 41.
Memory plays an important role in the progressive world. In every walk of life memory is indispensable. Memory owes its existence to impression of the previous experience of an object. Impression is the most active factor which produces memory. Thus we see memory reveals only the object which is already known but it does never reveal a new object. Now the question is why such faithful representation of an object should not be accepted as a form of valid knowledge. Some logicians accepts its validity. The Jainas are the foremost among them. A section of modern logicians also accepts its validity. Those who deny validity to it are the Buddhists, the ancient logicians, the Advaitins, the Sāmkhyists, the followers of Patañjali, the Naiyāyikas and both the Mīmāṁsā schools of the Bhāttas and Prābhākaraś.

Memory according to the Nyāya and both the Mīmāṁsā schools of the Bhāttas and the Prābhākaraś is not valid knowledge because in it the remembered object is not directly presented since it is past but, only represented or recalled by the similarity and hence it is

98. saṁskāramātrajanyāṁ jñānam smṛtiḥ, TS, p. 32.
not a means of valid knowledge. On this ground memory does not give us any new knowledge. Praśēstapāda observes that memory is a true form of knowledge (Vidyā) though he does not classify memory as a pramāṇa. He classifies memory as one of several varieties of true knowledge. Śrīdhara elucidates that, despite this, memory is not a means of valid knowledge, because it is dependent on perception and inference which initially makes us acquainted with the objects we can subsequently recall. According to Jayanta Bhatta memory is not to be counted as valid knowledge because its content is not among its causal factors. The ancient Naiyāyikas also hold that memory is not produced by the object which is revealed by its recollections. We have already found that the Māmāsakas offer a different theory to exclude memory, namely that, since all valid knowledge has as content, objects not previously known, and since memory has as its content an object previously known, memory is not valid.

According to Buddhists every object has only momentary existence. When the object is recollected it

99. na pramāṇam smṛtiḥ purva pratipatter apekṣanat,


smṛtiḥ punah pūrva saṃskārajan

jñānam utpadyati,

Ts.

100. tasmād anarthajatvena smṛtī—prāmāṇya vērānād,.....


101. ajñātā padenatra jñāta—viṣayayoh smṛtyau vēdayor

nirāsaḥ,

Mm, p.2.
does not exist. Therefore an object can never produce its recollection. Gangesa Upādhyāya argues in a different way. Every form of valid knowledge illuminates an object as present whereas memory invariably involves a reference to the past time. So according to him memory should not included in the list of the species of valid knowledge.

In the Yoga system many illustrations have been given which involve complicated process of knowledge. Several memories of some parts or events may be combined by imagination in memory. Let us give an example of complicated memory. A person has seen his body including head in a mirror. He has seen a sword and also the act of cutting something. In dream he may produce an image with the combination of these pieces of recollection with the help of imagination. He sees in dream that he beheads himself with a sword. The Bhāsyakāra Vyāsadeva of Yogasūtra holds that all dream images are memory image. Vācaspati Miśra further says that memory does never reveal more than what is experienced though it may reveal less i.e., omitting some portion it may reveal a partial picture of the object. 102 In the Sāmkhyasūtra no new information is given with regard to memory.

102 Tadadhika viśeyaparigrahastu sampremosah,
   Tattvavaiśāradī on Vyāsa Bhāṣya Ch.I.11, p. 36.
Dream: Dream means a vision which one seems to experience during sleep. It is in Sanskrit known as Svapna which is derived from the root 'svap' (to sleep). According to Nyāya dream cognitions are all memory cognitions and untrue in character.\textsuperscript{103} They are brought about by the remembrance of objects experienced in the past, by organic disorders and also by the imperceptible influence of past desires and actions (adṛṣṭa).\textsuperscript{104} Dream knowledge, however, is intrinsically false. It is no doubt related to certain objects of the real world. But these objects as cognised in dream are not present to sense. They are either past or remote. Still in dream, objects are actually represented as present. Hence there is in dream a false cognition of the real when it represents the not-present as the present, the 'that' as the 'this'. It may so happen that dreams sometimes turn out to be true and tally with the subsequent experience of waking life. But such correspondence between dream cognitions and waking experience is neither normal nor invariable. Hence dream can never be called Pramāṇa. Kumārila explains dream as

\begin{verbatim}
103. svapna tu sarvameva jñānem smaraṇamayathārthaṁ ca,
      TB, p. 30.
104. svapnaṁ su anubhūtādārthasamaraṇaṁ adṛṣṭena
dhātudoṣena ca janyete, TM cf Nik.
\end{verbatim}
the reflection of real objects seen before elsewhere. The objects may be seen either in the same life or in the other life. Though the object is not actually present at the time of dreaming still it is something known before and now revived through some impression. According to the Prabhākaras, dream is a distinct type of memory. This type of knowledge cannot arise, unless its object is previously known. But the mutilation of the known part and the knowledge that the object really exists occur only due to the demerit.

