The nature of Abhidhā being ascertained, we are confronted with another pertinent question as to whether this primary significative potency of a word is competent enough to bring the meaning of the sentence into light. Or to put in other words, the question is, how a sentence, which is nothing but a cluster of words, is competent to convey the united meaning. This very problem in fact, is the problem of relation of individual words and the sentence they constitute. Dr. K.K. Raja refers to two ancient authorities, viz. Vājapyāyana and Vyādi, who have explained the problem from two different angles. Vājapyāyana who understands the import of a word as Jāti or Universal, maintains 'that the import of a sentence is Samsarga or mutual association of the word-meanings'.¹ Thus he maintains that the sentence 'gauḥ śuklaḥ' (The cow is white), conveys the association of the two ideas, viz. Gotva (cowness) and Śuklatva (whiteness).

¹ jātivādino vājapyāyanaśya māte tu sāmsargō vākyārthāḥ. Helārāja on VP, l.lī. Jētisemuddeśa, V.5 Vide ITM, p. 191
Thus in a sentence, words logically connected with one another form a syntactic unity. Vyādi, however, is not ready to accept this view. He asserts that the function of a word in a sentence is to distinguish the object it refers to from all other similar objects. Thus Vyādi advocates the theory of Bheda (exclusion) for explanation of the relation between words and the sentence constituted by them. According to Kaiyāṭa, however, these two theories are not contradictory, but are mutually dependent. A compromise between Bheda and Sāṁsarga is best revealed in Pāṇini's concept of Sāmarthya (which is said to be the requisite of words to form a compound) as understood by some scholars and as referred to by Patañjali. These concepts of Bheda and Sāṁsarga are found to be best utilised by the subsequent thinkers pertaining Mīmāṃśa, Nyāya and Vyākaraṇa, as far as their theories of verbal comprehension are concerned.

The Mīmāṃsakas of both Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara schools came to be occupied very much with this problem concerning the comprehension of a sentence-meaning, and as an answer to the problem, the Bhāṭṭas propounded their Abhīhitānvaya theory, while the Prābhākaraṣ advocated the

2. Vide ITM, pp. 192-193
3. aupaḥa bhedaśāṁsargaḥ vā śāmarthyaṃmite. MB, i, p. 364
theory of Anvitābhidhāna. The Naiyāyikas also come to sponsor a theory which appears to be different from both the aforesaid Mīmāṃsā theories. Of the Mīmāṃsakas, the Bhāṭṭas examine the problem from the standpoint of the individual words and their isolated meanings, while the Prābhākaras look into it from the viewpoint of the sentence as a whole. A section of the Naiyāyikas also came to support, although in their own way, the Bhāṭṭas in this regard.

ABHIHITĀNVAYAVĀDA

Kumārila-bhaṭṭa and his followers maintain that the meaning of a sentence is the sum-total of the individual meanings conveyed by the constituent words. Every word in a sentence has its own meaning which can be understood separately. On hearing a sentence, we first grasp these individual meanings one after another. Afterwords we put them in proper order on the basis of the three syntactic factors, viz. Ākāṅkṣā, Yogyatā and Āsatti, and consequently apprehend the unified meaning of the sentence as a whole. Sabarasvāmin appears to hold this view when he asserts that the words in

4. yadi vākyaśya vākyārthe vyutpattis tadā anvitābhidhā- nam. padasya padārthe vyutpattau abhīhītānvaya iti.
NM. Vol.I, p. 364

5. Sa.d, p. 153f; TB, pp.91-161
sentence express their own meanings and stop with that, the meanings thus understood, signify the meaning of the sentence.\textsuperscript{6}

According to Kumārila a sentence does not possess its own meaning apart from the individual word-meanings. The word-meanings by themselves, however, are apprehended as unrelated concepts. They must be mutually related so that the sentence-meaning is comprehended. The three syntactic factors viz. Ākāṅksā etc. form the very basis of the relation among the word-meanings.\textsuperscript{7} The sentence-meaning thus produced is variously known as vākyārtha, Saṁserga (mutual association of word-meanings) and Tātparyārtha (the purport. It is actually not the sum-total of the word-meanings, but is something more than that. As Mammaṭa observes, when the individual meanings of words in a proposition are related with one another on the basis of syntactic expectancy and the like, there arises an additional

