PART—II

CHAPTER III:
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WESTERN AESTHETIC THEORIES PRECEDING KANT'S CRITICAL ENQUIRIES
SECTION 1: WHAT IS AESTHETICS?

Aesthetics is the philosophical study of beauty regarded in itself and in its application to art and nature. A history of aesthetics is the study of the succession of systematic theories by which philosophers have attempted to explain or connect together the facts that relate beauty. Different theories of aesthetics represent different points of view, from which beauty, whether in art or nature, has been studied by different thinkers at different times. Among the theories that have been advanced on the conception of beauty, we will discuss in brief the most outstanding ones that were anterior to Kant's theory of beauty. For the sake of convenience, we will attempt the task of tracing the aesthetic consciousness or sense of beauty through the stages of its development, starting from the pre-Socratic period and ending in Kantian philosophy, by dividing the entire chain of thought in different phases. These are (i) Beauty in Greek philosophy, (ii) Beauty in the philosophy of the Middle ages, (iii) Beauty in modern philosophy: from Descartes to Kant.

SECTION 2: BEAUTY IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY

Reflection upon beauty and upon fine art began among Hellenic thinkers. The dawn of Hellenic civilization is marked by the rise of plastic art. The objects of such art were the Homeric gods. Since the view of life at this stage was not spiritual, the god was not conceived as an unseen being. The Greek god was a part of nature. The representation of a divine being was to the Greek not a mere symbol which might faintly suggest Him who could be known only in the spirit, but a likeness of one who dwelt on earth, and whose nature was to be visible, and not to be invisible. Therefore, in the absence of any mystic sense of an invisible order of realities, the prevalent impression produced by the world of beauty was rather that of imitative representation. The artistic representation could not be treated as different in kind or in aim from a reality of ordinary life. Hence the principle that was followed by the artists in their production was imitation (mimesis). It consists in the production of a copy of what was directly perceptible in some medium such as clay or stone.

The early theory of imitation received some improvement in the hand of sophist Gorgias. To sophist Gorgias, if imitation were mere likeness to the
original, it would only arouse the memory of the copied through the consciousness of similarity. So imitation is more than mere likeness to the original; it is such perfect representation as deludes the spectator to take the product of art for the creation of nature.³

Socrates (469-399 B.C.) accepted the theory of imitation and applied it to the arts of painting and sculpture. Painting is "the representation of visible objects". The painter "represent substances imitating them by means of colour, hallow and high, dark and light, hard and soft, rough and smooth, fresh and old".⁴ However, imitation in his hand did not remain confined to copying of the sensible. He extended the principle of imitation to the ‘invisible’, and put art on the way to symbolism. A disposition of mind, Socrates says in the Memorabilia while discoursing with Parrhasius, can be imitated, although, it has neither proportion, nor colour, nor any of the qualities, and is not even a visible object. It is often observable in man that he regards others with a friendly or unfriendly look. At the good or ill fortune of people's friends, those who are affected at it, and those who are not, do not have the same sort of look. They look cheerful at their good, and sad at their evil fortune. It is possible to imitate those looks. In the same way nobleness and generosity of disposition, meanness and illiberality, modesty and intelligence, insolence and stupidity, show themselves both in the looks and gestures of men, whether they stand and move. These peculiarities can be imitated.⁵ These mental modes can be rendered not in direct representation, but only by means of expression of the face, and through the look of the eyes. Since the end of art, for him, was pleasure, considered from the aspect of end, art remained hedonistic in the hands of Socrates.⁶

Plato (427 - 347 B.C.) did not improve upon or modify the conception of imitation as it was prevalent among his predecessors. He simply elaborated it within the framework of his philosophy.

According to Plato, the Ideas are absolute reality, the Universals, and the necessary Forms which hold together the essential common qualities, belonging to many particulars. Ideas are transcendent; they exist beyond the world of stars. The absolute not-being is matter. The world of nature, i.e., the sensible world, is due to the contact of the world of Ideas with ‘matter’. Objects of sense, which are always particular and individual, participate both in the Ideas and in this not-being. They are halfway between Being and not-being. Ideas are the
cause, the ground of sense-objects. Sense objects are 'copies', 'imitations' of the Ideas. In so far as they resemble the Idea, they are real; in so far as they differ from it, they are unreal.

According to Plato, paintings, dramatic poems and songs are imitations in a narrower sense. In Book X of the Republic, he launches his tirade against art. Art is only imitation. It is the copy of an object of the senses, and this again is only a copy of an Idea. Hence a work of art is only a copy of a copy, a shadow of a shadow. It is this that places the arts at the second remove from the reality of the Forms, on the lowest level of the four levels of cognition, eikasia. Creation of nature or those of workmen have practical utility: a tree provides cool shadow to a scrotched traveller, a chair provides comfortable seat. But painted trees and chairs are utterly useless.

The poet, too, is in the same footing with the painter. The productions of both the painter and the poet are imitations of life which has itself only secondary reality, and neither the painter nor the poet have any knowledge of what they imitate. Both of them are second hand, unreal. The poet works, not with conscious intelligence, but from inspiration, like seers and oracle mongers who do not understand the meaning of the fine language they use. Such inspiration is irrational. The poet says very wise and beautiful things, but he does not know why they are wise and beautiful. This is what Plato calls 'divine madness'.

The appeal of dramatic poetry is not to the reason, but to a lower part of the soul, the emotions. The poet, instead of checking the excess, is concerned rather to stimulate and strengthen sympathetic emotion which threatens to undermine the reason.

So Plato's view of art (fine art in general, which includes painting, poetry and drama etc.) is that it does not belong to the lofty and rational region of the soul but to the sensual; it is not a strengthening but a corruption of the mind; it can serve only sensual pleasure, which troubles and obscures. For this reason, mimetic, poetry and poets must be excluded from the perfect Republic.\(^7\)

Though Plato by and large condemns art in the Republic, his fine aesthetic sense is also evident when in the Republic itself he slightly modifies his position and says that the only poetry that should be allowed in a state is hymns to the Gods and poems in praise of goodmen.\(^8\) In the Laws, Plato says
that the beauty of figure or beautiful melody consists in having good rhythm or
good harmony. Since virtue is also harmony of the soul, beautiful figures and
melodies are expressive of virtue of the soul of body, or images of virtues.
Figures and melodies, therefore, are without exception good (*Laws*, 655b).

In the *Laws*, Plato says that virtue and vice is originally present to the
children in the form of pleasure and pain. The particular training in respect of
pleasure and pain, which leads one to hate what ought to be hated, and love
what ought to be loved from the beginning of life to the end is called education.
In order to impart such education to man, Gods have appointed holy festivals,
where-in the Muses, Apollo, the leader of the Muses, and Dionysus, become
companions of men in their revels, and men partake in spiritual nourishment in
company with the Gods. Having been companions of ordinary men in the dances
and songs, which are called choruses, the Gods give them the pleasurable
sense of harmony and rhythm, and stir them into life. Men follow them, joining
hands together in dances and songs. In this way education is first given through
Apollo and the Muses. Well educated, therefore, is he who will be able to sing
and dance well. And the uneducated is he who has not been trained in the
chorus.9 Music and poetry are thus recognized in the *Laws* as indispensable
means of character education, as that which make men better and virtuous.

Since in the *Laws* Plato seems to allow all arts, as sources of pleasure, to
live in the ideal Republic, provided their exhibitions are “under due
regulations”10, and they are used, not for the mere satisfaction of sensuous
desires, but “with a view to the enforcement of temperance”,11 his view on art is
therefore called ‘Rigoristic Hedonism’12.

So Plato suffered from a kind of dichotomy regarding the question what
proper value must art be ascribed to. At one time he was rebellion against art,
and refused it a place in the ideal Republic; another time he was compromising,
and allowed art with some reservation. Aristotle (384 - 322 B.C.), the pupil of
Plato, took this compromise and developed his theory of ‘pedagogism’ of art: the
end of art is to improve its lover morally.13

Aristotle did not reject the idea of imitation. Given reality was still for him
the standard. He, however, stretched the idea of imitation. Artistic treatment
produces a difference in the given reality; it makes it idealized. So imitation is
not mere imitation — a faithful representation of real objects in nature. Imitation
consists in idealization, in presenting them as they ought to be under the control of the 'Ideas' which are immanent in them.\textsuperscript{14}

According to Aristotle, Ideas do not reside in a world apart. They are not transcendent, but immanent. They have existence, not separately from matter but in matter. The world of experience is not a mere shadow of the Ideal world. It is a real world of Form and matter in union. The Idea is not beyond the reach of the creative artist. Now Idea can be grasped through intellect only. Therefore art is creative activity under intellectual direction. Art as imitation is not the presentation of things as they are known to senses. Imitation is idealization, i.e., the presentation of things as they are visualized by the intellect to be under the controlling forces of Ideas. Art regards the individual thing not as individual, but in its universal aspect, as the fleeting embodiment of an eternal thought.

Among the arts, Aristotle chiefly confined his discussion to the art of invention or composition in poetry. Our knowledge of his aesthetic theory comes chiefly from \textit{Poetics}. Of the poetic arts, the phenomenon of tragedy in particular chiefly attracted his attention. In his \textit{Poetics}, Aristotle defines tragedy thus, "A tragedy, then, is the imitation of an action that is serious and also, as having magnitude, complete in itself; in language with pleasurable accessories, each kind brought in separately in the parts of the work; in a dramatic, not in a narrative form; with incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions".\textsuperscript{15}

The principal aim of tragedy is to arouse emotions of pity and fear by drawing dramatic pictures of suffering, and also to effect a catharsis. Fear is "a pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some destructive or painful evil in the future"\textsuperscript{16}, and even these "only if they appear not remote but so near as to be imminent".\textsuperscript{17} We do not fear things that are a very long way off; we all know, for instance, that we shall die, but we are not troubled thereby, because death is not close at hand. Pity is "a feeling of pain caused by the sight of some evil, destructive or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it, and which we might expect to befall ourselves or some friend of ours, and moreover to befall as soon".\textsuperscript{18} What we fear for ourselves excites our pity when it happens to others.

According to Aristotle, the origin of tragedy is due to two motives. Imitation is natural to man from childhood.\textsuperscript{18(a)} Imitation is pleasurable when it is
recognized to be imitation of known reality. The truth of this second point is shown by experience: though the objects themselves may be painful to see, we delight to view the most realistic representation of them in art, the forms for example of the lowest animals and of dead bodies. The recognizing of imitation is naturally pleasant to man because man finds learning pleasant and recognizing, say, a picture of a dog, is a form of learning. Since tragedy is an imitation of a special sort of object, namely fearful and pitable events, its proper pleasure is the pleasure that comes from pity and fear by means of imitation.

According to Aristotle, the aim of tragedy is to effect purification or *katharsis* of emotions through bringing about a purgation or discharge of the excessive elements of emotions, such as pity and fear, and thus freeing the emotions from the unwanted and producing harmony among them, i.e., bringing them to ‘the mean’. By bringing in the concept of *katharsis*, Aristotle tries to prove that tragedy at least is capable of bringing about moderation in people. Art can thus serve as the hand maid of morality. This is how he improves upon the aesthetic theory of his teacher by raising art from the sphere of mere sensibility to that of morality.

So far we have been discussing the theories of different Greek thinkers on art or artistic beauty. A fuller understanding of the aesthetic consciousness prevalent in ancient Greece requires also the enquiry into their search for the meaning of the conception of beautiful taken as a whole. Plato separated the beautiful from art, and Aristotle agreed with it. The study of beauty came in Greece not before the time of Socrates. The reason is that nothing comes of the study of beauty except in an integrally constituted philosophy, and before the age of Pericles Greek thought was unable to attain the true systematization. Almost all the Greek thinkers on beauty commonly held that beauty is an attribute of things. If, for a while, they gave their thought at all on the impressions that it makes upon one, they did this only secondarily, and not in order to see in the impressions an essential element of beauty.

The theory of the beautiful among the ancients was connected with the notions of rhythm, symmetry, harmony of parts, in a word, with the general formula of unity of variety. They saw in the great art of the ancient Hellenese chiefly the qualities of harmony, regularity and repose. The belief that beauty consists in certain proportion of parts, indeed, originated with Pythagoras’s
discovery that musical intervals depended on certain mathematical ratios of lengths of string held at the same tension. The Platonic-Aristotelian theory was that beauty resides in order and in the metaphysical elements included in order, namely, unity and multiplicity (harmony, symmetry, proportion).\textsuperscript{20} In fact, the study of order was the aesthetic aspect of the general problem which eclipsed the Greek mind, namely, the study of unity and multiplicity. Architectures and sculptures of the time of Pericles were embodiments in stone and marble the Platonic - Aristotelian formula. In the \textit{Philebus} Plato says, "And now the power of the good has retired into the region of the beautiful; for measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue all the world over".\textsuperscript{21} That Plato placed beauty in measure and proportion is clearly evident from the \textit{Philebus} 51. Protarchus asks Socrates what pleasures should we be right in conceiving to be true. In reply Socrates says that true pleasures are those which are given by beauty of colour and form. Next he goes on to clarify what he meant by beauty of form. By beauty of form is not meant such beauty as that of animals or pictures. Rather, he meant by it, "straight lines and circles, and the plain and solid figures which are formed out of them by turning-lathes and rulers and measures of angles; for these I affirm to be not only relatively beautiful, like other things, but they are eternally and absolutely beautiful, and they have peculiar pleasures, quite unlike the pleasures of scratching. And there are colours which are of the same character, and have similar pleasures ... When sounds are smooth and clear, and have a single pure tone, then I mean to say that they are not relatively but absolutely beautiful, and have natural pleasures of the same character".\textsuperscript{22} In this passage, the elementary geometrical forms, even the straight line, and more particularly certain triangles, are set down as absolutely beautiful. They are among the purest examples of unity in the form of single regular or symmetrical shape. Plato also recognizes, in the above passage, the self-identical quality of a colour extended in space or of a tone extended in time as beautiful for the reason of their being the most obvious types of sensuous presentations of unity.

The same voice is echoed in Aristotle's philosophy, when in the \textit{Poetics} Aristotle says that tragedy grows out of our sense of melody and rhythms, which is "natural to us".\textsuperscript{23} He elucidated the same principle of the relation of the one to the many, or of the whole to the part (or in more abstract term, the synthesis of the unity in variety) while considering the proper construction of the fable or plot.
of tragedy. Tragedy, for him, is "an imitation of an action that is complete in itself, as a whole of some magnitude." \(^{24}\) "Now a whole is that which has beginning, middle, and end. A beginning is that which is not itself necessarily after anything else, and which has naturally something else after it; an end is that which is naturally after something itself, either as its necessary or usual consequent, and with nothing else after it; and a middle, that which is by nature after one thing and has also another after it ... Again: to be beautiful, a living creature, and every whole made up of parts, must not only present a certain order in its arrangement of parts, but also be of a certain definite magnitude. Beauty is a matter of size and order..." \(^{25}\) As beauty depends on size and order, it is impossible in two cases. Beauty is impossible in a very minute creature, since our perception becomes indistinct as it approaches instantaneity. Beauty is also impossible in a creature of vast size, say, for example, 1000 miles long, since in that case, "instead of the object being seen all at once, the unity and wholeness of it is lost to the beholder". \(^{26}\) Just as a beautiful whole is made up of parts, or a beautiful living creature must be of such a size as is possible to be taken in by the eye, so a story or plot must be of some such length, so that it may be easily held in the memory.

The common-place belief about any beautiful object is often that it is such an object that if anything, very small, is added to it, or a smallest part is taken away from it, it would be spoiled altogether. This is genuine Greek aesthetic belief. Aristotle also expressed the same idea when he said, "The truth is that, just as in the other imitative arts one imitation is always of one thing, so in poetry the story, as an imitation of action, must represent one action, a complete whole, with its several incidents so closely connected that the transposal or withdrawal of any one of them will disjoin and dislocate the whole. For that which makes no perceptible difference by its presence or absence is no real part of the whole". \(^{27}\)

The period between the death of Alexander in 323 B.C. and the inauguration of Constantinople as the seat of Government for the Roman Empire in 330 A.D., is marked by the absence of complete systems in continuous succession. A number of post-Aristotelian treatises being lost to us, we come about with tendencies fragmentarily indicated. After Aristotle (d. 322 B.C.)
next name of first magnitude in aesthetics is Plotinus (204 – 269 A.D). The five centuries that flowed between is lacked by any great theory.

Among the thinkers that appeared in the interval between Aristotle and Plotinus, Cicero (106 – 43B.C.) was one of the most philosophically minded. He cared more for the way things seem to the listener, i.e., for the method of presentation, than the matter itself. If one is ignorant how to form and polish his speech, he cannot express himself eloquently even about a subject he understands very well. Thought cannot be made to shine without the light of language. In an age which saw the addition of thirty-three new aesthetic terms to make possible refined criticism of stylistic quality, Cicero was one of the main contributors to the technical fund. He coined many terms, transferring to literature qualities primarily moral or physiological. Cicero outlined an ideal necessary for a good orator.

An outstanding influential work on literature during the Roman period is *Peri Hypsous* or *On the Sublime*, probably written during the first century AD perhaps by a Greek named Longinus. Longinus provided a handbook for orators who wanted to develop their speaking skills, but later audiences were not much interested in his helpful hints for which they accepted Cicero and Aristotle as their mentors. What captured their attention was what Longinus had to say in passing about content rather than about style, and the poetic examples he had given. According to him, the grand style is suited only to subjects that are in themselves lofty, magnificent and astonishing — subjects that are sublime. For ordinary topics, everyday language is good enough. Sublimity is the image of the greatness of the soul. Nature has adjudged us men to be creatures of no mean or ignoble quality. From the first “she has implanted in our souls an unconquerable passion for all that is great and for all that is more divine than ourselves”.28

The whole world is not wide enough for the soaring range of human thought, but man’s mind often overleaps the very bounds of space. When we look at life from all sides, and see it abounding everywhere in what is elegant, grand and beautiful, we learn at once the purpose of our creation. “This is why, by some sort of natural instinct, we admire, not, surely, the small streams, beautifully clear though they may be, and useful too, but the Nile, the Danube, the Rhine, and even more than these the Ocean”.29 Not only nature, but art also
affords instances of the sublime. The sublime, wherever it occurs, is like a force of nature rather than a product of skill, and is destined to please all men at all time. In order to present an exalted subject, the grand style, adopted by the speaker, impregnates a passage with such strong suggestion that it becomes very difficult, or rather, impossible, to resist its appeal. The grand style therefore has great and irresistible emotional force. It not only persuades, but even ravishes and transports the hearer. “For the effect of elevated language is, not to persuade the hearers, but to entrance them; and at all times, and in every way, what transports us with wonder is more telling than what merely persuades and gratifies us”. The speaker who succeeds in presenting an exalted subject in a suitably elevated style thereby reveals an inward greatness. All other attributes prove their possessors to be men, but “sublimity carries one up to where one is close to the majestic mind of God”.

In the discussion of style he betrayed a consciousness that sublimity has some connection with incompleteness, but this idea, which forms rightly or wrongly an important factor in the theory of Kant, he does not pursue to any speculative result. Though philosophically incomplete, Longinus’s work is responsible for the exceedingly important part played by the theory of the sublime in modern speculation.

The philosophical reflection, that continued in the Platonic schools until the Academy of Athens was closed by Justinian I in A.D. 529, culminated in a new school of thought that arose in the third century A.D. in Alexandria, the centre then of civilization and culture. This new school of thought is called Neo-Platonism. Though the reputed founder of this school was Ammonias Saccas, his disciple Plotinus was the greatest exponent of it who first developed Neo-Platonism into a system.

Aristotle wrote on various aspects of the problem of aesthetics, which became separate centers of interest to his successors. Some of them studied the technical aspects, viz. the powers of language which are the means of poetic and dramatic production. Theophratus was responsible for increased attention to the word as aesthetic unit in the art of rhetoric. Besides this accent on the discrete verbal element, he refined and elaborated the desirable qualities of style. Whereas Aristotle had admitted two qualities only, namely, clearness and propriety, Theophratus added two more, namely, correctness and ornateness,
and emphasized the help given by figures of speech. Stoics also engaged themselves in grammatical problems and literary styles. Quintilian spoke of the force and compactness. Plotinus, in particular, occupied himself with the end of art, i.e., the problem of aesthetic experience. He improved upon the Aristotelian position in this respect. Aristotle believed that aesthetic experience was the experience of emotion at a high pitch, and the end of art (tragic) was the production of 'mean' to which an emotion is brought by the kathartik effect of tragedy. Plotinus, on the other hand, held that it is beyond the emotional level, and belongs to the transcendent, the spiritual level. Plotinus thus freed art from subordination to morality. He was representative of the mystical view of art which considered art as a special mode of self-beautification, of entering into relation with the Absolute, with the Good, with the ultimate root of things.

There are two distinct parts in the doctrine of Plotinus. First there is a critical part, his protests against the identification of beauty with symmetry. If beauty consists in mere symmetry, the simple parts of a beautiful whole, such as colour, lightning, the starts, could not be beautiful in themselves, whereas in reality a beautiful whole must have parts which are beautiful separately as well as in combination; beauty cannot result from a collection of ugly things. Plotinus also argued that there are things, such as simple sense qualities (colours and tones) and also moral qualities, that are simply beautiful without having any relation to symmetry, and, on the other hand, there is symmetry in things ugly. Moreover, an object can lose some of its beauty (as when a person dies) without losing any symmetry. Therefore, symmetry is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of beauty.

Next we come to the constructive part of beauty. Plato had shown that the idea of the One, exclusive of all multiplicity, was an impossible abstraction. The Absolute Being can be no abstract unity, but only a unity in multiplicity. Plotinus thought that behind the visible world there stands a primary being (God), called the One or the Good, which is the ultimate reality in its first ‘hypostasis’ or role. It is so transcendent that it is beyond all conception and knowledge. The One is the ‘potentiality of the Universe’. The One is the source and goal of everything, from which all oppositions and diversities emanate. This is the highest state attainable by the soul, the state of mystical ecstasy. In its second hypostasis, reality is Intellect or Spirit (Nous) or mind. Nous is the first
emanation from the One. It is not discursive thought. It thinks the One, and it
thinks itself. It corresponds to Plato’s world of Ideas. The Ideas of all things
exist in the Nous. It is the substance of which the phenomenal world is a
shadow. As a level of experience, it is just below the level of mystical ecstasy. It
is the level of the experience of the beautiful. It is here that we have the
aesthetic experience. In its third hypostasis, reality is the world soul (psyche),
the principle of creativity and life. The world-soul proceeds from the Nous as
second emanation. It stands midway between the phenomenal world of which it
is the principle, and the world of Spirit, which is its principle. It is the mediator
between Ideas and the corporeal world. To this third belongs the discursive
reasoning and the act of division.\(^{33(c)}\) The matter or whole of the phenomenal
world proceeds from it through the process of emanation. It produces out of itself
the individual souls which inhabit the world. The idea of emanation is conceived
poetically by Plotinus as resembling light which radiates from a bright centre,
and grows dimmer as it passes outwards, till it shades off at last into total
darkness.\(^{34}\) Within this scheme — infinite gradations of being ‘emanating’ from
the central ‘light’ — Plotinus develops his theory of beauty.

Plotinus calls the One “Beauty”. One, however, is not beautiful, for
beautiful is embodied in form, and One is formless. One is identical with Beauty
since Beauty is not embodied in form. He calls beautiful the Spiritual world, the
first emanation from the One, and which is the object of experience of the Nous.
Forms which belong to the Spiritual world are beautiful. One is the source and
beginning of the beautiful. Soul is beautiful through Spirit, bodies are beautiful
through soul, which forms them, and so are beautiful actions and practices. The
world of sense is a beautiful shadow, reflection or emanation of the Spiritual
world which is beautiful in itself. It is a picture, drawn by the World-Soul, which,
like an artist, keeps its eyes fixed on the Ideal, the Spiritual world. Beautiful
forms in the physical world have a real resemblance to their archetypes in the
Spiritual world.

Plotinus had compared the descending scale of beauty with light and its
simple diffusion. In his philosophy, light has become synonymous with being,
with Goodness and with Beauty. Everything shines in the world of intelligence.
The most beautiful thing, in the world of sense, is fire. Fire holds the rank of
Ideal-Principle to the other elements. It is the subtlest and sprihftliest of all
bodies. All the others are penetrated by it; they receive the Form of colour from it.\textsuperscript{34(a)} The glory of light, then, in Plotinus's philosophy, has a metaphysical value and is correlative with the conception of being; it is not a question of the impression produced, or of a relation between the thing and the subject who perceives it. So Beauty, that we find in objects is not the subjective element contributed by individual soul, which admires it. It is not a question of the impression produced, or of a relation between the splendour of the thing and the capacity of the subject who contemplates it. Thus in Plotinus too, we find the common feature of beauty which characterizes all the aesthetic theories of Greece: beauty is considered as an attribute of thing.

Objects of the physical world are made up of matter and Form. Form is a principle of unity and what it moulds must come to unity. It rallies confusion into co-operation, and has made the sum one harmonious whole. The Form groups and coordinates the parts, which make a unity, and this unity is beautiful. The more an object expresses Form, the principle of unity, life and order, the more beautiful it is. So physical objects have beauty proportionate to their communion in Form.\textsuperscript{34(b)} However, the beauty that is found in the material world, is inferior to that of the Spiritual world. The imperfect beauty in the material world is to be found in the objects of sight and hearing only. Plotinus admits only two aesthetic senses, sight and hearing. Beauty also lies in good character and conduct, which is beautiful in itself.

As there are Ideas or Forms of the individual objects, which are archetypes of the individual objects in the physical world, there are individual Spirits also corresponding to individual souls in this world. The individual soul stands midway between the phenomenal world and the world of Spirit, and is the connecting link. All the metaphysical principles are represented within it. The individual souls are the microcosm, the \textit{Logoi} of the individual Spirits in the Spiritual world. In beautiful things, the soul recognizes an affinity to itself. This affinity consists in its own participation in Ideal Form and its Divinity, and is co-extensive with the beautiful. The Ideal Form produces both the beautiful thing and the soul that perceives them. The Form in the beautiful thing reminds the soul of its Spiritual nature. Just as beauty is that property in things, which the soul recognizes as akin to her own essence, so ugly is that which she feels to be alien and antipathic to herself. Just as beautiful is that which participates in the
Spiritual Form, so ugly is that which is isolated from such Form, the 'Divine Thought'\(^{35}\).

According to Plotinus, Plato was wrong to despise the arts because they imitated nature. For, in the first place, natural things themselves are an imitation of Reasons or Ideas (Forms), and next, the arts do not simply imitate the visible, but go back to the Reasons or Forms from which nature itself is derived. Further arts create much out of themselves, and add beauty where it is wanting in nature. "Thus Pheidias wrought the Zeus upon no model among things of sense but by apprehending what form Zeus must take if he chose to become manifest to sight."\(^{35(a)}\)

Art is a product of intellectual imagination, and not of mere imitation. Imitation can copy the perceptible only, but imagination can picture up what is beyond the perceptual sphere. The activity of imagination extends to supersensuous. True artist fixes his eyes on archetypal \textit{Logoi} and tries to draw inspiration from the Spiritual power that creates the forms of bodily beauty. Art therefore, is not representative, but symbolical. It symbolizes an Idea, as it figures in the vision of the artist. The imagination creates images which are reflections of Reason in her most exalted mood. Artistic symbols are merely representations of such creations of intellectual imagination.\(^{36}\)

From the time of Plotinus the whole metaphysical assumption that art is limited by ordinary perception, which assumption is one with the imitative theory of fine arts, is broken through. It is henceforth understood that art is not imitative but symbolic. Further it is only with Plotinus that the two divided territories of the beautiful and art are united and the beautiful and art are fused into a single concept by the absorption of imitative art in the beautiful. We thus reach an altogether new view: the beautiful and art are now both alike melted into a mystical passion and elevation of the spirit.\(^{37}\) Perfect Beauty for Plotinus, is the Ideal and Spiritual, which is not to be found in the sensible world due to its spatial and temporal limitations. In nature, or in the work of the artist-craftsman, we have lesser and dimmer manifestations of the absolute and ultimate Beauty. However, imperfect beauty of the sensible world is the most suitable means that is available to imperfect souls that we are, to proceed to the realization of the perfect Beauty. Admiration of earthly beauty (beauty of nature or art) is the first step to the vision of the Spiritual Beauty. Disinterested love of the natural or
artistic beauty is the first step to aesthetic experience. The next step after disinterested love of sensible beauty of nature or of art is the true understanding of it, for which we have to rise from the sense-level to intellectual and to find out the underlying principle, the archetype, the vital law, which gives meaning to it. It involves intense concentration of mind and will on what is believed to be the essential of the quest. This is just what scientists and poets do. Now discursive reason can lead to but cannot grasp the Form because it is Spiritual. Apprehension of Form, of true Beauty is possible only through becoming like Spirit. Soul, therefore, has to free itself from all that is non-spiritual in it by rising not only above body and senses but also above memory and reason. Thus, the third, the final step to aesthetic experience is the rise from rational to Spiritual level. The soul turns to itself and recollects the highest Spiritual Form, a similarity with which the present beautiful object bears, and is led to the recognition of the Spiritual Form, disguised in material cover. Aesthetic experience is therefore, recognizable experience is as much as it consists in the recognition of Form, appearing in the imperfect expression in matter. The strong contemplation of the previous stage is now replaced by the living contemplation, which involves interaction of Spirit and Idea, and therefore, identification of the two. The contemplative subject loses its distinct consciousness and loses itself in the object that it contemplates. The subject becomes the object. In contemplating Beauty, the soul identifies itself with the formative activity of its own higher principles.

Thus in the philosophy of Plotinus, the moralistic limitations of beauty is thrown aside. All that symbolizes in sensuous or material form the laws or reasons eternally active in the world has a right to rank as beautiful. “Beauty comes to be regarded as a direct expression of reason in sense by way of aesthetic semblance only and is therefore co-ordinate with morality and not subordinate to it”.

38 The same reality, approached through intellect, will and love is True, Good and Beautiful. They are the highest forms in which reality can be apprehended by spirits. Aesthetical ascent is not separate from the intellectual and the moral ascent. The three paths are intellectually parallel, but spiritually mutually exclusive.
SECTION 3: AESTHETIC CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE MIDDLE AGES

In the emanative philosophy of Plotinus, by a method of loss, a series of principles was derived, each less perfect than its predecessors. The realization is always less than the Idea, the created less than the creator. This is only an application of the philosophical dualism of Plato, for which everything visible or material is a sign or counterpart of something invisible or immaterial, a doctrine which was opposed to the naturalistic monism of the ordinary Hellenic creed before Plato. The underlying conception of dualism is that nature and art, belonging to the visible universe, are beautiful if and in so far as they worthily symbolize the Divine power and goodness, and consequently do not appeal to sensuous interest or desire. This conception of Plotinus was essentially maintained by the intellectual consciousness of Christendom. The consciousness of Christendom was also dualistic (Christianity taught that the world was created ex nihilo by God, rather than generated or moulded out of something else). The Christian successors of Plotinus recognized the beauty of material nature as the direct work and symbol of Divinity. But they accentuated this recognition by a tendency to disparage, in comparison, arts, the works of men. The Church Fathers, at the entrance to the middle ages, began with a special sympathy for nature as opposed to the works of men. They depreciated art, the work of men, to make beauty of the world, the work of God, more glorious. Nature became an allegory, and every natural object a symbol of something beyond. This aesthetic rigorism, the total negation of art for religion or for divine and human science among certain Fathers of the Church at the entrance to the middle ages penetrated deeply in the minds of contemporary thinkers. St. Augustine (353 – 430A.D), one of the two greatest thinkers of the middle ages (the other is St. Thomas Aquinas), began to distrust fine art like others of his time, and dealt rather with the world than fine art in his account of beauty.

