CHAPTER III

THE CONCEPT AND TREATMENT OF ABHIDHĀ IN PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS IN SANSKRIT

INTRODUCTION:

The scholars belonging to all schools of Indian thought maintain directly or indirectly that the essential nature of a word lies in its primary significative potency which generally passes as Abhidhā or Sakti. They, however, are not in agreement with regard to the nature and concept of this Abhidhā. This leads to the emergence of two rival theories which may be termed as the 'Natural' or 'Inherent' theory and the 'Conventional' theory. While the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vaiyākaraṇas are the advocates of the former theory, the Naiyāyikas are the upholders of the latter. These theories concerning the primary significance of a word, are obviously based on the corresponding two divergent theories concerning the relation of a word to its meaning as held by these groups of scholars and as dealt with by us earlier. The Vedāntins generally agree with the Mīmāṃsakas on this issue and hence they accept the 'Natural' theory.

1. ITM, p. 19.
Now it is proposed here to deal with the concept and treatment of this primary significative potency of a word as met with in various schools of Indian philosophy with a special reference to those of Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya.

**ABHIDHĀ IN THE MĪMĀṂSĀ AND VEDĀNTA WORKS**

The Mīmāṃsakas pertaining to both the Nyāya and schools of Prabhākara conceive Abhidhā as an inherent potency (Sakti) of a word to signify its meaning. This Padrākta is not different from the power (Sakti) in general. Just as the power burning naturally inheres in fire, so also Sakti of a word remains latent in it. Jaimini himself refers to this Sakti by name in MS, I.2.28 in the context of dealing with the problem of signification of corrupt forms (Apabhrama) of words like Gāvī, Gopī etc. According to him, such corrupt forms as Gāvī are not possessed of Sakti of their own. They denote their meanings only indirectly by the expressive 'potency of the original correct words' (i.e. Gō in the present case) through their similarity with it'. This is because, as Jaimini contends, the natural and invariable relation between a word and its

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2. abhidhānasaktiḥ svābhāvikī, .............. TV, i. 683
3. padānāṁ tatpadārtheṣu śaktiḥ svābhāvikī sthitā/ PP, I.46, p. 16
4. tadasāktiścāturūpapratvāt, Vide MD, p. 53
5. tadasāktireṣāṁ gamyate. SB under MS. I.2.28
6. ibid; also vide ITM, p. 42
meaning does not allow a meaning to have more than one word, nor does the same eternal relation allow a word to convey more than one meaning.  

The meanings conveyed by Śakti are apprehended on the very occasion of hearing the corresponding words and hence these meanings are termed Śrutyartha or Srauta Artha and Śakti is called Śruti or Srauta-vṛtti.  

Although Jaimini recognises the function of Laksṇa also, he always insists on the primary signification of a word in the event of a conflict between the meanings conveyed by Śakti and Laksṇa.  

7. anyāyaścānēkasabdatvam. MS, I.3.26  
8. gārhapṛtyam upatiśṭhate iti sannikṛṣṭah śrutyartheḥ. SB under MS, III.3.14  
9. gaṅgēyāṁ ghoṣa ityādau śrautasya gaṅgāpadārtheṣu vākyārthe'nvayāsambhavāt...... ..... VM, p. 24  
10. śrutiśca laksṇāyāgarīyasī. SB under MS. X.8.35  
11. pratipattipraugau hi nāvaśyeyāṁ śrautaśrītyanunāśri- 
    nāveva, laksṇāpi loke darśanāt. V under VM, K.42, 
    Vide PP  
12. guṇomukhyayatikrame tadarthatvāt mukhyena 
    vedasāmyogah. MS, III, 3, 3.
in the case of the Vedic injunction 'niṣādarthapatim yājajayet', he accepts the primary significative potency of the expression 'niṣādsthapatim', allowing thereby the right to perform a sacrifice even to a Niṣāda, an outcaste.\(^{15}\)

Sabarāsvāmin, in his Bhāṣya on the Mīmāṃsāsūtra, came to insist much more on the primary signification of a word.\(^{14}\) He shows the predominance of the primary meaning over the secondary one in the expression 'agnirmāṇavakaḥ'. According to him, here the term Agni signifies both the ideas of the 'burning capacity' and 'brightness', and the whole sentence conveys the knowledge of the boy whose character is connected with the brightness of the fire by virtue of similarity. Thus the word Agni secondarily signifies the boy (Māṇavakaḥ) through similarity. But without a previous idea of 'fire', the idea of similarity cannot be apprehended. Hence 'fire' is the primary meaning of the term Agni, and the 'boy' who is similar with 'fire' is the later or secondary meaning of the word.\(^{15}\)

\(^{13}\) sthapatir niṣādaḥ syādasāmerthyāt. MS, VI.1.51

\(^{14}\) śrutilakṣaṇāviṣaye ca śrutir jyāyati. SB under MS, I.4.2

\(^{15}\) ato'gnisādṛṣyaḥ asya pravṛttau nimittam. na ca jvalane'pratīte tatsādṛṣyam pratiyate. tasmājjaḷenasyāgniśabdo nimittam, na māṇavakasya tasmājjaḷene mukhyo na māṇavake. ibid under III.2.1.
Thus according to Šabara, Laksana always stands in the need of a prior operation of Śakti, as he categorically says that a word cannot signify its secondary meaning without conveying the primary one. It is the meaning brought about by Śakti that is apprehended from a word directly. Hence Gāgābhata, a later Mīmāṃsaka of the Bhāṭṭa school, defines Śakti (Abhidhā) as the Vṛtti or verbal function which is conducive to the apprehension of meanings of words without involving any intervention brought by another Vṛtti.

Of the Mīmāṃsakas, Kumarilabhaṭṭa appears to be the first to use the term Abhidhā for the primary significative function of a word. According to him, the denotative potency of a word cannot be conceived apart from the knowledge of the natural relation between the word and the object signified by it. Just as the word Devadatta can have no inherent denotativeness, so also words like Jo (cow) cannot have any Abhidhā Śakti prior to recognition of the relation between the expression and the expressed. Thus

16. na hyanabhidhāya mukhyam gaunamabhivadati śabdāh.  
ibid.

17. keyāṁ śaktiriti cet? avyavdhānena śabdajenyaśpatītya- 
nukūla vṛttiḥ śaktiḥ.  
BHC, p. 56

18. sambandhagrahāyatpurvaṁ yasmāṇa gamayetypī/ 
gavāder nābhidhā/aktir devadattapade yathā //  
SV, Sambandhākṣepa, 35.
the concept of Abhidhāṇa owes its origin to the concept of this eternal relation which is variously termed as Vācyavācakasambandha,¹⁹ Samjñāsamjñīsambandha²⁰ or Pratyāyya-pratyāyakasambandha. Explaining the true nature of Vācyatva and Vācakatva, Kumārila says that in the action of denotation, the objective character pertains to the object denoted, and that of instrumentality to the word itself.²¹ Pārthasārathi explains the contention of Kumārila by saying that the denotation of the meaning serves as the action, the fruit whereof is the apprehension of the meaning, and this is not other than the knowledge of the word itself.

Like Śabara, Kumārila insists much more on this Sakti in the context of comprehension of the meaning of a word, and says that Abhidhānāsakti is an inherent

19. vācyavācakasambandhanīśedhe lokābādhanam /  
   ibid, ll.a

20. tannimitte'pi sambandhoḥ samjñāsamjñītalakṣaṇaḥ /  
   ibid, 32;  
   also, ucyate samjñāsamjñītalakṣaṇa iti.  
   SB under MS. I.1.5

21. abhidhānākriyāyām hi karmatvām vācyasamsritam /  
   sābdāṇām karaṇatvām vā kartṛtvām vā nirūpyatvām/  
   also  
   ibid, 12.6-13a  
   kiṃ punaridām vācyatvām vācakatvām ca taddhāryat.  
   arthanyakṛtiḥ sābdavyāpāraḥ abhidhānākriyāḥ,  
   taccā sābdajñānātmeva tadeva hyarthapratisattipha-  
   latayā nirūpyamāṇam abhidhānākriyetyucyate.  
   NāK under above, vide 54.
power of a word, while Laksana is only a secondary significative power which always stands in the need of a relation with the meaning signified by this primary Sakti. Thus we find that Kumarila uses the term AbhidhanaSakti also as a synonym of Abhidha. Another term used by him for Abhidha in VācakaSakti.

The term Abhidha itself as a synonym of Sakti is met with in the Tattvābhidhāvat avacaspati also. Vācaspāti describes Abhidha as the function of words, which causes the cognition of meanings through their inherent potency. According to him, Abhidha does not generate the cognition of word-meanings directly, but does it indirectly by rousing mental impressions (Samskāras) of the words previously known.

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22. abhidhanaSaktiḥ svābhāvikā, laksana tu na sambandhadadhiṣaṁ nimittam apekṣate. TV, p. 683
23. tena nūnamīmau siddhau loke vācakaSaktikau / SV, Sambandhākṣepa, 23.a
24. ko nu khalu ayamabhidhāvyāpāraḥ śabdāṇām. op.cit.,158
25. sa eva svābhāvikāSaktiśālīnaḥ śabdasya svasāktyā arthadhīhetutayā abhidheti gīyate. ibid.
26. ibid, p. 159.
Parthasarathimisra in his *Nyāyaratnamālā* conceives Abhidhā as an uncommon potentiality of a word to signify its meaning. He compares this Śakti to the extra-ordinary power of the visual organ which reveals a coloured shape.  

Thus the Mīmāṃsakas' Śakti pertaining to a word pertakes of its basic character of being a separate category. As we know, these scholars conceive Śakti as a separate category (Padārtha). Their contention is that Śakti is not a substance as the latter inheres qualities, it is also distinct from quality and action, it subsists genus (Jāti) and other categories, and as such, it must be recognised as a separate category. Śakti, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, is the common name given to the potency by which substance, quality, action and genus come to be causes of things.

27. *pratyāyakatvāṁ hi vācakatvāṁ.* taccā svabhāvaśaśktyā- 

28. *mīmāṃsakāstu abhidhānaśa matadārthāntaraṁ saṁketagṛhyām śaktiḥ ityāhuḥ.*  

29. *na dravyāṁ guṇavṛttiśvād guṇakarmavibhāgaśaḥ / sāmānyādiśu sattvāna siddhābhāvantānaṁ hi sā.*

Samgrahasloka referred to in TC, p. 574.
According to Dr. Radhakrishnan, the Mīmāṃsākas classify their Śakti into two types, viz. Sahajā (natural) and Ādheya (produced). They consider the potency of a word as Sahajā Śakti of the Nitya (permanent or eternal) type. Some later Mīmāṃsākas, however, came to recognise the Padaśakti as the third variety of Śakti in addition to the already accepted Sahajā and Ādheya types. The Mīmāṃsākas' notion of Śakti as a separate category, however, is rejected by other schools of thought like Nyāya.

The Bhatta and Prābhakara Mīmāṃsākas differ among themselves with regard to the actual range or scope of this Padaśakti. Pending a detailed discussion on this issue, we may here take note of the fact that, according to the Bhattas, the Śakti or Abhidhā can convey only the individual word-meanings, the sentence-meaning.

30. IP, p. 416
31. śaktistridhā sahajādheya padasaktiśceti. TP, vide NHC, p. 17
32. iti sahajasaktinirāsah... evām mīmāṃsakābhimata... ādheyasaktirapi nirastā veditavyā. NK, p. 852; IP, p. 415
33. padaiḥ padārthabodhanam śabdaśaktijanyetvād abhidhānam eveti pārthaśārathimīśrādeyah. MM, p. 35.
is apprehended only through the Lakṣaṇā function. Prābhākaras, on the other hand, comprehend the sentence-meaning through the same function of Sakti (Abhidhā) itself, on the strength of the syntactic relation of word-meanings based upon Ākāṅka, Yogya and Sannidhi.

As observed by Dr. H. Mukherjee, according to the Prābhākaras 'a single unvariant denotative efficiency conveys different composite judgement', just as 'the self-same efficiency of revealing colour as inherent in the visual organ' gives rise to such various images like black according to its contact with various objects like jar characterised by those colours.

But whatever the range of Abhidhā may be, an involvement of this primary verbal potency is definitely recognised by both Bhattas and Prābhākaras so far as the comprehension of a sentence-meaning is concerned.

In the school of Vedānta, Abhidhā passes as Sakti. The Vedāntins recognise two Vṛttis, viz. Sakti and Lakṣaṇā for the comprehension of two types of meanings, viz. Mukhya (primary) or Śakya (denoted) and Gauḍe (secondary) or Lakṣya (indicated) respectively as accepted by them.

34. VM, p. 13, Vide pp 35. Under ibid, K.10 36. LCAI, p. 221 37. tatra sakti nāma padānām artheṣu mukhyā vṛttih. VPB, IV. p. 93 38. tatra lakṣaṇāvīśayo lakṣyaḥ. ibid, p. 96
In the *Brahmasūtra* of Vādarāyana, there is no reference to Śakti by name, but the recognition of the same by the Sūtrakāra can be clearly asserted from the term Abhidhāna used by him more than once. Thus in case of the Śruti text 'ya eṣa puruṣo drṣṭya eṣa ātmeti'\(^{39}\) (The spirit who is perceived within the eye, is self), doubt arises, as Śāṅkara puts it, as to whether the term Puruṣa here refers to Ātman (individual self) or Viśnūnātman or Devatātman (the lord of sense-organs) or Īśvara (the Supreme Lord).\(^{40}\) Here Vādarāyana advances the Ūtra 'sukhaviśiṣṭābhidhānācca'\(^{41}\), which asserts that the term Puruṣa here refers to Saguna Brahman or Paramēśvara (the Supreme Lord) who is described as sukhaviśiṣṭa (the Blissful one) in the Śruti text 'prāṇo brahma keśam brahma khāṃ brahma'\(^{42}\) (Brahman is Life, He is Bliss, boundless Bliss, boundless as sky). The term Abhidhāna employed by the Sūtrakāra in the sense of direct reference definitely involves Abhidhā or Śakti whereby the idea of the so-called Qualified Brahman is said to be apprehended. This is

39. CHU, IV. 15.1
40. 'ya eṣa ......' tatra samśayaḥ kimayaḥ pratibimbēṭmā- kṣayādhikaraṇo nirdhiṣṭate, athaveśvara iti.
   SBH under BS, I.2.4.13
41. BS, I.2.4.15
42. Vide SBH under above.
warranted by the relevant *Sāṅkarabhāṣya* where the term Abhidheya is met with for 'Abhidhāna' of the Sūtrakāra. The next Sūtra that Vādarāyana puts forward to substantiate his argument in favour of Brahman being the intended meaning of the term Puruṣa in the afore-cited Śruti-text, is 'śrutopaniṣatkagatābhidhāna'ca'. Here Vādarāyana contends that from the description, in the Śruti text, of the path taken by those who are acquainted with Upaniṣad (i.e. the knowledge of Brahman), it appears that he who meditates upon the Spirit dwelling in the human eye, takes the same path as in taken by those who meditate upon Brahman. Thus the Sūtrakāra conclude that the spirit dwelling within the human eye is Brahman.

Here in the Sūtra, the term Abhidhāna stands for direct reference which invariably involves the function of Abhidhā for the comprehension of the meaning intended.

Śaṅkara goes a step further when he uses the term Mukhyā Vṛtti for the primary significative function of a

43. kim brāhmaśmin vākyevabhidyate na veti, 
sukhaviśiṣṭābhidhānādeva brahmātvaṁ siddham. ibid.

44. BS, I.2.4.16

45. SBH under above
word. While commenting upon the BS, I.2.4.13, he observes that the nature of Ātman (individual self) applies to Parameśvara (Supreme Lord)\(^{46}\) through the Mukhāyā Vṛtti on the strength of the Śruti text 'sa ātma tattvamāsi'.\(^{47}\) Śaṅkara under the BS, IV. 1.4.5 also uses the term Vyākhyā Vṛtti\(^{48}\) as a synonym of Sākti, in contrast to Loksana which is described by him as Guṇavṛtti\(^{49}\) and Upanāṇā also.

Śaṅkara also makes explicit reference to the meanings conveyed by Sākti and Guṇavṛtti as Mukhyārtha and Gaṇārtha or Loksanikārtha respectively.\(^{51}\) The word

\[\text{ātmatvam tāven mukhyāyā vṛttyā parameśvere upapadyate.}\]

ibid on BS, I. 2.4.13

\[\text{paścādvat arato brahmaśabdesya mukhyāyā vṛttyā sā hints-}
\text{dhikaranyāsambhavat.}\]

loc. cit.

\[\text{yadi predominamacetanām guṇavṛttyekṣitṛ kalipyate....}\]

SBH on I. 1.5.6

\[\text{itī cācetanayoraptyaptejasocetanavadupacāratarāṃ.}\]

ibid on BS, I.1.5.6

\[\text{itārāthā hyanyāyam anekārthatvām prāṇaśabdesyā-}
\text{pracajyeta, ekatra mukhyātvam itaratre vā laksanikart-}
\text{vam āpadyeta.}\]

ibid on BS, II.4.5.11
denotative is also variously described by him as Abhidhāyaka\textsuperscript{52} and Vācaka.\textsuperscript{53}

Thus we find that in the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara, the meaning of a word is usually sought to be understood through Śakti, which is the primary significative function of a word. Guṇavṛtti or Laksana is resorted to only in the event of failure of the primary meaning in a certain context.

The Vīśiṣṭa Advaita school of Vedānta does not differ from the Advaita in dealing with the problem of signification of a word. Thus in the Vedāntasāra of Rāmaṇuja, we find references to the Mukhya and Sānta types of meaning in the context of dealing with the problem as to whether Ākāśa (spatial ether) is actually created or not, under the BS, II.3.1.1.\textsuperscript{54} The Sūtrakāra observes that in the Śruti text 'tasmad vā ākāśah sambhūtah',\textsuperscript{55} (From Him, the Spatial ether is created), the term Sambhūtah (created) is to be understood in the

\begin{itemize}
  \item 52. सारीरसयात्मनो यां सादो'भीधायानह।
  \textit{ibid.} on BS, I.2.1.5
  \item 53. api ca.... kramasya vācakaḥ kaścit sādostīti.
  \textit{ibid.} on BS, II.3.1.6
  \item 54. na viyadaśruteḥ . Vide VSR, p. 131, also vide VSSP, p. 476.
  \item 55. TU, II.1.
\end{itemize}
secondary sense only, inasmuch as the creation of ether is impossible owing to non-availability of Samavāyi Kāraṇa (inherent cause) and other requisites for its creation. The same word, he continues, may convey different senses in the same context depending on the varied nature of subjects. As for instance, in the Śruti text 'tasmādetad brahma nāma rūpam annam ca jāyate' (From Him is born this Brahman, name, form and food), the term Brahman conveys secondarily Prakṛti. But in the Śruti text 'tapasā cīyate brahma' (Brahman swells on his contemplation), the term Brahman conveys its primary meaning, i.e. Brahman.  

Now, Rāmānuja while explaining the contention of the Sūtrakāra, uses the terms Mukhya and Gauna for the meanings conveyed by Śakti and Laksana respectively as is done by Śaṅkara in the same context.  

56. gaunyasambhavat. BS, II. 3.1.3, vide also VSR, p.192  
57. syāccaitasya brahmaśabdavat. BS, II. 3.1.5; also vide VSR on above  
58. MU, I.10  
59. ibid., I.9  
60. VSR, p. 193  
61. ekasya sambhutasabdavyakāśe gauntatvam anyatra mukhyatvam. ibid.  
62. SBH under II,3.1.5
recognition of अभिधा as the primary significative function of a word can be established beyond any doubt.

In the वेदांतकामुदी of नामदव्यासार्य, this primary significative function of a word is compared to the burning capacity latent in fire. It is different from the Śakti of the Naiyāyikas, which is conventional in character.63 Like the Mīmāṃsakas, the Vedāntins also believe in an inherent or natural relation between a word and the object signified by it.64

The वेदांतपरिभाषा of धर्मराज अध्वरिन्द्र, one of the most faithful compendia of Vedānta epistemology in general and of Śaṅkara Vedānta in particular, refers to two types of word-meanings, viz. शक्य (denoted) and लक्ष्या (indicated) signified by Śakti and Laksana respectively. Here Śakti is described as the primary significative function of a word with reference to their meanings.65

63. यथा खलु वृन्यादिनां................. न स तत्त
शब्दे समकेताद्हया शक्तिरथग्रकाशानया किंतु
अन्द्हैरव वाहनरव दाहासाधकार। VK, p. 193
64. कस्तर्थि सेबार्थेयो शेबार्थेयो सेबार्थेयो शेबार्थेयो सेबार्थेयो सेबार्थेयो। ibid.
65. पदर्थास्वा द्विविषाण शक्य लक्ष्यस्वतीतत्र सेबार्थेयो शेबार्थेयो शेबार्थेयो। VPB, IV, p. 31
Thus the term Ghāṭa (jar) conveys through Śakti an object with a form having a large bottom and belly etc. This is because there is a permanent relation between the word Ghāṭa and the object, i.e. jar signified by it.

Like the Māmsakas, the Vedāntins also conceive Śakti as a separate category. According to them, 'any power tending to produce an effect comes under a distinct category'. In the context of verbal comprehension, the apprehension of the individual meaning is the effect produced by the corresponding word, and it is Śakti (i.e. Abhidhā) that leads to such comprehension of meaning. Thus Śakti is to be inferred from such comprehension of meanings. The meaning signified by Śakti is termed Śakyārtha.

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66. yātā ghaṭapadasya prthubudrnoderādyakrtivirīṣṭe
   vastuviseṣe vṛttih. ibid.

67. sā ca śaktīḥ padārthāntaram. ibid.

68. siddhānte kāraṇeṣu kāryānukūlaśaktimātrasya
   padārthāntaraṇtvat. sā ca tatttacakajanyapadārtha-
   jñānarūpakāryānumeyā. ibid.

69. tādṛśaktivīṣayatvam śaṣkyaṭvam. ibid.
This primary significative power of word which was initially named as Śakti by the Vedāntins, came to be termed Abhidhā or Abhidhāvyāpāra also in the subsequent works on Vedānta.

ABHIDHĀ IN THE WORKS OF NYĀYA AND VAISÉSIKA

In the school of Nyāya, as we have shown earlier, Abhidhā passes by the name Śakti. This Śakti is one of the two kinds of Vṛtti (verbal functions) recognised by the Naiyāyikas. As it is clear from the analysis of the two, Śakti or Abhidhā is the primary verbal function (Mukhyā Vṛtti), while Lakṣaṇā is the secondary one (Ganāthi Vṛtti). Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana defines Vṛtti as the relation which is two-fold, viz. Śakti and Lakṣaṇā.  

Gautama, the champion of Nyāya goes a step further to clearly assert that it (Vṛtti) is the relation between words and their meanings, which is conducive to the apprehension of the said meanings that lead to the cognition of

70. vṛttir dvividhā abhidhopacārabhedat.
Nyāyapariśuddhi, p. 368, quoted in Vedānta Darśana, Advaitavāda, p. 274

71. atah śebdavijñānameva.... śaktyupavr̥hitam tasyābhidhāvyāpāraḥ.
VK, p. 200

72. vṛttiśca śaktilekṣaṇānyatarasambandhaḥ. SMU, p. 415.
the sentence-meaning.\textsuperscript{73} We have already shown how in the scheme of the Naiy\=ayikas, the knowledge of \textit{\textit{Vrtti}} serves as the auxiliary cause of a \textit{\textit{S\=abdabodha}}.

Of these two types of \textit{\textit{Vrttis}}, \textit{\textit{Sakti}} is defined as the relation between a word and its meaning by the Naiy\=ayika Vis\=van\=atha.\textsuperscript{74} Now, in the context of the \textit{\textit{Vrtti}} (covering both Sakti and Lak\=sa\=n\=a) being described by the Naiy\=ayikas like Ga\=nges\=a as the relation between a word and its meaning, the definition of Sakti by Vis\=van\=atha as a \textit{Padap\=ardharthasambandha} appears to be redundant, as it does not serve to differentiate Sakti from Lak\=sa\=n\=a. But from an examination of the nature of Lak\=sa\=n\=a by the Naiy\=ayikas including Vis\=van\=atha himself, we gather that Lak\=sa\=n\=a is conceived as the relation of the primary meaning with some other meaning (i.e. Lak\=y\=artha).\textsuperscript{75} Thus in Lak\=sa\=n\=a, the relation between a word and its meaning is only indirect and remote, while in Sakti (Abhidh\=a), it is direct and on

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{\textit{Vrttisca \textit{\textit{S\=abdabodha}}hetupad\=ar\=thop\=asthityanuk\=\textit{\textit{Ul}e}pad\=ar\=thasambandha}}. TC, p. 627

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{\textit{Sakti\textit{\textit{Sca padena saha \textit{\textit{Pad\=ar\=thasya sambandha}}}}}}. SMU, p. 416

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{\textit{Svarthasambandho eva lak\=sa\=n\=a. Saktism\=aritasakya\=n\-b\=andho v\=\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{}}}}}}}}} TC, pp. 665-666;
also vide BP, K. 82.a.
primary nature. Hence it is in quite fitness of things that संकल्प is defined by the Naiyāyikas as the relation of a word and its corresponding meaning.

Now it may be recalled that according to Naiyāyikas, the relation between a word and its meaning is not an inherent or natural one, it is an imposed and therefore, artificial relation being based on convention (साम्या or सामकता).\textsuperscript{76} We have further seen that the Naiyāyikas conceive this convention as the application of the regulation that a particular word should denote a particular meaning only and never otherwise.\textsuperscript{77} But the ancient and modern Naiyāyikas differ on the pertinent question as to whence such a regulation concerning the very signification of a word actually issues forth. While the ancient Naiyāyikas maintain that such convention is necessarily established by God, their modern counterparts assert that it may be established by human agents also.

Thus the Prācīna Naiyāyikas conceive सामया as the will of God which expresses itself in the form of 'Let this meaning be understood from this word'.\textsuperscript{78} It is the desire

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{76} NS,II. 1.56
\item \textsuperscript{77} VB on NS above
\item \textsuperscript{78} asmatpadādayamatho bodhavya itīśvarasāmketāḥ śektiḥ. TS, p. \textsuperscript{75}
\end{itemize}
of the almighty God before creation that a particular object should be apprehended from a particular word only.73

Thus the ancient Naiyāyikas conceive Sakti as the Divine will in the form of 'Let this meaning be understood from this word.' But as we have earlier observed, according to the Naiyāyikas, the meaning of a particular meaning is apprehended actually from the knowledge of the word and not from the word itself.80 Hence in the aforesaid definition of Sakti, the expression from this word actually means 'from the knowledge of this word'. But a meaning is capable of being apprehended from a word only when the latter signifies it. Hence Sakti is defined by the Prācīna Naiyāyikas as also the will of God which manifests itself in the form of 'Let this word signify this meaning'.81

79. .... tasminniyogo bodhavya iti bhagavataḥ parames- varasya sargadeva so'yam samaya ityarthah. NVT, p.418
80. padajñānāntu karaṇam. BP, K. 81.8,
also vide MUS under above.
81. idam padamimam arthambodhayatviti, asmāt śabdād ayamartho bodhavya iti vecchā, sāmketarūpā vrūtthā.
SAKV, p.5.
Thus in both the cases, convention in the form of Divine will with regard to a particular word being denotative of a particular meaning, constitutes the Sakti of a word in the scheme of these scholars.