The Prabhākaras idea regarding dream is that true knowledge of memory is sometimes not recognised to be such, and that mutilated memories form the subjects of our dream.

Doubt (samaśaya): Doubt is a knowledge produced by inner sense organ, mind. Doubt is the cognition of conflicting notions with regard to the same object. It is the mental reference of two or two or more contradictory properties to the

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105. svapnaḥ di pratyaya bāhyam sarvathā nahi neṣyate sarvarālambanam bāhyam desākālānyathātmaṃ jamaṃ yekatra bhimme vā tathā kālāntarepivā taddeśo vānyadeśo vā svapna jñānasya gocareh,


106. svapnastu smrtir eva na hyanubhūte sa samudeti/ dosācca tattā pramoṣah grahaṁkāraśca // TR, p.4.

107. evam svapne 'pi vaṣṭūni smaryämāṇi sanvapip anubhūtāmsamoṣena bhasante gṛhyānāvat // Pp, 3.44, pp. 54-55.

108. NS, 1.1.23
same object. In it mind oscillates between different alternate characterisations of some given object. Doubt has been spoken of as incomplete or indecisive cognition (anavachāraṇātmaka). But doubt is not merely the absence (abhāva) of assured cognition (niścaya). Doubt as knowledge cannot be called valid, because it is not certain knowledge. Such knowledge is contrasted with knowledge coming out of the ascertainment (nirṇaya).

Doubt is of five kinds. First, it may arise from the perception of such properties as are common to many things, as when we perceive a tall object at a distance and are not sure if it be a man or a post or a tree trunk, because tallness is common to them all. Secondly, it arises from the cognition of any peculiar and unique property, as when the cognition of sound makes us doubt if it is eternal or non-eternal, since it is not found in eternal objects like the soul and the atom nor in non-eternal things like water and earth. Thirdly it may be due to conflicting testimony, as when the different philosophical theories of the soul leave us in doubt as to the real nature of the soul. Fourthly it is caused by the irregularity of perception, as when we doubt if the

109. ekasmin dharmini viruddhenādhamveaiśiṣṭye jñānaṃ samāyayah, TS, p.82.
perceived water really exist or not, since there is a perception of water both in a tank and a mirage. Lastly doubt springs from irregularity of non-perception as when we are not sure if the thing we cannot see now really exists or not, since the existent also is not perceived under certain conditions.¹¹⁰

**Vikalpa** : According to the realists an unreal object is never presented to our consciousness. Nāgārjuna and his followers and some other logicians are on the view that an unreal object is presented to our consciousness. Yoga system combines these two opposite views and shows that an unreal object is communicated to other minds through the medium of words. There are certain verbal expressions which produce some knowledge which does not refer to an object. Let us illustrate the point with example. 'The son of a barren mother ', anutpattidharmāpurusah, tiṣṭathī bāṇah and so on. The son of a barren mother has no objective reference still, it suggests to our mind that it is something real. According to Sāṃkhya and Yoga systems Transcendental consciousness has neither attribute nor property. Therefore, the adjective anutpattidharma simply suggests that it does not come into being. Thus these

¹¹⁰ NBh,1.1.23.
words communicate some meaning having no corresponding object. In this way through Vikalpa one can communicate the unreal to the minds of the listeners.