Almost all the developments of ancient aesthetics were continued by tradition or reappeared by spontaneous generation in the course of the middle ages. St. Augustine inclined somewhat towards the Platonic-Aristotelian theories. In his treatise De Pulchro et Apto (“On the Beautiful and Fitting”), which he wrote in his youth, he provided with a formal doctrine of beauty, and
did not in general go beyond the conception of symmetrical relations between parts as belonging to a whole. He distinguished a beauty that belongs to things in virtue of their forming a whole and a beauty that belongs to things in virtue of their fitting in with something else or being part of a whole: "And I marked and perceived that in bodies themselves there was a beauty from their forming a kind of whole, and another from mutual fitness, as one part of the body with its whole, or a shoe with a foot, and so on." 39 Other works, which contain his later thoughts, are De Ordine (Concerning Order), De Vera Religione (Concerning True Religion) and De Musica (A Treatise on Meter). His thoughts on beauty are scattered throughout these works. The key concepts in Augustine's theory are unity, number, equality, proportion and order. Unity is the basic notion. The existence of individual things as units, and the possibility of comparing them with respect to equality or likeness, gives rise to proportion, measure, and number. Number is fundamental both to being and to beauty. Number gives rise to order, the arrangement of equal and unequal parts into an integrated complex in accordance with an end. And from order comes a second kind of unity, the emergent unity of heterogeneous wholes, harmonized or made symmetrical through internal relations of likeness between the parts. 40

Augustine was famous also for his conception of ugly, which he thought to be a subordinate element of beauty to which it serves as a foil. "Poisons, dangerous animals, and the like, all have their due place in the world and so far as elements in its beauty." 41 Ugly serves to bring beauty to prominence by contrast and contributes to the effectiveness of beauty, if put in right and proper relation with it. Ugliness, as a subordinate element in the beautiful, contributes on the whole to an effect which is harmonious or symmetrical almost in the traditional sense. 42

In the middle ages, the idea of beauty was developed principally by Scholastic philosophy. A new thought about the idea of beauty was now evident among the great scholastics. The beautiful no longer appeared under purely objective aspect, as in the Greek schools, but as a complex notion which belonged partly to the things and partly to the psychic subject who received the impressions of them: the beautiful was the result of a close connection between the two.
St. Thomas Aquinas (1225 – 1274) is generally regarded as the greatest of the scholastic philosophers. He had no treatise on the nature of beauty and of art making, but his ideas on these subjects can be gathered from his brief remarks in his *Commentary on the Divine names (De Divinis Nominibus)* and in the *Summa Theologiae*.

According to Aquinas, beauty is addressed to sense of sight and hearing in particular and cognitive power in general. Sight and hearing alone are aesthetic senses because they are "the best avenues of knowledge ... as ministering to reason" and more perceptive than taste and smell. Aesthetic activity is an activity of perception. More precisely, it is a disinterested contemplation by the eye, the ear and the intelligence. This contemplation begets a specific enjoyment, the pleasure of the beautiful. Considered from this psychological aspect, pleasure of the beautiful is different from the pleasure of the good. Goodness is being considered in relation to desire. The pleasant of the good is that which terminates the movement of appetite in the form of rest in the thing desired. We enjoy good by taking possession of the object itself. But in beauty, desire is quited due to the satisfaction of senses and cognitive power. We enjoy the beautiful by the simple perception of it. Beauty is what pleases on being seen.

So far we have been concerned with the subjective aspect of the beautiful in Aquinas’s philosophy. Next we turn over to the objective aspect of the beautiful. In the *De Divinis Nominibus*, he says that harmony (*consonantia*) is intrinsic to the essence of beauty. Hence all things which in anyway appertain to harmony (and thus to order and proportion) proceed from the divine Beauty. Senses are charmed by symmetrical and well-ordered objects. Beauty feeds the senses with something orderly. Sight and hearing are alone aesthetic because they are the only orderly senses and as such, they can assimilate to themselves order and measure. The scholastic doctrine unanimously accepted the Platonico-Aristotelian theory of beauty: order and its elements constitute the beautiful. Aesthetic order is closely connected with the form of beings. Form of a thing is that which makes a thing what it is, constitutes the principle of its constitution and perfection. Each thing is beautiful to the extent that it manifests its proper form. The identification of beauty with form is St. Augustine’s principal aesthetic thesis. It has often been suggested that St. Thomas is to St. Augustine as...
Aristotle is to Plato. Just as Aristotle hardly put forward a single aesthetic notion which was not already present in a Platonic conversation, so the more elaborate system of St. Thomas was founded on concepts and theories which St. Augustine had set down. 43

The order of the beautiful is not any order whatever, but such an order as is capable of giving to the subject that perceives it the natural and entire satisfaction which engenders aesthetic pleasure. So beauty is only ascribable in the context of actual or potential contemplation of the form of a thing. This introduces an element of subjectivity but relates it directly to an objective ground, the nature of the object being contemplated. Earlier, in the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas mentions that beauty includes three conditions. First, there is integrity or perfection: broken or injured objects, incomplete objects, are ugly. Second, there is due proportion or harmony. Third, there is brightness or clarity: those things are called beautiful which have an elegant colour. 43(a) The earlier analysis of beauty now emerges as an account of the necessary conditions under which the meeting of an object and a subject gives rise to aesthetic experience. First, the thing in question must be possessed of the elements or aspects apt to something having the relevant form or nature. Second, these elements must be properly related to one another; ‘due proportion or harmony’ also refers to a relation between the object and the perceiver: that the eminently visible object, for example, is proportioned to the sight. Third, these states must be manifest when the entity is perceived or contemplated. The order or form must be bright; it must be luminous to the eyes. The more form strikes the spectator, the more resplendent it is, and the more aesthetic will be the value that the impression experienced possesses.

The scholastic account of the light of the beautiful rises above Neo-Platonism. While for Plotinus, the theory of light has a metaphysical bearing, for scholastics like Thomas Aquinas, it is a psychological phenomenon, for it has to do with the mysterious connection between the object and the subject which forms the basis of the complex phenomenon of beauty. Aquinas’s claim that the experience of beauty arises directly as a type of intellectual satisfaction taken in the contemplation of elements apt for cognition when one’s present interest in them is not practical, is parallel to Kantian aesthetics.
SECTION 4: AESTHETIC IDEAS IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY

From the beginning of the 17th century, with the commencement of modern philosophy, interest in aesthetic investigation increased rapidly. Owing to the great burst of artistic criticism during the Renaissance, the artistic culture which was greatly aided by archaeological excavations, and the analysis of statuary and ancient drama, discussion of the great problems of beauty steadily gained importance and extent. Modern philosophy took its stand almost exclusively on the psychological side of beauty, and regarded it as a purely subjective phenomenon. This was due to the fact that in modern philosophy, psychological research made a great progress. The progress of psychological research naturally inserted a great influence on aesthetic consciousness in this period. Beauty, therefore, came to be studied only under its cognitive and emotive aspect, i.e., as a psychic fact.

In consonance with the two lines of psychological systems, empiricism and rationalism, originating from Francis Bacon and Descartes respectively, aesthetic investigation was carried along two lines.

EMPIRICISM

Thinkers in the Baconian tradition of empiricism were greatly interested in the psychology of art, especially the creative process and the effect of art upon the beholder. Though imagination had long been acknowledged to be playing a central role in artistic creation, it was only with the empiricists of the 17th century that the systematic investigation upon its mode of operation began. Bacon (1561-1626) divided the intellectual globe into three parts and assigned a faculty of the mind to each: memory to history, imagination to poetry, reason to philosophy. Reason and history buckles and bows down the mind to the nature of things. But imagination raises the mind and carries it aloft, accommodating the shows of the thing to the desires of the mind. Imagination exceeds the measure of nature, making unlawful matches and divorces of things. At first sight, Bacon thus appears to be recognizing the independence of a poet’s fancy, and the height of his invention. Poetry brings a more perfect order and a more beautiful variety than it can be found anywhere in nature. Although at one period, Bacon allowed the imagination an equal third place with the memory and
understanding, yet he changed his opinion later and left only memory and understanding, dropping imagination to the position of messenger between the other two.\footnote{44} Hobbes’s (1588-1679) was the attempt to draw the wild ranging of the poet within the neat scheme of his mechanical philosophy. The presupposition of his whole philosophy is that nothing exists in reality but matter and motion. The external body ‘presseth the organ proper to each sense’.\footnote{44(a)} A sensation, therefore, is a motion received from without. The pressure, by the mediation of nerves and other strings and membrances of the body continues inwards to the brain and heart, and causes there a resistance or counter-pressure. This counter-pressure or motion outwards is our formation of an image from the sensation.\footnote{45} The memory is a store-house of the residues of motions.

As we see in the water, though the wind ceases, the waves give not over rolling for a long time after, so also it happens that when the original physiological motions of sensation loose their vivacity and cease, the impressions of sensation persist in the memory in the form of mental images of sensation. The imagination is made up of these images stored in the memory. But it is something less than normal sense perception because the images are not the real objects and because like the voice of man in the noise of the day, they are obscure. As the light of the sun obscureth the light of the stars, the objects more present succeeding and working in us obscure the imagination of the past. Imagination is ‘decaying sense’.\footnote{45(a)}

However, imagination is not always simple and passive. Poetic imagination is compound, and delicate: it is then a relating activity. It sees similarities between things, which would remain unnoticed but for it, and rearranges these old images into novel ones. When a man compounds the image of his own person with the image of the actions of another man, as when a man imagines himself a Hercules or an Alexander, it is a compound imagination.\footnote{45(b)} All similes and metaphors are thus the discoveries or creations of imagination. It gives poets and orators the power, by means of which they can make things please or displease.

Poetic Imagination, according to Hobbes, may also include judgement. Judgement detects differences. It is the ‘intellectual discernment’.\footnote{46} In any kind
of poetry, though both judgement and imagination are required, the more eminent is the imagination, for upon it rests the sublimity of a poet.

Where philosophy has already introduced order and system among the data of experience, imagination finds the substance, and the only function that remains for it is simply to adorn and make it pleasing. But where philosophy has failed to do her part, imagination fetch both substance and words, and aims at presenting such a well-ordered and well-arranged system of data of experience as, when well-adorned, pleases the mind of the reader. Imagination thus functions as reason too, when it thinks and classifies and not merely burns and flies.47

In the later 17th century, we observe a widespread distrust of imagination. Locke (1632-1704) held that some connections of ideas are based on nature, and as such are archetypal and real. They are creations of mathematics only, but not of poets. Now there is also a kind of connection or association of ideas, which are not based on nature; they are made up of such collections of simple ideas as were really never united, never found together in any substance. By custom or chance, they come to be so united in some men's mind that it is very hard to separate them. “The ideas of goblins and sprites have really no more to do with darkness than light; yet let but a foolish maid inculcate these often on the mind of a child, and raise them there together, possibly he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives, but darkness shall ever afterwards bring with it those frightful ideas, and they shall be so joined that he can no more bear the one than the other.” 47(a) These kind of association of ideas is at the root of fancy and figures of speech. Since, such a complex idea neither conforms to an external thing, nor is it archetypal as the constructs of mathematical mind, it is not real.

According to Locke, fancy or imagination of the artist gives false colours, appearances and resemblances to what it presents and diverts the unwary spectator from truth. The artificial and figurative application of words insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, divert the mind from truth, mislead the judgement, and so indeed are perfect cheats. But human nature is such that it likes to be deceived by such a presentation of creative imagination; for such a deception is pleasant. The effect of art is pleasure rather than information and moral improvement.48
A new phase of aesthetic thinking can also be observed during this period. The investigation of the psychological effects of art and of the aesthetic experience was developing along two distinct, but occasionally intersecting, paths: (1) the search for an adequate analysis and explanation of certain basic aesthetic qualities (the beautiful and the sublime); (2) an enquiry into the nature and justification of critical judgement, the problem of taste. In aesthetics, ‘taste’ generally refers to the capacity to discern the aesthetic features of objects, especially beauty. Taste played a central role in the 18th century aesthetic thought. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson were the early writers on the subject.

Shaftesbury (1671-1713) believed that trained eye and ear were the ultimate judges of what is beautiful or not. He introduced internal sense as the instinct for beautiful. It is a sense of order and proportion. He was opposed to the doctrine of Locke. The internal sense is not mere sense. Experience of beauty is immediate and sure and the inner sense is the means to it. Shaftesbury therefore employed the word ‘sense’ to suggest the immediacy and sureness of the deliverances of our conscience and our taste. He applied the term ‘sense’ to value experience. Sense for beauty is identical with moral sense. The harmony perceived as beauty is also perceived as virtue. He gave the name ‘moral sense’ to that ‘inward eye’ that grasps harmony in both its aesthetic and ethical forms. He therefore, extended the term ‘beauty’ and ‘sense’ to the goodness of morality and the faculty by which we judge it. The introduction of a concept of a special faculty of aesthetic apprehension was one aspect of the theory of taste. Though Shaftesbury was perhaps the founder of the empirical school of British aesthetics, his recognition of an internal sense as a sense of order and proportion, identical with moral sense, betrays the fact that he was forced to recognize the elements of reason by the back door.

For Shaftesbury, a sense of harmony connoted a spiritual kinship with the harmony of the universe and the inward numbers of a noble life. His inner sense was like Leibnitz’s sympathy: a magic bond which predetermined the well-disposed soul to vibrate in unison with the divine harmony. In place of a fierce anti-sensuous Platonic dualism, we have in Shaftesbury now an easy-going pantheistic monism, almost identifying God, reason and ordinary material nature, and taking the charm of visible things as an obvious outcome of the
divine principle. Shaftesbury, thus, was an advocate of Neo-Platonic form of classicism.

The place of Shaftesbury is important in the history of aesthetics for other two reasons also. He is given the credit for introducing disinterestedness as characteristic of the aesthetic attitude in modern aesthetics. Second, his appreciation of wild fearful and irregular forms of nature brought into prominence, in the eighteenth century, the concept of sublime as an aesthetic quality distinct from beauty.

Lineal descendent of Shaftesbury was Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), who succeeded in popularizing the idea of an inward sense of beauty as something intermediate between sense and reason. His Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony and Design, the first part of An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, was the first real treatise on aesthetics in the modern world. On his view, the word beauty is taken for the idea raised in us, and a sense of beauty for our power of receiving this idea.\(^5\) The ‘property’ in ‘objects’ that causes this idea of beauty to be raised in us is a relation among the parts of the object that Hutcheson called uniformity amidst variety: “But what we call beautiful in objects, to speak in the mathematical style, seems to be in compound ratio of uniformity and variety: so that where the uniformity of bodies is equal, the beauty is as the variety; and where the variety is equal, the beauty is as the uniformity.”\(^5\) Original beauty, therefore, is the perception aroused in us by pleasing formal relations, particularly uniformity amid variety. This pleasing proportion is intuited in all sorts of geometrical figures and in animals, also in theorems, metaphysical axioms, and general truths.

Hutcheson called the power of perceiving the ideas of beauty and harmony an ‘internal sense’ in order to distinguish it from external senses of seeing and hearing. We cannot perceive beauty and harmony through external senses. Moreover, very like the beauty, in many respects, to that observed in sensible objects, we discern beauty in theorems or universal truths, in general causes, and in some extensive principles of action. External senses are not much concerned in such affairs.

Hutcheson held that the term sense was appropriate for aesthetic experience. The perception of beauty and harmony is justly called a sense because it involves no intellectual element, no reflection on principles and
causes. Beauty is felt without understanding the reason for it. The ideas of beauty and harmony, like other sensible objects, are necessarily pleasant to us, as well as immediately so. Aesthetic perception also has no kinship with desire, because desire is a joy which arises from self-love, upon prospect of advantage. But aesthetic experience is free from search for any personal advantage. It is disinterested.

Besides original or absolute beauty, which equalled for Hutcheson uniformity and variety, he also recognized a relative or comparative beauty, which arises from the pleasure we feel in imitation, in the similarity between copy and an original, and in the fineness of an instrument to an end. This view on the whole predominated in England during the eighteenth century.

Joseph Addison (1672-1719) in his *Spectator* papers dealt with the imaginative process. Imagination is that aspect of human mind, which receives images of external objects such as are conveyed to it by eyes. Certain kinds of objects are pleasant to see. The immediate presence of these objects of nature gives rise to pleasure. This is the primary pleasure of imagination. Secondary pleasures of imagination are from visible objects absent, but recalled. Secondary pleasures are excited by works of art such as painting, sculpture and poetry.

According to Addison, the sources of the primary pleasures of our imagination are three: what is great, what is new and what is beautiful in our own species. Greatness does not consist in the bulk of a single object of sight, but in the largeness of the whole, viewed as one entire piece, such as vast uncultivated desert, huge heaps of mountains, high rocks and precipices, a wide expanse of waters. The examples of new are the surprising elements in the varying spectacle of nature, and imperfections of nature such as monsters. Beauty of a product of art or nature consists in the gaiety or variety of colours, in symmetry and harmony of parts or in just mixture of all. Addison also meant by beauty members of our own race and kind. Each species of sensible creature is most affected by the beauty of its own kind.

The sources of pleasure of imagination are not, as it had seemed, in an external relationship to us, but altogether in us. The imaginative faculty is so constituted by nature that it loves to grasp at anything that is great and to be filled up with it. Therefore, when imagination is filled, there arises the feeling of
amazement. Pleasure of imagination from great consists in the feeling of amazement. Moreover, human mind naturally loves freedom. When the sight is restricted by walls or mountain barriers, the mind feels pain at the restraint. But if the sight is not restrained, as in the case of spacious horizon, imagination gets free exercise of its receptive power. Pleasure in the sublime or grand also consists in the feeling of freedom of imagination. Again the new or uncommon pleases us ultimately because it gratifies our curiosity, which is as natural to human mind as love of freedom. Finally, symmetry etc. also are not beautiful on themselves, but only in relation to the mind which is so constituted by nature that it pronounces them to be beautiful immediately. The Supreme Author has made us find the world in general beautiful so that we cannot behold His works with coldness or indifference. The sense of beauty, again, is the social instinct of kind.

The above discussion betrays that Joseph Addison conceived taste as simply as to be the capacity to discern those three qualities that gives rise to the pleasures of the imagination, viz, the greatness, the uncommonness (novelty) and beauty. He also noticed a new aesthetic fact 'the great', and thus supplied the basis of Burke's conception of the 'sublime' which had a great influence on Kant's treatment of mathematically sublime and dynamically sublime.

Next we come to the secondary pleasures of imagination. Human mind is so constituted that nothing to it in the material world is devoid of flaw. Imagination is empowered to picture up to itself things which are greater, stranger and more beautiful than those that exist in nature. The artist gives touches to what he sees in nature, which highten its beauty and enliven it so much as not to allow any room for the idea of improvement of nature to rise in the mind of the spectator. Ideas of objects of nature become so perfected in the work of the artist that in comparison to ideas aroused by words, ideas aroused by actual objects seem to be faint and feeble. This affords the spectator with highest imaginative pleasure.

David Hume (1711-1776) in his *A Treatise of Human Nature* suggested that beauty, like wit, cannot be defined, but is discerned only by a taste or sensation. Beauty and worth consist in an agreeable sentiment. Beauty is such an order and construction of parts, as either by the primary constitution of our nature, by custom, or by caprice, is fitted to give a pleasure and satisfaction to
the soul. This is the distinguishing character of beauty, and forms all the
difference between it, and deformity, whose natural tendency is to produce
uneasiness. Pleasure and pain, therefore, are not only necessary attendants of
beauty and deformity, but constitute their very essence. As surprise is nothing
but a pleasure arising from novelty, beauty is not a quality in any object, but
merely a passion or impression in the soul.

In the *Platonist* he calls beauty a sentiment or passion in human nature
which makes man relish the graces of a well-proportioned statue or the
symmetry of a noble pile. However, the fact that we prefer well-proportioned
figures does not justify the inference that we use our reason in making this
choice. The natural, emotional part of our animal frame is all that accounts for
our taste. Thus like Hutcheson, who influenced him considerably, Hume
allowed an immediate delight in beauty. But he allowed also for a transfer of this
delight by association. In the *Treatise*, Hume opines that the greater part of the
pleasure of beauty arises from the idea of convenience or utility. According to
him, where any object has a tendency to produce pleasure in its possessors, it is
always regarded as beautiful. Now the fact is that an object produces pleasure
in the possessor by its tendency to produce an end that is agreeable to him. In
what manner does it give pleasure to one who is merely the spectator of the
object, and not its possessor? Utility does not at all concern the spectator,
although his sense of beauty is awakened. Hume's answer is that it is only by
sympathy that the feeling of beauty can exist for the spectator. A man who
shows us any house or building, takes particular care among other things to
point out the convenience of the apartment, the advantage of their situation, and
the little room lost in the stairs, antechambers and passages. The chief part of
the beauty consists in these particulars. The observation of convenience gives
pleasure, because convenience is a beauty. Since it is certain that our own
interest is not in the least concerned, it must, therefore, delight us merely by
communication, and by our sympathizing with the proprietor of the lodging. We
enter into his interest by the force of imagination, and feel the same satisfaction,
that the object naturally occasions in him. "In every judgement of beauty, the
feelings of the person affected enter into consideration, and communicate to the
spectator similar touches of pain or pleasure.”
Hume’s doctrine of utility of beauty, therefore, does not involve a selfish interest on the part of the spectator. The spectator is pleased, not because the beautiful object is useful to him, but because it is so to the owner or the person affected by its properties. His pleasure is due to sympathy with the owner. Hume’s doctrine of utility in beauty practically implies a distinction in natural beauty as well as in art between aesthetic semblance and real effect. We get here an approximate anticipation of Kant’s ‘purposiveness without purpose,’ and also of his ‘disinterested delight’.

Though Hume was an empiricist, he still maintained that in many orders of beauty, particularly those of finer arts, it is requisite to employ much reasoning, in order to feel the proper sentiment; and a false relish may frequently be corrected by argument and reflection. These latter species demand the assistance of our intellectual faculties. We have to pave the way for the right sentiment. This insistence that right sense be taught is characteristic of the whole school of the British empiricists, who maintained that inner sense was educable. An internal sense may be molded, for even the external sense may be improved in their quality of function by exercise and training.

The question of a standard of taste was the chief concern of David Hume. In his essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, Hume says that since beauty is no quality in things themselves, and since it exists merely in the mind which contemplates them, each mind perceives different beauty. One person may even perceive deformity, whereas another is sensible of beauty. Men frequently make incorrect aesthetic preferences. They assert “an equality of genius and elegance between Ogilby and Milton, or Bynyan and Addison.” It is, therefore, “natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least a decision afforded confirming one sentiment, and condemning another.” Hume proposes initially that men are fundamentally alike in their sense organs: the same Homer who pleased in Athens and Rome two thousand years ago, is still admired at Paris and London. He believes that the rules of art are based on general observations concerning what has been universally found to please in all countries and in all ages. A standard of taste would therefore appear possible. But human feelings are not always consistent with what appear to be the common principles which govern them. There are many and frequent defects in
the internal organs, which prevent or weaken the influence of those general principles on which depends our sentiment of beauty or deformity. Though some objects, by the structure of the mind, are naturally calculated to give pleasure, it is not to be expected that in every individual the pleasure will be equally felt. Particular incidents and situations occur, which either throw a false light on the objects, or hinder the true from conveying to the imagination the proper sentiment and perception. Want of delicacy of imagination is another cause why many feel not the proper sentiment of beauty. Likewise, prejudice, lack of practice, unemployment of comparison (i.e., not comparing several performances, admired in different ages and nations) etc. are contrary to good taste. Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudices can alone entitle critics to establish their own sentiment as the standard of beauty. Hume eventually concludes that the laws of taste could be ascertained on a scientific basis and that, though some standard can be defined, it will not be arrived at by physical means. It can be deduced only from the joint verdict of those rare critics through the ages whom time has proved right. What has pleased long and has pleased the best judges who are experienced, calm and unprejudiced, provides the standard by which taste is measured. But there will always be areas within which preference is due to temperament, age, culture, and similar factors unchangeable by arguments. One man values simplicity over ornament, one prefers harmony, another energy. One person is more pleased with the sublime, another with the tender, a third with raillery. There is no objective standard by which such differences can be rationally resolved.

For Hume, then, beautiful exists only in us, not in things, and obeys the general laws of association. This principle was adopted and developed in England by Hutcheson, Home and Burke, in France by Batteux. We have already discussed Hutcheson’s view. Lord Kames, Henry Home (1696-1782) gave the best expression of the leading idea of the school in his *Elements of Criticism*. He was another staunch member of the inner sense school. Following Locke, he founded his system on origins given in experience. He confined himself to feelings derived from objects of sight and hearing, which, in so far as unaccompanied by desires, are more truly described as simple feelings. These occupy a middle position between mere sense impressions and intellectual or
moral ideas, and are therefore akin to both; it is from these that the pleasures of beauty are derived. Kames drew up a scale of the various pleasures derived from mental processes. At the bottom are gross pleasures from the physical senses, which quickly lead to satiety. Refined pleasures from the intellect are placed at the top. Pleasures from the inner senses are in the middle. Sight is connected with beauty, and hearing with harmony or what is agreeable.

Characteristically like most of the thinkers of this school, Kames leads us behind the senses into a realization of the divine purpose involved in the workings of these senses. Our liking for regularity, uniformity, order and simplicity was given to us because regularity etc. help to facilitate perception and make it possible for us to form clearer conception of objects than it would be possible to gain by the most earnest attention were such qualities not present. Our liking for change and variety and motion was given to us to make us industrious. Our liking for tragedy exercises our benevolent social passions, particularly our sympathy.

Edmund Burke (1729 - 1797) carried the sensationalistic idea that inspired him to its extreme limits in his A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful. He was clear, unlike most of his contemporaries, that if immediacy of operation was desired for the aesthetic function, then an instinct, quite independent of reason, must be trusted to carry through the business. An analysis of taste was therefore essential to him. Taste, is “that faculty, or those faculties of the mind which are affected with, or which form a judgement of the works of imagination and the elegant arts.”

According to Burke, taste operates by fixed principles in all men. Both Burke and Hume were concerned with the same problem: whether or not a standard of taste can be determined. Yet despite this measure of agreement, whereas Hume, as we saw earlier, was sceptical, Burke was convinced of the possibility of fixing such a standard. Hume emphasized the factors making for variety, Burke emphasized the factors making for uniformity of taste among all men.

While Burke started from data largely the same as Hume’s, he maintained that “the standard both of reason and Taste is the same in all human creatures.” For if there were not some principles of judgement as well as of sentiment common to all mankind, no hold could possibly be taken either on
reason or their passions, sufficient to maintain the ordinary correspondence of
life. Unless Burke could get assent to his claim that, at a certain level at least,
objects of beauty make the same appeal to all men, his attempt to trace laws for
the operation of taste would be in vain.

According to Burke, the faculties concerned with taste can be divided into
the senses, the imagination, and the judgement. However, sense experience is
the ground of all. It is, for Burke, the obvious starting-point. Provided they are
organically-sound, all men are alike in their perceptions of external objects. "We
are satisfied that what appears to be light to one eye, appears light to another;
that what seems sweet to one palate is sweet to another, that what is dark and
bitter to this man, is likewise dark and bitter to that."\(^{61}\) Now since there is very
little doubt that bodies present similar images to the whole species, it must
necessarily be allowed that the pleasures and the pain which every object
excites in one man, it must raise in all mankind, while it operates naturally,
simply and by its own power only. For if we deny this, we must imagine, that the
same cause operating in the same manner, and on subjects of the same kind,
will produce different effects, which would be highly absurd. "All men are agreed
to call vinegar sour, honey sweet, and aloes bitter; and as they are all agreed in
finding these qualities in those objects, they do not in the least differ concerning
their effects with regard to pleasure and pain. They all concur in calling
sweetness pleasant, and sourness and bitterness unpleasant."\(^{62}\) Similarly about
the principle of pleasure derived from sight. "Light is more pleasing than
darkness ... Summer ... is more agreeable than winter..."\(^{63}\)

Besides the ideas, with their annexed pain and pleasures, which are
presented by the senses, the mind of man possess a sort of creative power of its
own, either in representing at pleasure the images of things in the order and
manner in which they were received by the senses, or in combining those
images in a new manner, and according to a different order. This power is called
imagination. To this imagination belongs whatever is called wit, fancy, invention,
and the like. It is incapable of producing anything absolutely new, but can only
vary the disposition of those ideas which it has received from the senses. Since
the imagination is only the representative of the senses, it can only be pleased
or displeased with the images from the same principles on which the sense is
pleased or displeased. Consequently, "there must be just as close an
agreement in the imagination as in the senses of men.” 64 It is by the imagination too, that the passions like love, grief, fear, anger, joy etc. are aroused. Though all these passions have in their turns affected every mind, they do not affect in an arbitrary or casual manner, but upon certain natural and uniform principles. Consequently, in Burke’s view, there is a large area of human experience in which universal laws may be said to operate.

In the imagination, besides the pain or pleasure arising from the properties of natural objects, a pleasure is perceived from the resemblance, which the imagination has to the original. Burke agreed with Locke in holding that it is the wit which is concerned with tracing resemblances. And judgement is concerned with finding out differences. Both wit and judgement seem to result from different operations of the same faculty of comparing. Here the imagination is confined neither to sense data nor to the passions, but is involved with “the manners, the characters, the actions, and designs of men, their relations, their virtues and vices.” 65 But even here the same uniformity of opinion is possible as is found in real life. Arguing in this manner, Burke arrived at his most extended definition: “On the whole it appears to me, that what is called Taste, in its most general acceptation, is not a simple idea, but is partly made up of a perception of the primary pleasures of sense, of the secondary pleasures of the imagination, and of the conclusions of the reasoning faculty, concerning the various relations of these, and concerning the human passions, manners and actions.” 66 All these are requisite to form Taste, and the ground-work of all these is the same in the human mind; for as the senses are the great originals of all our ideas, and consequently of all our pleasures, if they are not uncertain and arbitrary, the whole ground-work of Taste is common to all, and therefore there is a sufficient foundation for a conclusive reasoning on these matters.

Burke, in his Enquiry, followed in a great tradition in holding his sensationalist philosophy. The dependence of mind for its ideas on the senses was fundamental to the work of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. We have seen that Addison also used this principle as the starting point for an analysis of aesthetic experience. To him, sight is the principal source for the imagination. Beauty, he thought, to be dependent on physical properties in objects, properties, therefore, apprehended through sensation. Burke agreed with it. For him sense experience is primary and the function of the judgement (which comes last in his listing of
the three faculties involved in taste) is to evaluate the various relations between the original in nature and the responses there, and its appearance and effect in art. Thus in the *Enquiry*, Burke assumed that beauty is immediately perceived and that it is dependent on sensible properties. His task was to discover their identity.

According to Burke, aesthetic experience is an immediate emotive experience, an experience of passions. Passions may be reduced very nearly to these two heads, self-preservation and society. The distinction between passions of self-preservation and society leads directly to the distinction between sublime and beautiful. The passions which concern self-preservation, turn mostly on pain and danger. The ideas of pain, sickness, and death fill the mind with strong emotions of horror. Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the *sublime*.

