The scope of Abhidhā provides another subject of interest to scholars pertaining to various philosophical schools, Grammar and Poetics as well. Words, as we have seen, are equipped with three different potencies, viz. Abhidhā, Laksana and Vyanjanā. In addition to these, there is the function called Tatparya, which, however, belongs not to the individual words, but to the sentence as a whole. Now, it is naturally a fact that when scholars belonging to different schools accept or reject any of these functions, they would differ amongst themselves with regard to the respective scope of these functions also. Abhidhā is the primal of all verbal functions as recognised by most of the systems, but on the very question of its scope of operation, we find scholars holding divergent opinions. For when Abhidhā is regarded by the Prabhakara Mīmāṃsakas and some Grammarians, as the only verbal function capable of conveying all sorts of meanings, viz., Vācya, Lakṣya and also Vyanjanā as the case
may be, its scope obviously becomes very wide. But in
the event of Abhidha being regarded as one of the two
(i.e. Abhidha and Lakṣaṇa) or three (i.e., Abhidha, Lakṣaṇa and Vyanjana) verbal function, its scope comes
to be narrow and narrower still. The scholars belonging
to various schools might have been confused about the
respective scope of these functions probably for such
reasons: (1) The significative functions of words are
purely mental phenomena, just as Inference and other
means of cognitions are. (2) On account of subtle
difference between any two functions, their scope might
get overlapped.

Now, so far the domain of Poetics is concerned,
we are fortunate enough to find that the Dhvani theorists
in general and Ānandavardhana in particular, with all
their eagerness to establish Vyanjana as a separate func-
tion of word, dealt with its specific scope as distinct
from that of Abhidha and Lakṣaṇa. In the light of their
such discussions, we are definitely in a position to

1. Vide our discussions on the views 'so'yamisoriva
dīrghadīrghataro vyāpāraḥ and 'sarve sarvārthavāc-kāh'
in chapter III of the present work.
2. Samketo lakṣaṇā cārthe padavṛttīḥ. SAKV, p. 1
3. PLM, p.13; SD. II.3.
determine the exact scope of Abhidhā as compared to that of other verbal functions. The scope of Abhidhā may also be compared with that of such other various means of cognitions as Anumāna and Upamāna.

ABHIDHĀ VERSUS LAKŚANĀ

From a comparative study of Abhidhā and Lakśanā, the following points of difference between the two functions come to our notice:

[1] Abhidhā is almost universally recognised as a verbal function, but Lakśanā is not recognised by all schools of thought. As we have already seen, some scholars have tried to include Lakśanā within the sphere of Abhidhā. ⁴

[2] Abhidhā is considered as the foremost all verbal functions and is thus described as Mukhya Vyāpāra⁵ and Mukhyā Vṛtti.⁶ Lakśanā, on the other hand, is considered as a secondary significative function and is thus known as the Gaunī Vṛtti or Jaghanyā Vṛtti.⁷ In view

⁴ For instance, vide treatment of Abhidhā by Mukulabhatta and Bhoja in chapter III of the present work.
⁵ KP, II, p. 39
⁶ DL, I. 17, p.224
⁷ S8 under MS,III.2.1.
of this distinction, it may be pointed out that of all recognised verbal functions, Abhidhā operates first and signifies instantaneously the meaning directly related to a word through convention. In the matter of signifying this meaning, Abhidhā does not stand in the need of any other significative function. Laksanā, on the other hand, operates only when there is some kind of syntactic inconsistency as regards to the meaning conveyed by Abhidhā.\(^8\) Thus Laksanā is based on Abhidhā and it may be better described as an extension of Abhidhā.\(^3\) Thus some scholars have called Laksanā the 'tail of Abhidhā'.\(^1\) Hence, Abhidhā is an independent function of word, while Laksanā is always a dependent function.

### Footnotes

8. ibid.
9. वाककवादर्यपुनः गुणवर्त्तिते व्यावस्थिते.\(^\text{DL, p. 55, Vide ITM, p. 248}\)
10. अते एव अधिधापुच्छधभूतः सः. \(^\text{KP, p. 248}\)
11. Locane, p. 90.
regard to its corresponding meaning, again, is determined by certain factors such as grammar, lexicon and usage by the elders. In the case of words having multiple meanings, however, first the various primary meanings are apprehended through the aforesaid factors, then on the strength of conjunction (Samyoga) and such certain other auxiliary factors, the desired primary meaning comes to be ascertained.\textsuperscript{12} Hence Samaya or convention is the invariable precondition of Abhidhā. The requisites for Lakṣana, on the other hand, are (1) the unsuitability of the primary meaning (Mukhyārthabādha),\textsuperscript{13} (2) some relation between the primary meaning and the secondary meaning (Mukhyārthayoga) and (3) sanction for the transferred meaning either by popular usage (Rūdhī) or a motive (Prayojana). These three conditions essential for the operation of Lakṣana, may be called Samayavīśeṣa (special convention) as Mammata refers them to be as such\textsuperscript{14} in contradistinction to Samaya (ordinary convention), the very basis of Abhidhā.

\textsuperscript{12} VF, II.317

\textsuperscript{13} According to Naiyāyikas, however, as we have seen in chapter II of the present work, unsuitability of the speaker’s intention is the first requisite of Lakṣana.

\textsuperscript{14} yathā sa samayavyapekṣa abhidhā, tathā mukhyārthabādḥahāditrayasamayavīśeṣayvyapekṣa lakṣanā... . .......

KP, p.296.
In fact, there is no denying of the fact that without a previous operation of Abhidhā, the operation of Lakṣaṇa cannot take place. Hence the Mīmāṃsāka asserts that the figurative meanings proceed directly from the primary meaning itself. The power that resides in the word as significativeness is only with reference to the primary referent, other figurative meanings are derived from this and dependent on this.  

All this is enough to show the predominance of Abhidhā over Lakṣaṇā.

ABHIDHĀ AND NĪRŪDHĀ LAKṢAṆĀ:

The foregoing passages provide us a survey of the scope of Abhidhā as compared to that of Lakṣaṇā as a whole. But we feel it imperative here to examine the scope of Abhidhā as compared to that of Nirūdhā variety of Lakṣaṇā also in view of the fact that both these functions involve a long-standing Rudhi or convention as the basis, thereby a room for confusion about their respective scope.

Now, before distinguishing these two functions from one another, we should take note of the fact that while the Ālaṃkārikas in general recognise two types of Lakṣaṇā, viz., one based on popular usage and the other based on motive, the Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsakas recognise only the former type. This variety of Lakṣaṇā is known as Nīrūdhā Lakṣaṇā (faded metaphor) with these Mīmāṃsakas. The Bhāṭṭas find little difference between Abhidhā and

15. sarvathā tāvad ayam gaunamukhyavibhāgaḥ śroṭṛṣāṁ arthaviśeṣāvadhrāme vyāpriyate. te ca pedavelāyām anadhyaśopitasvārthavṛttyevarvanta. gaunatāṁ kalpayanti. TV,p. 358, vide ITM, p. 245
16. Vide TL, p. 388
Nirūḍha Laksana. Kumārila observes that this Nirūḍha type of Laksana is sometimes as good as Abhidhā inasmuch as both are determined by convention. Laksana in such cases attains a special capacity to convey its meaning which is as good as the primary meaning of the word. The contention of Kumārila seems to have some relation to Śabara's idea of Rūḍhi (i.e. Rūḍha) Sabda. Śabara while citing the word Kusāla as an instance of Rūḍha word, comments that a person who collects the sacrificial grasses (Kuśa) may have several other qualities. But yet the term Kusāla is used in the sense of only one of those qualities, viz. his expertise (Nipuṇata). Thus the word Kusāla serves as an instance of Rūḍha variety of expressive word accepted by the later theoreticians. This observation of Śabara assumes greater significance in the domain of Poetics in view of the fact that the word Kusāla itself serves as the bone of contention for both Māmata and Viśvanātha engaged in the task of defining and illustrating the Rūḍhimūlā Laksana.

Regarding the concept of Nirūḍha Laksana, Abhinavagupta seems to have maintained a view similar to one

17. nirūḍha laksanaḥ kāscit sāmarthyādabhidyānnavat
   kriyante sāmpratām kāscit kāścinmaiva tvāśṛktithā

18. bahuṣu kuśānāṁ lātus guṇeṣu satṣu nipuṇataya kuśaṁ-
   śabdaprayogād rūḍhīśabda eva bhavati.

held by Kumārila. Ānandavardhana refers to certain words like Lāvanya, which though do not possess any suggested meaning, have some secondary significance. Ānanda's contention is that in the word Lāvanya, the etymological meaning, i.e., saltiness (Lavanasya bhāvah) is taken to be the primary meaning of the word. But this meaning, being incompatible, there arises the failure of the primary meaning, and the common meaning of 'loveliness' is taken to be the Laksyārtha. Abhinava, however, appears to deny the very presence of Laksanā in words like Lāvanya. His contention is that such words as Lāvanya convey meanings other than the etymological ones on the strength of a convention (Rūḍhi), and the convention in these cases is so powerful that it does not allow any of the three requisites of Laksanā (viz., Mukhyārtha-bādha etc.) to come into operation. Abhinava substantiates his argument by citing the authority of Kumārila, which states that

Mammata accepts the Rūḍhi type of Laksanā in the expression 'Karmanī Kuśālaḥ'. He contends that the word

\[
\begin{align*}
20. & \quad \text{teṣu copacāritavṛttirasti,} \quad y \text{om DL, I.16} \\
21. & \quad \text{kusān lāṭiti vyutpattya... ... ... kuśelapadāṁ vivecakatvasārūpyāt pravartamānamānādivrdhāparam-} \\
& \quad \text{paramāpātītvenābhidhānavaṛ prayojanamanapekṣya} \\
& \quad \text{pravartate.} \quad \text{SDS, p. 160}
\end{align*}
\]
Kusāla primarily signifies 'one who is capable of plucking the Kuśa grasses'. But such a meaning is not relevant to the context, and therefore, there is failure of the primary meaning (Mukhyārthabādha). Then on the strength of a convention (Rūḍhi), the primary meaning comes to indicate the meaning 'expert' (Nipunā). Here the idea of a power of discrimination serves as the relation between the primary and the secondary meanings.

But Viśvanātha Kavirāja strongly controverts the above stand of Mammata by saying that the primary meaning of the word Kusāla is 'expert' itself, although etymologically the word may mean 'a person who plucks Kuśa grasses'. The etymological meaning of a word should not necessarily be taken as its primary meaning. The employment of a word in its corresponding particular meaning is regulated by convention and not by etymology. If the etymological meaning alone be regarded as the primary meaning of a word, then in the sentence 'The cow is lying' (gauḥ ātete), there would be Laksanā, for, the word Go is constituted from the root Gam (to go) by the addition of the suffix ḍo as per the Uṇādi Sūtra 'ganerdoh' and thus etymologically it means 'that which is moving'. But such a meaning cannot be applied to a cow when it is lying down. Hence there would be

22. KP, pp. 42-43.
incompatibility of the primary meaning (Mukhyārthanabēdhā), when we say 'what is moving is lying down' and this would lead to acceptance of Lakṣāṇa. But nobody accepts the word Gauḥ in the aforesaid sentence as an indicative one. So also, in 'karmaṇi kuśālaḥ', the word Kuśāla is to be taken as an instance of Abhidhā and never as Lakṣāṇa.