\textsuperscript{6} padāni hi svam svam artham abhidhāya nivṛttavyaṁraṁi, athedāṁṁ padārthā avagatāṁ santo vākyārtham gamay anti. \textsuperscript{SB} under MS, 1.1.25

\textsuperscript{7} ākāṅkṣā sannidhānaṁca yogyatā ceti ca trayam / sambandhakāraṇaṁtena klptāṁ nānantarāśrutin ///

\textit{TV}, p. 455
meaning which pertains to the proposition itself and which is distinct from the totality of the word-meanings. 8

Now the pertinent question arises as to what is the function that brings the sentence-meaning into light. To this, Kumārila and his followers reply that the sentence-meaning is conveyed by Lakṣāna. 9 They contend that the individual words exhaust their functions after conveying their own isolated meanings. Hence they can not be regarded as capable of discharging another functions, i.e. that of conveying their mutual relation in the shape of the sentence-meaning and this is because of the dictum 'sabdabuddhikarmāṇāṁ viramya vyāpārābhāvaḥ'. Nor can it be regarded that the words themselves bring this mutual relation into light, because there is the intermediatory stage, i.e. comprehension of the word-meanings, between the comprehension of the words and that of the sentence-meaning. Hence it is necessarily the meanings of the individual

8. ākāṅkṣā...... tātparyartha viśeṣavāpur āpādārthopī vākyārthe samullasatīty abhihitānvaya-vādīnām matam. KP, p. 26

words that convey the sentence-meaning,\textsuperscript{10} and the function responsible for comprehension of this sentence-meaning is necessarily \L kṣaṇa.\textsuperscript{11} In order to justify their proposition that the sentence-meaning is apprehended through \L kṣaṇa, the \Bhāṭṭas refer to the preconditions of \L kṣaṇa, viz. incompatibility of the primary meaning etc. present here.\textsuperscript{12} According to them, the isolated words in a sentence signify their primary meanings only in the form of the genus, 'they are absolutely incapable of giving expression to the relational thought'.\textsuperscript{13} But a sentence is always used to convey a unified meaning. Hence the general meanings of words signify the particular meaning in the form of 'mutual syntactic relation', and this they do through the secondary significative function.

The \Bhāṭṭas while cherishing such a view, however, do not deny the role of the individual words in conveying the sentence-meaning. Thus Kumārila maintains that though the letters denote the meanings of individual words only, they do not stop with that, the meanings of individual words have

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} padārthaiḥ padevijñātaiva vākyārthaḥ pratipadyate iti, \textit{Nyāya-sūtra}\textit{, I, 1.445};
\item also, vinābhidheyaśarvaśāmanvētyā pratipattiteḥ/
tattatpadārthasmitayasteśāmanvēyabodhikā\textit{/Citsukhī, p. 149}
\item \textsuperscript{11} ata eva vākyārtho lākṣaṇika iti māmāṃsakāḥ. \textit{Nyāya-sūtra}, p. 129
\item also, vākyārtho lākṣaṇamāno hi sarvatraiva hi naḥ sthitāḥ
\item Kumārila quoted in \textit{IB, I, 133}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Vide \textit{IM}, p. 210
\item \textsuperscript{13} Vide \textit{ICAI, p. 216}
no use at all. Hence for bringing about the comprehension of the sentence-meaning, the conveying of the individual meanings by words is indispensable, just as for the purpose of cooking, production of fire by fuel is indispensable. 14

but the Naiyāyikas who also advocate the theory of Abhihitānveya in their own way, maintain that the sentence-meaning is only the mutual relation of the word-meanings, and the same is not conveyed by Laksānā. It may be noted that the Abhihitānveyavāda is not the monopoly of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsākās only, some Naiyāyikas and a section of Vaiyākaraṇas also came to propound such a theory. Of the Naiyāyikas, Jayantabhaṭṭa criticises various theories of verbal comprehension including the ones advocated by the two schools of Mīmāṃsā, and finally advances a modified form of Abhihitānveyavāda which accepts Tatparyā as a separate significative function. This function does not belong to an individual word, but to all words in

14. sāksād yādyapi kurvanti padārthapratipādānām / 
   vṛṇās tathāpi naitasmin paryavasanti niśphele / 
   vākyārthamiteye teṣām pravṛttau nāntariyekam / 
   pāke jvāleva kāṣṭhānām padārthapratipādanaṃ //

SV, Vākya, 342-343
common and it remains operative till the whole sentence-meaning is cognised. Thus according to Jayenta, the function of Abhidhā brings about the cognition of individual word-meanings, while Tatparyaṇvṛtti conveys the sentence-meaning in the form of mutual relation among the individual concepts. Thus while the Bhāṭṭas resort to Lakṣaṇa for obtaining the sentence-meanings, Jayanta postulates the function of Tatparya for the cognition of the same.

