The term Sabda ordinarily stands for a sound. In our day-to-day life, we come to hear innumerable sounds of varied nature and we call them Sabda. Thus something spoken by a man, a knock on a door or a rambling of a cloud—all come to be designated as Sabda and the organ of hearing is responsible for its perception. All sounds that we hear, however, do not carry meanings. While some of them carry meanings, others produce only auditory sensations. Thus Sabda as sound comes to us in two forms, viz. (i) Varna (articulate or meaningful sound i.e. letter) and (ii) Dhvani (inarticulate or ordinary sound). A Varna is produced by our vocal organ, i.e. tongue. It has a fixed nature by dint of which it occupies a place in a particular language. The sound 'Ka'
which means Prajāpati (i.e. the creator) or Ghanṭa which denotes a jar may be illustrated as Varna type of Sabda. A Dhvani, on the other hand, is a confused mass of auditory sensations which bears no specific meaning and hence is not useful in a language. A rambling of a cloud or a drumbeat may be illustrated as this type of Sabda.

On this basic point of Sabda being perceived by our ear, there is no controversy among the various schools of Indian thought. The schools generally also do not differ among themselves as regards the aforementioned two-fold division of Sabda into Varna and Dhvani. But yet in the context of human communication, emphasis has been always laid on the Varna type of Sabda, which not only occupies a place in language, but forms the very basic tissues thereof. A language has two forms, viz. spoken and written. So the Varṇes or letters also come to assume these two forms. The spoken letters are directly the auditory sensations of corresponding significant sounds, while the written ones represent the former by the medium of some script. A statement or proposition is a collection of words which consist of such significant sounds alone. Hence the Vaiyākaraṇas mean by Sabda a meaningful sound only, which they identify as Dhvani. Summarising the view of the

Vaiyākaraṇas, Patanjali asserts that a dvānī (sound) which brings a meaning to light is called a Sabda. As for instance, he points out, the term Go being uttered, invariably brings the idea of an animal (i.e. cow) having dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs and horns. As regards the concept of Sabda, the Vaiyākaraṇas thus differ primarily from the Naiyāyikas. For, while the former group of scholars means by Sabda only a meaningful sound (which also they call dvānī), the latter regards sound itself as Sabda, irrespective of that sound being meaningful or otherwise. Yet the Vaiyākaraṇas do not differ from the Naiyāyikas in admitting the basic character of Sabda being a sound.

In Grammar and Linguistics, the term Sabda is often used to signify a Pada, i.e. a part of speech. The terms Sabda and Pada are here found to be synonyms. In Sanskrit Grammar, a Pada is defined as that which has at its end a vibhakti (suffix) that may be either a Sup (i.e., an inflectional suffix) or a Tin (i.e., a conjugational suffix). But whatever is inflected or conjugated, is a

5. yenoccāritena sāsnālāṅgulakakudakuraviṣṇunām saṃpratityayo bhavati sa sabdā, athavā pratīpadārthakā hi loke dvānāṁ sabdā ucyate. MBP, p.3
6. suptiñantuṁ padam. P,1. 4,14
letter or a group of letters. By way of being inflected or conjugated, therefore, a letter or letters qualify for the status of a Pada.

The Ālaṃkārikas in general, have accepted the authority of the Vaiyākaraṇas as regards the concept of a Sabda 7 and as such they have not felt the need of any elaboration of the concept. Thus Viśvanātha Kavirāja defines a word (Pada) as letter or a group of letters not syntactically related, capable of being used (in a sentence), which conveys a single meaning. Here by the qualification 'capable of being used', the state of being inflected or conjugated is suggested. But an inflection or a conjugation is possible in the case of a letter or letters only.

The term Sabda also stands for a Pramāṇa-vākyā i.e. a sentence used as a means of valid knowledge. Thus Sabda signifies Sabdaprāmāṇa, one of the chief sources of valid knowledge, recognised in some important schools of Indian philosophy. Sabda as a Pramāṇa is defined as an instructive communication from a trustworthy person.  

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7. kāḥ punaḥ sabdahyenaocaritenārthah pratiyate.
SRP, p.2

8. varṇāḥ padam prayogārthānāvitaikārthabodhakāḥ.
SD, 1.12

9. Ṛṣtopadeśah Sabdah. NS, 1.1.7
Instructive or non-instructive, any communication conveyed in the form of a Vākya (sentence), and Śabda as a Pramāṇa is a Vākya uttered by a trustworthy person. Since a Vākya is a collection of Padas which are nothing but certain clusters of letters (i.e. articulate sounds), so Śabda as a Pramāṇa also retains its basic character of being a sound.

THE VIEWS REGARDING NITYĀNITYATVA (ETERNALITY OR OTHERWISE) OF ŚABDA.

In the context of the concept of Śabda, there is a strong controversy as to whether Śabda is Nitya (eternal) or Anitya (non-eternal or transient). While the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vaiyākaraṇas have advocated for the eternity of Śabda, the Naiyāyikas have taken all pains to describe it as non-eternal. Thus there arose two rival theories concerning the very nature of Śabda, viz. śabdānityatvavāda and śabdānityatvavāda.

THE THEORY OF ŚABDANITYATVA

The Mīmāṃsakas always insist on the eternity of Śabda in order to establish the eternity of the Vedas. For, if Śabda were regarded as non-eternal, it would mean

10. āptavākyām śabdaḥ. TS, p. 65
that the Vedas are also non-eternal. Dr. Sanganath Jha points out that according to the Mīmāṃsakas, the meaning of a word can not be comprehended except on the hypothesis of its eternality. To explain the eternality of Śabda, the Mīmāṃsakas have propounded their well-known theory of Pratyabhijñā. Jaimini, the first exponent of this theory, maintains that the perceived sound (Dhvani) is not word. The sound produced and perceived, only reveals the already existing word which itself is not produced and is, therefore, uncaused. It is the volume of sound that actually increases or decreases. A word, in its essence, is eternal. Both the Bhaṭṭas and Prābhākaras who advocate this theory of Pratyabhijñā maintain that the mere sounds are transient; it is the letters manifested by these sounds that are eternal. And the letters being admitted as eternal, the words composed of such letters, naturally come to be eternal.

11. anityatve hi śabdānāṁ śaśastrigraprāharavat / śabdātmakānāṁ vedānāṁ nityatvam hāsyatām vrajet / MM, p. 22
12. PMS, p. 150
13. saṁkhyaabhavat. MS, I.1.20
14. nādevṛddhiparā. MS, I.1.17
also vide SB under above.
in the school of Grammar, this eternality of Sabda was conceived of even from the time of Vyādi. Pāṇini considers the word, its meaning as also the relation between the two as Siddha. Pāṇini understands the term Siddha in the sense of Nitya (eternal). His contention is that the science of Grammar enjoins restriction for religious merit as because, the word, the meaning and the relation between the two stand established as eternal.

THE SPHOTA THEORY OF THE VAJYAKARAṆAS

The theory concerning the eternality of Sabda reached its momentum with the exposition of the doctrine of Sphota by the Vaiyakaranas. According to Bhartrihari who modelled this Sphota theory for the first time, the momentary sounds pronounced by us, are not competent to signify any meaning. The meaning is conveyed by an indivisible and eternal word-essence called Sphota, which in its turn is revealed by such transient sounds. Thus there is a

15. saṁgraha etat prādhānyena parīkṣitam...... yadyapi nityaḥ athāpi kāryaḥ................. MBP, p. 36
16. siddhe śabdārthasambandhe lokato'rthaprayukte śabdārthaprayoge śāstreṇa dharmeniyamah. ibid, p. 57
17. nityaparyāyavācī siddhasabdah. ibid.
18. tasmād varṇāṇām vēcakatvānupapattau yadbalād artha-pratipattih sa sphoṭah. SDS, p. 152.
distinction between the momentary and isolated sounds on one hand and the eternal word-essence on the other. Bhartrhari refers to these two types of sounds as Nāda and Sphoṭa respectively. Of these, the former reveals the latter which alone is significant. The Grammarians understand Sphoṭa as an eternal entity which is manifested by letters. According to them, a word is a successive series of sounds called letters. Every letter in a word manifests the same Sphoṭa. But the momentary sounds which bring Sphoṭa to light, being different, Sphoṭa also comes to assume various forms, just as a crystal, if presented by the side of various coloured shapes, assumes those various colours. Thus though Sphoṭa is asserted as one and indivisible entity, it assumes the form of Varnasphoṭa, Padasphoṭa and Vākyasphoṭa as the case may be, being revealed by the letters taking the shape of letters, words and sentences. Thus according to the Vaiyākaraṇas Sphoṭa is the eternal word which is different from letters and yet becomes suggested by them.

19. dvāvupādānaśabdesu śabdau śabdavido viduḥ/
   eko nimittaṁ śabdānāmaparo'rtthe prayuṣyate //
   VP.1.44

20. PLM, p.32

21. yadyaipyeko'khandaśca, tathāpi....... varṇavyayoḥḥḥ
    varṇarūpāḥ pāḍaḥpā ṭaṅkvarūpaḥ. PLU', 1.65

22. varṇātirikto varṇābhivyāṅgyo'ṛthapratyāyako nityoḥ
    śabdāḥ sphoṭa iti tādvido vṛddanti. SūT, 1.142.
THE THEORY OF ŚAŚDĀNITYAIVA

As against the above view of the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vaiyākaraṇas, the Naiyāyikas assert that śabda is non-eternal. They argue that śabda has its origin and whatever is produced, gets destroyed and is therefore, non-eternal. Our notion that a particular sound, say ka, is produced and gets destroyed, is enough to prove that the sound is transient. To an anticipated pertinent query as to how then one can perceive a sound, the Naiyāyikas reply that a sound, after it is originally produced, gives rise to a series of successive sounds called letters. Each preceding sound produces the immediately succeeding ones leaving behind its impression, and this process continues till the cognition of the last sound. What is actually perceived, therefore, is the final sound of the series. But when this sound is being perceived, all the preceding sounds cease to exist.

Thus the Naiyāyikas reject the view of the Mīmāṃsakas that the sounds are eternal on account of pratyabhijñā. They also refute the Sphoṭa theory on the

23. aindriyakatvāt. NS, II, 2.13
also vide VB on above
24. utpannah ko vinaśṭah ka iti buduheranityate/ BP, K, 167
25. VB on NS, II, 2.13; PLM, p. 57
26. TS, p. 54
It may be mentioned here that this 'Sphota' theory is refuted even by the Mīmāṃsakas and other schools of thought including the Bauddha and Jaina. Without going to the detail of this issue, we may take note of the fact that while the Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas put forward their arguments to assert that there is no Sphota over and above word, the Bauddhas and Jainas advance their arguments to establish that the world is not an evolution of Sphota as the Vaiyakaranas consider it to be so.1

CONCEPT OF ARTHA

Despite differences about the nature of word, scholars of various schools are one in maintaining that the essential nature of a word lies in its meaning. In fact, a word by itself is of no use at all. It is useful to us simply because of its meaningfulness.28 We have already noted that the great Grammarian Patanjali defines Sabda only as that sound which is significant.29 In meaningfulness has been regarded as the chief criterion of a word in other schools of thought also such as those of

27. PM, p. 267
28. .......... arthe śabdaprayogat. arthe śabdāḥ
prayujyante......................... MUp, p. 89
29. ibid, p. 5.
Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya. Of the Māṇḍūkya, Vaiśeṣika, and
}\n\begin{quote}
\textit{Annambhātā have defined a word as that (letter or
cluster of letters) only which has some fixed relation
to some object, laying emphasis thereby on the meaning-
fulness of a word. Following the Grammarians, the
Rhetoricians also have laid emphasis on this essential
aspect of a word.}
\end{quote}

Now, the pertinent question arises as to what
the term meaning actually stands for. In other words,
the question is what we actually mean when the term
Ghaṭāḥ is uttered? Do we mean actually the object jar
existing in the world outside or only the idea of the
object which a person has in mind?