In our opinion, in the event of accepting the view of Viśvanātha Kavirāja, Mammata's example of Rūḍhi-mūlā Lakṣāṇā, viz. 'karmaṇi kuśālaḥ' is a case of Nirūḍhā Lakṣāṇā which is as good as Rūḍhi type of Abhidhā.

A later Alamkārika Hemacandra also accepts the instances of Nirūḍhā Lakṣāṇā such as Kuśāla and Dvireṇe as the cases of the word's primary meaning itself.

In fact, an examination of all instances of Nirūḍhā Lakṣāṇā shows that they are nothing but certain cases of Rūḍhi type of Abhidhā. If, however, following scholars like Ānanda and Mammata, we accept these usages as secondary ones under the name of Nirūḍhā Lakṣāṇā, we shall have to bear in mind a line of demarcation as

23. SDK, p.9
24. Kuśāladvireṇeḥdayastu sāksātsāmketavīcasya, atvāt
mukhyā eveti na rūḍhir lakṣyasyārthasya
hetutvamābhiruktā. KS, p. 25.
stated below between Rūḍhimulā Laksanā and Nirūḍhā Laksanā: Every case of Rūḍhimulā Laksanā presupposes the immediate incompatibility of the speaker's intention (Tātparya) with regard to the primary meaning leading to the said intention of the speaker to a new meaning which is designated as the Laksyārtha. Thus here the Tātparya comes to be directed to the Laksyārtha which originates in the subsequent time. But in the case of Nirūḍhā Laksanā, the intention of the speaker is not of immediate origin, nor can it be traced back to the immediate past.25

In view of above observations, the distinction between Rūḍhi type of Abhidhā and Nirūḍhā Laksanā may be shown as follows:

[1] The Tātparya or speaker's intention in Nirūḍhā Laksanā with regard to the Laksyārtha is not an original one. This type of Laksanā also presupposes an earlier incompatibility (Anupapatti) of the Tātparya, as a result of which the Tātparya comes to be fixed to the present meaning. But in the case of Rūḍhi type of Abhidhā as in the case of the term Go(cow), the original Tātparya

25. nirūḍhālakṣaneti. anāditātparyaviṣayalakṣanetayarthah.
R.R, Vide NSM, p. 271,
Vide ACS, p. 197
stands fixed and the conventional meaning does not get hindered paving a way for a secondary meaning to come in.26

[2] Like Abhidhā, the Nirūḍhā type of Laksanā also brings instantaneously the conventional meaning. But in the latter case, words give up their primary meanings and convey only the secondary meanings, which however, appear as good as the primary ones.27

In fact, the Yogarūḍha words can be compared with words involving Nirūḍhā Laksanā, inasmuch as in both the cases the original derivative meaning is discernible, 'but it has slightly changed in popular usage'.28 As for instance, the words Paṅkaja and Kuśala may be cited. The former is an example of Yogarūḍha word and the latter that of Nirūḍhā Laksanā. The word Paṅkaja though etymologically means anything that grows on mud, its use is restricted to a lotus only, which also grows on mud. Similarly, the word Kuśala though etymologically signifies 'one who plucks Kuśa grasses', is usually used to mean an 'expert' only. It might be this very affinity between these two sets of words that has prompted some scholars to

26. ACS, p. 198
27. anulomapratikūlādisadēsu kācana sā vācyārtham parihrtya lakṣya evārthe vācakavan nirūḍhā. SVV, Vide VRS, p. 72
28. ITM, p. 62
regard the cases of Nirūdhā Laksanā as the cases of primary meaning itself.  

Finally, we may say that the difference between Abnidha and Nirūdhā Laksanā is very slight and often negligible. But inspite of that, they are treated as two separate functions by the tradition of the Poeticians and are differently designated.

ABHIDHĀ VERSUS VYAṆJANĀ

The suggested meaning differs from the expressed meaning on a number of points and this difference between the two leads consequently to the differentiation between the function of VyaṆjanā and that of Abhidhā. As we have earlier pointed out, Anandavardhana and his followers while postulating the theory of Dhvani, have systematically narrated the difference between Abhidhā and VyaṆjanā. The

29. kusaladvirephadvipādayastu sāksātsamketaviṣayatvān mukhyā eveti na rūḍhir lakṣyārthasya hetutven- āsmabhīr uktā. KŚ, 1.25
points of difference between these two functions are shown as follows:

1. Abhidhā and Vyañjanā are different from each other due to their difference in scope (Viṣaya). While Abhidhā conveys the Viṣya meaning which is directly related to a word, Vyañjanā conveys a meaning related to this Vacyarthā. In other words, Vyañjanā is related directly with the Viṣya Artha and indirectly with the Vācaka Sabda. Had the suggested meaning been directly related to the Vācaka word, it would not have been designated as a different meaning at all. 30

2. Abhidhā is different from Vyañjanā due to its difference in respect of form (Rūpabheda). 31 As for instance, if the expressed meaning is negative (Niśedha), the suggested meaning comes to be affirmative (Vidhi). Again, if the express meaning is a doubt (Sañdeha), the suggested one is a

30. tathā hi vācakatvalakṣaṇo vyāpāraḥ śabdasya svārthaviṣayāḥ, gamakatvalakṣaṇo arthāntarasvisayāḥ.........vācyāḥ hi arthaḥ sāksāt śabdasya sambandhī, taditarastu abhidheyaśaṁarthayākṣiptaḥ sambandhisambandhī....... .............. tasmāt viṣayabhedastetvāt tayor vyāpāroyoḥ suprasiddhaḥ. DLV, pp. 254-255

31. rūpabheda'pi prasiddha eva. ibid, p. 255
Also, vide UTSP, p. 189.
doubt (Sandeha), the suggested one is a certainty (Risayā). Again, if the expressed meaning is a reproach (hinda), the suggested one comes to be a praise (Prasāmsa). Avoiding details, we may refer to the following Prākṛta Verse:

\[ \text{attā ettha nimajjai ettha ahām diasaam pāloehi/ mā pahia rattiahdhia sejjāye maha nimajjahisi } \]

Here the expressed meaning, i.e. prohibition to the traveller by the woman is negative in character. But the suggested meaning being an invitation in disguise, is affirmative.

3. Abhidhā conveys only that meaning with reference to which there is a convention. But Vyanjanā operates even in respect of musical sounds and gestures etc. and conveys charming meanings in the form of Rasa, Bhava and the like.

32. vācyavyāngyayoh niḥśeṣa ityādau niśedhavidhyātmanā...

33. The Sanskrit Chāyā of the verse is:

34. kvacid vācye pratiśedhārūpe vidhirūpo yathā. ibid.

35. abhidhāyāḥ samketitārthamātrabhodhanaviratāyā na vastvalāmkārarrāśādvyaṅgyabodhane kṣema tvaṃ. ULV, p.244

36. avācakasyāpi gitaśabdādē rasādilaksanārthāvagyamadher-

śanāt. aśabdasyāpi ceṣṭāder arthavīśesapraķāsanaprā-
siddheḥ. ULV, p.255.
4. Abhidhā is distinct from Vyaṇjanā in respect of time (Kalabheda) also. The expressed meaning being the cause is always comprehended first and the suggested meaning which is an effect is cognised later.37

5. Abhidhā and Vyaṇjanā are different from each other in respect of their medium or substratum (Āsraya) also. Abhidhā can convey the corresponding expressed meaning in the medium of word alone, but Vyaṇjanā suggests a meaning by words, their parts such as the roots, affixes and suffixes and their peculiar composition (Samghaṭanā) also.38

6. In the matter of instrumentality (Nimitta) also, Abhidhā is distinct from Vyaṇjanā. The expressed meaning is understood by the aid of Grammar, lexicon and such certain other methods. But for the comprehension of the suggested meaning, one requires, in addition to the knowledge of these methods, one's clear intellect (Pratibhānairmaiyā) aided by one's knowledge of context and such certain other factors.39

37. pūrvapāscād bhāvena pratiṣṭeṇa kālaya.... kP, 263
38. sabdāśrayatvena sabdatadekadesatadarthavarṇasamghaṭanāśrayatvena ca āśrayasya. ............ ibid.
39. sabdānuṭiṣasaṇajñānena prakaraṇādidasāhāyapratibhānairmalyasahitena tena cāvagama iti nimittasya........... ibid.
7. The meaning conveyed by Abhidhā is understood by any person having the minimum of intelligence, while the meaning conveyed by Vyañjanā is capable of being comprehended only by the cultured.40

8. The meaning brought by Abhidhā is always one and is comprehended uniformly by all cognisers. But the meaning conveyed by Vyañjanā may vary widely depending on factors like diversity of the context, speciality of the speaker and so on. Thus in the expression 'gato' stamar-kaḥ' (the sun has set), the expressed meaning is one and the same for all cognisers. But the same expression may convey a good number of suggested meanings such as, 'this is the time to evade the enemy' (when spoken to a fighting general), 'now you may repair to your lover (when spoken to a woman ready for her march), 'your lover is about to arrive (when spoken to a love-lorn girl whose lover had promised to be with her in the evening) and so on.41

40. bodharmātravidagdhavyapadeśayoh pratītimātracamatkṛtyośca kāraṇāt kāryasya...... ...... .... itid.

41. api ca vācyo’rthah sarvān patipaṭṭh prati ekarūpa eva iti nityo’sau. na hi ‘gato’ stamar-kaḥ’ ityāśau vācyo’rthah kvacidanyathā bhavati, pratīyamānāntu tattatprakarana...... ...... nānātvam bhajate.

KP, p. 240.
9. Vyañjanā sometimes depends on Abhidhā and sometimes on Lakṣanā and thus we have two types of Dhveni, viz., Avivakṣitavācyā and Vivakṣitānaparavācyā based on Abhidhā and Lakṣanā respectively.42 These two types of Dhveni pass as Abhidhāmūlā Vyañjanā and Lakṣanāmūlā Vyañjanā respectively with certain Ālaṃkārikas.43 Vyañjanā thus being dependent on these two functions, cannot be obviously identical with either of them.44

10. Moreover, Abhidhā has for its substratum only Sabda, but Vyañjanā resides in both Sabda and Artha.45

In view this point of distinction between the two functions, it may be noted that some Ālaṃkārikas like Viśvanātha consider Lakṣanā as a function pertaining to words alone.46 But Ālaṃkārikas like Abhinevagupta conceive Lakṣanā as a function pertaining to the word's primary meaning also.47

42. DL, I, p. 199
43. SDK, p. 12
44. DTSP, p. 192
45. DL, p. 423
46. SDK, p. 8
47. Locana, p. 152

Vide DTSP, p. 191
11. Further, Abhidhā is an invariable attribute of a word. From the very beginning of the process of learning, a word conveys its conventional meaning without fail and without the help of any other factor. But Vyāñjana being superimposed on the word, is a variable potency. It operates only with the help of certain variable factors like context, speciality of the speaker and so on.

Mammatā while emphatically making distinction between the Vācya and the Vyāngya senses cites the maxim which says, 'It is the apprehension of the opposite attributes and the difference of cause that constitutes the difference or ground to difference'49 This being well applicable to the functions of Abhidhā and Vyāñjana, they are indeed two distinct functions.