As we have earlier pointed out, Viśvanātha Kavirāja refers to the Tatparyaṇvṛtti as being admitted by the Abhihitānvayāvādins. But as has been rightly pointed out by Dr. R. Mukherji and Dr. K.K. Raja, this is exclusively the view of scholars including the Naiyāyika Jayantebhāṭṭa and the Ālemkārika Abhinavagupta. As we have earlier pointed out, among the Ālemkārikas, Bhoja accepts Tatparya for conveying the syntactic relation of word meanings. Like Jayanta, Bhoja also rejects both

15. abhidhātramātā saktiḥ padānām svārthanāṣṭhataḥ /
   teṣām tatparyaśaktistu sāmsargāvagemāvadhīḥ/

16. Vide SDK, p.16
17. LCA1, p.224
18. ITM, pp.220-221
19. Vide our discussion on Tatparya in chapter 11 of the present work.
Abhitānvayavāda and Anvītabhidhānāvāda of the Mīmāṃsakas and maintains that words signify the unified import of a proposition by their cumulative effect or Samhātyakārita which Jayanta attributes to the Tātparyaśakti recognised by him. According to Dr. K.K. Raja, this Tātparyaśakti of Jayanta is same as the Samsargamaryāda of the modern Logicians like Gadādhara. He also maintains that the Association theory or Samsargavāda recognised by the ancient Grammarian Vājapāyana is only a kind of Abhihitānvayavāda.

The Abhihitānvaya theory advocated by the Bṛhadās, however, is strongly controverted by the Prabhakarins, as according to them, the theory is vitiated by the serious fault of prolixity. Thus it is pointed out that the Bṛhadās view postulates three different significative functions. In the first place, the theory holds that the words have the function to signify their individual unrelated meanings. Secondly, it maintains that these meanings too possess a function to convey the syntactic relation between them. Thirdly, it assumes that the words

20. Dr. V. Raghavan, SRP, Second ed., p. 21, NM, p. 371
21. cf. VUV, p.1, vide ITM, p. 221
22. ITM, p. 220
are endowed with an additional capacity to generate the cognition of the final relation judgement'. Thus because of involvement of 'a superflous assumption of these three capacities', the Prabhakaras reject the theory of the Bhattas and come to advocate a theory of their own known as Anvītabhidhānāvāda keeping in view the law of parsimony.

**ANVĪTABHIDHĀNAVĀDA:**

Prabhakara and his followers assert that the sentence alone has the real significance. The individual words by themselves are of no use at all, they are useful in so far as they are integral parts of a sentence. Although the word-meanings are only concepts in their essence, they are cognised never in isolation, but with reference to some relation. Thus whenever the word Ghaṭa is uttered, the word Asti would be dragged in through the process of Adhyātma or importation so as to make the meaning of the term Ghaṭa a related (Anvite) one, i.e. related with the idea of Astitva (existence) in the present instance. In fact, an individual meaning is never understood apart from its relation to other meanings in a sentence. This relation

23. śaktitrayāṁ prakalpyam syāt padānām arthagocarā /
arthānām anvite śaktis tadadhayakatvāt pade //
Vide NRM, p.18
Vide also PWM, p. 179
Also Vide LCAI, pp. 218-219
forms an integral part of the meanings. Thus according to the Prabhakaras, words can convey the sentence-meaning only when they are syntactically related (Anvita). Hence this theory of theirs is known as Anvitabhidhanavada. Prabhakara himself asserts that a word can convey its meaning only when the utterance of all words is completed.