According to Burke, pain and danger are simply painful when their causes immediately affect us. But if pain and danger are felt at a safe remove from the real thing, i.e., if pain is not carried to violence, and terror is not conversant about the present destruction of the person concerned and in consequence, the pain and terror are able to tense and set in play the finer part of the system in a fashion that is stimulating and invigorating without being actually noxious, they are delightful. So pain and danger are delightful, when they do not press too nearly, but involve us only through the effect of curiosity, sympathy, or imitation; we have here only an idea of pain and danger, without being actually in such dangerous circumstances. This delight is not pleasure, because it turns on pain, and because it is different enough from any idea of positive pleasure. Whatever excites this delight is sublime. The sublime is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling. Terror produces an unnatural tension and certain violent emotions on the nerves. Burke thinks that “whatever is fitted to produce such a tension, must be productive of a passion similar to terror, and consequently must be the source of the sublime, though it should have no idea of danger connected with it.” In the experience of the sublime, in place of suffering actual terror, we are conscious of a sort of ‘delightful horror,’ a sort of tranquility tinged with horror. The passion caused by the great and
sublime in nature, in its highest degree, is called astonishment. Astonishment is “that state of the soul, in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree of horror. In this case the mind is so entirely filled with its object, that it cannot entertain any other, nor by consequence reason on that object which employs it. Hence arises the great power of the sublime, that far from being produced by them, it anticipates our reasonings, and hurries us on by an irresistible force.”

Astonishment is the effect of the sublime in its highest degree; the subordinate degrees are awe, reverence and respect.

Burke held that one of the contributors of sublimity is obscurity. “It is our ignorance of things that causes all our admiration, and chiefly excites our passions. Knowledge and acquaintance make the most striking causes affect but little…” 

“A clear idea is therefore another name for a little idea.” Power is likewise the source of sublime. Pain is always inflicted by a power in some way superior, because we never submit to pain willingly. Similarly, privation and emptiness, vastness approaching infinity etc. are other sources of the sublime.

The second division of passion, we have mentioned, are those relating to society. There are two sorts of societies. The first is the society of sex. The passion belonging to this is called love, and it contains the mixture of lust; its object is the beauty of women. The other is the great society of man and all other animals. The passion subservient to this is likewise called love, but it has no mixture of lust, and its object is beauty; love here involves friendship and sympathy with others. Burke applies the name beauty to “all such qualities in things as induce in us a sense of affection and tenderness, or some other passion the most nearly resembling these.”

Love of both types originate: from pleasure. But the pleasure, which is caused by the society of sex, is the highest of sensuous pleasures. It is capable of being mixed with a mode of uneasiness, that is, when an idea of its object is excited in the mind with an idea at the same time of having irretrievably lost it. This mixed sense of pleasure is not pure pain, because we like to remember the lost objects of love. The other type of love simply arouses the feeling of tenderness towards its object.

Just as the sublime is experienced when there is no question of our having to ward off or avoid a present danger, so experiences of the beautiful are distinguishable from those of “desire or lust” which is an energy of the mind that hurries us on to the possession of certain objects that do not affect us as they
are beautiful, but by means altogether different. "We shall have a strong desire for a woman of no remarkable beauty; whilst the greatest beauty in men, or in other animals, though it causes love, yet excites nothing at all of desire. Which shews that beauty, and the passion caused by beauty, which I call love, is different from desire...". 73 Love, the paradigm emotion, therefore is response to female beauty minus lust. In experience of beauty the relevant sentiments are transposed to, and modified within, a setting where they exert no active influence; we are caused to respond to particular things in a purely contemplative frame of mind, the pleasure involved — unlike that of the sublime — deriving from their tendency to relax the 'fibres' and 'solids' of the whole system. The qualities which can effect this happy outcome are those of smallness ("... we submit to what we admire, but we love what submits to us." 74), smoothness ("In trees and flowers, smooth leaves are beautiful; smooth slopes of earth in gardens... in fine woman, smooth skins;..." 75), gradual variations (of the kind exemplified by 'waving' and 'serpentine' lines), and delicacy or fragility ("It is not the oak, the ash...or any of the robust trees of the forest, which we consider beautiful; they are aweful and majestic; they inspire a sort of reverence. It is the delicate myrtle ... it is the almound, it is the jessamine, it is vine, which we look on as vegetable beauties. It is the flowery species, so remarkable for its weakness and momentary duration, that gives us the liveliest idea of beauty, and elegance." 76).

In the history of Western aesthetics, Burke occupied a very remarkable position. It was he who for the first time distinguished aesthetic judgement from the logical, in his conception of taste. The Burkian conception of taste, in its aspect of judgement, probably suggested to Kant the title of his third Critique, The Critique of Judgement, where he used the word 'judgement' in the sense of aesthetic judgement or judgement of taste and teleological judgement, and not in the sense of logical judgement.

Though Burke followed Longinus in his conception of sublime, the recognition of the sublime as co-ordinate with the beautiful indicates the beginning of a great enlargement in aesthetic appreciation. Many of the qualities in which he found the sublime, e.g. formlessness, strength, magnitude, were taken up into Kant's treatment of the subject. Kant in his conception of the sublime was considerably influenced by Burke, whom he quoted in his Critique
of Judgement. In the Critique, Kant recognized the psychological view of Burke’s Enquiry, although he denied it any philosophical value.

Burke’s insistence on the fact that no normal person wishes for such a real catastrophe as he will run to see when it takes place clearly points out his idea that reality be regarded as a representation, i.e., in abstraction from its real bearing and interest. As against Plato who lowered art to the rank of useful reality, Burke, by a reverse movement, elevated reality to the rank of aesthetic semblance. From the time of Burke, we notice the inception of the idea that “reality can be looked at aesthetically if looked at without practical interest, and therefore that the aesthetic temper consists, in part at least, in the absence of such interest.” 77 A fuller and direct presentation of this idea we find in the Kantian doctrine of ‘disinterested delight.’

RATIONALISM

Unlike the empiricists, the great rationalist philosophers had little to say about aesthetics. The obscure world of taste, imagination and feeling was not selected for examination or even included in the picture of Cartesian philosophy. Descartes (1596 – 1650) abhorred imagination, which according to him, was the outcome of the agitation of the animal spirits. He wrote nothing about the arts apart from his early Compendium Musicae (1618). In the Compendium, he allied beauty with agreeableness, and agreeableness is congeniality, or adaptation of stimulus to response. The general tendency of musical rhythms is to set up an affection or passion in the soul similar to that of the music: a slow measure excites gentle and sluggish feelings, such as languor or sadness, and a swift measure excites sprightly passions such as joy or anger. Thus any given motion in an aesthetic stimulus tends to elicit its counterpart among the motions of the soul. 78 Though at odd moments he acknowledged the sweetness and kindling power of the arts, his adding admiration was for chains of reason coercing deduction. In consonance with his mathematical spirit, Descartes’ aesthetic norm, as can be gathered from his Correspondence, Compendium of Music, and Treatise on the Passions, “swings back ultimately to a mathematical and logical ideal, although it makes a circuit through individual psychology and the agitation of the nerves”. 79 Though not utterly condemning poetry, he allowed it to exist
only in so far as it was guided by intellect, that being the sole faculty able to save men from the caprices of the folle du logis. He tolerated it, but that was all; and went so far as not to deny it.

Though Descartes had no aesthetic idea, his method and metaphysics dominated aesthetics for a century. Descartes maintained that concepts must be analysed to render them 'clear' and 'distinct'. Clarity attaches to a concept apparent to the attentive mind; 'distinctiveness' attaches to a concept so precise and different from all other objects that it contains within itself nothing but what is clear. Pain may be a clear perception, though not distinct. It follows that feelings may share an attribute of reason, and it would thus appear that the beautiful is not wholly to be cut off from reason. Aesthetic feelings would belong to a realm of sensuous truth, indistinct and confused, but nonetheless 'clear'.

Much more thoroughly and with much greater philosophical vigour Leibnitz (1646 — 1716) opened the door to that crowd of psychic facts from which Cartesianism recoiled in horror. In his conception of the real, governed by the law of continuity, presenting an uninterrupted scale of existence from the lowest beings to God, imagination, taste, wit and the like found ample room for shelter. The facts now called aesthetics were identified by Leibnitz with Descartes' confused cognition, which might be clear without being distinct.

Leibnitz distinguished four grades of knowledge: (1) Obscure and dark knowledge made up of like perceptions, such as the mass of vague images in dream or the unrecognized but received sensations of the separate waves beating on the shore. (2) Clear but confused knowledge, in which phenomena such as colours are recognized but are not intellectually defined. (3) Distinct knowledge in which a definition or scientific explanation is possible (4) Adequate or intuitive knowledge in which all the marks of objects are known exhaustively and gathered into a single complete survey. Aesthetic knowledge is in the main placed on the second level. We feel a something, "I know not what", that arouses sympathy in us. Though painters and other artists are able to judge works of art very fairly, they can give no reason for their decisions, and if questioned as to the reason of their condemnation of any work of art, they reply it lacks a je ne sais quoi (an indefinable something). They do possess, in fact, clear cognition, but confused and not distinct. They possess, in other words, imaginative and not ratiocinative consciousness. Ratiocinative consciousness
does not exist in the case of art. Leibnitz holds that there is an artistic faculty, taste, which is a means to the different levels of aesthetic experience. He distinguishes taste from understanding. Taste consists in confused perception of which no adequate amount is possible. It is something approaching instinct. We cannot always detect in what the agreeableness of a thing consists, or to what sort of perfection in us it ministers, as it is felt by our spirit rather than our understanding. Leibnitz here comes very close to the views of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson in England, who held that the feeling of beauty rests on a vague propension of the mind rather on reason or good sense.\(^{81}\)

However, according to Leibnitz, though taste approaches instinct, it is not an instinct or sympathy that is to be left to its own devices. It is rather to be formed on the basis of what reason and tradition have declared to be beautiful. Taste begins with vague perceptions, which are always pregnant with their own rational explanation, and hence taste might start as a \textit{je ne sais quoi}, but it proceeds to drawing moral lesson from and complete rational grasp of the presented which leads to intuitive vision. Leibnitz thus recognizes different levels of aesthetic experience from a good piece of art, namely, sensory, emotive, intellectual and spiritual, the lower level of aesthetic experience leading to the higher.

At the first and lowest level, aesthetic experience is constituted by vague perceptions, and consists in feeling something that is not definable. This is the second grade of knowledge, clear but confused perception in which phenomena, such as colour etc. are recognized but not intellectually defined.\(^{82}\) Accepting this empiricistic view, Leibnitz maintains that the culminating point at this level is emotive experience.

At the second level, aesthetic experience is intellectual. As a rationalist, he holds that aesthetic experience at this level proceeds to have complete rational grasp of the presented as an affair of ratio. As a follower of Aristotle, who held that art improves its lover morally, Leibnitz maintains that taste, at this level, draws moral lesson from the presented.

At the third level of aesthetic experience, intellectual grasp of the presented leads to intuitive vision. At this level, all the marks of presented work of art are exhaustively known and are gathered into single complete survey.\(^{83}\)
The fourth and final level of aesthetic experience is characterized by the experience of universal harmony, got through its symbolic presentation in art. An occult sympathy invisibly draws together all the parts of the universe, and makes the mirror of each individual soul reflect the ‘grand entire’. At this level, individual monad attains Godhead. Leibnitz here allies himself with the mystic school of aesthetics such as that of Plotinus.

The Leibnizian philosophy was followed in Germany by Christian Wolff. He accepted the rationalism of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz, and identified the method of philosophy with that of mathematics. He, however, gave scholastic forms to the brilliant observations of the master Leibnitz, and held that the facts of experience will agree with deductions of reason: reason and sense perceptions are both legitimate faculties of knowledge.

Wolff divided the sciences into two groups, theoretical and practical, according to the two faculties of the soul, cognition and appetition; under the former he includes Ontology, Cosmology, Psychology and Theology (all of which constitute metaphysics); under the latter Ethics, Politics and Economics. Logic forms the introduction to all the sciences. Although Wolff distinguished a productive imagination, ruled by the principle of sufficient reason, from the merely associative and chaotic, yet a science of imagination as a new theoretical value could find no niche in his schematism. Knowledge of a lower order, as such, belonged to Pneumatology and was incapable of possessing its own “organon”. Leibnitz, too, could not isolate a distinct region of imagination. The rights of an independent science for the theory of imagination were first claimed by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714 – 1762). He aided to the Wolffian division of theoretical sciences another science, which he called ‘aesthetic’. In his Meditationes Philosophicae de Nonnullis ad Poema Pertinentibus, the word ‘aesthetic’ appeared for the first time as name of a special science.

Baumgarten, like Hume, thought that taste and aesthetics were sensate matters, and supposed that they were continuous with reason and ideas. Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz and Wolff, each of them in his own way, looked upon passions and sense perceptions as confused acts of knowledge, different from abstract ideas (universals) which are characterized by clarity. Baumgarten accepted the Leibnitzian classification of knowledge. Like other rationalists, he maintained that sensitive knowledge, and as such, aesthetic experience, is
‘indisist’ or provides ‘obscure or confused representations’, because it depends on the body, while understanding knows ‘distinctly’. Now clear thinking was treated by Wolff in the science or method of Logic, both theoretical and practical, as an introduction to theoretical philosophy or metaphysics with its four parts, Ontology, Cosmology, Ethics and Psychology. It occurred then to Baumgarten — who in every way continued to push the survey of science into detail — to prefix to the Wolffian logic, or method of clear knowledge, a still prior science or method of sensible or obscure knowledge, to be called aesthetics. Thus unlike Leibnitz and Wolff, Baumgarten ascribed a Logic to sensitive knowledge and understanding, which distinguishes the claims we make for and with the intellect from those we make with and for the senses.

According to Baumgarten, a poem is ‘a perfect sensate discourse’. Poetry is a means to distinct thought. As one cannot suddenly leap from the darkness to the light of noon, so one must pass from the darkness of unknowingness to distinct thought through the confused but vivid imagery of the poets. Poetry has its ‘specific’ order and perfection and its own separate field. This order and perfection of poetry may be less glorious than the virtues of reason, but they are *sui generis*: they require interpretation by an independent discipline. The predecessors and contemporary thinkers like Addison, Burke, Hutcheson etc. were noticing and affirming the imagination and the sense of beauty, but Baumgarten organized the undeveloped acknowledgements into a carefully elaborated system, “that ... could point the way through the century toward Kant’s *Critique of Judgement*, which was crown to its end”.

According to Baumgarten, the subject of the aesthetica is obscure knowledge, i.e., knowledge in the form of the feeling. The mind has an upper and lower level. The ‘upper apprehension’ is the faculty of distinct and adequate thinking, the faculty which produces science and philosophy. The matter of science and philosophy is the universal. The logically precise ideas appropriate to science do not suit poetry. The stuff of poetry evidently must be drawn from below, the faculty of lower apprehension, the region often vivid, but always confused, that is, unanalyzed, imagery. Poetry, and therefore, fine art, belongs to this faculty. The materials that are available in the reservoir of the lower half of mind are the following: i) individual things which are wholly unique and determinate, 2) classes of things which are nearest the single example, 3)
particular sensations and emotions, 4) fictions. These are, therefore, the right staff of poetry.

In order to create poetry, when one descends into the depths of the soul, he finds vague dark modes of feeling. Baumgarten warns against this uncommunicability of dark images. Dark images do not contain as many images of characters as are needed for recognizing the thing again and distinguishing it from others. But clear images are so full of parts that they can be easily communicated. So sensate representations will be better communicated if they are clear rather than obscure. A poem, therefore, whose representations are clear is more perfect than one whose representations are obscure, and clear representations are more poetic than obscure ones. Now Baumgarten also claims that distinct representations, which are complete, adequate, and profound in every degree, are not sensate; consequently, they cannot be poetic. Presumably, although a poem would in some sense be more perfect if its representations were clearer, nevertheless, if its representations become distinct, they cease to be poetic. Consequently, poetry must be as clear as possible in order to gain the fullest perfection that our sensate faculty is capable of, but must also be confused in order to remain a poem. Thus the implication of ‘clear’ in Baumgarten’s philosophy is ‘clear but confused knowledge’, a term which he borrowed from Leibnitzian thought. Baumgarten called this clarity ‘extensive clarity’. The poet must avoid the clarity that comes from intellectual discrimination and definition; but he must seek the ‘extensive clarity’. Extensive clarity is quantitative richness of imagery: ‘the more that is gathered together in a confused representation, the more extensive clarity the representation has’. Poetic words have extensive clarity in as much as the richness of poetic allusions involves making all the implicit associations of an image explicitly clear. The distinct images aroused in the mind of the reader or hearer are by no means exhaustive presentation of the poetic vision. They suggest, and therefore, make the connoisseur feel something more than what is actually presented in words. And because this implicit association of an image does not come to the level of clear thought, but remains simply a matter of feeling, it is therefore obscure or confused.

Besides richness, various types of order, also contribute to the perfection of poetry. These types of order are analogous to those discovered by reason,
but are not themselves intellectual connections. These practical orders are i) that which is parallel to the deduction of conclusions from a premise; ii) that which finds similar to similar; iii) that which history furnishes. These are unclear imitations of the order reason establishes. If a chain of reason is felt rather than understood, we have a perfect poem. If a poem presents similarity which is crystallized in a metaphor without being in the least supported by analysis, and is seized by a happy inspiration, it is perfect. If a poem presents historical connections in such a way that they are grasped as wholes and not examined carefully link by link, it is perfect.

The idea of perfection had played a great part in the speculation of Descartes, Leibnitz and Wolff, and the idea was also transmitted to Baumgarten from Wolff. Perfection is generally defined as the character of a whole in so far as this whole is affirmed by its parts without counter-action, and thus perfection became a postulate of everything real, because reality depends upon power to harmonize with the greatest number of conditions. In Wolff, therefore, it naturally came to mean the more logical relation of the whole to the part, or unity in variety, and this is the sense in which Baumgarten employed it. The content of beauty for him was therefore the formal principle of unity in variety.

Leibnitz held that the greatest degree of perfection was to be found in the existing universe, every other possible system being as a whole less perfect. Baumgarten inherited this view. He made nature, the world accessible to sense-perception, the standard and pattern of art. The artist is to imitate nature, for by doing so he emulates the ideal. Such imitation is not mere copying of what is given to senses; rather it consists of eliminating that portion of a given phenomenon that is in disharmony with the whole, and introducing in the given the fullness of details, extensive clarity and quantitative richness of sensuous contents. Such an imitation of nature is the law of art.

Baumgarten’s conception that the artist imitates nature has only a verbal coincidence with the Platonic doctrines of antiquity; it is altogether different. For the nature which is to be imitated is for him the revelation of perfection, and not as in Plato a secondary and inferior world.

The domain of poetry, according to Baumgarten, is the domain of feeling, as distinct from the domain of science. Accordingly, beauty, for him, is felt perfection. Beauty is the manifestation in feeling of that attribute which when
manifested in intellectual knowledge is called truth. Since Baumgarten uses the 
conception of perfection in the Wolffian sense, i.e., in the sense of logical
relation of the whole to parts, or unity in multiplicity, beauty, according to him, is
nothing but felt harmony of parts with one another and with the whole. Ugly is 
the absence of this feeling of harmony.

It must be noted that beauty, for Baumgarten, is felt perfection, in the
sense of perfection of sensation. It is not sensitive appreciation of perfection.
Baumgarten belongs to that philosophical tradition for which the character of
perceptive content (the content of feeling) as such and in itself is the only
concern of aesthetics, just as the character of knowledge as such and in itself is
what concerns logic. The distinction of subject and object concerns metaphysics,
but not logic or aesthetics.

The ideas of Baumgarten are found in his disciple Mendelssohn (1729-
1786). He took a less rationalistic view of the psychic facts than former
psychologists. Beauty, according to him, vanishes away as soon as we try to
analyze it. Conceiving beauty as indistinct image of a perfection, he deduced
that God can have no perception of beauty, as this is merely a phenomenon of
human imperfection. He pointed to triple form of pleasure. The primary form of
pleasure is that of senses, arising from the battered state of our bodily
constitution. A second form is the aesthetic fact of sensible beauty, that is to
say, unity in variety. A third form is perfection, or harmony in variety. Sensible
beauty, perfection such as can be apprehended by the senses, is independent
of the fact that the object represented is beautiful or ugly, good or bad by nature;
it suffices that it leaves us not indifferent. Mendelssohn thus agreed with
Baumgarten’s definition that a poem is a discourse sensibly perfect. Another
enthusiastic admirer and disciple of Baumgarten was G.F.Meier. His view on
aesthetics too moved in the same direction as that of Baumgarten. In his
Anfangsgründe aller sehönen Wissenschaften (Principles of all the Beautiful
Sciences), he lays down the limits of the inferior cognitive faculties, alleged as
the domain of poetry and the arts. Beauty disappears when made the object of
distinct thought. As he says in Anfangsgründe that the cheeks of a beautiful girl
whereon bloom the roses of youth are lovely so long as they are looked at with
the naked eye; but when they are examined with a magnifying glass, their
beauty departs.
The disciples of Leibnitz and Baumgarten had considerably furthered the problem of aesthetics, but all were eclipsed by the gigantic figure of Kant. Kant’s aesthetics made as profound an impression as his theory of metaphysics and his ethics. Just as in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, he had established human knowledge and human duty in the very constitution of our theoretical and practical reason, so he explains opinions on the beautiful and the sublime by calling for the construction of a third faculty, the source of contemplation and sentiment.

In his philosophy of beauty, Kant, in some respect, is indebted to his predecessors of the modern period. He incorporates the opinion of Addison, Hutcheson, Burke, Kames and Shaftesbury into his own theory. For him, imagination is a mediator between the other two principle faculties of mind, sensibility and understanding. Here we observe in Kant a shadow of Kame’s ideas, who too, prior to Kant, had pointed out that pleasures from the inner sense occupy a middle position between the gross pleasures from the physical senses and refined pleasures from the intellect. Again the Kantian concept of disinterestedness of aesthetic pleasure was a common place in Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Lord Kames. Kant’s distinction between pure and relative beauty was present in the works of Hutcheson, Kames, Hume or Addison. Common place was also Kant’s doctrine of immediate and non-cognitive character of the judgement of taste. Kant’s treatment of the sublime was also foreshadowed in Addison, when he mentioned greatness (vast uncultivated land or huge heaps of mountains) as one of the sources of aesthetic pleasure. Kant’s theory of sublimity was also considerably influenced by Burke. For Burke, passion caused by the sublime is that state of the soul in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree of horror. We find an echo of this idea in Kant when he says that sublimity involves a momentary check to our vital powers. Kant also owed to Baumgarten. He used Baumgarten’s rational approach, and painstakingly discussed the concepts of confused knowledge and perfection, around which the latter’s aesthetic theory revolved.

Though Shaftesbury, Kames, Hutcheson, Burke, Leibnitz, Baumgarten made penetrating observations on aesthetic experience, no philosopher since Plato had given to aesthetic experience the central role in Philosophy that Kant has given to it. Nor had Kant’s predecessors perceived that both metaphysics
and ethics must remain incomplete without a theory of the aesthetics. Only a rational being can experience beauty; and without the experience of beauty, rationality is unfulfilled. It is only in the aesthetic experience that we grasp the relation of our faculties to the world, and so understand both our own limitations and the possibility of transcending them. In the third Critique or The Critique of Judgement, Kant therefore aims to link the worlds of nature and freedom, which the first two Critiques had distinguished and separated. Kant thus becomes the first modern philosopher to make his aesthetic theory an integral part of a philosophic system. His effort to demonstrate in the third Critique the philosophical presuppositions of taste includes all the works that went before and so aims to crown his total intellectual structure.

According to Kant, the empiricist school attempted the problem of aesthetics from the point of view of empirical psychology. Empiricists attribute the delight in the object wholly and entirely to the gratification which it affords through charm and emotion. According to Kant, judgement of taste requires the concurrence of everyone and hence must be allowed a 'pluralistic validity.' But the empiricist explanation of aesthetic response as a purely sensory response to the stimuli presented by particular external objects cannot justify the claim of aesthetic experience to be universally valid. For in the gratification afforded through charm and emotion each person rightly consults his own personal feeling alone. The pluralistic validity of a judgement of taste is allowed from its inner nature, i.e., on account of what taste itself is, and not on account of the examples which others give of their taste, and hence such a judgement must be founded upon some a priori principle. For Kant the problem of aesthetics is the discovery of such a principle Empirical psychology can yield empirical laws of the changes that go on within the mind in actual cases of perception. But such laws cannot establish such a principle. Empirical laws can yield only a knowledge of how we do judge, but not how we should judge. It is an obvious absurdity to deduce from the fact that every man judges in a certain manner that he ought so to judge. But if empirical laws of taste cannot justify such a command, then they cannot justify a judgement of taste, for in making such a judgement one demands the assent of others. Empiricism can establish only a contingent congruence among the pleasures of different persons, and any claim to agreement based on such a contingency would be resented and
rejected in favour of the natural right to submit a judgement concerning the immediate feeling of one's own satisfaction to one's own sense, instead of submitting it to that of others.

Hume and Burke both confronted the issue whether there are standards of taste. They argued affirmatively for such standards, but maintained that the standards are no more than empirical generalizations concerning how certain qualities and characteristics of objects, such as unity and variety and eloquence of expression, affect normal observers. Both Hume and Burke observed that certain works of art endure, their values and reputations either do not change at all or, if they change, they increase through time; Milton and Homer can never be relegated to the status of second-rate poets. They also observed that certain men have recognizable abilities of discrimination and discernment with respect to matters of beauty. Hume called this a delicacy of taste. There is, therefore, such a thing as good taste. For Hume and Burke, then, there must be standard of taste, however difficult it may be for us to discover them. Kant thinks that the argument of Hume and Burke is inadequate, because such empirically derived standards cannot provide an objective basis for any individual claim that something is beautiful.

Regarding Burke's theory of the beautiful and the sublime too, Kant says that Burke's analyses of our mental phenomena are merely 'psychological observations' and "supply a wealth of material for the favourite investigations of empirical psychology." But the obvious purpose of such psychology is mere observation, and collection of data, without pretension to apprehension. Empirical psychology seems to indicate a posteriori sources of taste, and such will hardly ever be able to claim the rank of a philosophical science. By pointing out the empirical origin of aesthetic experience, Burke precluded the necessity in the judgement of taste.

Kant also never found any satisfying necessity in the immediacy of the operations of the sense organs, external and internal, in the animal frame, as Hutcheson and Kames did. This kind of necessity seemed to Kant to have no real binding power. He wanted an a priori condition, which was what Hutcheson and Kames did not want.

Rationalists like Baumgarten held that aesthetic experience is confused knowledge of perfection. Kant argues against this view of Baumgarten.
It is difficult to find out how confusion in our knowledge is related to pleasing form. Few people have a clear conception of what is right; but the confused conception of right, therefore, cannot be said to be identical with aesthetic experience. Clearness of knowledge differs from confusion only in quantity, and is the result of more concentration of attention. Quantitative difference, therefore, cannot establish the distinctive feature of aesthetic experience.

Perfection has nothing to do with aesthetic experience. Perfection may mean unity of manifold and completeness of a given object. But the fact that a thing is complete does not make it beautiful. Further, the judgement that a thing is perfect requires a concept of a definite objective purpose which the object then judged to have perfectly fulfilled. But aesthetic experience is free from the idea of a purpose that an object serves. A judgement of taste is not a conceptual judgement, and is therefore quite distinct from the judgement of perfection.

According to Kant, rationalism concedes that judgement of taste judges on a priori grounds. But according to rationalism, the judgement rests on definite concepts. His point, on the other hand, is that there are also a priori grounds of delight which can subsist along with the principle of rationalism, although they cannot be comprehended in definite concepts. If the judgement of taste rest on definite concepts, it would be just as much a cognitive judgement as the judgement by which something is declared good. And within this frame-work of rationalist aesthetics, the question of inter-subjective validity could not even arise.

In Kant, again, the western tradition in aesthetic studies that began with the early Greeks of the pre-Socratic period reaches its summit. The matter-form Greek distinction, the emphasis put on 'Form' as that in which beauty lies, and, further, the Neo-Platonic conception of beauty as the symbol of the beyond, got their due recognitions and fullest syncretization in Kant. On the whole, however, Kant’s aesthetic theory proves to be unique, though it does not fail to touch upon the common human perception across nations and over the ages. Let us now try to explain Kant’s aesthetic theory in its details in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV:

KANT’S AESTHETIC THEORY EXPLAINED
SECTION 1: THE BACKGROUND

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in the ‘Transcendental Logic’, Immanuel Kant tries to work out the metaphysical principles which underlie the process of syllogistic reasoning. Following the lines of ordinary logic, he points out that corresponding to the three propositions in every syllogism, the higher faculties of soul may be regarded as three-fold. The understanding or the faculty of concepts gives us our major premise, as it supplies, in the first instance, with a general notion. By means of the judgement we see that a particular case comes under the general rule, and by the Reason we draw our conclusion. These, as three distinct movements in the process of reasoning, are regarded by Kant as indicating three distinct faculties. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant discusses the problem of knowledge, its conditions, and its proper objects. There he shows that the *a priori* categories and principles of the understanding, which exercise a ‘constitutive’ function, make possible a knowledge of objects of nature. The conclusion of the first *Critique* is that nature as phenomenon is the only object of which we can hope to acquire any exact knowledge. The *Critique* also considers the Ideas of pure Reason in its speculative capacity, which exercise a ‘regulative’ and not a ‘constitutive’ function.

Now a complete philosophy concerns other problems too; it includes practice as well as theory; it has to do not only with logic, but also with life.¹ The second *Critique* or the *Critique of Practical Reason* was written with the aim of pointing out the conditions of practical life, and it upholds the doctrine of man’s freedom standing in sharp contrast with the necessity of natural law. The second *Critique* shows that pure Reason in its practical employment contains constitutive principles *a priori* which legislate for desire.

Still there remains something to cover the entire field of human activity. Knowledge, feeling and desire — these are the three ultimate modes of consciousness. The first two *Critiques* have critically analyzed knowledge and desire; only feeling remains to be further analysed. What *a priori* elements can be found in feeling? That is the problem of the third *Critique*, i.e., *The Critique of judgement*. The first two *Critiques* have shown that understanding is *par excellence* the faculty of knowledge, and Reason the faculty of desire. Now the feeling of pleasure is intermediate between our perception of an object and our
desire to possess it: we first perceive an object, the object then produces pleasure in us, and then we desire to get hold of it. If we compare the three modes of consciousness with the former triple division of cognitive faculties, viz. understanding, judgement and Reason, which Kant derives from ordinary logic, the comparison at once suggests that judgement corresponds to the feeling of pleasure and pain; it occupies a position intermediate between understanding and Reason, just as feeling mediates in some sense between cognition and desire. Accordingly, Kant enquires into the third Critique whether the power of judgement possesses its own a priori principles, whether these principles are constitutive or merely regulative, and whether they give rules a priori to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Since the endeavour of the third Critique is to show that there are a priori principles of judgement, just as there are, in the case of understanding and of Reason, he calls the third Critique, The Critique of Judgement.

In the Critique of Practical Reason, one feeling, that is, feeling of respect for the moral law has already been shown to have an a priori character. The other feelings that remain for the third Critique to examine are those of an aesthetical character, feelings of the beautiful and the sublime, and those of a teleological character.