Here it may be observed that if we understand suggested meanings from affixes, suffixes or even meaningless musical sounds, then we shall have to admit that Vyāñjana can operate even without a preceding Abhidhā and in this case the connection between the two functions is not indispensable.

48. वाचकत्वम हि सादविशेषasya nitya तत्त्वात्।
vyutpattikālādārabhyya tadavīnābhāvena tasya prasiddhā-
tvāt. sa tvaniyataḥ, aupādhikatvāt prakarāṇādyavacche-
dena tasya pratīteritarathā tvāpratīten। DLV, p. 270;
also , Vide DTSP, p. 193

49. आयामेवा हि भेदो भेदहेतुवर्वा यादविरुद्धहराधरम्मोध्ययोषन।
kāraṇābhedāsca। KP, p. 244.
ABHIDHA IM SABDASAKTIMULADHVANI

Writers on Poetics hold divergent opinions on the exact role played by Abhidha in Sabdasaktuyuddhava or Sabdasaktimula type of Dhvani which passes as Sabdī yanjanā also. This variety of Dhvani owes its origin to the use of certain homonyms (Anekārthakaśabdas). A homonym conveys more than one expressed meaning wherefrom the suggested idea is apprehended. In order to have more than one expressed meaning as the basis of the suggested meaning, we must have homonymous words. Here the order of words can not be changed, nor the original words allow any substitution by other words even having the same meaning, for in that case, the apprehension of more than one expressed will not take place and the very basis being absent, there will not arise the apprehension of the desired suggested meaning. Thus the words themselves being responsible for conveying the suggested idea, this type of suggestion is called the suggestion based upon the power of words (Sabdasaktimuladhvani).

Thus in Sabdasaktimuladhvani, the suggested meaning depends on the use of words capable of signifying two

\[ \text{50. Ākṣipta evālawmākaraḥ sabdasaktyān prakāsatē /} \\
\text{yasminnannuktēḥ sabdena sabdasaktyuddhevo hi saḥ.} \]

DL, II. 21

\[ \text{51. UṭSP, pp. 95-96.} \]
or more meanings simultaneously. Of these, one comes to be conveyed by the power of Abhidha on the strength of certain factors, which passes as the primary meaning through its relevance to the context. The rest of the possible meaning or meanings may sometimes come to be conveyed by the power of suggestion (Vyanjana).

Now, let us take the following instance of Samā Vyanjana based on denotation, as cited by Visvanātha Kavirāja:

durgālaṁghita-vigraho manasiṣam sammīlayan stejesā
prodyad ṛajakalo gṛhitagarimā visvag vrto bhogibhih
nakṣatresa-krtekṣaṇo girigurau gādham ruciṁ dhēinyān
gōmakramyc vibhūtibhūśita-tanū rājaty-
ūmēvallabheh āph.

Here the poet makes an eulogy of his patron king of Utkala. The term Umā stands here for the queen of that king. But as we know, Umā is a name of the beloved consort of the Lord Siva also, so the adjectives and substantives employed in the verse are applicable to both the king and the Lord. In other words, in the aforesaid verse, we have two sets of meanings, one being applicable to the king of Utkala and the other to the Lord Siva.

51. D'ISP, pp. 95-96
52. SD, pp. 59-60.
Now, of these two sets of meanings, the one relating to the king (who is being glorified), being relevant to the context, are decidedly conveyed by the Abhidhā function. But scholars are of divergent views regarding the status of the non-contextual ideas relating to the Lord Siva. According to Mammata and Visvanātha the non-contextual idea of a homonym (i.e. Uma in the present instance), is conveyed by the function of Vyanjānā. Their contention is that the contextual factors like conjunction (Samyoga) restrict Abhidhā to one of the several meanings of a homonymam. Thus in the verse cited above, the denotation of the term Umāvallabha is restricted by context only to the husband of the queen Umā by name. The idea of Lord Siva, i.e. husband of Gaurī is apprehended only through the function of suggestion. According to these theorists, the Abhidhā so restricted, cannot convey another meaning which may still lurk in, due to the established maxim of the Mimamsakas which is supported by the Alamkarikas also that 'the word, intelligent and action cease to operate after discharging their respective functions'.

53. anekārthasya śabdasya vācakatve niyantite

54. SD, II, 14

55. Ibid, p. 60.

56. SDK, p. 12.
idea so comprehended, cannot be ascribed to the function of Lakṣaṇā also because of absence of the three requisites, viz., failure of the primary meaning (Mukhyārthābhādha) etc.. Hence Vyanjana is the function that brings such non-contextual ideas into comprehension.57 These writers further contend that in the case of a homonym, where the expressed meanings are many, the context or Prakaraṇa delimits the scope of Abhidhā to the domain of the contextual meaning alone.

According to Ānandavardhana, however, who first initiated the discourse on the issue, both the contextual and non-contextual ideas in Sabdaśaktimūlādhvani are conveyed by the function of Abhidhā itself. It is the Alam-kāra (i.e. the relation between the contextual and the non-contextual ideas) alone that is conveyed by the Vyanjana function.59

57. KP, pp.67-68
58. iha khalu umāvallabhasabdāt yeyam dvitiyārthāpratītis tatrābhidhāyāḥ prakṛtārthāmātrabodhanavirāmāt. Lakṣmitikā, p.60, Vide CD
59. ēsu udāharaṇeṣu sabdaśaktyā prakāśamāne sati aprākaranike'ṛthantare vākyasyāsambaddhārthābhidhāyitvām mā prasaṅkṣīditi apraṣākaraṇika-praṣākaraṇikārthayor upamānappameyabhvāḥ kalpayitavyaḥ. DL, II, p.86.
It is to be noted here that Anandavardhana himself does not refer to the Śabdaśaktimūladhvani. According to him, the potency pertaining to a word (Śabdaśakti) can convey only a suggested Alamkāra and not a matter of fact (Vastu). It is the later Alamkārikas like Māmāta and Viśvanātha that came to recognise the Śabdaśaktimūla Vastudhvani as a separate category of suggestion in the domain of Śabdī Vyañjana.

Anandavardhana illustrates the Śabdaśaktimūladhvani with several instances, of which, the following may be quoted for a consideration:

'atrañtare kusumasamayugam upasāmarājan aśrmbhata grīṃabhidhānāha phullamallikādhvalātātahāso mahākālaḥ'.

Here we have two portions, viz. substantive portion (Mahākāla) and adjective portion (kusumamayayugam, etc). The term Mahākāla refers to the great season, i.e. summer. It may stand for the Lord Śiva also. The adjective portion

60. ata eva dhvanikṛtā 'ākṣipta evālaṁkāraḥ śabdaśaktyā prakāśate' ityādikārikāyā alamkāradhanireva śabdaśaktimūlo lakṣyate.

Kāvyaprakāśasamketa of Ruyyaka. vide DL,II,p.38

61. alamkāro'tha vastveva śabdād yatrāvabhāsatā pradhānatvena sa jñeyāḥ śabdaśaktyudbhavo dvidhā

also conveys two meanings which may be separately applicable to the aforesaid two meanings of the term Mahākāla. We understand also an idea of similarity between the season and the Lord Śiva. Thus the passage provides us three different categories of meanings, viz.,

1. the contextual description of the 'great season',
2. the non-contextual description of the Lord Śiva, and
3. the suggested figure (i.e. the similarity between the season and the Lord Śiva).

Now, according to Anandavardhana, in the aforesaid instance, the meaning relating to the great season being relevant to the context, is conveyed by Abhidhā. He also comprehends the non-contextual idea of the Lord Śiva as the Abhidheya Artha of the word. Hence what is apprehended through Vyanjana is only the similarity between the great season and the Lord Śiva. Thus we have here an Alamkaradhvani (instead of a Vastudhvani). That Anandavardhana considers both the contextual and non-contextual meanings as expressed and the figure of speech alone as suggested, is evident from several expressions available in his DL itself and Abhinava's exposition of the same as well.

63. DTSP, p. 100
64. ibid, p. 101
65. DL, p. 244
Abhinava on his part, however, maintains that in Śabdaśaktimūladhvani, the contextual meaning alone is conveyed by Abhidhā and all additional ideas are apprehended as the suggested ones. Thus with him, in the instance cited above, the meaning relating to the 'great season' alone is conveyed by Abhidhā, while the meanings applicable to the Lord Śiva are conveyed by the Vyanjana function.67

In view of above observations, we are led to believe that the later Ālāmārikas like Māmaṭa and Viśva-nātha were influenced by Abhinavagupta and not by Ānandavardhana in the matter of accepting the Vastu type of Śabdaśaktimūladhvani as a separate category.

This trend set by the successors of Ānandavardhana was, however, not accepted by Appayadīksita and Jagannātha, both known for their unique way of treating the whole issue of signification. Thus Appaya in his Vṛttivārtika maintains that when from a particular homonym, both the contextual and the non-contextual meanings are cognised.

67. atra ṛtuvarṇanaparastāvaniyantritābhidhāśāktayāḥ, 
ata eva...... mahākālāprabhṛtyāḥ śabdā etamevārtham 
abhidhāya krtakṛtyā eva. tadantaram arthavagatir 
dhvenanavyāpārādeva śabdaśaktimūlātvāt.

Locana, pp. 259-260
both of them are apprehended through the function of Abhidha itself. While in such cases, the contextual meaning is distinguished by the context (Prakaranā) the non-contextual is distinguished by its co-existence (Samabhivyāhāra, i.e. Sabdasyanyasya samnidhi of Bhartrhari) with the other meanings of syntactically connected with it. Here the restrictive factors like Sauyāga (conjunction) come to be logically unjustifiable. Now, Appaya takes care to show that although in such cases, the non-contextual meaning is not suggested, the relation that connects the contextual and the non-contextual, is apprehended as a suggested content and thus we have a Sabdasaktimulamkāradhvani.

According to Jagannātha also, all meanings possible from a homonym are primary ones and as such, are brought by the function of Abhidha itself. He controverts the proposition of his predecessors that Sabdasaktimūli Vyañjanā operates in those cases where homonyms are employed and conveys the idea of the non-contextual, when the function of Abhidha is restricted by factors like Samyoga (conjunction) to one of the several meanings of a

68. tasmāt..... prastutāprastutobhayavācyārthe'bhidhaiva vṛttih. VRV, p.47, vide VRS.
69. ibid, p.43,Vide VRS. Also vide exposition of DL,11 by Bhattacharya, B, p. 77.
homonym. 70 The contextual factors like Saṃyoga can only restrict the application of a word, but they can not deprive a word of its primary meaning. 71 Jagannātha, however, accepts the view of his predecessors that the relation between the contextual and the non-contextual is apprehended as a suggested Alamkāra. 72 But what actually distinguishes Jagannātha from the ancients is that he finds out a new field of operation of the Śābdī Vyañjana. 73 Thus he asserts that in the case of Yogarūḍha words like Paṅkaja (which also convey multiple meanings), the etymological meaning is restricted in its use by convention and the function of Abhidhā conveys its popular meaning. But in those case where etymological meaning is also apprehended, Vyañjana is the function responsible for such comprehension. Thus in such cases, we have Ṣabdāsaktimūlavastudhvani.