According to this theory, the related meanings of words are cognised through Vrddhavyaveha, the very natural process of learning a language. In this process, as we have noted earlier, a child (i.e. the learner) understands the significance of words in such sentences as 'gām ānaya' (Bring the cow) by observing usage and subsequent activities of the elders. The meaning thus apprehended is always understood as being connected (Anvita) either with some action or object or something else. Thus from the utterance of the sentence 'gām ānaya' the child understands the meaning 'cow' as being connected with the action 'bringing' and the latter as connected with the 'cow' as

24. cf. tasmād yatra samudāyāḥ prayuktah tatraiva padam padārtham avagamayati. BR, p. 258

25. yadyapi vrddhavyavehārapūrvikaiva servā satavyutpattiḥ vākyaireva vyavahāraḥ........ V uncer VM, K.6
its object. Thus the child comes to understand the meaning of the utterance (i.e. sentence) as a whole. Subsequently by a close observation of other units of expression and the follow-up activities on the part of the elders, he can find the corresponding varieties of significance in respect of the sentences. Thus the meaning of the component words come to be ascertained by observing the insertion (Avāpa or Anvaya) and extraction (Udvāpa or Vyatireka) of the words.

According to the Bhāttas, the sentence-meaning is something more than the sum-total of the isolated concepts and the same cannot be conveyed by Abhidhā whose function gets exhausted after conveying the individual concepts. Hence the function of Laksanā is to be assumed for understanding the unified sentence-meaning which embodies the relation among the word-meanings. But the Prabhākaras maintain that as the relation itself enters into the constitution of the concepts conveyed by the individual terms, it is useless to assume the additional function, Laksanā for comprehension of the unified idea when Abhidhā alone is competent to

26. cf. ibid.
27. vyavahāresu vrddhanām vakyasravanabhāviṣu / 
Avāpoddharabhādena padānām śaktiniscayā //
Also Vide BR, p. 254
bring the same into light. As Sālikanaṭha asserts, the words themselves are endowed with the capacity (i.e. Abhidhā) to convey the related word-meanings as well as the meaning of the sentence as a whole.28 The Prābhākaras, however, resort to Laksana when the expressed meaning of a word is inconsistent with the sentence-meaning.

As we have earlier seen, this Abhidhā of Prābhākaras which is competent to bring into light both Padārtha and Vākyārtha as well, is described by Abhinava as dīrghadīrgha-tara vyāpāra. The advocates of Dhvani theory have referred to this view for refutation, in their strong bid to establish Vyāṇjanā as a separate function of words.

The Prābhākaras while advocating such a theory, however, do not deny the existence of individual words and their isolated meanings, what they want to emphasise is that it is not possible to understand the isolated meaning of a word apart from its relation to the sentence. Thus the words themselves signify their meanings as mutually related on the basis of the three syntactic conditions, viz. ākāṅkṣā,

Thus words themselves are responsible for bringing the sentence-meaning into light.

In view of the foregoing discussions, the main difference maintained by the theories of Abhihitānvaya and Anvitābhidhāna may be summed up as follows:

i) The Abhihitānvayavāda holds that the expressed meanings of words signify the sentence-meaning through Laksāṇā, while the Anvitābhidhānavāda maintains that the words (which are already mutually related) themselves convey the sentence-meaning through the function of Abhidhā itself. Thus while according to the former view, Abhidhā is not competent to bring in the sentence-meaning, according to the latter it is.

ii) In Abhihitānvayavāda denotation (Abhidhāna) precedes syntactic relation (Anvaya), while in Anvitābhidhāna, syntactic relation precedes denotation.

According to Dr. Gaurinath Sastri, the difference between these two theories lies in their conception of the

29. ākāṅkṣā-sannidhiprāptayogārthānterasadāgatān / svārthānāhuh padānīti vyutpattiḥ samśritā mayā . . . / VM, p. 5
medium of syntactical relation. The Prābhākaras as the followers of Anvitabhīdhāna make the Padas and the Bhātṭas as the followers of Abhīhitānvaya, make the Padārthas as the medium. As far as the relative merits of these two theories are concerned, we find a number of modern scholars maintaining their views in favour of the former. Thus, to quote again Dr. Sastri, he finds in the Anvitabhīdhānavāda, the merit of satisfying the law of economy, inasmuch as this theory asserts that a word denotes a related meaning. Dr. K.K. also maintains that the Anvitabhīdhāna theory seems to be an advance of the Abhīhitānvaya theory of the Bhātṭas. Prof. S.C. Chatterjee on the other hand, goes to the extent of describing the Anvitabhīdhāna as the best among the various views concerning the meaning of a sentence.