We have already mentioned at the beginning of this section that in the first Critique, judgement is for Kant a mere faculty of subsuming particulars under given universal rules or concepts. In The Critique of Judgement Kant expands on this definition and describes two different ways in which judgement can operate: depending upon whether it is at first furnished with a universal or a particular, judgement may be ‘determinant’ or ‘reflective’. If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law or concept) is antecedently given, such as the a priori categories and principles of the understanding, and we search for an object to subsume under it, the activity of the power of judgement occurs in its determinate form. If, on the other hand, the particular, such as a beautiful scene or an intricate organism, is given, and a universal has to the found under which the individual may be subsumed, the activity of the power of judgement occurs in its reflective form. There are many general laws which are not given but have to be discovered. Thus the empirical laws of physics are not given a priori. We know a priori that all phenomena are members of causal series; but we do not
know particular causal laws \textit{a priori} \; nor are they given to us \textit{a posteriori} as objects of experience. We have to discover the general empirical laws under which we subsume particulars. This is the work of reflective judgement, the function of which, therefore, is not merely subsumptive; for it has to find the universal, under which the particular can be subsumed. Kant, in \textit{The Critique of Judgement}, is concerned with this reflective judgement.

In \textit{The Critique of Judgement} Kant considers three main forms of reflective judgement. The first form of reflective judgement is judgement about the systematicity of the body of our scientific concepts and laws itself. Judgement has the capacity for detecting systematic connections among the diversity of empirical concepts or laws. The \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} assures us that we can always bring the particular items in our experience under some concepts or laws. It also provides us with the most general form of concepts for the objects of our experience, the categories or pure concepts of the understanding (concepts such as those of substance or causation), as well as with the most general laws of nature in the form of the principles of empirical thinking (such as the principle\footnote{that every event has a cause}). But all of this still leaves the task of finding more particular concepts under which to subsume our experiences – for example, more concrete concepts of causation, such as the concepts of crystallization or reproduction – and of organizing these concepts and the natural laws associated with them into a system. The task of seeking such particular concepts intermediate between the categories and our actual observations or empirical intuitions and of organizing them into a coherent system are assigned to the reflective power of judgement as an instance of its general task of seeking to find universals for given concepts. Kant assumes that in order to carry out these tasks reflective judgement is in need of a guidance, and therefore, it has to have an \textit{a priori} principle which will act as the guide. This principle is not the \textit{a priori} principle in precisely the same sense that the principles of understanding or of Reason are \textit{a priori}. It is not a necessary condition for the possibility of objects of experience at all. Rather it is a necessary heuristic principle, which guides and encourages us in the conduct of our scientific enquiry. Such an \textit{a priori} principle amounts only to the general assumption that nature itself has the kind of systematic organization that we seek to find in it, that nature specifies its general laws into empirical ones, in
accordance with the form of a logical system, on behalf of the power of judgement. The principle merely confirms our authorization to seek for systematicity in our concepts and laws. Kant calls this principle the principle of 'heautonomy' of judgement, the principle by means of which the power of judgement "prescribes a law, not to nature (as autonomy) but to itself (as heautonomy), to guide its reflection upon nature." ² "It is not one cognized a priori in nature, but judgement adopts it in the interests of a natural order, cognizable by our understanding, in the division which it makes of nature’s universal laws when it seeks to subordinate to them a variety of particular laws."³ Kant calls this principle the law of the specification of nature in respect of its empirical laws.

The second form of reflective judgement is aesthetic judgement, which is directed to both the beautiful and the sublime objects in both nature and art. The third form of reflective judgement is teleological judgement, which is concerned with the purposiveness (finality) in the internal organization of organisms as well as with the purposiveness of nature as a whole.

Kant’s treatment of reflective judgement in The Critique of Judgement points out the fact that the kinds of universals that may be sought by reflective judgement will have to be understood very broadly. In teleological judgement of an intricate organism the universal that we seek may be understood to be the concept of purpose (end) such as the purpose of a particular organ within the internal economy of the organism. However, in the case of aesthetic judgement, Kant explicitly denies that we seek to subsume the object under any particular or determinate concept. In the case of aesthetic judgement the only universal we seek is the idea of interpersonal agreement in pleasure in a beautiful object or in awe at a sublime one.

SECTION 2 : JUDGEMENT OF TASTE IS AESTHETIC

In the First Book of the 'Analytic of Aesthetic Judgement', Kant tries to explain the nature of a specific kind of judgement, namely, judgement of taste. Kant called the judgement which pronounces a thing to be beautiful the judgement of taste. Here his main problem is: what is required for calling an object beautiful? What do we assert when we make such a judgement about it?
The title of § 1 of The Critique of Judgement is “The Judgement of Taste is Aesthetic”. An aesthetic judgement is one in which the representations, whatever their nature (that is, whether sensible, aesthetic, or rational) are referred or related in the judgement back to the subject rather than to an object. Aesthetic judgements are thus subjective judgements, in the sense of being ‘of the subject’. The judgement that something is beautiful is the classic and perhaps still the paradigmatic case of an aesthetic judgement. The judgement of taste is aesthetic because it relates a representation (an object of art or nature) to the subject and his feeling of pleasure or displeasure.

When we call an object beautiful or ugly, we are not at all concerned with the object as such, but with the pleasure or pain which we feel when we represent it to ourselves. When we make a logical (cognitive) judgement about an object we ascribe to the object certain properties. A judgement such as ‘The Taj is made of white marble’ is a logical judgement. The predicate of this judgement is a property which we attribute to our object. On the other hand, when we say, ‘The Taj is beautiful’, we do not ascribe to the Taj any property. We merely state that we take pleasure in it. We see that judgements of taste are essentially different from logical judgements in that they are not at all concerned with the object or its properties, but merely with our own feeling about it. Judgements of taste are subjective. That is to say, in making them we refer the representation of the object by means of the imagination to the subject and its feeling of pleasure and pain. But logical or cognitive judgements are objective.

The ground of our judgement that a thing is beautiful or ugly is the way in which our power of feeling is affected by the representation of the object. In modern language we might say that for Kant the judgement of taste is an emotive proposition, expressing feeling and not conceptual knowledge. As Kant observes, conceptual knowledge about a building is one thing; appreciation of its beauty is another. “To apprehend a regular and appropriate building with one’s cognitive faculties,... is quite a different thing from being conscious of this representation with an accompanying sensation of delight. Here the representation is referred wholly to the Subject, and what is more to its feeling of life — under the name of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure — and this forms the basis of a quite separate faculty of discriminating and estimating, that contributes nothing to knowledge.” Here Kant’s assumption is that a feeling of
pleasure or displeasure cannot be affirmed of an object (such as a house or a painting); it can only be affirmed of a perceiving subject. "To form a cognitive judgement we may immediately connect with the perception of an object the concept of an object in general, the empirical predicates of which are contained in that perception. In this way a judgement of experience is produced... But we may also immediately connect with a perception a feeling of pleasure (or displeasure) and a delight attending the representation of the Object and serving it instead of a predicate." 6

But though the ground of the judgement of taste is subjective, what we actually say is obviously something about the thing, namely, that it is beautiful. The ground for the statement consists in feeling, though, of course, when I say that an object is beautiful I am not simply making a statement about my private feelings. For such a statement would be an empirically verifiable psychological judgement. It would not be a judgement of taste as such. The latter arises only when I pronounce a thing to be beautiful. There is room, therefore, for an analytic of the beautiful, even though beauty cannot be regarded as an objective quality of an object without relation to the subjective ground of the judgement that the object is beautiful.

SECTION 3 : THE FOUR MOMENTS

It has been pointed out in the first Critique that there are four logical functions of thought or judgement, and they can be brought under the heads, Quality, Quantity, Relation, and Modality. Kant's analytic of the beautiful begins by enunciating four propositions about beauty, each of which corresponds to one of these functions or moments. However, the correlations between these four moments and the four logical forms of judgement is odd, because the judgement of taste is not itself a logical judgement, even though, according to Kant, it involves a reference or relation to the understanding. Notwithstanding, the study of each moment of the judgement of taste results in a partial definition of the beautiful. We are given, as it were, four complementary elucidations of the meaning of the term 'beautiful'.

Kant presents the four moments in the Analytic as :
1. *Taste* is the faculty of estimating an object or a mode of representation by means of a delight or aversion *apart from any interest*. The object of such delight is called beautiful.

2. The *beautiful* is that which, apart from a concept, pleases universally.

3. *Beauty* is the form of *finality* in an object, so far as perceived in it *apart from the representation of an end*.

4. The beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, is cognized as object of a *necessary* delight.

Consideration of the judgment of taste from the standpoint of quality leads to the first definition of the beautiful. The second definition of the beautiful follows from the consideration of the judgement of taste according to quantity. The third definition corresponds to the category of relation. The fourth definition is derived from a consideration of the judgement of taste according to the modality of the subject’s satisfaction in the object.

**SECTION 4: JUDGEMENT OF TASTE IN DISINTERESTED**

We have already said that a judgement of taste, according to Kant, is not a logical or cognitive judgement. The judgement that something is beautiful is unlike the judgement that it is square, or that it is a feline or that it is a book, in which a particular awareness (representation, in this case an intuition) is related to a concept or universal. Only a relation between the particular awareness (to which the ‘this’ refers) and a feeling of pleasure on the part of the judging subject is all that is indicated by a judgement of taste. Kant then goes on to explicate this view by examining the nature of the felt pleasure or delight which forms the basis of the judgement that something is beautiful. The first step in that direction is the claim that the pleasure or delight is disinterested. The delight which determines the judgement of taste is independent of all interest. By interest in an object we may understand the delight which we connect with the representation of the real existence of an object. Interest involves desire or will and, therefore, a need or want. As Kant says, “But to will something, and to take a delight in its existence, i.e. to take an interest in it, are identical.” Suppose that looking at a painting of fruit, I say that it is beautiful. If I mean that I should
like to eat the fruit were it real, thus relating it to appetite, my judgement would
not be a judgement of taste in the technical sense; and I should be misusing the
word ‘beautiful’. I relate the painted fruit to appetite or desire, and I am
interested in its existence in the sense that I wish that the fruit were real, so that
I could eat it. Judgement of taste implies that the object which is called beautiful
causes satisfaction without reference to desire, to the appetitive faculties.
Aesthetic appreciation is wholly disinterested in the sense that it is
contemplative; the judgement of taste implies that the form of the thing is
pleasing precisely as an object of contemplation, without any reference to
appetite or desire. When we judge an object beautiful, we are indifferent to the
question whether it ought to exist or not. In the example of the painted fruit, if I
contemplate the painted fruit aesthetically, the fact that the fruit is represented
fruit and not existent eatable fruit is entirely irrelevant. I am concerned only with
how the thing appears to me. The mere representation of the object is
accompanied in me with satisfaction.

Kant illustrates this point with a simple example. If anyone asks me if I
find that palace beautiful which I see before me, I may answer : I do not care for
things of that kind that are made to be stared at. Or I can answer like that
Iroquois sachem who said that nothing in Paris pleased him better than the
eating houses. Or again after the manner of Rousseau I may rebuke the vanity
of the great who waste the sweat of the people on such superfluous things. In
fine, I could easily conceive myself that I found myself on an uninhabited island
without the hope of ever again coming among men, and could conjure up just
such a splendid building by my mere wish, I should not even give myself the
trouble if I had a sufficiently comfortable hut. This may all be admitted and
approved. Only it is not an answer to the question I am asked. All one wants to
know is whether the mere representation of the object gives me pleasure or not,
no matter how indifferent I may be to the real existence of the object of this
representation. In saying that the object is beautiful and in showing that I have
taste, I am concerned, not with that in which I depend on the existence of the
object, but with that which I make out of this representation in myself. To quote
Kant in this regard, “Every one must allow that a judgement on the beautiful
which is tinged with the slightest interest, is very partial and not a pure
judgement of taste. One must not be in the least prepossessed in favour of the
real existence of the thing, but must preserve complete indifference in this respect, in order to play the part of judge in matters of taste.”

SECTION 5: PURE DISINTERESTED DELIGHT CONTRASTED WITH THE DELIGHT ALLIED TO AN INTEREST

In The Critique of Judgement, Kant mentions two kinds of interest, that in the agreeable (pleasant) and that in the good. In order to elucidate his conception of ‘disinterested delight’, Kant contrasts these two kinds of pleasure with the pure disinterested delight in the judgement of taste. He defines agreeable (pleasant) thus: “That is AGREEABLE which the senses find pleasing in sensation.” Kant opines that there are two different kinds of sensation, viz., objective sensation and subjective sensation. Objective sensation is concerned with the sensible qualities of objects. Subjective sensation is not concerned with objects at all but with the feelings of the subject. Our judgements about the agreeable (pleasant) are judgements about subjective sensation. They are not concerned with the knowledge of the object, nor with knowledge of its sensible qualities. They are purely subjective. In making such judgements we make assertions only about our own subjective sensations, about the delight which we take in our object. “The green colour of the meadows belongs to objective sensation, as the perception of an object of sense; but its agreeableness to subjective sensation, by which no object is represented: i.e., to feeling, through which the object is regarded as an Object of delight (which involves no cognition of the object.)”

Now according to Kant, both the judgements about the beautiful and the pleasant are purely subjective and aesthetic judgements. However, their difference is that whereas judgements about the beautiful are disinterested, merely contemplative judgements, judgements about the pleasant are bound up with an interest in the existence of their object. When we judge a thing to be pleasant we are not primarily interested in our judgement. The judgement produces in us a desire to get hold of the object in order to enjoy it, so much so that those whose main purpose is enjoyment quite willingly dispense with judging the object, and are interested in nothing else than that the object should exist and that they should be able to enjoy it.
The delight in the good is also bound up with interest. To deem something good, we must always know what sort of a thing the object is intended to be, i.e., we must have a concept of it. A thing may be called good in two ways. We call that good for something (useful) which only pleases as a means; or we call that good in itself, which pleases on its own account. When we judge a thing to be useful, we must make use of a definite concept. The concept which is employed in our judgement about the useful is the concept of a purpose. For we call that thing useful which is regarded as a means of bringing about something else in the existence of which we have an interest. The good in itself, i.e., the moral good is also bound up with an interest. In the case of the mediately good (the useful) we are interested in something else that it will be good for. But when we call on action morally good or good in itself we are concerned with the goodness which is contained in it. The moral good is also coupled with an interest because of an obvious fact: we desire the existence of the moral good. The good is the necessary object of the will of every rational being. We approve of the good action, we take delight in it, because it realizes an object in the existence of which we have interest.

The pleasant, the beautiful, and the good, denote three different relations in which representations can stand to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. The pleasant is that which gratifies inclination or desire, and it is experienced by all animals as well as man. The good is the object of esteem: it is that to which objective worth is attributed. And it concerns all rational beings, including rational beings, if there are any, which are not human beings, that is, which have no bodies. The beautiful is that which simply pleases, without any intrinsic reference to inclination or desire. It is experienced only by those rational beings which have feelings, i.e. possess bodies. In short, aesthetic pleasure is distinctly human pleasure.

Of the three kinds of delight, only the delight in the beautiful is, again, a ‘free delight.’ The delight in the pleasant is not free because it is dependent upon our desire to possess the object. We naturally desire, as sensible beings, that objects pleasing us should belong to us so that we should be able to enjoy them. Our delight in the good is also not free. The delight in the good is the feeling of respect for the moral law. The respect for the moral law cannot even be called a feeling in the proper sense of the word. It is nothing but the
subjective awareness of our being determined by the objective moral law. It is not an independent feeling, but is necessarily connected with the moral law. A finite being which finds itself subject to the moral law must necessarily have respect for it. It is given no choice in the matter. It ought to feel respect. The delight in the good is therefore not free: it is not a disinterested delight. According to Kant, our delight in the pleasant is related to inclination, our delight in the beautiful to favour, our delight in the good to respect. Of these three, favour alone can be called a free delight, for it is only regarding the object of the judgement of taste that we can choose between favouring and disfavouring it. As regards the pleasant our natural inclination impels us to desire it, and as regards the good we are bound by the law of Reason to desire it.

SECTION 6 : EMPIRICAL INTEREST IN THE BEAUTIFUL

Kant also points out that when he speaks of the judgement of taste as entirely disinterested, he does not mean to say that it cannot or that it ought not to be accompanied by any interest. In society men certainly have an interest in communicating the pleasure which they feel in aesthetic experience. And Kant calls this an empirical interest in the beautiful. But interest, though it may accompany or be combined with the judgement of taste, is not its determining ground. Considered in itself, the judgement of taste is disinterested.

SECTION 7 : THE BEAUTIFUL PLEASES UNIVERSALLY

According to Kant, the fact that the beautiful is the object of an entirely disinterested satisfaction implies that it is the object, or ought to be the object, of a universal satisfaction. Suppose that a person is conscious that his judgement that a given statue is beautiful is entirely disinterested. This means that he is conscious that his judgement is not dependent on any private condition peculiar to himself. In pronouncing the judgement he is completely ‘free’, neither impelled by desire on the one hand nor dictated to by the moral imperative on the other. He therefore believes that he has reason for attributing to other a delight similar to that which he experiences in himself. For the delight is not grounded in the gratification of his private inclinations. Naturally, he assumes
that the object will be judged in the same manner by everybody else. Kant's argument here is that if the judging subject can find no personal reason peculiar to him for the thing in question to give him delight, he must believe that the reason for his delight must be something which he can presuppose in every other person. Accordingly he will speak of the statue as if beauty were an objective quality of it, and he will formulate his judgement as if it were a logical judgement, i.e., a judgement forming a cognition of the object through concepts of it. He will do so because there is a resemblance between the two judgements (aesthetic and logical) in that they both claim to be universally valid. But there is also an essential difference between the two judgements. Although aesthetic judgements (judgements of taste) are universal, their universality is subjective, not objective, as is that of so called logical judgements. The universality of logical judgements springs from concepts. When I call something red, I am not just describing how it appears to me – this I do by saying, “It seems red”. By calling something red, I rather describe how I expect it will appear to anyone in certain circumstances, in virtue of certain specific properties it has, for example, that it reflects light of a certain wave length. Similarly when I call something beautiful, I am not saying merely that it pleases me, but rather it ought to please everyone perceiving it. But this intersubjective claim for the judgement of taste I do not make on the basis of any specific properties of the object, as I did in the case of the logical judgement that something is red.

The universality of aesthetic judgements does not spring from concepts. For the aesthetic judgement about beauty is concerned with nothing but the pleasure or pain which is felt by the subject, and from objective concepts there is no transition to the subjective feeling of pleasure or displeasure. It is true that in the case of practical laws there is a necessary transition to a certain kind of pleasure, namely the feeling of respect for these laws. But all practical laws carry an interest with them. We approve of moral actions because we believe that the actions which are determined by those laws realize an object in the existence of which we are interested, namely, the good. Judgements of taste, on the other hand, claim universal validity for the reason that they are independent of all interest in their objects. The universality claimed by them is purely subjective. The subject of the judgement presupposes that, since it takes pleasure in the object without being in the least interested in its existence,
everyone else will feel the same pleasure. It does not demand that everyone should attribute the same properties to the object, since it is not at all concerned with its properties. It merely assumes that everyone will have the same subjective feeling about it.

The contrast between the beautiful and the merely pleasant (agreeable) is important here. According to Kant, the judgement that this wine has a pleasant taste in purely subjective and has no universal reference; the man who makes it must admit that he can legitimately mean no more by it than that the wine tastes pleasant to him. It is in this context, not in that of the aesthetic judgement of beauty, that the proverb ‘Everyone has his own taste’ is true. Pleasant feeling depends entirely on the individual nature of each person. In respect of pleasantness or unpleasantness, the mind of the individual is entirely passive. Certain objects give pleasure to certain persons and do not give it to others. There is no contradiction between ‘This wine tastes pleasant (sc. to me)’ said by one man and ‘This wine tastes unpleasant (sc. to me)’ said by another. Judgements concerning the pleasant are entirely private, i.e., based on private feelings. But if one man says of a building ‘That is beautiful’ and another says of the same building ‘That is not beautiful’, they are contradicting one another, and cannot both be right. When we say that something is beautiful, we demand agreement from others and object to their disagreement by saying ‘they have no taste’. Regarding the beautiful it cannot be said that everyone has his own taste, for this would be tantamount to saying that there is no such thing as taste at all.

Yet, according to Kant, even in the case of the pleasant (agreeable) we find that the estimates men form do betray a prevalent agreement among them, in view of which we credit some with taste and deny it to other. For instance, someone knows how to entertain his guests. He offers them food which he knows they will like, etc. It is customary to say of such a man that he has good taste. However he finds out what things are generally liked by other people by empirical observation. He is not in any way interested in the question as to whether they ought to do so or not. He simply observes, and in this way arrives at general rules according to which he makes his choice. We have to distinguish between general (empirical) rules and universal a priori rules. All rules concerning the beautiful are such universal rules. They do not tell us what has taken place in most cases but what ought to take place in every case.
Naturally, Kant does not mean to imply that when someone calls a statue beautiful, he necessarily believes that all, as a matter of fact, judge it to be beautiful. He means that by making the judgement a man claims that others should recognize the statue’s beauty. For being conscious that his judgement is ‘free’, he either attributes to others a satisfaction similar to his own or claims that they should experience it.

So all judgements about beauty claim universality which is subjective. We cannot prove logically to others that an object is beautiful. For the claim of universal validity which we make on behalf of a judgement of taste does not have any reference to the cognitive faculty, but only to the feeling of pleasure and pain in every subject. In Kant’s terminology, the judgement does not rest upon any concept: it rests upon feeling. We cannot, therefore, make good our claim to the universal validity of the judgement by any process of logical argument. We can only persuade others to look again, and to look with more attention, at the object, confident that in the end their feelings will speak for themselves and that they will concur with our judgement.

Our aesthetic judgements about the pleasant (agreeable) involve no such claim. We regard them purely as individual judgements, although actually there is to be found a very considerable amount of agreement even in those judgements. But when I judge a thing to be beautiful, I am convinced that everyone else ought to do the same. It would never enter into anyone’s head to use the expression ‘beautiful’ of an object if he did not mean by that that everyone else ought to call it beautiful also. Wherever different individuals disagree about beauty, they disagree only about the particular case, about whether the object before them actually possesses the universal characteristic, beauty. But that there is such a thing as beauty, that some things ought to be judged beautiful and others ought to be judged ugly, they do not call in question.

The universality, which our judgment about the beautiful involves, does not rest upon concepts of the object and, therefore, is in no way logical, but aesthetic. Such universality does not involve any objective quantity of the judgement, but only one that is subjective. For this universality, Kant uses the expression, ‘general validity’, “which denotes the validity of the reference of a
representation, not to the cognitive faculties, but to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure for every Subject.”

Both logical judgements and judgements of taste claim universal validity. But the difference is that logical judgements involve objective universal validity, and aesthetic judgements involve subjective universal validity. Objective universal validity is simply the formal property of universal quantification, or the validity of a particular predicate for any object falling under a certain subject-concept. Objective universal validity is the quantity manifested in the propositional form “All Fs are g”, and characterizes the content of a given proposition quite apart from its truth or acceptability. The universality of a judgement of taste, by contrast, is not an internal or formal feature of its content, but its imputability to or acceptability for all judges or subjects. This is why Kant calls it ‘subjective universal validity.’ A logically universal judgement connects a predicate-concept to a subject-concept in such a way that the former is valid of any object falling in the extension of the latter; the extension of a subjectively universal judgement, by contrast, is not a class of objects, but the class of possible human judges. Aesthetic universality thus does not connect a predicate with the concept of an object, taken in its entire logical sphere, but rather extends (the predicate of beauty) over the whole sphere of the judging subjects. Logical judgements claim that everyone ought to ascribe the same properties to the object, whereas judgements of taste claim that everyone ought to take the same pleasure in the object. Judgements of taste are interested in their object in a very limited sense. They are concerned with nothing but the judging subjects and their feeling about the object.

As a judgement of taste is concerned with nothing but the ‘individual’ object which is judged, Kant holds that all judgements of taste, in their logical quantity, are singular judgements. They are always of the form “This rose is beautiful.” In such a judgement the use of the referring expression ‘this rose’ may serve to pick out the object of attention, but does not provide the basis for calling it beautiful. A logical judgement compares a given object with other objects and determines their relation by means of concepts. A judgement of taste does not compare the object with other objects. In order to judge an object aesthetically we must immediately hold the object up to our feeling of pleasure and displeasure, without using universal concepts. The judgement of taste
carries with it an aesthetic quantity of universality, and cannot have the quantity of an objectively generally valid judgement, i.e., logical quantity. It is because an aesthetic judgement is concerned with an individual object, and the universality which it claims is validity for everyone who judges the same object. It demands that every other subject ought to take the same pleasure in the representation of this particular object. A logically universal judgement can of course arise out of a comparison of several aesthetic judgements with each other. For instance, by means of a judgement of taste I declare the rose that I am gazing to be beautiful. By contrast, the judgement that arises from the comparison of many singular ones, that roses in general are beautiful, is no longer pronounced merely as an aesthetic judgement, but as an aesthetically grounded logical judgement.

Since in judgements of taste objects are not estimated merely from concepts, it follows that there cannot be any rule in accordance with which someone can be compelled to recognize a particular object as beautiful. We cannot call a thing beautiful unless we take pleasure in it, just as if our judgement depended on sensation. No one can convince us that an object is beautiful which we do not feel to be so. When we make the judgement, we believe that we speak as it were, with a universal voice, and we claim the assent of others; but they will give this assent only on the basis of their own feelings, and not in virtue of any concepts which we adduce.

According to Kant, the pleasure in the beautiful is the only kind of sensation that is universally communicable. The pleasure in the pleasant, as we have seen in this section, cannot demand the acknowledgement of every one. Another kind of sensation is organic sensation. Organic sensation would be universally communicable if one assumes that every one has a sense that is the same as our own. But this cannot be presupposed. Thus, to someone who lacks the sense of smell, this kind of sensation cannot be communicated; and even if he does not lack this sense, one still cannot be sure that he has exactly the same sensation from a flower that we have from it.
According to Kant, in a judgement of taste, it is not the pleasure which is felt but the specific state of mind of which the pleasure is a consequence, that can be deemed universally communicable. When I represent the object to myself I become aware of a specific state of mind. This gives me pleasure. Everyone else in representing the object to themselves will find themselves in the same state of mind, and consequently will feel the same pleasure. The pleasure which I feel is universally communicable because the state of mind which produces it is universally communicable.

Now the question inevitably arises: Is it possible for a pleasure to be based on a universally communicable mental state? According to Kant, knowledge arises as an effect from a specific mental state. It is the subjective condition of knowledge. Moreover, knowledge is sharable. The sharability of a knowledge claim is a necessary condition of its being knowledge. Otherwise knowledge would be nothing but a merely subjective play of the faculties of representation, just as skepticism claims. Now if different persons are capable of sharing a common cognition, then they must all be capable of being in the mental state which explains possession of that knowledge. In other words, the subjective condition of knowledge must be as communicable as knowledge itself. The subjective state of mind necessary for cognition is the accordance of the cognitive powers for cognition generally, and that proportion of them which is suitable for a representation (by which an object is given to us) in order that a cognition may be made out of it. So in Kant’s view nothing can be universally communicable except cognition or the mental states (the subjective state of mind when it has knowledge) in so far as they relate to cognition. It follows, therefore, that the subjective state of mind, on which the universally communicable pleasure is based, is universally communicable if it is the same as that generally obtaining for cognition, namely, the harmony of the cognitive powers of the mind—the imagination and the understanding.

In the Introduction of the Critique of Pure Person, Kant says that all our knowledge begins with experience, but is not wholly derived from experience.
Knowledge consists of impressions derived from experience, together with other elements supplied by the faculty of knowledge from within itself when the sense impressions serve merely as the occasion. Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind, viz., sensibility and understanding. Sensibility stands for the capacity of the mind to receive impressions, understanding stands for the capacity of the mind to supply concepts out of itself, to be applied to impressions received through sensibility. Sensibility is the faculty which enables us to be affected by objects. It is a passive faculty. Through sensations we have intuitions of empirical objects. An intuition is any presumed awareness or experience of an object. The object of an intuition is called appearance, to which a phenomenal object, i.e., an empirical object may or may not correspond. What is first given to us is an appearance. Appearance is a manifold, and if this manifold is to be experienced as an object, we must be able to view the manifold as a unity. This requires a combination or synthesis of the manifold. So, we must possess an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold, namely the imagination. The imagination runs through the manifold and holds them together. Since the parts of the manifold come one after another in time, it is necessary that when we intuit the last part we should be able to reproduce the earlier parts in imagination, so that all the parts together may constitute a whole. Imagination is the faculty which enables us to call back sensuous representations and to combine them. Now the synthesis of manifold, must be given a unity, in order to have real experience of objects. It is the faculty of understanding which brings about a unity of this collected manifold in concepts. Understanding enables the mind to determine the collected manifold by means of concepts.

According to Kant, the synthesis is a single act: cognition results from the harmony of the equally active imagination and understanding. The harmony of the cognitive faculties occurs when they unite in subsuming a representation under a universal or concept. But the problem regarding judgement of taste is that it is aesthetic and not conceptual, and hence the state of mind on which the pleasure in the beautiful is based cannot be that of a definite act of cognition (judging a particular to be subsumable under a concept). Then, how is the harmony of cognitive faculties possible in the case of judgement of taste? How is the judgement of taste to be legitimized?
Kant's solution to the riddle is this: when we judge an object to be beautiful, we do so on the ground that the manifold of intuitions given to us is not a disorderly manifold, that there is some principle of order implicit in it which unites the parts of the manifold. We do not know why this is the case. We merely feel that there is some kind of regularity present in our object. In becoming aware of this we feel that the faculty of mere apprehensions, the faculty by means of which we collect intuitions without being concerned about whether they are in any way related to each other, namely, imagination, harmonizes in some indefinite manner with the understanding. We refer our representation to the understanding because in representing the object to ourselves we become aware of the fact that the manifold before us is not a mere manifold, but is determined by some kind of rule. What this rule is we do not know. Neither we are concerned about it. When the knowing subject makes a logical judgement, the cognitive powers of imagination and understanding are restricted to a particular rule of the understanding. When it makes an aesthetic judgement, it merely feels that they are in some such indefinite relation, that they harmonize with each other. The condition of objective knowledge is also that the faculties of cognition should harmonize with each other. But objective knowledge depends also on definite rules of the understanding; whereas in order to be enabled to judge an object to be beautiful, we require only the feeling arising from a given representation of the relation of the free play of the powers of representation with reference to knowledge in general. In aesthetic response, the relationship between the two faculties of imagination and understanding is often described as that of 'mutual assistance'. This mutual assistance can only consist in the imagination's performance of the synthesis of apprehension and reproduction, or in its unification of manifold without a concept. This is a task ordinarily performed 'on behalf of' the understanding and thus the imagination in aesthetic response is in harmony with the usual requirements of the understanding, even though the latter does not apply any determinate concept in the state of free play. Thus the harmony of the faculties is a state in which the ordinary general condition of knowledge obtains without the use of any concept. This can only be a state in which the imagination conforms to the understanding's demand for the unification of our manifolds of intuition, without the understanding performing its customary role of applying a
concept to a manifold as the rule for its unification. Imagination, in its combination of manifold, thus harmonizes with the understanding’s requirement of unity by its own action. Kant intimates that in this case, the unity of the manifold is represented by a feeling rather than a concept. Kant holds that all judging subjects in representing the same object to themselves will be in exactly the same state of mind, i.e., they will become aware of the harmony of their cognitive faculties, and as a result, will feel the specific kind of pleasure which is connected with this, for the consciousness of this harmony is the feeling of pleasure. The indefinite and merely subjective relation of the subjective conditions of knowledge is universally valid and communicable in this way.