According to the ancient Naiyāyikas, the convention originally fixed by God in respect of such words as Go with reference to their such corresponding meanings as cow, is learnt by people in subsequent times through the process of Vṛddhavyavahāra and thus meaning of a particular word is capable of being ascertained.82

Now in the context of the Divine will being accepted as the true nature of Sakti, a pertinent question arises as to how a modern name like Maitra can be significant at all. To this, the ancient Naiyāyikas' reply is that83 the word Maitra signifies the particular boy apparently on the strength of the will of a person other than God. But here too, there is a Divine will in the form of an injunction: 'the father should name (his child) on the eleventh day'. The father of Maitra is definitely

82. perameśvareṇa hi yah srṣṭyādau gāvādīsabdānāmaṁurtvam saṁketaḥ kṛtvā, so'dhunā vṛddhavyavahāre prayuveśvam naṁ naṁ sabdānām aviditaṁ gatibhirapi bālāṁ śakyo grahiṁ. WTT, p. 416.
83. nanu maitrādiśabdānāmiśverasaṁketaḥbhavād ardhatsu yajñādvau na prayogeḥ syāditi cet, na. dvādaśamāni pitaṁ nāma kuryādityanene sāmānyaśteṣamāpīśverasaṁketavisayatvāt. TC, p. 616.
empowered to exercise the will of God by the Divine will contained in such injunctions. Here the Divine will manifests itself in the form of the will of a father. And it is with such a logic that the ancient Naiyāyikas account for the primary signification of modern names and non-Vedic words. It may be recalled here that with the Naiyāyikas, Vedas are the creations of Isvara and as such Vedic words are significant themselves being Isvarasamkētita. Hence it is only with reference to the non-Vedic words and modern names that such Chastric injunctions are sought to be applied by the ancient Naiyāyikas. These scholars, however, are not ready to admit Sakti with regard to the purely modern names with reference to which a Divine sanction is not capable of being traced out. 84

In view of the above observations, we should take note of the fact that according to the ancient Naiyāyikas, the convention in the form of a relation assumes a twofold division into Sakti and Prābhāṣā. Sakti is the permanent type of convention which depends upon the will of God 85 manifesting itself as 'Let such and such an object be apprehended from such and such a word.' Thus the convention involved in such terms as Go (cow) with

84. vide ACS, p. 89
85. Isvarasamkētaḥ śaktiḥ. SAKV, p. 6.
reference to such meaning as Gotva (cowness) stand fixed as pertaining to God since the very time of creation. The word that signifies a meaning through Śakti is called a Śākta or Vācaka word, and the meaning apprehended through it, is termed a Śakyā, Vācya or Mukhya meaning. Paribhāṣa is the occasional type of convention which depends upon the will of human agent. Thus a word is called Pāribhāṣika (technical) if it signifies a meaning desired by a man. This Paribhāṣa type of convention needs to be recognised in order to account for those technical words which are coined by men. As for instance, the grammatical terms like Nādi, Vṛddhi etc. are Pāribhāṣika.

Uttarādhoni also takes cognisance of these two types of convention recognised by the ancient Brahmā and calls them Ājanika (permanent) and Ādhunika (modern) respectively.

86. tayā cārthabodhakaṁ padām vācakam, yathā gotvāṅdiviśiṣṭa-bodhakaṁ gavādipadām tadbodhyo'rtho gavādirvābh, sa eva mukhyārtha ityucyate. ibid.

87. tatrādhunikasamketaḥ paribhāṣā, tayā cārthabodhakām padām pāribhāṣikām. yathā śāstrakārādīsamketītat na iv rddhyādipadām. SAKV, p.443 also vide HilL, p.449

88. ājanikāśādūdhunikeḥ saṁketa dvividhāṁ mataḥ / nitya ājānīkastatra ya śaktiriti giyate / kādācītkaśvādūdhunikāḥ śāstrakārādībhīṁ krteḥ / VP quoted in SSP, p. 122.
The modern Naiyāyikas do not accept the view of their predecessors that Sakti is constituted only by Divine will. They understand the terms Sakti and Samketa as synonymous and assert that Sakti is mere will,—be it divine or otherwise. Gadadhara in his Vyutpattivaśade argues that if Sakti would mean only Divine will, then words like Caitra coined and employed by some human individual would be nonsensical being devoid of Sakti. According to him, the argument of the ancient Naiyāyikas that such modern names also possess Sakti in the form of Divine will on the strength of scriptural injunctions, is too weak to prove signification of such words. Jajñāṅsa, the author of Sādāsaktipraśāsīka, also maintains that the scriptural injunctions of such kind only prescribe the duty of a father in naming his son, and are not concerned with the significative potency of a word. In fact, in human community, such proper names are always being coined, and it is not possible to attach a shastric injunction to all of them in order to account for their credibility.

89. nyavyāṣtu īśvarcchā na saktih, kintu icchaiva.

    teṇādhunikasamketaṁ pi saktirastyeśe ityāh.

MUS, l. 418

90. op. cit.
as being Isvarasamkatita and consequently as Sakta (expressive). The modern Naiyāyikas further argue that if Sakti is conceived as only Divine will, there would be no occurrence of verbal comprehension on the part of a person denying the very existence of God. Under the circumstances, the moderners came to accept the liberal view that Sakti consists in mere will, be it divine or human. Gangesa who critically examines the position of the Prācina Naiyāyikas evolves a new formula of his own. According to him, it is wrong to accept as correct only those words whose convention stands fixed by God, for such a position would lead one to accept all words as correct because of their simply being possessed of Divine convention and all secondary usages as corrupt in the sense of the same. But this, Gangesa contends, would be contradictory to our experience. In our daily usage, we find people often using correct form of words even without

91. ādhunikāstu samketo na śaktir nityasyaiva tasya
tethētvāt...... na ca pitṛdīna samketite caitrāni-
pade nityasamketatve mānamasti, dvādaśe'heni pīṭa
nāma kuryādīti śrutīḥ pitṛkartavyasamketavidhāy akemā-
trāparatvāt, caitrādipadosya śaktimattve pūrva-pūrva-
rayuktetvāpātācca. SSP, p.139-141
92. evaṁīśvarasamketitasya śaktitva Īśvarānāṁ kartimate
śabdabodhānapattih. SAKV, p.12
93. yah śābdo yatresvarasamketitah, sa tatra śaktah
śādhurityucyate paresām śabdārthayoh svādāvīkacam-
bandhāvat atmākam Īśvarasamketasya niyāmakatvāt.
TC, pp.48-49.
knowing the Divine convention involved in them. So what constitutes Sakti is mere will and not necessarily the Divine will. Viśvanātha Nyāyaśāstra faithfully represents this Navyāyā concept of Sakti (as mere will) in the manner of a conclusive proposition. 94

It is, however, not that the older concept of Sakti as Divine convention was totally rejected by the modern Naiyāyikas, as the same continued to gain currency with such moderners like Jagadīśa. Jagadīśa, as we find, refuses to accept Sakti in respect of modern names like Caitra and considers them as only technical (Pārabhāṣīka) terms. 95

Thus the Naiyāyikas conceive Sakti as Ichchā or will (be it Divine or human) and at the same time as a Sambandha or relation between a word and its corresponding meaning. But their equation of Ichchā with Sambandha is strongly controverted by the Vaiyākaranas. Nāgaraṇa, who

94. MUS, p.418
95. yatrārthe yamāme 'ādhuṇikasamkhetvāt tadeva tatra pāribhāṣikem, yathā pitṛāādibhiḥ putrāāau samkhetitam caitrādi, ādhuṇikāstu samketo na śaktir nityasyaiva tasya tathātvat. SCP, pp.122-124.
examines the whole issue, hastens to quote the very definition of Sambandha. Accordingly, a Sambandha or relation pertains to both the related objects and yet remains different from both, and at the same time, leads to some qualified cognition in respect of the two related. But Icchā which is said to constitute the very Sakti of a word, does not fulfil these conditions of a relation at all, because Icchā does not pertain to either of the related objects, viz. Pāda and the Pādārtha, nor does it lead to any qualified cognition. Moreover, according to the Naiyāyikas themselves, Icchā - whether Divine or human, is only a quality of the self (Ātma-guna). Under the circumstances, Nāgāsa asserts, the Naiyāyikas' identification of Sakti as Sambandha and Icchā, is inconsistent.

But the Naiyāyikas refute the above charge of the Grammarians by saying that Icchā is indeed a quality of the

96. sambandho hi sambandhibhāyam bhinna ubhayāsrita iti dviṣṭah sambandha iti ca visiṣṭabuddhiniyāmaṅkā iti cābhīyuktavyavahārāt. VSM, pp.23-24

97. tarna icchāyāh sambandhinorāśrayataḥniyāmaṅkātvābhāvena sambandhatvāsambhavāt. PLM, p.15

98. yathātma-gunaḥāhi cchādveṣāderupapatsyate sabdo nayena tainaiḥ bhaviṣyati nabhogaḥ. NM, p.21.
self. But the relation between a word and its meaning, which is said to constitute the very primary significative potency of a word, is a peculiar type of relation. It is different from all known types of relations such as Samyoga (conjunction), Samavāya (inherence) and the like. Nor is it a natural or eternal type of relation as conceived by the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vaiyākaraṇas. It is, on the other hand, a relation superimposed on the word and its meaning by the will of a self. Hence the Sambandha as conceived by them (Naiyāyikas), in no way pertains to a word or its meaning, but to a conscious self. This relation is apprehended as belonging to a word and its meaning only at a later stage when the convention in the form of some Divine or human will is ascertained. 99

The Naiyāyikas' equation of Śakti with Saṃketa is also not difficult to guess. It is because, in the scheme of these scholars, Śakti is entirely dependent upon Saṃketa. Hence we find that Naiyāyikas like Gaṅgādāra and Ācārya unhesitatingly use the term Saṃketa as a synonym of Śakti. 100

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99. ACS, pp. 92-93
100. samketo laksanā cārthe padavṛttiḥ. SAKV, p. i.
The Naiyāyikas while conceiving Sakti as Samaya or convention, naturally reject the Mīmāṃsakas' view that the Sakti (which includes Padaśakti also) should be given the status of a separate category. 101

The Naiyāyikas do not see also any justification in the Mīmāṃsakas' ascribing eternal potency of expressiveness to words, as rightly observed by Dr. R. Mukherji. According to them, the significative potency of a word has no affinity with the power of burning latent in fire. For, the power burning does not require its knowledge for its operation, while the significative potency of a word needs for its operation a prior knowledge of the conventional relation between the word and the object signified by it. The Naiyāyikas point out that the doctrine of Mīmāṃsakas involves the fault of prolixity, since they have to admit this conventional relation in addition to the inherent power of expressiveness. But the assertion of the Naiyāyikas, they argue, is in consonance with the law of parsimony, since in their scheme, the Divine will itself serves as the relation between the expression and

101. naiyāyikastvāsvasyakatvāt somketa evābhidhā na,
padarthaṁ tattvām mānabhāvat. NSM, p. 146.
the expressed.\textsuperscript{102}

According to the Naiyāyikas, Sakti belongs to a word and word alone. They substantiate this stand by saying that in the process of learning through usage by the elders, the learner apprehends the knowledge of the related word-meanings from the Sakti of the words themselves, since it is words that first come to serve as the cause of Sabdabodha.\textsuperscript{103} Gangesa who represents the Naiyāyikas in this regard, warns that Sakti should not be accepted as pertaining to the meaning also, since admission of an additional Sakti will lead to the fault of prolixity (Gaurava) only.\textsuperscript{104}

As has been earlier observed, the Vaiśeṣikas do not recognise Sabda as a separate source of valid knowledge, but try to include it under the province of Anumāna. According to them, the meaning of a word is apprehended

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{102} atra tārīkāḥ - asmācchabādayamartho bodhāvyan ityākāraḥ... saktih lāghavāt. PLM, p. 7
vide LCAL, pp. 96-97
\textsuperscript{103} prayojakavākyoccāraṇāntaram prayojaavyāpāredarśanāt anvītajñānopapattyartham padasyaiva saktih kalpyate prathamastasasyaiva kāraṇatvāt. TC, p. 553
\textsuperscript{104} padārtheṣu sākyantarakaḷpene gauravāt. ibid.
\end{quote}
through an inferential process. As Prasastapada asserts, in both inference and the so-called verbal testimony, the process of attaining the valid knowledge is the same, that is to say, both generate the desired valid knowledge through vyāpti or invariable concomitance.\(^{106}\)

The Vaiśeṣikas contend that both inference and verbal testimony, invariably presuppose a relation. In the former, the relation is in between a Linga (premise) and the corresponding Lingin (Conclusion), while in the latter it is between the Šabdas (words) and their corresponding Arthas (meanings). Just as a pure inference provides us the knowledge of an unknown object through that of a previously known object, so also verbal testimony gives us the knowledge of an unknown object through an object previously known.\(^{107}\)

The process of verbal comprehension in their scheme may be explained thus - a person first cognizes the denotation of particular words. Subsequently he hears these words and at once recollects the denotation - i.e. conventional relation between those words and their respective

\(^{105}\) śabdādīrṇamapya anumāne ntarbhāveḥ, saṁānavidhitvāt. PPB, p. 51.

\(^{106}\) yathā vyāptigrahaṇabalena anumāṇam pravartate, tathā śabdādayopītyarthah. NKAN on above.

\(^{107}\) sambandhācca. NS,II.1.52; also vide VB on above.
meanings. Then and then only, he understands the meaning of the whole sentence. As Dr. R. Mukherjee puts it, "The inference may be presented thus, 'these words possess conventional relation with their respective denotations, which have already been remembered, for the simple reason that, they form a group of words, possessing mutual expectancy, compatibility and proximity.'

Now the pertinent question arises as to whether the Vaiśeṣikas recognise a significative power or a primary significative function of a word to account for the meaning so comprehended. Prāgastapāda himself raises this question and answers by saying that the meaning of a word is not apprehended through its so-called primary function (Mukhyā Vṛtti), since in his scheme, there is no natural connection between a word and its meaning. The relation subsisting between the two owes its origin to convention and hence it is conventional in nature. Thus the Vaiśeṣikas do not differ from the Naiyāyikas in admitting a conventional relation between a word and its corresponding meaning. But while the latter group of scholars goes to the extent of declaring the said relation as Sakti or primary significative function of a word, the former is not ready to recognise at all the significative function of a word. According to them, the meanings of words are understood as because such words are employed by the trustworthy

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108. LCAI, p. 114
109. Āt. 17.32 Ṛg. Ṛg. 1.4.4
śabdasyāarthapratipādānāṁ mukhyāyā ṛṛttyā kim na kalpyate? sambandhābhāvāt. IB, p. 216
persons with reference to those specific meanings. Thus whenever some person infers the meaning of the word ‘cow’ with reference to the particular animal having ‘a hump’ etc., he grasps the intention of Āptas or trustworthy persons who use the said word in that specific sense only. Thus according to the Vāiśeṣikas, words are significant not because they possess a natural or artificial potency called Sakti (as held by the Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas respectively), nor even because they are the utterances of trustworthy persons, but because they carry the intention of the trustworthy persons. 110.

Thus in pure Vāiśeṣika system, we do not come across any treatment of Abhīdhā function. But the Nyāya-Vāiśeṣika school as represented by such works as the Tarsakamūrtha and Bhāṣāpariccheda has done full justice to the issue through an exhaustive treatment of the same.

110. prathamam gosabdāduccāritād vektuḥ kākudādīmadartha-vivekṣaya gemyate. svasaṅtāne gosabdāduccārayasaśpadārtha-vivekṣāpūrvavakatvopalambhāt tādartha-vivekṣāpyascārthānumānem. ibid., p. 510

111. Āptātvāt śabdārtha-pratītiḥritī cet ṭ āptābhīpṛtyāde-vārthasyāvagātītirī samānārthāḥ.

NKAN, Vide ibid.
ABHIDHĀ IN OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS

In our humble opinion, like the Vaisesika, other philosophical schools also appear to treat the concept of Abhidhā more or less only casually. In the following passages, it is proposed to bring out the approach of those schools towards the problem of a word's primary signification as far as possible.

In the Sāmkhya, Sabda is accepted as a pramāṇa and is defined by Kapila, the author of Sāmkhyasūtra, as the knowledge derived through words that are capable (so as to lead to the attainment of valid verbal knowledge). A word is used as a sign for some particular object. The relation between the two is described by the Sutrakāra as Vācyavācakasambandha (one of expressive and expressed).

Now it is interesting to note that the commentators on Sāmkhyadarśanam like Vijnānabhiṣaku and Māgāṣa have explained this Vācyavācakasambandha as the very śakti or primary significative function of a word. Their contention is that, each word signifies its corresponding meaning.

112. āptopadesāḥ 'sabdah. SAD, I.101
also, āpto yogyah ābhdastadupadeśaśtaṭa-janyatāṁ jñānaṁ 'sabdākhyayaṁ prememān.
Vṛttisēra on above

113. SAD, V. 37.
because of this relation existing between the two. Apprehension of the meaning invariably presupposes a knowledge of this relation. Thus the Vācyavācakasambandha because of being conducive to apprehension of meaning, comes to be designated as Sakti or denotative potency which pertains to both word and its meaning. While the word is said to possess the Vācakata Sakti, its meaning is said to have Vācyatāsakti. Now in our humble opinion, the terms Vācakata and Vācyata here do not refer to two different types of Sakti, but to two different aspects of the same denotative potency. That is to say, the same Sakti is called Vācakata/sakti when considered from the angle of the denotative word and is termed Vācyatāsakti when viewed from the angle of the denoted meaning.

The Sāmkhya scholars while recognising the Vācyavācaka type of relation between a word and its meaning, take care to show that the relation cannot be of Tādātmya (identity) type. Thus Aniruddha and Vedāntimahādeva,

114. .... vācyavācaka..... arthe vācyatākhyā saktiḥ, rābda ca vācakatākhyā saktirasti, saiva tayoḥ sambandhaṁ-yogitāvat. tajjñānācchabdenārthopasthitīrthityarthoḥ. Bhāṣya on above.

also,

vastutastayoḥ svarūpasambandhaḥ sa eva saktiḥ, tasyaiva ca saktitvena jñānam bodhe kāraṇamiti bhavaḥ. Bhāṣyasastra on above.
both commentators on Sāṅkhya-sūtras, maintain that in the event of admission of the Tādātmya type of relation, even a jar would be heard and a word would also be seen. Moreover, if such a relation is admitted, a person who utters the word 'fire' would find his mouth burnt.\textsuperscript{115} but all these are contradictory to our experience. Hence the relation between a word and its meaning is essentially that of the significant and the signified. The existence of such a relation, Kapila maintains, is known from statement of the trustworthy person, usage by the elders and association of well-known words.\textsuperscript{116} In other words, these are the three different means of ascertaining the Sakti of a word in the scheme of Sāṅkhya.

\textsuperscript{115} padapadārthayostādātmyam niṣedhayati- vācyavācaka.... tādātmyapakṣe ghaṭo'pi śrotagrahāyaḥ syāt, sabdo'pi cākṣuso bhavet, agnīyadyuccāraṇe mukhadāhādiprasaṅga iti. \textit{Vṛtti} on SAD, V. 37
also Vide Vṛttisāra thereon.

\textsuperscript{116} tribhiḥ sambandhasiddheḥ.
SAD, V. 38
āptopadeso vrddhavyavahāraḥ prasiddhapadasāmanādhī- karanyām - ityetaistribhiḥ uktasambandho grhyata ityarthaḥ.
Bhāṣya on above.
Also vide IP, p. 800.
In contrast to the Śāmkhya scholars, the Yoga philosophers conceive the relation between a word and its meaning as an inherent one. Patañjali, the author of Yogasūtram suggests such a relation when he asserts that the sacred word Om (Prāṇava) connotes the Lord (Īśvara).

Vyāsa, the commentator, explaining the contention of the Sūtrakāra says that the relation existing between the Lord and the sign (i.e., word) is inherent and eternal. It is like the relation already existing between a father and the son. Vyāsa here finds an occasion to pinpoint the exact role played by convention (Samaya). As against the Naiyāyikas' view that the relation between a word and its meaning is based on convention, Vyāsa maintains that this relation never owes its origin to convention. The convention only reveals the relation already existing between the two, as in the case of the father and his son that 'this is the father, this is the son'.

117. tasya vācakāh prāṇavāh. YS, I.27

118. tasya vācakāh prāṇavāh, vācyā īśvarāh prāṇavasya. sthitō'sya vācyasya vācakena saha sambandhah. Vyāsa on above.

119. sāmketastu īśvarasya sthitamevārthatm abhinayati. yathāvasthitāh pitāputrayoḥ sambandhāḥ sāmketenā vadyotyate 'ayamasya pitā ayamasya putra' iti. ibid.
Now, this eternal Vācyavācakasambandha which is said to exist between a word and its meaning, is conceived by the Yoga philosophers as the very Śakti or the primary significative potency of a word. This is warranted by the exposition of the relevant YS by Vyāsa himself.\textsuperscript{120} We are also led to believe that, while according to the Naiyāyikas, convention is the regulator of the relation between a word and its meaning, according to the Yoga philosophers, convention itself is regulated by this very relation existing between the expression and the expressed.

The Jainas accept Sabda\textsuperscript{121} or Śrutajñāna\textsuperscript{122} as a Pramāṇa only in the empirical realm of knowledge. Sabda is defined by them as the knowledge obtained from what is heard from the trustworthy persons (Āpta).\textsuperscript{123} Thus Sabda or Śrutajñāna consequently involves a proposition comprising words leading to valid verbal knowledge.\textsuperscript{124}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{120} sargāntareṣvapi vācyavācakasāktyaṃ āpekṣaṣastathāiva samketaḥ.\textsuperscript{op.cit, I.27}
  \item \textsuperscript{121} pramāṇāni pratyakṣaṃ qeṣāmbiḥ sābdāni. Nyāyaśārvikavṛtti, p.4 (S.C.Vidyābhusanā ed.)
  \item \textsuperscript{122} śrūtānusāri ca śrutajñānam. JTB, p.2
  \item \textsuperscript{123} śrutamāptavacanam......... Bhāṣya on TASU, I.20
  \item \textsuperscript{124} Tīkā on above.
\end{itemize}
The Jainas recognise the relation between a word and the object signified by it as Vācyavācakasambandha (one of expressive and expressed). Thus the word Ghata denotes the object 'pitcher' because of this relation existing between the two. Now, this Vācyavācaka type of relation which is described as Saṁjñāsaṁjñisambandhe also by the Jainas, appears to be conceived by them as the very primary significative function of a word. This is warranted by the observations of Umāsvāti, the author of Tattvārthādhyāgamasūtram that the relation of Yogyatā (capability) between a word and its meaning is known from the relation of expressive and expressed existing between the two.

That this Yogyatā is not other than the function of

125. śrutānusāritvām ca .... vācyavācakabhāvena saṁjñojña ghaṭo ghaṭah' ......... JTB, p.2

126. saṁjñāsaṁjñisambandhakāle prasiddho'sau ghatādisabdo'bhidhānataya teṣām nāmadīnām asya ghatāderarthasaṁyāyam vācaka ityevam prasiddhapūrvāt vācyavācakasambandhasamketanāt yogyatālakṣānasambandhāvegastervāt.

Bhāṣya on TASU, i.35.
Abhidhā, is also presumable from such various expressions as Abhidhāna,\(^{127}\) Abhidheya, Abhihita,\(^{128}\) etc. met with in the Jaina epistemology in the sense of primary meaning of a word.

The Buddhist logicians who do not recognise Šabda as a Prāmaṇa maintain that the essence of a meaning is negative in character and words do not have any direct reference to the objective realities.\(^{129}\) According to them, words refer directly to the conceptual images only, which are purely subjective constructions of mind (Vikalpa).\(^{130}\) There cannot be any actual connection between the words and the external objects. Under the circumstances, the Buddhists consider the significative power of words as being based on the reciprocal relation between a word and the mental image produced by it.\(^{131}\)

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127. yathārthaḥabhidhānam śabdāḥ. ibid.
128. nigameṣu ye'bhihitāḥ śabdāḥ...... ibid.
129. Vide our discussion on Apoha theory of Buddhists in the present chapter itself.
130. vikalpayonayah śabdā vikalpāḥ śabdāyonayah / Diṃnāga (quoted in Steherbatsky, Buddhist Logic,II, p. 405 n.) Vide ITM, p. 78.
131. Vide ITM, p. 93.
According to them, all meanings occurring in our verbal statements are to be accepted as only Gaṇa or Secondly signified through the process of Upacāra; there is no primary at all. The relation between a word and its meaning is one of cause and effect and not that of the significant and signified. A word cannot signify a real positive thing, for what is ultimately real is the thing-in-itself. As Śāntarakṣita, the author of Tattvasaṃgraha observes, the very essence of objects is such that they cannot be the objects of our verbal expression. Whatever is said to be the object of our verbal expression is never actually cognised. The words are not fixed by convention upon certain objects, they cannot really denote those objects. The denotativeness of a word is invariably concomitant with convention and the latter is absent in a word.

132. api ca sarva evāyaṃ gaṇa eva na mukhyo'sti........ sarvaśca śabdaḥ pradhāne'vidyāmānenaiva gaṇarūpeṇa pravartate, ato mukhyo nāstyeva. VMS, p.127

133. tatpratibimbakeṁ ca śabdena anyamāntvāt kāryam eti kāryakāraṇabhāva eva vācyavācakabhāvah. PKM, p.128(b)

134. yasya yasya hi śabdasya yo yo viśaya ucyate / sa sa (samvidya)te naiva vastūnām aḥ hi dharmatā/ op.cit.,Vol.I,87a

135. kṛtasamayatvenābhidhāyakasya vyāstatvāt, tasyaḥ abhāvah. Kamalaśīla on above, Vide Ts, p.276.
Under the circumstances, we feel, the Buddhist Logicians do not conceive of the Abhidhā function of a word.

Thus from an examination of the treatment of Abhidhā in Indian philosophical schools, we are led to believe that the recognition of this primary significative function (and for that matter, other functions also), presupposes the recognition of Śabda, in some form or other, as one of the valid sources of knowledge.

THE CONCEPT AND TREATMENT OF ABHIDHĀ IN WORKS OF SAN SKRIT GRAMMAR

The Vaiyākaraṇas conceive Abhidhā or Sakti\textsuperscript{136} as an inherent potency of a word. A word, according to them, is equipped with a natural capacity to signify its meaning. According to Bhartrhari, just as the organs of sense have a natural capacity of perceiving their respective objects, e.g. the eye recognising the form, the ear sound and so on, so also a word has a natural capacity to convey its meaning. This potency is the very cause of cognition of a

\textsuperscript{136} As we have earlier seen, the Vaiyākaraṇas use the term Śakti as a synonym of Abhidhā.
particular meaning from the corresponding word.\textsuperscript{137} The Vaiyākaraṇas thus agree with the Mīmāṃsakas while conceiving Sakti as an inherent capacity of a word.

The Vaiyākaraṇas, however, contend that although the primary significative potency naturally inheres in a word, this cannot signify a meaning at each and every moment of hearing a word. It can produce a conceptual knowledge only when the relation it bears with the corresponding object is ascertained. Thus Sakti can be equated with the illuminative power of a lamp. Just as the illuminative capacity though inherent in a lamp, can reveal an object only when the latter comes into contact of the light, so also Sakti of a word can present an idea of an object only when the said word used as a sign for the particular object, is previously known to the cogniser.\textsuperscript{138}

As we have earlier observed, the Vaiyākaraṇas have strongly criticised the Naiyāyikas' proposition that

\begin{verbatim}
137. indriyāṇāṁ svaviśayevanādir yogyatā yathā / anādirarthaiḥ śabdāṇāṁ sambandho yogyatā tathā ||'VP, III.29
also vide Vbh, p.181.
138. sakterapi kāryajanaṇakatvāṁ sambandhasyaiva nityānākataṁ dvipādigataprakāśaka ālokaṃ viśayasyasambandhe satyeva vastuprakāśakatvāṁ nānyatheti drṣṭatvāt. PLM, pp.12-16.
\end{verbatim}
Sakti is the relation between a word and its meaning and that, it is at the same time of the nature of a volition be it divine or human. The Vaiyakaraṇas conceive Sakti only as a relation which is different from all known types of relations, such as Samyoga (conjunction), Samavāya (invariable concomitance) and Kārya-kārāṇa (cause and effect). Nāgēśa describes Sakti as a Vācyā- Vācaka-Bhāva, i.e. a relation existing between the expressive word and the expressed meaning. The Sakti is apprehended through an identity (Tādātmya) between the word and the object signified by it on the strength of an Itaretara Adhyāsa (mutual illusory attribution). This Adhyāsa is the superimposition of a property (Dharma) belonging to one object upon another, the superimposition, which has for its ground an illusory identity of the said two objects. In this process of illusory attribution, the Artha is superimposed upon the Šabda and the Šabda is

139. vide our discussion under the title 'Abhidhā in the works of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika.'
140. tasmātpadapadārthāyōḥ sambandhāntarāmeva sāktī, vācyavācakabhbhāvaparyāyā tadgrāhakaṇcetaretarādhyāsamulakāṁ tādātmyam, tadeva sambandhaḥ. PLM, p.17;
141 adhyāsasāca anyasmīnmanyadharmabhāsastamulakāmeva tādātmyam na vāstavikamiti tātparyam. also, Tattvaprakāśikā on PLM, p.17; cf., āha ko'yamadhyāso nāmeti. ucyate, smṛtimūp healthcare paratra pūrvadrṣṭāvabhāseḥ. Sārīraabhāṣya on lS, p.17.
superimposed upon the Artha. Thus Šabdā and Artha are apprehended as identical like the Guna (Quality) and the Guṇin (Qualified). Without an identity, this superimposition is not possible, just as it is not possible in case of the Ghaṭa (a jar) and the Paṭa (a piece of cloth). The origin of this idea of illusory attribute can be traced back to the Sūtra of Patañjali, which states that the word, the object signified and the knowledge of the object are in a state of intermixture because of a mutual attribution. In this context, the Bhāsyakāra cites the word Gauḥ where, as a matter of common experience, the word, the object signified by it and the idea of the object stand as identical. Thus there is an identity between the word and the corresponding meaning and this identity is due to an illusory mutual attribution. On the basis of this concept of

142. śabdārthayoritaretarādhyāsopī 'śabdārtha-pratyāya-
namiterādhyāsāt saṁskāraḥ' iti pātañjalasūtre (Pa.3, Sūtra 17) 'gaurīti śabdō gaurītyartho gaurītya jñāna-
mityanubhavapradarsānanena spaṭṭikṛtaḥ patañjalina
FN No.2 on PIM,p.7 by Nityānanda Pant Parvatīyā, 
Vide TL, pp. 48-49.