Of the various groups of scholars, the Vaiśeṣika-
rajas' solution to this problem deserves to be noted
here. According to them, the term Ghaṭāḥ does not refer
to the actual jar existing in the world outside, but to
the idea of the jar which one has in mind. This is

\begin{quote}
sarvo hi śabdo'ṛthapratyānyaṃ arthaṃ prayujyate.
\end{quote}

TV under MS,1.3.8,p.143

\begin{quote}
30. \textit{śaktam padam. SMU,p.441; TS, p.50
31. śabdasya cārthapratipattilakṣaṇakāryānupapattiyā
kārakatvāt............ SVV,p.1
32. bauddha evaṛthaḥ śakyah, padamapi sphotatmakam
prasiddham. PLM, p.11.}
\end{quote}
corroborated by the fact that whenever a person intends to mean that a jar exists in the world outside, he does not use simply the word Ghaṭaḥ, but the word Asti also which signifies the idea of existence. What is meant by the expression 'ghaṭaḥ asti' is that, in the external world, there exists an object corresponding to the idea of a jar which the person has in mind. The Vaiyākaraṇas' contention is that both the word and the object signified by it, are mental in character. The word Ghaṭaḥ when related to the object Ghaṭa (i.e. jar), existing in the mind of the listener, produces the knowledge of the jar in him. Thus the meaning is determined by the correspondence of the mental word with the mental object. Nāgasaśe maintains that when the mental word corresponds with the physical object, the word signifying such object is credible. This credibility, however, does not deprive a word of its meaningfulness. As for instance, such expressions, as Vandhyāsuta (the barren woman's son) and Śaśasṛṅga (hare's horn) may not be credible, as there are no objects such as barren woman's son.

34. evem śakyo'rthopī buddhisattāsāmāviṣṭa eva na tu bāhyasattāviṣṭa ghaṭa ityata eva sattāvaceman ghaṭo'stiti prayoge gatāarthatvādastiti prayogāṇāṃpyante sattayā virodhāit ghaṭo nāstīti asyānāpyateśca.

VSLM, p.240

35 yatra cābhyaṁantarārthasya bāhyārthena samvādaya sa śabdāḥ pramāṇam, visamvāde tvaprāmāṇyanīti vyavasthit.

Ibid, p.357
Vide PMIP, p.234
and the like in the actual word. But yet these words come to be accepted as meaningful, because we do have the ideas of such objects in our mental world.\(^{36}\) For, according to the \textit{Vaiy\textbar kara\textbar nas}, the actual significant word is also not physical, but mental in construction, inasmuch as the eternal \textit{word-Unit Sphota}\(^{37}\) recognised by them, is also intellectual in its character. They point out that the transient sound pronounced by us reveals the eternal Word-Essence. The latter resides in the form of an impression (\textit{S\textbar m\textbar sk\textbar \\textbar \\textbar k\textbar a\textbar ra}) in our mind and this goes on being recollected until the corresponding idea is cognised. As for instance, in the case of the utterance of the word \textit{d\textbar h\textbar a\textbar t\textbar a\textbar h}, the speaker uses the articulate sounds (\textit{gh+e+t+a+h}) which are nothing but symbols of the Eternal Word-Essence. Now as soon as these momentary sounds are cognised by the listener, the impression of the corresponding symbols is awoken in him, as a result of which the corresponding

\begin{quote}
\begin{verbatim}
36. ki\textbar nca 's\textbar sa\textbar sa\textbar ri\textbar ga\textbar m n\textbar \\textbar sti' '\textbar e\textbar k\textbar u\textbar ro j\textbar \\textbar ay\textbar ate' ity\textbar at\textbar e bodh\textbar h\textbar an\textbar n\textbar ap\textbar t\textbar te\textbar h. mama tu buddhi\textbar sa\textbar m\textbar na\textbar k\textbar u\textbar ro j\textbar \\textbar ay\textbar ate ity\textbar ar\textbar th\textbar a\textbar h. VSLM, p. 240

37. Vide pp. 27-28 of the present work for our discussion on the \textit{Sphota} theory of the \textit{Grammar\textbar ans}.\end{verbatim}
\end{quote}
concept is cognised.  

Thus, according to the Vaiyākaraṇas, the meaning of a word is intellectual in its character and not something external. We shall observe in the succeeding passages of the present work that, even the Mīmāṃśakas who advocate for the natural relation between a word and the corresponding meaning, understand the meaning only as an idea and not as an external entity. Such a stand came to be necessary for these scholars as because the relation existing between the expression and the expressed is possible only in their intellectual parlance.

THE RELATION BETWEEN ŚABDA(WORD) AND ARTHA(MEANING)  

The problem of relation between a word and its meaning forms one of the central issues in the study of the problem of meaning not only with the Mīmāṃśakas and Vaiyākaraṇas, but with other schools of thought also. In fact, scholars of various disciplines are one in maintaining that the comprehension of the meaning from a word invariably demands a prior knowledge of the relation  

38. kenacid ghaṭamāṇayetivaikharinādaḥ prayuktah, sa kenacicchrotrendriyena grhītaḥ, sa nādah indriyavārā buddhiḥṛdayagatassanarthabodhakām śabdām svantī n-katvādīnā vyāṃjayati.  

PLM, pp.31-32
existing between the two and that no apprehension of individual word-meanings and for that matter that sentence-meaning also can take place without the knowledge of this relation. Scholars, however, are divided in their opinion as regards the nature of their relation. Thus, we find two rival theories dealing with the problem with two quite opposite approaches and they are namely the 'natural' or inherent theory and the 'conventional' theory. The former refers to the view of the Mīmāṃsakas and Vaiśeṣikaraṇas as we have earlier pointed out and the latter refers to the view of the Naiyāyikas.

**THE 'NATURAL' THEORY**

The Mīmāṃsakas who are very much known for their theory of eternality of word (Sabdanyatva), are naturally eager to establish that the relation of a word to its meaning is eternal.\(^{39}\) According to them, the relation between a word and its meaning is ever-lived.

\(^{39}\) autpattikeṣtu ṣabdanyārthena sambandhāḥ, tasya mīmāṃsakorṣadvā svacyutakṣamasyatāḥ kāśyapiṣyanyāpyoṣyāpyaṇāpyaṃbuddhāpyaṃbuddhadāhāḥ. MG, 1.1.3

also vide SB under above.
by nature. Like the Vedas, it has neither beginning nor end. We cannot trace back this relation to any conceivable period of human society. A word has an eternal potency to signify its meaning which is inseparably associated with it.

Now, in the context of such a view of the Mīmāṃsakas, two questions are very much pertinent. In the first place, if the words and their meanings are so naturally related, then why are the meanings of words not grasped by all people as soon as they are uttered and heard? To this, the Mīmāṃsakas reply that the comprehension of a meaning is restricted to one with a prior knowledge of the same eternal relation. All the listeners may not have the said knowledge and hence may not grasp the meaning invariably on every occasion of listening a word. Secondly, if the relation is natural, then why does the utterance of the words Kṣura (a razor) and Modaka (a sweet ball) not result in cutting the mouth of the speaker.

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40. sambandhagrahaṇat pūrvam yasmānna gamayatyataḥ /
    gavāder nābhidhāśaktir devadattapade yathā //

SV, Sambandha-kṣepa, 33

Also,

sarvākārārparicchedyaśakte'rtthe vācaka'pi vā .
    sarvākārārthaviṣṇunāsamārthe niyamāḥ kītare.

ibid, Pratyakṣa, p. 228
and giving it a sweet taste respectively? To this, the Mīmāṃsakas' reply is that a word presents the idea of an object and not the very object. Thus the relation between the two is that of the significant (Samjña) and the signified (Samjnī), a fact which is corroborated by the usage by the elderly persons (Vṛddhayayehāre) also.

Explaining the contention of the Mīmāṃsakas, Dr. K.K. Raja observes that it is not possible to conceive a society without language which we learn through a chained process. We learn our language from our parents and elders who in their turn learnt it from their forefathers and thus there is an unending process.

Following the Mīmāṃsakas, the Vaiyākaraṇas also take care to show that the permanent nature of this relation is to be understood from the aforesaid unending popular usage. According to Bhartṛhari, the notion of an...
eternal relation between word and its meaning was in vogue amongst the Vaiyākaraṇas even from the time of Vyādi. The latter asserts that there is no conceivable agent to effect a relation between a word and its meaning.⁴⁵

The Grammarians have explained this natural relation between a word and its meaning in terms of an innate capacity called Yogyātā.⁴⁶ This Yogyātā, as we shall see later on, is the very primary significative function of a word (Abhidhā), which the Grammarians conceive as a special kind of relation existing between the expression and the expressed.

‘CONVENTIONAL’ THEORY

In sharp contrast to the above theory of the Mīmāṁsakas and Vaiyākaraṇas, the Naiyāyikas maintain that the relation between a word and its meaning is not natural but conventional.⁴⁷ On this very issue, the Vaiśeṣikas⁴⁸

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⁴⁵. VP, I.26
⁴⁶. ...... tathā śabdānāmarthe anādīḥ sambandha eva yogyatā..... VSli-1, 1.41
  also see VP,III.3.29
⁴⁷. sāmayikatvāt śabdārthasampratyayasya. NS,III.1.85
⁴⁸. sāmayikaḥ śabdārthasambandhah. VS,VII.2.20.
also join hands with the Naiyāyikas and maintain that there can not be any direct relation between a word and its meaning. According to the Naiyāyikas, this conventional relation is confirmed by our experience through which we acquire knowledge of meanings of words. There are various ways such as popular usage (Vṛddhavyavahāra), Grammar (Vyākaraṇa), dictionary (Kosā) etc. through which we understand the meanings of words. The convention that such and such a word should mean such and such an object is established by God. The later Naiyāyikas, however, maintain that this convention may be established by men also. At any rate, this convention is the act or will that determines that a particular word should signify a particular meaning and never otherwise.

49. IP, pp.106-107
50. asmāt padēdayamartho boddhdevya iti Īśvarasamketah saktih. TS, p.50
51. navyāstu Īśvarecchā na saktih kintu icchaiva. MUS, p. 41a
52. kah punarayam samayah āsya śabdasyedamarthajātamiti abhidhānābheyaniyamaniyogah.