70. tasmat nānārthasya aprākaraṇike'rthe vyañjanaeti prīcām siddhāntaṁ śithila eva. RG, p. 144
71. ITM, p. 308
72. praśkaraṇikāprākaraṇikayor arthayor upaṁayaṁ tu kadaĉit syādepi ityatra āsmākāṁ pratibhāti. RG, p. 144
73. CAIP, p. 44
74. yogarūḍhasya śabdasya yoge rūḍhyā niyantrite / dhīyāṁ yogasṛśo'rthasya yā sute vyañjanaiva sā // RG, p. 147
also vide, ITM, p. 308.
From the above discussion, we may conclude that the operation of Abhidhā in Śābdī Vyañjana is universally accepted by the champions of Dhvani. But they differ among themselves with regard to the question as to how and to what extent the former is involved in the latter.

Here we feel it imperative to add the main point of difference between Śleṣa and Sabdaśaktimūladhvani, inasmuch as both involve homonymous words and are therefore, subject to one’s confusion. In fact, Śleṣa and Sabdaśaktimūladhvani are two different phenomena on the following grounds:

1. According to Ālāṅkārikas when same set of words conveys two different sets of meanings, both of which are relevant to the context, we have the figure Śleṣa. Here both sets of meanings are brought by the Abhidhā function. But when one set of meanings comes to be relevant to the context and the other inappropriate to it, we have Sabdaśaktimūladhvani. Here the meaning relevant to the context is obtained through Abhidhā, while the one inappropriate to the context, is apprehended through Vyañjana. According to Ānandavardhana, however, as we we have observed earlier, in Sabdaśaktimūladhvani only an...

75. vastudvaye ca prakāśamāne śleṣeḥ. DL,11, p. 71.
Alamkāra is suggested.76

2. In Śleṣa, we understand an additional figure of speech also as being expressed, but in Sabdaśaktimūla-dhvani, the figure is apprehended only as being suggested and not expressed.77

3. In Śleṣa, we easily understand both the primary meanings possible from a homonym, but in Sabdaśaktimūladhvani, we seek to establish a relation between the contextual and non-contextual ideas.78

4. In Śleṣa, both the meanings being Prākaraṇika, we cannot distinguish between them on the basis of the context, but in Sabdaśaktimūladhvani, one of the several meanings possible from a homonym being restricted by Prakaraṇa, we are in a position to distinguish between the two meanings.

5. Further, in Śleṣa, we assume one and the same Śakti (Abhidhā) for comprehension of meanings, but in Sabdaśaktimūladhvani, we make use of two significative functions, one being Abhidhā and the other being Vyāñjana.

76. yatru tu sāmarthyāksiptaṁ sad alamkārantaram Sabdaśaktyā prakāśate, sa eva dhvāner viśayaḥ. ibid, p.85

77. DTSP, p. 97

78. ibid, p.98
Now, from a consideration of all the aforesaid points of difference between Śleṣa and Sabdasāktimūladhvanī, it appears to us that all these are tantamount to the contention of Anandavadhanā that while Alasmākāras are based on the relation between the Vācyā and the Vācaka (i.e., Abhidhā), Dhvani is based on the relation between the Vyaṅgya and Vyañjaka (i.e., Vyañjanā).

The champions of Dhvani emphasise again and again that Dhvani should not be relegated to the status of Alasmākāras (including Śleṣa), nor the former should be confused for the latter under any circumstances.

**ABHIDHĀ VERSUS TĀTPARYA**

As we have earlier shown, the term Tātparya signifies in addition to the intention of the speaker, two other meanings also, viz. (i) the purport of a verbal statement as interpreted by the Mīmāṃsakas and (ii) the significative function placed on the same par with Abhidhā etc., as advocated by the Naiyāyika Jayantabhaṭṭa and the Ālamkārika Abhinavagupta and as referred to by Mammaṭe and Viśvanātha.

The Mīmāṃsakas maintain that the real purport of a proposition can be understood irrespective of the...
speaker's intention, and such a position on the part of these scholars is attributed to their laying too much emphasis on the revealed text of the Vedas.\textsuperscript{80} Now, so far the purport of a statement is concerned, the Mīmāṁsakas maintain that it is found in the predicate portion of a proposition.\textsuperscript{81} A proposition consists of two parts, viz. Uddesiya or Anuvādyā (subject) and Vidheya (predicate). The former contains an idea which already exists (Siddha) and the latter refers to an idea that has to be brought into existence (Sādhyā). Now, of these two, the Vidheya portion carries the real significance of an utterance inasmuch as it is the Vidheya that conveys something new, the Uddesiya remaining the same.\textsuperscript{82}

As we have observed earlier, the Mīmāṁsakas not only conceived Tātparya as a motive force, some BhāṭṭaMīmāṁsakas like Pārthasārathi went to the extent of recognising Tātparya as a significative function. But it was the Naiyāyika Jayantabhaṭṭa who actually gave Tātparya the status of an independent function on the same par with Abhidhā, Lakṣaṇa and Vyaśjanā. And of the

\textsuperscript{80} ITM, p. 179
\textsuperscript{81} yadeva vidheyaṁ tatraiva tātparyam. KP, p. 227
\textsuperscript{82} ITM, pp. 184-185.
Alamkārikas, Abhinavagupta accepted Tatparya as a Vṛtti being inspired by Jayantabhaṭṭa.  

Now, in the event of Tatparya being recognised as a significative function, we may identify the distinction between Abhidhā and Tatparya as follows:

1. Abhidhā conveys only the individual meanings of words, while Tatparya signifies the syntactically related ideas.

2. Abhidhā, thus, is a function pertaining to the words, while Tatparya is a function pertaining to the sentence as a whole.

3. While the function of Abhidhā is recognised by almost all schools of thought, Tatparya is admitted as a Vākyavṛtti only in certain circles of scholars, e.g., the Naiyāyikas like Jayantabhaṭṭa and Alamkārikas like Abhinavagupta. In other words, the admission of Abhidhā is almost universal, while that of Tatparya is only partial.

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83. Vide our discussion on TATPAKYAVRVTI under the heading 'VARIETIES OF SABDAŚAKTIS' in chapter II of the present work.

84. pratipattiscāṃvayaṇya naabhidhēśaktyā tesyāḥ padārthopratyupakāhāyā vireṇyavāyāparatī tatparyaśaktyāt va .......... pratipattih. Locana, 58
Here, of course, we must not forget that even those who do not understand Tātparya as a Vākyavṛtti, have come to admit the involvement of Tātparya in the sense of the speaker's intention or general purport of the utterance in the context of the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence.

**Abhidhā and Anumāṇa**

In the context of the relations as well as the order of precedence between Anumāṇa (Pramāṇa) and Saṃcāda (Pramāṇa), a discussion on Anumāṇa with reference to Abhidhā is felt necessary. Anumāṇa, as we find, is one of the Pramāṇas recognised by all schools of Indian thought excepting the Cārvākas. The knowledge coming from Anumāṇa is called Anumiti (inferential knowledge). 'Anumāṇa' as Dr. B.N. Seal puts it, 'is the process of ascertaining, not by perception or direct observation, but through the instrumentality or medium of a mark, that a thing possesses a certain character'.

It is a process of reasoning in which we pass from the apprehension of some mark (Līṅga) to that of something else, by virtue of a relation of invariable concomitance (Vyāpti) between the two.

85. *The positive Science of the Ancient Hindus*, p. 250
Vide IIP, p. 182.
As we find, in the process of śābdabodha, all cases of verbal comprehension presuppose the existence of a perception (Pratyakṣa) in the form of auditory perception (Śrāuta Pratyakṣa). Because, the first stage in each case of śābdabodha is the hearing of words or seeing the same in a script. So in the form of either auditory or visual perception, perception precedes each case of verbal knowledge. Similarly in certain or some cases of verbal knowledge, inferential knowledge precedes. Thus in the process of learning the convention of words by observing the usage by the elderly people (Vṛddhavyavahāra), we find the involvement of a process of Anumāna.

Abhidhā is not directly involved in Anumāna, for, the inferential knowledge is attained through a process different from the one involved in verbal cognition. But yet it can be safely said that in every case of Anumāna, there is an initial involvement of Abhidhā. For, to attain an inferential knowledge from such statements as 'parvato vahnimān' (The hill is fiery), the speaker should have an earlier śābdabodha in respect of the sentence learnt from

86. praroyja-vṛddhaśābdasravaṇasamanantāṁ praroyja-vṛddha-pravṛttihetujānānumānapūrvvakatvāc cchabādārthesambranagrehaṇasya... ... anumānapūrvvakatvamityanumānanāntāṁ śabdam laksryati.

Sāṅkhya-tattvakaumudi, p. 49
an āpta. This Sabda-bodha again is possible only when the words consisting the sentence give rise to their corresponding meanings through Sakti or the primary significative function of the words. Thus though Anumāna is invariably based on Pratyakṣa, yet we find here an involvement Sabda-pramāṇa and for that matter Abhidhā also.

ABHIDHĀ VERSUS UPAMĀNA:

The scope of Abhidhā with reference to the Upamāna or comparison forms yet another subject of interest to us. Abhidhā, as we have earlier seen, serves as an ancillary cause to the attainment of Śabdajñāna (valid verbal knowledge) through Sabda as a Pramāṇa. Upamāna, on the other hand, being itself a Pramāṇa, leads to the attainment of Upamiti (knowledge obtained through comparison). Thus Abhidhā and Upamāna pertain to two different spheres of valid knowledge.

According to the Naiyāyikas, every case of Upamāna necessitates a prior involvement of Sabdepramāṇa. As for instance, in the expression 'gosadṛśo gavayāh', the learner is to first hear from the forester that the Gavayā or wild
cow is like a Go (cow). The forester has the perceptive knowledge of a Gavaya. The statement of the forester which is an Atidesavākya, must be regarded as an Ātutavākya in order to safeguard the validity of Upamīti itself inasmuch as in the Nyāya view, it forms the very basis for the functioning of the Upamāna. The learner who perceives a Gavaya, observes its similarity with a Go and recollects the Atidesavākya or directive statement of the forester and consequently ascertains that this creature Gavaya is what is denoted by the term Gavaya. Hence according to the Naiyāyikas, the concept of Upamāna involves Śabda in the form of an Atidesavākya. In other words, Upamāna is dependent on Śabdapramāṇa.

But Upamāna serves as an aid to Śabdapramāṇa also, as it is recognised as one of the factors of ascertaining the denotation of a word. As the Naiyāyika Viśvanātha observes, the result of Upamāna is the ascertaining the Śakti of such words as Gavaya. But the knowledge of the very significative power, i.e. Śaktidhi is the way by

88. ibid
89. ACS, p. 43
90. ŚMU, pp. 407-408, vide BP
91. BP, K. 79-80.
which Karana in Sâbdabodha (i.e. the knowledge of a word) comes to give rise to the Vyâpâra (i.e. knowledge of meanings of words). Upamiti as leading to the knowledge of the significative power (Sakti) of words like Gavaya comes to serve as an aid in generating Sâbdabodha. But the primary significance of a word is ascertained not only by Upamâna. There are other factors also such as grammar for ascertaining the Sakti of a word.