143. tādātmyaṁca tadbhinnatve sati tadbhdo na pratīyamā-
natvamiti bheṣjābhedasamanīyatvam abhedasyādhyāst-
tvācca na tayervirodhaḥ. VSM, p. 40
Adhyāsa, Nāgēśa says that Tādātmya is the Sambandha which has for its root a mutual attribution. To substantiate his stand, Nāgēśa quotes the authority of the Bhāṣya of Patañjali who defines the very convention (Samketa) of a word as the aforesaid mutual illusory attribution which has for its essence a recollection as in the expression 'yḍyāṁ śabdah so'ṛthaḥ yo'ṛthaḥ sa śabdah' (whatever is a word is the meaning and whatever is a meaning is the word). This Tādātmya between a word and its meaning, however, is not a pure identity, but is something like difference-cum-identity. The Vaiyākaraṇas maintain that although the identity between word and meaning is not real, yet the admission of the same stands indispensable in the usage by the elders (Vṛddhayavahāra) and in common usage. To illustrate the identity between word and meaning, Nāgēśa cites the expressions 'the single-lettered word ṣa signifies Brahman and 'the di-syllabled word Rāma demolishes the pride of Pīnākīn (i.e. Lord Śiva) (by way of

144. taduktam pātañjalabhaṣya, saṁketastu padārthayorita- retarādhyāsārūpāḥ smṛtyākhyo yo'yaṁ śabdah so'ṛtho yo'ṛthaḥ sa śabda iti. ibid, p. 23. 
vide also, śabdārthapratyāyanaṁ itaretarādhyāsāt saṁskāras tatpravibhāgasāmyamāt sarvabhūtatarutaj- nānam. YS, III.17.
breaking the bow in the court of Janaka). Here in the first expression, the word 'Om' is shown to be identical with Brahman (i.e. the meaning denoted by 'Om'), while in the second example, the word Rāma said to be competent to perform a heroic feat is shown as identical with the concept of Rāmacandra, the son of Dasaratha, which is denoted by the audible word (i.e. Rāma). Hence according to Nāgase, the Abheda (identity) between Sabda and Artha as recognised by the Vaiyākaraṇas, in reality, is a qualified (Viśiṣṭa) Abheda and as such it is to be termed as Bhedabheda, i.e. the relation of difference-cum-identity. This qualified Abheda or Tādātmya, again, is due to the process of ltaretarādhyāsa.\textsuperscript{146}

The above passages, however, provide us only the traditional view of the Vaiyākaraṇas on the issue as summed up by Nāgase.\textsuperscript{147} Nāgase, on his part, goes a step further and asserts that the relation between a word and its meaning which is said to constitute Śakti, is not one of difference-cum-identity but is of pure identity. In other words, both word and its meaning are completely

\textsuperscript{145} sābdārthayostādatmyādeva.... 'omiteyekāksaram brahma' 'rāmeti dvayāksaram nāma mānabhaṅgaḥ pinākīneḥ'..... iti śaktigrāhakasrutismrtivिषये śāmnādhiśaktiḥ pravṛttaye prāvṛttaye prayogaśca. PIM, p.21

\textsuperscript{146} Tl, p.50

\textsuperscript{147} CAIP, p.18.
identical. Such a position, however, Nāgēśa fears, may be objected to by the Naiyāyikas on the plea that the word and its meaning do not stand in the spatial association, the former residing inside our mouth and the latter in the world outside, and an identity between two things is possible only when there is an association of time or space between the two. As an answer to such an anticipated objection, Nāgēśa says that the term 'word' should be taken to mean only that word which resides in our mental world in the form of the eternal word-Principle -Sphoṭa. The term 'meaning' also should be understood as the idea of an object whatsoever, and not necessarily an object existing in the external world. Thus both word and its meaning being intellectual in essence, a spatial relation and consequently a complete identity between the two is not impossible to be established.¹⁴⁸ Nāgēśa hastens to add that the meanings understood from such words as 'fire' (Vahni) being only intellectual phenomena are obviously devoid of the power of burning (Dāhakatva) and the like. In support of his stand against the Naiyāyikas, he refers to the Yogasūtra of Patañjali,¹⁴⁹ according to

148. vastuto bauddha evārthāḥ sākyāḥ, padamapi sphoṭatmakāṁ prasiddham, tayo 'stādātmyam. PIM,p. 24
149. sādajñānānupāti vastusūnyo vikalpaḥ. Y S, 1.3
which, a meaning is grasped by us as an intellectual entity without any reference to the objective world. Thus the Vaiyākaraṇas' proposition that both word and meaning are intellectual in nature, helps them to defend their concept of the relation of identity between the expressive word and the expressed content.

As we have earlier indicated, the above contention of Nāgęśa is based on the Sphoṭa theory of Bhartrhari. Bhartrhari maintains that the meaningful language has two entities, both of which may be called words, one is the sound, the underlying cause of the articulate while the other is attached to the meaning. Thus the so-called word is the sound-pattern which is external aspect of language while the so-called meaning is the semantic aspect of it, which alone it significant. Bhartrhari, however, maintains that every word in ordinary usage, is possessed of a double potency to reveal itself and the object symbolised.

150. tatra bauddhe vahnyādāvarthe dāhādiśaktimatvābhāvēt.
ata eva 'śabda... vikalpa' iti vikalpasūtram samgrahate. śabdajñānakāryamātṛapāṇupāti buddhāvanupatañnasaśilo vastuśūnyah bāhyārtharatvaḥ vīsesena kalpyata iti vikalpah, buddhiparikalpita iti taddarthaḥ. PLM, p.24

151. VP, I.44
Also Vide ITM, p. 116.
by it. Just as a light can reveal itself while revealing other objects, so also a word first reveals its own form and then only the external object for which it is used as a sign. These two powers are designated by him as Grāhyatāsakti and Grāhakatāsakti.¹⁵²

According to Bhartrhari, the relation of the expression and the expressed between a word and its meaning is known from the function of Abhidhā, just as the relation between the object (Karma) and the instrument (Karaṇa) is understood from the action (Kriyā).¹⁵³

Explaining the contention of Bhartrhari, Puṇyarāja says that, in the process of a word signifying its meaning, the word is the instrument and the meaning signified is the object, but the idea of the 'object' and 'instrument' can not be conceived with a reference to an action. For it is the action that brings in the result.¹⁵⁴ Now, all this is enough to show that Bhartrhari emphasises on the operational aspect of the Abhidhā function.

¹⁵². grāhyatvaṁ grāhakatvaṁ ca dve śaktī tajāgo yathā /
tathaiva sarvasabdānām ete prthagiva stute //
VP, I.55

¹⁵³. kriyāvyavetāḥ sambandho diṣṭoḥ karatkarmanoḥ /
abhidhāniyamastasmādabhidhānābhidheyayoḥ //
ibid., II.4ο.1

¹⁵⁴. Vide Puṇyarāja on above.
According to him, although a word is possessed of its natural significative potency, it never conveys its meaning without its application by some agent. Thus when a word signifies a particular meaning, it does so because the speaker deliberately uses that word in that specific sense. Just as an eye perceives an object only when it is directed towards the object, so also a word signifies an object only when it is deliberately applied to it. Thus according to Grammarians, without a desire of the speaker, the primary significative function of a word, though latent in it, cannot signify the meaning.

THE OPINION 'SARVE SArvāRTHVĀCAKAH' UNDER REVIEW:

In the school of Grammar, Abhidhā was sometimes given so high a status that it was recognised as the only function of words capable of conveying all types of meanings. This is what is contended in the well-known maxim of the Grammarians 'sarve sarvārthavācakāh'. The Grammarians including Patañjali and Bhartṛhari maintain that all words are denotative of all their meanings. what

155. viniyagādṛte śabdo nārthasya prakāśakāh /
   arthābhidhānasambandhamuktidvāramaḥ pracakṣate //
   VP,II. 39

156. yathā sannihitaṃ caṣṣur darsanāyopakalpyate /
   tathābhisaṃhitah śabdo bhavatyarthasya vācakāh //
   ibid,II. 40.
they contend is that a word may have its meanings other than the one attached to convention. But all these meanings can be apprehended as the denoted meanings of the word. In other words, all meanings possible from a word are apprehended through the function of Abhidhā alone and there is no separate functions called Lakṣaṇā or Vyaṇjaṇā. Nāgæśa, referring to Patañjali's authority to this effect, however, maintains that this possibility is regulated by the presence or absence of Tatparya (intention of the speaker). There is indeed, one function of word and that is Abhidhā and hence recognition of another function called Lakṣaṇā should unnecessarily involve the fault of proximity (Gaurava). Under the circumstances, if Lakṣaṇā is assumed, it must be assumed only as a secondary function (Jaghanyā Vṛtti). But such a position, Nāgæśa maintains, would not be justified, since it suffices to recognise only one function of words. Thus in the stock example of: Lakṣaṇā 'gangāyēn ghoṣah' (A hemlet on the Gaṅgā), the word Gaṅgā may be said to have Sakti both in respect of the

157. sati tatparye sarve sarvarthavācakā iti bhasyāt
lakṣaṇāyā abhāvāt. vṛttidvayakalpane gauravāt
jaghanyavṛttikalpanāyā anyāyatvāc ca. katham
tarhi gāṅgādipadāt tīrapratyayāḥ bhrānto'si,
sati tatparye sarve sarvarthavācakā iti bhāṣyān-
meva grāhaṇa. PLM, p.206.
'current' and the 'bank'. Nāgėśa contends that the word Ganga may convey the concept of either the 'current' or the 'bank' as demanded by Tatparya of the word, with the help of Abhidhā itself. In order to account for the idea of the 'bank', therefore, there is no need of recognising Lakṣaṇa. In the opinion of Nāgėśa, Lakṣaṇa is not a secondary function, but is also a Sakti, the primary significative function of a word with reference to the so-called secondary meaning (Lakṣyārtha).

Nāgėśa, however, maintains that the maxim 'sarve sarvārthavācakāḥ' should not necessarily lead to the anomaly like that of making the word Ghaṭa (a jar) stand also for a Paṭā (a piece of cloth), as the act of conveying a meaning would always depend on the Tatparya (the intention of the speaker). This Tatparya, again, need not necessarily pertain only to the immediate speaker, it may belong even to Iśvara (the Almighty Lord), other deities, the seers, the learned people and also the society as a whole.

158. / tātparyaṅupattisandhānameva .... PLM, p.45
159. tātparyāṁ cāṭrā aisvaram devatāmahārṣilokavṛddhapatamaparātōśmadādibhīr labdhhamī sarvāṁ surūdhham.
PLM, . .27.
The scholars who hold this view, maintain that Sakti or Abhidha which is said to bring all possible meanings of a word into light, is of two types, viz., Prasiddhā and Aprasiddhā. The former is familiar to all and the meaning brought by it, is grasped by one and all irrespective of possession or lack of intelligence, while the latter and also the meaning conveyed by it, is familiar only to the intelligent. Thus in the expression 'gangāyām ghoṣah' we have two Saktis, viz. one that conveys the idea of the current and the other that brings about the idea of the 'banā'. Thus it is possible for the same word to have more than one expressed meanings. Nāgeśa appears to have modelled the classification of Sakti into Prasiddhā and Aprasiddhā on the principle of distinguishing Arthas (meanings) into Mukhya (primary) and Gauṇa (secondary) on the basis of Siddhi (i.e. Prasiddhi) and Asiddhi (i.e. Aprasiddhi) as propounded by Bhartrhari. Nāgeśa, however, admits

160. tatha hi saktir dvividhā-prasiddhā-prasiddhā ca, amandabuddhivedyatvam prasiddhātvam, sahrdayaḥ śrdayamāt-ravedyatvam aprasiddhātvam, tatra gangādipadānām pravahādau prasiddhā śaktiḥ, tīrādeu cāprasiddhāti kimāṇupapannam. PLM, pp. 20-21

161. sarvasāktestu tasyaiva śabdasyānekadharminēḥ / prasiddhītyāgād gauṇatvām mukhyatvām vopajyate. VP quoted in VBH, p. 150
here a role to be played by Tātparya (intention of the speaker) in the matter of a word's conveying a meaning only through Śakti. Nāgęsa further observes that the maxim 'sarve sarvārthavācakāh' is applicable to the seers (yogins) only. It is with the Yogins that any word signifies any meaning as demanded by Tātparya. In common parlance where an expressed meaning is restricted by convention, the maxim 'sarve sarvārthavācakāh' does not hold good.

The Vaiyākaraṇas while cherishing such an opinion, anticipate an objection from the Naiyāyikas. The Naiyāyikas may argue that the use of a word is restricted to that particular meaning only with reference to which there is convention in the shape of Divine Will. Thus convention being the determining factor of the primary meaning, any word can not convey any meaning simply on the strength of the speaker's intention. To this, the Vaiyākaraṇas' reply is that the convention of God in the shape of His will only reveals the meaning and never denotes it. There is a fixed eternal relation

162. ACS, pp.160-161
163. sarvair arthah sarvārthavācakāh smābhāsā
yogijñānagamyā eva, tēśām yogabalenobhayāparā-
pratyaksāt. VSM, p.49
between a word and its corresponding meaning, \textsuperscript{164} which constitutes the very Śakti of a word known as Bodhakatā (significativeness)\textsuperscript{165} This expressive potency may assume either Prasiddhā (familiar) or Aprasiddhā (unfamiliar) form to convey different meanings of the same word.\textsuperscript{166} Thus the Vaiyākaraṇas justify their proposition in favour of all words being Vācaka only.

Here we reiterate the point that the Vaiyākaraṇas' view under consideration, in favour of the singular verbal function applies only to the intellectual parlance of language. The common-sense view of the Vaiyākaraṇas extends recognition to Lakṣanā and Vyāñjanā also (in addition to Abhidhā) as significative functions of words.\textsuperscript{167}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{164} sarve śabdā....... Īśvarasaṅketastu prakāśakāh ata 
\item \textsuperscript{165} eva nityaḥ śabdārthasambandha iti taṇtrikāh.
\item \textsuperscript{166} VSM, p. 49
\item \textsuperscript{167} VP quoted in VBHS, p. 74.
\end{itemize}
THE CONCEPT AND TREATMENT OF ABHIDHA
IN SANSKRIT POETICS

The writers of Sanskrit poetics, in course of their poetic and aesthetic criticism, considered it imperative on their part to deal with the significative functions of words. These scholars, however, for the most part of their discussions, have borrowed the views of the Grammarians and Philosophers. We have earlier shown how Anandavardhana acknowledges the leading role of the Grammarians in the domain of knowledge. But the Alamkārikas have modelled the theories accepted from others in such a manner that they can definitely claim their originality. This is true in respect of their treatment of Abhidhā function also.

As regards the concept and treatment of verbal functions, we find that the theorists prior to Anandavardhana were not so much critical about them. They dealt with the nature of words, their meanings and also their significative functions either casually or from specific viewpoints, or these scholars were more concerned with the task of defining and illustrating various figures of speech - both verbal and ideational. But inspite of such casual treatment of the problem of signification on the part of these scholars, we
find them recognising Abhidhā as the primary signification of a word and Lakṣaṇā as the secondary function, which however, as we shall presently see, was usually accepted as an extension of Abhidhā. In Sanskrit Poetics, a serious study of the functions of words actually started with Ānandavardhana. Ānandavardhana while asserting Dhvani or suggestion as the soul of poetry, had to establish Vyāñjana as an independent function of words in addition to Abhidhā and Lakṣaṇā recognised by his predecessors. It is, however, not that the theorists prior to him were not familiar with the phenomenon of Dhvani. They did recognise Dhvani, but did not brought it to limelight as Ānandavardhana did. Ānandavardhana critically examines also the respective status of Abhidhā, Lakṣaṇā and Vyāñjana functions of words and finally establishes the predominance of Vyāñjana in the domain of Kāvya. As Dr. S.K. De observes, Ānandavardhana in his Dhvanyāloka not only fixed the new principle of Dhvani in poetry, but also worked up and rationalised into a synthetic and comprehensive system the already accumulated ideas, elaborated by previous thinkers but flowing through channels in the respective systems of Bhamaha, Vāmēna and the post-Bharata dramaturgic Rasa-writers'.

In fact, it was Ānandavardhana who for the first time set a standard of poetic criticism to be followed by the entries

169. HSP, p. 322
to come. Under the circumstances, we may take the date of Ānandavardhana as the central point and divide, for our convenience, the whole age of history of Sanskrit Poetics into two periods, viz. pre-Ānandavardhana period and post-Ānandavardhana period in the context of our dealing with the concept and treatment of Abhidhā in Sanskrit Alamkāra works. It shall be observed in due course of our discussion that even among the successors of Ānandavardhana, there were some scholars who were not ready to accept the Vyañjana function of words. Some of these scholars recognised even Abhidhā as the only function of words. In such cases, Abhidhā usually included in its perview the Laksana function also. Thus the trend set by the earlier theorists like Bhāmaaha was not altogether given up by the successors of Ānandavardhana, the same was rather developed or modified by some of these scholars. Pending a detailed examination of the different views on the concept of Abhidhā as held by the post-Ānandavardhana theorists, we now propose to bring out the concept and treatment of Abhidhā in Sanskrit Poetics pertaining to pre-Ānandavardhana period, as represented by the major Alamkāra works.

170. dhvanikṛtām ālāmkārikaśāraṇīvyavasthāpakatvāt.

RG, p. 425
Of the writers of Poetics preceding Ānandavardhana, Bhāmaha, the author of Kāvyālāmākāra appears to be the first to deal with the function of Abhidhā, although the term used by him for the same is Abhidhāna. He refers to Abhidhāna along with Sabda (words) Chandas (metre) etc. as the essentials of poetry. On the concept of this Abhidhāna, however, Bhāmaha is silent himself. But from Udbhāṭa's gloss on KL, it is gathered that the term Abhidhāna used by Bhāmaha stands for Abhidhāvyāpāra, which is two-fold, viz, Mukhyā Abhidhā and Guṇavṛtta.

Now, in view of this twofold Abhidhāvyāpāra, we presume that Bhāmaha's Mukhya Abhidhāvyāpāra signifies the Abhidhā function in the popular sense of the term and his Guṇavṛtta stands for both Laksanā and Gauṇī. This is warranted by the fact that Mukulabhaṭṭa, a celebrated successor of Bhāmaha also uses the terms Mukhya Abhidhā Vyāpāra in the sense of Abhidhā and Laksanika Abhidhāvyāpāra in the sense of Laksanā. Thus Bhāmaha's Abhidhāna stands...
for the significative function of a word which is two-fold, viz. Abhidhā and Laksanā.

DANDIN:

Although Dandin does not refer to the function of Abhidhā by name, he refers to the denotative word and the denoted meaning in various contexts. Thus in context of defining the figure Dīpaka, he refers to the Vācaka words that signify Jāti (universal), Guṇa (quality), Kriyā (action) and Dravya (substance). But a Vācaka word is that which conveys a meaning through the function of Abhidhā. Dandin refers to Laksanā as a Gauri (secondary) Vṛtti while defining the poetic merit called Samādhi. This also suggests that in his scheme there must be some Mukhya Vṛtti or primary significative function which is nothing but Abhidhā. He also refers to the involvement of the Vyāhārtha or suggested meaning while defining the poetic excellence called Udātta.

174 jātikriyā-guṇadravyavācinaiketravartinā /
sarvavākyopakāraścet tamāhur dīsakaṁ yathā //
KD, II. 97

175. cf. KP, II, 2.b; SD II. 3.a

176. niṣṭhyutakṛṣṇavāntādī guṇavṛttiyaśvāsrayam /
KD, I. 95. a

177. ibid, II. 303.
From all these, we may conclude that Dandin recognises Abhidhā, Lakṣaṇā, and Vyañjana as three separate functions of words, of which, Abhidhā is the foremost one.

Vāmana:

Vāmana, the author of Kāvyālāṃkārasūtra has not treated the concept of Abhidhā directly, but only indirectly. As pointed out by Dr. Y.D. Sharma, Vāmana while examining ten essential elements of Kāvya already familiar to the Ālāṃkārikas, has neither referred to Rasa nor to the functions of words. 178 But his recognition of Abhidhā as the primary significative function of a word can be presumed from his direct reference to Laksāṇa in the context of his treatment of the figure Vakrokti. He defines Vakrokti as Laksāṇa based upon Sadṛṣya, i.e. resemblance. 179 This shows that Vāmana not only knows Laksāṇa, but its different varieties also, e.g. Laksāṇa based upon the relations known as Sadṛṣya and Sadṛṣyetara (other than resemblance). And Vakrokti being conceived as a special mode of metaphorical expression, it must involve an earlier inconsistency of the direct signification of an expression. Thus Uttuṅgodaya in his Kaumudī under Locana cites an 

178. AV, p. 101
179. 'vāmano'pi sadṛṣyāl lakṣaṇā vakroktīḥ iti.
Vide Locana, pp. 68-69
instance of the figure Vakrokti from Vāmana and shows that in Vokrakti, the inconsistency of the primary meaning leads to the comprehension of a metaphorical meaning or Lakṣyārtha. Thus must have recognised Abhidhā as the primary function of a word.

It may be mentioned here that Abhinava places Vāmana on the same footing of earlier writers like bhāmaha and Udbhāta who have touched some fringe of the concept of Dhvani, but have not directly referred to it as a poetic theory at all. Thus Vāmana stands out as one of the Bhāktavādins or Antarbhāvāvadins (who include Dhvani under Bhakti or Lakṣaṇā) as referred to by Ānandavardhana.

Now, this status of a Bhāktavādin given to Vāmana by Ānanda and Abhinava is also suggestive enough of the fact that in the scheme of Vāmana, there are two distinct

180. unmimīla kumudām sarasaṁ pahkajām ca nimimīla
 muhūrtāt / KLSV under KLS, IV.3.8
181. atromśūnanimśūnaśabdāu bādhitaṁukhyārthau sādvāyā-
tsaṁkocavikāsalakṣākatayā prayuktāu.
op.cit., p.68
182. bhaṭṭodbhāṭavāmanādinā.
Locana, p.67
183. bhāktamahus tamanye. DL, I.1
significant functions of words, viz. Abhidha and Lakṣaṇa, of which Abhidha is the primary function and Lakṣaṇa is only a secondary function.

**Udbhāta:**

Of the Ālamkārikas, Udbhāta the author of Kāvyālāmākārasārasamgraha and Laghuvṛtti appears to be the first to use the term Abhidha in the sense of the significative function of a word. As we have earlier observed, Udbhāta understands the term Abhidhāna used by Bhāmaha in the sense of Abhidha. According to Abhinavagupta, such a behaviour on the part of Udbhāta was to distinguish Bhāmaha's 'Abhidhāna' from 'Śabda' (words).

That is to say, according to Udbhāta, Bhāmaha's 'Śabda' and 'Abhidhāna' should not be understood as synonymous; instead, 'Abhidhāna' should be taken to mean the vyāpāra (function) of Śabdās to signify their meanings. Thus 'Abhidhāna' of Bhāmaha is consequently the Abhidhāvyāpāra of Udbhāta. Here the term Abhidha is used in a broader sense to cover both 'Abhidha' (in its popular sense) and Gunavṛtti (which includes both Lakṣaṇa and Gaunī).  

184. abhidhānasya śabdaḥ bhedāḥ vyākhyātum bhūtodbhātac bhabhāse- śabdānām.......... Locana, vide DL. I, pp. 34-35

185. abhidhānāṃ sabdo'yam nābhidhāyakasabdevacanah, kintu tadvyāpārasyarthapratiptikēryāvakāmyasya mukhyagunavṛttibhedābhinnasyābhidhākhyasyāyamabhidhāyakṛt....... Kaumudī on above Locana text. Vide DL. I, pp. 34-35
Udbhata not only uses the term Mukhya Abhidhavyayāpāra for the primary significative function of a word, but also goes a step further to describe it as Nirantarārthaniṣṭhavyāpāra. Thus in the context of his treatment of the figure Rūpaka (Metaphor), he recognises an involvement of the Lakṣaṇā function and maintains that Lakṣaṇā is resorted to in those cases where the meaning brought by the Nirantarārthaniṣṭhavyāpāra is inappropriate to the context. 186

Now, in the context of the development of the concept of Abhidhā in Sanskrit Poetics, this notion of Nirantarārthaniṣṭhavyāpāra bears great significance. This expression means that Abhidhā is the function that conveys to one's comprehension a meaning which is not intervened by any other meaning. It may be recalled that according to various philosophical schools and Grammarians also, the essential nature of Abhidhā lies in its direct signification of a meaning. Of the Ālamkārikas, Udbhata appears to be the first to explicitly mention this essential characteristic of his Mukhya Abhidhavyāpāra. In contrast to this Mukhya Abhidhā, Udbhata conceives Guṇavṛtta (covering both Lakṣaṇā

186. nanu viruddharthābhidhāyinaḥ semānādhikaranaṇayoh |
śabārthayor nirantarārthaniṣṭhena abhidhāvyāpāreṇa |
anupapadyamānānyonya..... lakṣaṇāyā guṇavṛt提tvam |
abhidyate.

Kāvyālāmकेतारसारसमग्रहा and Laghuvrīṭti, p. 77.
and Gauñī) as Sāntarāthanaśthavyāpāra. The later Ālamkarikas like Mukula\textsuperscript{187} and Mammata,\textsuperscript{188} while distinguishing between the functions of Abhidhā and Laksāṇa, have appropriately utilised the concepts of 'Nirantarāthaśthavyāpāra and Sāntarāthanaśthavyāpāra as cherished by Udbhata.

**RUDRAṬA:**

Rudraṭa in his Kāvyālamkāra uses the word Abhidhā in the context of defining an Artha (meaning) which, along with Šabda (word) constitutes a Kāvyā. He defines an Artha as Abhidhāvēṇ, i.e., possessed of Abhidhā.\textsuperscript{189} Namisāḍhu, the commentator on KLR understands the term Abhidhā in the sense of Pratīti, i.e., comprehension. Thus whatever is comprehended through Šabda is called Artha.\textsuperscript{190} This Artha is fourfold, viz., Jāti, Guna, Kriyā and Dravya, and the comprehension of this fourfold meaning is said to constitute Abhidhā. Thus

\begin{quote}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[187.] evamayāṃ mukhyalākṣaṇīkātmaviṣayopavārtanaśāvibhāya
dsabdasyābhidhāvyāpāro dvividhāḥ pratipādito nirmantarāthāvṛtyaḥ sāntarāthanaśthāṣṭra. AVM, i.3
\item[188.] ...... sa aropitah śabdavyāpārah sāntarāthanaśthāṃ lekṣāṇa. KP, p.43
\item[189.] arthaḥ punarabhidhāvēṇ pravartate tasya vācaḥ
	tasya bhavanti dravyaḥ gūṇaḥ kriyā jātirīti maṇḍalāḥ.
	KLR, VII. 1
\item[190.] abhidhā pratīti sa vidyate yasya sa tathā. Namisāḍhu on above, vide KLR, p. 74.
\end{enumerate}
\end{quote}
Rudraṭa's Abhidhā appears to stand for the very action of denotation (Abhidhāna or Abhidhānakriyā). As we have earlier observed, Bhāmaṭha has already used the term Abhidhāna as a synonym of Abhidhā. Thus, in essence, there appears to be no difference between 'Abhidhāna' of Bhāmaṭha and 'Abhidhā' of Rudraṭa. Moreover, according to Rudraṭa, it is through Abhidhā function that the comprehension of the four types of meanings, Jāti etc. takes place, as is warranted by the Ālamkārikas' Jātyādi theory concerning the import of a word as we shall deal with in due course of the present work. Rudraṭa himself uses the term Vācaka Sābda for a denotative word.\(^{192}\) Namīṣādhā uses the terms Abhīhita Artha for a denoted meaning and Abhidhāyaka Sābda for a denotative word.\(^{193}\) He also refers to the relation between the two as the Vācyavācakabhūva.\(^{194}\)

From all this, Rudraṭa's recognition of Abhidhā as the primary significative function of a word can be ascertained beyond any doubt.