VB under NS,II.1.55, Vide ND, p. 125
In support of their position, the Naiyāyikas point out that a natural relation is perceived only in the case of an inference and not of verbal testimony. In case of an inference, a sign, say smoke (Dhuma) and the object signified by it, i.e. fire (Vahni) are naturally related to each other. In other words, both are co-existent. But a word does not co-exist with the object signified by it. The word 'fire' never burns the mouth of the speaker or the word 'rahor' (Kṣura) does not cut it, nor does the word 'honey' (Modaka) sweetens the mouth. Hence the relation between a word and its meaning can not be natural but conventional. Gautama while cherishing such a view, maintains that there is no fixed law for the use of the same set of words among the different groups of people belonging to different countries. Thus words are used to signify their meanings according to the arbitrary wishes of the sages, nobles and barbarians (Mlecchas) irrespectively. If the words and its meaning were fixed, this much of latitude would not have been possible. Vātsāyana contends that the said convention is known to the common people from the usage of the persons adept in the use of specific words in their corresponding specific meanings. If there be

53. pūrāṇapradāharpāṭanāmuṇapalābhahesca sambandhabhāvah. NS II. 1.53

54. jātivāse caṇīyamāt. ibid, II.1.56.
no knowledge of this convention, the comprehension of the object is not likely to occur even when the relevant word is heard. As Dr. K.K. Raja observes, 'the Naiyāyikas' objection against a permanent relation between word and the object is only against an assumed relation between the word uttered and the external objects symbolized by them'.

It is interesting to note that according to some Western philosophers and linguists also the relation between a word and its meaning is not natural. Instead, they advocate the theory of a symbolic relation between the two. According to Ogden and Richards, a word stands as a symbol for its meaning. A word does not stand as a substratum of its meaning. But yet it is universally supposed to bear some specific meaning with which it is associated. Thus there is an indirect relation between a word and the object it stands for.

Ogden and Richards, however, do not deny a direct relation also. They maintain that the expressions such as 'this word has this meaning' certainly indicate that there is a direct and natural relation between the two.

55. ITM, p.24
56. MOM, pp. 6-12
57. ibid.
Bartrand Russell understands a meaning in term of a relation. Mr. Joachim remarks that for Mr. Russell meaning appeared (among other things) as 'a relation', that a relation constitutes meaning and that a word not only has meaning but is related 'to its meaning'.

It is interesting to note that the relation of identity between a word and its meaning as conceived by the Indian Grammarians gets echoed in the writings of modern scholars also in the West. According to the celebrated anthropologist Bronislaw Malinoski, no word nor its meaning can be thought of apart from a relation; they are, indeed, inseparably related to each other.

58. A word which aims at a complete generality, such as 'entity', for example, will have to be devoid of mnemic effects, and therefore, of meaning. In practice, this is not the case: such words have verbal associations. MOM, p.161.

59. ibid, p.309.
THE REQUISITES OF SĀBDABODHA:
KARANA, VYAPARA AND SAHAKARI KĀRAṆA

In the context of the treatment of Abhidhā in the philosophical schools, we find it necessary to examine the entire issue of Sābdabodha. Sābdabodha as we understand, is the knowledge derived from Sabda as a Pramāṇa. And Sabda as a Pramāṇa means a Vākya (sentence). Hence Sābdabodha consequently stands for a Vākyārthajñāna, i.e. the knowledge of the total meaning of a sentence.\(^6\) A sentence, again is nothing but a collection of words fulfills certain syntactic conditions.\(^6\) Hence, the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence obviously demands a prior knowledge of the constituent words and their meanings. Words again, are capable of conveying their corresponding meanings only through their Vṛttī or the significative function either in the form of Abhidhā (the primary significative function) or Laksanā (the secondary significative function).\(^6\) Hence, for the comprehension of the meanings from words, a prior knowledge of this Vṛttī is a must. Thus there is a causal link

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60. vākyārthajñānaṁ sābdajñānam . TS, p. 68
61. vākyāṁ padasamūhah . ibid, p. 50
62. āsattiyogayetätatparyajñānāmiṣyate/ kāraṇam................. ............... NSM, p.46
63. vṛttiscā śaktilaksanānyatārasambandhah . SMU, p. 413
among the cognition of words, cognition of meaning, and also the cognition of the function pertaining to the words, and all these three come to serve as the different degrees of causality in the matter of generating a contextual Śabdabodha. Viśvanātha, the Naiyāyika while initiating the treatment of Śabdabodha, maintains that the knowledge of Pada is the Karana (instrumental cause) of Śabdabodha, that of the meanings of the Pada is the Dvāra or Vyākaraṇa (operation), the Śabdabodha is the Phala (result) thereof and the knowledge of Śakti (Vṛtti) is the Sahākāri Karana (auxiliary cause).64

It may be noted here that Sabda is not recognised as a Pramāṇavākyya in all schools of thought. But yet there is no controversy over the fact that the result or Śabda-pramāṇa is a Vākyārthajñāna.65

Now it is proposed to examine, in brief, the aforesaid requisites of Śabdabodha as held by philosophers and grammarians.

KARANA : Before determining the Karana of Śabdabodha, it is imperative on our part to know what the term Karana

64. padajñānantu karaṇam dvāraṁ tatra padārthādhiḥ Śabdabodhah phalam tatra Śaktidhiḥ sahākārinī.
65. tatra tāvat padairajñātaiḥ padārtham artham krte / asennikṛṣṭavākyārthajñānam śabdāmitire // BP, K. 81, pp. 410-11
actually means. The term Karana as we find, denotes a lot of meanings, e.g. a sense organ, cause, effect and bodily activity, yet in the context of Sabdabodha the term is used in the sense of a specific cause of an effect (Phala), the effect being the Sabdabodha itself.

Now, coming to the very concept of Karana, we find that the ancient Naiyayikas define it as an extraordinary cause possessed of an operation (Vyapara). Thus the definition of Karana can be given to a cause which is not common to all effects, but to a special cause of the particular effects. The modern Naiyayikas, however, define Karana as a cause which is felt to be the most essential for having the effects and but for which the effect is not produced in spite of all other causes being present. This view of the modern Logicians agrees to that of the Grammarians who also define Karana as the most efficient of all the causes. According to the Vaiyakaranas, of all Karakas whose business lies in giving service to the Kriyā (the contextual verb) by way of being syntactically related to it, Karana becomes

66. karanatvam ca vyaparavadasadhakaranakaranatvam.
   NSM, p. 5

67. sadhakatama karanam. P, I. 4.42; also vide Fil, i. 149

68. kriyanispattau prakrtoptakarakam karakam karana- sanjam syat. SIK, under P, I. 4.42.
the most beneficial, inasmuch as it renders the best service to the Kriyā in the matter of its completion. Thus a Kāraṇa is that which operates to bring in a result in immediate succession.⁶⁹

Now of the various schools of Indian thought, the Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā considers a word as the Kāraṇa of Śābdabodha. This is in conformity to its theory of Anvītābhidhāna. The Prabhākaraśa maintain that the sentence-meanings in the form of an Anvāya (relation) is conveyed by the words themselves which are already mutually related.⁷⁰ The words do have their isolated meanings, but their function does not exhaust with that, as they proceed further to convey the related meaning in the form of a Vākyārtha. The Bhāttas, on the other hand, consider the meaning of words (Paḍārtha) as the Kāraṇa of Śābdabodha.⁷¹

Of the Naiyāyikas, Gautama and some of his followers accept Śabda as the Kāraṇa of Śābdabodha.⁷² Here the

⁶⁹. ACS, pp.57-58
⁷⁰. paddebhyo eva vākyārthapratyayogajyate yathā / tathā vayam nibadhnimath prabhākara-pragurum mañā / VM, p.1, vide pp
⁷¹. padārtham hi vākyārthe spaṭoktātra nimittattā NRM, 32b, p.98
⁷². NS, I.1.7; NS, II. 1.53
term Śabda, however, stands for a Vākya. The Naiyāyika to Viśvanātha while referring the Pada as the Karana of Śabdabodha uses the term (i.e. Pada) not in the sense of an individual Pada, but in the sense of a Padasamūha, i.e. a cluster of words that constitutes a Vākya. This he does presumably to highlight the involvement of individual words in generating a verbal comprehension, a fact corroborated by the different phases of verbal comprehension. It is, however, to be noted that according to modern Naiyāyikas including Viśvanātha, it is the knowledge of the words and not the words themselves that actually forms the Karana of Śabdabodha. For in the event of words being the Karana of Śabdabodha, it would not be possible for one to understand a verse composed by a dumb without uttering a single word. Hence it is the knowledge of the words whether heard orally or seen in a written form that actually produces Śabdabodha.

VYĀPĀRA: A Karana, as we have earlier observed, always involves an operation (Vyāpāravat). This applies to the Śabdabodha-Karana also. Now a Vyāpāra, as we find,

73. vākyārthajñānam śabdajñānam. tatkaranaṃ śabdah.

TS, pp.65-68

74. ACS, pp. 66-67

75. BP, K. 81
is considered as the immediate cause of an effect it generates.\footnote{vyāpāratvam ca dravyānyatve sati bhāvatve sati tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajanakatvam.} It is thus traditionally defined as 'tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajanakatvam'.\footnote{NSM, p. 2, quoted in NK, p. 390} Here the term Tat stands for Karana. Hence the expression 'tajjanyatve' would mean 'karaṇajanya'.\footnote{Ibid.} Thus a Vyāpāra itself is Karanajanya, i.e. the effect of Karana which is the principal cause of an effect. The final effect to be produced by a Karana immediately follows the Vyāpāra. Thus Vyāpāra is immediately responsible for production of the effect of which Karana is the chief cause.

Keeping in view such a general notion of Vyāpāra, the Naiyāyikas conceive a Vyāpāra in the context of Śabdabodha as the recollection of the meaning generated by a word.\footnote{padajanyapadārthasmaranam vyāpāraḥ.} Their contention is that, Śabdabodha which is the final effect, immediately follows the knowledge of the meanings of words. This knowledge, again, is generated by the knowledge of the corresponding words which is the principal cause in generating Śabdabodha. Thus while

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \footnote{vyāpāratvam ca dravyānyatve sati bhāvatve sati tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajanakatvam.} NSM, p. 2, quoted in NK, p. 390
\item \footnote{Ibid.}
\item \footnote{NSMP, quoted in NK, p. 830}
\item \footnote{padajanyapadārthasmaranam vyāpāraḥ.} MUS, vide BP, p. 410.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Padajñāna serves as the Karana of Sābdabodha, Padarthajñāna serves as the vyāpāra being itself Karanajana. That is, in terms of conditions of a Vyāpāra, the Padarthajñāna is Padajñānajanya and yet it is Padajñānajanya Sābdabodhajana-ka, i.e. the immediate cause of verbal cognition which is the final effect of the knowledge of the words.  