Thus the riddle raised before has been solved: judgements of taste can be legitimized only in one way, i.e., if the pleasure, which is the consciousness of the harmony of the cognitive faculties, is based upon “the mental state that presents itself in the mutual relation of the powers of representation so far as they refer a given representation to cognition in general.”¹⁵ The harmony of cognitive faculties is possible in case of a judgement of taste because they are united in such a way as to fulfill the conditions for cognition in general, although no specific conceptualization is involved in the case of the experience of the beautiful. Since in the experience of the beautiful, the subjective state of the mind is, in its general characteristics, the same as the subjective state of mind when one has knowledge, it is universally communicable. Thus we can attribute subjective universal validity to the judgement of taste.

What follows also from the above discussion, thinks Kant, is that the judgement of taste must precede the pleasure which is felt. He says, “Now this purely subjective (aesthetic) estimation of the object, or of the representation through which it is given, is antecedent to the pleasure in it, and is the basis of this pleasure in the harmony of the cognitive faculties. Again, the above-described universality of the subjective conditions of estimating objects forms the sole foundation of this universal subjective validity of the delight which we connect with the representation of the object that we call beautiful.”¹⁶

It would be convenient for us if we spend here a few words on the free play of the faculties. In case of cognition, we have already seen, the synthesis of the imagination and the concept of the understanding chime together. This may
be thought as perceptual coinciding with conceptual form, a case falling neatly under the rule.\(^{17}\) However, though the cognitive faculties are in harmony or accord with each other, they are also in a constraint in perceptual knowledge. The imagination is constrained because it is at the service of the understanding. On the other hand, the understanding is constrained too. Synthesis and application of concepts cannot be made upon personal likings and whims since the objective is to ascertain truth or to solve a problem. Understanding is constrained by the task in hand, and we have merely the value set upon the solution that satisfies the problem, and not a free and indeterminately final entertainment of the mental powers. Now in case of the experience of the beautiful also, the two faculties are in harmony as they are in perceptual knowledge. But in aesthetic experience, they are also in ‘free play’, as they were not in perceptual knowledge. The imagination is not at the service of the understanding, and hence it is free. The understanding too, in aesthetic experience, is not to ascertain truth or solve problems of practice, and hence it is not in constraints. The imagination can, as it were, take the understanding for a walk. The understanding can come along because freed from its usual constraints, its role is simply to keep the imagination’s synthesizing thinkable. The interaction of both is described as mutual quickening.\(^{18}\)

SECTION 9: MATTER AND FORM

According to Kant, the claim to the agreement of others implicit in a judgement of taste cannot be justified by an appeal to ‘the matter’ of sensation. Kant’s matter of sensation approximates to the epistemic concept of ‘sense data’. Matter of sensation corresponds to the particular sensations of colour, taste, sound, smell, heat and cold. Sense data are private, and we can never be sure that any two persons have the same sense data. As Kant says in § 39 of The Critique of Judgement, “Thus a person who is without a sense of smell cannot have a sensation of this kind communicated to him, and, even if he does not suffer from this deficiency, we still cannot be certain that he gets precisely the same sensation from a flower that we get from it”.\(^{19}\) He continually emphasizes the private character of these qualities (the qualities of colour, taste, sound, and smell) or sensations, and calls their intrinsic sensuous appeals
‘charms’ and ‘emotions’. Charms and emotions are sensory and interested feelings of pleasure. Charm and emotion have no influence on a judgement of taste. “The colours which give brilliancy to the sketch are part of charm. They may no doubt, in their own way, enliven the object for sensation, but make it really worth looking at and beautiful they cannot”20. In § 32 he says that one man revels in the smell of a rose, but to another it is a headache. “A violet colour is to one soft and lovely: to another dull and faded. One man likes the tone of wind instruments, another prefers that of string instruments”21. Thus the claim to the agreement of other cannot be justified by reference to ‘matters’ of sensation because of their entirely private characters. So whatever it is that is to fulfill the justificatory role of the universal validity of a judgement of taste must be public and interpersonal. Kant believes that only the ‘form’ as distinct from the ‘matter’ of sensation can satisfy this condition. Judgement of taste must be based on pleasure occasioned by the perceptual form of objects, as opposed to pleasures connected with any sensations of them or any concepts applicable to them.

Kant speaks of form as ordering the matter or the constituent elements of a being, or relating them in such a way as to give them a unity. He says, “In painting, sculpture, and in fact in all the formative arts, in architecture and horticulture, so far as fine arts, the design is what is essential. Here it is not what gratifies in sensation but merely what pleases by its form that is the fundamental prerequisite for taste”.22 Crawford thinks that here the word ‘design’ is used to refer to a drawing, sketch, or design in the sense of a presentation of figures or shapes by means of lines, rather than by means of colour masses or planes.23 Kant continuously goes on to say that what we are to contemplate in the experience of the beautiful is the figure and the shape. In such cases, where by form Kant means ‘figure’ or ‘shape’, he analyzes form as the spatial relations of a given sensuous content. Regarding temporal relations it can be said that Kant analyzes music as a purely temporal art form – the composition of sensations (tones) in time. His analysis of form in terms of spatial and temporal relations is clearly indicated in the following passage, “All form of objects of sense (both of external and also, mediately, of internal sense) is either figure or play. In the latter case it is either play of figures (in space: mimic and dance), or mere play of sensation (in time). The charm of colours, or of the agreeable tones of
instruments, may be added: but the *design* in the forms and the *composition* in the later constitute the proper object of the pure judgement of taste"\textsuperscript{24}. It is clear from this passage that for Kant, form consists of the spatial and temporal organization of elements; figure, shape or design in the one case, composition in the other. In the above quoted passages Kant asserts that only such purely formal features of spatial and temporal organization as ‘design’, ‘drawing’, ‘outline’, ‘figure’, ‘play’ and ‘composition’ are allowed to contribute to actual beauty. In his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant holds that space and time are pure forms of intuition; they are forms in which intuitions necessarily are given to us. They are conditions of sense experience. The forms of our experience consist of the relations between sensations. Though sensations are private, the relations or orderings of sensations in space and time are objective because they are conditions for experience in general – they are the *a priori* forms of intuition. So in order to justify the universal validity of a judgement of taste, it must be based on the reflection and contemplation of the spatial and temporal relations of sensations. Kant also shows in the first *Critique* that concepts are rules for the unification or ordering of appearances spatially and temporally. But in *The Critique of Judgement*, Kant claims that concepts are not relevant to experience something aesthetically. So in order to sustain his claim to the universal validity of a judgement of taste, he maintains that in the experience of the beautiful, spatial and temporal properties are related in a law like way. The doctrine which he now brings in to substantiate his claim is ‘conformity to law without a law’, or ‘finality without an end’ (‘purposiveness without a purpose’). In order to discover whether the thing before us is beautiful, what we ought to do is to reflect on or contemplate — somehow judge — the way in which various sensations or *sensa* (sights, sound) we have are, or can be, ordered or related into a purposive whole — as if the whole were designed for a determinate purpose\textsuperscript{25}; but either we cannot say what this purpose is, or we prevent ourselves (through abstracting the formal relations from the purpose) from thinking what it is.\textsuperscript{26} The judgement of taste must be a response to the ‘form of finality’ in an object.
Kant's definition of 'end' or 'purpose' and 'finality' or 'purposiveness' runs as follows: "An end is the object of a concept so far as this concept is regarded as the cause of the object, (the real ground of its possibility); and the casuality of a concept in respect of its object is finality (forma finalis)." To clarify Kant's point, let us take an example. When we make the judgement "The purpose of ear is hearing", we mean that the object (the ear) would not exist but for the function which it fulfils. The function is not an object of sense, it is a concept. We assume that the object would not exist without this concept which is to be regarded as the real ground of the object. The causality of a concept in respect of its object is called 'purposiveness' or 'finality'. We ascribe causality to the concept (the purpose, viz. hearing). The concept has brought the object into being.

An object is said to have a purpose (end) when its form and existence is conceived as the result of a plan or rule (concept). Concepts are supplied by human beings. Thus purposes (aims, goals, intentions) are linked to wills. When we say of an object that it is a purpose (end), we presuppose that the being which brought it into existence would not have begun to act, would not have produced it, if it had not desired to produce the effect. The cause is determined in its action by the representation of the desired effect. In Section V of the First Introduction Kant says, "... we call purposive that the existence of which seems to presuppose a representation of the same thing." Let us again take another example. We may judge that a natural body, e.g. an organism, serves a purpose. When we judge this we believe that the organism was created by a being to whose mind the concept of what the organism was to be was present before it created it. We assume this because we believe it to be impossible that the parts of the organism and the whole organism, which we find related to each other and in harmony with each other, could exist, if such a relation and such a harmony had not been intended by an intelligent being. We assume that this being first represents to itself what the organism is to be. The existence of the thing depends on whether it has been represented in the mind of an intelligent being. Thus the cause is determined in its action by the representation of the
effect. The causal relation which is assumed is quite different from the principal of mechanical causation. Kant discusses about it in § 65 in the 'Analytic of Teleological Judgement'. In case of mechanical causation, the causal connection is thought by the understanding. In this, the series of causes and effects is invariably progressive. The effects are regarded as dependent on their causes, but the causes for their part are not regarded as determined by the effects. This causal connection is termed that of efficient causes (*nexus effectivus*). But Kant is here explaining a fundamentally different kind of causal connection. Reason enables us to conceive the idea of such a connection. The series of causes and effects involve progressive as well as regressive dependency. The effects are regarded as dependant on the causes, and at the same time the causes as dependent on the effects. A causal connection of this kind is termed that of final causes (*nexus finalis*). Kant calls the former casual principle the nexus of real causes, the latter the nexus of ideal causes. In assuming this principle of ideal causes we presuppose that causes and effects are mutually dependent. We assume that the cause produces the effect as well as that the cause is dependent on the effect in so far as it would not have been caused to operate at all unless there had been a desire to bring about the effect. According to Kant, in the domain of practical matters, namely in art (things which are produced by human beings), we readily find examples of nexus finals. He says, "Thus a house is certainly the cause of the money that is received as rent, but yet, conversely, the representation of this possible income was the cause of the building of the house." The man would not have built the house at all if he had not desired to receive rent from it. So, according to Kant, when we judge an object to be a purpose (end), this implies that what has produced it, whether it is a human being or nature, before producing it conceived the idea of what the object was to be, what purpose (end) it was to serve. The cause is determined by the representation of the effect. The concept of the object exists before the object itself exists.

In connection with judgement of taste, Kant speaks of another kind of purposiveness (finality). An object or a state of mind or even an action, although its possibility does not necessarily presuppose the representation of a purpose, is called purposive merely because its possibility can only be explained and conceived by us in so far as we assume as its ground a causality according to
purposes, i.e. a will that has arranged it so in accordance with the representation of a certain rule. Purposiveness (finality) can thus exist without a purpose, in so far as, we do not place the causes of this form in a will, but can still make the explanation of its possibility conceivable to ourselves only by deriving it from a will. This special kind of purposiveness is merely subjective. In assuming it, Kant holds, we are interested only in the mere form of our object and its relation to our faculties of representing it to ourselves. According to Kant, we are not always obliged to look with the eye of reason into what we observe (i.e., to consider it in its possibility). So we may observe a purposiveness (finality) of form; we cannot conclude that it has a definite objective purpose, even though the object is intelligible to us only in terms of purposes. Hence there can be ‘finality without an end’, or ‘purposiveness without purpose’. In the language of Kant, “Finality, therefore, may exist apart from an end, in so far we do not locate the causes of this form in a will, but yet are able to render the explanation of its possibility intelligible to ourselves only by deriving it from a will.”

Our judgements about the beautiful are quite independent of any idea of a purpose. It follows from the fact that they are judgements which are independent of any interest in the existence of the object which is judged. Without raising the question as to whether it ought to exist or not, we take pleasure in it by merely contemplating it. So our judgements about the beautiful must be quite independent of any idea of what purpose the object serves. When we take delight in an object on the ground that it realizes some purpose which we ascribe to it, we are in judging the object naturally interested in the question as to whether the object which is judged actually realizes this purpose. The object pleases us because it serves a subjective purpose of which we approve, namely enjoyment. Our judgements about the pleasant are like this. Judgements of taste are independent of any such subjective purposes. They are also independent of any representation of an objective purpose. Judgements of good depend on the representation of such an objective purpose. It is the good itself. We take pleasure in the good for in its realization lies the interest of every rational being. We judge an action to be good when it realizes this objective purpose of which we approve. So judgements of taste are unlike our judgements of good.
According to Kant, if a judgement of beauty can be determined neither by the agreeableness of an object as a subjective purpose nor by its perfection as an objective purpose, then we are left “with the subjective finality in the representation of an object, exclusive of any end (objective or subjective) — consequently the bare form of finality in the representation whereby an object is given to us, so far as we are conscious of it — as that which is alone capable of constituting the delight which, apart from any concept, we estimate as universally communicable, and so of forming the determining ground of the judgement of taste.” The above passage indicates that an object or its representation may possess the ‘form’ of finality without possessing the usual ‘matter of finality’ — that is, actual relation to some subjective end or recognized status as an objective end. The term ‘subjective finality’ has been used here as an alternative expression of ‘form of finality’, which points out that an object has the form of finality when it stands in a certain relation to a subject who perceives or enjoys it. In the First Introduction, Kant says, “If then, the form of a given object in empirical intuition is so constituted that the apprehension of its manifold in the imagination agrees with the presentation of a concept of the understanding (though which concept be undetermined), then in the mere reflection understanding and imagination mutually agree for the advancement of their business, and the object will be perceived as purposive merely for the power of judgement, hence the purposiveness itself will be considered as merely subjective; for which, further, no determinate concept of the object at all is required nor is one thereby generated, and the judgement itself is not a cognitive judgement. —Such a judgement is called an aesthetic judgement of reflection.” The above passage makes it clear what the relation is in which an object stands to the subject — the relation in which the subjective or formal finality (purposiveness) of the object consists. The relation is that the object must be able to dispose the imagination and the understanding of the subject to their state of free play. The form of finality in an object consists precisely in its tendency to produce the harmony of the faculties, or its suitability for allowing this state to result from the contemplation of it.

In the published Introduction of The Critique of Judgement, Kant explains ‘subjective formal finality’ in connection with an object’s production of the harmony of the faculties. Here he says that if “pleasure is connected with the
mere apprehension (*apprehensio*) of the form of an object of intuition, apart from any reference it may have to a concept for the purpose of a definite cognition”, then in such a case “the pleasure can express nothing but the conformity of the Object to the cognitive faculties brought into play in the reflective judgement, and so far as they are in play, and hence merely a subjective formal finality of the Object”. Here also Kant suggests that the object’s ‘subjective formal finality’ consists in its conformity to our cognitive faculties, ‘so far as they are in play’ or in its disposition to produce this state of play without judgement having to contemplate the object’s relation to a concept for the purpose of acquiring knowledge. Thus we speak of purposiveness in so far as the object makes us feel the harmony of our faculties of representation. The feeling is the feeling of pleasure. We feel pleasure in the harmony of our faculties of representation. The harmony of the faculties manifests or expresses itself in a feeling of pleasure. The consciousness of the free play of the faculties just is the consciousness of pleasure. As Kant says, “The consciousness of mere formal finality in the play of the cognitive faculties of the Subject attending a representation whereby an object is given, is the pleasure itself”. Our consciousness of pleasure in the beautiful is our sole direct consciousness of the ground of this pleasure. That the cognitive faculties are free and harmonious in play is and can only be discerned by our pleasure in such engagements of our powers, that is, by feeling. We speak of purposiveness in so far as the object makes us feel the harmony of our faculties of representation. An object is subjectively or formally purposive because by producing the free play between the imagination and the understanding it produces pleasure.

The purport of what Kant wants to say is this. Judgements of taste are contemplative judgements. We call objects beautiful because their representation makes us conscious of a harmony of our faculties of representation. We can not explain to ourselves why we do this. We can merely feel it. We cannot ascribe it to the object. We cannot say the object as such serves a purpose, simply because we are not concerned with the object at all but with our own feelings. In representing an object to ourselves and calling it beautiful, we are concerned only with our own representation. What we judge to be purposive (final) is not object but rather the representation whereby the object is given to us. Our way of representing the object to ourselves, and not
the object irrespective of how it is given to us, makes us feel pleasure in the harmony of our faculties of representation. This is a subjective purposiveness of the representation, apart from any purpose.

In the passages quoted from both the Introductions, we have seen that Kant affirms that aesthetic pleasure is connected with the apprehension of mere form of the given object. In the Section VII of the published Introduction, Kant says, “When the form of an object (as opposed to the matter of its representations, as sensation) is, in the mere act of reflecting upon it, without regard to any concept to be obtained from it, estimated as the ground of a pleasure in the representation of such an Object, then this pleasure is also judged to be combined necessarily with the representation of it, and so not merely for the Subject apprehending this form, but for all in general who pass judgement. The object is thus called beautiful.” 35 The quoted passage indicates that our experience of the beautiful is based on the act of reflecting upon the form of the object judged to be beautiful, as opposed to the matter of its representation, as sensation. Only that pleasure which is connected with the apprehension of the mere form of the object can be claimed to be universally communicable, for in the Kantian system, as we have already discussed in Section 9 of this chapter, only the form can have intersubjective validity. We have also mentioned in Section 9 that strictly sensory and physiological aspects of perception such as colours and tones have been relegated by Kant to the status of matter; they contribute to nothing but charm or gratification in their objects. Only such purely formal features of spatial and temporal organization as ‘design’, ‘drawing’, ‘outline’, ‘figure’, ‘play’ and ‘composition’ contribute to actual beauty. So only these features of objects are able to dispose the imagination and understanding to their harmonious fulfillment of the subjective conditions of knowledge. Judgement of taste is based on response to these perceptual forms of objects.

The fact that Kant calls this purposive follows from what is argued in the Introduction. There Kant says that all our reflective judgements are based upon the Idea of ‘purposiveness’, and also that in conceiving this Idea we attribute to nature a special principle, the principle of Technique. We ascribe to nature logical purposiveness. The reason is this. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant did not pay sufficient attention to the fact that we do not merely presuppose that all
natural objects are determined by universal laws, but also assume that we shall succeed in arranging particular laws in a system. This is a presupposition on which all our scientific enquiry into nature rests. In the first *Critique*, Kant's view is that we have neither *a priori* knowledge of particular laws of nature nor any *a priori* principle with regard to them. In the *Critique of Judgement* he takes a different view. He realizes now that it is not enough to regard nature as a system in accordance with transcendental laws which constitute the universal conditions of experience. If we are to have real experience, we must presuppose that nature is a system in accordance with particular laws which it contains. We must assume that the particular laws of nature which we discover are related to each other and are derived from one principle which embraces them all. In doing so, we conceive the idea of nature which conforms to our subjective requirements. We expect that the particular laws will not be so different from each other as to make it impossible for our faculty of judgement to find a universal principle common to them all. This presupposition may be called a subjectively necessary transcendental presupposition; for we presuppose it, not because there are any objective reasons why we should believe it to be the case, but because without it experience would be impossible. It cannot be the understanding which makes us presuppose this; for the understanding is concerned only with strictly universal laws and does not take any account of particular empirical laws. It cannot also be regarded as a product of Reason; for Reason by its very nature transcends experience, and is not concerned with the world of experience or its laws. The presupposition prior to actual experience that nature will be a system of empirical laws originates in our judgement. The faculty of judgement demands this systematic unity of nature on merely subjective grounds. It expects that nature will meet its demands. The faculty of judgement presupposes that we shall find a certain regularity in nature, that natural objects will be of such a kind as to make it possible for us to form concepts of them and to discover empirical laws, that nature has observed a certain economy, that there is not an unlimited number of totally different laws but a limited number of laws which are related to each other. The idea of a logical system of nature is not an objective principle of determination, but a subjective principle of mere reflection, because we have no objective grounds for believing that nature actually is such a system. This subjective principle we apply only in the interests of our knowledge. Our
judgement presupposes that it can regard natural objects as suitable for arrangement in a logical system because the human mind could not know nature otherwise. This is the principle of reflective judgement. The Idea of the systematic unity of particular laws is a product of the faculty of judgement, which on subjective grounds ascribes to nature a principle of purposiveness. It assumes that nature has taken account of the special needs of the human mind. The curious fact is that we expect nature to serve a purpose which is entirely ours, and which has nothing to do with nature as such. It is a faculty of human mind, viz. the faculty of judgement, which demands the system of particular laws. It is not nature itself but the human mind which needs a logical system of nature.

According to Kant, judgement is in search of a different kind of unity, viz. the unity of the particular laws. So the judgement must conceive the Idea of a Technique of nature. Judgement assumes that nature specifies its universal laws according to the Idea of a system so that every particular law is related to every other, and all are related to the universal laws of which they are mere instances. Now we cannot regard this relation as merely accidental. We must assume that nature, which we represent to ourselves as an intelligent being, intended its laws to belong to a system, i.e., to stand in a connection in which every part is related to every other and to the whole. Thus in conceiving the Idea of a logical system of nature, we regard nature as if it were an artist, as if it had arranged its particular laws so that they were all related to each other and all derived from the universal principle conceived by the mind of an all intelligent being. We ascribe to nature a specific kind of purposiveness namely, a logical purposiveness. We know that when we judge an object to be purposive we assume that the object could not exist unless it had been represented by an intelligent being. Therefore, since the assumption of a system of empirical natural laws implies an Idea of purposiveness, we must also assume that it has been brought about by an intelligent being, by a superhuman understanding, which is to be regarded as the ground of its possibility.

The Idea of a superhuman understanding which applies the principle of Technique is presupposed by reflective and not by determinant judgement. The principle which is employed is an indeterminate principle of a purposive disposition of nature in a system. Judgement assumes it in its own interest in
order to have a principle of reflection. It does not presume that nature as such owes its existence to an understanding which employs the principle of Technique, but it conceives such an Idea for the sake of enquiring into nature. It gives a law to itself, not to nature. It must take as a basis of its enquiry the Idea of a system of particular laws, because if it did not, it could not even begin to enquire into nature, or to arrange the particular laws of nature in a logical system.

According to Kant, when we are concerned with nothing but a logical problem, viz., the problem of a logical division of our concepts of natural objects, we cannot but ascribe purposiveness to nature. For we must assume that nature will not make it impossible for us to arrange our empirical concepts of these objects in a system. As the concept of purposiveness is only needed for use in logic it cannot be regarded as an objective determining concept. For the purpose which we ascribe to nature is entirely dependent on the knowing mind. It is not posited in the object, but merely in the subject. Judgement assumes that nature has taken account of the special needs of the human mind.

Not only are we concerned with the systematic relations of objects to each other, we judge certain natural products too as containing within themselves systematic unity, e.g. crystal formations, various shapes of flowers, or the inner structure of plants and animals. As regards these products, nature proceeds not as mere nature, but as an artist. We judge an object to be a purpose of nature because we find that the parts which are contained in it are related both to one another and to the whole of which they are parts in such a way as to make it impossible for us to explain them to ourselves without deriving them from an Idea. Once more we think of nature as an artist. We attribute to nature the principle of a Technique.

Kant holds that the human mind possesses a principle of aesthetic reflection which is subjective. The human mind is capable of bringing about a harmonious relation of its faculties of representation; and it calls those objects beautiful the representation of which makes it conscious of this harmony. Now nature actually presents us with such objects, and we cannot explain them to ourselves without assuming that nature in producing them has taken account of our subjective principle of aesthetic reflection. We do not ascribe to it any objective purposes.
From the above exposition of Kant's doctrine, it is now easy to grasp Kant's main idea behind his belief that our judgements about the beautiful rest upon the Idea of subjective purposiveness and that in applying this idea we must refer to a will.

Now since the universal laws of the understanding are necessary conditions of our experience of nature, it is not surprising that nature should conform to them. Since they are the universal a priori conditions of experience, nature as the object of experience must conform to them. But it does not seem necessary that nature as regards its particular laws, with their possible wealth of variety and heterogeneity, should conform to our faculty of comprehension. On the contrary, it may seem surprising that it should be so. It is the business of the understanding to introduce unity into nature. However, the understanding cannot give us any necessary objective laws regarding the unity of the particular laws of nature. So it may rightly be asked how we can expect such unity of nature. The situation is that on the one hand the human mind must necessarily assume that it will succeed in bringing about a system of particular laws and on the other it has no objective grounds for believing that it will succeed. The faculty of judgement, according to its necessary a priori principle, must aim at bringing about a system of particular laws, but it can never know prior to actual experience whether it will be able to do this or not. This is why we feel pleasure whenever we discover that two or more heterogeneous empirical laws have a common principle. In finding that nature is in accordance with the universal laws of nature, the knowing mind will feel no pleasure at all, because the understanding knows that this is objectively necessary. Such a necessity does not exist for the principle of judgement; and that is why we must feel pleasure whenever we succeed in making use of this principle. Both the principle of judgement and the feeling of pleasure are a priori necessary and universally valid; and there is also a necessary connection between them. To assume the purposiveness of nature is subjectively necessary and objectively contingent. We can have no objective knowledge of the Technique of nature or the Idea of a nature which arranges its particulars in a system. We merely wish that it would be so. It is the uncertainty of our own success which makes us feel pleasure when we meet it. A merely subjective principle manifests itself in a subjective feeling. The connection between the two is a priori necessary.
According to Kant, we may account for purposiveness of a beautiful object in two ways. We may say that it was actually designed to be beautiful by the Supreme Force behind nature. This is the realism of the purposiveness: the purposiveness is assumed as an actual (designed) purpose of nature or art harmonizing with our judgement. “The beautiful forms displayed in the organic world all plead eloquently on the side of the realism of the aesthetic finality of nature in support of the plausible assumption that beneath the production of the beautiful there must lie a preconceived idea in the producing cause - that is to say an end acting in the interest of our own imagination.”

On the other hand, there may also be the idealism of purposiveness. We may say that the purposiveness is not really resident in nature, but that our perception of it is due to the subjective needs of our judging faculty. We have to contemplate beautiful objects as if they were purposive, but they may not be so in reality. The purposiveness is the result of our own contemplating mind; it is this activity which supplies the element of purposiveness. And this latter idealistic doctrine is what Kant falls back upon. He opposes the principle of real purposiveness by referring to the laws of mechanism of nature. Nature everywhere shows in its free formations much mechanical tendency to the productions of forms seemingly made, as it were, for the aesthetic employment of our judgement, “without affording the least support to the supposition of a need for anything over and above its mechanism, as mere nature, to enable them to be final for our judgement apart from their being grounded upon any idea.” In support of his doctrine, Kant appeals to the phenomena of crystallization, in which many very beautiful forms seem to be produced by merely mechanical processes. As Kant says, “… the halo in the grotto of Antiparos is merely the work of water percolating through strata of gypsum.”

The beauty of a rock crystal is apparently produced without any forethought on the part of nature. According to Kant, what shows the principle of the ideality of the purposiveness in the beauty of nature, as that which we always place at the basis of an aesthetical judgement, is the fact that in judging beauty we invariably seek its gauge in ourselves a priori, and that our faculty of judgement is itself legislative in respect of the judgement whether anything is beautiful or not. We do not learn from nature, but from ourselves, what we are to find beautiful. In such an act of judging the important point is not what nature is, or even, as a
purpose, is in relation to us, but how we take it. In the case of the play of the imagination in its freedom, i.e. subjective purposiveness, it is we who receive nature with favour, and not nature which shows us favour.

Had we assumed the realism of the purposiveness of nature, we must have learnt from nature what we ought to find beautiful, and the judgement of taste would be subjected to empirical principles. The judgement of taste would not then be free, would be founded upon heteronomy, and not upon autonomy.

An objective and real purposiveness in nature would exist if nature has fashioned its forms for our satisfaction; but this we can never know. In case of beautiful art, too, an aesthetical realism of this purposiveness cannot be perceived by sensations (for then the art would be only pleasant, not beautiful). Subjective purposiveness of beautiful forms in nature and art is merely ideal in that we can only claim that the objects of nature and art bring with them a purposiveness in their form by which the object seems to be, as it were, preadapted to our judgement. This is the source of satisfaction in the beautiful. But it is our power of judgement that brings this about: a satisfaction independent of mere sense-enjoyment is created by the imagination, regarded as the instrument of Reason, exercising a domain over sensibility.

Thus according to Kant, we do not judge an object as beautiful because we think of it as having been consciously and effectively designed; we judge it as beautiful because, in order to understand its effect, we have to think of it as if it had been so designed. It is beautiful because, if it had been designed, it would have been well designed; well designed, that is, to appeal to, and cause pleasure to, our contemplating mind. “The perception of ‘purposiveness’, like the regular ideas of reason, is not a perception of what is, but a perception ‘as if’.” 39 Indeed, in Kant’s view, what we are really taking pleasure in when we feel pleasure as the result of judging something to be beautiful is not anything in the beautiful object itself, but rather the activity or free play of our own cognitive powers. In feeling our pleasure in the beautiful we are concerned with nothing but our own state of mind. And yet there belongs to this pleasure a certain causality, a causality of a special sort, which is the inherent or inner causality. The representation of the object judged to be beautiful affects the judging subject in such a way that he is incited to remain in that state of contemplating the beautiful object. This is the ‘disinterested interest’ 40, an interest only toward
maintaining the state of the judging subject. Contemplation of the beautiful is thus self-perpetuating. As Kant holds, “We dwell on the contemplation of the beautiful because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself”. The judgement that an object is beautiful is based on a felt harmony in the play of our mental powers when we contemplate the object.

Though a judgement of taste has for its determining ground merely the purposiveness of the form, Kant admits that colours and tones may make a possible contribution in the process of judging an object aesthetically. If a statue has been painted in a bright colour in order that it may have an added superficial attractiveness, this colour cannot contribute in any way to its beauty, strictly and properly so called. On the other hand, the way in which colour is used in a painting can contribute to its beauty to the extent that it is considered as part of the painting’s formal structure. Charms may be added beside beauty in order to interest the mind through the representation of the object beyond dry satisfaction, and thus to serve to recommend taste and its cultivation, especially when it is still crude and unpractical. But they actually do damage to the judgement of taste if they attract attention to themselves as grounds for the judging of beauty. It is a fact that colours and tones are agreeable by themselves. But merely because they are agreeable, it should not be supposed that they supply a supplement of the same rank to the satisfaction in the form. They contribute to beauty not because of their own nature or any pleasure we may take in them. They contribute to beauty only in so far as they merely make the form more precisely, more determinately, and more completely intuitable. They enliven the representation through their charm, thereby awakening and sustaining attention to the object itself. Emotional appeal is similarly not a constituent of beauty.

SECTION : 11 WHY THE HARMONY OF THE FACULTIES PRODUCES PLEASURE—AN EXPLANATION

We have just observed in the previous section that the form of finality in an object consists precisely in its tendency to produce the harmony of the cognitive faculties. Such a tendency, according to Paul Guyer, as he offers this explanation in his book *Kant And The Claims of Taste*,” may be called final or purposive because the harmony of the faculties itself pleases as an unusual
accompaniment of our general cognitive aim or purpose. Thus a beautiful object pleases in reference to the aim of cognition itself, on which Kant’s entire theory of aesthetic response depends.

According to Guyer, Kant connects pleasure to the faculty of reflective judgement by the theory that all pleasure results from the fulfillment of some aim of the subject. As Kant says in Section VI of the published Introduction, “The attainment of every aim is coupled with a feeling of pleasure.” According to Kant, each of the faculties of mind has the objective of producing the state which it is capable of producing, and the satisfaction of this objective, at least under certain conditions, produces pleasure. Thus the attainment of knowledge is the fulfillment of the objective of the faculties of cognition and, at least ideally, the occasion of a pleasure which does not fulfill an objective set by desire. Correspondingly, the satisfaction of the objective set by the faculty of desire itself may be regarded as the cause of pleasure that does not involve the objectives of the faculty of cognition. Hence, the successful employment of the faculty of reflective judgement must also be seen as the occasion of a pleasure which is independent of the practical aims of the faculty of desire.