AGNIPURĀNA:

The Ālamkāra section of the Agnipurāṇa deals with the concept of Abhidhā only casually. It is, however, difficult to ascertain the date of this Purāṇa. As pointed

\(^{191}\) ibid., VII.1
\(^{192}\) ibid.
\(^{193}\) Namīṣādhā on above.
\(^{194}\) KiR, p. 74
out by Dr. S.K. De, the Alamkāra section of AP does not represent any orthodox system of Alamkāra. Its author appears to be only a compiler of teachings available in various sources of his time. The most peculiar characteristic of this Purāṇa is that it makes no reference to the principle of Dhwani, although the concept of the same is included in the figure Ākṣepa in the manner of the ancient theorists. Hence AP may pertain to that period of Sanskrit Poetics when the concept of Dhwani was yet to get the status of an independent doctrine. Thus AP may be treated as a treatise pertaining to the pre-Ānandavardhana period.

The AP recognises Abhidhā and Laksamā as the significative functions of words. It describes Abhidhā as the distinguishing mark of Kāvya, while Āśāstra (scriptures) and Itiḥāsa (history) are said to be characterised by Sabda (words) and Artha (meanings) respectively.

195. HSP, p. 201
196. ibid.
197. सास्त्रे साब्दप्रदाननात्वम्र इतिहासे रक्षानिष्ठताः / अभिधिव्याह प्रदाननात्वम् काव्याम् ताभ्याम् भिद्यात् / Vide ASAP, p. 137
In AP edited by Kṣemarāja Kṛṣṇadāsa, however, the second foot of this verse is read as 'ितिहासे रक्षनिष्ठताः'. Vide AP, 357, 1-2a
The AP deals with the concept of Abhidhā in the context of its treatment of the figure Abhivyakti which is referred to as a Śabdārthaśākāra. Abhivyakti is defined as Prakātavat (manifestation) and it is classified into two types, viz. Śruti andĀkṣepa.\(^{198}\) In Śruti type of Abhivyakti, a word delivers its own (expressed) meaning. Ākṣepa is used as a synonym of Dhwani. Śruti is again twofold, viz. Naimittikī and Pāribhāṣikī. Pāribhāṣā is understood as Śaṁketa (convention).\(^{199}\) So the variety of Abhivyakti that brings the Śaṁketī Artha into light is termed Pāribhāṣikī Abhivyakti. Both Naimittikī and Pāribhāṣikī types of Śruti are further subdivided as Mukhyā and Aupācārikī. Aupācārikī Śruti is said to occur in those cases where the meaning brought by an expressive word conveys some remote meaning on the strength of some Nimittā (ground).\(^{200}\)

198. prakātatvam abhivyaktiḥ śruti ākṣepa ity api /
tasya bhedau śruti statra śabdāṁ svārthaśemarpanaṁ //
ibid., 345.7

199. bhaven naimittikī pāribhāṣikī dvividheiva sa /
śaṁketīḥ paribhāṣeti tataḥ syāt pāribhāṣikī //
ibid., 345.8

200. mukhyāupācārikī ceti sa ca sa ca dvidiha dvidiha /
svābhidheyaśakhaladvṛttir mukhyārthasya vācakaḥ //
ibid., 345.9
Now, from the above observations, we are led to believe that the AP uses the word Śruti as a synonym of Abhidhā. This Abhidhā, however, is not confined to a word's conventional meaning only, but includes in its scope the secondary significative function also, which is termed Aupacārikī Śruti, which includes both Laksana and Gaṇī Vṛtti. Mukhyā variety of Śruti here appears to be analogous to Abhidhā, the primary function of a word. The AP defines Laksana as the invariable association between the primary and secondary concepts. Thus like Kumārila, the author of AP also maintains that when primary meaning leads to the comprehension of an additional meaning because of the invariable relation existing between the two, the function that takes place is Laksana. Now, conceiving Laksana as such, AP recognises the priority of Abhidhā, i.e. Mukhyā Śruti to Laksana which is only a variety of Aupacārikī Śruti.

201. Vide Joshi Thakurdatta, Sanskrit Kāvyasastra men lakṣaṇā kā udbhav tathā vikās, p. 99
202. sa ca lakṣaṇikī gaṇī lakṣaṇa guṇayogatāḥ / AP, 346-101b
203. abhidheyāvinābhūte pravṛttitir lakṣaṇocayate / ibid, 346.11a

In TV of Kumārila, however, the definition occurs with a slight difference:

abhidheyāvinābhūte pravṛttitir lakṣaṇocayata

op. cit., Vide MD, p. 313
Such a behaviour on the part of the author of AP places him on the same footing of earlier Ālāṃkārīkas like Bhamaha and Udbhaṭa. But so far as his concept of Lakṣaṇa and naming of Abhidhā as Śruti (Mukhya Śruti, of course) are concerned, he appears to be a follower of the Mīmāṃsā school.

Thus in the Pre-Ānandavardhana period of Sanskrit Poetics, we find that Abhidhā and Lakṣaṇa were the functions of words assumed for the comprehension of the significance of Poetry. The concept of Dhvani, though known to these writers was included under Guṇas and Ālāṃkāras. For according to them, true poetry consists in the combination of words and meanings beautified by Guṇas (poetic merits) and Ālāṃkāras (figures) which are nothing but the properties of those words and meanings. Hence any element that was considered as conducive to the enhancement of poetic excellence, came to be included under the perview of Guṇas and Ālāṃkāras.

204. Vide SB under MS, I.4.2.

205. cf. śabdārthagunālāṃkārāṇāṁ eva śabdārthasobhākārit-vāt lokaśastrātirikta-sundaraśabdārthamayaśya kāvyasyēnyaśobhāhetuḥ kaścid anyo'sti......

Locana, p. 37
Alamkāras in the scheme of these writers preceding Ānanda-
davardhana. 206

ABHIDHĀ IN SANSKRIT POETICS OF
POST-ĀNANDAVARDHANA PERIOD

ĀNANDAVARDHANA:

As against the aforesaid trend of thought set by
his predecessors, Ānandavardhana came to emphasise on the
inner significance of poetry. He asserts that poetry has
a deeper meaning called Dhvani or suggestion which has
been recognised as the very soul of it by the learned, but
the same remained unnoticed as such even by the subtlest
of the intellect of the ancient rhetoricians. Ānanda takes
care to show that the suggested meaning by no means can be
identified or equated with the expressed sense hitherto
recognised by the ancients. But yet the expressed sense
is indispensable in poetry inasmuch as it is the very
foundation of the suggested content. Thus Dhvani appears
in such various forms, as Vastu (a bare matter of fact),
Alamkāra (figures) and Rasādi (sentiments); but in all
these cases, it presupposes an expressed meaning, because

206. cf. atha sobhākāri bhavati terhi asmadukta eva supe
va' lemkare v'entarbhavati,nāmānteragrahane tu
kiyedidam pāṇḍityam. ibid., p.38
207 kāvyasyātmā dhvaniḥ...... DL,1,1
Also, tasya hi dhvaneḥ svarūpam sakalasatkevīkāvyo-
peniṣadhūtām atiramarāpyam anyasyādhirapi cintantane-
kāvyalakṣaṇavadhāyinām buddhibhiranumilitaḥpuṛvam.
ibid.,p.6
each case of Dhvani is implied by an inner potency of the explicit. Hence while propounding the theory of Dhvani, Ananda conceives the expressed meaning as the very foundation of it. In his opinion, in the domain of Kāvya, only the suggested sense is prominent and as such it can alone be described as the very soul thereof, but the same can not be grasped without understanding the expressed sense. Just as without knowing first the meaning of individual words, the total meaning of a sentence is not capable of being comprehended, so also without a prior understanding of the primary meaning of the sentence, its suggested sense can not be cognised. Thus the expressed meaning and the suggested content stand in the relation similar to the one subsisting between the Padārtha and the Vākyārtha. Hence it is in quite fitness of things, as Abhinava observes, that the Dhvanikāra mentions and treats the Vācya sense along with the Pratiyamāna even when he goes to define the nature

208. sa hyartho vācyasāmarthyākṣiptaṃ vastumātram ānāmkeśra-rasādayaśca ityanekaprabhedaprabhīnno derśayiṣyate.

Also,

'vācyasāmarthyākṣiptam' iti bhedatrayayāyēpakaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇam. Locana, Vide ibid., p. 103

209. tatra dhvanereva lakṣayitumāratdhasya bhūmiṃ kāmakākṣiptaṃ racayitumārdhasya bhūmiṃ ucyate -

yō'rthah sahrdayaslaghyah kāvyaśetmeti vyavasthitah vācyapratiyamānakhyau tasya bhedāvubhau smṛtah

210. DL, 1,10
of the latter only. Abhinava contends that just as before constructing a new building, one builds its foundation, so also Ānanda bases his novel theory of Dhvani on the firm ground of the Vācyā sense.

But in spite of all cases of Dhvani being based directly or indirectly on the expressed meaning, the former cannot be included in the domain of the latter, and while substantiating this proposition, the Dhvanikāra brings out the real nature of the explicit and the function of Abhidhā that brings the same into light.

Ānanda describes the Vācyā sense as Svārtha, i.e. the meaning pertaining to the word itself, and conceives Abhidhā as Sabdeśakti, i.e., the significative function pertaining to the word itself. Now, from an examination of the nature of Abhidhā, we find that the comprehension of the meaning brought about by Abhidhā

211. bhūmiriva bhūmikā, yathā apūrvanirmane cikirṣite pūrvāḥ bhūmireva viracyate, tathā dhvanisvarūpe pratiyamānākhye nirūpayitavye nirvīdādesiddhava-cyebhidhrānam bhūmiḥ. Locana, pp. 84-85

Also Vide Kaumudī on above.

212. yatra s'abdah svārtham abhidadhāno'rhāntaram avagamayati.......... ... DLV, p. 254
proceeds from the comprehension of the very word and not from that of a meaning. In other words, the understanding of the Vācyā meaning is not intervened by the cognition of any other meaning. As we have earlier observed, of the ancient writers, Udbhāṭa has already noted this essential nature of the expressed meaning and as such has described Abhidhā as Nirantarārthanisthābhyāpāra. Hence Ānanda has rightly described Abhidhā as the Śabdāsakti. Although Lokaśeṇa is also conceived as Śabdāsakti, it is conceived as such only secondarily. The term Svārtha is also very significantly used for the Abhidheya Artha. This implies that Abhidhā conveys only that meaning of a word which is attached to it through Samaya or convention. Although we have earlier observed, this convention is defined by the Vaiśeṣikas as the recommendation of the regulation that such and such a word should mean such and such a meaning and never otherwise. Like his predecessors, Ānandaavardhana also comes to accept this basic notion of convention in the concept of

213. ibid., II.21
214. vāccakatvām hi śabdaviśeṣasya niyata ātmā, vyuttattikālād ārabhya tedaśinabhāvena tasya prasiddhatvād. DL, p. 476
215. cf. tatra samayepekṣeṇa śabdōrthapratiṣṭhādaka iti kṛtvā vācyayatiriktaṃ nāsti vyāñgaṃ. Lucana, p. 37
Abhidhā and maintains that the function of Abhidhā is confined to this conventional meaning only.\(^{216}\)

Ānanda describes the primary significative function of a word variously as Mukhya Vṛtti,\(^{217}\) Abhidhāna-sakti\(^{218}\) and Vācakatva;\(^{219}\) but he has identified the same by the specific term 'Abhidhā'\(^{220}\) also. Thus while his predecessors like Udbhata have used the term Abhidhā indiscriminately for both primary and secondary functions of a word (the former being called Mukhya Abhidhā Vyāpāra and the latter Guṇavṛtti), Ānanda comes to use the term Abhidhā in the sense of a word's primary significative function only. In view of this distinction, 'Abhidhā' of Udbhata may be described as Vyāpārasāmānyya (any significative function, and that of Ānanda may be termed as Vyāpāraviśeṣa (a particular significative function).

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216. cf. ata eva samayaniyamītad abhidhāvyāpāraḥ vikalṣeṣaḥ iti yāvat. ibid., Vide DL, p. 47c
217. mukhyaṁ vṛttiṁ parityajya guṇavṛttyārtha-darśanam / DL, I.17
218. na hi yaśvābhidhāna-saktiḥ saivāyogamaṇa-saktiḥ. DLV, p. 255
219. vācakatvaṁ hi śabdaviśeṣasya .. ibid, p. 270
220. yadi ca guṇavṛttyaiva dhvanir laksyeta ityuc. ati
tadabhidhāvyāpāraṇa .. ibid, p. 67.
describes Laksana as the Amukhya Vṛtti or Guṇavṛtti, which always stands in the need of an earlier operation of Abhidha. It may be noted here that although Vyanjana is always based on Abhidha or Laksana, Ānanda never calls it Guṇavṛtti, i.e. a secondary function, rather he conceives it as the Mukhya Vṛtti, i.e. primary function in true sense of the term. For, according to him, the suggested sense whether it is in the form of Vastu, Alamkāra or Rasa, is never comprehended as being subordinate to the Vācyā sense. He further contends that a poet of first rate marshalls both the expressive and the expressed in the direction of Rasa. For, the main business of a poet lies in making the Rasa principal in the whole poem and in employing both words and meanings in such a way that the contextual Rasa is suggested clearly. According to the Dhvani theorist, this Rasa can not be expressed even in a dream. But Rasa is always grasped along with the Vācyā even when the latter is not intended to be conveyed. Thus according to Ānanda, in all

221. ..... yad amukhyatayā vyāpāro guṇavṛttih presiddhā. ibid, p. 259
222. vācakatvāsrayenaiva guṇavṛttir vyavasthita / DL, I.18.a
223. vyānijkatvām tu mukhyatayaiśa śabdasya vyāpārah. DL, p. 253
224. Vide ibid.
225. DL, III.32
226. Vide V under above
cases of Dhvani, a previous operation of the Abhidhā function stands indispensable.

The above position of Ananda came to be accepted as a general approach to the problem of verbal signification in general and that of Abhidhā in particular by the subsequent writers on Poetics who accepted the principle of Dhvani. Hence on the question of nature and jurisdiction of Abhidhā function, the later Dhvanivādin writers do not essentially differ from Ananda. But yet while treating the concept of Abhidhā in their own way, these scholars have added their new ideas to the original concept. Hence it is felt imperative on our part to bring out here the concept of Abhidhā treated by certain noted Poeticians affiliated to the school of Dhvani.

ABHINAVAGUPTA:

Abhinavagupta in his Locana under DL only expounds the concept of Abhidhā as cherished by Ananda. As we have earlier pointed out, Abhinava recognises three different functions, viz. Abhidhā, Laksanā and Vyaśajaranā pertaining to the individual words and an additional function called Tātparya pertaining to the sentence as a whole. Of these, Abhidhā is conceived

\[
\text{trayo hyatra vyāprāh samvedyante... tato viśeṣaty]
\]

\[
\text{vākyārthe tātparyāsaktih... Locana, p.157}
\]
as the primary function which operates in all word-meanings in common and conveys the meaning which is attached to a word through convention.\textsuperscript{228}

Although Abhinava recognises in poetry three types of Dhvani, viz. Vastu, Alamkāra and Rasa, he is better known for his exclusive preference to Rasadhvani, and in fact, he is the forerunner of the Rasadhvani school which is the most popular school of Sanskrit Poetics. But as we have noted earlier, in all cases of Dhvani, Abhinava recognises a prior operation of Abhidhā function. Hence in the case of realisation of Rasa, the very essence of Poetry, an earlier operation of Abhidhā stands admitted.

Ānanda while refuting the view of the opponents of Dhvani uses the word Vāgvikalpa meaning thereby that according to opponents, the ways of speech (Vāk) are endless and as such even if there should be any element like Dhvani, it could be explained away as one of such ways of speech. Abhinava while commenting on this view of Ānanda understands the term Vāk in three different senses, viz. expressive word, expressed meaning and the expressive function, i.e. Abhidhā

\textsuperscript{228} padārtheṣu sāmānyatmaṣu abhidhēvyāpāreḥ. saṃeyēpeksēyē arthāvagamanaśaktiḥ abhidhā. ibid.
as well. Here Abhinava takes cognisance of the view of the earlier writers (other than Anandavardhana) that just as words and meanings are countless, so also the ways of charmingness brought about by the Abhidhā function are innumerable. In fact like Ananda, Abhinava also admits that in poetry, Abhidhā brings in exquisite charm and delight through innumerable figures of speech, although he is strongly of the view that Dvēni can by no means be included under the domain of Alamkāras.

MAMMAṬABHĀṬṬA:

Mammaṭa in his KP describes Abhidhā as the Mukhya Vyāpāra, the primary function that brings the primary meaning of a word into light. The primary meaning is the very conventional meaning of a word. Mammaṭa asserts that a word is never in a position to convey its meaning unless there is a prior convention attached to it. This conventional meaning which is known as Vācyārtha and Abhidheyārtha also, is designated as Mukhyārtha as because

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229. vāgvikalpānāmiti. vaktiti vāk śabdāḥ, ucyate iti vāg
ærthāḥ, ucyate'nayā iti vāg abhidhāvyāpāraḥ.
Locana, p. 56

230. tatra........ abhidhāvaicitryāprakāra'nantaḥ,
abhidhāvaicitryāprakāro'saṅkhāreyah
ibid.

231. sa mukhyo'rthas tatra mukhyo vyāpāro'syābhidhāvyāpāraḥ
KF, p. 59
it is comprehended earlier than any other meaning possible from a word.\textsuperscript{232}

According to Mammata, however, Abhidhā conveys only that meaning with reference to which there stands attached a direct convention. This is contended by him while defining a Vācaka word. A Vācaka word is that which conveys its directly conventional (Sākṣat samketa) meaning.\textsuperscript{233} It may be noted that the Samketa or convention may be either direct (Avyavahita) or indirect (Vyavahita). The convention attached to a Vācyārtha is direct in nature, while the one attached to a Lakṣyārtha is indirect in character. Abhidhā conveys a meaning immediately after the utterance or use of the corresponding word because of this direct convention attached to the meaning. But Lakṣapā conveys a meaning only in the event of failure of Abhidhā; thus the convention involved in Lakṣapā is intervened by an earlier operation of Abhidhā. The three preconditions of Lakṣaṇā, viz. Mukhyārthabādha etc. are conceived by Mammata.

\textsuperscript{232} tena samitaḥ samketitaḥ dhvaniḥ śabdo yatra so'rtathā
pūrvam upalabhyamānetvāt, na tu viśṛṇtiphāṃmatvāt
mukhyas iti prasiddho vācyo'bhidheyo'ṛthrā.
SVV, p.1

\textsuperscript{233} sākṣat samketitam yo'ṛthamabhidhatte sa vācakathā

KP, p.31
as indirect convention. According to him, the meaning obtained by an indirect convention is not entitled to the status of a Vācyārtha and is, therefore, not comprehended through the function of Abhidhā. Thus Mammāṭa uses the terms Sākṣāt and Saṃketita in his definition of a Vācaka word in order to exclude the Avyayahita type of Saṃketa from the domain of Abhidhā.

Now it may be observed that Mammāṭa's predecessors like Udbhāṭa and Mukula have already implied the involvement of these direct and indirect types of convention in Abhidhā and Lakṣaṇā by way of their conceiving these two functions as Nirantarārthaniṣṭhā Vyāpāra and Sāntarārthaniṣṭhā Vyāpāra respectively. But Mammāṭa goes a step forward to recognise in explicit terms the involvement of only the direct type of convention in the concept of Abhidhā.

VIŚVANĀTHA KAVIRĀJA:

Although Viśvanātha takes strong exception to the definition of Kāvya presented by Mammāṭa, yet as regards the

234. cf. yathā ca samayavyāpekṣā abhidhā tathā mukhyārthā- bāḍhaditrayasamayavisiṣṭa-vyāpēkṣā lakṣaṇā. ibid., p. 246

235. cf. ...... yasya yatra-vyavadhāmēna saṃketa grāvate sa vācakaḥ. ibid., p. 51
the concept of Abhidhā, he only echoes the notion cherished by the latter. Thus he defines Abhidhā as the function that conveys to the comprehension the meaning which pertains to a word by convention. He asserts that while conveying this conventional sense of a word, Abhidhā is not intervened by any other function of word, such as Laksāṇā or Vyāñjana. Abhidhā comes into operation earlier than any other function and as such it is described by Viśvanātha as the Agrimā (foremost) Sakti of a word.

APPAYADĪKṢITĀ:

Appayadīkṣita in his Vṛtīvārtika defines Abhidhā as the Pratipādakatvā (expressiveness) pertaining to a word, which is effected by Sakti. This is a very

236. SD, II.4.a.
Also, abhidhāyāḥ sāmketitārthaṁ atreṇa vr̥dhanaṁ viratāḥ... ibid, p. 294
237. tam sāmketitam artham bodhayantī ābdaṁ saktīyaṁ rānantaritā śaktir abhidhā nāma. ibid, p. 34
238. agrimā prathama śaktir abhidhā nāmetyarthaḥ. Lakṣmiṇīka, vide ibid... 32
239. sāktyā pratipādakatvam abhidhā. op.cit., p.29, vide VRS.
unusal definition of Abhidhā in Sanskrit Poetics, and Appaya's staunch critic Jagannātha finds here the involvement of such serious defects known as absurdity and self-reliance. Thus Jagannātha maintains that Appaya by way of defining Abhidhā as Pratipādakattvam attempts to explain this Pratipādakattvam as an attribute inherent in a word. Thus Appaya's definition is vitiated by the defect of absurdity, for according to Jagannātha, the attribute of expressiveness belonging to a word cannot be conceived as Abhidhā. Secondly, Jagannātha points out, when Appaya states, 'śāktyā pratipādakattvam abhidhā', he thereby means that the function pertaining to a word for signifying its meaning through Abhidhā is Abhidhā. Here the definition suffers from the fallacy of self-dependence. Jagannātha maintains that a definition of such sort where the aforesaid faults are clearly noticeable, is not acceptable at all.

But Nāgeśa, the learned commentator on RG tries to defend the position of Appaya from the Vaiyākaraṇa point of view. Thus he points out that the third case-ending used in the term Śāktyā, conveys the idea of relation of

240. tathā ca sāpuṭāva aṣaṃgatīr ātmāsrayasca . RG,p.177
241. Vide ibid.
identity and thus the expression 'śāktyā pratiṣṭhānas' is analogous to the expression 'dhānyena dhanavān' (Rich with paddy). In the use 'dhānyena dhanavān', Nāgēśa contends, the use of the third case-ending conveys the sense of relation of identity. Moreover, the two things presented by two terms, viz. Dhānyena and Dhanavān, stand in the relation of the Universal and the Particular. In the same manner, in the definition of Abhidhā as śāktyā pratiṣṭhānas' presented by Appāya, Sakti and Abhidhā stand in the relation of the Universal and the particular, Sakti being the common term to signify all significative functions of words and Abhidhā being a single variety thereof. Such an explanation of Appāya's definition of Abhidhā would definitely place him in the main stream of Sanskrit Ālāmkarikas, according to whom, Sakti of which Abhidhā is only one variety, is threefold in character, the other two varieties being Lakṣāṇā and Vyāṇjanā.

PANḌITĀḤĀJA JAGANNĀTHA:

Of the champions of Dhvani, Panḍitāḥāja Jagannātha stands out as an exception as he conceives Abhidhā in

242. prakṛtyādityābhodhīna dhanavān ityādityābhodhīnābhodhīnahetvarthakātvaro nā kāścit dūṣa iti cintyam ātma sarvāṁ. Nāgēśa on RG above, Vide RG, pp. 177-178

243. Vide CAIP, p.21
Jagannātha uses the term Sakti as a synonym of Abhidhā and defines the same as a special kind of relation which a word bears to its corresponding meaning or the meaning to the corresponding word. Here Jagannātha appears to contend that although both word and its meaning being the relata, serve as the substrata of the said relation, yet either the word or the corresponding meaning may be viewed as the primary substratum of the same.

By conceiving Abhidhā as a special kind of relation, Jagannātha appears to support the Vaiyākaraṇas in this regard. Although Jagannātha refers to the concept of Abhidhā as cherished by the Naiyāyikas also, he prefers to accept the concept of the eternal relation between a word and its meaning as cherished by the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vaiyākaraṇas, in the concept of his primary significative function. We gather such an idea from relevant observations of Nāgāra.246 We have earlier shown that

244. śaktyākhyā'rthasya sabdagataḥ sabdasyārthagato vaśambandhavisēṣo'bhidhā. RG, p. 176
245. Vide ibid., pp.176-177
246. sā ca padārthāntarmiti kecit. ibid., p.176

Nāgāra commenting on above says:
'kecit, vaiyākaraṇamīmāṃsakādayeḥ'. Vide ibid., p.177
Jeṣṭhādīśa rejects the definition of Abhidhā put forward by Appayādikṣita, although the latter's position is justifiably supported by Nāgāsena.

In the foregoing paragraphs, we have made a humble attempt to show the treatment of Abhidhā by certain post-Ānandavardhana Ālamkārikas affiliated to the doctrine of Dhvani. The Ālamkārikas pertaining to this school but left unmentioned by us, generally do not differ from the aforesaid scholars on the issue. Hence avoiding their individual reference, we propose here to deal with the treatment of Abhidhā by the Ālamkārikas succeeding Ānandavardhana, who opposed the doctrine of Dhvani in different ways and laid prime emphasis on the Abhidhā function. As we shall presently see, some of these writers behave as Abhidhāvēdins recognising, in their own way, Abhidhā as the only verbal function.

MUKULABHATTĀ:

Mukulabhaṭṭa, the author of Abhidhāyavṛtīmātraka, appears to be the pioneer of the Ālamkārikas who opposed the doctrine of Dhvani modelled by Ānandavardhana. While the votaries of Dhvani recognised three different functions of words, Viz. Abhidhā, Laksāṇa and Vyaṁjana,
Mukula came to accept Abhidhā, as the only function of words. But this Abhidhā is not confined to the word's conventional meaning only, it includes in its scope the Lakṣaṇā function also. Thus he uses the term Abhidhā in the broader sense of significative power in general so as to cover within its scope the so-called Lakṣaṇā function also.

Thus Mukula recognises two types of Abhidhāvyāpāra, viz. Mukhya and Lākṣaṇika. Of these, the former is analogous to Abhidhā, the primary significative function and the latter to Lakṣaṇā, the secondary significative power of a word generally recognised by the Ālāmkārikas. The Mukhya Abhidhā is the function pertaining to the word itself, while the Lākṣaṇika Abhidhā is the potency pertaining to the meaning only. The former conveys the primary meaning of a word, while the latter signifies only the secondary concept. Mukula maintains that the primary sense of a word is comprehended earlier than any other implied meaning, just like the face (Mukha) of a person appears earlier than any other hinder part of his body. Thus he

247. śabdesya ca mukhyena lākṣaṇīkene vā'bhidhāvyāpāreṣa arthāvagatihetutvam. AVM, p.1

248. śabdāvyāpārato yasya pratītistasya mukhyetā / arthāvaseyasya puner lākṣaṇīkatvam ucyate // ibid., p.2
contends, the primary meaning is appropriately designated as the Mukhya (mukham iva mukhyah) Artha of a word. 249

As a true follower of the Mīmāṁsā school, Mukula asserts that the primary import of a word is the Jāti or Universal, and the same is comprehended through the function of the word itself. The idea of the Vyakti or particular is apprehended through the function pertaining to the meaning only. Thus in the case of the Vedic injunction ‘gaur anubandhyah’ (The cow is to be killed for immolation), Mukula contends, the word Go primarily denotes the Universal ‘cowness’. In other words, the said meaning is understood from the function of word itself, i.e., Mukhya Abhidhā. 250 The idea of the particular cow which alone is useful in the present context (for only a particular cow can be killed and immolated, the Universal being eternal) is comprehended through function pertaining to the meaning, i.e., Lākṣaṇik Abhidhā. Mukula maintains that, according to well-known maxim of the Mīmāṁsakas, viz. ‘śabdabudhi-karmaṇāṁ virāmya vyāpārabhāvaḥ’, the word with its own function conveys the idea of the Universal (i.e. cowness in the present instance) only and stops with that. But this Universal conveys the particular (i.e. individual cow) because of the invariable relation existing between

249. ibid.
250. Vide ibid.
the two. Thus the function responsible for understanding the particular pertains to the meaning and not to the very word. Thus the Laksanika Abhidha always stands in the need of a prior understanding of the primary meaning, while the Mukhya Abhidha operates without intermediacy of any other meaning. In view of this distinction between the two functions, Mukula identifies Mukhya Abhidha as Nirantararthaviṣaya and Laksanika Abhidha as Sāntarāthanisthā.252

Mukula anticipates here a probable objection from the opponents as to how a word can be denotative of a meaning which is signified by the Laksanika Abhidha Vyāpāra only and is thus entitled to be called an indicated meaning. For, a word through Abhidha, (i.e. the Mukhya Abhidhavyāpāra), signifies its meaning which is directly related to it through convention. But the secondary meaning apprehended through Laksāna (i.e., the Laksanika Abhidhavyāpāra) has no such direct relation to a word.253 To this Mukula replies that a word may not be directly related to it. But since it is related to a

251. ibid., pp.2-3
252. evam ayam ... sabdasyābhidhēvyāpardo dvividhaḥ
pratipādito nirantarārthaviṣeyāh sāntarāthaniṣṭhasca. ibid.
253. nanu mukhyārthe sabdasya sambandhāvadhāranāt pratipādakatvem upapadyate na tu laksānike, tedviparyayāt... ibid., p. 24
secondary meaning through a primary one as is evident
from observing the usage by the elders, so it is
quite possible for a word to become denotive of a
secondary meaning also. But at all events, Mukula
considers Lakṣaṇā as a secondary function which is
always dependent on Abhidhā. In this context, he
quotes the authority of Śabarasaṁvin who considers
Lakṣaṇā only as a Laukikī Vṛtti.