SAMUCCAYAVĀDA:

Some later thinkers in India, instead of accepting the aforesaid two extreme theories of Mīmāṃsakas, tried to reconcile them both. Among the Mīmāṃsakas themselves, Vācaspatimisra appears to take a middle path between the

30. PWM, p. 235
31. ibid, p. 179
32. ITM, p. 212
33. NTK, p. 344
two Mīmāṃsā doctrines of verbal comprehension. In the circle of Ālaṃkārikas also, Mukula favours a reconciliation of Abhihitānvayavāda and Anvitābhīdhānnavāda. Mukula examines the status of Laksanā not only from the viewpoints of the two Mīmāṃsā theories, but from the angles of Akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭavāda and Samuccayavāda also. In that context, he maintains that both the Abhihitānvaya and Anvitābhīdhāna theories contain only partial truth. Because, considered from the viewpoint of the individual words, the Abhihitānvayavāda seems to be preferable, while looked at from the angle of the sentence, the Anvitābhīdhānnavāda seems to be acceptable. In fact, neither of these theories taken singularly can explain the problem of verbal comprehension. So Mukula recommends a combination of the two theories and refers to this view as Samuccayavāda. Regarding the operation

34. idānimabhhihitānvayo'nvitābhīdhānānam, tattāmuccayaḥ
tadubhayābhāvaścetyeyem ye cetvāraḥ paksās......
AVM, p.42

35. anyesēṁ tu mate padānām tattattāmānāyabhūto vācyo'r-
thaḥ, vākyāpeksayā tu parasparānītāḥ padārthē iti
padāpeksayā abhihitānvayāḥ, vākyāpeksayā tu
anvitābhīdhānām, evam ca etayor abhihitānvayānvitābhī-
dhānāyoḥ samuccaya iti.
ibid., p.45
of Abhidhā and Lakṣaṇā in a verbal judgement, Mukula’s contention is this: when the emphasis is laid on the individual words, in that event the function of Abhidhā precedes that of Lakṣaṇā, but when the emphasis is laid on the sentence, in that case operation of Lakṣaṇā precedes that of Abhidhā. But it may be noted that even when Lakṣaṇā is said to precede Abhidhā, in that case also a prior operation of Abhidhā function stands indispensable.

AKHAṆḌAVĀKYASPOTĀVĀDA:

Bhartṛhari finds none of the above theories as an answer to the problem. According to him, a sentence is an indivisible unit of language and its meaning is also an instantaneous 'flash of insight' (Pratibhā), or intuition, which is partless. The division of a sentence into words and of words into various parts like roots and suffixes made by the Grammarians is only to facilitate easy study of the language. In fact, these divisions are

36. ...... samuccaye tu pūrvoditanyādvitayasamkalanayā padāpekṣayā vācyatvottarakālabhāvini lakṣaṇā bhavati, (vākyāpekṣayā ca) vākyārthottarakālām tasyāḥ (vācyatvāt) pūrvam avasthānam. ibid, p.47

37. sphoṭātmake vākya pratibhālakṣaṇe vākyārthe.........

Puṇyārāja on VP, II.2
not found in a sentence, inasmuch as we are concerned with the total utterance which alone is useful. Thus although Bhartṛhari classifies Sphoṭa into three types, viz. Varnasphoṭa, Padasphoṭa and Vākyasphoṭa, he considers the Vākyasphoṭa alone as the real unit of speech. The other divisions of Sphoṭa are real in so far as they are conducive to the building up a higher unit of speech, i.e., the Vākya-sphoṭa.

According to Bhartṛhari, the meaning of a sentence is not understood stage by stage on the basis of word-meanings, but is comprehended instantaneously in the form of Pratibhā which is partless. This Pratibhā is not only indivisible but is inexplicable also. Bhartṛhari identifies this Pratibhā with the instinctive urge in animals which prompts them to act. Thus he says that it is this urge that teaches the cuckoo to sing in spring and the birds to build their nests. The meaning of a sentence belongs to this kind of urge. It is because of repeated usage that a sentence can generate such an urge in the mind of the listener.

Thus according to Bhartṛhari, words are not real, nor do they denote any external objects. The purpose of

38. VP, II, 151-152
39. abhyāṣāt pratibhāhetuḥ śabdasya sarvoparaṇaḥ smṛtaḥ / ibid., II. 119
language consists in producing an urge for some action and this function can be discharged by the sentence when taken in its totality.

Now it may be noted that the Sphoṭa in all its forms is generally referred to as Vācaka or Abhidhīyaka by the Grammarians. Hence when a sentence is conceived as Akhanda Vākyasphoṭa, it must involve the function of Abhidhā.