SAHAKĀRI KĀRANA: According to the Naiyāyikas, the knowledge of Vṛtti or significative powers of words leading to the knowledge of their meanings serves as the Sahakāri Kārana. Now it may be noted here that a Kārana is defined by these scholars as an invariable antecedent, failing which there is no occurrence of the effect, and it is of three types, viz. Samavāyi, Asamavāyi and Nimitta. In a Samavāyi Kārana, the effect exists in the relation of Samavāya (Inherence). An Asamavāyi Kārana is that which exists in the Samavāyi cause of an effect by the relation of Inherence. A Kārana different from these two is said to be Nimitta Kārana. Now, in the context of a Sābdabodha, all the three causes involved, viz. Kārana, Vyāpāra and Sahakāri Kārana come to

80. padarthasmaraṇāṁ hi padajñānajanyāṁ padajñānajanyāsābdabodhajanaṁ kāncaḥ citi yuktāṁ tasyāṁ vyāpāratvamiti bhūtvā. ibid.  
81. Bp, K.16  
82. ibid, K.18a  
83. ibid, K.18b
be Nimitta Kāraṇas being different from both Sampvpyi and Asamavāyi Kāraṇas stated above. The Sahakārī Kāraṇa is distinct from both Vyāpāra and Vyāpāravat (i.e. Kāraṇa). Thus the three Nimitta Kāraṇas involved in verbal comprehension may be conveniently described as the instrumental, operative and auxiliary causes respectively. 84

According to the Naiyāyikas, the knowledge of the relation between the words and their meanings serves as the auxiliary cause of verbal comprehension. 85 This relational knowledge is virtually the knowledge of the Vṛttis or significative functions of words. The relation of a word to its meaning in some form or other is recognised in India by all schools of thought. 86 It is this very knowledge of relation that actually produces the knowledge of meanings of words. 87 The Naiyāyikas 88 and Vaiyākaraṇas 89 are strongly of the opinion that a person though possessed of the knowledge of words and

84. ACS, pp. 60-61
85. BP, K. 81b
86. ITM, p.24
87. tatrāpi vṛttyā padajanyetvāṁ bodhyet. ŚīU, .411
88. ibid, pp.411-412
89. tatragṛhitavṛttikasya śūndabodhādārśanāt.....VV, .13
their corresponding meanings, can not comprehend the sentence-meaning without this relation between the two. In other words, his knowledge of words must be invariably from his knowledge of the significative functions and never otherwise.

It is interesting to note that the Naiyāyika Visvanātha refers to the knowledge of Sakti (Abhidhaā) as the auxiliary cause of Sabdabodha.30 This he presumably does in order to underline the importance of Abhidhā in the matter of generating a valid verbal judgement. Because, as we shall later on, the function of Laksana is resorted to only occasionally in a verbal comprehension. Moreover, each and every case of Lakṣaṇā presupposes an involvement of Abhidhā and thus it is an extension of the latter.31 Hence Visvanātha's reference to Saktidhī instead of Vṛttidhī in this context appears to be quite justified.

THE PROCESS OF SABDABODHA PHASE BY PHASE

As has been indicated earlier, there is a definite process through which a valid verbal knowledge

90. BP, K.81
91. See our discussions on Laksana in the present work.
is produced. This process, as Vātsāyana puts it in his Nyāyabhāṣya⁹² is as follows:

1) At first, each letter in a sentence comes to be heard immediately after its utterance. As for instance, the sentence 'ghaṭaḥ asti' (There is a pot) is first heard as gh + a + ṭ + a + ṭ + a + s + t + i. Then these letters come to be joined together in the form of words. Sometimes, however, a single letter may also constitute a word.

ii) Then there follows the next phase, i.e., the recollection of the meanings signified by the words (i.e., Padārthasmarana). In case of the sentence under consideration, we have the knowledge of the 'pot' as signified by the word 'Gaṭa'. Similarly from letters 'ḥ' (a modification of the case-ending 'Su'), 'as' (the root and 'ti' (a verbal suffix), we have the knowledge of: 'one', 'existing', and 'the state of being abiding' respectively.

iii) Afterwards there is the knowledge of mutual connection (Samsargabodha) of things already recollected.

⁹². vākyasthēṣu khalu varṇoṣūtsartṣu prativaryayam tāvat śṝvaṇām bhavati. śṛtaṁekamānekām vē padabhy vas pratisandhatte ....... vākyārtham pratipadyate.

V Ś under NS III.2.58.
In case of the sentence 'ghaṭaḥ asti' cited above, we have the knowledge that the 'pot' as qualified by 'oneness' is an abode of existence. This is virtually the desired verbal knowledge or Śādabodha.

FACTORS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING OF A SENTENCE: Ākāṅkṣā, Yogyaṭā, Āsatti and Taṭṭaṇaya-jñāna.

A sentence is the real unit of expression. Our fulfledged idea in a certain context is conveyed by a sentence alone. The individual words are meaningful only in so far as they are part of a sentence. A sentence, however, is not a mere combination of words. There must be some syntactic unity among the words that comprise a sentence, in order to produce a unified idea. In other words, the words must be syntactically related to one another for generating the contextual sentence-meaning. Scholars belonging to all schools of thought have underlined the importance of this syntactic unity amongst the word-meanings in a sentence and have recognised certain factors that effect the same and consequently lead to the comprehension of the sentence-meaning. These factors are namely Ākāṅkṣā, (expectancy), Yogyaṭā (compatibility) and Āsatti or Sannidhi (contiguity).

93. TC, I, p. 44
94. Ākāṅkṣā sannidhānaṇca yogyaṭā ceti ca trayam. sambandhakāraṇatvena kiptam nānanta-rāgrutiḥ. TV, II. 1, p. 438.
A fourth factor called Tātparya (intention of the speaker) also was later added by certain schools.

In pursuance of these factors, we find, the Mīmāṃsakas are generally considered to have dealt with these in the context of their discussion on a sentence. Jaimini himself considers only those words as capable of forming a sentence which serve a single purpose and are mutually expectant. Thus he recognises Ākāṅkṣā as an essential prerequisite of a sentence. It may, however, be observed that the need of such interdependence of words to give a unified idea in a compound or a sentence was stressed even earlier by the grammarians. Panini himself maintains that words must have Sāmarthya (capacity) in order to form a compound. This Sāmarthya of Panini although interpreted variously by different scholars, is said to refer to the same conditions about Ākāṅkṣā as conceived by Jaimini.

Of the Mīmāṃsakas, Kumārila comes to recognize Yogṛtā and Sannidhi in addition to his primarily accepted Ākāṅkṣā. Prabhākara and his followers also admit, though in their own way, the involvement of these three factors in bringing

95. arthaikatvād ekāṃ vākyam sākāṅksām ced vibhāge syāt. MS, II. 1.46
96. samarthāḥ padavidhiḥ. P, II. 1.1
97. Vide ITM, pp.155-156.
about the sentence-meaning in the form of an Ānvaya, i.e. mutual relation amongst the word-meanings. The writers on poetics also universally accept these three factors as essentials of a sentence. But of all these factors, the greatest linguistic importance is to be given to Ākāṅkṣā.

ĀKĀṅKṢĀ : Ākāṅkṣā or verbal expectancy consists in a word not being capable of conveying a complete judgement in the absence of another word. A word is considered to have expectancy for another, if in the absence of the latter, it cannot generate the knowledge of co-relation in a sentence. A word like Ghaṭam (a jar) stands in the need of a such word like Ānaya to complete the sense. For whenever some person utters the word Ghaṭam, a desire is at once produced in the mind of the listener as to what about that Ghaṭam, and the same is satisfied only when a word like Ānaya is supplied.

In fact, every word in a sentence does require some other word or words to complete the sense. Thus a word

98. yadyadākāṅkṣitam yogyem sannidhānam prepadyate / tadedvitāh padenārthāh svakīyāh pratipadyate // VM, p.5, vide PP.

99. vākyam syād yogyastākāṅkṣāsattiyukteh padaccayāh / SB,11.1

100. ITM, p.157

in the nominative (Kartr) requires a verb, a verb needs an object (Karma) and so on in order to convey a total idea. This syntactic need is what is known as Ākāṅkṣā. A group of words like 'gaur āśvaḥ puruṣo hastī (cow, horse, man, elephant) can not give us a total idea due to lack of expectancy and hence fails to constitute a sentence.  

According to Nāgēśa, Ākāṅkṣā is the desire on the part of the listener to know an object which can be associated with another object signified by a word already understood. Such a desire, he contends, though actually pertains to the listener, is secondarily attributed to the words and their meanings. Of the Ālāmāṇikas also, Viśvanātha Kavirāja accepts this position of the Vaiyākaraṇas and says that the expectancy although a property of the soul, is regarded secondarily as a property of the words.

The Naiyāyikas, however, reject the Vaiyākaraṇa definition of Ākāṅkṣā as the desire of the listener, since

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102. tetra padārthānām yogatāvīśayatvayogatvam ākāṅkṣā, kriyāरणां kārākasya... itikartavyatāyāsā jijnāśāvīśayatvāt. VPB, IV, p. 86
103. SD. II, pp. 27-28
104. sa caikāpadārthajñāne tadārthānvayayogyārthasya jajñāṇām tadviśayecchā 'asyānvayārthah kā' ity evaṁṛūpā puruṣaṁniṣṭhāiva, tathāpi tasyāṁ svāvīśaye rthe āropah. PLM, p.33
105. SD, II, p.28
according to them, 106 verbal comprehension takes place even in the case of a person having the least inquisitiveness to obtain any knowledge. Thus Vardhamana, the commentator on the Nyāyakusumāñjali defines Ākāṅkṣā 107 as the non-completion of the relational meaning intended to be conveyed by the speaker. He contends that in a sentence, there is mutual expectancy between the stems and inflectional suffixes and again between the verbal roots and the conjugational suffixes and all these stand in a specific sequence which is conducive to the understanding of the intended meaning. 108 According to Viśvanātha the Naiyāyika also, Ākāṅkṣā consists in such a sequence, as without the latter, there can not arise any propositional expectancy leading to the relational idea in the shape of a Vākyārtha. 109

YOGYĀTĀ: Yogyatā is the logical compatibility of words in a sentence for mutual relation of things. 110

106. NK, p. 122
108. ibid.
109. yatpadena vinā yasyānāmubhāvakaṁ tānaṁ sākāṅkṣā. BP, K.84, also vide SMU under above.
110. arthābhedho yogyatā. TS, p. 30; peraspaṇāvayān-vyojakadhimavatvam. PLM, p. 36.
factor demands the words to have the feasibility of being connected with other words in the same sentence. A sentence like 'payasā siṃcati' (He sprinkles with water) is said to have Yogyāta, since water has the property of being sprinkled. But in the sentence like 'agninā siṃcati' (He sprinkles with fire), there is no Yogyāta, since fire has no liquidity which can alone make an object an instrument in the act of sprinkling. Thus Yogyāta is conceived by scholars of various schools as the capacity of two words to be co-ordinated. If a collection of words could make a sentence even in the absence of this factor, then such an expression as 'agninā siṃcati' would also constitute a sentence. But this is contrary to our experience. As the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas maintain, the knowledge of this Yogyāta takes place in the mind of the speaker and the listener on the strength of a previous experience of seeing the words to stand in such relations.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas consider Yogyāta as an indispensable factor for a valid verbal judgement and maintain that the latter is not possible in such expressions as 'agninā siṃcati' due to lack of Yogyāta between the

111. kim punaridām yogyatvam nāma? yat sambandhārhatvam. sambandhārham iti kathāṃ jñāyate? sambandhitvam drṣṭatvāt. VM, p.3, vide pp
Vide also ACS, p. 252.
words Agnīnā and Sīncatī. The Vedāntins also define Yogyatā as non-contradiction of the relation between the meanings intended. The Ālaṁkārika Viśvanātha also defines Yogyatā as the absence of absurdity in the mutual relation of things conveyed by the words in a sentence. He maintains further that although Yogyatā is thus a property of the meanings, it is considered as the property of the cluster of words only secondarily.