As a follower of Mimēsē school, Mukula does
not recognise Vyañjana as a separate function. According
to him, Abhidhā (which includes Lakṣaṇā also) is com-
petent to convey all sorts of meanings. This prolonged
range of Abhidhā includes in its scope even the ultimate
intended meaning of an expression, whether it is a
Kāvyā or a Śāstra. Thus Mukula’s Abhidhā is analogous
to the Tatparya function recognised by Dhanika in his
Avalokā under Dasarūpaka.

DIVISION OF ABHIDHĀ IN THE SCHEME OF MUKULA:

Although according to Mukula, Abhidhā is the only
function of word, yet from a consideration of the meanings

254. śabdānēm svārtham avagamayatām svārthadvāreṇa lakṣya-
miṁṣasambandhasya vṛddnavyayavehāreṇa avadhārittvē.
ibid., p. 22

255. punaśc asāveva āha 'lakṣaṇāpi hi laukikye.a'. ibid.

conveyed by it, the single function assumes a tenfold classification. As we have earlier seen, Abhidhā is first divided by him into Mukhyā and Lākṣanikī types. Now, this Mukhyā Abhidhā is said to be fourfold being based on Jāti (Universal), Guna (Quality), Kriyā (Action) and Saṃjñā (Substance or proper names). The Lākṣanikī Abhidhā is first divided into two types, viz. Suddhā (pure) and Upacāreṇa (based on resemblance). The Suddhā type again, has two sub-varieties, viz. Upādānalekṣaṇā (Inclusive Indication) and Lākṣaṇalekṣaṇā (Exclusive Indication). Upacāreṇa is divided into two types, viz. Śuddhopacārā and Gaunopacārā. Both Śuddhopacārā and Gaunopacārā again have two sub-varieties called Āropamūlā and Adhyavasāna-mūlā. Thus Lākṣanikī Abhidhā has six varieties in total. Now, with the four varieties of Mukhyā Abhidhā and six varieties of Lākṣanikī Abhidhā, Mukula’s Abhidhā assumes a tenfold classification, which may be conveniently shown as follows:

257. tatra mukhyācaturasbheda jñeyo jātyādibhedateḥ //
     ibid., p.4

258. Vide ibid., p.11

259. Vide ibid., p.12

260. Vide ibid., p.15

261. Vide ibid., p.24

262. ity etad abhidhāvṛttam dasadha’tra vivecitam //
     ibid., p.72
It is true that Mukula recognises ten types of Abhidhā on the basis of the meanings conveyed by it. But according to himself, such a division of Abhidhā holds good only when the meaning transforms itself into plurality. Otherwise and in reality, the word is singular in the form of a Vākya or sentence, the meaning is also indivisible, which is apprehended only as the sentence-meaning or Brahman and the function that brings this meaning into light is also singular and indivisible which is the function of Abhidhā itself.263

Thus we may conclude with the remark of Dr. R. Dvivedi that some theorists did not really deny the functions other than Abhidhā, viz. Laksanā and Vijñāna, but they cherished the idea that these functions are included in the perview of Abhidhā itself. These scholars do not believe in the exhaustion of word’s primary significative function after conveying its respective meaning; instead, they accept the change in respect of the ancillary factors giving thereby a chance to the same Abhidhā Śakti to convey the ultimate desired meaning in a context.264 And Mukulabhaṭṭa stands out as the pioneer of this group of scholars.

263. Vide AVM (Introduction), pp. 50-51, R. Dvivedi
264. ibid., p. 22
PRATIHÄRENDURÄJA:

A pupil of Mukulabhaṭṭa, Pratihärenduräja was also an opponent of Laksanā and Vyañjanā functions. In spirit, he appears to be a follower of the Alamkāra school established by Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa, and as such, he tries to relegate all the three types of Dhvani, viz. Vastu, Alamkāra and Rasādi to the status of Alamkāres like Paryāyokta, Sīṣa, Rasavat etc., where the suggested ideas are always given a secondary status. Thus Pratihärenduräja proves himself as an Abhidāvādin scholar.

DÔNÍKA:

Dhanika, in his Avaloka commentary under Dhanañjayā's Desarūpaka severely criticises the proposition of the Dhvani theorists that Rasa is relished through the function of Vyañjanā. According to him, the individual meanings of words are apprehended through the function of Abhidhā, while Rasa is relished through Tatparyaśakti.

265. evam etad vyañjakatvam paryayoktādi su antarbhāktam.

Vide SKL, p. 366

266. atah kecid abhidhālakṣaṇāgaumādhayo vācyāntarapari-kalpitaśaktibhyo vyatiriktam vyañjakaktvalakṣakam sabdevyaparam rasālakṣāramvastuvigayam icchanti.

Vide Avaloka, p. 356.
According to Dhanika, Abhidhā itself conveys the desired sentence-meaning through Tātparyāsakti. This Tātparyāsakti knows no limit, and under the circumstances, admission of Lakṣaṇā or Vyānjanā functions is redundant. Thus Dhanika also appears to be an Abhidhāvādin Ālemkārika as far as his treatment of individual word-meanings is concerned.

BHĀṬṬĀṆĀYAKA:

BhāṭṭāṆāyaka, the author of Hṛdayadārpana (the work is no longer an extant one), is referred to by Abhinavagupta as an interpreter of the Rasa theory of Bharata. As interpreted by Abhinava and Mammata, this scholar recognises three different functions to account for the realisation of Rasa, and they are namely, Abhidhā, Bhāvākātva and Bhogīkaraṇa.268 According to BhāṭṭāṆāyaka, in the process of realisation of Rasa, the Vibhāvas and the Sthāyībhāvas come to be comprehended through the function of Abhidhā. Then operates the second function, i.e., Bhāvākātva which generalises all the Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas and Sthāyībhāvas, and consequently Rasa as such is realised by the connoisseurs through the function.

267. Vide SKL, p. 395
268. abhidhā bhāvanā caṇyā tadbhogīkātmeva ca / Abhinavabhārati, 1, p. 277
Now of these three functions, Abhidhā is conceived by Bhāṭṭānāyaka as the function which comprehends the Vācyā meaning. But this Abhidhā is not confined to the actual denotation of a word; it includes in its scope the Lakṣaṇā function also. Thus Samudrabandha in his commentary on Alemkārasaṅgravasve, maintains that Bhāṭṭānāyaka's Abhidhā stands for all significative functions, including the primary denotation and indication which comprehend the significance of Sāstras and Kāvyas indiscriminately. Thus Bhāṭṭānāyaka's Vācyā meaning is also not restricted to the conventional meaning of a word, it embraces in its scope the metaphorical significance also, on the basis of which Rasa is realised.

Dr. V. Raghavan also appears to maintain that Bhāṭṭānāyaka's 'Abhidhā' is used in a broader sense to cover 'the poet's expression as a whole' and not

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269. rasaḥ pratīyatve ...... kāvye nātye cābhidhāto dvitiyena vibhāvādīsādhāraṇaḥ karaṇātmanā bhāvakatvavyāpāreṇa bhāvyemānaḥ sthāyī............. bhogena bhujyate iti bhāṭṭānāyakaḥ. KP, p. 30

270. tatra abhidhāyakatvam vācyaviśayatvam. 
Locana, p. 193, Vide DL

271. tatra abhidhāśabdenā śāstrakāvyasādhāraṇo mukhyālakṣaṇā- 
dir vyāpāro'bhidhīyate. op. cit., Vide AL, p. 9
Also, cf. 'abhidhā lekṣāṇaiva.' Vide HSP, p. 174.
necessarily in its restricted sense of Śakti or Abhidhā.\textsuperscript{72}

For, after all, the meaning indicated is not independent of the denoted meaning, but is always related to the same.

Thus in spite of his being a successor of Ānandaśāstra, bhaṭṭanāyaka does not consider kāsa as Vyaṅga, but as Vācyā. And by including even Lakṣaṇā under the perview of Abhidhā, he proves himself to be an Abhidhāvadin scholar.

As Dr. Thakur Datta Joshi observes, some scholars posterior to Ānandaśāstra wrote their works in order to controvert the Dvēnśi theory of Ānandaśāstra. Thus the Vakroktíjīvita of Kuntaka, the Vyaktiviveka of Mahimabhaṭṭa and Ḥṛdayadarpaṇa (which is not extant now) of Bhaṭṭanāyaka are such treaties written exclusively for combating the doctrine of Dvēnśi.\textsuperscript{273}

KUNTAKA:

Kuntaka, the author of Vakroktíjīvita gives a very high status to Abhidhā in his concept of Kāvyā. Following the tradition of Bhāmaha's Vakokti, he modells a system of Vakrokti of his own, whereby he tries to explain away all

\textsuperscript{272} JOR. VI, 1932, p. 21, Vide ibid.

\textsuperscript{273} SKL, p. 109.
ideas of Dhvani and even those of Rasa. According to him, Vakrokti is the very essence of poetry. This Vakrokti is described by him as Vicitrā Abhidhā, i.e. a striking and delightful mode of expression, which is peculiar to the domain of poetry only. This peculiar mode of expression employed in Kāvya excells the common expression of words and meanings in the Śāstras (Scriptures) etc. Thus Kuntaka does acknowledge the expressive words and their expressed meanings, but what he contends is that the expressive and the expressed should be marshalled in the direction of an exquisite delight peculiar to poetry. Hence he maintains that a poet should make use of words and meanings which should be invariably embellished and this embellishment is what he means by Vokrokti.

274. Vide HSP, p. 185
275. vakroktih prasiddhaḥbhidhānavyatirekīṇī vicitraiva abhidhā. VJ, p. 22
276. ubhāvetā valāṃkāryau tayoḥ punaralāṃkṛtiḥ / vakroktireva vaidagdhyaḥbhahībhanitir ucyate //
   ibid., 1.10
277. vacyortha vacakah śabdah prasiddhamiti yadyapi /
   tathāpi kāvyamarge'smin paramārtho'yam etayoḥ //
   ibid., 1.3.
According to Kuntaka it is the peculiar skill of a poet that effects this strikingness due to the peculiar turn of expression. Since this Vicitrā Abhidhā is competent to explain all meanings of poetry including Rasa and Dhvani, Kuntaka does not recognise any other function like Lakṣaṇā and Vyāñjanā.

Now, from a thorough perusal of 'Vicitrā Abhidhā', recognised by Kuntaka we are led to believe that he means by this term only the Abhidhā function of a word. For, the Dhvanivēdin Ālaṃkārikas also confine the Ālaṃkāras only to the field of denotation by way of describing them as Vāgvikalpa. Mahimabhaṭṭa also categorically says that the Ālaṃkāras are nothing but some or other forms of Abhidhā. Kuntaka's Abhidhā, however, includes in its scope the so-called Lakṣaṇā and Vyāñjanā functions also.

Mahimabhaṭṭa:

Mahimabhaṭṭa spares no pains to establish his thesis that a word has only one function and that is Abhidhā, the primary significative function, and only one

278. Vide LHKP, p. 61
279. Vide DL, p. 4
280. Ālaṃkāraṇām ca abhidhātvam upagatam, teṣām bhavībhā-

-ṇitirūpatvāt. VV, p. 19
meaning, i.e. Abhidheya, the primary meaning brought about by this Abhidhā function. The meaning of a word, he contends, is what is prima facie understood by all. It is the conventional meaning of a word which is given in the dictionary as the primary meaning and this can be the only meaning signified by a word. Thus the admission of any other function like Lakṣaṇa or Vyākhyā is redundant. Mahima boldly asserts that there can not be more than one function of a word. If there be more than one function, they should all operate at a time, just as in case of a fire, both the power of burning (Dāhakatva) and that of revealing (Prakāśakatva) operate simultaneously. But a word never present its primary and the so-called secondary (Lakṣaṇika) meanings at a time. The secondary meaning is apprehended only after the primary or normal meaning of a word is unsuitable to a particular context. Mahima points out that there is a sequence in the comprehension of the primary and the secondary meanings. If we recognise both the functions of words, viz. Abhidhā and Lakṣaṇa, we should not have the sequence of cognition of meanings conveyed by the two functions. Hence, the function of Lakṣaṇa must

Also vide,

281. śebdasyaikābhidhā saktirarthayaikaita liṅgatā ne vyākhyākata vamanayoh samastītyupākāditam //

Also vide, VV, I.27, p. 105;..... ekābhidheti abbidhātiriktavyāpārasyākataścandita bhāvah. Madhusūdāni on above.
have a different substratum and that is nothing but the primary meaning (Vācyārtha) itself. And if the primary meaning is supposed to be the substratum of Laksāya, then the function must be identified with inference (Anumāna). As for instance, in the expression 'vēhikaḥ' (The Vēhika is a cow), the primary meaning of the word Go, which appears to have identity with the Vēhika, leads to the inference of a partial identity (i.e. similarity) due to its failure to have any congruity in respect of its identity with Vēhika.

Thus Mahima recognises two types of meanings, viz. Vācyā (expressed) and Anumāya (inferential). But a word has its capacity to convey its expressed meaning only. In other words, a word has only one signification function, i.e. Abhidhā. All kinds of secondary ideas are apprehended through an inferential process.

282. yatpumarsyānekaśektisamśrayatvād vyāprantar... kalpanam tadarthasyaivaivopadhyate, na śabdasya, tasyānekaśektisamśrayatvāsiddheḥ. VV, pp.108-109

283. tathā hi gaurvāhika ityādeu...... servētmane.

ibid., p.110

284. artho'pi dvividho vācyo'numeṣaśca tatra śabdasya... pāraviśayo vācyah sa eva mukhya ucyate. ibid.,...

285. atrocyate'bhidhēsamjñāḥ śabdasyārtheprakāśiṣe... vyāpīra eke evetsto yastvanyo'rthasya so'khilāḥ /

ibid., 171
The expressed meaning is the direct meaning of a word which is apprehended through Abhidha immediately after a word is cognised. The secondary meaning is said to be apprehended through some 'effort' (Yatna) which is nothing but Anumāna. Mahima maintains that word cannot be used for any other meaning than its primary one on account of its inherent incapacity. The primary significative function is necessarily confined to its primary meaning and this is the only meaning to be understood through a verbal function. The secondary meaning is apprehended only after the primary meaning and as such the former depends on the latter. Hence, Mahima argues, the secondary function or the so-called Lekṣēṇa cannot be considered as a function of word but due to immediate succession in the apprehension of the primary and the so-called secondary idea, ordinary people believe that the latter is derived from the word.

286. śrutimātreṇa yatrasya tēdarthyamevavasīyate /
    tam mukhyamartham manvantena gauṣṇam yatnopapādītim; //
    ibid., p. 39

287. mukhyavṛtti-parityāgo na sabdasyopapadīyate /
    vihitō'rthāntare hyarthah svasāmyesānumāpayet //
    ibid., p. 151
Mahima asserts that the secondary meaning is not the primary one and if it is implied by the latter, it is indeed a case of inference and not that of the so-called Lakṣaṇā.

Thus Mahima recognises Abhidhā as the only function pertaining a word.

BHOJARĀJA:

Bhoja in his Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa conceives verbal functions in terms of verbal relation (Sāhitya). According to him, there may be twelve types of relation between a word and its meaning, viz. Abhidhā, Vivakṣā, Tātparya, Pravibhāga, Vyapekṣā, Sāmarthya, Anvaya, Ekaṁrthābhāva, Doṣahēna, Guṇopādēna, Alamkārayoga and Rasāviyoga. Of these twelve types of relation, the first eight are called Śābda-Sambandha-Śaktis.

Thus, with Bhoja Abhidhā is of the nature of a relation between word and its corresponding meaning.

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288. tulyādiṣu hi lokoṛtheśvartham taddarsanāsmṛtam / 
āropayenna śabdastu svārthamētrānuṁyāśyinam // 
itthamarthāntere śabdavṛtteranupattitah / 
phale lingaikagaye syāt kutet śabdāḥ skhaladgatiḥ // 
ibid. I, 43-50

Also, āsabhavēdanāleksyam kintvarthāropamanantarō / 
loko gausācitra ityādau śabdāropamevasyati // ibid. I, 6-7

289. tetrābhidhā-vivakṣā-tātparya........ .............
.... śabdārthayoh dvādaśāsambandhāḥ sāhityamucyate.
SRP, p. 22
like Mukula, Bhoja conceives Abhidhā as the significative function of word that brings its meaning to light. A word may signify its meaning through three different functions, viz. Mukhyā, Gaunī and Laksana. Thus Abhidhā of Bhoja comes to assume threefold classification into Mukhyā, Gaunī and Laksana. Thus Bhoja's Abhidhā is a general name to cover any one or all of these three varieties of Śabdavṛttis recognised by him. His Mukhyā Abhidhā is decidedly the primary significative function of a word or Abhidhā in the popularly accepted sense of the term. This is evident from his own assertion that the word Go (cow) signifies a particular animal having dewlap etc. through its primary significative function. This Mukhyā Abhidhā thus brings to light the primary meaning of word which is attached to it through convention.

290. teṣa śabdasyārthābhidhāyinī saktirabhidhā. 
SRP, VII, p. 223, Rātnadārpaṇa under Sar. K, p. 148

291. śabdō hi mukhyāgaunīlaksanaḥbhūḥ... vṛttibhir 
arthavisēṣapratītinimittam bhavati... ibid., p. 346

292. tathā hi gaurityeḥ śabdō mukhyaye vṛttyā sāsnēdi- 
manam artham pratipādayati. 
SRP, p. 223

293. rudhyā yatra śabdārtho'pi loke śabdō niveśitaḥ 
sa mukhyāḥ.............. ... 
ibid.
Bhoja deviates from the general trend of the Ālamkārikas in presenting the classification of Abhidhā of a different type peculiar to him. He gives two subdivisions of each of the aforesaid varieties of Abhidhā. Accordingly, the Mukhyā Abhidhā is divided into Tathābhūtartha and Tadbhāvapatti types, Gauṅī Laksanā is classified as Guṇanimittā and Upacāranimittā types and Suddhā Laksanā is divided into Laksanā and Laksitā Laksanā varieties.

Bhoja makes a further subdivision of each of the aforesaid six varieties of Abhidhā and consequently the total varieties of Abhidhā comes to be thirty-six. Avoiding details, we refer here the chief varieties of Abhidhā recognised by Bhoja with the help of following table:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abhidhā</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mukhyā</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gaũṅī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laksanā</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tathābhūtartha (6 types)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadbhāvapatti (6 types)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laksanā (6 types)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laksitā Laksanā (6 types)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guṇanimittā (6 types)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upacāranimittā (6 types)</td>
</tr>
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of these six principal types of Abhidhana or
Sahānavrttis of Bhoja, the Mukhyā type deserves some con-
sideration, as it is the very primary function of a word.
In this context, the observations of Ratanesvara, the
author of Ratnadarpāna, deserve a mention. Explicitly, the
concept of the aforesaid two varieties of Mukhyā
Abhidhā, Ratanesvara says that the Tathābhūtārtha type
embraces for its content, the relation of a word with
some other meaning (i.e., meaning other than the vārtha),
while Tadbhāvapatti type embraces for its subject, the
relation of a word with both its individual meaning and
some other meaning as well.294

According to Bhoja, the Tathābhūtārtha variety
of Abhidhā assumes six sub-varieties in accordance with
the six types of primary meanings conveyed by them, viz.
Jātivisayā (denotation concerning the Universal),
Vyaktivisayā (denotation concerning the Individual),
Ākrtivisayā (denotation concerning the Configuration),
Guna visayā (denotation concerning Quality), Kriyāvisayā
(denotation concerning Action) and Sambandhavisayā.

294. tathābhūtārtha tadbhāvapattisca tatre avārthavārthā
visayā tathābhūtārthaḥ...... ...... svarthāsti
tena. saivārthainterasvārthasambandhavisayā
tadbhāvapattiḥ.

Ratnadarpāna on Sar. K., p. 77.
Thus words like Gauh (cow), Aśvah (horse) etc. exemplify the Jñātivipāya type of Tathābhyūtārthā Mukhyā Abhidhā.

Now, from an examination of his treatise on Cābdaśaktis, Bhoja appears as a follower of the Vāyākaraṇa and Nyāya schools on one hand and of Mīmāṃsā on the other. Because like the Vāyākaraṇas and the Nyāyāyikas, he treats the verbal functions in terms of relation (Sāhitya) between the words and their meanings. But like a Mīmāṃsaka, he classifies his Abhidhā Vṛtti into three types, viz.: Mukhyā (which is equivalent to Sakti or Abhidhā of the Mīmāṃsakas), Gauni (equivalent to Gauni Vṛtti of Mīmāṃsakas) and Laksanā. In respect of his very concept of Gauni Vṛtti\(^2\) and Laksanā\(^2\), also, he appears to be affiliated to the stream of Mīmāṃsā. But at any rate, like Mukula, Bhoja appears to be influenced more by the Mīmāṃsakas in his treatment of verbal functions.

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295. ibid.

296. "tatra tesmād gauṇo'nyatra skhaldgatiḥ. Sat, p. ...

297. abhidhācyānavinībhūtaptitītir laksanocayate / ibid.
MAṆKHAKA:

MaṆkhaka, the author of Śāhityamīmamsā, recognises three Vṛttis of words, viz. Mukhyā, Laksanā and Gauni for understanding their individual meanings.298 His Mukhyā Vṛtti is decidedly the Abhidhā Vṛtti in its restricted sense as is warranted by the treatment of the same by Bhoja, the immediate predecessor of MaṆkhaka. He describes Laksanā and Gauni as Jaghanya Vṛttis,299 and considers these two functions only as the extension of Abhidhā itself.

Thus like Bhoja, MaṆkhaka appears as a follower of Bhoja, who includes Laksanā and Gauni under the purview of Abhidhā itself.300

MaṆkhaka, however, recognises Tatparya also as a function pertaining to the sentence as a whole, which conveys the ultimate meaning of poetry, i.e. Rasa. At any rate, MaṆkhaka comes out as an Abhidhāvādin.

The aforementioned scholars beginning from Mukulabhaṭṭa to MaṆkhaka represent various theories

298. vrṛttih padaṇāṁ vyāpāraḥ padarthapratipādane / sa mukhyā laksanā gauniyeva traśvidhyamāṣṭhitā // op.cit., p.2
299. vrṛtti jaghanye unneye tatropayogataḥ. ibid.
300. Dvivedi, R., Anandavardhana, p. 524
to the Anti-Dhvani schools. Without going to the details of their opposition to the Dhvani theory and Vyanjana function, we may take note of the fact that, the Dhvani theory modelled by Anandavardhana and subsequently nourished by his celebrated successors, failed to win the hearts of a good number of literary critics. Thus as in the pre-Anandavardhana period, in the post-Anandavardhana age of Sanskrit Poetics also the claim of Dhvani being the essence of poetry went on being challenged by the Alamkārikas. But even among the opponents of Dhvani, we find that they hold divergent views regarding the nature and scope of Abhidhā. Thus Abhidhā of Mukula, Pratihāren-durāja and Kuntaka, for instance, has a very long range to cover the so-called indicated and suggested meanings in addition to the normal conventional sense of a word. But Mahimabhatta's Abhidhā is confined to the conventional meaning only. He explains away all other meanings by the process of inference.

THE VIEW 'SU'YAM IŚORIVA DĪRGHADĪRGHATAMO VYĀPAHĀH' UNDER CONSIDERATION:

The proposition of Abhidhāvādin Alamkārikas that Abhidhā alone is capable of conveying all sorts of meanings, can be traced back to the Prābhākara system of Mīmāṁsā. As we have earlier observed, according to Prābhākaras, the
function of Abhidha not only conveys the individual meanings of words, but also the meaning of the sentence as a whole. According to them, Abhidha is the only function of words, but it has a very long range to convey all types of meanings to be understood from a word and the syntactic connection of the word with other words in the sentence. Thus this function begins with Abhidha in the usually accepted sense of the term and extends to the so-called Vyanjan function. Here a word bears a striking resemblance to an arrow. Just as an arrow is capable of being extended farther and farther according to the force with which it is discharged by the archer, similarly the significative function of a word can be extended to any length depending on the will of the employer. Thus an arrow, with its single velocity can take away the life of an enemy after piercing through his armour, skin, flesh and the vital parts of his body. So also a word when used by a first-rate poet, not only denotes its normal or literal meaning, but also effects the syntactical relation amongst the individual word-meanings and conveys

301. prabhakaradarsane'pi dirhadirgho vyaparaha.
also, Locana, p. 188
yo'pyanvitabhidnavad yatpara sabda sa sabcdrthna
iti hrdaye gphitva saravad abhidhavyparn sam eva
dirhadirgham icchati.
ibid, I. p. 64; Vide also IIT, pp. 298-299
the so-called suggested ideas with its single significative function of Abhidha.\textsuperscript{302} Hence, according to these scholars, the admission of any other function like Vyañjanā is redundant. For, they believe that the meaning of a word is that which is intended by the speaker (yatparah sadbā sa sadērthaḥ). Hence the function of Abhidha remains operative till this intended sense is understood. Thus the primary meaning of a word includes besides its normal or literal meaning, its relation to other words (which is known as Samsarga suggested by their juxtaposition) and also the emotive contents or the so-called Vyañgya Arthas.

The Dhvani theorists would naturally oppose such a view in favour of a single verbal function as held by the Mīmāṃsakas. Thus Abhinavagupta in his \textit{Locana} quotes\textsuperscript{303} and criticises this theory in his strong bid to establish Vyañjanā as a separate function. Abhinava shows that.

\textit{302. yathā balavātā prerita eka eva isurekṣeṣaiva veṁakā-
yena vyāpāreṇa ripor varmecchedām marmabhedām prēṇa-
haranām ca vidhatte tathā sukavipraukta eka eva
śabdaḥ ekenaivabhidhīkhyavyāpāreṇa pāḍārthopasti-
timayayabodhām vyañgyapratiśtim ca vidhatte
janayati. KP, p. 225}

\textit{303. Vide Locana, 1. p.64}
according to this peculiar theory of the Mimamsakas, the
meanings signified by a word in succession must be
attributed to the word alone on the strength of the
dictum 'yatporah saudah sa saubertha'. Moreover, this
theory asserts that a word's significative function is
a protracted affair like that of an arrow. Now, granting
all these, Abhinava raises the pertinent question as to
whether this verbal function is one or many. The answer
obviously will be that it can not be one when the meanings
are many. In fact, there are different meanings and
different ancillary conditions for their comprehension.
The condition for the primary meaning is convention
(Samaya). The condition for the secondarily signified
sense is the incompatibility of the primary meaning and
the like. The condition for the suggested meaning,
however, is manifold. The factors like the contextual
circumstances, the particular status of the speaker and
the listener and an imaginative insight of the connoisseur
are considered as factors essential for understanding the
suggested meaning. Thus meanings and their auxiliary

304. ibid., I, p. 65
305. yathā ca samayasyapekṣā abhidhā tathā mukhyārthām
badhāditrayaṃ samayasyapekṣā lakṣaṇā. KP, V, p. 48
306. Vide KP, III.2-3
conditions being many, Abhinava argues, the functions of words can not be one, but manifold.\textsuperscript{307}

Moreover, Abhinava asserts, the function of a word gets exhausted after conveying the respective meaning according to the accepted dictum that, 'a word, understanding and action discharge their functions only once and stop with that.'\textsuperscript{308} Thus Abhidhā can convey only the primary meaning of a word. To account for other possible meanings, we must assume some functions like Laksanā and Vyāñjana. These varied types of meanings and their conditions naturally point to different functions of words. Hence it is not proper to consider all these functions as one and the same.