The Nyâya concept of Upamâna is not accepted in toto by other schools of thought. As for instance, the Vedántins do not see any involvement of Sâbda in Upamâna. Their idea of Upamâna as a Pramâna is this - a person who has never seen an individual cow in his homestead, comes to have the visual perception of an individual Gavaya. Then he concludes that his cow is like this creature. This conclusion to the final knowledge which is called Upamiti or Sâdrśyajñâna (knowledge obtained through comparison). The learner's previous knowledge of resemblance of the creature (i.e., Gavaya) with the cow (Go) serves as an instrument (Karana).  

92. athopamânam nirûpyate........ nāpyanumēnno.  
VPB, p. 83

93. ..... tetrānvasvavystirekābhyaṁ gavayamisthagosdrāya-jñānam karânam, goniṣṭhagavayasādrāya-jñānam wholesome.  
ibid.
As the knower does not need to hear from someone earlier regarding the Gavaya being similar to a Go, hence the question of a prior involvement of Śabda does not arise here. So in the opinion of the Vedāntins, there is no involvement of Abhidhā also in the process of acquiring knowledge through Upamāna. According to them, Śabda has a wider scope in comparison to Upamāna. Unlike the Naiyāyikas, these scholars do not find any mutual dependence between these two Pramāṇas. The Mīmāṃsakas also do not find any involvement of Śabda in Upamāna.²⁴

From a comparative analysis of the Nyāya concept of Upamāna and of Śabda, we are led to believe that all cases of Śabda-bodha are not the result of Upamāna. But each case of Upamāna implies a prior involvement of Śabda, as there can be no Upamāna without an Atidesavākya. Thus in order to have Upamiti or valid comparative knowledge, the learner must have a prior Śabdabodha in respect of the Atidesavākya. This Śabdabodha again is possible only when there is a previous knowledge of the Śakti or significative potency of the words that constitute the Atidesavākya. Hence it can be safely said that each case of Upamāna necessitates a prior involvement of Śakti or Abhidhā in it.

²⁴ ACS, p. 43
While meaningfulness is considered as the chief criterion of a word by all schools of thought, there is a considerable amount of controversy among the scholars with regard to the meaningfulness of Upasargas and Nipātas. The pertinent question involved here is whether these two sets of words are Vācaka (expressive) or Dyotaka (suggestive). Or the problem is, whether the Nipātas and Upasargas have their own meanings or signify the meanings of the words or verbal roots (as the case may be) to which they stand attached.

Now in our humble persue of the subject, we first take up the problem of the Upasargas and then that of the Nipātas.

The problem concerning the signification of Upasargas stood even before Yāska. Yāska refers to two authorities prior to him, viz. Śākatāyana and Gārgya, who held quite divergent views on the issue. While Śākatāyana asserts that the Upasargas are Dyotaka, Gārgya describes

\[\text{na nirbaddhā arthan nirahuriti śākatāyanaḥ.}
\]

\[\text{nāmākhyātayostu karmoposāmyogadyotakah bhavanti.}
\]

\[\text{NIR, 1.1.4}\]
them as Vaṅka.  

Now, in the context of the Upasargas being described as Dyotaka by Sākaṭāyana, Durgācārya, the celebrated Commentator on Nirukta, maintains that the Upasargas do not have any direct significative potency of their own. Just as the individual letters in a particular word do not have any significative potency, so also the Upasargas do not possess any Abhidhānasakti of their own, but reveal the meaning of the nominal and verbal roots to which they stand attached. Now this direct significative potency which Durgācārya terms as Sākṣāt Abhidhānasakti is decidedly the function of Abhidhā, as is clear from the concept of the same in various philosophical schools, Grammar and Poetics as well. Thus Śaṅkāyana is not ready to accept any involvement of Abhidhā in Upasargas. But Gārgya maintains that an Upasarga has its own meaning.

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90. vide our discussion on the concept and treatment of Abhidhā in various schools of thought in chapter III of the present work.

100. Vide NIR, 1.1.4
Thus, he contends that the Upasarga Abhi means 'in front' (Abhimukhyam), Pari signifies 'all around' (Sarvatobhadram) and so on through Abhidhanasakti itself. The Upasargas signify their own meanings irrespective of their being attached to or detached from nominal and verbal roots. Dārgya however, contends that the Upasargas which have their own significative potency if added to the nominal and verbal roots, come to suggest a special meaning of those nouns or verbs.

Yāska on his part, treats the Upasargas and niśātas as two separate categories of words (Padas) leading thereby us to believe that according to him, these sets of words have their own meanings.

In subsequent periods also, we find that scholars pertaining particularly to the Nyāya, Vyākaraṇa and Alāmākēra schools have indulged in a hot controversy with regard to the problem of signification of Upasargas and Niśātas.

According to the Naiyāyikas, the Upasargas are only dyotoka (suggestive) and not vācaka (expressive).

102. NIR, 1.1.5

103. evam upasarga arthavanto'pi santah svārthaśobhāhineśaktim anekapraakārām.... nāmākhyāte pratītyān vyahīryeyuh . Durgācārya on NIR, 1.1.4

104. catvāri yadejaśatāni nāmākhyate copasargenipātāhi... NIR, I. 1.1
According to them, the Upasargas only reveal the meaning of the Dhatu or verbal root to which they stand attached. As for instance, they point out, in the case of the verbal expression Prajayati (wins per excellence), the prefix pra acts only as the revealer of the meaning of the root Ji (to win); it does not signify any meaning of its own. Thus the Naiyāyikas Jayantabhaṭṭa\textsuperscript{105} and Gaṅgeśa\textsuperscript{106} while advocating such a view, maintain that the Upasargas only help in bringing out the intended meaning of the root. Annambhaṭṭa also recognises in distinct terms the suggestivity of the Upasargas. Here it is to be noted that the term Dyotaka is used by the Naiyāyikas not in the usually accepted sense of Vyanjaka or suggestor, but in the sense of Tātparyagrāhaka, i.e. the determinant of the intention of the speaker in a certain context.\textsuperscript{107}

It is however, to be noted that the Naiyāyikas do not totally deny the expressive potency to the Upasargas. According to them, the Upasargas are suggestive only in those cases where there is no sanction for expressiveness. Thus in the case of the term Upakumbham which is an

\textsuperscript{105} Compare: praJayatityāde prāśabdasya dyotakatvam, jayatiratra prakṛṣṭajayakeśakah, praśadastu tātparyagrāhakah. NM, IV, p. 816. na vācakah. TC, p. 85h

\textsuperscript{106} dyotakatvam ca dhātorarthaviśeṣe tātparyagrāhakatvam. ibid.
Avyayabhāva compound, the Naiyāyikas maintain that, the Upasarga Upā must be admitted as denotative of the sense of nearness as required by the grammatical injunction 'pūrvapadārthapradhāno'vyayabhāvaḥ'. In an Avyayabhāva compound, the first member must convey a denotative sense which will predominate the sense of the other members of the compound. But in the case of the verbal expression Prasūte (gives birth per excellence), because of lack of such a shastric requirement as maintained by the Naiyāyikas, we can not take the Upasarga Pra as denotative. Hence, 'Pra' by way of suggesting the sense of Prakarṣa (excess) of the root Sū (to give birth) shall have to be accepted as Dyotaka only.¹⁰⁹

According to the Vaiyākaranas, the Nipātas which are attached to the verbal roots (Uhātus) are Upasargas.¹¹⁰ As for instance, in the case of the expression Prasūte, as Pra is prefixed to a verbal root i.e., it is an Upasarga. But in the case of the word Upakumbha, Upa is only a Nipāta and not an Upasarga.

¹⁰⁸. VBH, p. 129
¹⁰⁹. atreyām vyavasthā upasargāṇāṁ madhye yatra yasyopa-
sargasya kiṁcidarthe śaktir na prāmāṇikī tatra tasya
dyotakatvameva, yathā prasūte ityādau, yasya ca śaktir
prāmāṇikī tasya vācaśtvam eva, yathā upakumbhah
ityādau. NK, p. 174
¹¹⁰. upasargāḥ kriyāyoge. p. I.4.59
According to the Vaiyākarāṇas also, the Upāsargās are only suggestive and never expressive. The Upāsargās serve to indicate that a verb in a certain context, signifies a special meaning. To take an illustration, the verb Ṛpta means attained, but the expression Prāpta means 'attained per excellence'. Now in the latter case, the Vaiyākarāṇas contend, the additional meaning i.e., 'per excellence' is conveyed by the verb itself, the prefix Prā only serves as the revealer of such a meaning. Here the Vaiyākarāṇas' contention is that a verbal root is not confined to any particular meaning. The meaning of a root as fixed by Pāṇini in his Dhātupātha is simply illustrative and not exhaustive. So it is possible for a root to signify more than one meaning. And it is the business of a prefix to determine the exact meaning of a verb in a certain context. This is what is contended in the well-known assertion of the Vaiyākarāṇas -

\[
\text{upāsargaṇa dhātvartho baśāṇyastra nīyate /}
\text{prahārāhāra-saṃhāravihāraparihāravat //}
\]

where the same verbal root i.e. Ṛṣ is said to signify a

\[111\text{. dyotakāḥ prādayo yena nipātāscādayastathā / Vṛ, quoted in Vbh, p. 198; prādayo dyotakā iti naiyāyikā vaiyākarāṇaścāḥuh NK, p.174} \]

\[112\text{. nanu yadi śabdasya arthaniirapekṣasya vyayājetvām negyate, tat kathām prāptam ityādau prādinām dyotakatvām uktām na vacakatvām. VV,1.122} \]

\[113\text{. atra dhātuṇāmenekārthakatvām iti śabdikānām rāddhānto'nuśandheyen. Tattvaprakāśikā,IV, p.70; NK,p.389.} \]
a number of meanings like Prahāra (to strike) with the addition of Upasargamas like Pra. Thus, according to the Vaiyākaraṇas, the Upasargamas are only suggestive and symbolical in their nature, they do not convey any meaning through Abhidhā. But here there is a difference between the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiyākaraṇas. For, while the former set of scholars means by the word Dyotaka, the determinative of the intention of the speaker, the latter means by it suggestor i.e. Vyanjaka.

The Āleńkārikas generally follow the Vaiyākaraṇas in this regard. In his DL, Anandavardhana cites a verse from Kālidāsa’s Abhijnānaśākuntalam to illustrate the suggestivity of the Upasargamas. Thus he says,

\[
\text{upasargānāṁ vyañjakatvaṁ yathā—}
\text{nīvārāḥ śukagerbhakoṭaramukhabhraṣṭästarūṇāmādhāḥ,}
\text{prasnigdāḥ kvaḍicīṅgudīphalabhādīḥ sūcyanta}
\text{evopālaḥ} / \text{viśvāsopagamadabhinnatavah śabdāṁ sahante mṛgā-}
\text{stoyādhārapathāśca vallakalāśikhāniṣyanderekāṅkitaḥ.}
\]

Here we find a very picturesque description of the environs of Kāṇva’s hermitage. Now, Anandavardhana takes up the word Prasnigdāḥ which qualifies the word Upāṣāḥ (i.e., the slabs of stones in the hermitage) and maintains

114. VP, 11.89
Also Vide Punyarāja on above.
that the Upasarga Pra in the expression not only suggests the fact that the slabs of stone are very much smooth being oily (Snigdha), but also suggests a deeper meaning, i.e., excessive beauty of Kanve’s hermitage as warranted by the reference to the presence of jucy Ingudi fruits there.\footnote{115}

Of the Ālemkārikas, however, Mahimadhṛta asserts that the Upasargas are only expressive and never suggestive. This is in conformity to his proposition that Abhidhā is the only significative function of a word.\footnote{116} Mahima points out that in expressions like Prajyati and Prāpta as referred to earlier, the additional meaning of excellence is apprehended only when the corresponding prefix is present and not when it is absent, according the rules of Anvaya (agreement) and Vyatireka (contrast).\footnote{117} Thus he concludes that the Upasargas like Pra and para are as good as the Namapadas like Gō (cow), Čaṭe (Jar) etc. and convey their meanings through Abhidhā itself.\footnote{118}

\begin{verbatim}
115. prakarṣeṇa snigdha iti prasabdah prakarṣam dyotayan ingudiphalāṇāṁ sarasatvam ācakṣāṇa ēśramasya saundaryātiśayāṁ dhvanati. Dvēnyāloka - Locana, vide, DL, p. 200
116. sabdasyaikābhidhā saktih. VV, I. 27a
117. prādiprayogānuviddhāyini tatra pācātityedau prakarṣādipratītir iti te'pi tathā bhavitum arhantyeva. ibid, pp.130-132
118. SM, p.118
\end{verbatim}
in general, however, advocate for the suggestivity of the Upasargas.