Here it may be added that the lack of syntactic inconsistency in some cases is only apparent, as the same can be removed by resorting to Laksāṇā. In such cases, the incompatibility of the primary meaning comes to serve as one of the three prerequisites of Laksāṇā.

Āsatti: Āsatti is the juxtaposition or unintervened occurrence of two words. This factor demands that the words in a sentence be uttered without involving any

112. agnīnā sīncatītyādau ayogyānāmananvayāt yogyatāpi parigrāhyā. MM, p. 99
113. VPB,IV, p. 90
114. yogyātā padārthānām parasparasambandhe bādhabhīvāh. SD, II, p.27
115. ibid, p.28
116. See our discussions on Laksāṇā in chapter ii itself.
time-gap more than necessary. Thus if someone utters the word Devadatta today and the word Gacchati tomorrow, none will have the verbal comprehension that 'Devadatta goes'. A sentence-meaning is constituted by the combination of several ideas signified by the words used, and as such, it is essential that the impression produced by each word remains fresh till this combination is effected. If there occurs any long break in the midst of the sentence, the impressions made by the previous words are bound to vanish leaving the sentence-meaning incomplete in spite of there being syntactic expectancy and compatibility. There can not be also verbal comprehension if the words are separated by intervention of irrelevant words. Hence the Naiyāyika Viśvanātha, defines Āsatti as the immediacy of two concepts which are mutually related. The author of Sahityadarpana also defines it as the absence of break in the apprehension of what is said, or in other words, as an uninterrupted cognition.

The Uṭṭāra and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas hold divergent views on the actual nature of Āsatti. While the

117. āsattiscāvyavadānena padajanyapadārthopasthitih. VPB, IV, p. 91
118. sannidhānantu padasyāsattiruceyate / MP, K. 64. also, anvayapratiyogyanuyogipadnyoravyavahāramnamāsattih, tajjñānam kābdhodbhāvānkalaram. MUS under above, vide MP
119. āsattir buddhyāvichchedah. V. under SD.11, 1a.
former group of scholars conceives Asatti as the continuous moving about of words or their meanings in the mind, the latter only as the contiguity of apprehension of the meanings and not necessarily of the words actually uttered.  

According to the modern Naiyāyikas, Asatti is the immediate recollection of meanings of words either through Sakti or Lakṣaṇa. This recollection is explained by them as a collective cognition (Samuhālambanajñāna). In a sentence, the perception of each letter leaves behind its impression, and as soon as the last word is uttered, its last letter comes to act as the stimulator of the collective cognition that takes place. According to the modern Naiyāyikas, Asatti itself serves as the cause of verbal comprehension and not its knowledge as is held by their ancient counterparts.

The Vaiyakaraṇas, however, do not accept Asatti as an essential prerequisite of a verbal comprehension. Asatti,

120. TV, p. 455
121. VM, p.9, vide pp.
122. tasrāmad vṛttāyā padārthopasthitirāsattiḥ. NSM, p. 238
123. The problem of Sanskrit Teaching, p. 436 vide 1TM, p. 169
124. sā ca svarūpasatī śabdabodhāhetuḥ. NSM, p.238.
according to them, might be necessary for one who is not capable of understanding the mutual expectancy of the individual word-meanings. But to persons with quick intelligence, it appears to be quite useless.\(^{125}\)

The concept of Āsatti involves the interesting concept of Adhyāhāra (Importation) in certain schools of Indian thought, so far the elliptical sentences are concerned. The pertinent question in this regard is whether in such incomplete sentences as 'dvāram' (door), we should import the word like Pidhehi (shut) itself or its meaning to understand such fulfledged ideas as 'shut the door' (dvāram pidhehi). The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas,\(^{126}\) the Naiyāyikas, and Vedāntins\(^{128}\) maintain that in such incomplete sentences, the listener is to supply the omitted word itself.

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125. Āsattirapi mandasyāvilambena śabdabodhe kāraṇam amandasya tu āsattyabhāve'pi padārthopasthitau ākāṅkṣājñānavato bodho'vilambenaiva bhavatīti ma tadabdohe tasya kāraṇatvam. VSM, p. 522

126. aparipūrṇavākyasthale śabdādhyāhāro'bhihitānveya- vādibhirbhaṭṭamīmāṃsakair āṅgīkriyate. dvāram ityatra pidhehīti śabdam adhyāhāranti. FN. under PP, p. 280

127. yatra dvāramityuktām, tatra pidhehitipadasya jñānādeva bodhāḥ. SMU, p. 468

128. asrutapadarthasthale tattatpadādhyāhārāḥ. VFB, IV, p. 41.
to form a syntactically complete sentence. According to them, the syntactical expectancy should be satisfied by supplying the omitted word itself.\(^\text{129}\) This view is known as \(Ś\text{abdādhyāhāravāda}\) (the theory of importation of word).

The \(\text{Prābhākaras}\), on the other hand, take care to show that the importation of the necessary idea is easier than the presumption of the omitted words.\(^\text{130}\) According to these scholars, a word can be regarded as implied only after apprehending the meaning to be supplied, and when that meaning is cognised, it is needless to supply the omitted word, for after all, we are concerned with the meaning and not with the very word.\(^\text{131}\) This view concerning verbal comprehension is known as \(\text{Arthādhyāhāravāda}\).

Of the \(\text{Ālmākārikas}\) also, Bhoja deals with the problem of elliptical sentences and accepts both types of \(\text{Adhyāhāra}\) with of the \(\text{Mīmāṁsakas}\) though with different names, viz. \(\text{Adhyāhāra}\) and \(\text{Vākyāśeṣa}\).\(^\text{132}\)

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\(^\text{129}\) \(\text{Śabdā hyākāhksa śabḍenaiwa prapūryate} / \text{NK, p. 113} \)

\(^\text{130}\) anvitābhidhānāvādīnaḥ prābhākarmīmāṁsakā aparipūrṇavākyasthale pidehānārupamartham adhyāharaṇti. atēva te'arthādhyāhāravādina iti gīyante. \text{FN. under PP, p. 280}

\(^\text{131}\) \(\text{ITM, p. 170} \)

\(^\text{132}\) \(\text{SRP, p. 177, vide ITM, p. 174} \).
TATPARYAJNANA: Some Naiyāyikas, Vedāntins and Vaiyākarāṇas consider the knowledge of Tatparya as an essential factor for the understanding of a sentence-meaning. It may be added here that in Indian epistemology, the term Tatparya is found to have been used in two other senses also: (i) 'in the sense of the purport of a verbal statement as admitted in the circle of the Mīmāṃsakas and (ii) in the sense of the function of a sentence in order to convey its meaning i.e., a function placed on a par with 'Abhidhā etc. as advocated by the Naiyāyika Jayantabhaṭṭa and the Alamkārika Abhinavagupta'. While we propose to examine these two concepts later on, we simply point out at this stage that the scholars even who advocated for this factor, were of divergent opinions regarding the role to be played by the intention of the speaker in a Sābdabodha. However, the common feeling of all these scholars is that the meaning of a sentence is what the speaker intends to be understood from it by the listener. The same word may signify different ideas in various contexts. But we are concerned with only that idea which the speaker intends to convey to the listener. Hence, in order to understand the meaning of a sentence, the listener should have a prior knowledge of the intention of the speaker.

135. ACS, p. 259.
Some Naiyāyikas consider the knowledge of Tātparya as essential and indispensable in the matter of statements involving homonymous words (Nāṇārthapadas). As for instance, in the sentence 'saindhavam ānaya', the listener should grasp from the word Saindhava whether the speaker intends to mean salt or a horse of a particular breed. The intention of the speaker again depends on the occasion on which the sentence is uttered or used. Thus on the occasion of dining, the word Saindhava would mean salt, while on the occasion of the speaker's departing for a battle, it would mean a horse.

Some later Naiyāyikas opine that the knowledge of Tātparya is essential even in the case of ordinary speeches like 'ghatamānaya' (Bring the jar) which do not involve any homonym. For, otherwise, the term Ghaṭa would mean a Paṭa (a piece of cloth) also through Laksana. The Vedāntins and Mīmāṃsakas do not attach so much importance to the intention of the speaker. According to

134. SMU, p. 473-74
135. tadgrāhakām ca prakaraṇādikām. VSM, p. 524
136. pare tu ghaṭādiśabdasthālē'pi ghaṭapadaṃ kumbhaparam laksanaya paṭaparam vā ghaṭaśabdabodhābhāvāt sarvatra tātparyaniścayāḥ kāraṇamityāhūḥ. NK, p. 327
them, just as a word has a natural capacity to signify its meaning, so also a sentence is possessed of an inherent power to convey the relational idea in the form of the sentence-meaning.\textsuperscript{137} As Dr. Raja observes, 'The Mīmāṃsākās' habit of attending too exclusively to the revealed texts of the Vedas probably encouraged them to formulate a theory of verbal comprehension without any reference to the speaker at all.\textsuperscript{138}

The Vedāntins, however, admit the knowledge of Tātparya as a prerequisite of Śabdabodha in the case of statements involving ambiguous words.\textsuperscript{139} Here Tātparya serves to restrict a particular word to one of the multiple meanings in the same statement.

Of the Vaiyākaraṇas also Nāgeśa stresses the importance of Tātparya in the case of equivocal expressions.\textsuperscript{140}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
137. & saktiṁṇāpyaśca yathā padārthastathā vākyārtho'piti na kācidamupapetī. \\
& VPB, IV, p. 102 \\
138. & ITM, p. 179 \\
139. & tāparyasaṁśayaviparyayottarasaśabdajñānaviśeṣe tātparyajñānam hetureva. \\
& VPB, IV, p. 110 \\
140. & nanārthapadasthale padaviśayo'pi sa tathā. \\
& VSM, p. 524.
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
Here it is important to note that the Naiyāyikas' Tatparya which is defined as the intention or will of the speaker (Vakturicchā) and thus involves Icchā, should not be confused with their Sakti (i.e. Abhidhā) which they define as Īśvarecchā (will of God) or simply Icchā (will). Because, in the case of Sakti, the term Icchā is concerned with the individual primary meaning of a word, while in the case of Tatparya, it is concerned with the meaning pertaining to the sentence as a whole.

The term Vaktr (speaker) also, the knowledge of whose intention is said to form Tatparya, should not necessarily be taken in its restricted sense of a speaker. Otherwise, there will not be any śabdabodha in the case of a passage mentally recited by a person under a vow of silence. Hence scholars recommend the use of the word in the sense of Abhisandhātr (one with an intention).

141. Vide our discussion on Šakti in chapter III of the present work.

142. ātapyām cedām prayukturicchā. prayoktā cābhisandhāpaṃ cittātātmatram, na tu vaktai. mauniślokaṃ vyāptetaḥ.

NSM, p. 242

also vide MUS, pp. 473-74.
VARIETIES OF SABDASAKTIS: ABHIDHĀ, LAKṢĀNA AND VYĀṆJĀNA,
VARIETIES OF WORDS AND MEANINGS ON THE BASIS OF THEIR
FUNCTIONS: VĀCAKA, LAKṢAKA AND VYĀṆJAKA WORDS AND VĀCA,
LAKSYA AND VYAṄGYA MEANINGS.