Moreover, Abhinava points out that, there are definite successive stages in the apprehension of these various meanings. Thus when we relish a poem, for instance, we comprehend first the conventional meanings of different

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{307} tasya yadi dīrgho vyāpāras tad eko'śaviti kutaḥ? bhinnaviśayatvāt etha aneko'sau?tadviśaya-sahakāribhodat asajātiya eva yuktah. Locana, \textit{ibid.}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{308} sajātiye ca kārye viramya vyāpāreḥ sabdabuddhikar-mañān padārthavidhir niṣiddhāḥ?asajātiye ca esman naya eva. \textit{ibid.}
\end{quote}
words. In the second stage, the syntactical relation among the various word-meanings is apprehended. In the case of sentences involving Lakṣaṇā, however, the secondary sense is apprehended in the second stage and the syntactical relation is apprehended in the third. The suggested idea is understood in the fourth stage. While understanding the meaning of a sentence and some piece of poetic creation, we cannot ignore these different stages actually involved in the process of understanding the same.

Thus Abhinava maintains that Lakṣaṇā, Vyāpāna, and also Tātparya functions shall have to be admitted along with Abhidhā not only for normal verbal comprehension, but also for meeting poetic needs. Memmat in his KP only echoes the views of Abhinava in this regard.

Even Mahimabhaṭṭa, who is best known for his opposition of the Dhvani theory, joins hands with the votaries of Dhvani in refuting the Mīmāṃsakas' theory. He asserts that a word can not convey its suggested meaning instantaneously on the very occasion of its utterance. The primary meaning is apprehended first and then the

309. atha yo'sau caturtho'kṣanīvisto'rthah............

ibid., p. 65

310. KP, pp. 225-226
other meanings like the indicated and suggested ones follow. Thus there is a succession in apprehension of meanings. So meanings other than the primary ones must be attributed to the word only in an indirect way.\textsuperscript{311}

Moreover, Mahima argues, the function of a word has hardly any affinity with an arrow. An arrow discharges all its various operations e.g. piercing through the armour by one natural function. But this is not the case with a word.\textsuperscript{312} A word conveys its meaning only when its conventional relation to the latter is previously known. A word denotes only that meaning to which it stands related through convention. Otherwise, any word could convey any other meaning. But this is against our experience. Hence Mahima concludes that all meanings other than the conventional ones must be attributed to the meanings of words and never to the words themselves.\textsuperscript{313} Thus the function of Abhidhā, according to him, is confined to the conventional meaning only.

\textsuperscript{311} tādayuktaṁ, sākṣācchabdaysārthaṁpratibhibhitaṁtivēśiddheḥ
.......... ityarthasyeiva vyaśāro' bhyapagentum
yukto na śabdasya. VV, I. p.123

\textsuperscript{312} kiṁca ayam visamah sīradṛṣṭāntopayāsah..... na hi
ekayē eva vṛttyā tat tat kēryām karoti, tathā saodhaḥ.
ibid.

\textsuperscript{313} tasmād yatra samketapeksā, tatra eva asya
vyāpāra iti avagentum yuktaṁ, na arthaṁ saḥ.
ibid, p.126
meanings other than the conventional or primary ones are to be attributed to the meanings of words and not to the very words.

As noted by Dr. K.K. Raja, this theory is wrongly attributed to the Bhatta Mimamsakas by some traditional commentators and modern scholars. But Abhinavagupta refers to this view as being advocated by the Prabhakara Mimamsakas, who finds it fitting in with their Anvitabhidhana theory of verbal comprehension.

It is interesting to note here that Anandavardhana in his Dvanyaloka while referring to the probable opponents of his Dhvani theory, has not alluded to the view about Abhidha on the analogy of an arrow. This leads modern scholars like Dr. A. Chakravorty to presume that this theory was promugated after the dhvani theory had gained adherents and became a current coin among a good number of literary critics.

314. ITM, p. 299
315. atha bhattamatopajyam bhattalollatadhinm abhimatam paksamaskanakte ye tviti so'yamisorivet. BB, Vide KP, p.229,
also vide Adarsa on KP, p.247
316. Vide SDK, p.64
317. Vide Vrtti on DL, 1.1
318. SM, p. 101
THE IMPORT OF A WORD: THE CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE REGARDING A WORD BEING DENOTATIVE OF JĀTI (Universal), VYAKTI (Individual or Particular) AND ĀKRĪTI(Configuration) ETC.

The problem of the exact nature of the denoted meaning has been viewed with much emphasis in almost all schools of Indian thought. In fact, as Vātsāyana asserts, the determination of the exact meaning of words is necessary, because right knowledge is obtained from these words. So various schools of thought are found to have evolved different theories to answer the query as to what actually constitutes the connotation of a word (Pravṛttinimitta), i.e. whether a word conveys the concept of an Individual (Vyakti), or that of a Universal (Jāti) or that of Configuration (Ākṛti) or more than one of these entities. In other words, the question is what the term 'cow' (Go) primarily means, does it connote all these three attributes taken together, or any one or two of these or anything else. Kumārila in his Tantreṇārtike raises this very query and refers to innumerable theories that seek to solve the problem. The chief of these theories are discussed below:

319. VB under NS,II. 2.58
320. Vide op.cit., p.246
AKRTIVADA: Akrtivada or the theory of configuration is the assertion that Akrti is the primary meaning of a word. The Jainas may be reasonably called Akrtivadins. According to these scholars, the word 'cow' does not signify an individual cow, but all animals bearing the general form or shape of a cow. The primary meaning of a word is determined by what the speaker intends to speak and what is cognised by the listener. Akrti must be the denoted meaning of a word, because the determination of the exact nature of an object is dependent on it. An object is ascertained to be a cow or a horse or anything else only through its form. It is the form of an object which is attested by our perception. An object without a form or shape is never perceived. Moreover, general words such as 'cow', 'pot' etc. are always used to refer to percepts only. Hence Akrti being the object of perception, it should alone be regarded as the import of a word. Akrti is defined in the Nyayasutra of Gautama

321. NS, II. 2,62
322. akrtistadapeksatvat sattvayavasthahnasiddheh.
ibid., II 2,64
323. atah pratyakavisaye padam pravartamamakrtaveva vartitumarhati. NM, I, p. 294.
as that which signifies the universal.\textsuperscript{324} It is the particular arrangement of the parts (Avayavas) of an object and the components of these parts. The apprehension of these parts arranged in a particular manner leads to the apprehension of the Universal. The Universal 'cowness', for instance, is apprehended either by the perception of similarity of shape, head, feet etc. pertaining to the particular animal cow or by the perception of a composite substance of which these head etc. are parts.\textsuperscript{325}

Here it is interesting to note that the Mīmāṃsakas have used the word Ākṛti as a synonym of Jāti,\textsuperscript{326} which, according to them, forms the very import of a word. But in the theory under consideration, the term Ākṛti stands for configuration which is distinct from the Universal and the individuals which possess it.\textsuperscript{327}

\textsuperscript{324} ākṛtirjātiliṅgākhyā. NS, II. 21.68
Also vide VB on above.

\textsuperscript{325} NV, p. 333

\textsuperscript{326} jātimevākṛtim prāhur vyaktirākriyate yaya /
śāmānyām tacca piṇḍānāmekabuddhinibandhanam //
SV, Ākṛti, 3, p. 549

\textsuperscript{327} cf. tatrākṛtipadeneha saṁsthānamabhidhiyate /
sūtre prthagupadānna na jātir jaimiṇiyavat //
NM, p. 230
Dr. Gaurinath Shastri however, refers to certain points of weakness involved in this theory. According to him, the whole problem of understanding Ākṛti as the only import of a word is based on a superficial view of nature. This theory, he points out, may hold good 'in case of specific kinds of the animal and Botanical kingdom', but not with reference to the material objects which do not possess 'definite structure or morphological characteristics.' The view will be of no use especially in the case of abstract ideas which never possess any form. Moreover, as Ākṛti is the 'organisation of parts', it must differ in each case. Hence Ākṛti can not be the import of a word which must be common to all members belonging to a class.

JĀTIVĀDA: The Mīmāṁsakas belonging to both Bhaṭṭa and Prābhākara schools as also the Vedāntins are known as kevale-jātivādins, as according to them, Jāti (Universal) is the primary import of a word. Patañjali in his MB, however, refers to the sage Vājapāyana as the first exponent of this theory. The upholders of this view argue that the condition

328. PWM, p. 137

329. anākṛṭivyayaṁ jātāu mṛt suvarṇām rajatamityevamādiśu ākṛṭirnvartate jātāti padārthatvam iti.
VB under NS 11.2.68.
of the meaning brought about by a word pertains to the Universal alone, since the latter has alone action for its object.\textsuperscript{330} When a person, for instance, is asked to bring a cow, he brings any cow he likes.\textsuperscript{331} It is the Universal 'cowness' that determines his choice. If the individual were admitted as the import of a word, it would be difficult to understand which individual is meant. Thus, if in the present instance, the word 'cow' would signify a 'white cow', it would be difficult to understand that the word has a reference to a 'black cow' also. According to the Universalists, there is such a 'community' (i.e. identity of character) amongst the numerous 'cows' which enables us to use the term 'cow' with regard to each of the individual cows. The community which goes by the name Jāti, is the import of a word.

The Universalists argue that the admission of the individual as the import of a word would lead to the involvement of prolixity (Gaurava). For, in that case, a word would possess as many potencies (Saktis) as there are individuals. Thus in the present instance, we shall have to coin as many words 'cows' as there are individual

\textsuperscript{330} ākṛtistu kriyārthatvāt. MS, I.3.38, also vide IP, p.391
\textsuperscript{331} gāmānayeti vākya yathāruciparigratāt. TV, p. 272
cows, — a position which is practically inconvenient.\textsuperscript{332}

Moreover, the Universalists contend, it is the Universal alone that can be brought into the relation with the eternal words. This proposition is in conformity with their thesis that the word, the object signified and the relation between the two are eternal. The Universal is the essential attribute common to the particular instances of a class, and as such it is easier to establish a relation to it. The individuals being innumerable, it is impossible to establish a relation to each of them.\textsuperscript{334} Thus the word 'cow' cannot be related to all the individual cows in the globe.

The Universalists further argue that a word is never found to give rise to a mixed conception.\textsuperscript{335} The individuals are possessed of various characteristics such as variegated colour, size, shape and the like, but these features never enter into the primary import of a word. The word 'cow' for instance, conveys the single uniform

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{332} \text{ānantiyāvyabhicārabhyāṁ śaktyanekadosaṁ /}
\text{saṅdehaścaramajñānāccitabuddherabhāvetaḥ//}
\text{TV on MS, I.3.33}
\textsuperscript{333} \text{ākṛtivyatireke'rtthe sambandho nityatāsyas ca /
na sidhyetāmiti jñātvā tadvacetyatvemihocayet,}
\text{SV, Ākṛti, i, p. 545}
\textsuperscript{334} cf. \text{tatra jātāveva śaktigraheḥ, na tu vyaktau,}
\text{vyabhicāraḥ ānantiyāc ca. SMU, p. 435}
\textsuperscript{335} \text{citraabuddheranudbhavāt. TV, p. 272}
\end{flushleft}
conception of 'cowness' inspite of the individual cows being different.

Moreover, the Universalists contend, in a verbal cognition, it is the Universal that is comprehended before there is any idea of the individual. 336 Thus when the word 'cow' is uttered, what we understand first is the Universal 'cowness' (UoTvA), it is only after the Universal is duly comprehended that the individual is understood. 337 This is because, as the Universalists hold, in the case of a qualified cognition, the cognition of the adjective precedes that of the substantive. 338 So, the Universal being the first object apprehended in a verbal cognition, it should alone be the import of a word. Thus the Universalists do not deny the comprehension of the individual from a word. What they contend is, it is not primarily signified by a words but is conveyed only secondarily through Laksana. 339 Of the Mīmāṃsakas, however,

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336. पुरवत्स सामायविज्ञानत। TV, under I. 3.26, p. 678
337. Ibid.
338. तस्मात साधवेत यत प्रतीत स्वेषाग्न्य तथा प्रतियाते। SB under MS I.3.53
339. जोते अस्तित्वास्टिते नाका कास्चिद विवैक्षातिक nityatvāl lakṣyaṃविज्ञायां व्यक्ते। te hi विशेषां g V, p. 932
Prabhākara and Murārimiśra maintain that the individual is apprehended not through Lakṣaṇā, but from the Universal itself due to an invariable connection (Avinābhāva) between the two, and since both the entities are comprehended by the same cognition. 340

The Advaita Vedāntins also maintain that a word primarily signifies the Universal (Jāti) and only secondarily (through Lakṣaṇā) the individual (Vyakti). The later writers on Vedānta, however, do not admit the existence of the Universal, as the latter can neither be perceived nor inferred. They contend that, the apprehension of the same form in various individuals should not necessarily be a proof of existence of the so-called Universal. 342

The Universalists understand even quality, action and proper names as signifying the Universal alone. 343

340. Vide ITM, p.73
341. tacca jātereva na vyakteḥ, vyaktInēmānantyena gurutvāt ....... athavā vyakter lakṣaṇasyāvagamaḥ. VPB, pp.94-95
342. na tāvid gaur gaurityabhiṇnākāraṇāhī pratyaksam jātāu pramāṇam. Tattvapradīpikā, p. 303
343. vājaprīyanasasya mate................. śuklaāyena śabda guṇasamavetāh jātimācakṣate..........siva dhātuvācyā pacatītyādāvenuvṛttipratyayasya prādurbhāvāt. SDS, p.130
As for instance, they point out, the words Sukla (white) and Pacati (cooks) actually refer to the Universal Suklatva (whiteness) and the Universal Pakatva (cookingness) respectively. In the case of proper names, say Devadatta, the Mīmāṁsakas have explained the knowledge of identity of the same person from birth to death through all his changing stages on the basis of the common attribute, i.e. the Universal. 344

VYAKTIVĀDA: In sharp contrast to the Jātivāda of the Mīmāṁsakas, the Sāmkhya philosophers and some modern Nyāyāyikas came to advocate the Vyaktivāda or the individualist theory which holds that the individual alone is the import of a word. According to these thinkers, for all practical purposes, reference is made to the individual and never to the Universal. Gautama in his Āyāgūḍha records a number of such usages current in our language as that, which, grouping, giving, possession, number, enlargement, contradiction, colour, compounding and procreation, which can not pertain to the Universal but to the individual alone. 345 These expressions involve qualification and it is the individual alone which is capable of being qualified. The individual is the composite material body which is the abode of these

344. ibid.
345. NS, II.2.61
distinguished qualities.\textsuperscript{346} Gautama takes cognizance of this view of the Sāṅkhya philosophers who can be identified as Individualists. These scholars maintain that the Universal is identical and uniform in all individuals and as such it cannot be the subject of the aforesaid qualifications. Thus when we say, 'that cow which is sitting' or 'that cow which is grazing,' we certainly mean the individual cow and never the Universal 'cowness.' The individual alone is possessed of necessary intelligence for getting engaged in or abstaining from an activity.\textsuperscript{347} In the context of the command, 'Bring a cow,' for instance, reference is obviously made to the individual cow and never to the Universal cowness pertaining to all cows of past, present and future.

The Individualists further contend that the individual alone can form the content of a perceptual cognition. There is no difference of opinion as to the fact that what a word denotes is what is actually perceived. Hence the individual alone being perceived, it should alone be the import of a word.\textsuperscript{348}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{346} vyaktiguṇaḥviśeṣaśrayaḥ mūrtiḥ. NS, \textsection 11.2.8
\item \textsuperscript{347} Vide KP, II, pp.33-40
\item \textsuperscript{348} pratyaksāviśeyo vr̥ttiḥ padasyeṣṭaḥ padairapi niṣeṣṭatva ca sāmānyamātram pratyakṣaḥocatraḥ vyakto vedaḥ padarthatvam tasmādabhyaupagatam. NM, I, p. 513
\end{itemize}
Moreover, the individualists point out that there are certain unique objects like the sun and the moon and proper names like pittha, which cannot have a Universal, but can refer only to the individual.344

P.V. Kane while referring to a section of the Naiyāyikas as individualists, cites the view of the author of the Didhīti commentary, according to whom, the denotation of a word is to be accepted with reference to the individual and never to the Universal, which remains only as the Śakyatēvacchedaka, i.e., determinant of the denoted meaning.351 A section of the individualists, however, in response to the severe criticism of their opponents, comes to remodel their theory and admits that the Universal is to be understood as Śakyatēvacchedaka alone, it should not be understood as entering into the very import of a word. The individualists maintain that the individual as the import of a word is substantive in relation to the Universal which is its determinant or attribute.

344. Vide ITM, p.71
350. Vide SDK, pp.41-42
351. didhītikārāstu gotvādinām Śakyatēvacchedakaḥ e'tatra na śaktih kintu vyaktēvevetyāhuh.

MUS, vide BP, p. 441
JAṬYĀKṚṬIVYAKTIVĀDA: Gautama, the founder of the Indian Logic feels that none of the above theories can be a solution to the problem. According to him, the import of a word can not be exclusively confined either to the Universal or to the Individual or to the Configuration, all these three taken together can only form the import of a word. The Universal can not be the sole import of a word, because its manifestation depends on the Configuration and the individual. No word can produce the knowledge purely of the Universal without the apprehension of the Configuration and the particular. All these three elements are equally present in the import of a word. All the ancient Naiyāyikas have adhered to this view of Gautama and as such they can be conveniently identified as Jātyākṛṭivaktivādins or the advocates of the theory of composite denotation of a word.

The Naiyāyikas while considering all the three aforesaid elements as the import of a word, however, maintain that there is no hard and fast rule concerning the predominance or subordination of these elements. That is to say, any one of these elements may be principally conveyed by a word in subordination to the other two elements. Thus when the idea of distinction intended to be

352. vyaktyākṛṭijātayastu padārthāh. NS,II.2.68
353. na ākṛṭivyaktyapekṣatvāj jātayabhivyakteḥ. ibid,II...66
354. vide NV, p. 319
conveyed in such expressions as 'bring the cow', the other two elements, viz. the Universal and the Configuration remain subordinate in the matter of signification. When the idea of distinction is not sought and only the idea of a universal is emphasised in such expressions as 'the cow should not be touched by one's feet', it is the Universal which is principally signified. Again in such expressions as 'paint a cow', or 'make cows with clay', the emphasis is laid on the configuration, inasmuch as the idea of painting etc. can be construed with that of Configuration alone. Thus none of the aforesaid elements should hold a status of importance or otherwise in the matter of signification.

JÀTIVISISTAVEYAKTIVADÀ AND JÀTYÀKRTIVISISTAVEYAKTIVÀDA:

In dealing with the issue under consideration, the modern Naiyàyikas come to be divided into two groups and as such they can be identified as the Jàtivisistaveyaktivàdins and the Jàtyàkrtivisistaveyaktivàdins. The scholars belonging to the first group refuse to accept A÷krti as the import of a word, however, they accept a balanced view.

355. yadà tu vyaktih pradhànam aùgam tu jàtyàkrti...... jàtih pradhànam aùgam tu vyaktyàkrti...... ñàrtesa pradhànabhàva utprekàsitavya. VB under 1/5, 2.....

Also vide NH, I, p.297
with regard to Jāti and Vyākta, which according to them, constitute the import of a word. Their contention, as Jayantabhaṭṭa observes, is that the Universal should not necessarily be regarded as the import of a word. A word consists of two elements, viz. a stem (Prakṛti which may be either nominal or verbal and a suffix (Pratyaya). The import of a suffix is case, gender and number. If the Universal be regarded as the import of a stem, it would be impossible to construe the import of the stem with that of the suffix. For, it is the individual which can be qualified by case, gender and number. Hence the individual should be regarded as the import of a word. But the individuals are innumerable and vary widely among themselves in respect of colour, size and shape. Hence it is necessary that the particular individual that can be denoted by a word should be restricted or determined. And it is only by recognising the Universal that such a restriction and determination of the individuals can be achieved. Thus according to these group of the Naiyāyikas, the import of a word is

\[\text{gavādipaddenāḥ jātireva śaktih..... iti kecita, tenn, jātiviśistavyaktaveva śaktikalpanat.}\]

TD, vide TS, pp 317-318

356. MM, I, p. 294
the individual as characterised by the Universal. 358.

The Nāyāyikas belonging to the other group include the concept of Ākṛti also along with jāti as qualifying the denoted Vyakti. Now it may be observed that according to the Prācīna, Nāyāyikas also, the import of a word includes all these three entities. In their opinion, jāti, Vyakti and Ākṛti can not be apprehended apart from each other as far as the connotation of a word is concerned. The Nāyāyikas like Gangeśa 353 and Viśvanātha have accepted this basic logic of their old counterparts. But their difference from their predecessors is that they lay emphasis on Vyakti. The ancient Nāyāyikas, as we have seen, while accepting jāti, Vyakti and Ākṛti as the primary import of a word, recognise different degrees of prominence in these three as demanded by the circumstances. The theory under consideration, however, though recognises all these entities in the import of a word, holds that it is always the Vyakti which is primarily signified, jāti and Ākṛti are apprehended only as qualifying it (Vyakti). Hence this view may be conveniently

Also vide PWM, p. 142
359. jātimātrānirvika-papatyā kalpakaḥ vyaktimātā-papatyā,.............
jātyākṛtivāśya-śekṣya-ākṛtivāśya prakāśante aham. TC, p. 590.
APUllAVĀDA: The Buddhist Logicians have viewed the whole problem with quite a novel approach. As we have observed earlier, according to the Buddhist thinkers, the essence of the meaning is negative in character and that words are only subjective construction of our mind (Vikalpa).

Under the circumstances the Buddhists conceive the import of a word as Apoha or Atadyāvṛtti. The negation of the complement something is technically called 'Apoha' and the Buddhists' theory is thus referred to as Apohavāda. According to this theory, the Universal is a mere conception made by our mind and as such it cannot form the import of a word. The individuals, on the other hand, also are innumerable and self-contained; one individual has nothing to do with any other individual. Hence the individual also cannot be accepted as the import of a word. In fact, what a word signifies is a

360. vika lpayonayah śabdā vika lpaḥ śabdāy onayah / (Quoted in Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, II, p. 402 n.) Vide 1BM, p. 78

361. cf. apoha vā śabdār thāna kaiściduktaḥ iti. KD, 1. 1

362. cf. atyantāvilakṣaṇāntām sāla kaṇ anyam atavyāvṛttikātām eva. yathā gavāvamahārāntāhānām atyantāvilakṣaṇāntām api smāha vyāvṛttyām sāla kaṇ anyam. NVTT, p. 48c
particular object possessing certain peculiarities which distinguish it from all other objects similar or dissimilar. The word 'cow', for instance, signifies the particular animal 'cow' as distinguished from a horse or a buffalo or anything else which is not a cow. In other words, the word 'cow' implies the negation of non-cow. The negation of the opposite, the Buddhists assert, is the common element in the meaning of a word, but this is falsely interpreted as a positive universal. As M.K. P. Kane explains the position of the Buddhists, we do not exactly know what 'Chata' is, we know what it is not, we know that it is not 'Pata' or anything else. Thus we have only a negative knowledge of things and consequently the import of a word comes to be negative.

The Realist Naiyayikas and the Mimamsakas subject the Buddhist theory of Apoha to severe criticism. Avoiding much details, we just like to give an idea of the same.

363. saugatāstu vyaktavānantyaśidādīsabhāvasya ca deśakalas-nugamabhbāvāttadenugatayāmatadvyāvṛttau samketah.
   Pradīpa quoted in SDK, p.42 (Notes)

364. gośabdāśūraṇaḥ sarvāsām govyaktaṁamupasthitaratām-
   mādashvādito vyāvṛttidarśānāccātadvyāvṛttirūpo vācyā iti buddhamatam. BB, vide KP, p. 38

365. Vide SDK, p. 42 (Notes)
The Naiyāyikas point out that if the concepts do not refer to a real common element (as the Buddhists hold it to be), the inferential and verbal knowledge must be declared as null and void. The Buddhists' reply to this objection is that terms definitely refer to a common element. But this common element is not objectively real. It is understood as an exclusion of all other objects from itself. In other words, the meaning of a term is understood as a negation of negation and as such as a concept without any objective basis.

**JĀTYĀDIVĀDA:** The Vaiyākaraṇas who find all the aforesaid theories untenable, have come to evolve a new theory of their own, according to which words connote four entities, viz., Jāti (Universal), Guṇa (Quality), Kriyā (Action) and Dravya (Substance). Patanjali in his *Mahābhāṣyā* refers in distinct terms to these fourfold connotation of words in the expression 'gauḥ ṭuklaḥ caḥo dītthāḥ' (Dītthāḥ, the white bull is moving).

Here the term Gauḥ is a class-name (Jātiśabda) as it stands for the Universal cowness (Gotva) which is common to all individual members comprising the class. The term Śuklaḥ signifies the quality whiteness, while the term
Calo signifies an action 'moving'.

The term 'Ḍittha' means the discrete individual entity which is the substratum of the three aforesaid entities viz. Jāti etc, being itself devoid of any attribute. Thus the term 'Gauḥ' (cow) if uttered by someone, not only signifies the 'cow' as characterised by the concept of its class, but by the notions of its quality, action and substance as well. A word, according to the Vaishākaraṇas, thus connotes only these attributes (Upādhis) of the individuals and not the individuals themselves.

The Vaishākaraṇas' theory was later accepted by the Ālāmkārikas also to solve the controversy on the issue. Thus Mukula, Mammata, Mahimabhaṭṭa and Jagannātha refer to this fourfold connotation of words and deal with the problem in details.

367. tatra mukhyas caturbhedo jñeyo jātyādibhedate.

AVM, p. 4

368. Vide KP, II.3

369. jātigunakriyādravyānāṁ tatpravṛttinimitānāṁ bahutvāt.

VV, p. 28.
According to this theory, the attribute pertaining to the individuals are primarily of two types, viz. Vastudharma and Vaktṛyadrccchāsanniveśita. While the former is inherent in an object, the latter comes to be optionally imposed on a particular individual according to the sweet will of the speaker. The Vastudharma again falls under two groups, viz. Siddha and Sādhyā. The Siddha type of attribute is that one which is accomplished. The Sādhyā attribute is that which is in the process of being accomplished. The Siddha type of attribute has two sub-varieties, viz. Jāti (Universal) and Guṇa (Quality). A Jāti is an eternal attribute which inheres in all particular instances of a class. A Guṇa, on the other hand, is the means of comprehension of the differentia of an object and as such is called the viśeṣādhānāhetu.