Thus, we may conclude by saying that of the subsequent schools of thought, the Vaiyākaraṇas and Ālemākritikas consider Upasargas as Dyotaka in the sense of Vyañjaka (suggestors). But the Naiyāyikas who do not recognise the Vyañjana function, use the term Dyotaka in the sense of Tātparyagrāhaka. Of the Ālamākārikas, Mahimabhaṭṭa is an exception as he regards an Upasarga as Vācaka.

**Ābhīdhā in Nīpātas**

As regards the signification of the Nīpātas, we find that while the Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas have taken all pains to prove their expressiveness, the Ālamākārikas have propounded their suggestivity. The Vaiyākaraṇas, however, have treated the Nīpātas as both expressive and suggestive.

The Mīmāṃsakas who always emphasise on the primary signification of a word, consider the Nīpātas only as expressive. Thus Kumārila maintains that although


\[\text{120. upasargani pātāḥ na prayogani yame sati /} \]

\[\text{arthastadāganyāt syāt samāsapaḍeṣviva //} \]

SV, Vākyā, 277
the Upasargas and Nipātas are used only with other words (verbs and etc.) and never by themselves, this very fact does not deprive them of their own meanings. Just as in the case of a compound, its various members retain their own meanings, so also in the case of a verbal expression or a sentence, the Upasargas and Nipātas retain their individual identity and signify their independent meanings.

Kumārila contends that his proposition supported by the rules of agreement (Anvaya) and contrariety (Vyatireka). For, we understand the corresponding meaning of an Upasarga or a Nipāta only when it is physically present and not when it is absent. As Pṛthasārathi says, 121 the collective idea (Samuccaya) in such expressions as 'Plavaśca' 'Vṛksaśca' is understood only when 'Ca' (which is a Nipāta) is used in that sense and the same idea is not cognised beforehand. It cannot be said that the idea of 'collection' is understood from the term Vṛksa which can denote only a tree. 122 The Mīmāṃsakas further argue that in the event of the a Nipāta (like Ca) being regarded as dyotaka, Sakti shall have to assumed with regard to the

121. cakarāgame hi samuccayo gamyate, na tataḥ prāgiti.

NRK on above

122. ata eva samuccayādhiśharaṇe mīmāṃśakair uktam - kevala-vṛksaśabdāt samuccayābodhāt cakārasāvane tad- bodhāt cakāra eva tadvācakah, na ca dyotakah.

VBH, p. 208.
Nipāta itself, and such a position would involve the fault of prolixity which is not desirable at all. Hence for the sake of parsimony, the Nipāta itself is to be admitted as Vācaka.

Kumārila however, dismisses the whole issue by saying that it is useless to deliberate on the question as to whether the verbal prefixes etc. are themselves distinctly denotative or suggestive of the roots to which they are attached. For, what the Mīmāṁsakas really seek to assert is that, in the context of signification of the sentence, the Upasargas and Nipātas have distinct significative functions of their own, either in the shape of direct independent denotation or in that of merely helping to manifest certain changes in the signification of the root.

Of the Vaiyākaraṇas, Bhartrhari, Nāgėśa, Kondabhaṭṭa and Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita have elaborately dealt with the problem of signification of Upasargas and Nipātas.

123. kiṃca dyotakatve padāntaraṇāṁ ēaktiḥ kalpyā ca kārasya ca dyotakatva ēaktiḥ kalpanīyā iti gaurevam syēt.

ibid.

124. vācakatvadyotakatvāṁ tu nātīvātropayujyate / tadbhāvāḥ vācakatvam vā parasyānugraho'stu vā / SV , Vākya, 278

Also vide Nīk on above
Also vide SV translated by Ganganath Jhā, p. 53c.
Bhartṛhari severely criticises the Naiyāyikas for their discrimination in the treatment of the two sets of words, viz. Upasargas, and Nipātas.125 According to the Naiyāyikas, the Nipātas are expressive and Upasargas are suggestive, whereas Bhartṛhari asserts that the Nipātas like Ca are suggestive on the same ground on which the Upasargas are.

According to Bhartṛhari, the Nipātas (e.g. Ca) are not capable of being used as words like Go (cow), and as such they can not be considered as having their own meaning (Vācyārtha). Hence, whether employed before or after other word, Nipātas like Ca can only suggest a meaning.126 Thus Upasargas and Nipātas are indiscriminately treated as suggestive words by Bhartṛhari. Nāgeśa takes cognizance of this view of Bhartṛhari and shows that in the expressions 'anubhūyate sukham' and 'sākṣātkriyate guruḥ', the Upasarga Anu and the Nipāta Sākṣāt do not make any difference, inasmuch as both of them only suggest the special meanings of the verbs concerned.127 Nāgeśa on his

125. upasargā dyotakaḥ, nipātā vācakā iti naiyāyikamatam na yuktam, vaiṣamye bijābhāvāditi... ..... VBH, p. 203
   dyotakaḥ prādayo yena nipātās/cadayas tathā/
   VP, Vide VBH, p. 198

126. VP, II, 194

127. VSM, p. 584
part, however, maintains that the Upasargas other than the Nipātas are both expressive and suggestive. Some other Vaiyākārṇas also hold this view. These scholars refer to the Paninian rule 'avyayam vibhaktisamIpe' to substantiate their stand.

Bhartṛhari also maintains that some Nipātas can be expressive of a separate meaning, while some others may behave like augments and express a sense together with the words to which they stand attached. Thus a Nipāta derives its expressive potency from the expressive word to which it stands attached. Kaundabhaṭṭa explains this position of Bhartṛhari, in the expression 'atha śabdānuśāsanam'. Here the Nipāta Atha is said to be expressive because of the term śabdānuśāsana (science of words, i.e. Grammar) which is expressive by itself.

128. etena upasargāṇāṁ dyotatvam taditaranipatānāṁ vācakatvam.

ibid, 585

129. Vide NK, p.422

130. nipāta dyotakāh kecit prthgarthābhidhāyinaḥ / āgamā iva ke'pi syuḥ sambhūyārthasya vācakaḥ //

VP, 11.184

131. etena cādayāṁ santu dyotakāḥ uktayukteḥ, athaśabdastu vācaka eva...... atha śabdānuśāsanaṁ ityatra vācakaśpadasamabhivyāhārācca. 'atha śabdānuśāsanam'ityatrāpi anudāsanaśabda eva tadvācakaḥ.

VBH, p. 209.
That certain Nipātas convey their meaning through Abhidhā is maintained by Bhaṭṭoji also. Thus in the context of his explanation of the Paninian rule 'tritiyāsampatmyor bahulam', he recognises the expressiveness of the Nipāte Adhi in the example 'adhihari'. He however, shows his awareness of the view of the ancient Grammarians who have accepted such Nipātas as Adhi only as suggestive and not expressive.  

So the Vaiyākaraṇas including Bhartṛhari maintain a two-fold signification of the Nipātas viz. Vācakātva and Dyotakātva as well. Thus, the Vaiyākaraṇas differ from the Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas, since these two groups of scholars consider all Nipātas as Vācaka only.

The Ālāmkkārikas strongly advocate for the suggestivity of the Nipātas. Thus Ānandavardhana in his strong anxiety to establish Dhvani as the very essence of Kavya, shows that in the writings of great poets, even a Nipāta can convey a very profound idea. As an instance of suggestivity of Nipātas, he cites a verse from Kāli Ṛṣa's

132. hari ityadhihari sampatmyarthasyaiva dyotakeḥ .......... 
    stra nipatenaḥbhihite'pyadhikaraṇa ............. .... 
    SLK, 959

Also Vide Tippānī on above by Śivadāsa.

133. iti vākyapadīye'pi pakṣadvayam uktam iti bhāvaḥ. 
    VBH, p. 204
Here the king Pururavas laments upon his separation from the heavenly demesne Urvasi at the advent of the rainy season when the sky is overcast with the dark masses of clouds heavy with rains, and when the days are totally deprived of sunshine. According to Ananda, the Nipata 'Ca' here suggests that the coincidence of the two events (viz. separation from Urvasi and advent of the rainy season) is unbearable to the speaker, i.e. the king, which is enough to cause his death.

Of the later Alamkārikas also, Pāṇḍitaraṇjana Jagannātha asserts that the Nipatas like Iva are only suggestive and never denotative. Thus in the matter of their signification, Jagannātha contends, the Nipatas behave like the Upasargas. It is however, important to note that the suggestiveness of the Nipatas as recognised by the Dvānī theorists is distinct from the one accepted by the Grammarians. For, Ānandaśārvaṇa propounds

134. ayamekapade tathā viyogāḥ priyaśā copanatah
suduḥsaḥo me /
navavṛidharodayādahobhir-bhavitavyām ca nirāt:pardhi-
.... -ramyaḥ // op.cit., IV.

135. DL. III, p. 195
136. tatrevādināṁ dyotakatveva na vṛcakatveṁ
nipatātavādupasargavat dyotakatveṁ ca
svasam bhivyāhṛtapadāntareṇa śaktyā lokṣamayā vṛt.

ib, p. 141
their suggestiveness in relation to Rasa, bhāva etc. not in the sense in which the Vaiyākaraṇas regard them to be suggestive. Kuntakā, in his Vakroktijivita faithfully represents this view held by the advocates of Dhvani.

Avoiding any further deliberation on the issue, we may take note of the fact that the controversy which appears to be first recorded by Yāska, remained an unsolved problem even after centuries. In fact, in subsequent periods, Vācakatva or Dyotakatva with regard to the Upasargas and Nīpātas had usually a reference to the corresponding Abhidhā and Vyākaranā functions recognised by various schools of thought, and the Āleśkārikas fully utilised the concept of Dyotakatva of Yāska in the context of their propounding the doctrine of Dhvani.

ABHIDHĀ INVOLVED IN SAMĀSAS:

On the question of the significative function involved in a Samāsa also scholars hold divergent views. Here the pertinent question is whether a compound signifies its meaning through Abhidhā or any other function.