As has been observed earlier, the comprehension of the meaning of a particular word takes place only through the latter's significative function. But there is a controversy among the scholars regarding the number of these functions. While Abhidhā is recognised by all schools of thought, Lakṣāna and VyāṆjāna are recognised by only certain schools. Thus a section of the Prabhakara Mīmāṃsakas, and the Ālāmārka Mahimabhaṭṭa accept Abhidhā as the only significative function. The Mīmāṃsakas except the aforesaid section of Prabhakaras, the Vedāntins and Naiyāyikas on the other hand,

143. yo'pyanvitābhidhānavādī........ abhidhāvyāpāram eva
dirghadīrghamānicchati.......... Locana, p. 18

144. śabdasyaikābhidhā saktirarthasyaikaiva liṅgata
VV, 1.27 a, p. 105

145. tadayāṃ bhāṭṭamate bodhakramāḥ........................
śabdabhāvanāmbodhāḥ saktikalpanena laksāṇayā
vopapadyate.............. TP, NIC, p. 70

146 padarthaśca dvividhā. sākṣya lakṣyaśceti. tatra
śaktir māma prāñamārthasū mukhyā vṛttih...
tatra laksāṇāvisayo lakṣyāḥ. VPB, pp. 87-90

147. vṛttisca sakti-laksāṇānyataraśambandhā... SJU, p. 413
also vide TC, pp. 659-660.
recognise Abhidhā and Laksanā as the functions of words. Of the Naiyāyikas, Jayantabhaṭṭa comes to add Tātparya-vṛtti to the aforesaid two.\textsuperscript{148} The Vaiyākaraṇas accept Abhidhā, Laksanā and Vyañjanā as the functions of words. The Ālāmkārikas generally agree with the Vaiyākaraṇas on this issue.\textsuperscript{150}

Now pending a detailed discussion on these verbal functions, we should take note of the fact that it is these functions that form the very basis of division of words and meanings into different types in various schools of Indian thought. Thus in the schools of Indian Grammar and Rhetoric, we find the meanings being classified into three types, viz. Vācyā (expressed), Laksya (indicated) and Vyaṅgya (suggested) on the basis of the three functions, viz. Abhidhā, Laksanā and Vyañjanā recognised by them.\textsuperscript{151} Accordingly, the words that signify these three types of meanings through these functions also

\textsuperscript{148} tātparyasaktistu teṣām anvītvagamaparyantā. NM, p.371
\textsuperscript{149} sā ca vṛttistridhā, saktir laksanā vyañjanā ca.
\textsuperscript{150} SD, II.3
\textsuperscript{151} artho vācyāscacalaksyaśca vyaṅgyaśceti tridhāmatāḥ / ibid, II.2
come to be of three types viz. Vācaka (expressive), Lakṣaka (indicative) and Vyāñjaka (suggestive) respectively. Thus a word that signifies a meaning through Abhidhā is called a Vācaka word, one that conveys a meaning through Laksana is designated as a Lakṣaka word and one that presents a meaning through Vyāñjanā is termed a Vyāñjaka word. The nature of these different types of words and meanings will be clear in the present work in the context of their significative functions. At this stage, this much may be enough to say that the aforesaid classification of words relates only to the designations and not to the words designated. That is to say, there is no separate list of Vācaka, Lakṣaka and Vyāñjaka words, because the same word is entitled to any of or more than one of the said designations depending upon the significative function by which it conveys a particular meaning. As for instance, in the expression 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣah' (A village on the Gaṅgā), the same word Gaṅgā is

152. syād vācako lākṣaṇikaḥ śabdo'tra vyāñjakastridhā / KP,II,1a, p. 25;
also, mukhyo lākṣaṇikastathā vyāñjakaśceti. AKU, I,13, p. 33
153. sākṣat saṁketitām yo'rthāmabhidhatte sa vācakaḥ / KP, II,2, p.31
154. atra upādhīnāmeva tritvām na tu upādheyānām. Sārabodhinī cited in BB under KP,II,1
treated as Vācaka when it signifies the current of the particular river of that name, as Laksaka when it stands for the bank of that river and is taken as Vyanjaka when it signifies the excess of coolness, purity etc. pertaining to that river. Thus although all words form a single class by way of being significant in nature, yet from the point of difference in their significative functions, they come to be treated as the three aforesaid varieties by the Vaiyākaraṇas and Ālāmkārikas. It shall be observed in due course of the present work that the expressive word is the basis of both indicative and suggestive types of words.

As we have earlier observed, the aforesaid three types of words and the corresponding three varieties of meanings recognised by the Vaiyākaraṇas and Ālāmkārikas conform to the three respective significative functions, viz. Abhidhā, Laksanā and Vyanjāna recognised by these scholars. Hence in the scheme of other schools of thought not recognising all these three functions of words, this threefold division of words and meanings naturally does not hold good. Thus a section of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas

155. ata eva gangāyam ghoṣa ityādau ekasyāpi gangāṣabdasya vācakatvam lākṣaṇikatvam vyāñjakatvam copapadyate. BB under KP, II.1
also vide LCAI, p.92
156. atra lākṣaṇikavyañjakayor vācaka upjīvyah. BB under KP, II.1
157. Lokeśa, p.18.
and Ālāṃkārika like Mahimabhaṭṭa. would consider all words as Vācaka and all meanings as Vācyā in accordance with their admitting Abhidhā as the only function of a word. This is the view of a section of the Vaiyākaraṇas also. The Mīmāṃsakas excepting the aforesaid section of the Prābhākaras and the Naiyāyikas in general recognize two types of words, viz. Vācaka or Śakta and Lakṣaka corresponding to two significative functions of words, viz. Abhidhā or Śakti and Lakṣaṇa admitted by them. Thus in the scheme of these scholars, meanings also come to assume a twofold division into Vācyā or Śakya and Lakṣya respectively. The Ālāṃkārikas, more particularly the Dhvani theorists came to recognise Vyāṇjanā as a separate function of word in order to account for the emotive and 'socio-cultural' aspect of 'meaning', which they term as Dhvani, the very essence of poetry.

Of the verbal functions, Abhidhā is unequivocally recognised as the first and foremost by all schools of thought. The present work being proposed as an exhaustive

158. VV, 1.27.a, p. 105

159. sati tātparye sarve sṛvrthavācaka iti bhāṣyāt
lakṣaṇāyā abhāvāt vṛttidvayakalpane gauravāt.
PLM, p. 206

160. ITM, p. 281

161. kāvyasyātmā dhvaniriti.................DL. I.1
investigation of the concept and treatment of this primary significative function itself, we shall be deliberating on it exclusively later on. Pending a detailed discussion on Abhidhā, therefore, let us now bring out, in brief, the significance of the other three functions, Laksana, Vyājana and Tatparya.

LAKŚANA: Laksana is the secondary significative function of a word in contrast to Abhidhā, its primary function. A word, as we find, not only conveys its direct or conventional meaning, but signifies, on occasions, some indirect meaning also, which has no bearing on convention. Such secondary usage, in fact, is noticeable as a common feature of all languages from very ancient time. In Sanskrit, Laksana is the common term used for such transferred usage. The other popular terms used for Laksana are Upacara, Junyavrtti and Bhakti.

In India, a word is found to be used in its transferred meaning even from the Rāvedic period.

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162. ITM, p.231
163. dharmavikalpanirdeśerthasahapavartisah
upacāracchalam. NS, I.2.14
164. mukhyāṃ vṛttiṃ parityajya guṇavṛttiṃ
rthadarsanaṃ
165. kā punariyāṃ bhaktih? ānantaryāṃ bhaktih.
166. RV, I.64.20.
Yāska in his *Nirukta* deals with a number of secondary usage, which came to serve as instances of Lakṣaṇā to the later writers on poetics. In subsequent ages, scholars belonging to various schools of philosophy, Grammar as also poetics came to deal with the subject in its manifold aspects.

Of the various schools of thought, we find that the Mīmāṃsakas have given a very high status to Lakṣaṇā so far verbal comprehension is concerned. According to Kumārila and his followers, every sentence-meaning is apprehended by means of Lakṣaṇā, since Śakti or Abhidhā can convey only the individual word-meanings and never the sentence-meaning. According to the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, however, the sentence-meaning is normally apprehended through the function of Abhidhā itself. Hence Lakṣaṇā is to be resorted to only when there is a failure of the logical connection of the primary meaning in the sentence-meaning.

The Naiyāyikas, in consonance with their concept of Śakti as the primary relation between of a word

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167. *vākyārtho lakṣyāsmāno hi sarvatraiva hi nāḥ sthitiḥ/
  VM, p.13, vide PP.*

168. *vācyasyārthasya vākyārthe sambandhānamupāptītah /
  tatsambandhavaśaaprāptasyānvayāllakṣaṇocyate //*
and its meaning, conceive Lakṣaṇa as a secondary type of relation existing between the primary and the secondary meanings. According to them, Lakṣaṇa is resorted to when the primary meaning of a word is incompatible with the intention of the speaker.\(^{169}\) Here it may be noted that there is a hot controversy as to whether the incompatibility of the primary meaning is due to Anvayānupapāpatti (the failure of a syntactical relation among the words in a sentence) or Tātparyānupāpatti (the failure of the intention of the Speaker). According to Mīmāṃsākās, some Naiyāyikas like Gaṅgeśa and Ālaṃkārikas, the operation of Lakṣaṇa is caused by Anvayānupapātī. But the Vedāntins, Vaiyākaraṇas and some modern Naiyāyikas consider Tātparyānupāpatti as the cause of operation of Lakṣaṇa.\(^{170}\)

Of the Vaiyākaraṇas, Bhartrihari maintains that a sentence conveys its meaning as a whole and in the total meaning of the sentence, the individual word-meanings retain very little of their individual identity. He substantiates his view by citing such expressions as 'kākebhya rakṣyatām sarpiḥ'\(^{171}\) which serve as instances of

169. lakṣaṇa śākyasambandhastātparyānupāpattitah / BP, K, 82a
170. ACS, pp.168-73
171. kākebhya rakṣyatām sarpīti bālo'pi coditaḥ / upaghatapare vākye śvādibhyo na rakṣitaṁ // VP,11.314
Laksana to the later Ālāmākārikas. Nāgésa, however, does not recognize Laksana as a secondary function, but as a Śakti, the denotative function itself of a word in respect of the so-called secondary meaning. 172

The Ālāmākārikas, in general, recognize Laksana as a separate verbal function. They define it as that function of a word which operates in the event of the primary meaning being incompatible with the rest of the sentence, depending either on popular usage or a motive and signifies a meaning closely related to the primary one. Thus, according to Ālāmākārikas, operation of Laksana demands three pre-requisites, viz. (i) incompatibility of the primary meaning (Mukhyārthabādha), (ii) relation between the primary and the secondary meanings (Mukhyārthasambandha) and (iii) presence either of popular usage (Rūdhī) or a motive (Prayojana). 173

To take an instance, in the sentence 'kalingph sahasikah' (The Kalinga is valiant), the word Kalinga primarily signifies a country bearing that name. But such a meaning can not be appropriately construed with the sense of