The classification of these Upādhis or attributes of the individuals may be conveniently presented in the following shape:

370. upādhiśca dvividhāḥ, vastudharmo vaktṛyadrccchāsanniveśitaśca. vastudharmo'pi dvividhāḥ siddhaḥ sādhyāḥ ca. siddho'pi dvividhāḥ padārthasya prāṇeprado viśeṣādhānahetuseśa ca. tatrādyo jātih. KP,11,pp.41-42
Also vide AVM, pp. 5-6
The rhetoricians recalling the authority of Bhertraperi maintain that the Universal is the very essence (Pranaprada) of the individual and remains unchanged through all its evolu-
4 tion.371 Thus while Jati inhering in all individuals, gives a class concept, a Guna is conceived of only as a differentiating attribute. In view of this distinction, it is pointed out that the Universal is never found as dissociated from the individual in which it inheres. As Bukula rightly observes, an individual can not obtain its own nature without a relation

371. ayam hi jatirupaḥ satdārthena padarthasya pranadv itucata, pranam vyavahārayogyatvaṁ dadāti sampadāyati tīvratatvaṁ. RG, II, p. 135

Also, cf. pranapradattvam ca yāvatsthitisambandhatvam. Ādarsa on KP, II, p. 13
with the Universal.\(^{372}\) A Guṇa, say Śukla (whiteness), on the other hand, serves to distinguish a particular object from all other objects pertaining to the same class.\(^{373}\) Māmata quotes an observation of Bhartrhari, which states that a cow is neither a cow nor a non-cow because of its being, but is a cow owing to its invariable connection with cowness.\(^{374}\) Thus its positive character of being a cow and the negative character of being distinct from other entities is not intrinsic, but is derived from the inherence of the universal element of 'cowness' in it.\(^{375}\) Jagannātha explaining this observation of Bhartrhari says that a cow is neither recognised as a cow nor is differentiated from non-cows until and unless the universal 'cowness' remains uncognised and is so recognised and differentiated as soon as the Universal element of 'cowness' comes to be comprehended - a fact which is enough to show that the Universal alone forms the very basis of all positive and negative cognitions.\(^{376}\) A Guṇa, on the other

\(^{372}\) na hi kaścit paḍārtho jātisambandham antareṇa svarūpam pratilahate. AVM, p. 5

\(^{373}\) Śuklādinā hi labdhasattākām vastu viśisyate. KP, II, p. 43

\(^{374}\) uktāṁ hi vākyapādyaye-'na hi gauḥ svarūpena gauḥ nāpya gauḥ, gotvābhisaṃbhātta gauḥ' iti. VP, quoted in KP, II, p. 35

\(^{375}\) LCAI, p. 112

\(^{376}\) Vide RG, II, p. 156
hand, distinguishes an object from all other objects only when the nature of that object is established by means of its invariable connection with the class-concept. In other words, the existence of a particular object is to be established first and then only the qualities come to distinguish it from other objects. Moreover, it is the Universal and never a quality that causes an object assume its being.

The distinction between Jāti and Guṇa would be clear from the definition of Guṇa as given by Patañjali. A Guṇa, according to him, is that which resides in a substance and yet may leave it and may be found in substances of a different class which is the Ādheya (substratum) and which is different from a substance. A Jāti never leaves the object where it resides, but a Guṇa can also leave the object qualified by it, just as 'blackness' (which is a Guṇa) leaves a jar when it is backed.

A Kriyā or action is defined as a whole made up of succeeding parts. Patañjali maintains that an action is a combination of a series of sub-actions and it has temporal and sequential significance. Thus an action involves in itself a series of successive operations (Vyāpāras).378

377 sattve niviśete'paiti prthag jātiṣu dṛṣyate /
   ādheyasākryājāśca so'sattvapraṅtritir guṇah //
MB, IV.1.2 under 'voto guṇavacanāt', P.IV.1.44
378. kriyā hi nāmeiyamatyantāparidṛṣṭapūrvāparībhūtāvayavā
   na śakyā pindaṅkṛtya nidarśayitum. MB under P.1.3.1.
A Dravya or the Vakṣṭrasannivesita type of attribute consists in such proper names as Dittha which is arbitrarily imposed by the speaker upon an individual. As regards the proper names like Dittha, we can not think of any perceptible attribute which may form the essence of their expressiveness.\(^{379}\)

Thus, according to the Vaiyākaraṇas and Ālāṁkārikas, the import of a word is fourfold, viz. Jāti, Guna, Kriyā and Dravya.

It is of interest to note that of the Ālāṁkārikas, Mahimabhaṭṭa accepts the said fourfold connotation of words only with reference to the noun-words (Nāmapadas). According to him, genus, quality, action and substance are the factors that actually characterise the denoted meaning of a word.\(^{380}\) In this context, he alludes to a different view which holds that Action (Kriyā) alone is the import of a word and all noun-words form a common class of Kriyāśabda.\(^{381}\)

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379. Vide KP, p. 35
380. tatra sattvapradhānāni nāmāni tāny api bahuprakāraṇi sambhavanti jātigunākriyādravyānāṁ tatpravṛttinimittānāṁ bahutvāt VV, I, p.28
381. kecit punaresāṁ kriyaivaikā pravṛttinimittamiti kriyāśabdatvameva sarvesāṁ nāmapadānām upaścandanti. ibid., p.30
Of the Naiyāyikas also Jagadīśa takes note of this fourfold connotation of words when he deals with the conventional type of words (Rūḍhaśabdās). He observes that the conventional word is of four types according to 'others' (meaning hereby the Vaiyākaraṇas and the Ālāṃkārikas), and they are namely Jātiśabda, Guṇaśabda, Kriyāśabda and Dravyāśabda. It may be presumed that the Rūḍha words of Jagadīśa are identical with the conventional words of the Vaiyākaraṇas and the Ālāṃkārikas. To throw the suggestion that the position of the Ālāṃkārikas is equivalent to that of the Vaiyākaraṇas, he quotes a verse ascribed by himself to Daṇḍin.382

THE ĀLĀṃKĀRIKAS' REFUTATION OF THE THEORIES JĀTIVĀDA AND VYAKTIVĀDA:

In their strong bid to establish the Jātyādivāda, the Ālāṃkārikas had to refute the Jātivāda as advocated by the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vyaktivāda as held by the Sāṅkhyaśas and some modern Naiyāyikas. As we have earlier observed, the Mīmāṃsakas as Jātivādins consider even words denotative

382. jātidravya guṇaśabdādair dharmaiḥ samketavattayā
jātiśabdādibhedena cāturvidhyām pare jaguḥ //SSP,K.18

Here the term Pare refers to the Vaiyākaraṇas and Spanda to Kriyā. Vide Krṣṇakānti on SSP above.
of quality, action and proper names as signifying the Jāti alone. Thus according to them, the quality whiteness, for instance, subsisting in such various white objects as snow, conch and milk, although appears to differ in each case, is same in reality, inasmuch as we use the same identical expression, i.e. 'white' as in such utterances as 'white snow', 'white milk' and 'white conch'. Thus though the individual whites are different from one another, yet they bear a common class-characteristic i.e. whiteness (Śuklatva) on account of which an identical expression and consequently an identical cognition arise with reference to the different white objects. This being the case, the Mīmāṃsakas contend, the word Śukla, which is considered as a Guṇavācaka Śabda (i.e. word expressive of a quality) by the Grammarians, is exactly similar to the word Go (cow) and as such, both of them come to be Jātivācaka Śabdās (i.e. words expressive of the guṇas). This applies to an action (Kriyā) also. The act of cooking (Pākakriyā), for instance, in the case of molasses (Guḍa) is not different from the one pertaining to rice (Taṇḍula), as the same Universal action in the form of 'Pākatvajāti is present in both the cases. In the context of the

383. himapayaḥsaṅkhādyāśrayesu paramārthato bhinnesu yadvāsena śuklaḥ śukla ityādyabhinnapratyayotpattiḥ tat śuklatvādisāmānyah guḍataṇḍulādisvevameva pākatvādi. KP,II, p.37
proper names like Dittha being conceived as Universal, the Mīmāṃsakas' contention is this, the word Dittha as uttered by an old, is certainly different in pitch and intonation from the word Dittha as uttered by a child. But yet, we do recognise these two utterances as essentially similar, and this similarity can be explained only when the reality of a Universal 'Dittha' (i.e. Ditthatva) like the Universal 'Gotva' (cowhood) is acknowledged with reference to all particular utterances of that sound-group. Thus the Universal alone should be regarded as the import of a word.

Mukula controverts the above position of the Universalist Mīmāṃsakas by saying that the cognition of unity in respect of quality and action is not brought about by any Universal such as Suklatva and Pākatva, but by the individuals themselves to which these attributes viz. quality e.g. Sukla and action e.g. Pākakriyā actually pertain. Mukula substantiates his proposition by quoting the authority of Patanjali, the Mahābhāṣyakāra who advocates in distinct terms the fourfold connotation of a word viz. Jāti etc. Mukula maintains that the factor that

384. bālavṛddhasūkādyudīritesu ditthādiśabdeṣu ca prati-
ksaṇam bhidyamāneṣu ditthādyarthēṣu.........
pravṛttinimittamityanye. ibid.
causes differentiating cognition in respect of the individuals, in fact, is the attributes (Upādhis) which pertain to them.\textsuperscript{385} Just as the single face of a person appears as different being reflected on such various surfaces as oil, sword, water and mirror, so also quality like Sukla (white) pertaining to such white objects as conch-shell appears as different because of the difference brought about by such various auxiliary factors as place, time and the like at the time of creation of such objects (i.e. conch-shell etc.).\textsuperscript{386} Thus words like Sukla are not capable of being treated as Jātisabdas, as there can not be any Jāti like Suklatva. Mukula asserts that the 'white' individuals like conch-shell which serve as substratum of 'white' (i.e. Suklaguna) are originally one and the same (because of their possessing the same attribute, i.e. whiteness). In other words, here the individual is one and the same, i.e. Sukla. Suklatva Jāti would have been possible only when Sukla as individual were plural, because although Jāti is one, it demands for its substratum many individuals. But this is not the case with words like Sukla. Thus Suklatvajāti is not possible.

\textsuperscript{385} ibid., p.10

\textsuperscript{386} yathā hi ekam eva mukham tālyayākhagodakādārśādīnām...

\ldots... vicitraiva syāditi. ibid.
at all. The same logic applies to actions like Pāka (cooking) also, and thus there can not be any Pākatvajāti. In the case of proper names also, there can not be any Universal like Ditthatva. A single individual, say Dittha (Mr. x), may appear as many and different as he undergoes a number of changes through various stages of life, such as infancy, childhood and youth, but yet the individual 'Dittha' is originally one, and as such, there can not be any Ditthatvajāti. Hence Mukula concludes that Guṇa, Kriyā and Dṛṣṭya should not be reduced to Jāti, as in the primary import of a word all these four entities retain their individual identity.

In refuting the Individualist theory, however, the Ālamkārikas join their hands with the Mīmāṃsakas. The Individualists, as we find, assert that the individual alone is capable of application (Pravṛtti) or the reverse (i.e. Nivṛtti) and as such, it should alone be regarded as the primary import of a word. But the Ālamkārikas take

387. ataśce tasyāh śuklādīvyakter ekatvāt............... na śuklādīśabdānām jātisābdatvām. ibid.

388. ibid.

389. sthitam etac chabdapraśṛttinimittānām catuṣṭvān mukhyāḥ śabdārthaścaturvidha iti. ibid.
care to show that this Individualist theory involves three serious faults, and as such, is not acceptable to them. In the first place, they point out, if the convention of a word were to be accepted with reference to the individual, it would refer either (i) to all individuals of a class or (ii) to a single individual or (iii) to a limited number of individuals. Thus the term *Go* would mean all the individual cows pertaining to the past, present and future, or a single cow or a limited number of cows that come to our notice. Now, in the case of the first alternative, there arises the fault *Ānanyya* (endlessness), since individuals being innumerable, it is not possible to accept the convention with reference to all of them at a time. If in order to avoid this difficulty, the second alternative is accepted, i.e. if convention is accepted with regard to only a limited number of individuals, then there would arise the fault *Vyabhicāra* (violation of a principle). For, if the

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390. *yadyapyarthakriyākāritayā pravṛttinivṛttiyoγyā vyaktireva tathāpyānanyād vyabhicārācca tatra sāmketaḥ kartum na yuyyata iti gṛūḥ śuklaścalo qittha ityādīnāṁ viṣayavibhāgo na prāpnotīti ca tadupādhāveva sāmketaḥ.*  

KP, pp. 32-33

391. cf. *nēpi dvitiyāḥ, vyabhicāraprasāṅgāt ekasyāmeva govyaktau sāmketagrahaṇe dvitiyādinām tacchaḥdaviṣayatvāṁ na syāt.*  

KTS, p. 56
term Go were to signify only those cows with reference to which convention is accepted, the cows that have not been perceived and consequently not Samketita would be left unsignified. This is violation of the principle which states that verbal comprehension is possible only from those words with reference to which convention is accepted. And lastly, if the convention were accepted with reference to the individual alone, the differentiation of objects viz. Universal, Quality, Action and Substance would not be possible in case of a proposition such as 'gauḥ suklaḥ calo ditthah' (The white ox Dittha is moving). If each word in this proposition would signify an individual alone and not its attribute, there would be no reason why we should use the four aforesaid words (Gauḥ etc.) instead of one, for a single word would be enough to convey the concept of the individual.

In view of these serious difficulties perceived in the Individualist theory, the Ālaṃkārikas refute the same and come to accept the connotation of a word only in respect of the aforesaid attributes of the individuals and not with reference to the individuals themselves.

392. pratyakṣemulakāṁ ca saṃketagrahaṇamitī...ibid, p. 56
393. saṃketitasasyaśābdabodha iti niyamābhāvaprasaṅgādityarthāḥ.
Prabhā quoted in Bālabodhinī, Vide KP,II, p.33
Here a question is very pertinent as to what is the exact nature of the attribute that we impose on an individual according to our sweet will. For, in the cases of words expressive of Universal, quality and action, we may refer to these specific attributes as the basis of expressiveness. But in the case of proper names like Dittha, we can not think of any perceptible attribute which may form the essence of its expressiveness. To this Mammata replies that in such words as Dittha, the underlying word-essence serves as the determining attribute. Thus whenever one utters the name Dittha, one imposes the form of this term on the person called Dittha. The listener, on his part, also cognises the form of the word after perceiving the last letter (i.e. h) without taking into consideration the order (viz., d+i+t+th+a+h) in which the letters stand. Now the form of the word Dittha serves as the determining (Bhedaka) attribute and consequently it serves as the very basis of expressiveness concerned.

Of the modern scholars, Dr. Gaurinath Sastri reviews the whole issue critically and analytically. He sums up his discourse on the subject with the opinion of Bhartṛhari that the import of a word is largely

394. ibid., p.35
395. PWM, pp. 136-171
determined by our subjective attitude and culture and so the denotation of words is held to be different in different systems of thought. Bhartrhari wants us not to be surprised at the incompatibility or conflict of one theory with another. He further thinks that the discussion on the import of words should not be carried to any inordinate length. He is inclined to accept a state of indeterminism and thinks that it is impossible to 'hit upon' a theory which will meet universal approval.

MEANS OF ASCERTAINING THE PRIMARY MEANING OF A WORD:

The nature of Abhidhā being known, there arises the subsequent pertinent question as to how one can obtain the knowledge of this primary significative potency in respect of a particular word. In other words, the question is how one can understand the primary meaning of a particular word. This very problem is known in various circles of scholars as the problem of Śaktigraha, Śaktijñēna or Saṃketagraha. A verbal comprehension, as we have seen, is immediately followed by the cognition of the meanings of words, which is generated by the cognition of the words themselves. But the cognition of words can lead to the corresponding cognition of meanings only

396. VP, II.142
through a relevant cognition of Śakti or Abhidhā. Hence scholars through ages have been occupied with the business of finding out the means of ascertaining Śakti of a word with reference to its corresponding meaning. A summarising verse\textsuperscript{397} which enumerates as many as eight such means and quoted in various systems of thought, reflects the crystalised opinion of the earlier scholars. The means suggested here are namely, Vyākaraṇa (Grammar), Upamāna (Analogy), Kośa (lexicon), Āptavākya (statement of a trustworthy person), Vṛddhavyavahāra (usage by the elderly people), Vākyaśeṣa (Supplementary statement), Vivṛti (paraphrase) and Prasiddhapadasannidhi (proximity of a well-known word). These eight various means of ascertaining convention and consequently the primary meaning of a word, however, are not always recognised by all schools and scholars. We notice difference amongst them as regards the number and even names of such means. In the school of Nyāya, for instance, Jagadīśa\textsuperscript{398} recognises all the aforesaid means, while Gaṅgeśa\textsuperscript{399} leaves out Vivṛtti or Vivaraṇa. Of the Vaiyākaraṇas,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{397} Saktigrāham vyākaraṇopamāna-kośāptavākyavyavahāraratasya/vākyasya sēṣād vivṛtter vadantī sānnidhyataḥ siddhapadasya vṛddhāḥ// cited in TC,p.649; SMU,p.246
\item \textsuperscript{398} SSP,pp.103-10
\item \textsuperscript{399} TC, p.649
\end{itemize}
Nāgeśa recognises all the eight aforesaid means. The schools of Sāmkhya accepts only three such means, viz. Āptopadeśa, Vṛddhavyavahāra and Prasiddhapadasannidhi. Of the ancient Ālāmkārikas, Vāmana refers only to Abhidhānakośa as Śaktigrāhaka. The modern Ālāmkārikas, however, came to accept more such means. Viśvanātha Kavirāja, for instance, refers to Vṛddhavyavahāra Āptopadeśa and Prasiddhapadasamabhivyāhāra (Prasiddhapadasannidhi) in this context. Despite such differences, however, almost all schools of thought, as we shall presently see, behave like one in recognising Vṛddhavyavahāra as the principal of the means of ascertaining Śakti of a word.

**VYĀKARANA:** Grammar teaches us the meanings of roots, terminations and cases etc., and as such, all schools of thought have stressed the need of studying this science in the context of learning the meaning of a new word. Thus in the sentence, 'caitrah pacati' (Caitra cooks), we understand from Grammar the meaning of the word Caitra as the agent of the act of 'cooking', which is denoted by the verbal root Pac (to cook). According to

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400. abhidhānakośataḥ padārthanिःscayāḥ. KLSV, 1.3.3
401. SDK, p.8
Patañjali, the most important use of Grammar is to help people to learn a language quickly and correctly. Thus he cites Laghu (conciseness) as an important use of Grammar. According to the Grammarians, though there is a fixed relation between a word and its meaning, yet the help of Grammar is indispensable for learning the meaning of words in a sentence. The Naiyāyikas also stress the need of Grammar for distinguishing between correct and corrupt forms of words. According to Vācaspatimiśra, Grammar is indispensable even while learning a meaning through Vṛddhavyavahāra.

It is, however, not that the Naiyāyikas do always accept the meaning of a word as fixed by Grammar; they may reject such a meaning in the event of their fundamental principles being contradicted.

402. na cāntareṇa vyākaraṇaṁ laghunopāyena śabdasaṅktyā vijñātum. MBP, p.8
403. ITM, p.29
404. laghvarthaṁ ādhyeyam vyākaraṇam. MBP, p.3
405. sādhvasādhuvībhāgopareṇa vyākaraṇaḥ . . . . . . tathā ca ..... siddham. NVTT, p. 419
406. ibid, p.420
407. kvacit tu sati bādhake tyjyate....... caitraḥ pacatityādau... ... prakāriṁbhūya bhāsatē. SMU,pp.419-420

Vide also ACS, pp.95-103
UPAMĀNA: Recognition of Upamāna or Analogy as a separate Pramāṇa by certain schools like the Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and Nyāya has been already referred to in the present work. Upamāna gives us the knowledge of an object derived through its similarity with another familiar object by way of producing the knowledge of Śakti or relation between words and their meanings involved in the statement concerned. Thus a person who does not known what a Gavaya (gayal) is, comes to identify the same from such description as 'gosadrśo gavayah' (a gayal is like a cow). The process involved here may be explained thus: A person who has never seen a gayal, is told by some forester that a gayal is like a cow. Then he goes to the forest and comes to meet an unknown animal bearing, however, some resemblance with a cow which he knows well. The perception of this resemblance reminds him of the Atidesāvākyā (directive statement) of the forester and hence he identifies the animal as a gayal. Consequently the person acquires the knowledge 'the creature gayal is what is signified by the word Gavaya' (gavayah gavayapada-vācyah), which is known as Upamiti, i.e. the knowledge

408. yatṛāraṇyakena kenacid grāmiṇāyoktam-gosadrśo
gavayapadavācya iti. pāścād grāmiṇena kvacidaraṇyādau
gavayo drṣṭastatra gosādrśyadārśanām yad jātām
tpdupamiti-karanamiti. SMU, p.407
derived through Analogy.

KOŚA: Kośa or lexicon provides us the primary meaning of a word by way of substituting some other words bearing the same primary meaning. As for instance, we learn from a lexicon that the word Heramba signifies the same meaning (i.e. the god Gaṇeśa) which is conveyed by the words Ekadanta, Lambodara and Gajānana also. 409

Sometimes, a lexicon may supply, apart from a word's normal or primary meaning, some secondary meanings also based on usage. But as the Naiyāyikas maintain, all such meanings are to be apprehended through Lakṣaṇā only, and Śakti should be assumed in respect of the word's primary meaning alone. As for instance, for the word Nīla (blue), the lexicon gives us two meanings, viz. 'the blue colour' (Nīlarūpa) and 'an object possessed of blue colour' (Nīlarūpaviśiṣṭa). But the Śakti here is to be assumed with reference to the colour (i.e., blue) only and not in respect of the object possessing the same. The object characterised by blue colour is apprehended only through Lakṣaṇā and not through Śakti. 410

409. apyekadantaherambalambodaragajānanāḥ. AK,1,38,p.7
410. nīlādiviśiṣte śaktipakṣe nīlavraviśiṣṭanīlārūpaḥ śakyatāvacchedakamityanantānām nīlavraviśiṣṭani-
 śakyatāvacchedakatvam.

MUS, p. 426, vide BP
Kosā though not always treated separately, has been almost universally accepted as a Saktigrāhaka. As for instance, in the field of Poetics, Viśvanātha does not make any explicit reference to it, but from the relevant Lakṣmitikā, we can presume his recognition of this Saktigrāhaka.

As we have earlier pointed out, the ancient Ālaṃkārika Vāmana recognises Abhidhānakosā as the only Saktigrāhaka. Here the term Abhidhānakosā needs some explanation, as it creates a doubt as to whether Abhidhāna and Kosā refer to one and the same Saktigrāhaka or two different Saktigrāhakas. In our opinion, the term Abhidhānakosā refers to Kosā as characterised by Abhidhāna as the only Saktigrāhaka. Vāmana probably uses the term Abhidhānakosā in the sense of Abhidhānarūpakosā i.e., the Kosā, the chief business of which is to illustrate Abhidhāna, i.e. the primary sense of words. Thus we have a Karmadhārayasamāsa (instead of Dvandva) where the noun 'Kosā' is qualified by the adjective Abhidhāna. Hence Abhidhāna and Kosā should not be understood as two distinct Saktigrāhakas. If Abhidhāna and Kosā were treated as two

411. koṣāptavākyādityatra koṣāpadam gaṇapāṭhasyāpyupalak-
ṣaṇam ........... saṃketagrahaḥ.

op. cit., vide SD,II, p. 33
different Śaktigrāhakas, the writer would have referred to them in dual number instead of the singular. That is to say, we would have got the expression 'Abhidhānakośābhyām' instead of 'abhidhānakosāt'. Consequently what Vāmana intends to mean is, - in the event of there arising a question as to acceptance or rejection of a particular meaning of a particular word, one should consult a dictionary.

ĀPTAVĀKYA: The meaning of a word is sometimes ascertained from Āptavākyya or the direct statement of a trustworthy person. Thus from the statement 'the word pika means a Cuckoo' used by a trustworthy person, a learner directly apprehends the Śakti of 'Pika' with reference to a Cuckoo. In our everyday life also, when the parents and other relatives point out with their fingers the various persons and things and say to a child, 'This is your father', 'This is your brother eating the banana' etc., the child comes to know the relation of

413. Āptopadeśasāmarthyācchabdādarthasāmpratyayah. NS, II.1.52
414. yathā kokilāḥ pikapadāvācyā ityādiśabdāt pikādiśabdānām kokile śaktigrāhāḥ. SMU, p. 427
Also, vide SD, II. p. 83
words and the persons or things signified by them.\textsuperscript{415}

Of the Naiyāyikas, Jagadīśa has not referred to Āptavākyya as a Śaktigrāhaka perhaps for the reason that the other methods like Vyākaraṇa are also nothing but Āptavākyas of this or that sort. The specific mention of Āptavākyya by scholars as a method of ascertaining Śakti is only to cover the non-specific forms of Āptavākyas.\textsuperscript{416}

VRDDHAVYAVAHĀRA: Vṛddhavyavahāra (or simply Vyavahāra) is recognised as an important and indispensable method of ascertaining Śakti of a word by almost all schools of thought. This process of learning a language involves three persons, viz. Prayojakavṛddha (the persons in command), the Prayojyavṛddha (the person who acts in response to the command) and the Bāla (the learner of the meaning of a new word). The process involved here may be explained thus.\textsuperscript{417} The experienced person utters, ‘Bring

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{415} NK, p. 860
\textsuperscript{416} Vide ACS, p. 109
\textsuperscript{417} evam vyavahārdapi yathā prayojakavṛddhena ghatamānaya ityuktaṁ. tacci śrutvā prayojyavṛddhena ghatamānitaṁ tadavadhārya pārśvastho bālo ghatānayanarūpaṁ kāryo ghatāmānayeti śabdaprayojamityavadhārayati ..... ghatādipadānāṁ śaktiṁ grhnāti. SMU,pp.427-28
\end{footnotesize}
a jar'. On hearing this, the less experienced person brings the jar. Observing this, the person standing nearby, ignorant of Śakti (denotation) of the words involved in the sentence comes to ascertain that the act of bringing the jar is the result of the utterance, i.e. 'Bring the jar'. In the next moment, on hearing such other sentences as 'Take away the jar' and 'Bring the cow', the learner by way of inclusion (Āvāpa) and exclusion (Udvāpa or Uddhāra) of the particular word or words in the sentence, comes to ascertain the Śakti of such words as Ghaṭa with reference to such corresponding objects as 'jar' as being connected with such actions as 'bringing'. Thus observing such utterances of the person in command and the subsequent activities on the part of the person who follows it, the learner comes to acquire a general idea about the meanings of the individual words by way of inclusion and exclusion of certain words in a statement.418

It is important to note that in various schools of thought Vṛddhavyavahāra is considered as the foremost of all Śaktigrāhakas. Thus the Prābhākaras recognise it

418. vyavahāreṇa vṛddhānām vākyaśravaṇabhāviṣu /
    āvāpodhārabhedena padānaṁ śaktiniścayaḥ //
 VM, vide PP, p. 378
as the only method of learning the meaning of a word.\textsuperscript{419}

The Naiyāyika Jagadīśa also holds that Śakti of a word is to be ascertained first on the strength of Vṛddhavyavahāra and then only through other methods like Upamāna. Of the Vaiyākaraṇas also, Nāgेśa regards it as the Śaktigrāhakaśiromaṇi, i.e. the chief (lit. crest-jewell) of the means of ascertaining Śakti.\textsuperscript{421} Amongst the Ālāmkārikas too, Viśvanātha Kavirāja refers to Vṛddhavyavahāra first and then only the other methods.\textsuperscript{422}

VĀKYASAŚA : Sometimes the Śakti of a word is grasped from Vākyasāsā, i.e. the remaining part of a sentence. This particularly applies to statements involving ambiguous words. Thus, on hearing the Vedic statement 'yavamayascarur bhavati' (the porridge should be made of Yavas), a person is in doubt as to whether the word Yava signifies Dirghasūka (i.e. Barley, lit. a long-awned grain) in which sense it is used by the Aryans, or

\begin{align*}
\text{\textsuperscript{419}} \text{cātra vṛddhavyavahāram muktā anyat kāraṇam upalabhāmahe. BR, p. 258} \\
\text{\textsuperscript{420}} \text{samketasya grahaḥ pūrvaḥ vṛddhasya vyavahāratatḥ / pascād upamānādyaiḥ śaktidhipūrvakairasaḥ // SSP, p. 104} \\
\text{\textsuperscript{421}} \text{PLM, p. 27} \\
\text{\textsuperscript{422}} \text{SD, II, p. 32}
\end{align*}
Kar'igu (Panic seed) as is understood by the 'Mlecchas (laymen). But the doubt is removed from the supplementary statement 'While other herbs wither, these stand flourishing.' There is also another supplementary statement read in the context - 'In spring all grains lose their leaves, but barley with its awn, stands blooming.' Now, from either of these supplementary statements, the person comes to settle that the word Yava signifies barley and not panic seed.

The concept of Vākyaśeṣa can be traced back to the Mīmāṃsāśutras of Jaimini. According to Jaimini, when one gets puzzled as to which of the several meanings of an ambiguous words is to be understood, one should consider the rest of the statement.

VIVARĀNA: Sometimes the primary meaning of a word is ascertained on the strength of Vivarana or paraphrase.

423. evam vākyaśeṣaśdapi saktigrāhah, yathā yavamayaścarur bhavatiḥyatra yavapadaśya dīrghaśūkavīśeṣe āryaṃ prayogah, kaṅgau tu mleccaḥaṃ. SMU, p.433

424. yatraṇyā oṣadhayo mlayante'thaite modamāna ivottisthanti. NK, p. 859.