137. iha dyotakatvāṁ rasāpekṣayoktamiti draṣṭavyam.
    DLV, p. 20

138. upasarganiplayaḥ vaiyākaraṇaprasiddhabhidhānoḥrāṣṭuyagottotanāṁ śṛṅgāraprabhṛtīprakāśanam/
    op.cit., p.120.
This very problem has been treated mainly by the Mīmāṃsākās, Naiyāyikas and Vaiyākaraṇas.

The Mīmāṃsākās assert that the meaning of a compound is generally conveyed by Abhidhā. But in the cases of compounds where the desired meaning is not understood from the constituent members, Laksanā must be assumed for the apprehension of the same. The Mīmāṃsākās, as we have earlier seen, maintain that a word bears a natural relation to its meaning and as such, when a passage can be explained by the primary meaning itself, it is of no use resorting to Laksanā. As for instance, they have cited the word Nisadasthāpati,139 occurring in the context of nāyudreṇī. This word may be derived in two ways, viz. [i] 'nisādaścāsausthāpatiscacā' and [ii] 'nisādānām sthāpatiḥ'. The former is an instance of Karmadharaya compound and the latter that of Tatpuruṣa. The word, if taken as a Karmadharaya compound, means a 'king who is a Nisāda'. But if taken as a Tatpuruṣa compound, it means the 'king of Nisādas'. The Mīmāṃsākās maintain that the word Nisadasthāpati is to be considered as a Karmadharaya compound so that the constituent members may retain their primary meanings. In other words, the meaning brought about by Abhidhā should be accepted as the intended meaning of the word. The word should not be taken as a

139. MS, VI. 1.51-52
Tatpuruṣa compound, as in that case, it will necessitate a recourse to Laksanā, - a position which the Mīmāṃsākās do not usually favour.140

The Naiyāyikas, however, maintain that in all cases of compounds where the intended meaning is not apprehended directly from the constituent members, one must resort to Laksanā. As for instance, in the case of the Bahuvrīhi compound Citraguh (one possessed of spotted cows), the Naiyāyikas resort to Laksanā in order to have the sense of the owner (of the spotted cows). Here the Vigrahavākya is 'citra gāvo yasya saḥ'. Thus the intended meaning is neither 'spotted' (Citra), nor 'cows' (Gāvaḥ), but 'the owner of the spotted cows'. As the Sakti pertaining to the constituent members fails to convey this meaning, one must resort to Laksanā for understanding the same.141 The Naiyāyikas, however, do not resort to Laksanā in the case of the whole compound word but with regard to one word only.142 Thus in the case of

140. Purvamīmāṃśa in it Source, p. 315
vide ITM, pp. 268-269
141. na ca citrapadām citragosvāmīlaksākām tatra gopadārthaṁvayāt nāpi gopadām laksākām, gosvāminī citrapadārthaṁvayāpateḥ. TC, p. 73;
142. na hi bahuvrīhau samastapadānāṃ lākṣaṇikatvāt ekpadadātri lākṣaṇaṁyāpi bahuvrīheryavasthāpyastvāt, SSP, p. 238.
the Bhuvrihi compound Citraguh cited above, the first word possesses its fixed Sakti with regard to the quality 'of being spotted' while the second word i.e. Go, besides signifying through Sakti the object cow, conveys through Lakṣaṇā the meaning 'the owner of the spotted cows'. In such cases, the word retaining its fixed Sakti comes to serve as suggestive of the intention of the speaker (Tātparyagrāhaka), just as in the sentence 'gambhirāyām nadyām ghusah' (the village of cowherds on the deep river), either the word Nadi or Gambhirā signifies through Lakṣaṇā 'the bank of the deep river' and the other word serves to suggest the purport.143

Here it may be noted that the Naiyāyikas reject Sakti and for that matter Lakṣaṇā also in a whole compound keeping consistency with their notion of a word (word) as being possessed of Sakti. According to them, Sakti belongs to a word and word alone. Since there is no Sakti in a sentence, there can not be Lakṣaṇā also in it, Lakṣaṇā being nothing but a relation between the expressed meaning and the indicated meaning. Hence whether it is Sakti or Lakṣaṇā, it must belong only to the component members of a compound and never to the

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143. gambhirāyām nadyām ghusah
lakṣaṇām, padāntaram tu tatra tātparyagrāhakamiti
siddhāntavidah. SSP, p. 143
Viśvanātha while representing the view of the Naiyāyikas in this regard, shows that in the cases of Uvandva and Karmaḥāraya compounds, where the scope of Lakṣaṇā is completely ruled out, the desired Śabdabodha occurs on the strength of the syntactical relation of the expressed meanings of the component members. In the cases where Lakṣaṇā operates in the constituent members in order to effect the desired Śabdabodha, it (i.e. Lakṣaṇā) pertains only to the individual words. The secondary meanings in such cases are apprehended as additional meanings related to the primary ones. Hence it does not necessitate the admission of Sakti of the whole compound word. So the question of Lakṣaṇā pertaining to a Samāsa as a whole also does not arise.

The Vaiyākaraṇas assert that a Samāsa is an expressive word and the expressive potency pertains to the compound word as a whole. According to them, a Samāsa is a single word and is never a sentence as is conceived by

\[ 144. \text{vākya tu saktarabhāvāt saktisambandharūpā lakṣaṇāpi nāsti. SMU, p. 452} \]
\[ 145. \text{itthānca samāsa na kvāpi saktiḥ padaśaktyāiva nirvāhāditi. SMU, p. 464} \]
\[ 146. \text{ACS, p. 464} \]
the Naiyāyikas. This is because, the Vaiyākaraṇas are anxious to maintain the status of a Samāsa as a prātipadika. If a Samāsa is supposed to be a collection of words (and hence a sentence), and not as a single word (Ekapada), it will not be possible to apply the definition of a Prātipadika\textsuperscript{147} to it. Thus the Vaiyākaraṇas' difference from the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas is very natural, as according to these two groups of scholars there is no Śakti in a Vākya and a Samāsa which is also a Vākya in its condensed form.

The Vaiyākaraṇas, however, maintain that the Śakti pertaining to the component members cannot convey the unified idea intended to be signified by a compound. Hence they assume a special function of denotation for the comprehension of the new meaning of the compound word\textsuperscript{148}, the meaning which is different from those of the component members. Thus in case of the Bahuvrīhi compound Citraguh\textsuperscript{149} cited above, Laksāṇa is not competent to convey the sense of the owner. For, the word Go here cannot signify such a meaning through Laksāṇa, nor can the word Citra indicate the same, as in that case the meaning of

\textsuperscript{147} arthavadadhāturaṇaṃpratyayāḥ prātipadikaḥ, \textit{P}, \textit{1.2.45}.

\textsuperscript{148} samāse khalu bhinnaiśa śaktiḥ. \textit{VBH}, p. 31.

\textsuperscript{149} citragurūṭyādau svāmyadipratitāye śaktirēvāśyāti, na ca laksāṇayā nirvāhah. \textit{ibid.}, p. 177.
the word Citrā will be incompatible with that of the owner, for it is the cows and not the owner that is spotted. It is under these circumstances that the Vaiyākaraṇas assume a special Sakti to account for such an additional meaning of a compound and regard the whole compound as an indivisible unit of speech.¹⁵⁰

Here it may be noted that, since the Vaiyākaraṇas believe in Padalakṣanā, it is not unnatural that they assume a Lakṣanā in a Samāsa. According to them, Samāsa is a kind of Pada. Here we are alive to the fact that the Vaiyākaraṇas have included Samāsas in the list of Prātipadikas. Still they believe that Abhidhā involved in a Samāsa (compounded word) is different from Abhidhā involved in an ordinary word. So they describe the Abhidhā involved in a Samāsa as a special kind of Abhidhā.

In view of above, it may be noted that the Vaiyāka-
raṇas' theory in favour of a special Sakti may be justified in cases of those compounds only where we understand a meaning different from those of the component members. Thus in cases of Bahuvrīhi and Samāhāra Dvandva, for instance, where such a separate meaning is apprehended, we can justify the above position of the Vaiyākaraṇas. But in cases of such compounds as Dvandva (others than Samāhāra type) and karma-
dhāraya, where we do not understand any meaning other than the one of the component members, the Vaiyākaraṇa's position does not seem to be justified, since in such cases, Abhidhā involved in the component members themselves conveys the total meaning of the compound.

¹⁵⁰ ITM, pp. 267-268
The involvement of Abhidhā in Alamkāras or figures of speech is universally recognised. The Alamkāras contribute excellence to poetry and render it more relishable. This they do by beautifying the poetic texture comprising word and meaning.\textsuperscript{151} Thus there are two types of Alamkāras, viz. (i) Śabdālāmākāras, i.e. figures based on words and (ii) Arthālāmākāras i.e. figures based on meanings. It is needless to say that the Śabdālāmākāras bring in only outward charm to poetry, while the Arthālāmākāras render inward charm to the expression and make poetry more delightful.

The writers on Poetics, as we find, differ among themselves on the question of the exact role played by the Alamkāras in Poetry. The ancient writers like Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Udbhāta and Vāmana consider the Alamkāras as indispensable part of Poetry. According to them, Kāvya consists in the combination of word and sense embellished by the Alamkāras.\textsuperscript{152} These writers, as we have earlier seen, try to explain away all cases of suggested meanings as certain types of Alamkāras. They conceive all Alamkāras as various types

\textsuperscript{151} śabdārthayor asthirā ye dharmaḥ śobhātisāyīnāḥ / rasādIn upakurvanto'lamkāras te 'ṅgadādivat // SD.X.1

\textsuperscript{152} cf. sahrdayahṛdayāḥlādakāri śabdārthamayatvam eva kāvyalakṣaṇām. DLV, p. 5
of relation between the expressive word and the expressed
content and as such, with them, Alamkāras are nothing
more than Vāgvikalpa, i.e. various ways of denotation.\(^{153}\)
Thus according to the pre-Ānandavardhena Alamkārikas,
genearly Abhidhā is the function involved in Alamkāras.

Ānandavardhena while taking cognisance of this
view of his predecessor, however, takes care to show that
Dhvani can not be included under the domain of Alamkāras.
He draws the line of demarcation between the scope of
Alamkāra and that of Dhvani, says that while the former is
based on Abhidhā, the latter has for its basis, the function
of Vyaṇjanā.\(^{154}\) The figures of speech are solely
dependent on the expressive word and the expressed meaning
and as such on the primary significative function of a
word. But Dhvani is conveyed through the function of
suggestion and hence Alamkāra and Dhvani are mutually
exclusive. Abhidhā, basically is the relation between the
word and its meaning, and when this relation develops stage
by stage, new poetic figures with greater excellence come
to be created in poetry automatically. As for instance,
the face is variously compared to the lotus through such

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\(^{153}\) cf. DL, I. p.20; also vide Locana, p.56
\(^{154}\) vyāṅgyavyāṅjakasambandhanibandhanatayā dhvanēḥ
\textit{vācyavācacakacārutraḥvahetvatapatītā kutah} //
DL, I.13, also Vṛtti, 1/13, p. 129
various expressions as 'mukham kamalam iva manoharam' (The face is as beautiful as the lotus), 'mukhakamalam pasyami' (I see the face-lotus), 'mukham vā kamalam vā' (Whether it is a face or a lotus?) and so on, and thus various figures like Upamā, Rūpaka, Saṇdeha etc. come to be created in Poetry. Thus in all such Alamkāras based on the relation of Sādṛśya or resemblance, we find basically an involvement of Upamā Alamkāra. In other words the same figure Upamā appears as Rūpaka, Anavayav, Atiśayokta, Utpreksa etc. depending on the nature of relation between the Upameya and the Upamāna.