As we have already discussed in Section 10 of this Chapter, according to Kant, in order to have empirical knowledge, we require that not only the universal laws, but also the particular laws of nature must belong to a system. We endeavour to bring the heterogeneous laws of nature together under other higher empirical laws. When we discover that nature displays the higher order organization demanded by our ideal that its laws be systematic, we feel pleasure. To speak in the language of psychology, success which cannot be predicted, and is thus a surprise, produces a feeling of pleasure. The subsumption of perceptions under the general laws of nature stated by the categories does not produce pleasure, because in the case of such subsumption understanding necessarily proceeds and succeeds according to rules set by its own nature. But pleasure is felt in the systematicity of nature, because the perception of systematicity represents the fulfillment of a general cognitive objective in a case in which such success is not guaranteed and cannot be predicted on the basis of the necessary conformity of nature to the mere conditions of the possibility of our experience itself. Success in reflective judgement’s objective of systematizing the understanding’s knowledge of nature
produces a feeling of pleasure, because the conformity of nature to the requirements of judgement is seen by us as contingent, and not necessitated by the mere nature of our cognitive faculties.

According to Guyer, we feel pleasure in the discovery of systematicity of nature because “this discovery falls into a larger class of events, the attainment of objectives, which are invariably coupled with pleasure – at least when contingent.” The same justification lies beyond our reason why should pleasure be connected with the occurrence of the harmony of the faculties. The mental state of the harmony of the faculties produces pleasure because it too represents a state in which a general cognitive objective, analogous to our requirement of systematicity, is fulfilled in conditions where such success is contingent.

Our goal of knowledge may actually be characterized in two ways. It might be strictly objective, i.e., the discovery or acquisition of true beliefs or objectively valid judgements. Or our goal might be subjective, simply consisting in the synthesis or unification of our manifolds of intuition. The synthesis or unification of a manifold is what produces an objectively valid judgement. As the mental event which has knowledge as its outcome, this synthesis may be thought of as the subjective condition of cognition, and as itself a goal in cognition. Ordinarily, the satisfaction of this goal is achieved by the application of determinate concepts of the understanding to the manifold of intuition and in so far as this application is guaranteed by the nature of the understanding itself, it provides no particular occasion for pleasure. Now the harmony of the faculties in case of aesthetic response is a state in which a manifold of intuition is in some sense apprehended as unified without being subsumed under any determinate concept, or in which the imagination meets the understanding’s general requirements of ‘lawfulness’ without the use of a concept. Therefore the harmony of the faculties is a state in which the ordinary general condition of knowledge obtains without the use of any concept. Since it is the use of a concept which ordinarily guarantees the unification of a manifold, unification without a concept can be regarded as the contingent and unexpected fulfillment of our aim in knowledge, described from the subjective point of view, and would thus be the occasion of pleasure.
WE JUDGE AN OBJECT TO BE PLEASANT ON THE GROUND THAT ITS REPRESENTATION EXCITES PLEASURE IN THE SUBJECT WHICH REPRESENTS THE OBJECT TO ITSELF. BUT IN MAKING SUCH A JUDGEMENT WE DO NOT IN ANY WAY ASSERT THAT THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATION AND THE FEELING IS \textit{a priori} NECESSARY. JUDGEMENTS ABOUT PLEASANT ARE MERELY EMPIRICAL JUDGEMENTS. HOWEVER IN JUDGING A THING BEAUTIFUL WE ASSUME THAT THERE IS A NECESSARY CONNEXION BETWEEN OUR REPRESENTATION OF IT AND THE PLEASURE WHICH IS FELT BY US.

THE NECESSITY OF A JUDGEMENT OF TASTE IS NOT A THEORETICAL OBJECTIVE NECESSITY THAT BELONGS TO \textit{a priori} COGNITIVE JUDGEMENTS (FOR EXAMPLE, THE NECESSITY WHICH IS INVOLVED IN THE PROPOSITION, KNOWN BY US TO BE TRUE, THAT EVERY EVENT HAS AS ITS CAUSE, OR GROUND, SOME OTHER EVENT PRECEDING IT IN TIME). FOR IF IT WERE, I SHOULD KNOW \textit{a priori} THAT "EVERYONE WILL FEEL THIS DELIGHT IN THE OBJECT THAT IS CALLED BEAUTIFUL BY ME." \textit{45} AND THIS IS CERTAINLY NOT THE CASE. I CLAIM UNIVERSAL VALIDITY FOR MY JUDGEMENT; BUT I DO NOT KNOW THAT IT WILL BE ADMITTED IN FACT. THERE IS ALSO A PRACTICAL NECESSITY WHICH IS BOUND UP WITH MORALITY. IN EVERY PRACTICAL JUDGEMENT IT IS IMPLIED THAT THERE IS A NECESSARY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATION OF THE MORAL LAW AND A SPECIAL KIND OF DELIGHT, NAMELY, THE FEELING OF RESPECT FOR THE MORAL LAW. BUT THIS FEELING OF RESPECT IS NOTHING BUT THE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE OF OUR CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE MORAL LAW. A WILL THAT REPRESENTS TO ITSELF THE MORAL LAW MUST NECESSARILY FEEL RESPECT FOR IT. IT IS THE WILL OF THE AGENT WHICH IS DETERMINED BY THE MORAL LAW, AND THE FEELING OF RESPECT IS IN FACT IDENTICAL WITH THIS DETERMINATION OF THE WILL. A PERSON WHO FEELS THAT HE OUGHT TO ACT MORALLY, AND THAT THIS WILL OUGHT TO MAKE ITSELF DEPENDENT ON THE MORAL LAW, MUST NECESSARILY FEEL RESPECT FOR THE MORAL LAW. SO PRACTICAL NECESSITY IS THE Necessity to act in a certain way. But the necessity of a judgement of taste is not a practical necessity, that is, the result of an objective law telling us how to act.

THE NECESSITY IMPLIED IN OUR THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL JUDGEMENTS IS OBJECTIVE. THESE JUDGEMENTS DERIVE THEIR NECESSARY VALIDITY FROM UNIVERSAL OBJECTIVE RULES. IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO MAKE A THEORETICAL OR A PRACTICAL JUDGEMENT WE MUST SUBSUME A PARTICULAR CASE UNDER A UNIVERSAL RULE. IN THE CASE OF A THEORETICAL JUDGEMENT IT IS OUR FACULTY OF THEORETICAL JUDGEMENT WHICH SUBSUMES THE PARTICULAR CASE UNDER CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING. IN THE CASE OF A
practical judgement it is our faculty of practical judgement which subsumes a
given case under concepts of Reason.

But judgements of taste are singular judgements. They are concerned
with individual objects. They, therefore, cannot depend upon objective universal
rules, and obviously the necessity of judgements of taste cannot be *apodictic*
(objective necessity). It is what Kant calls *exemplary*, i.e., “a necessity of the
assent of *all* to a judgement regarded as exemplifying a universal rule incapable
of formulation.” 46 In judging a particular object beautiful we refer our
representation of it to a universal rule which we are incapable of determinig. We
call a thing beautiful on the ground that we regard it as an instance of a rule
(indeterminate and indeterminable) which we consider necessary. We assume
that our judgement of taste is necessary, and that every other subject ought to
agree to it, because it refers to a rule which we must necessarily assume.

The judgement of taste ascribes assent to everyone, and whoever
declares something to be beautiful wishes that everyone *ought to* approve of the
object in question and similarly declare it to be beautiful. Now the ‘ought’ in
aesthetic judgement is pronounced conditionally. Since we have no objective
knowledge of the rule to which we refer, we can never be certain that the given
case actually is an instance of the indeterminate rule. The universal subjective
necessity that we ascribe to the judgement of taste depends on a condition, the
condition, namely that the particular case actually is an instance of a rule. The
‘ought’ is conditional in so far as we can never be certain that we have
subsumed a particular case correctly. On the other hand, one could even count
on this assent if only one were always sure that the case was correctly
subsumed under that rule. The rule itself must be held to be universally valid
and necessary.

Both the moments of universality and necessity require that a person
calling an object beautiful rationally expects that others will take pleasure in it.
However, though both the moments place the same demand on the judgement
of taste, the requirement of necessity is fundamental to the judgement of taste.
The demand for universality can be met only if the pleasure is attributed to a
ground which is neither private nor contingent, but is instead a necessary
constituent of human nature. In other words, the demand for universal validity
can be satisfied only by a pleasure which is connected with a necessary rather
than a contingent feature of the subject. A pleasure which is due to the harmony of
the cognitive faculties is a pleasure one has just in virtue of possessing the
faculties necessary for cognition, rather than because of some contingent fact
about one’s own physiology or interests. One can rationally believe that the
requirement of intersubjectivity is satisfied only if one believes that a given
pleasure is in this sense necessary rather than contingent.

Judgement of taste must be based on a principle on which we can claim
the necessity and universality it possesses. Such a principle cannot be a
determinate objective principle, one which links beauty to other properties of
objects by logically universal rules.

Judgements of taste must be based on a subjective a priori principle. In
making a judgement of taste we assume that it is possible to determine
independently of any concepts, by means of mere feeling, that the
representation of certain objects must necessarily create pleasure in every
subject which judges it. Such a presupposition implies that there exists a
specific subjective state of mind common to all judging subjects. Kant calls this
assumed state of mind ‘common sense’ (sensus communis). But this is not
common sense according to the ordinary usage of the term. For the latter judges
by concepts and principles, however indistinctly represented. Common sense in
the aesthetic understanding of the term refers to ‘the effect of the free play of
our cognitive powers’. In passing an aesthetic judgement we presuppose that a
certain similar satisfaction will arise or should arise from the interplay of the
faculties in all who perceive the object in question. What the judgement of taste
requires as a condition of calling an object beautiful is that it occasions a
pleasure which could be felt by any human observer of that object, because it is
produced by the object’s effect on a ground common to all. Only if we
presuppose such a common sense, can we make a judgement of taste.

Now Kant asks: Have we any reason for presupposing a common sense?
Is such an assumption in keeping with the fundamental principles of
transcendental philosophy? His answer is in the affirmative. In the Critique of
Pure Reason Kant has shown that logical judgements are universally valid, that
one judging subject can communicate its own state of mind to every other
subject. This is because there exists a necessary relation between the faculties
of cognition (imagination and understanding) which must be the same in every subject which judges the object.

Though, according to Kant, the common sense is the subjective principle of judgement of taste, yet he also considers it the necessary subjective condition of universal communication in general, and therefore of all judgements, and not just judgements of taste. Kant believes in a philosophy which, unlike skeptical philosophy, sets forth the view that human beings are capable of sharing their objective knowledge with each other. So he assumes a common sense as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our knowledge. If such a common sense were absent, then it would be impossible to refer to objects existing independently of individuals. For Kant, our objective experience is made up of subjective ‘inner’ experience. Here, without a common sense, each of us would make judgements about objects, have an individual and distinctive subjective experience of them, but be unable to identify the object in others’ description because their descriptions of their experiences of the object would be distinctive and need not be similar to our own. Instead of a communicable experience of objects, then, cognition would consist only of a “mere subjective play of the powers of representation, just as skepticism would have it” \(^{47}\), where the play of the powers of representation would be the individual possession of each subject. If we are to have cognitions which can be communicated to other subjects, then “our mental state...must also admit of being universally communicated.” \(^{48}\) Universal communicability “is presupposed in every logic, and every principle of knowledge that is not one of skepticism.” \(^{48}\) It is the only alternative to so-lipsism. Since communication is possible, and communication includes the communication of a feeling too, we are justified in assuming the existence of a common sense which underlies judgements of taste.

The relation of the cognitive faculties (imagination and understanding) may vary according to the object, or rather according to concept which is applied for the cognition of the object. But the relation admits of being universally communicated; for otherwise objective knowledge would be impossible. Kant argues that, since according to transcendental principles we have to presuppose the existence of different determinate relations between imagination and understanding (relations which are made necessary by objective concepts), it is possible and even necessary that we should also presuppose the existence of
an indeterminate relation which, being independent of any concept, can only be determined by a feeling. It is reasonable to assume that human beings should be capable of becoming aware of a harmony of their cognitive faculties in the representation of certain objects. This indeterminate harmony must be the same in all subjects i.e., it must admit of being universally communicated. Now, since we cannot become aware of the harmony of the cognitive faculties in any other way than by feeling, the assumption of common sense is in keeping with the transcendental principles, for it simply means that the indeterminate relation of the cognitive faculties, the mere harmony of which we become aware of by means of feeling, is identical in different subjects.

Now since transcendental philosophy is convinced that the universal communicability of knowledge is possible, it can assume, although not prove, that the universal communicability of the feeling which arises from our consciousness of the harmonious play of the cognitive faculties is also possible.

To sum up: We cannot prove the existence of this common sense; but it is presupposed as the necessary condition of the communicability of aesthetic judgements. According to Kant, judgements, along with the conviction which accompanies them, must admit of universal communicability. But aesthetic judgements cannot be communicated by concepts and by appeal to a universal logical rule. Hence ‘common sense’ is the necessary condition of their communicability. And this is our ground for presupposing such a common sense.

When we call an object beautiful, the common sense, whose existence we presuppose, does not say that everyone will concur with our judgement but that everyone ought to agree with it, even if no one ever has or ever will. Thus the common sense is an ideal norm. Since we cannot formulate this rule, when we judge a particular object to be beautiful, we mean by this that we have before us an instance of a universal rule. We assign exemplary validity to our judgement of taste. We are right in ascribing universal validity to a judgement which refers to this ideal norm; for the principle is subjectively universal and necessary. Everyone who makes an aesthetic judgement refers to this ideal rule. That there exists such a rule is a necessary Idea. This principle, though subjectively universal (an Idea necessary for everyone), could demand universal assent just like an objective one, provided we were certain that we had subsumed the particular case in question correctly under the ideal norm.
In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant has shown that the faculty of imagination has two entirely different functions, that of reproductive imagination and that of productive imagination. We have already discussed about reproductive imagination (Section 8). Reproductive imagination enables us to combine the manifold of our representations in one time in accordance with the empirical laws of association. It has also been mentioned that this combination of representation must be determined by definite rules of the understanding if the human mind is to become aware of objects. Now categories are intellectual and the appearances sensible. So the problem is how the purely intellectual and the purely sensible spheres can be united. Kant’s answer is the following. If the imagination in performing the combination of our representations determines itself according to the categories, then something will be produced that is on the one hand homogeneous with our representations, and on the other hand, with categories. This something is the transcendental schema: it is a characteristic imposed upon the pure manifold by the imagination. Schema is always a product of imagination. What is common to different schemata is that they are all sensuous correlates of the pure categories and that they are produced by the imagination. The schema is nothing but the transcendental determination of time. Time is eminently fitted for the work of mediation between the category and what is sensibly given. It is like the category because it is pure, and a form of intuition, because it is also contained in whatever is empirically given. So a determination of time is a determination of the condition of sensibility. Thus, by a determination of time we get an *a priori* determination of the sensible content itself. So if there are determinations of time according to different categories, we get corresponding determinations of the sensible contents to which the categories may be easily applied. We see that by a determination of time in accordance with the categories we get an *a priori* determination of the sensible content in such a way that the categories can be easily applied to. The categories are applicable to sensible content because, in being sensed, the sensible content has already been so determined by imagination as to be fit for categorical synthesis. Let us take an example. The pure category of ground and consequent is in itself a mere form of thought. It has no reference to time. We can however, introduce the reference to time. This is made possible by
imagination which produces the schema of ‘necessary succession in time’. This schema provides a sensuous correlate of the pure category and restricts the category to objects in time. The pure category of ground and consequent becomes the schematized category, the concept of a ground which always precedes its consequent in time, or the category of cause and effect. In schematizing a category, we do not try to reproduce in imagination what we have experienced before, but we attempt an original synthesis of imagination according to a rule of unity given by the category. The imagination, as the producer of schema, is called by Kant the productive imagination. The imagination here, being independent of previous experience, is an a priori condition of experience, and, as such, is called productive. Experience is the product of it.

The imagination, in both of its functioning as reproducing and producing, is not free. Reproductive imagination is not free since it depends on empirical laws of association. The productive imagination is not free since it depends on the a priori laws of the understanding. Now, according to Kant, the imagination, when underlying our judgement of taste, is both productive, not merely reproductive, and free. The imagination, when functioning in a judgement of taste, may be termed as aesthetic imagination. Aesthetic imagination is free in the sense that it is independent of any determinate laws of the understanding. However, it is not free in the sense that the beautiful object were a product of our own fancy. The imagination as such is a sensuous faculty. It is not imagination as such which enables us to make judgement of taste. Imagination in aesthetic judgement look to the understanding for discipline and guidance, but without a particular law’s being placed upon it, just as Caliban must look to Prospero, as in the drama The Tempest. Without a master, Caliban is wayward and purposeless; the imagination without a general rule of lawfulness remains in the shackles of its own freedom. So in case of a judgement of taste, the imagination has an indeterminate relation to the understanding. Our judgement of taste depends on a harmony between the imagination and the understanding. Imagination refers to the principle of conformity to law in general without any further determination. The imagination is free in so far it is not referred to any determinate law of the understanding. According to Kant, a mere succession of impressions cannot itself yield experience of an object. The experience of an
object — an object of nature or a work of art — requires the synthesis of the manifold. In cognitive perception this synthesis is determined by rules, and the cognitive judgement is determinate. In aesthetic perception, the imagination is free to relate the parts in whatever way it can to obtain a synthetic unity of the manifold. Pleasure in the beautiful results when such an ordering is achieved that the cognitive powers are in harmony; it is as if the manifold has a unity to which a concept ought to apply, even though there is no definite concept applicable. Judgement is used here reflectively. "One reflects on the manifold to discover a possible unity, rather than approach it with a specific rule of determinate organization to discover whether the specific rule is satisfied." So the freedom of the imagination consists in the spatial and temporal ordering of the impressions in a variety of ways to determine whether a relatedness, a purposiveness of form can be apprehended. "Hence, it is only a conformity to law without a law, and a subjective harmonizing of the imagination and the understanding without an objective one — which latter would mean that the representation was referred to a definite concept of the object — that can consist with the free conformity to law of the understanding (which has also been called finality apart from an end) and with the specific character of a judgement of taste."^52

SECTION 14: FREE AND DEPENDENT BEAUTY

As an implication of the thesis that judgements of taste are based on disinterested delight, Kant draws a distinction between free and dependent beauty. Kant proceeds to make a distinction which further emphasizes the need to distinguish pure judgements of aesthetic taste from judgements which, though they are connected in some ways with judgements of taste or have some resemblance to them, are themselves relatively impure. This is the distinction between free and dependent beauty. The first presupposes no concept of what the object ought to be; the second does presuppose such a concept and the perfection of the object in accordance with it. "Those of the first kind are said to be (self-subsisting) beauties of this or that thing; the other kind of beauty, being attached to a concept (conditioned beauty), is ascribed to Objects which come under the concept of a particular end."^53 We may on occasion judge a building (a church, for example) to be beautiful partly at least because we have an idea
of what a church ought to be; the beauty is here dependent on our concept of a church, and is thus not part of a free and pure judgement of taste, since its dependence on the concept restricts the free play of our imagination — our contemplation of the church is confined within limits by reflection on the nature and function of churches. In the same way the beauty of a human being (and in this species that of a man, a woman, or a child), the beauty of a horse, presupposes a concept of the end that determines what the thing should be, hence a concept of its perfection, and is thus merely adherent beauty. Free beauty, on the other hand, exists where there are no such normative ideas or concepts; flower-blossoms, birds of paradise, many kinds of sea-shell, non-figurative drawings such as designs on wallpapers, and music which is not a setting of words, are given by Kant as examples, since when we judge them to be beautiful, there is involved no idea of perfection of any kind, no internal purposiveness.

A judgement of taste in regard to an object with a determinate internal end would thus be pure only if the person making the judgement either had no concept of this end or abstracted from it in his judgement. For example, a botanist, even though he may have some idea of what sort of thing a flower ought to be, i.e., even though he may recognize in it the reproductive organ of the plant, does not take this notion of natural purpose into account when he judges the flower by means of taste. The distinction between free and dependent beauty is not in terms of what is present; the distinction rather concerns how the object is judged. An object may be judged in terms of its formal purposiveness, and the object can be considered as a free beauty; the judgement on it would then be a pure judgement of taste. The very same object may be judged in terms of the extent to which it approaches perfection of its kind. The object would then be considered as an example of dependent beauty, and the judgement on it an impure judgement of taste. A couch shell may be judged in terms of the extent to which it exemplifies the perfection of the species, or it may be judged simply in terms of its formal subjective purposiveness, i.e., in terms of its free beauty. Some of the disagreements which occur over the question whether a given object is beautiful are caused, Kant thinks, by a failure to distinguish these two types of beauty. One man may think a palace to be beautiful, another not, because the first judges it as a case of free beauty, — as a
sensuous manifold in terms of the purposiveness of its form, whereas the other, though he might acknowledge the formal perfection of its design, nevertheless thinks that it does not look the way a palace ought to look, and is therefore lacking in dependent beauty. Thus by means of this distinction one can settle many disputes about beauty between judges of taste, by showing them that one is concerned with free beauty, the other with adherent beauty, the first making a pure, the second an applied judgement of taste.

SECTION 15: THE SUBLIME AND THE BEAUTIFUL

In the Second Book of the ‘Critique of Aesthetic Judgement’, Kant extensively deals with the sublime and fine art. Both introduce into the arena of aesthetic judgement the notion of Ideas as opposed to intuitions of sensibility, images of imagination and concepts or rules of the understanding. In the case of the sublime the Ideas are Ideas of Reason (of the intellect and mortality) whereas in case of fine art, the Ideas are aesthetic Ideas, which are Ideas created (not reproduced) by the imagination.

Kant begins his ‘Analytic of the Sublime’ by pointing out that the judgements of sublimity have certain things in common with the judgements of beauty. They are both aesthetic reflective judgements. They are both sources of pleasure. They are distinct from judgements of pleasant, because in both cases the pleasure is not a mere matter of sensation. They are also different from judgements about the good because they are independent of definite concepts. Both of them are singular judgements and yet are universal. They ascribe universal validity only to the delight of the subject, and not to any cognition of the object. Since judgements of sublime are universal, they, like the judgements about the beautiful, refer in the judging of particular objects to an indeterminate rule which we hold to be valid for all subjects.

However there are considerable differences between the beautiful and the sublime. First, the former is associated with quality rather than quantity, the latter with quantity rather than quality. Secondly, the beautiful in nature is associated with the notion of form, which must consist in a kind of limitation. The experience of sublime, however, is associated with formlessness, in the sense of absence of limitation, provided that this absence of limits is represented
together with totality. Thus the overpowering grandeur of tempestuous ocean is felt as limitless, but the absence of limits is also represented as totality. Kant thus associates beauty with the understanding, the sublime with the Reason. Aesthetic experience of the beautiful does not depend on any determinate concept. Nevertheless it involves a free interplay of the faculties of the imagination and understanding. The beautiful as definite is felt as adequate to the imagination, and the imagination is considered as being in accord, in regard to a given intuition, with the understanding, which is a faculty of concepts. The sublime, however, does violence to the imagination; it overwhelms it, as it were. We call an object sublime for the very reason that it is devoid of form, because it contains a greater manifold of parts than our imagination can comprehend. We call an object beautiful because as regards its form it seems preadapted to our faculty of judgement. We judge an object to be absolutely great for the reason that we are incapable of grasping it as a whole. The sublime is then represented as being in accord with Reason, considered as a faculty of indeterminate Ideas of totality. The sublime, in proportion as it involves absence of limits, is inadequate to our power of imaginative representation; that is to say, it exceeds and overwhelms it. And in so far as this absence of limits is associated with totality, the sublime can be regarded as the 'exibition' of an indefinite Idea of the Reason. Thirdly, whereas the pleasure produced by the beautiful can be described as a positive joy, prolonged in quiet contemplation, the sublime must be said to cause wonder and awe rather than positive joy. And the experience of it is associated with emotion in the sense of "a momentary checking to the vital forces followed at once by a discharge all the more powerful." In the experience of the sublime the imagination is in earnest, not at play. Fourthly, the beautiful, though distinct from the charming, can be linked with it. But charm and the sublime are incompatible. Fifthly, sublime objects in nature, unlike beautiful objects, are not preadapted to our faculty of judgement; rather, we call them sublime on the ground that they are ill adapted. Hence we cannot ascribe any purposive aspect to nature when it presents us with objects which we judge sublime. We judge an object to be sublime precisely because we realize that it is too great to be encompassed or understood by our limited imaginative and intellectual powers. That is why Kant holds that natural objects are not themselves, strictly speaking, sublime, but rather express and evoke a kind of
sublimity in the human mind. The feeling of the sublime arises in us because the object which we judge reminds us of our faculty of Reason and its concept (Idea) of the supersensible world. Thus it can be clearly observed that aesthetic judgements about sublime are as subjective or even more subjective than judgements of beautiful. In judging an object sublime we refer our representation of it to something that has nothing whatever to do with the sensible object itself, viz., Ideas of Reason. Sixthly and finally, natural beauty is connected with notions of law (even though the law is teleological, not physical law), whereas the sublime has no such connexion, ideas of sublimity being often excited by the wilder and more chaotic aspects of nature. In general, the concept of the sublime gives no indication of the existence of any purposiveness in nature. In order to judge a thing sublime, we must seek a ground merely in ourselves and need not look for any external ground. It is our own mind “that introduces sublimity into the representation of nature.”55

SECTION 16: MATHEMATICAL AND DYNAMICAL SUBLIME

Kant divides the analytic of the sublime into the categories of quantity, quality, relation and modality, following the same principle that was used in the analysis of judgements of taste. The delight in the sublime must be represented as universally valid in its quantity, as without interest in its quality, as subjective purposiveness in its relation, and as necessary in its modality. But this division is overlaid with another distinction, that between the mathematical and dynamical sublime. In fact, his account of the mathematical sublime is organized around the concepts of quantity and quality while the discussion of the dynamical sublime represents the application of the concepts of relation and modality.

Kant defines mathematical sublime thus “Sublime is the name given to what is absolutely great.”56 Sublime is that “what is beyond all comparision great.”57 The concept of absolutely great is not a concept of the understanding and must not be confused with the category of quantity. Nor is it a concept of Reason. For Reason and its concepts (Ideas) are concerned with the supersensible, and will never make us judge a sensible object to be absolutely great. The concept of absolute greatness cannot also be a concept of intuition, since intuition, by itself, can never be a source of a judgement. The concept of the absolutely great must therefore be a concept of the faculty of judgement. A judgement which makes us
call a sensible object absolutely great does not involve any principle of
cognition. We call objects absolutely great or sublime because we feel that we
cannot imagine that any object could be greater. The judgement is not a
cognitive but an aesthetic judgement.

If we ascertained the quantity of our object by comparison with a fixed
unit, we could not call any object absolutely great. It would be great by
comparison with the unit or with other objects of known size. However,
according to Kant, even when we assert that an object is absolutely great, there
must be some standard. In making such a judgement we demand the assent of
every other subject. Judgements about the sublime are not objective
judgements. What is predicted in them is merely that we, the judging subjects,
find it impossible to imagine that a greater object could exist. We judge an object
to be absolutely great because we are incapable of grasping the object in its
totality. We feel this without being interested in comparing our objects with
others and ascertaining its objective size. We assign universal validity to such a
judgement which calls the object sublime, for we refer to other subjects. We
presuppose that like us, everyone else will find it impossible to imagine the
existence of a greater object and for this reason would call it sublime. So we see
that it is the judging subjects who provide the standard required by the
judgement, and it is not the object by itself which is judged, but the object in
relation to the judging subjects.

Now it is noteworthy here that even if we have no interest at all in the
object, i.e., its existence is indifferent to us, still its mere greatness is capable of
creating in us a feeling of delight. It is the mere contemplation of the object
which gives us pleasure and we ascribe universal communicability to this
pleasure, i.e. we assume that the same pleasure will be felt by everyone else.
The pleasure, however, is not in the object, but in the enlargement of the
imagination itself.

According to Kant, judgements about the sublime are reflective
judgements and are different from mathematically determinant judgements, i.e.,
judgements which determine the magnitude of objects by measuring them.
Mathematically determinant judgements ascertain objectively how great an
object is, by taking other objects as the standard of measurement. But they
never judge any object to be absolutely great. For it is clear that nothing can be
given in nature, however great it may be judged to be by us, which could not, considered in another relation, be diminished down to the infinitely small. A mountain, for instance, may be great in comparison with any other mountain, but it will be judged to be small when it is regarded in some other relation. The concept of the absolutely great or of that which is great beyond all comparison is an aesthetic concept. If and when we call something absolutely great, then one immediately sees that we do not allow a suitable standard for it to be sought outside of it, but merely within it. It is a magnitude which is equal only to itself. Kant says, “that is sublime in comparison with which all else is small.” From this it follows that the sublime is not to be sought in the things of nature, but only in our own ideas. The idea of absolute greatness refers the representation of the object, not to other objects, but to the subject. It is the subject which feels that the object which it represents to itself is greater than anything else.

Kant believes that the representation of the mere greatness of an object involves the consciousness of a subjective purposiveness in the use of our cognitive faculties. Kant’s reason for this belief is this. According to Kant, there is in our imagination a natural tendency to proceed with the apprehension of a given manifold to the infinite. Now there are certain objects in nature which we cannot comprehend. Our imagination feels itself checked. It cannot reach the totality of the given sensible object. The imagination cannot proceed, and this reminds the subject of Reason’s Idea of totality, and since Reason in conceiving the Idea of totality is not concerned with the sensible world but with the supersensible world, our very inability to comprehend the totality of certain natural objects reminds us of a supersensible faculty within us. Hence the object which is judged sublime is not at all purposive. For the only purpose the object serves is that it makes us think of our faculty of conceiving Ideas of Reason. The object is purposive only in so far as it gives occasion to the faculty of judgement for referring to that faculty of the mind which alone is concerned with the supersensible, namely, Reason. Thus Kant says, “The sublime is that, the mere capacity of thinking which evidences a faculty of mind transcending every standard of sense.”

According to Kant, there are two methods of estimating the magnitude of objects. The estimation of magnitude by means of numerical concepts (or algebraic symbols) is mathematical, but that in mere intuition (measured by eye)
is aesthetic. Mathematical estimation of a magnitude can progress indefinitely by simply adding one unit to another. However, the estimation must make use of a fundamental unit as a known quantity, which can be no further determined. The magnitude of this irreducible fundamental unit is to be determined by grasping it immediately (without mediation of numerical concepts) in intuition.

In order to take in a quantum intuitively to use it as a fundamental unit for the measuring of a magnitude, the imagination performs two actions: apprehension and comprehension. Apprehension is the immediate awareness of an individual representation, and comprehension is the putting together or combining of several representations.

Mathematical estimation is merely progressive. It proceeds from one number to another indefinitely by adding as many numbers to one another as we please. So mathematical estimation of magnitude can never arrive at the idea of a greatest possible object. It is merely progressive and proceeds from one member of the numerical series to another without being concerned about comprehension of the manifold.