425. SMU, p. 433

also, which consists in a commentary involving synonyms. Thus the sentence 'ghato'sti' (There is a jar) is explained as 'kalaso'sti' (There is a pitcher) and consequently we understand the meaning of the word Ghata as Kalasa. Similarly by the paraphrasing the word Pacati (cooks), it is ascertained that the Ākhyāta (verbal suffix) in Pacati signifies the effort (Yatna) that facilitates the act of cooking (pākaṁ karoti).

According to Patanjali, the meaning of a word is to be determined through a commentary in the event of there arising a doubt.

PRASĪDHA PADASANNIDHI: Sometimes the proximity of a well-known word also enables a man to learn the meaning. Thus in the sentence, 'iha sahakāratarau madhureō piko rauti' the primary meaning of the word pika is ascertained.

427. evam vivaranādapi ākhyātāh, vivaranastu tatasāma-nārthakapadāntareṇa tadārthakathānam. SMU, p. 434
428. ibid.
429. SSP, p.107
430. vyākhyaṇato viśeṣapratipattir na sandehādalaksanam. MB, I, p.42
431. kvacit prasiddhārthakasabdāsāmānādhiśaṁyādapi.

Also SMU, p. 435
in respect of Kokila (cuckoo), by means of the other well-known words. Here in the example, the words Sahakārataru (a mango tree) and Madhurn (sweet) are already familiar to a person who is eager to know the Śakti in respect of the word Pika, which is strange to him. These two familiar words thus come to convey the idea of sweet-singing on the mango-tree, an activity invariably associated with a Cuckoo. Now the unfamiliar word Pika having a physical proximity with the said familiar words, comes to signify the idea of a Cuckoo as its denoted meaning. The Naiyāyikas like Viśvanātha while illustrating this example, however, take care to show that the Śakti of the word Pika can not be accepted with reference to a human singer who is not found with the tradition of singing being seated on a mango-tree. Nor can it be said that the said Śakti is capable of being accepted in respect of other birds also, since 'sweetness' can not be associated with birds like crow (Kāka). Hence the word Pika stands for a Cuckoo only.

The Ālāmkārikas have also recognised Prasiddhapadasamānīdhi as one of the means of ascertaining Śakti of a word. Thus Viśvanātha Kavirāja shows that from the

432. SMU, p. 435
433. ibid.
434. kvacicca prasiddhapadasamabhivyāhārāt.

SD, II, p. 33
proximity of the well-known words Kamala (lotus) and Pibati (drinks), the Śakti of the unfamiliar word Madhukara is capable of being ascertained.  

Here a question may arise like this - while Āptavākya is a statement of a trustworthy person, Kośa and Vivṛtti also are certain statements made by certain authorities (who may be called Āptas). Then why should the Kośa and Vivṛtti be not included in the Āptavākya? In reply to such an anticipated query it may be pointed out, as Dr. L.G. Chutia observes, Āptavākya means a statement made by an authority, who is physically present at the time of learning the meaning of a new word. He (i.e. the Āpta) gives the explanation as an on-the-spot reply to a specific query. In the Kośa, on the other hand, the Āpta keeps the meaning already furnished in a syntactical manner. The Kośa presents the equivalent words irrespective of their familiarity or otherwise. In Vivṛtti, the man of authority keeps already finished meanings of only such words and expressions which are supposed by him to be familiar. While the Kośa in the form of a book and the Vivṛtti in the shape of a commentary serve the purpose of the entire society and the succeeding generation of the learners, the Āptavākya can

435. iha prabhinnakamalodare madhurām madhukarāḥ pibati.

ibid.
serve the purpose of an individual physically closer to the Apta (i.e. the authority). 436

CONTEXTUAL FACTORS FOR DETERMINING THE PRIMARY MEANING OF A WORD:

Scholars pertaining to various schools of thought have emphasised the importance of the contextual factors in the matter of determining the exact meaning of a word. As Bhartrhari observes, the form of a word is not enough to determine its meaning; the meaning is very much dependent on the context or the situation in which the word is actually uttered or used. 437 Hence in ascertaining the true signification of a word, the contextual elements or factors also must be taken into account.

Scholars pertaining to various schools of thought, however, vary in their opinion as regards the nature and number of these contextual factors. Jaimini recognises Śruti (direct statement), Liṅga (implication from another word), Vākya (syntactic connection among the word-meanings), Prakaraṇa (context or situation), Sthāna (position) and

436. TL, pp. 30-31
437. VP, II. 253, 268 etc.
Samākhyā (etymological meaning) as the means of evidence for subordinating the details of a sacrifice to the main Utpattividhi.\textsuperscript{438} The Brhaddevatā provides a somewhat different list which includes Artha (purpose to be served), Prakaraṇa (the subject-matter under discussion), Liṅga (an indication from another place), Aucitya (propriety), Deśa (place) and Kāla (time).\textsuperscript{439} Bhartrhari recognises all these factors except substituting Vākyā (syntactic relation) for Liṅga. Bhartrhari, however, furnishes a separate list of contextual factors for determining the exact sense of a word in the case of ambiguous and equivocal expressions. These factors are namely, Saṁyoga (conjunction), Vipreyoga (disjunction), Sāhacarya (association), Virodhīta (opposition), Artha (purpose), Prakaraṇa (context), Liṅga (indication), Anyaśabdasannidhi (proximity to another word), Śāmartya (competence), Aucitī (propriety), Deśa (place), Kāla (time), Vyakti (characteristic factor) and Śvara (modulation of voice) etc. In the case of an ambiguous expression, doubt arises as to which one of the several meanings of a word is to be

\textsuperscript{438} cf. MS, III.3.14
Vide ITM, p.49

\textsuperscript{439} arthat prakarnat liṅgādaucityādādesākālatah /
mantreśvarthavivekatah syāditāresvīti sthitāḥ //
op.cit., II.118
understood. In such cases, the meaning is to be determined with the help of these contextual factors.

The later writers on Grammar like Nāgęśā and those on Poetics including Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha, Hemacandra, Appaya and Jagannātha came to be very much occupied with these factors particularly in the context of their treatment of Abhidhāmūlā Vyañjana. Pending a discussion on that aspect of the problem, we propose here to show how the contextual factors referred to by Bhartṛhari come to restrict the denotation of a multi-meaning term.

1) SAMYOGA: Samyoga is generally defined as the connection between two objects. In the sentence

440. samyogo viprayogaśca sāhacaryam virodhitā /
    arthah prakarṇām liṅgaṁ śabdasyānyasya sannidhiṁ //
    sāmartyām aucitī deśāṁ kālo vyaktīḥ svarādayaṁ /
    śabdārthasyānamavacchede viśeṣasmtiḥhetavah //
    VP, II. 317-318

441. LM, p.109; KP.II; SD II; VRV,p.6; RG,II, pp.118-120

442. The reading in the printed text of VP is Samsarga, which is retained in the Kāvyānusāsana of Hemacandra also. But in all the quotations, we find the reading as Samyoga. In both the cases, however, the meaning is the same.
    Vide ITM, p.50; P.V. Kane, SD, Notes,p. 106

443. samyogah prasiddhārthasya guṇaviśeṣarūpāḥ sambandhāḥ.
    Pradīpa vide P.V.Kane, SD., Notes 67.
'saśāṅkha-cakro hariḥ' (Hari with a conch and a discuss) the primary meaning of the term Hari is ascertained to be Viṣṇu on account of His usual conjunction with the conch and the discuss. Otherwise the word Hari would denote other possible meanings also such as the god Yama, the god Vāyu, the god Indra, a monkey or a lion, and under the circumstance, doubt might have arisen as to which of these several meanings is to be apprehended.

ii) VIPRAYOGA: It is the state of disappearance of the connection known to exist between two objects. In the sentence 'aśāṅkhacakro hariḥ' (Hari without the conch and discuss), the word Hari signifies Viṣṇu alone on account of disjunction of conch and discuss. A lion etc. can not be described as without Saṅkha and Cakra as they are never seen being connected with these.

iii) SĀHCARYA: It is mutual connection of two objects. Thus in the expression 'bhīmārjunau' (Bhima and Arjuna), the term Arjuna denotes the son of Prthu.

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444. Vide AK, nāṇārtha-varga, 174.b-175.a
445. tadṛṣasambandhadhvamsah.
Prādipa on KP, vide P.V. Kane, SD, Notes,b7
446. sāhcaryam ekesmin kārye parasparāpekṣitvam.
RG,II. p. 148
447. SDK, p.13
(and not the son of Kṛtavīrya, who was slain by Parāśu-
rāma) on account of companionship of both. Similarly in
the expression 'rāmalakṣmaṇau' (Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa), the
word Rāma signifies the brother of Lakṣmaṇa (and not
Parāśurāma or Balarāma) on account of the association of
the former with the latter.

According to Jagannātha, Sāhacarya is distingui-
shable from Saṁyoga. In Saṁyoga, the connection restric-
ting the denotation of a word is expressed by such words
as 'with', e.g., 'śeṣaṁdīvo'ṛjunah' (Arjuna with Gāṇḍīva).
But in Sāhacarya the things connected are just stated
together as in the case of Dvandva compound, e.g.
gāṇḍīvāṛjunau (Gāṇḍīva and Arjuna).

iv) VIRODHITĀ: It is defined as the well-known
hostility or not being in co-existence. In the express-
ion 'Karnaṛjunau' (Karna and Arjuna), Karna denotes the
son of Sūta (charioteer) and not any one else or 'the
ear',449 because Karna's hostility to Arjuna is a well-
known fact. The term Arjuna again signifies only the
enemy of Karna, and not Arjuna, the son of Kṛtavīrya.

The second case of Virodhitā (i.e. Sahānavasthāna) is
illustrated in the expression 'chayātāpau' (shade and
light).450 Elsewhere the term chāya would mean lustre,

448. Vide RG, p.150
449. SDK, p.13
450. Vide P.V. Kane, op.cit., Notes, p.68
but here it signifies 'shade' which is just the contrast to light.

v) ARTHA : In the sentence 'sthāṇum bhaja bhavacchide' (worship Sthāṇu to get rid of the sufferings of the world), the term Sthāṇu denotes the Lord Hara and not a pillar, although both are apprehended as the primary meanings of the term. It is because, in the present instance, the intended object is capable of being attained by worshipping the god only.

vi) PRAKARANA : In the sentence 'sarvam jānāti devah' (My lord knows everything), the term Deva signifies a king and not a god on the strength of the Prakarana or context of situation under which the sentence is uttered or used. Similarly, in the expression 'saindhavam ānaya' (Bring Saindhava), the word Saindhava may denote 'salt' or a 'horse pertaining to a particular breed' as demanded by the context. Thus Prakarana serves as the Tātparya-grāhaka, i.e. determinant of the intention of the speaker, which involves a psychological excercise not only of the speaker, but of the listener as well, as is warranted by

451. KP, II, p.65
452. Vide our discussion on Tātparya-ajñāna in ch.II of the present work.
vii) LINGA: In the sentence 'kupito makaradhvaja' (Makaradhvaja is angry), the term Makaradhvaja denotes the 'god of love' only and not 'ocean', because the characteristic anger is applicable only to him and never to the ocean.

As noted by Dr. Raja and P.V. Kane, a considerable amount of controversy has raged among the scholars over the concept of LINGA. Thus according to one view, LINGA means 'indication' from another place. It is exemplified in the Vedic passage 'aktah sarkara upadadhiti' (The wet pebbles are to be placed nearby) where the meaning of the term Aktah is to be ascertained from another Vedic passages in the same context, 'tejo vai ghrtam' (clarified butter is brilliance). Thus LINGA taken in this sense comes to be as good as the Vakyasesa (supplementary statement).

453. prakaranam ca vaktrisrotrubuddhishthatã. VRV, p. 36, vide VRS
454. RG, Il. p.153
455. Vide ITM, p.54
456. Vide P.V. Kane, SD, Notes, pp.68-69
Avoiding details on the issue, we may take note of the fact that according to Ālāmkārikas, in the case of Liṅga, the relation between two things need not be a well-known one as in the case of Saṁyoga. Liṅga is used as an attribute for exclusion of other meanings of a term which is capable of conveying several meanings.457

viii) ŚABDASYĀNYASYA SANNIDHĪ: In the expression 'devaḥ purāriḥ' (the god, the enemy of Puras), the term Purāri signifies 'god Śiva' because of the proximity of the word Deva which qualifies it. In the absence of the adjective Deva, the word could have signified a king who destroyed cities. The Pradīpa458 on KP defines this factor as the agreement in case with another word having a fixed meaning. But both VRV459 and RG460 have severely criticised this definition and have explained it as the

457. saṁyogodāharaṇe praśiddhīprācūryaṁ......................
    liṅgodāharaṇe tu sarvathā arthāntaravāyārūṭṭirīti
    bhedaḥ. \quad VRV, p. 37, Vide VRS

    also vide Pradīpa on KP, p. 39

458. niyatārthakasaṅbāntarasāmānādhikaranyāṁ.
    \quad op. cit., vide P.V. Kane, SD, Notes, p. 69

459. nānārthapadaikavācyasamsargyarthāntaravācīpasama-
    bhivyānāraḥ. \quad op. cit., p. 36, vide VRS

460. RG, II, p. 153
use of a word having a meaning logically connected with only one of the possible several meanings of the ambiguous term. Jagannātha exemplifies 'kareṇā rājate nāgaḥ' (the Nāga shines by its Kara), where each of the ambiguous terms viz. Nāga and Kara restricts the denotation of the either, as a result of which, we understand the sentence-meaning as 'the elephant is conspicuous by its trunk'.

ix) SĀMARTHYA: It is explained as the capacity which is known from the result. Thus in the sentence 'madhunā mattaḥ pikaḥ' (The cuckoo is intoxicated by Madhu), the term Madhu signifies the 'spring-season' and not 'honey', because the former alone has the power to intoxicate the cuckoo. Thus Sāmartya is rightly explained as Kāraṇatva (the state of being cause) by both Appaya and Jagannātha.

x) AUCITĪ: In the sentence 'pātu vo dayitāmukham' (May the Mukha of your beloved protect you), the term Mukha denotes 'favour' and not 'face', because the term

461. ITM, p. 55
462. Vide ITM, p. 56
463. VRV, p. 36, vide VRS
464. RG, II, p. 155
Mukha in the sense of 'face' has no propriety or congruity with reference to the act of protecting. As Jagannātha rightly observes, the preservation of the love-stricken persons is brought about only by the favourableness of their sweet hearts, and not by mere faces. As a matter of fact, mere faces can not preserve such people if their sweet hearts are really unfavourable. So in the example under consideration, Mukha signifies Śāmmukhya, i.e. favourableness. 465

xi) DEśA: In the expression 'bhaṭytatre paramēśvaraḥ' (Here shines Paramēśvaraḥ), the denotation of the term Paramēśvara is restricted to 'King' because of a reference to the place (i.e. 'here' which stands for his capital-city), although the term means god Śiva also elsewhere. 466

xii) KĀLA: In the sentence 'niśi citrabhānuḥ' (Citrabhānu at night), the term Citrabhānu signifies 'fire' on account of the time specified i.e., night. 467 The term would mean 'the sun' if spoken of the day-time by using an expression like 'Divase'. 468

465. dayitāmukhakartṛkarakṣenakarmatvāksiptakāmārtānaṁ sambodhyapurusāṇāṁ trāṇāṁ hi tasyāṁ śāmmukhyenaiva bhavati, na tu mukhamātṛeṇa, vaimukhye trāṇāḥ oṣṭastraṃārhatvām vadanā śāmmukhyobhayapratyāyakasya mukhaśabdasya. ibid, II, pp. 155-156

466. Vide KP, II, p.66
467. SDK, p.13
468. KP, II, p.66
(Rathāṅga glitters), the term Rathāṅga signifies 'a wheel' a part of a chariot, and not the Cakravāka, 'the ruddy goose' because of its being in neuter gender. The term means a Cakravāka when used in masculine gender. Similarly the term Mitra denotes 'the sun' when treated as masculine and 'a friend' when used as neuter. Thus Vyakti is explained as grammatical gender by Appaya and Jagannātha. In doing so, however, these scholars enjoy the sanction of Pāṇini who has already used the term in that sense.

Proper use of accents regulates or modifies the meaning of a Vedic passage. As for instance, the word Indrasatruḥ which is accented on the last syllable, denotes the 'slayer of Indra' (indrasya śatruḥ), but the same word when accented on the first syllable i.e. Indrasatruḥ, signifies 'one whose slayer is Indra' (indrah śatruḥ yasya saḥ).
The question as to whether Svara can be a restrictive factor of denotation in classical Sanskrit literature gives rise to a hot controversy among the scholars. Panini himself emphasises the importance of accents in determining the meaning of words such as a compound. But the Alamkarikas generally consider Svara as a factor applicable to Vedas only. Thus Mammata maintains that Svara is not recognised in the domain of poetry. Visvanatha while fully agreeing with Mammata on the issue, refers to some opponents who challenge the stand of Mammata and insist on the employment of accents in poetry also. According to Dr. P.V. Kane, these 'opponents' are Rucaka or Ruyyaka, the author of Alamkarasarvesa, who comments upon the words of Mammata, in Kavyaprakasasamketa. The Locana on SD, however, as noted by Dr. Kane himself, identifies these 'opponents' as Candidasa and Raghave-nanda, both being the commentators on KP. These

475. Ast, VI.I.223; VI.2.1
476. indraśatrurityādau vede eva na kāvye svaro viśeṣapratītikṛt. KP,II. p.66
477. svarastu veda eva viśeṣapratītikṛt, na kāvyā iti tasya viśeṣye nodāḥṛtam. SDK, p. 13
478. Vide SD, II, Kane's Notes, p.73
scholars contend that the term Svara referred to by Bhartrhari may signify a Vedic accent such as Udātta, Anudātta or Svarita, or it may mean simply a Kāku or intonation. Now Svara taken in either of these senses, is found to modify the meaning of a word in poetry. As for instance, in the verse 'mathnāmi Kaurava-vaśataṁ samare na kopāt' etc. in the Venīśamhāra o! Bhaṭṭenāyaka, the direct meaning, i.e. 'I shall not kill the hundred Kauravas' etc. is a pure negation. But the intended meaning which is demanded by the context is a strong affirmation, i.e. 'I shall surely kill the hundred of Kauravas' etc. But such a meaning is apprehended only through Kāku or modulation of the voice on the part of the speaker. To substantiate their stand that Svara in the other aforementioned sense (i.e. Udātta etc.) also defines a meaning in poetry, these

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479. idam ca ke'pyasehāmānaḥ āhuḥ -'svaro'pi kākvedirūpaḥ kāvye visēṣapratītikṛdeva udāttādirūpo'pi muneḥ pāthoktadīśā śrīgārādirasavisēṣapratītikṛdeva ityedvisaye udāharaṇamucitameva' iti. SDK,p.13

480. ibid.

481. op.cit.,1.15

482. atra kākva na mathnāmi iti na api tu mathnāmyeva ityartho labhyate. evamanyatrāpi.

Tippanī of Jagaddhara on Veṇī above.
scholars quote the authority of the sage Bharata who emphasises the need of employment of accents like Udātta for the delineation of the specific Rasas, without which a Rasa can not be properly conveyed. 483

Visvanātha meets these objections of the opponents by saying that Śvara whether taken in the sense of Udātta etc. or in the sense of intonation serves to convey the particular meaning only as a suggested one. 484

The author of Pradīpa echoes the view of Visvanātha. 485
Thus Śvara can not be placed on the same par with Saṃyoga etc. as a restrictive factor of denotation, so far as the sphere of poetry is concerned.

The identification of Śvara as Kāku by scholars like Ruuyaka, however, is not at all just, as is observed by Dr. Raja who mentions some clear points of demarcation between the two. According to him, 486 Śvara which

483. tatra hāsya-śrṅgārayoḥ svaritodāttair vīraraudrādbhuteṣu udāttakampitah... varṇaiḥ pāṭhyamupapādayet. Nātyasāstra, XIX,43
484. tathāhi śvaraḥ kākvādaya udāttādayo vā vyaṅgyarūpa-meva viśeṣām pratyāyayanti, na khalu prakṛtoctamane-kārthasyaikārthanīyantraṇām viśeṣanam. SDK, p.13
485. kākusthale tu na nānārthābhidhānīyamānām kintvapadārthasyāvā vyaṃjanam. Pradīpa, vide P.V.Kane, SD, Notes, p.72
486. ITM, p.58
'restricts the primary meaning of a word' in Vedas only 'is capable of objective analysis' while Kāku is capable of suggesting 'the subtle variation of meaning' only in classical Sanskrit.

In the list of contextual factors given by Bhartṛhari, the term Ādi (etc.) in the expression 'svarā-dayah' includes such factors as Abhinaya (gesticulation) and Apadesā (pointing out directly), which also come to restrict an ambiguous term to one of its several meanings. In view of the above discussion, it is clear that the contextual factors go a long way in determining Abhidhā or primary meaning of a word.

In the context of Abhidhāmūlā Vyāñjanā which is directly dependent on Abhidhā, the importance of these contextual factors can not be belittled. For, it is these factors that restrict the scope of Abhidhā to one of the several meanings of a multi-meaninged term, and it is only when Abhidhā is so restricted that the function of Vyāñjanā comes into operation to convey the additional meaning or meanings possible from the term.

487. svarādayah ityādigrahaḥ adabhinayā apadesāu grhyete.

Pradīpa, vide P.V. Kane, SD, II, Notes, p. 74
ON EXPRESSIVENESS OF APAŚABDAS:

In the context of a Śabda being regarded as endowed with Śakti or expressive potency, a pertinent question arises as to whether an Apaśābda is equipped with the same or not. In other words, the question is, how we can account for the meaningfulness of an Apaśābda if it possesses at all. An Apaśābda means any corrupt form of speech that has lost its pristine sanctity.⁴⁸⁸ Patañjali uses the terms Apaśābda and Apabhraṃśa as synonymous. He shows that the single Śabda Go (cow) has several Apaśābdas such as Gāvī, Goṇī, Gotā, Gopotalikā etc.⁴⁸⁹ which do not conform to the rules of Grammar. All Prākrit words are Apaśābdas in the sense that they are corruption in relation to their Sanskrit forms. The corrupt forms of words occur in a language due to discrepancy of the speakers, but because of their gaining long currency in the speech, people mistake them as correct.

Now, as regards the question as to whether these Apaśābdas are meaningful by themselves or not, we find various circles of scholars holding divergent views.

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⁴⁸⁸ cf. śabdaprakṛtir apabhraṃśa iti saṃgrahakārokteḥ. Puṇyārāja on VP,1.149;

Also,
śabdaḥ saṃskārahino yo gaur iti prayuyuṣṭite /
tam apabhraṃśam icchanti viśiṣṭārthanivesīnṃ /
VP, 1.148

⁴⁸⁹ Vide MBP, p. 15

⁴⁹⁰ Vide ITM, pp. 42-43
According to the Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas, the Apabhramśas are not independent words and they cannot be accepted as the synonyms of the original words. According to Mīmāṃsakas, as we have earlier pointed out, the relation of a word and its meaning is a permanent one and as such a particular word can be connected with only one particular meaning which also pertains to only one and the same word. \(^{491}\) Such a position of the Mīmāṃsakas do not usually allow an admission of the homonyms and synonyms in a language. But it is also a fact that the corrupt forms of words in a language are as current as the correct ones are. According to Kumārila, such corrupt words denote their meanings only indirectly by manifesting the potentiality of the original correct words through their resemblance to them. \(^{492}\) However, the Mīmāṃsakas accept well-known synonyms such as Hāsta, Pāni and Kara, as correct words and recognise them as expressive by themselves. \(^{493}\)

According to the Naiyāyikas, an Apasabdha is not significant by itself, its apparent expressiveness depends

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491. anyāyaścānekeśabdatvam. MS, I.3.26; anyāyaścānekarthā- tvam. SB on MS, III.2.1
492. Vide TV under MS, I.3.28
493. Vide ibid under I.3.26
Also vide ITM, p.43
upon an inference of the correct form of the word which alone is the significant unit. When a corrupt word is cognised, its corresponding correct form is immediately recollected, and the meaning is conveyed by the expressive potency or Sakti pertaining to the correct word. Thus, the Naiyāyikas hold that whenever some person utters the word Gāvī due to lack of knowledge of its Sakti or out of mistake, the listener who happens to be there, understands that the actual word uttered is Go (cow) and not Gāvī and he derives such a knowledge through an inference of the correct form of the word.

The Vaiyākaraṇas, however, are not ready to accept this stand of the Naiyāyikas. They point out that the meaning of a corrupt word is apprehended even when its corresponding correct form is not recollected. Moreover, the meaning of a corrupt word is understood even by people ignorant of the correct form of the word.\[495\]

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494. ucyate kenacid gaur iti sabde prayoktavye pramādād gāvīśabde prayukte vyutpannas tena gośabdam unnīya tato gām pratītya vyavahṛtavān. Also cf, te sādhuṣvanumānena prayayotpattihetavāḥ / tēdātmayamupagamyaiśa sābdāarthasya prakāśakāḥ//

VP, I.150

495. tama, sādhusmaranaṁ vināpi bodhānuḥbāhavakatvāt tadvācakasādhuśabdabdamajānatāṁ bodhānāpat tesca.

PLM, p.14
The Vaiyākaraṇas further contend that the involvement of Vṛddhayavahāra, the foremost of all the means of ascertaining Śakti of a word makes no difference in the case of the correct and corrupt forms of words, and all this leads us to the conclusion that Śakti involves in both the sets of words alike.⁴⁹⁶ Nāgeśa maintains that by observing usage by the elderly people, a person comes to recollect Śakti of a certain word with regard to its corresponding meaning in such a manner as though he did the same in his previous birth. Such recollection, however, Nāgeśa holds, occurs not only in case of human beings, but in case of lower creatures (e.g. parrot etc.) as well, inasmuch as like men these creatures too, understand syntactical relation among various word-meaning in a sentence and consequently have conceptual cognition.⁴⁹⁷

Thus according to the Vaiyākaraṇas, an Apāśābdha is as much expressive as is a Śābda. But these two sets of words are not capable of being placed on the same footing, for while the knowledge of Śābda leads to the attainment of

⁴⁹⁶. sā ca śaktīḥ sādhuśvīvāpabhramśeṣvapi, śaktigrāhaka-śiromānṛ vṛddhayavahārasya tulyatvāt. ibid., p.27

⁴⁹⁷. vyavahāradasāṇena ca pūrvajamānubhūtasāktisamarapām. ata eva bālānām tīrāścām ānubhūtasāktisamarapām. ibid.
religious merit, that of Apāsābdha to the attainment of demerit. This predominance of Šabda over Apasābdha is maintained by the Mīmāṃsakas also. Thus they point out that the term Yava is used by the Aryans in the sense of barley-corn, while the Mlecchās use it in the sense of long-pepper. According to them, the correctness or otherwise concerning a particular words is to be finally ascertained from Vedas.

Bhartṛhari who deals with the whole issue elaborately, maintains that the same word may prove to be correct in a certain sense and corrupt in some other sense. As for instance, he points, the term Asva is correct in the sense of a 'poor' (lit. a person not in possession of wealth, i.e., Sva), but is corrupt in the sense of a 'horse'. The same is the case with Apasābdas like Gonī, Gāvī and the like also. Thus Bhartṛhari

498. cf. yathaiva hi śabdajñāne dharma evam apasābdajñāne'py adharmaḥ. MBP, p. 15

499. Vide SMU, p.433

500. śāstrasthā vā tannimittatvat.... ke śāstrasthāḥ? 
śiṣṭāḥ. teśām avicchinnā smṛtiḥ śabdeṣu vedeṣu ca tena 
śiṣṭā nimittaṁ śrutismṛty avadāraṇe. MS, 1.3.9

501. asvagonyadayah sabdāḥ sādhavo viṣayāntare / 
nimittabhedat sarvatra sādhutvāṁ ca vyavasthitam/√ 
VP, I.149
maintains that like the Śabdās, the so-called Apabhraṃśas i.e., corrupt forms of words also possess expressive potency of their own,\(^{502}\) and as such the Naiyāyikas' proposition that the meaning of a corrupt word is to be known from the corresponding correct form is not acceptable to him.

From the above discussion, it is clear that the admission of expressiveness in respect of a corrupt word (Apaśabdā or Apabhraṃśa) is not universal. As for instance, the Grammarians advocate their expressiveness, but the Logicians deny it. The Mīmāṃsakas also, as we have seen, accept the expressiveness of such corrupt form of words only indirectly.

\[^{502} \text{ubhayesām avicchedād anyaśabdavivakṣayā/}
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\[^{502} \text{yo'nyah prayujyate śabdo na so'ṛthasyābhidhāyakaḥ/}
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\[^{502} \text{ibid., 1.196} \]