Nirūḍa (Sleep): The sleeping state of the intellect is not easy to explain. During the state 'Tamas' plays a prominent role. It subdues Sattva and Raja gunas. When Tamas subdues Sattva and Rajas and with their co-operation produces a distinct state of the intellect, it is called nirūḍa or sleep. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that sleep means absence of knowledge. But our experience contradicts such an explanation of sleep. When we awake we remember either of the three states of intellect, namely (i) we slept in the last night enjoying happiness or (ii) we remember that we slept feeling pain during the sleep or (iii) we remember that we slept with a sluggish mind and knew nothing. The cheerfulness of the intellect in the morning is not accidental state of mind. It is due to experience of happiness. According to the fundamental assumption of the Sāṁkhya and Yoga school of Logic, the mode of the intellect is only revealed by Transcendental consciousness. Therefore, intellect also assumes the form of the state of the intellect which reigns supreme, during the state of slumber. From this standpoint Vijnānabhikṣu holds that during the state of imperfect slumber a person has experience. But during the state of perfect

111. śabdajñānānupāti vastuśūnyo vikalpah, YS ch. I.9.
slumber no knowledge is possible. Because during that state all the states of intellect disappear since the intellect itself becomes merged in its cause. Balarama Udasina, a sub-commentator of Tattva Vaisaradi of Vacaspati Misra, adds a very useful comment on the sutra of Patanjali which defines sleep.\textsuperscript{112} He first refutes the hypothesis of the Vaisesikas. He, of course, criticises the view of Udayana who is supposed to be the best exponent of the Vaisesika system of thought. According to him, during the state of sleep soul has no experience at all. He points out defects in the argument of Udayana. Next, he criticises the hypothesis of Vijnanabhiksu.

In all the literature of Sankhya-Yoga school whether the experience of pleasure, pain, etc. during the state of slumber is valid or not is not discussed. During the state of slumber Ahamkar plays its part but whether Manas plays a part or not is not discussed.

**Hypothetical Argument (Tarka):** Tarka is a type of implicative argument by which we may test the validity of the conclusion of any reasoning (or of any judgement). It is defined as the prasañjana of an inadmissible negation from

\textsuperscript{112} Abhāvapratyayālamvārvṛttinidrā, Y.S. ch. I., 10.
the two negations having equal force on account of their
being in the same space and time.\textsuperscript{113} For example,
absence of smoke (dhūmābhāva) in the argument, ‘if there
were no fire there would be no smoke’\textsuperscript{114} for in the absence
of the cause the effect is not possible.

Tarka is a distinct type of reasoning. It is not
based on any perception. It is like this. We see a mass
of smoke rising for a distant house and say that the
house has caught fire. A friend contradicts on this and
says that there is no fire. Now we argue: if there is no
fire there cannot be smoke. Thus with regard to the
inference of fire from the perception of smoke, there are
two alternative positions, namely, that the smoky object
if fiery, and that it is not fiery. From the latter
position we deduce the proposition that the object is not
smoky which is contradicted by our direct experience.
This is expressed in the form of a hypothetical proposi-
tion \textit{viz.}, if the object be fireless, it must be smokeless.
Since reasoning like this is not to know the fire, but to

\textsuperscript{113} anīṣṭa-vyapaka prasaṁjanam tarkaḥ tulyatvenābhā vayoḥ
pratyabhāva vacanam prasaṁjanam, SP, p.81.

\textsuperscript{114} yadyatra vahnyābhēvah syāt tarhyatra dhūmābhēvo'
pisyet, Ts.
confirm our previous inference of fire from smoke, it is not valid knowledge. Hence Vātsāyana thinks that it does not give us determinate knowledge, but it leads indirectly to valid knowledge. He observes that tarka is neither included in any means of valid knowledge nor a distinct one but by knowing the reality it assists the pramanas. 115 Tarka has been defined by the modern Naiyāyikas as the process of deducing from a mark that of which it is a mark, but is false. 116

Reinculcation (Samvāda): Reinculcation is repetition of what is previously told. The invalidity of it is not acceptable to Nyāya school and others. But the Mīmāmsakas do not accept the view. They argue that as the repetition does not possess any distinction from the previous knowledge either in the determination of facts or in empirical usage, it does not deserve the name of valid knowledge. 117

115. na tvavadhārayati na vyavasyati na niścinoti evam evedam iti, Nāh. p.322 (1.1.40).
    tarko na pramāṇa samgrhito na pramāṇāntaram
    pramāṇāṁānugrāhakas tattva jñānāya kalpate,
    Nāh. p. 53 (1.1.1).
116. vyāpyāṅgikāreṇa anīṣṭavyāpaka prasaṅjanarupah, TB, p.32.
117. anusvādānām aprāmāṇyaṁ tārkināṁ nānumatiṁ
    vayāṁ tu brūmeḥ - anusvādo hyārtha-paricchede
    vyavahāre vā na pūrva jñānat kiṁcid viśeṣam ādhatte
    ato.... anusvā do'pi bahūskārya eva iti, Mm, p.2.