Aesthetic estimation, on the other hand, arrives at the idea of the absolutely great owing to the fact that it tries to comprehend the given intuitions in one intuition. Aesthetic estimation has to grasp the object in one intuition, to represent it to itself as a whole; and this cannot be done without a reference to the fundamental aesthetic measure, which is to be kept present to the imagination. The greater the object the greater must be the fundamental measure which we take as the basis of our measurement. In order to judge the magnitude of an object aesthetically, we have to increase the measure in accordance with the magnitude of the object. Otherwise we could not represent the object to ourselves intuitively. Now this cannot go on indefinitely. The more the measure is increased the more difficult it is for the imagination to grasp it in one intuition, and a point is soon reached which the imagination cannot exceed. This is the absolute measure beyond which no greater is possible subjectively. When the absolute measure is reached by the imagination, the subject gets a feeling of the sublime. When we judge an object to be absolutely or infinitely great, we believe that there is given to us in intuition an object which possesses infinite magnitude. Now from the first Critique we know that there is only one faculty of the mind which is concerned with the absolute or infinite, namely,
Reason. We also know that Reason makes every object subject to its Idea of totality. So when we feel that there is an absolutely great object given to us in its totality, this reminds us of the principle of Reason. The mere ability to think the absolutely great indicates a faculty of the mind transcending every standard of sense. When we find an object the magnitude of which is such that the imagination spends its whole faculty of comprehension upon it in vain, this object or rather its representation must carry our concept of nature to the supersensible world which is great beyond every standard of sense.

To sum up: The faculty of judgement judges an object to be absolutely great on the ground that it becomes aware of the fact that the imagination is incapable of finding in the world of sense a measure great enough to serve as a standard for the measurement of the object. This makes the judging subject think of a different standard, the Idea of the supersensible, compared with which everything in the world of sense is infinitely small. In doing so it refers the imagination to Reason. Now since the judgement is an aesthetic judgement, the imagination is referred not to any definite concept of Reason but merely to the principle of Reason in general.

Thus just as the aesthetic power of judgement in judging the beautiful relates the imagination in its free play to the understanding, in order that the imagination may conform with the understanding’s concept in general without any determination of them, so in judging a thing sublime the same faculty (i.e., the imagination) is related to Reason in order that the imagination should subjectively conform to Reason’s Ideas, without its being indicated which of them are involved.

So the judgement in which we call an object sublime rests upon a specific Idea of purposiveness. The sublime object is purposive only in relation to the mind of the judging subject. It is purposive in so far as it enables the judging subject to bring about an indefinite relation between imagination and Reason. The purpose ascertained to the object is subjective. According to Kant, human beings have a natural desire to be reminded of the fact that they, as rational beings, are not limited to the world of sense, and can raise themselves above it. The consciousness of this capacity fills them with pleasure, purely subjective. Sublimity is a feeling and not a property of any object. “Who would apply the term ‘sublime’ even to shapeless mountain masses towering one above the
other in wild disorder, with their pyramids of ice, or to the dark tempestuous ocean, or such like things? But in the contemplation of them, without any regard to their form, the mind abandons itself to the imagination and to a reason placed, though quite apart from any definite end, in conjunction therewith, and merely broadening its view, and it feels itself elevated in its own estimate of itself on finding all the might of imagination still unequal to its ideas.”

Next Kant says something on the quality of the satisfaction in the judging of the sublime. So far we have seen that when we make judgement about the mathematically sublime or absolutely great we refer our representation of the object to Reason and its Idea of absolute totality. Now according to Kant, our judgement about the sublime is accompanied by a feeling of respect for our objects. Respect is the “feeling of our incapacity to attain to an idea that is a law for us.”

According to Kant, the law of Reason imposes upon us the Idea that the comprehension of every appearance must be given to us into the intuition of a whole. Reason recognizes no other determinate measure than the absolute whole. But our imagination, in spite of its greatest effort, fails to comprehend in the whole of one intuition the object which is given to it. This make us think of Reason and its Idea of totality. So, properly speaking, the respect we feel is not for the object, but for the principle of Reason. We feel that we ought to realize the Idea of totality, and that we are incapable of doing so. Thus the feeling of the sublime in nature is respect for our own vocation (destiny), which we attribute to an object of nature; in place of a respect for the ‘idea of humanity’ in our subject, we substitute a respect for the object. This feeling places before our eyes “the supremacy of our cognitive faculties on the rational side over the greatest faculty of sensibility.”

The feeling of respect is a ‘complex’ feeling of pain and pleasure. The feeling of sublime is a feeling of pain when we become conscious of the inadequacy of our imagination to make aesthetic estimation of the magnitude of certain sensible objects and our inability to conform to Reason’s demand that we should recognize as the supreme measure nothing but the totality of the world, i.e. our inability to conform to the Idea of absolute totality. But it is also a feeling of pleasure; for it is our Reason which makes us judge every sensible object to be infinitely small in comparison with the Idea of absolute totality. We
take pleasure in the realization that every standard of sensibility falls short of the Ideas of Reason. To become aware of the incapacity of the imagination’s ever conforming to Ideas of Reason gives pleasure to a rational being. It makes us alive to our supersensible destiny. We feel raised above the world of sense. For, although the object which is judged seems repellent to our imagination, which is incapable of comprehending it, it seems attractive to our Reason. “The mind feels itself set in motion in the representation of the sublime in nature; whereas in the aesthetic judgement upon what is beautiful therein it is in restful contemplation. This movement, especially in its inception, may be compared with a vibration, i.e., with a rapidly alternating repulsion and attraction produced by one and the same Object. The point of excess for the imagination (towards which it is driven in the apprehension of the intuition) is like an abyss, in which it fears to lose itself; yet again for the rational idea of the supersensible it is not excessive, but conformable to law, and directed to drawing out such an effort on the part of the imagination: and so in turn as much a source of attraction as it was repellent to mere sensibility.”

So judgements about the mathematically sublime rest on two conditions. In the first place we have to become aware of the incompetence of our imagination. The imagination, being unable to comprehend the object, feels it to be absolutely great; and the judging subject becomes in that way aware of its limitations as a sensuous being. But in becoming aware of this incompetence of its imagination the subject refers to its rational faculty, which gives it a standard compared with which every sensible standard is infinitely small. The subject feels that as a rational being it is infinitely superior even to the greatest natural object.

Aesthetic judgements about the sublime are different from cognitive judgements on the ground that they do not impart any knowledge of objects and do not employ any concept. Judgements about the sublime merely make us feel an indeterminate harmony of our cognitive faculties. And yet this harmony is entirely different from the one which lies at the basis of our judgements about the beautiful. In aesthetic judgements about beautiful we become aware of a perfect harmony of our cognitive faculties. But in aesthetic judgements about sublime, imagination and Reason are felt to harmonize in virtue of their contrast. “For just as in the estimate of the beautiful imagination and understanding by
their concert generate subjective finality of the mental faculties, so imagination and *reason* do so here by their conflict...". The consciousness of this disharmony gives us pleasure because in our capacity as rational beings we enjoy representing to ourselves the complete diversity of our sensuous and rational faculties.

The complexity of the feeling of the sublime is akin to the complexity of the moral feeling of respect. The moral feeling of respect also involves the heterogeneous elements of pleasure and pain. Our respect for the moral law may be regarded as a kind of pleasure in so far as, in making us conscious of our being determined by the law of Reason, it elevates us above the sensible world. The element of pain is involved in the fact that we feel that despite all our efforts we can never fully realize the demand made upon us.

So the complexity of the feeling of sublime is akin to the complexity of the moral feeling of respect, and leads Kant to the discussion of the dynamical sublime.

The dynamical sublime represents the application of the concept of relation to the experience of the sublime. The mathematically sublime is an object which seems to the judging subject to possess infinite magnitude. The dynamically sublime is an object which seems to the judging subject to possess infinite power. According to Kant, nature can count as a power, thus as dynamically sublime, only in so far as it is considered an object of fear. In representing the object to ourselves we feel that even to try to offer any resistance to it is quite impossible. The object is thought to be infinitely superior to ourselves. However, according to Kant, if we are to judge an object to be dynamically sublime, we must not be in an actual state of fear. For "One who is in a state of fear can no more play the part of a judge of the sublime of nature than one captivated by inclination and appetite can of the beautiful. He flees from the sight of an object filling him with dread; and it is impossible to take delight in terror that is seriously entertained." 

The feeling of the sublime arises in us when we judge the object in such a way that we merely *think* of the case in which we might wish to resist it and think that in that case all resistance would be completely futile. We must not actually be in such a situation. We consider the object as fearful without being afraid of it. Thus the virtuous man fears God without being afraid of Him, because he
does not think of the case of wishing to resist God and His commands as anything that is worrisome for him. But since he does not think of such a case as intrinsically impossible, he recognizes God as one to be feared.

The experience of the dynamical sublime is produced by the experience of vast forces in nature, such as those of threatening cliffs, thunder clouds towering up into the heavens, bringing with them flashes of lightning and crashes of thunder, the boundless ocean set into a rage, a lofty waterfall on a mighty river, in relation to which we realize that our own physical powers are puny. At the same time, however, the experience of our insignificance in relation to such physical forces also leads us to the realization that there is another force in us, which gives us the faculty of practical Reason and the freedom of the will. This force gives us a value that cannot be damaged even by forces which would suffice for our physical destruction. So judgements about the dynamically sublime, like the judgements about the mathematically sublime, also rest upon two conditions. The object which we judge sublime, through the irresistibility of its power makes us, considered as natural beings, recognize our physical powerlessness. But at the same time the object reveals a capacity for judging ourselves independent of nature. We feel that there is within us a faculty infinitely superior to nature, whereby the humanity in our person remains undemeaned even though the human being as mortal men must submit to that domain. Nature may deprive us of everything (of all our worldly goods, health and life), but it has no power over our moral personality. The feeling of our physical inferiority excites a feeling of our moral superiority. To quote Kant, "...we readily call these objects sublime, because they raise the forces of the soul above the height of vulgar commonplace, and discover within us a power of resistance of quite another kind, which gives us the courage to be able to measure ourselves against the seeming omnipotence of nature." 66 "Therefore nature is here called sublime merely because it raises the imagination to a presentation of those cases in which the mind can make itself sensible of the appropriate sublimity of the sphere of its own being, even above nature." 67 Thus once more it becomes clear that sublimity is not contained in anything in nature. It belongs to the human mind alone. We call things sublime on the ground that they make us feel the sublimity of our own minds. Sublimity, strictly speaking, is
only a state of our mind brought about by the contemplation of the natural phenomena that we call sublime.

Kant believes that our experience of the dynamically sublime, like our experience of the mathematically sublime, produces a complex mix of pain and pleasure, which is even closer to the moral feeling of respect. The pain is felt because our imagination presents to itself the infinite superiority of nature, the pleasure because this makes us think of our existence as rational beings, of the pre-eminence of our rational nature over physical nature even in its immeasurability. Thus in the case of the dynamically sublime, it is not that imagination cannot get a grip, but that we are fearful of destruction and what Kant thinks redeems the situation is the thought of the power of righteousness, a power which no natural nor supernatural force can overcome. Again it is an Idea of Reason, this time of practical Reason, which helps out in the face of something affronting to sensibility and this time it is practical sensibility. Kant’s thought here seems to suggest that in confronting the sublime the noumenal self shows itself competent to the task to which the phenomenal self profoundly feels itself to be inadequate. 68

Under the rubric of modality, Kant argues that we have ground to expect universal subjective validity in the experience of the sublime as well as in that of beauty. But the difference is that, whereas in the case of an aesthetic judgement about the beautiful we demand agreement as a matter of course (since the judgement refers the imagination merely to the understanding), we demand agreement with our aesthetic judgements about the sublime (since they refer the imagination to Reason as a faculty of Ideas) on a certain subjective assumption. What we assume is the existence of moral feeling in every human being; and on this assumption we ascribe necessity to our judgement. According to Kant, in the case of the sublime the ground of agreement lies in a potential for moral sensitivity that each of us has innately but that each of us must actively cultivate as part of our moral development. Commonality in the experience of the sublime is thus a product of our active effort to a degree that agreement about the beautiful apparently is not.
SECTION 17: LOGICAL PECULIARITIES OF JUDGEMENT OF TASTE

A judgement of taste is always a singular judgement. It is a judgement about a particular object made by a particular person. The subject that makes it does not compare the object with any other object; and what is asserted by the subject is merely that the form of the object which it represents to itself makes it aware of a specific state of mind which it presumes is necessarily the same in every other subject which represents the same object to itself. The curious fact is that universal validity and necessity is attributed to a singular judgement, and a judgement which is made independently of concepts. We speak of the beautiful as if it were a property of the object. We express our judgement as if it were a logical judgement. To take an example, we say: This flower is beautiful, i.e., we speak of its beauty as if beauty were an objective quality. But this is impossible. We call a thing beautiful for no other reason than that it gives us pleasure. The predicate of our judgement is devoid of all meaning unless it is referred to the individual person who makes it. When we call a thing beautiful we do not and cannot consult other people; for if we did we could never think of our judgement as a necessary \textit{a priori} judgement. We should make a merely empirical judgement, stating what in most cases actually takes places, but not what in every case ought to take place. So the universal validity of a judgement of taste is not to be grounded on collecting votes and asking around among other people about the sort of sensations they have. It is based upon an autonomy of the subject judging about the feeling of pleasure which it finds in the given representation, i.e., upon the \textit{subject's own taste}. \textquotedblleft Taste lays claim simply to autonomy. To make the judgement of others the determining ground of one's own would be heteronomy.\textquotedblright{}\textsuperscript{69} The subject feels the object to be beautiful, and relying upon nothing but this purely subjective feeling we demand that everyone else should feel as we do.

A judgement of taste cannot be determined by empirical proof. If someone does not find a poem beautiful on the ground that it does not give him pleasure, he cannot change his opinion even though a hundred voices praise the poem highly. He may of course behave as if it pleased him as well, in order not to be regarded as lacking in taste; he can even begin to doubt whether he has adequately formed his taste. But unless the poem gives him pleasure he
cannot call it beautiful. What has pleased others can never serve as the ground of an aesthetic judgement. The judgement of others, when it is unfavourable to our own, can of course rightly give us reservation about our own, but can never convince us of its incorrectness.

Again, an *a priori* proof in accordance with determinate rules cannot also determine the judgement on beauty. If someone reads his poem that in the end fails to please my taste, then even if he adduces all the rules established by the famous critics of taste, I will not change my opinion about the poem. “I will stop my ears, listen to no reasons and arguments, and would rather believe that those rules of the critics are false or at least that this is not a case for their application than allow that my judgement should be determined by means of *a priori* grounds of proof, since it is supposed to be a judgement of taste and not of the understanding or of reason.” 70

Kant says that this is one of the chief causes on account of which this faculty of aesthetic judging has been given the very name of ‘taste’. “For a man may recount to me all the ingredients of a dish, and observe of each and every one of them that it is just what I like, and, in addition, rightly commend the wholesomeness of the food; yet I am deaf to all these arguments. I try the dish with *my own* tongue and palate, and I pass judgement according to their verdict (not according to universal principles)”. 71

According to Kant, the subjective condition of all judgement is the power itself whereby we judge, i.e., the faculty of judgement. The faculty of judgement is not an independent faculty of the mind, and never does more than merely relate two other faculties of the mind to one another. When this faculty is to be used in respect of a representation whereby an object is given, it requires the harmony of the two faculties of representation — the imagination (to make possible the intuition and the combination of the manifold of this intuition), and the understanding (to produce a concept as the representation of the unity of this combination). Judgement does nothing but subsume the given particulars under the universal concepts. This happens in the case of logical judgements. Now since the judgement of taste (which is a reflective judgement) is not based upon a concept of the object, what takes place can only be that the imagination itself, at the instance of a representation by which an object is given, is subsumed under the general conditions which the understanding requires in
order to pass from intuition to concepts. In other words, since the freedom of the imagination consists in the very fact that it schematizes without a concept, it follows that the judgement of taste must rest upon mere sensation. This sensation makes us aware that the imagination in its freedom and the understanding with its conformity to law reciprocally enliven one another. Thus the judgement of taste rests upon a feeling which allows us to judge the object according as the representation (by which an object is given) serves the purpose of assisting the cognitive faculties in their free play. Taste, therefore, as a subjective power of judgement, contains a principle of subsumption. Yet, it is a subsumption, not of intuitions under concepts, but of the faculty of intuitions or exhibitions (i.e., the imagination) under the faculty of concepts (i.e., the understanding) in so far as the former in its freedom harmonizes with the latter in its conformity to law.

SECTION 18 : DEDUCTION OF PURE AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT

A judgement of taste asserts that there is a connection between the representation of an object and a subjective feeling. We attribute necessity to this connection. We demand a priori that in representing the object to themselves all should feel the peculiar kind of pleasure (arising from the interplay of imagination and understanding). We are therefore required to show how a subjective judgement can lay claim to universality and necessity. A judgement of taste, then, stands in need of a deduction.

We have seen in Section 17 that the judgement of taste cannot be supported by ordinary induction and deduction. So the deduction is to supply a priori principle which can make it intelligible how an aesthetic judgement can lay claim to necessity. On this is founded the problem of how judgements of taste are possible. Kant puts the problem of deduction in this way: How is a judgement possible which, going merely upon the individual’s own feeling of pleasure in an object independent of the concept of it, estimates this as a pleasure attached to the representation of the same Object in every other individual, and does so a priori, i.e. without being allowed to wait and see if other people will be of the same mind? According to Kant, judgements of taste are synthetic judgements, for they go beyond the concept and even the intuition of the object in order to add as predicate to that intuition something that has no
reference to knowledge at all, namely, the feeling of pleasure and pain. But although the predicate, the individual pleasure connected with the representation, is an empirical predicate, the fact that the judgements claim the agreement of everyone shows in the very expression of their claim that the judgements are either a priori or at least desire to be regarded as such. Thus the problem belongs to The Critique of Judgement, and is part of the general problem of transcendental philosophy: How are synthetic a priori judgements possible?

For Kant, it cannot be known a priori that an object is beautiful. Rather, one’s connection of pleasure to an object — a connection presupposed in judging it to be beautiful — can be made only on the basis of actual experiences of the object, or empirically. For one’s judgement that an object is beautiful cannot proceed from any conceptual characterization of the object, but must await one’s own experience of it. A judgement which determines such a connection between representation of an object and pleasure is an empirical judgement. But to deny that the feeling of pleasure can be produced a priori is not to deny that the judgement of taste has an a priori element. For reflection on one’s pleasure in an object can reveal that the pleasure can be attributed to the harmony of the faculties, and on the basis of this attribution the pleasure that the object produces may be imputed to others. Thus it is the universal validity of pleasure which is represented a priori in a judgement of taste. It is an empirical judgement that I perceive and judge an object with pleasure. But it is a priori judgement that I find it beautiful, i.e., that I may require the satisfaction of everyone as necessary.

Thus a judgement that a given object is beautiful has both empirical and a priori elements. In so far as it reports my own pleasure, and attributes my pleasure to the harmony of the faculties, it is empirical, for it is a judgement about my experience of the object and about a particular causal link in my own mental history. But in so far as it takes the last attribution as a basis for imputing my pleasure to others, the judgement of taste is a priori. For it depends not upon actual experience of shared responses, but on the a priori assumption that what occasions the harmony of the faculties is the same for all.73

Since aesthetic judgement is a variety of synthetic a priori judgement, the problem of a deduction of aesthetic judgement may therefore be considered
part of the general problem of transcendental philosophy: How are synthetic \textit{a priori} judgements possible?" \textsuperscript{74} Now in case of a synthetic judgement, it is its claim to \textit{apriority} which requires a deduction. And we have just pointed out that what is \textit{a priori} in the judgement of taste is its attribution of intersubjective validity to particular feelings of pleasure. Hence the task of deduction is precisely to demonstrate the intersubjective validity of pleasure which is its ground. So “the deduction of aesthetic judgement is a justification for moving from the explanation of aesthetic pleasure as a response produced by mere estimation to a universal imputation of that pleasure.” \textsuperscript{75} The deduction asserts that we are justified in universally presupposing in every person the same subjective conditions of the faculty of judgement which we find in ourselves. The above assertion is justified by proving that possession of the capacity to enjoy aesthetic response is entailed by the capacity to make any cognitive judgement at all. These arguments we have already expounded in Sections 8, 9, 10 and 12. There we have shown the argument behind Kant’s claim that the judgement of taste can be made only on the presupposition that there is a common sense. Common sense is the necessary subjective condition for the universal validity of a judgement of taste. Kant, therefore, regards this common sense as the principle of taste. For the sake of convenience, we may restate here the main points of the deduction of the judgement of taste, as it is given in § 38 of \textit{The Critique of Judgement}.

Kant has shown in the preceding sections that we judge an object to be beautiful when in representing it to ourselves we become conscious of a harmonious relation of our cognitive faculties (imagination and understanding). We possess a faculty of aesthetic reflection, i.e., a faculty of becoming aware of a harmony of the faculties of the mind which are the conditions of knowledge in general. We call an object beautiful because it makes us feel this harmony. It has been shown that our pleasure in the object arises from its subjective purposiveness for the faculty of judgement. We take pleasure in the object only because its representation brings the subjective conditions of knowledge in general into a harmonious relation.

Kant’s argument goes on as follows. We are entitled to presuppose that the accordance of a representation with these conditions of the faculty of judgement will be the same in all men and that therefore these conditions must
admit of being assumed valid \textit{a priori} for everyone. Here the main point of his argument about which he has told us in the `Analytic of the beautiful', although he does not state it here, is that, since for the sake of the communicability of objective knowledge it is necessary that determinate relations between imagination and understanding should be the same in every subject, it follows that their indeterminate relation is also identical and, therefore, aesthetic judgements may rightly claim universal validity.

The section on deduction is followed by a remark. There Kant says that since a judgement of taste is not a cognitive judgement, to establish its validity we are only required to show that we are justified in presupposing that the same subjective conditions of judgement exist in every judging subject. Another condition of the validity of a particular judgement of taste is the correct subsumption of the particular case under the universal rule. In a logical judgement we subsume the particular instance under definite universal concepts. However in an aesthetic judgement we subsume it under an indeterminate subjective rule (the harmony of imagination and understanding) which cannot be thought but merely felt. As such the subsumption can be defective. Yet this does not affect the aesthetic principle. All we assume is that provided a particular case has been subsumed correctly we can count upon universal agreement. The principle upon which aesthetic judgements rest is that an individual person who judges an object to be beautiful is justified in referring to a universal indeterminate subjective rule which is valid for all judging subjects.

\textbf{SECTION 19: KANT ON FINE ART}

According to Kant, there are two classes of objects which we judge to be beautiful, namely, products of nature and products of art. So far we have been concerned with Kant’s theory of the beauty of natural objects. Now we turn our attention to his theory of art. “Art is distinguished from nature as making (facere) is from acting or operating in general (agree), and the product or the result of former is distinguished from that of latter as work (opus) from operation (effectus).”\textsuperscript{76}

Art is “production through freedom”.\textsuperscript{77} It is production through a will that places reason at the basis of its action. Though ordinarily we call the product of bees (regularly built cells of wax) a work of art, we do so only by analogy. The
work of the bees, properly speaking, is a product of nature, since their work is not based on any proper rational deliberation. The regularly constructed cell of bees is an art only in so far as we ascribe their work to their creator.

It is a fact that the cause of the cells, the bees, must have represented the cells to themselves, prior to the actual existence of these; yet they did this without having any thought of the effect. If anything is called absolutely a work of art, as distinct from a natural product, then we always take it to be a work of human being.

Art, again, is divided into two types: (a) mechanical art and (b) aesthetic art. Where art, adequate for the cognition of a possible object, merely performs the actions requisite to make it actual, then it is mechanical. But if art has for its immediate design the feeling of pleasure, it is called aesthetical. So nothing but the production of only those objects as would give pleasure to those who judge them, is the only concern of aesthetic art.

Aesthetical art may be divided into agreeable art and fine art. Both the pleasant art and fine art have, as their end in view, pleasure. The kind of pleasure, however, differs. In the case of the pleasant art, the pleasure is a pleasure in sensation, that is a pleasure which should “accompany the representations considered as mere sensations”.78 Pleasure in fine art is pleasure which accompanies the representations as kinds of cognition.

The pleasant art, therefore, produces things with a view to giving mere enjoyment to others. Cookery may be called a pleasant art. Kant here draws examples from dinner parties. “Such are all the charms that can gratify a dinner party: entertaining narrative, the art of starting the whole table in unrestrained and sprightly conversation, or with jest and laughter inducing a certain air of gaiety. Here, as the saying goes, there may be much loose talk over the glasses, without a person wishing to be brought to book for all he utters, because it is only given out for the entertainment of the moment, and not as a lasting matter to be made the subject of reflection or repetition. (Of the same sort is also the art of arranging the table for enjoyment, or, at large banquets, the music of orchestra — a quaint idea intended to act on the mind merely as an agreeable noise fostering a genial spirit, which, without any one paying the smallest attention to the composition, promotes the free flow of conversation between guest and guest). In addition must be included play of every kind which
is attended with no further interest than that of making the time pass by unheeded.”

Pleasure in fine art is pleasure in a “representation which is intrinsically final”. Though fine art is purposive in itself, and without an end, i.e., without a definite purpose (end), it nevertheless promotes the cultivation of the mental powers for sociable communication. “The universal communicability of a pleasure involves in its very concept that the pleasure is not one of enjoyment arising out of mere sensation, but must be one of reflection. Hence aesthetic art, as art which is beautiful, is one having for its standard the reflective judgement and not organic sensation.”

So we find that Kant’s theory of fine art is entirely dependent on his theory of our judgements about the beautiful. He is convinced that there is no other way to determine what is the nature of fine art (i.e. art which is concerned with the production of beautiful objects), than to refer to the judgements about the beautiful, i.e., to refer to the conditions which make us judge a thing beautiful.

SECTION 20 : FINE ART AND GENIUS

It has already been discussed that the idea of beauty arises out of an awareness of a harmonious relation of the faculties of representation, a relation which is independent of any concept. From this it follows that a work of art gives us the impression not of having been created by a human being for a definite purpose. It looks as if it were a product of nature, as if it just existed. In order to be capable of enjoying it, we must not think of any definite intention on the part of the artist; for if we were to do so, the consciousness of the free play of our cognitive faculties would not be brought about, our imagination would be fettered by definite concepts, and we should cease to enjoy the product of art aesthetically.

According to Kant, it is also a strange fact that in order to be enabled to feel a natural object to be beautiful, we must regard nature as if it were an artist, and not as mere nature (acting according to the principle of mechanical causality). We must think of nature whose products are determined by a principle other than merely mechanical principles. Nature is viewed as giving its objects a form which we find beautiful. So we ascribe to nature the principle of
'purposiveness without a purpose' or 'finality without an end'. We conceive the Idea of a Technique of nature.

But the difficulty here is that no product of human art can be regarded as having been produced quite unintentionally. Art always has a determinate intention of producing something. But if this 'something' were mere sensation, that is to say, something merely subjective that is supposed to be accompanied with pleasure, then the product would please us only through organic sensation when we judge it. As has been shown before, we should attribute no universal validity to such a feeling at all. If the intention of the artists were directed to the production of a definite object, this object would please by means of a concept and we should again not call it beautiful. It would please us in the same manner as a mechanical art pleases us, i.e. it would please us on the ground that it serves the purpose it has been made for.

So it follows that the beautiful object must be regarded as intentionally produced in so far as the artist intended it to be an object the representation of which should make us conscious of a harmony of our cognitive faculties, i.e. which would make it seem to be a case to which we could apply our principle of aesthetic purposiveness.

It is clear that we must ascribe to the artist some kind of intention. We must assume that he intends to present us with an object which we shall find beautiful. He must apply some rules for the production of his work without being fully conscious of what they are; and this is true also of the person who finds his work beautiful. Just as we can enjoy beauty only when our imagination and understanding are in an indefinite relation without being determined by any definite rule, so the artist himself must enjoy freedom in his faculties of cognition. The product of art shows no trace that the rule — in accordance with which it became what it ought to be — has hovered before the artist and fettered his mental powers. We find the product of art to agree with rules 'punctiliously', but not 'painstakingly'. In this way a product of art (beautiful art) appears like nature — although it is designed, it must not seem to be so designed.

The rules which the artist applies belong to his own individual nature. He must possess a capacity for producing things which will be judged beautiful. The rules cannot be determined either by the artist who produces the work of art or
by those who judge it. They are an expression of the individual nature of the artist. The productive faculty of the artist may be called genius.

"Genius is the talent (natural endowment) which gives the rule to art. Since talent, as an innate productive faculty of the artist, belongs itself to nature, we may put it in this way: Genius is the innate mental aptitude (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art." 84

Every art presupposes rules; for otherwise its products would be products not of art but of mere chance. The concept of beautiful art, however, does not allow the judgement concerning the beauty of its product to be derived from any sort of rule that has a concept for its determining ground. So it follows that the artist himself is not conscious of the rule which he applies. Now since without a preceding rule a product can never be called art, it is the nature of the individual artist which must supply the rule to art, i.e., beautiful art is possible only as a product of genius.

From the above discussions the following points can be drawn: (1) Since no definite rules can be given for producing beautiful objects, the artist can neither teach others the rules which will enable them to make beautiful things nor can he learn it from others. Genius is "not an aptitude in the way of cleverness for what can be learned according to some rule." 85 Thus originality must be the primary characteristic of genius.

(2) Since there can also be original non-sense, the products of genius, in spite of their originality, must at the same time be models, i.e. exemplary, and so, while not themselves the result of imitation, they must serve that purpose for others, i.e., as a standard or a rule of estimating.

(3) The creator of a work of art is incapable of indicating scientifically how he brings his product into being. He gives the rule as nature. Hence the author of a product for which he is indebted to his genius does not know himself how he has come by his ideas, and he does not have it in his power to device such things at will or according to plan, and to communicate it to others in precepts that will enable them to produce similar products.

(4) By means of genius nature does not prescribe the rule to science but to art, and even to the latter only in so far as it is to be beautiful art. Neither science nor mechanical art are products of genius, for they follow determinate rules which can be set down in a formula and can be both taught and learnt.
There is a general agreement on the fact that genius is entirely opposed to the spirit of imitation. For, learning is nothing but imitation, and genius creates something according to indeterminate rules which cannot be learnt, and, therefore, cannot be imitated. Even if one invents a great deal for art and science by thinking or writing for himself without taking up what others have thought, such a mind cannot still be called genius. It is because this sort of thing could also have been learnt. A scientist knows how he arrives at his conclusions and can prove the truth of his argument and set down definite rules which others can learn. By following his argument step by step, one can acquire knowledge of it by industry and perseverance. In the scientific sphere, therefore, the greatest inventor differs from the most hardworking imitator and apprentice only in degree and not in kind, for what the scientist has accomplished is something that could also have been learnt. Newton required indeed a great head to discover all those things that he has set forth in his immortal work on the \textit{Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy}; still we can learn what he has expounded in his work. But we cannot learn to write inspired poetry, although we may be provided with exhaustive rules for the art of poetry and excellent models. It is because the steps Newton had taken, from the first elements of geometry to his great and profound discoveries, were not beyond the reach of his intuitive grasp, and, as such, he could lay down the steps quite determinately for everyone else; but no Homer or Wieland can indicate how his ideas, however rich in fancy and thought, arise and come together in his head, simply because he himself does not know it and thus cannot teach it to anyone else either.

So genius is not a skill which can be communicated, but rather is a natural gift — a talent. It is bestowed to each individual immediately by the ‘hand of nature’, and thus it dies with him, until nature one day similarly endows another; and this man needs nothing more than an example in order to put in action in a similar way the talent of which he is conscious.