172. tathā hi śaktir dvividhā ...... kimānapapannam.
PIM, p.51

173. mukhyārthabādhe tadyoge rūdhito'tha prayojanāt /
anyo'rtho lakṣyate yat sā laksanaropitā kriyā //
KP, II.9.
the term Sāhasika, since valour can be an attribute of a sentient being only. Thus there is Mukhyārthabādha. Then we are prompted to think of the people living in the said country, which meaning is connected with the primary one, i.e., Kaliṅga. Thus there is Mukhyārthasambandha. Here the relation between the primary and the secondary meanings is that of the location (Ādhāra) and the located (Ādheya). To take another instance, in the sentence 'gāṅgāyam ghoṣah' (A herd-station on the Gaṅgā), the term Gaṅgā primarily signifies a particular current of water (Jalapravāhaviśeṣa). But a herd-station can not be built over a mass of water, and as such the said primary meaning stands inappropriate in the context. Then another meaning in the shape of the 'bank of the river Gaṅgā' (Gaṅgātaṇa) is accepted, by virtue of which, the said syntactical inconsistency is removed. This secondary meaning is connected with the aforesaid primary one by the relation of proximity (Sāmīpya). Now, the function of

174. kaliṅgaḥ sāhasikaḥ ityādau kaliṅgādisābdo deśaviśeṣā- disvārthe'sambhavan yayā śabdaśaktyā svasāmyuktān puruṣādīn pratyāyayati...... V under SD.II. 5

175. atra deśapuruṣayorāhārādheyaabhāvaḥ sambandhaḥ..... V under S.D.II 9a.
words by which we apprehend the meanings 'people' from the word Kaliṅga and 'bank' from the word Gaṅgā respectively, is Laksanā.\textsuperscript{176} In the former instance, the basis of Laksanā is usage (Rūḍhi), on the strength of which the word Kaliṅga comes to be used or understood in the sense of the inhabitants of that country. In the latter example, the basis of Laksanā is the motive which demands that the word Gaṅgā itself be used instead of 'Gaṅgā-taṭa' in order to convey the ideas of excess of coolness (Sitatva) and purity (Pāvantva).\textsuperscript{177}

Laksanā, however, is not treated as a separate function of word by all the Ālamkārikas. Mukulabhaṭṭa, for instance, considers Laksanā as the secondary denotative function of a word (Lākṣanika Abhidhāvyāpāra). Mahimabhaṭṭa, on the other hand, tries to explain away all instances of Laksanā as cases of Anumāna (inference).

\textsuperscript{176} gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣa ityādeu ca gaṅgādīnām ghoṣādyadhār- atvāsambhāvānmukhyārthasya bādhē viveca-kātva-dau sāmīpye ca sambandhe rūḍhitat prasiddhēsthāḥ..... laksanā. V under KP,II. 4

\textsuperscript{177} V under SD,II.5

\textsuperscript{178} evamayan mukhyalakṣanikātmaviprayopavartanadvāreṇa śabdasyābhidhāvyāpāro dvividhaḥ.........

AVM, p.3.
since, according to him, a word can have only one function and that is Abhidhā.\(^{179}\)

Notwithstanding the divergent views on the concept of Lakṣaṇā, however, the common notion of almost all schools of thought is that Lakṣaṇā is only the secondary significative function of a word, which is resorted to only when Abhidhā fails to convey the desired meaning in a certain context. Thus amongst the Mīmāṃsakas, Śabara always insists on the primary meaning of a word.\(^{180}\) He calls the secondary meaning Jaghanyārtha as it is subordinate to the primary meaning which appears like a hinder part of the body, in contrast to the Mukhyārtha, primary meaning which appears primarily like a face (what appears earlier than any other part of the body).\(^{181}\) Thus with Śabara, Lakṣaṇā comes to be the Jaghanyā Vṛtti in contradistinction to Abhidhā, the Mukhyā Vṛtti.

\(^{179}\) Vide Mahimabhaṭṭa's treatment of Abhidhā in chapter III of the present work.

\(^{180}\) śrutilakṣaṇāviṣaye ca śrutir āśayasyā.  
\hspace{1cm} SB. under MS. I.4.2

\(^{181}\) mukhamiva bhavatīti mukhyā ityucyate. yastu khalu pratītādharthāt kenacit sambandhena gamyate, sa paścādbhāvāj Jaghanyāmiva bhavatīti jaghanyah.  
\hspace{1cm} SB under MS III. 2.1, Vide MD, p. 167
Of the Ālāṁkārīkas also, Māmaṭabhaṭṭa calls Lākṣaṇā the 'tail of Abhidhā' (Abhidhāpucchabhūtā), showing thereby that Lākṣaṇā is solely dependent on Abhidhā.

We come across certain modern scholars who have dealt with the nature and kinds of Lākṣaṇā in details. In this connection, reference may be made to Dr. K. K. Raja, Dr. R. Mukherji, Dr. R. Tripathi, Dr. L. G. Gogoi Chutia and Dr. A. K. Goswami.

VYAṆJANĀ:

Vyaṇjanā is the third function of a word recognised by the Ālāṁkārīkas. It brings the suggested idea into comprehension when the functions of Abhidhā, Lākṣaṇā and Tātparya cease to operate after discharging their respective functions (i.e. conveying the corresponding meanings).

182. ITM, pp. 229-273
183. LCAI, pp. 125-162
184. LHKP
185. TL
186. ACS, pp. 174-236
187. viratāsvabhidhādyāsya yayārtho bodhyate'parah / sā vṛttir vyaṇjanā nāma sābdasyārthādikasya ca //

SD,II. 12b-13a
The admission of Vyanjana, in fact, was the result of a strong feeling cherished by the Alamkarikas that the earlier two functions of words, viz. Abhidha and Lakṣaṇa and even Tātparya which is recognised as a Vākyavṛtti by some Alamkarikas, were not enough to exhaust the entire significance of poetry. Hence they came to advance another significative function of word called Vyanjana in order to account for the ideas not capable of being conveyed by the earlier functions. Vyanjana conveys a deeper meaning which is discernible only to the men of taste. The other popular terms used for Vyanjana are Gamana, Dhvanana, Dyotana and Pratyāyana.

The Alamkarikas while postulating this suggestive function of word, however, had before them, the doctrine of Sphota already established by the Vaiyakarana. Earlier we have made reference to this Sphota theory advocated by Bhartrhari. Anandavardhana, taking the clue from Bhartrhari modelled his theory of Dhwani and established Vyanjana as a separate function. Following Ananda, other writers including Abhinava, Mammapata, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha came to deal with the issue in greater details.

188. ITM, p179
189. SD, II, p54.
According to Mammaṭa, the motive element of a Prayojanamulā Lakṣaṇā is conveyed by Vyāñjana. He categorically says that when a word is used in a secondary sense with the desire of conveying a motive, the apprehension of that motive arises not through any function other than Vyāñjana. As for instance, in the expression 'gāngāyām ghoṣah' which is already cited as an instance of Prayojanamulā Lakṣaṇā, the term Gāṅgā stands for Gāṅgātāṭa (i.e. the bank of the river Gāṅgā) and the motive element of the term, viz. the idea of the excess of coolness and purity is apprehended through the Vyāñjana function.

Mammaṭa argues that the ideas of coolness etc. in the expression 'gāngāyām ghoṣah' can not be conveyed by Abhidhā, since the word Gāṅgā does not have a conventional invariable relation with the ideas of coolness etc. The same can not be signified by Lakṣaṇā also, since the three requisites of Lakṣaṇā, viz. incompatibility of the primary meaning etc. are not present here. Moreover, since Lakṣaṇā has already conveyed the meaning Gaṅgātāṭa, the same function can not operate again to give some other meaning like coolness. It is because, like the Mīmāṃsakas,

190. yasya pratītimādhātum vyāñjanā samupāsyate / phale śakyaikagame'ṭra vyāñjanānāparā kriyā //
KP, II. 9b

191. nabhidhā samayābhavāt  . KP, II.24

192. hetvābhāvānna lakṣaṇā. KP, I1.25
the Ālamkārikas, in general, also contend that the function of word, cognition and intelligence gets exhausted after a single effort. Hence in order to account for such idea as coolness, we must recognise some other function of the word and that is what is known as Vyāñjana.194

As for substratum of Vyāñjanā, the Ālamkārikas refer to word, the meaning, the sentence and even a letter - all these being competent to bring the underlying idea into comprehension.195 But yet the Vyāñjana Ālamkārikas have classified on the basis of word and its meaning only and thus we find two divisions of Vyāñjanā into Śabdī and Ārthī.196 While in the former, the word plays the dominating role, in the latter, the meaning plays the greater part.

Without going to details of Vyāñjanā, we seek to emphasise that like Lakṣaṇa, Vyāñjanā is also directly

193. 'sabdabuddhikarmaṇām viramyā vyāpārābhāvaḥ'.
   SD, II, p. 12
194. V under KP, II. 31, vide KP, p. 63
195. KP, V. p. 243
196. SD, II. 13.a
   also, evam śabdīm vyāñjanaṁuktvārthīmānaḥ.
or indirectly dependent on Abhidhā. In Abhidhāmūlā type
of Śabdī Vyañjanā, it is directly dependent on Abhidhā,
while in Lakṣaṇāmūlā type of Śabdī Vyañjanā, it is
indirectly dependent on Abhidhā. In case of Ārthī Vyañjanā,
directness or indirectness of dependence of Vyañjanā upon
Abhidhā varies from case to case. As for instance, the
dependence of Vyañjanā upon Abhidhā is direct in the verse
'kālo maḍhu' etc.197 and indirect in the verse
'nīpāsēṣacyutacandana'198 etc.

It is, however, not that all Ālakārikas have
recognised Vyañjanā as a separate function of word.
Ānandavardhana himself refers to such opponents who could
include Vyañjanā under the perview of Lakṣaṇā.199 Thus
Mukulabhaṭṭa, even a posterior to Ānandavardhana explains
away all instances of Vyañjanā as the cases of Lakṣaṇā
itself.200 Mahimabhaṭṭa, another dread opponent of the
Dhvani theory, on the other hand, tries to include
Vyañjanā under the perview of Anumāna (inference).201

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197. SDK, II. p. 14
198. ibid.
199. bhāktamahustamanye. anye tāṁ dhvanisañjitaṁ kāvyāt-
mānam guṇavṛttityāhuḥ. DL, I, p. 28
200. laksanamargavagāhitvāṁ tu dhvaneḥ sahrdayair
nūtanatayopavarniṣṭasya vidyate. AVM, p. 66
201. WV, I.1
In this context, we may refer to certain modern scholars who have dealt with the Vyanjana function in details. They include Dr. K.K. Raja, Dr. R. Mukherji, and Dr. M.M. Sarma.

Tātparya-vṛtti. In addition to the aforesaid three functions pertaining to the individual words and their meanings, a function pertaining to the sentence as a whole, Tātparya by name, came to be conceived by a section of scholars to obtain the sentence-meaning. In fact, it was the Naiyāyika Jayantabhaṭṭa who for the first time recognised Tātparya as a separate function. According to him, the words in a sentence signify their individual meanings by the function of Abhidhā, but they have another function called Tātparya to convey the mutual relation among the word-meanings. This Vṛtti pertains to all words in common and remains operative till the sentence-meaning is comprehended. As Dr. K.K. Raja

202. ITM, pp. 277-315
203. LCA1, pp. 162-204
204. DESP; VPS
205. padāni .... nānvitam abhidadhati. nābhidhātrī śaktir anvitavisayā, kintu anvaya-vatirekāvagataniḥ-kṛṣṭavisyayaiva, tātparyaśaktistu tesān anvita-vagama-paryantā....