Now, although Abhidhā is the function that generally operates to convey the significance of Alamkāras, yet we find the involvement of Lakṣanā and Vyājanā also in certain figures. Thus in the figure Upamā which is accepted as the ground of almost all the ideational figures, the similarity between the Upamāna (the standard of comparison) and Upameya (the object to be compared) is brought about by the function of Abhidhā. Among the earlier Ālamkārikas, Rudraṇa conceives of the figure Aupamya, which has as many as twenty one varieties, Upamā being the foremost of them.155 In fact, of the figures

155. cf. arthasyāālamkārā vāstavam aupamyam atiśayam śleṣah/
KLR, VII, 9.a.
of speech that embellish the expressed meaning, Upamā stands out as pre-eminent. Viśvanātha Kavirāja defines Upamā as that figure of speech where the resemblance between two things is expressed in words comprising a single sentence, without reference to any contrast (between the two things). Here Viśvanātha mentions in explicit terms that the relation of resemblance between two things is conveyed by the function of Abhidhā itself. He contends that words like Iva, Yathā, and Vā express the similarity between the Upameya (e.g. Mukha) and Upamāna (e.g. Kamala). Here it may be noted that although there is a hot controversy as to whether words like Iva are Vācaka or Dyotaka because of their being Nīpātas, Viśvanātha enjoys support from such ancient authorities as Bhāmaha when he considers them as Vācaka. According to Bhāmaha, the words such as Iva have a peculiar power whereby they denote, whenever they are employed, that two objects are related together as possessing a common property. Thus in the

156. samprati arthālāmkārāṇām prastāvāḥ tarmūlaṁ copamā iti saiva vicāryate. KLSV, IV 2.1
157. sāmyam vācyam avaidharmyam vakyaika upamā dvayoh. SDK, p.17
158. cf. tatra ivādīnām dyotakatvameva, na vācakatvāṃ nipātatvād upasargavat. RG, p.191
159. yathevaśabdau sādṛṣyamāḥhartur vyatirekiṅoh. KL, 11.31a
example 'mukhām kamalam iva manoharam' which is cited as an example of the figure Upamā, by the very employment of the word Iva, the two objects, viz. Mukha and Kamala are shown to be related together as Upameya and Upamāna on account of their possessing the common property of being 'manohara' (charming).

In Upamā, the apprehension of the comparison, however, may be either direct or indirect, and thus we have two types of it, viz. Śrauti (Direct) and Ārthī (Indirect). The Śrauti type of Upamā is that where the idea of comparison is conveyed by words like Yathā, Iva, Vā and so on or by the suffix Vat used in the sense of Iva (like), it is called Ārthī when the notion of comparison is brought about by such words as Tulya, Samāna and so on or by the suffix Vat employed in the sense of Tulya (equal). Now in view of these two divisions of Upamā, the Ālāṃkārikas contend that, in Śrauti Upamā the notion of comparison is apprehended as soon as the words like Yathā, Iva etc. are cognised. In other words, in such examples as 'mukhaṁ kamalam iva manoharam' the expressive potency or Abhidha pertaining to such words as Iva immediately brings about the notion of comparison.

160. Vide KP, p. 548; SDK, p.17
161. cf. yathēvasābdēyogena sā śrūtyā anvayam arhati.

KLSS, I.35
But in Ārthī Upāma, say in 'kamalena tulyam mukham' (The face is similar to the lotus), the function of words like Tulya is exhausted with the Upameya (i.e. Mukha), in 'kamalāṇa mukhasya tulyam' (The lotus is equal of the face), the power of words like Tulya is exhausted in the Upamāna (i.e. Kamala), in 'kamalāṇa mukham ca tulyam' (The lotus and the face are alike), on the other hand, the power of words like Tulya gets exhausted in both Upameya and Upamāna. Thus in Ārthī Upāma, the expressive potency (i.e. Abhidhā) pertaining to the words like Iva gets exhausted in being attributive to the Upamāna. Such words have no further potency to convey the idea of comparison between the two things based upon the possession of some common property (Sāmanyakārma in the shape of a quality or action). The apprehension of Śādṛṣyā or comparison arises only when we reflect upon the fact that one thing cannot be similar unless there is some common property. Thus in Ārthī Upāma, the idea of comparison occurs at a later stage unlike in the Śrautī type.

Now a pertinent question arises as to what is the significative function that conveys the idea of comparison

162. Vide SDK, p. 17
163. Vide P.V.Kane, SD, Notes, p.92
in the case of Ārthī Upamā. Mammaṭa maintains that the notion of comparison occurs here from Arthasāmartya, i.e., the potency pertaining to the meaning (of words like Tulya). The Bālabodhinī under KP understands this Arthasāmartya in the sense of Ākṣepa or Arthāpatti. Nāgeśa, as interpreted by BB, maintains that in Ārthī Upamā, the comparison is brought about by the function of Vyañjanā. Nāgeśa, however, himself refers to two types of Upamā, Vācyā and Lakṣya. Thus according to him, Upamā is Vācyā when words such as Yathā, Iva, Sadṛṣa and Tulya are employed. It is treated as Lakṣyā if words like Suhṛt, Pratipakṣa are used.

Now, whether Upamā is Vācyā, Lakṣyā or Vyaṅgyā, in all these varieties, it involves the Abhidhā function. In the case of Vācyā Upamā, the involvement of Abhidhā is

164. sāmyapryālocaṇayā tulyatāpratītītītītī sadharmasyasya arthatvāt tulyādiśabdopadāne ārthī... KP, p. 552
Also, cf. kecit śabdopāttāḥ kecid arthasāmartyād avaseyāḥ. ibid., p. 597
165. cf. arthatvāt arthavaśalabhyātvaḥ ākṣepagamyātyvatāḥ ityarthāḥ. arthāpattigamyatvād iti yāvat.
   op.cit, Vide KP, p. 552
166. cf. ata eva ārthitvam ityādinaḥ vyāñjanayā eva ityantena nāgojibhāṭṭair iti tatra draṣṭavyam.
   BB, vide ibid., p. 554
167. iyam ca upamā yathā iva sadṛṣa-tulyādiśabdopadāne vyācyālakṣyāḥ, suhṛtpratipakṣādiśabdopadāne lakṣyā.
   Udyota on KP, vide KP, p. 28
direct, while in the cases of Lakṣyā and Vyaṅgyā types, the involvement of Abhidhā in Upamā is indirect.

Various figures of speech are rooted in the function of Lakṣaṇā. As for instance, the figures Rūpaka, Atisayokti, Aprastutapraśamsā, Vyājastuti and Hetu have for their root the secondary significative function of words. Thus Udbhaṭa recognises in explicit terms the involvement of Guṇavṛtti (i.e., Lakṣaṇā) in Rūpaka. He defines Rūpaka as that figure where a word fails to get syntactically related with other words through its denotative function (Śruti) and gets connected chiefly with the Guṇavṛtti. Thus we can safely say that in the scheme of Udbhaṭa, the figure Rūpaka involves the function of Abhidhā, as without a previous operation of Śruti or Abhidhā, Guṇavṛtti or Lakṣaṇā can not come into operation. In respect of the other afore-mentioned figures, also based on Lakṣaṇā as recognised by these ancient writers, involvement of Abhidhā function stands indispensable on the same ground.

According to the advocates of Dhvani and Rasa schools, however, in figures like Rūpaka, the idea of comparison is brought about by the Vyaṅjanā function.

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168. śrutiya sambandhavirahād yatpadena padāntaram /

169. cf. rūpakādiṣu sāmyasya vyaṅgyatvam. SDK,p.17

168. K LSS,1.11

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But in such figures also, we find an involvement of Abhidhā in its different degree. As for instance, we may refer to such figures as Prativastūpamā. In Prativastūpamā, the idea of similarity between two sentences is brought about by the function of Vyaṇjanā. But the common property (i.e. the very basis of this similarity) signified here by two different words, i.e. synonymous expression comes to be conveyed by the function of Abhidhā.

To illustrate the involvement of Abhidhā in Alamkāras, we may here refer to a few other Alamkāras. Thus in Vācyotprekṣā the idea of comparison between two things is conveyed by the function of Abhidhā itself through such words as Iva. Another important figure involving Abhidhā is the figure Śleṣa. In Śleṣa both the sets of meanings understood from homonyms are contextual and such are conveyed by Abhidhā. As an illustration of Śleṣa, the following verse is cited in the Dhvanyāloka.

170. Prativastūpamā is defined as follows:

prativastūpamā sa syād vākyayor gamyāsyāyoḥ /
ekō'pi dharmāḥ sāmānyo yatra nirdiśyate prthak //
SD.X. 49.b- 50.a

171. cf. vācyevādiprayoge syād........ Vide SDK, p.29

172. vastudvaye ca śabdaśaktyā prakāśāyamāne śleṣāh.
DL,II. p.71

173. ibid., p.72
yena dhvastamanobhavena balijit kāyāḥ pūrastrīkṛto
yasćcodvṛttabhujaḥghanaḥavaloṣa ganga ca yo'dhārayat/
yasyābhūḥ sāśimacchirohara iti stutyaṁ ca nāmāmaṁ
pāyat sa svayamandhakekṣayakarastvāṁ servademēdhavaḥ//

This whole verse is homonymous (Sliṣṭa) and it may be applicable as a benediction soliciting the favour of either Mādhava (i.e., Lord Viṣṇu) or Umādhava (i.e., Lord Śiva, the consort of Umā). Thus we have two completely different meanings from the same set of words as applicable to Viṣṇu and Śiva. Here both the meanings are brought about by the function of Abhidhe itself.

The theorists prior to Ānandavardhana hold that in Śleṣa another Alakāra may be discernible. Udbhata points out that Śleṣa invariably gives rise to the idea of additional Alakāras like Upemē, Virodha, Kūpakā etc. 174 Ānandavardhana also accepts this view and says that the additional figure in Śleṣa is conveyed by Abhidhe. 175 To substantiate his stand, Ānandavardhana cites the following verse 176:

ḥāreṇa
tasyā vināpi nisargādeva hārīnau
janayāmāsūṇ kasya vismayāṁ na payodharau //

Here the term Hārīnau is a homonym. In one case, it means

174. KLSS, IV. 9-10
175. Vide DL, II. p. 81
176. Vide ibid.
'attractive' and in another it signifies 'having a neck-lace'. Now when we connect the second meaning, i.e. 'having a neck-lace', we have the figure Virodhābhāsa which is expressly conveyed because of the particle Api. In this case, we have a Vācyā Śleṣa as well as a 'Vācyavirodhābhāsa' on account of the same Śleṣa. 177 Both these additional figures, therefore, are conveyed by Abhidhā.

Thus we may conclude by saying that the involvement of Abhidhā, directly or indirectly, is admitted by the Ālamkārikas pertaining to all schools of poetics. In the case of Vyaṅgyālamkāras (expressed figures of speech, while Vyañjanā is the significative function immediately responsible for comprehension of those figures, we must not lose sight of the fact that the Vyañjanā which serves the purpose in the context is also dependent on some Abhidhā.

177. DTSP, p. 97