Bhartrhari while advocating such a view, rejects the Mīmāṃsakas' theories of Abhihitānvaya and Anitābhidhāna in both of which only the meanings of words are said to have an absolute reality. The Mīmāṃsakas and other schools of thought have, however, subjected the theory of Bhartrhari to severe criticism. But in the context of a true and unbiased perusal of the whole language-situation, Bhartrhari's sphoṭa theory and for that matter, his Akhanda Vākyasphoṭa theory of verbal comprehension has great significance and as such it cannot be dispensed with.

40. cf. IITM, p. 139
CONCLUDING REMARKS:

From a careful examination of the nature and concept of Abhidhā function, we can safely assert that of all verbal functions, Abhidhā stands out as the foremost one and as such, its scope is much more wider than that of the other functions. This proposition is warranted by the following few facts:

(1) In the context of a verbal judgement, we first take recourse to Abhidhā for the understanding of the individual word-meanings involved. Laksāṇā and Vyāñjana are assumed only when the meaning brought by Abhidhā becomes incompatible or the same demands an additional meaning in the context. Śābārasvāmin maintains repeatedly that Laksāṇā should be resorted to only when the direct meaning is clearly incompatible in the context. He is strongly of the opinion that whenever there arises a conflict between the direct statement and the secondary meaning, preference should be given to the former. In fact, in the domain of Grammar and philosophy also, it is the expressed meaning that we usually understand.

(2) In our practical life also, we are mostly concerned with the meaning conveyed by Abhidhā. Generally we do not want any ambiguity in meaning in our normal conversation or communication with our fellow-beings.

41. Vide SB under MS, I.4.2; SB under MS, VI.1.51
During our various business hours of daily life, only the expressed meaning comes to be useful and so we often consult a lexicon or Grammar in order to understand this meaning. Thus there is less scope of Lakṣaṇa or Vyañjana here. Āśādharaṇāṅga categorically states that while the laymen understand a meaning through Abhidhā, the intelligent ones apprehend the meaning through Lakṣaṇa and the connoisseurs do the same through Vyañjana.  42

(3) The scope of Abhidhā in comparison to that of Lakṣaṇa is much more wider. Each and every word coming to the process of our verbal comprehension signifies its normal primary meaning through Abhidhā function. In fact, Lakṣaṇa has a very limited scope. In this context, certain observations of Dr. Raja deserve to be noted. He says, 'whenever we hear a word it is only the well-known primary meaning that we recognise immediately.' Then we find that it is not compatible with the context and so we know that the word has been used figuratively on the basis of the similarity between the primary and the actual referents.'

42.  Ājātī m bhañjanti saralā lakṣaṇāṁ caturā nārāḥ / vyañjanaṁ narmamarmajñānāḥ kavaṇṇā kemaṇā janāḥ / Trivenikā, p. 33
Also Vide Āśādharaṇāṅga, p. 56
43.  Purvānubhūta evārthāṁ smaryate prāthamāṁ padēt. TV, p. 358
(4) Anandavardhana with whom Dhvani occupies the foremost position in Kāvyā, does not deny the presence of the Vācya sense even when the suggested meaning is revealed. Thus he explains the relationship between the expressed sense and the suggested content with the analogy of a jar being revealed by the lamp (i.e. ghaṭapradīpanyāya). The lamp which illuminates other objects shines itself. So also the denoted meaning makes itself known while revealing the suggested idea. The final aim of a poet, undoubtedly is to convey the suggested meaning. But this he does by conveying the denoted meaning first, and it is the denotative word that he primarily uses.

(5) The Dhvani theorists in general and Anandavardhana in particular recognise Vyanjanā as a separate function of word as prompted by the argument that 'it is not possible to discard the usefulness of detailed definitions of particulars simply because general definitions are already there'. This argument is perhaps sufficient to

44. na hi vyāṅgye pratīyamāṇe vācyabuddhīrūribhavati...... ghaṭapradīpanyāstayoḥ. DL, III, p. 420

45. ibid, I, p. 108
46. na hi sāmēnyamātralekṣaṇanopopyogivivesālekṣaṇānām pratikṣeṣeḥ śākyah kartum. DL, p. 224
warrant the general contention of the linguists, philosophers and the poeticians that Abhidhā cannot be the sole function of words and that other functions like Laksyam, Vyājanā and Tātparya are to be recognised on the same par with Abhidhā for a proper appreciation of Indian epistemology and a better understanding of Poetry. But at all events, Abhidhā stands admitted as the foremost of these functions.