NM, p. 371.
points out, Jayantabhatṭa was inspired by Kumārilabhaṭṭa in the context of his advocating Tātparya as a separate function. Though the earlier Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas did not explicitly recognise a Vṛtti like Tātparya, yet they utilised the spirit of the Tātparya in the sense of a motive force conveying the syntactical relation. This they did by way of admitting Vākyalakṣaṇā for obtaining the relational thought of a proposition. But we find that Pārthasārathimisra, a Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka himself, refers to the function of Tātparya.

Among the Ālāmākārikas, Abhinavagupta is the first to recognise Tātparya as a separate significative function. He refers to four distinct functions and arranges them in the order of Abhidhā, Tātparya, Laksāṇā and Vyāñjanā in conformity to the Abhīhitānvaya theory of verbal comprehension accepted by him. According to him, while Abhidhā, Laksāṇā and Vyāñjanā convey the individual word-meanings, Tātparyaśakti conveys the

206. Vide ITM, p. 223
207. yadyapi abhidhāvyāpāraḥ padārthesu eva paryavasitasah, tathāpi tātparyavyāpṛter apanyavasitāyāḥ..... NRkon SV, p. 909
208. trayo hyatra vyāpāraḥ sāmvedyante. .... padārthesu sāmānyātmasu..... tato viśeṣerūpe vākyārthe tātparyaśaktiḥ parasperānvite...... Locana, p.16
209. ibid.
syntactical relation among them. Abhinava’s concept of Tatparya is actually based on the Nyāyamāñjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa. 210

Among other Ālaṃkārikas Dhanika, the author of the Avaloka (a commentary on the Dāsārūpaka of Dhenaṇ-jaya), recognises Tatparya as a function that signifies the sentence-meaning in the form of the Tatparyārtha. 211 But as an opponent of the Dhavani theory, Dhanika maintains that the so-called Vyāngya Artha can be apprehended as the meaning of a sentence itself through this Tatparyaśakti. Thus his Tatparyārtha not only includes in itself the expressed meaning, but also the implied sense following it, as also the whole range of the intention of the speaker. 212

Both Mammata 213 and Viśvanātha 214 refer to Tatparya as a separate function admitted for conveying

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210. DISP, p. 214
211. na cāpadārthasya vākyārthatvāṁ nāstīti vācyam, kāryaparyevāsyitvāt tatparyāsaktēḥ. DR, IV, p. 238
212. Avaloka on DR, p. 156
213. ‘tattparyārtho ’pi keśucit’, padārthānāṁ parasya-parasmanvasye tattparyārtho viṣeṣavapur apadārtho ’pi samullasatītyabhihitānveṣayavādīnāṁ matam. KP, II.6
214. tattparyākhyāṁ vṛttimāhuḥ padārthānveṣayabodhane / ......... tadbodhakāṁ pare // SD, 11, 20
the syntactical relation among the individual word-meanings in a sentence. But from their texts, it is clear that Tatparya as a significative function is admitted not by these two authors themselves, but by 'others' (referred to as 'Keśucit' in KP and as 'Pare' in SD). By 'Others', Viśvanātha Kavirāja has meant the Abhihitānવvavādins. The author of KP, however, tactfully avoids naming any scholar or scholars recognising Tatparya-वत्ती. Most of the commentators and certain modern scholars understand by 'others' the Bhāṭṭamāṁśakas. In the context of admitting Tatparya as a वर्त्ती, as it appears, the later Ālāmārārikas like Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha seem not to have supported the view of the Naiyāyika Jayantabhaṭṭa and the Ālāmārārika Abhinavagupta also.

It may be noted here that even Anandavardhana does not conceive Tatparya as a वर्त्ती, but only as the intention of the speaker, the knowledge of which is necessary for the understanding of the sentence-meaning.

215. padārthānवvavasya bodhikā tatparyaśa nāma vṛttīḥ ........ ityabhīhitānवvavavādīnāṁ matām. SDK, p.16

216. Vide commentaries on KP 11.6 by Māṇikyacandra, Govinda Thakākura and Jhalkika. Also vide Pande K.C., Comparative Aesthetics, 1, p.217; Kane, P.V., Notes on SD.II above, vide SDK, p.86

217. tadavāṁ sābde vyavahāre trayāḥ prakārāḥ, vācakatvāṁ gunavṛttir vyaṁjakatvāṁ ca. DL, p. 194
Bhoja in his unique way of treating the subject, however, uses the term Tatparya in the general sense of the total meaning of a passage, which is of three types, viz. Vācyas (expressed), Pratiyamānas (implied) and Dhvanirūpas (suggested). He uses the term Tatparya in a restricted sense as equivalent to the intended meaning or suggestion.

Finally we may say that the admission of Tatparya is almost universal in respect of comprehension of the total meaning of a sentence. But the concept of the same is found to differ sometimes from school to school and sometimes from scholar to scholar in the same school.

In this context, certain observations of Dr. K.K. Raja who has exhaustively dealt with the issue, deserve to be noted: 'A kind of suggestion has to be accepted by all schools of thought, the individual words give only their own individual isolated meanings, leaving the Sāṃsarga or mutual relation of the meanings to be conveyed by suggestion. The Naiyāyikas may call it Tatparyavṛtti or Sāṃsargamaryādā, the Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsakas may call it

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218. tacca vākyapratipādyāṃ vastu trirūpaḥ bhavati. abhidhiyamānāṃ pratiyamānāṃ dhvanirūpāṇca.
SRP, p. 246

219. Raghavan, V. SRP, p. 19
Vide 1TM, pp. 214-215
Laksana, and the Prabhakaras may take it to be an extension of the primary power Abhidha itself. Tatparya, the speaker's intention or the general purport of the utterance, has to be accepted as a motivating factor in verbal comprehension, but there is no need to assume a separate function of words called Tatparyavrtti. This is why it has not been accepted as such by later writers.  

THE TERMS SAKTI, VRTTI AND VYAPARA

The significative functions of words are known in different systems of thought by such various terms as Sakti, Vrtti and Vyapara. The Alamkarikas have indiscriminately used all these three terms and even the term Kriya also to denote any of the verbal functions recognised by them. But the Naiyayikas and the Vaiyakaranas have used the term Vrtti only to signify a

\begin{enumerate}
  \item \text{trisra\'h \'{s}abdasya \'{s}aktaya\'{h}.} SD,11.3 ; mukhyam vrttim parityajya........ DL,K,17.a
  \item \text{laksan\'{a}ropita kriya.} KP,P,40
  \item \text{vrttisca \'{s}abdabodha........ . sambandha\',} TC, p. 627
  \item \text{s\'{a} ca vrttistridh\'{a}.} PLM, p.13
\end{enumerate}
verbal function. These two groups of scholars generally use the term *Sakti* as a synonym of *Abhidhā*. Of the Naiyāyikas, Visvanātha initially seems to use the term *Sakti* in the sense of both *Abhidhā* and *Lakṣaṇā*. As we have earlier pointed out, such a behaviour on the part of this scholar may be due to his awareness of dependence of Lakṣaṇā on the operation of Ṣakti.

The Mīmāṁsakas though generally use the term *Sakti* for the primary significative function of a word, yet are found to use the terms *Abhidhā*, Abhidhāna-ṣakti, Vācakatā, and Pratyāyakatva also in that sense.

While the Naiyāyikas use the term *Vṛtti* as a general name for a verbal function, they use the terms *Sakti* and *Samketa* also for *Abhidhā*. Their equation of

225. *saktidhīḥ* sahakārīṇī. BP, K. 81.a
226. *saktistrividhā*, sahajādheyā padaśaktīsceti. TP, vide BHC, p.17
227. *abhidhā* nānyathā sidhyediti vācakasaktatām / SV, Arthāpatti, 6.a
228. abnidhānasāktiḥ svabhāvikī...... TV, p. 683
229. tatra vācakatāyaṁ siddhāyām.... / SV, Šabda,76.a.
230. pratyāyakatvāṁ hi vācakatvām. NRM, p.86
231. samketo laksanā cārthe padavrūtiḥ. SAKV , p.1
Sakti with Samketa is obviously due to their admission of a conventional relation between a word and its corresponding meaning.

The term Vyapara being used by the Alamkārīkās as a synonym of Vṛtti, however, demands a scrutiny. A Vyapara, as we have observed earlier, is traditionally defined as 'tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajanakatvam'. Thus in the context of Sabdabodha, the very recollection of the meaning of a word produced by its knowledge, comes to be called a Vyapara. But a question may arise as to how this very notion of Vyapara is applicable to verbal functions like Abhiccha or Lakṣaṇā. To this, it may be pointed out that these functions too, have words as their Samavāyi kāraṇa (Intimate cause) inasmuch as in the form of an act, they inhere in the word and the meaning conveyed by them as their effect. Thus the function of a word serves as a cause on account of its being an unconditional invariable antecedent of the meaning conveyed. Thus what is conceived by the Mimamsakas as Sakti is explained as Kāraṇatvam (causality) by the Naiyāyikas. Hence the Alamkārīkās while using the term Vyapara for a verbal function, might have had in their mind such a concept of Vyapara as

232. NSM, p.2 quoted in NK, p. 830

233. na hi no darsane saktipadartha eva nasti........ ko'- sau terhi? Kāraṇatvam. NKU, I.13
cherished by the Naiyāyikas. In his Dhvanyāloka, Ānandavardhana identifies Vyāpāra as a capacity (Sakti) of a word, which is threefold viz. Abhidhā, Lakṣaṇā and Vyañjana. He uses the term Dharma (i.e. property) also in the sense of a Sabdavyāpāra and recognises the admission of a relation in the concept of the same.

The reason behind Ālaṃkārikas' identification of Sakti with Vyāpāra may be that, if the concept of Sakti be as rigid as that of the Mīmāṃsākās, then Sakti should mean a self-sufficient potentiality to signify the meaning instantaneously without the intervention of any other mental process. But from the treatment of verbal functions by Ālaṃkārikas in general and Ānandavardana in particular, we gather that these scholars were

234. sabdavyāpāragocaratvam...... vyañgyatvenaiva na vācyatvena.
DL, p.418

235. api ca vyañjakatvalakṣaṇo yah sabdārthayor dharmaḥ...
ibid, p.436

236. prasiddhābhidhānāntarasambandhayogyatvena........
yuktā.
ibid, pp. 418-419

237. tatra pratyākatvakalpanameva jyāyaḥ sabdānantarāṁ arthapratyayadarsanāt tasyaiva tatra kāraṇatvam kalpayitum yuktam.
NIRM, p.107, vide DTSP, pp. 187-188.
liberal enough to allow the admission of other psychological processes also in the matter of verbal comprehension and aesthetic relish as well.  

The Naiyāyikas may have difficulty in explaining Vṛtti as Vyāpāra. It is because, they conceive Vyāpāra from the viewpoint of Śabdabodha. As we have earlier pointed out, Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana considers Padārtha-dhī as Dvāra, i.e. Vyāpāra. Śabdabodha being the effect of Padajñāna, comes to be Tajjanya. Padārtha-jñāna as the immediate cause of Śabdabodha comes to be Tajjanyajanaka, i.e. Vyāpāra. So we do not find the Naiyāyikas describing their Sakti (i.e. Abhidhā) and Laksāṇā as Vyāpāra in any way.