We have discussed that although a product of art is not determined by any definite rule which can be couched in a formula to serve as precepts, there is some kind of rule implicit in it, for which the product can be regarded as a model. The rule according to which the work has been produced, being indeterminate, cannot be specified. The product cannot also be imitated.
However it is possible that the artist’s ideas, which are expressed in his work of art, will arouse similar ideas in his apprentice if nature has equipped him with a similar proportion of mental powers. But these ideas are to be met with nowhere except in the individual work of art; and so an artist will never merely imitate another artist. The work of art by which the productive capacity of the pupil is excited serves as a model, not for imitation, but for following. An artist following another artist will produce a work of art stimulated by the work of his master. But his own work will be original.  

Although a product of fine art, unlike that of a mechanical art, must possess the character of originality, there is also something mechanical element in it, which in fact must be learnt and obeyed. Genius and originality, though necessary conditions of fine art, do no more than furnish rich material. How to work up this material, and to give the work of fine art a form is something which must be learnt, and there are certain rules which must on no account be violated, in order to make such a use of this material as will stand examination by the judgement. “It is not a miss, however, to remind the reader of this: that in all free arts something of a compulsory character is still required, or, as it is called, a mechanism, without which the soul, which in art must be free, and which alone gives life to the work, would be bodyless and evanescent (e.g. in the poetic art there must be correctness and wealth of language, likewise prosody and metre)” Only a shallow head, who believes that he could make “a braver show on the back of a wild horse than on the back of a trained animal,” throws off the constrain of all rules, in order to give the evidence of his being a full blown genius.

SECTION 22: SUBJECTIVE FINALITY IN BEAUTIFUL PRODUCTS OF ART

According to Kant, whereas in order to judge a beauty of nature we do not need first to have a concept of what sort of thing the object is supposed to be, i.e. it is not necessary to know the material finality or purposiveness (the end), in appreciating a beautiful work of art we must presuppose an end or a purpose, i.e., a concept of what the object is to be. The agreement of the manifold in a thing with its inner determination as an end is the perfection of a thing, and in appreciating the beauty of the thing (work of art), its perfection must be taken into account.
This seems to be contradictory to the position Kant has maintained so far in his third Critique that judgements about beauty do not presuppose a definite concept of the object (end), and that, beauty is a quality which is fundamentally different from perfection. However, a closer scrutiny reveals what Kant is trying to show, while contrasting the beauty of art with the beauty of nature. It is that in estimating a beautiful product of art we have to refer our representation of it to the will of a human being (the artist) who intended to give beauty to his product, for otherwise it would be a product not of art but of pure chance. We cannot but assume that the beauty has been given to a work of art intentionally, that the artist intended it to possess perfect beauty. On the other hand, we cannot ascribe any such purpose to nature. We ascribe beauty to certain natural objects, but we cannot say that nature has given them their beauty intentionally, since we have no knowledge of an intelligent nature. But we do have knowledge of the fact that certain human beings (artists) produce things with the intention of giving them a beautiful form. So judgements about beautiful products of art presuppose the idea of a purpose. But here also the purpose involved, like the one involved in case of natural beauty, is not a definite objective purpose. The principle of subjective purposiveness (finality) underlies all our judgements about beauty.

SECTION 23: AESTHETIC IDEAS

So far we have discussed the point that the artist must possess a productive capacity called ‘genius’ to create things which will be judged beautiful. Now the question which inevitably crops up is this: what are the faculties of the mind which constitute genius?

According to Kant, we may miss something in a work of art, although we may find nothing to criticize it so far as the rules of taste are concerned. Kant calls this element of beauty Geist, which approximates to the sense of the English word ‘spirit’. Thus we may say of a product of a fine art that it is ohne Geist, i.e., without spirit. A poem may be very neat and elegant, but without spirit. A story may be accurate and well organized but without spirit. Conversation is often not devoid of entertainment, but it is without spirit. Even of a women we may say that she is pretty, talkative and charming, but without spirit.
Geist, in an aesthetical sense, is the name given to the animating principle of the mind. But that by means of which this principle animates the soul, the material which it applies to that purpose, is what puts the mental powers purposively into swing, i.e. into such a play as maintains itself and strengthens the mental powers in their exercise. Kant’s idea is here linked to what he has told in § 12 of The Critique of Judgement. Geist is simply that which brings about the harmony of the faculties of the mind (subjective or formal purposiveness). Formal purposiveness which expresses the free play of the cognitive faculties involves a certain form of causality; it fills us with a desire to preserve the feeling of the harmony of the cognitive faculties. As Kant has explained § 12 of the Critique of Judgement, we dwell on the contemplation of the beautiful because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself.

So Geist gives life to the work of art. A work of art which is ohne Geist is lifeless; for though it does not violate the rules of taste, its representation does not make us feel the harmonious relation of our mental powers. As long as the artist does no more than not disobey the rules of taste, he cannot produce a genuine work of art. What he lacks is Geist, the animating principle of the mind. Genius shows itself through Geist.

Geist is the faculty of exhibiting aesthetic Ideas. A worthwhile work of fine art is an intentionally produced beautiful thing which is expressive of aesthetic Ideas. An aesthetic Idea is that representation of the imagination which lies beyond the bounds of sense experience and for which no concept can ever be adequate. An aesthetic Idea is the sensible counterpart of a rational Idea. A rational Idea (Idea of Reason) is a concept to which no intuition (i.e., representation of the imagination) can ever be adequate. An aesthetic Idea is a counterpart to a Rational Idea, since it is a sensible representation of that for which no concept is or can be adequate, whereas a rational Idea is a concept of that for which no sensible representation is or can be adequate. According to Kant, Ideas are representations referred to an object according to a certain principle whether subjective or objective in so far as they can never give us knowledge of this object. Either they are referred to an intuition, in accordance with a merely subjective principle of the cognitive faculties, namely imagination and understanding, and are called aesthetic Ideas. Or else they are referred to a concept according to an objective principle, and yet can never give us
knowledge of the object, and are called rational Ideas. In the latter case the concept is a *transcendent* concept, which is distinct from the concept of the understanding, to which an adequately corresponding experience can always be ascribed, and which is therefore called *immanent*. In perceptual knowledge, a synthesis of intuitions is subsumed under a concept, and in which, every concept is adequate to intuitions and every intuition to concept. "An aesthetic idea cannot become a cognition, because it is an intuition (of the imagination) for which an adequate concept can never be found." An aesthetic Idea contains more than our faculty of thought can explain. "A rational idea can never become a cognition, because it involves a concept (of the supersensible) for which a commensurate intuition can never be given." In conceiving a rational Idea we think more than our imagination can exhibit.

Kant says that whereas an aesthetic Idea is ‘an inexponible representation of the imagination’, a rational Idea is ‘an indemonstrable concept of reason.’ For Kant, demonstrable concepts are those capable of being referred to intuition. A concept of the understanding must be demonstrable, i.e., “the object answering to such concepts must always be capable of being given in intuition (pure or empirical)” Otherwise they would be devoid of real meaning. Now both the rational concept of the supersensible substrate of all phenomena in general and the rational concept of moral freedom are indemonstrable concepts of Reason. There can be given in experience, as regards its quality, absolutely nothing corresponding to the former. As regards the latter, no empirical product attains to the degree of that causality, which the rational Idea prescribes as the rule.

To expound a representation of the imagination is to reduce it to concepts. Aesthetical Idea may be called an inexponible representation of the imagination because as in a rational Idea the imagination with its intuitions does not attain to the given concept, so in an aesthetical Idea the understanding “fails with its concepts ever to attain to the completeness of the internal intuition which imagination conjoins with a given representation.”

We have already mentioned in Section 8 that imagination performs the job of combining or synthesizing the data of sensation (intuitions) into a representation. Imagination in its empirical employment synthesizes in a way which is governed by the empirical laws of association and is called
'reproductive imagination'. We have also seen Kant contrasts this with the productive power of imagination (or simply productive imagination) which is the transcendental faculty of imagination, where it is not dependent on empirical laws but rather constitutive of them, and hence, constitutive of empirical objects. Both in its empirical and transcendental employment the imagination is not free. In *The Critique of Judgement*, Kant discusses the productive as opposed to the reproductive function of the imagination on two occasions, and in both of these contexts, imagination has been considered in its freedom. The first is in the context of the experience of the beautiful, judging object as to their beauty, where we have referred it as 'aesthetic imagination'. The second discussion of productive imagination occurs in the context of aesthetic production. Imagination is here involved in the creation of aesthetic Ideas which give soul to works of art. Here the synthetic activity of the imagination is not performed according to rules dependent upon the laws of association. The imagination is free and the synthesis of the data of perception results in a novel combination of intuitions. We entertain ourselves with this imagination when experience seems too mundane to us. To gain a sense of freedom from the confines of common place experience and to afford a sensuous analogy of the noumenon, we remould experience by this imagination into something that transcends the empirical laws of understanding and fulfills the higher laws of Reason. By this productive imagination the material supplied to us by nature in accordance with the laws of association is worked up by us into something that surpasses nature. “The imagination (as a productive faculty of cognition) is a powerful agent for creating, as it were, a second nature out of the material supplied to it by actual nature.”

The representations of the imagination are called Ideas (as opposed to intuitions or concepts) for two reasons: (1) like rational or intellectual Ideas such as Freedom, God and Immortality, they strive after something which is beyond the bounds of possible experience, and so seek to present a concept of Reason (a rational or intellectual Idea) to sense and give it the appearance of objective reality (2) no concept can be fully adequate to them as intuition — whatever we are aware of apprehending cannot be fully conceptualized.

The poet ventures the task of interpreting to the sense the rational Ideas of invisible beings, the kingdom of the blessed, the kingdom of hell, eternity,
Kant here specially speaks about the poet because for him, among the arts, poetry occupies a special position, since it has greater susceptibility for communication and expression of aesthetic ideas than the other arts. So Kant’s point is that although there are no syntheses of intuitions which instantiate rational ideas such as God, hell, eternity etc, imagination can body forth such ideas to sense. When an aesthetic idea bodies forth to sense a Rational Idea, a synthesis of intuitions to which no concept can be adequate is used to body forth to sense a concept to which no intuition can be adequate. The poet also deals with things of which there are examples in experience, e.g. death, envy and all vices, also love, fame and the like. Unlike the invisible ideas, these concepts are already instantiated in experience. However such instantiations are in some way incomplete, and when the poet, transgressing the limits of experience and by means of imagination which emulates the play of Reason in its quest after a maximum bodies them forth to sense in poetry, they become more complete than they are in actual experience.

However, the novel combination of intuitions produced by the imagination may result in such a thought as that of a creature which possesses the head of fish and legs of a human being. Such nonsense combinations are not aesthetic ideas. An aesthetic idea is not merely a novel synthesis of intuitions; it also has the function of broadening the understanding. It animates the mind “by opening out for it a prospect into a field of kindred representations stretching beyond its ken.” Aesthetic idea must not be nonsense, it must be original, mind stretching and followable. An aesthetic idea, thus, is fertile of thought and suggestion, though in a condensed and indeterminate way, just as the overture of an opera contains the elements that are subsequently developed.

Since an aesthetic idea involves much thought than could be comprehended in a concept, it cannot be spelled into determinate concepts as objects of sense. Aesthetic Ideas are untranslatable into the literal because they represent a special mode of thinking. Aesthetic Ideas are typically expressed in symbolic uses of depictions and in poetic figures of speech such as metaphor, simile or personification. Such symbols are ‘ineffable’, because, on the one hand, they cannot be given literal, conceptual rendering, and, on the other hand, the thought they stimulate on the part of the appreciator is likewise ineffable. The symbolic presentation of rational ideas (e.g. death, love, envy) stimulate the
appreciator to much thought, his own power of productive imagination being aroused. Only such symbolic expressions invite and expand thought, ‘animating the mind by opening out for it a prospect into a field of kindred representations stretching beyond its ken’. So the artist or the poet does not present an aesthetic Idea itself, but only a symbolic representation, that gets us to think about the Idea. Kant uses the general term ‘aesthetic attribute’ to refer to what the artist does present. For example, the poet can express an aesthetic Idea such as ‘the mighty king of heaven’ (Jupiter) by presenting ‘Jupiter’s eagle with the lightning in its claws.’ According to Kant, the imagination, in case of cognition, synthesizes by making use of a thing’s logical attributes. Logical attributes of a thing are those by reference to which it satisfies the concept ordinarily applied to it. In the case of Jupiter’s eagle with the lightning in its claws, logical attributes are those attributes in virtue of which we deem it to be an eagle, and in the case of Jupiter himself, those in virtue of which we deem him to be majestic and powerful. But there are also ‘secondary representations’ of the imagination which are the ‘aesthetic attributes’. These can be used as a basis for synthesizing not eagle with eagle, and God with God, but eagle with God, both of whom are majestic and powerful. The novel synthesis brings home the majesty and power of Jupiter not by reference to the logical attributes of Jupiter which makes it true that he is majestic and powerful, but by reference to the ‘aesthetic attributes of eagles’. Crawford interprets ‘Jupiter’s eagle with the lightning in its claws’ as a case of synecdoche: “a symbolic part of Jupiter’s might is presented as standing for the whole of his might”.

Thus aesthetic attributes do not constitute the presentation of a given concept itself but only, as approximate representations of the imagination, express the consequences bound up with it and its relationship to other concepts; they furnish an aesthetical Idea. Aesthetic attributes allow the imagination to spread its flight over a whole host of kindred representations that arouse more thought than can be expressed in a concept determined by words. Poetry and rhetoric derive the spirit which animates their works solely from the aesthetic attributes of the objects – attributes which go hand in hand with the logical, and give the imagination an impetus to spread itself over a number of kindred representations and thus to think more, although in an undeveloped way, than can be comprehended in a concept, and therefore, in a definite
linguistic expression. To substantiate his points Kant here gives two examples. He quotes some lines from a poem of Friedrich II (Friedrich the great) of Prussia. The original poem is in French, and Kant, in *The Critique of Judgement*, gives the German prose translation of these lines. Paul Guyer gives the English translation of Kant’s German line in his *Critique of the power of judgement*. We quote them here from Guyer: “Let us depart from life without grumbling and without regretting anything, leaving the world beyond us replete with good deeds. Thus does the sun, after it has completed its daily course, still spread a gentle light across the heavens, and the last rays that it sends froth into the sky are its last sighs for the well-being of the world.”

The great King, by expressing himself in the above way, animates his rational Idea of a cosmopolitan disposition even at the end of life by means of an attribute which the imagination (in remembering all the pleasures of a beautiful summer day that is over and gone — a memory of which pleasures is suggested by serene evening) associates with that representation, and which arouses a multitude of sensations and supplementary representations for which no expression is found.

Kant also furnishes another example by quoting from the *Akademischen Gedichten* (Academic poems) of Philipp Lorenz Withof, where an intellectual concept conversely serves as the attribute of a representation of sense, and so animate the latter by means of the idea of the supersensible, but only in so far as the aesthetical element, which is subjectively attached to the consciousness of the latter, is used to this end. The poet says in the description of a beautiful morning, “The sun streamed forth, as tranquility streams from virtue” 99. The consciousness of virtue, even where we put ourselves only in thought in the position of a virtuous man, diffuses in the mind a multitude of sublime and tranquilizing feelings, and gives a boundless outlook into a happy future, such as no expression within the compass of a definite concept completely attains.

According to Kant, if we attach a representation of the imagination to a concept and if this representation, although the exhibition of the concept is involved in it, causes us by itself to think more than could even be comprehended by a determinate concept, the result being that the concept is aesthetically enlarged beyond limit, then the imagination is creative, and it sets in motion the faculty of intellectual Idea, namely Reason. What happens is that,
at the instance of a representation, the imagination makes Reason think about
this representation; and although this thought belongs to the concept of the
object, it exceeds what can be grasped or made distinct in the representation.

The discussions we have made so far on Kant’s theory of art clearly
show the close connection it bears with his analysis of judgements of taste. In
the ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’, Kant has told us that making of judgement of
taste requires reference in some way to the understanding as the faculty of
concepts. In the theory of art, he now shows that the creative artist, if he is to be
able to produce a work of art, must also use his understanding, that he must
have a definite conception of his intention. As the imagination is a merely
sensuous faculty, in order to create anything it must some way refer to the
understanding and its concepts. Further, we are told that since the imagination
of the artist is not limited to any definite concept it displays a creative activity.
The artist’s representation of the thing he is to produce contains more than what
belongs to its empirical concept. In this way his imagination leads the artist
beyond the world of sense. He creates a second nature. His imagination is free,
but not in the sense that it is completely independent of any concept. On the
contrary, his work expresses more than can be comprehended by any empirical
or a priori concept of the understanding.

Kant’s doctrine is that it is the imagination which supplies the material for
a work of art. The concept of the understanding is exhibited in an indefinite
manner. The artist himself cannot have precise knowledge of this material; for
his imagination gives him a greater wealth of material than can be comprised in
any definite concept. This is the reason why, although there is a relation of
imagination and understanding, it is an indefinite relation.

Since the imagination is not restricted to any definite concept, it can by
itself bring about the harmony with the understanding. It provides an abundance
of undeveloped material to the understanding, and the understanding makes
use of this material, “not so much objectively for cognition, as subjectively for
quickening the cognitive faculties ...”100 It is this ‘happy relation’101 between the
mental powers which enables one to find out Ideas for a given concept. Since
genius shows itself through Geist, and Geist is the faculty of exhibiting aesthetic
Ideas, genius is also defined by Kant as the faculty of aesthetic Ideas. Again
since the ‘happy relation’ between the cognitive faculties is what enables one to
find out Ideas for a given concept, the union of the mental powers in a certain relation constitutes genius. On the other hand, genius also enables us to find for these Ideas the expression by means of which the subjective mental condition induced by these Ideas as an accompaniment of the concept can be communicated to others. By presenting the aesthetic attributes the artist stirs up the mental powers of his audience into full imaginative activity centering round what has been presented and leading to the reflection on Ideas. Genius thus consists in the ability to come up both with the content for works of art and forms for the expression of this content that will at the same time manifest the freedom of the imagination of the artist and yet leave room for and stimulate the freedom of the imagination of the audience — tall order, of course, which is why genius is rare.

Kant’s conviction is that the indeterminate and indeterminable harmony of the imagination and the understanding, of which the artist becomes conscious, arises in him when he feels that his representations contain more than can be determined by rules of the understanding. That there must be some reference to understanding and its rules is a fact beyond question; but there must also be more in the representations which are produced by the artist’s imagination than can ever be made explicit or expressed in words. This is what gives life to the product of art. The free harmony of the imagination and the understanding and its principle of conformity to law cannot be brought about by any observance of rules. It belongs to the nature of the individual artist and expresses itself in his work in an original manner. In fact, as we have already mentioned, Kant here derives the product of fine art from our judgements about beauty. Since the beautiful must not be estimated according to concepts, but by the final mode in which the imagination is attuned so as to accord with the faculty of concepts in general, the work of art which is to be judged beautiful cannot be produced according to any definite purpose or a definite concept of what it is to be. That is why the artist can give no definite rule to art. In the products of genius, it is the nature of the individual artist, and not a set purposes, which gives rule to art as the production of the beautiful. To quote Kant, "...the unsought and undesigned subjective finality in the free harmonizing of the imagination with the understanding’s conformity to law presupposes a proportion and accord between these faculties such as cannot be brought about be any observance of
rules, whether of science or mechanical imitation, but can only be produced by
the nature of individual.”  102 According to these presuppositions, genius in
defined as “the exemplary originality of the natural endowments of an individual
in the free employment of his cognitive faculties.”  103 So the product of genius is
not an example to be imitated, for that would mean the loss of the essence of
genius and of the very soul of the work. It is an example to be followed by
another genius who is awakened by it to a feeling of his own originality. It rouses
him to exercise his art, free from the constraint of rules, so that art itself gains a
new rule, by which the talent shows itself as exemplary.

SECTION 24: THE GUIDANCE OF TASTE

So far we have seen that the genius provides the original material for fine
art, which material must be that through which aesthetic Ideas are expressed.
Now the abundance of Ideas produces in lawless freedom nothing but
nonsense. Therefore the imagination in its freedom must be accorded with the
conformity to law of the understanding. This is more necessary to beauty than
the abundance and originality of Ideas. The faculty by which the imagination is
adjusted to the understanding is the faculty of judging the beautiful or taste. So
genius gives ‘soul’ to works and entitles us to call them original and inspired,
whereas taste prevents works in which aesthetic Ideas are expressed from
degenerating into nonsense and entitles us to call them fine art.

Thus taste as the faculty of judging the beautiful is not only connected
with the appreciator’s experience of the beautiful, but it also is necessary for the
creation of beautiful objects of art. “Taste, like judgement in general, is the
discipline (or corrective) of genius.”  104 It clips the wings of genius, and makes it
cultured and polished. Critical judgement or taste guides the creative
imagination of the artist as to how far the imagination may extend himself, so
that it may preserve its character of finality. So though taste is merely a judging
and not a productive faculty, as Kant says in § 48 that “For estimating beautiful
objects, as such, what is required is taste; but for fine art, i.e. the production of
such objects, one needs genius”  105, it is necessary for the successful
production of beautiful objects.

For Kant, a work which does not express aesthetic Ideas is without ‘soul’.
Having soul is, however, not enough for a work of art to be an exemplar of fine
art. The work must render the aesthetic Ideas it expresses universally communicable, just as natural objects, in order to be beautiful, must not only give pleasure but must give pleasure which is universally communicable. The significance of art is the communication of aesthetic Ideas. Therefore this imaginative material must take on a sensible form that allows it to be communicated. Since according to Kant’s transcendental philosophy, communication necessarily involves the harmonious engagement of the cognitive faculties, taste is necessary for the artist to give such perfection to his product as will successfully express aesthetic Ideas. Genius, therefore, must be combined with taste. Simply possessing the imaginative genius is not the only mark of a great artist. He is a creative genius “who himself must exercise taste (judgement on the formal purposiveness of the elements under his control) in the very course of creating.” 106 Taste “introduces a clearness and order into the plentitude of thought, and in so doing gives stability to the ideas, and qualifies them at once for permanent and universal approval, for being followed by others, and for a continually progressive culture.” 107 Therefore the creative artistic genius, in order to be successful artistic genius must subject his artistic insights (imaginings) to the proper form for artistic communication. He must subject his creative spirit to discipline. A good work of art is produced only if criticism (which requires the exercise of the faculty of judgement generally as well as the making of specific judgement of taste) and creativity interact.

So the beautiful representation of an object consists only in the form by which the aesthetic Idea is presented, and by which this Idea is universally communicated. And to give this form to the product of art, taste is required. The artist confers the form to the imaginative material provided by genius not arbitrarily. To produce his work of art, the artist continually estimates his work. After he has exercised and corrected his work by manifold examples from art and nature, the artist estimates his work by taste, and after many, often toilsome, attempts to content himself he finds that form which satisfies him. “Hence this form in not, as it were, a matter of inspiration, or of a free swing of the mental powers, but rather of a slow and even painful process of improvement, directed to making the form adequate to his thought without prejudice to the freedom in the play of those powers.” 108
As to the question whether genius or taste, imagination or judgement, is the more important in matters of fine art, Kant says that given the goal of communication, the weight should always be tipped in favour of taste and judgement. In a conflict between the two faculties of imagination and judgement, if something is to be sacrificed, it should be rather on the side of genius. The judgement will rather sacrifice the freedom and wealth of imagination than permit anything prejudicial to the understanding. Kant’s answer is also contained in the following lines, “Now imagination rather entitles an art to be called inspired (geistriche) than a fine art. It is only in respect of judgement that the name of fine art is deserved. Hence it follows that judgement, being the indispensible condition (conditio sine quo non), is at least what one must look to as of capital importance in forming an estimate of art as fine art.”

SECTION 25: THE SUPERSENSIBLE

In the ‘Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgement’, Kant justifies the rationality of aesthetic judgement with ontological intimations. Here he makes a brief return to the question of intersubjective validity. In the Dialectic, Kant first maintains that there is an antinomy of taste which is generated by assuming that aesthetic judgements cannot be grounded in determinate concepts of objects and yet claim universal validity which only a judgement, so grounded on concept, can claim. Kant attempts to resolve the antinomy by arguing that the judgement of taste may be grounded on a concept, but an indeterminate one. The presence of a concept makes this truly a judgement and grounds the claim to universality; but the indeterminate character of the concept eliminates the possibility of proof and preserves the ‘aesthetic’ character of the judgement. However, Kant does not adduce now the concept of the harmony of the faculties as the indeterminate concept which founds aesthetic judgement. Instead, he introduces an indeterminate metaphysical concept for which we have no specific sensible criteria of application, i.e., the concept of the ‘supersensible’ ground or substratum of all phenomenal reality. It is the ‘transcendental rational concept’ which “lies at the basis of all that sensible intuition, and is, therefore, incapable of being further determined theoretically.” Kant thus solves the antinomy by applying the fundamental transcendental principle according to which the world
of empirical objects is regarded as a world of mere appearance as distinct from the world of things in themselves.

The concept of the harmony of the faculties is meant by Kant to be a concept of the subjective condition of experience. It is a mental state or disposition of the faculties of a subject without which the consciousness of unity in manifolds that constitutes both ordinary experience and aesthetic response cannot obtain. The supersensible is not a condition of experience in this sense at all; it is rather a putative explanatory ground of the objects which dispose the faculties into a harmonious relation to each other, and therefore, is the ground or real basis of the objects which provide manifolds of intuition and of the subjects which have and unify those manifolds. The concept of the supersensible is an ontological concept, a concept of an object of which we know little, but which we nevertheless think to be that which both empirical objects and empirical subjects are in themselves. It is the ground of existence of both subjects and objects of knowledge and taste.

Kant necessarily assumes the existence of a world beyond the world of sense. We cannot understand our own world unless we contrast it with another world, the world of things in themselves, and we cannot properly understand the nature of our knowledge unless we contrast it with a different kind of knowledge, a knowledge which would know things as they are in themselves. This sphere of the supersensible includes the supersensible substrate of nature (regarded as a mere phenomenon) on the one hand and of humanity on the other.

Kant’s reference to a supersensible ground of experience is continuous with his theory of the harmony of the faculties. This becomes clear when he says that the indeterminate concept on which the judgement of taste is based is the concept of a “general ground of the subjective finality of nature for the power of judgement.” Here he identifies the supersensible as the ground of the subjective finality of nature for the power of judgement. Since Kant already has explained the point that the ground of subjective finality is the harmony of the faculties, i.e., subjective finality is attributed to an object because it produces the harmony of the faculties, we will not go astray if we think that the state of the subjective finality of nature is identical with the free play of the faculties. On the basis of this idea, he perhaps has assumed that the ground of either was some supersensible substratum. Thus we can suppose that the thinking of the
harmony of the faculties require a concept of the supersensible, because the concept of an appearance always requires a concept of that object which it is in itself.

The connection between the indeterminate concept of the harmony of the faculties and the supersensible substratum, concepts respectively of epistemology and ontology is found revealed in § 57 of The Critique of Judgement, in the context of Kant's theory of genius. We have already discussed in Section 19 that for Kant, the production of an object of fine art is the production of something which is subjectively final. A product of genius can neither be judged nor produced by reference to any determinate concept (rule and precept), but which yet pleases universally. It is the nature of the individual artist and not a set purposes that in products of genius gives the rule to art. By 'nature' Kant here does not mean nature as an object of sense experience which we determine according to the rules of the understanding and which every human being can know by determining his intuitions by means of the concept of the understanding and thus bringing intuition and understanding into a determinate relation. It is nature in a special sense, viz. the ultimate nature of the individual, his faculty of bringing about the harmonious relation of the cognitive faculties which has also been called subjective purposiveness. The artist himself does not know how he achieves it, nor does the man who judges his work to be beautiful, i.e., to be in accordance with the subjective and yet universally valid principle of aesthetic reflection. All objective knowledge of nature can be determined by rules and concepts but the subjective principle of the indeterminate harmony of the cognitive faculties which has to serve "as the requisite subjective standard for that aesthetic and unconditional finality in fine art which has to make a warranted claim to being bound to please everyone" cannot be determined in this way. There must be a 'point of reference' for the harmonious accord of all our faculties of cognition, and this point we can find only in a higher principle, the principle of the supersensible faculty of the subject, its faculty of producing aesthetic Ideas. It is the supersensible substrate of all the faculties of the subject (which cannot be reached by any concept of the understanding) that serves as a standard of fine art. A subject's production of a work of art judged beautiful by everyone has to be referred to a specific faculty of the subject who produces the work of art. The rule in accordance with which
he produces the work of art can only be derived from 'the element of mere
nature of the subject', the supersensible substrate of all the faculties of the
subject which cannot be reached by any concept of the understanding.

The understanding is concerned with the world of sense and determinate
concepts which apply to it. So it cannot make intelligible harmonious and yet
indeterminate relation between the imagination and the understanding. That is
why the indeterminate relation of the two faculties is referred to a higher
principle, the principle of the supersensible world which serves as the ground for
the possibility of such a relation, i.e., which explains the fact that although the
imagination contains more than any concepts of the understanding can
comprehend, the two faculties are yet in harmony with each other. This principle
is merely subjective which can explain to us neither why we possess a faculty of
aesthetic appreciation, nor why certain human beings are capable of producing
objects the representation of which makes every judging subject feel a harmony
of its faculties of cognition. That there are human beings who possess such a
capacity we must describe to something beyond nature as determined by rules
of the understanding.

Actually, since neither the estimation nor the production of beauty can be
explained by reference to determinate concepts, or 'set purposes', nature —
which is the realm beyond specific human intention — must be the ultimate
source for both. And with this assumption Kant has linked the harmony of the
faculties to the supersensible. So far Kant explained aesthetic response in terms
of its relation to the faculties, states of mind, and objectives involved in ordinary
cognition. Kant now suggests that both the existence of that objective itself and
the existence of objects which can satisfy it — whether products of nature or of
art need explanation, which we can find by transcending the limits of the
empirical world and the faculties needed to comprehend it, and invoking
intimations of noumenal reality.

By postulating the concept of supersensible substratum, Kant tries to
establish on a firm foundation taste’s claim to intersubjective validity. Since the
thing-in-itself is what lies behind the appearance of our difference from each
other and from the rest of nature, Kant thinks that the suggestion of a
metaphysical ground for harmony both among subjects and between subjects
and objects will more effectively silence the skeptic than he was by Kant’s
previous arguments. In § 57 Kant says that the judgement of taste acquires the validity for everyone, not because its determining ground is the concept of a mental state common to all humans in so far as they are capable of knowledge at all, but because “its determining ground lies, perhaps, in the concept of what may be regarded as the supersensible substrate of humanity.” This implies that merely an epistemological and psychological condition shared by all persons in so far as they are capable of cognition is not the ground of aesthetic judgement. The ground is rather an aspect of the ultimate reality of all humans—a property of what they are in themselves quite apart from how they may appear to differ. A supersensible substratum is not something which can be attributed to human beings only conditionally on their possession of certain capabilities. It must be something which everyone possesses just in virtue of being human at all. The idea of a supersensible substratum of humanity intimates a metaphysical guarantee for the ultimate likeness of all human beings, on which the intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgements rests. In § 57, Kant uses both the phrases ‘supersensible substratum of humanity’, and ‘supersensible substratum of phenomena’ to indicate the indeterminate concept which grounds judgement of taste. Since there is only one indeterminate concept which can serve as the ground of aesthetic judgement, Kant has used both the phrases in the identical sense. This implies that the intersubjective validity of a judgement of taste not only gets the epistemological guarantee of a pre-determined harmony between human being and human being, but also gets the metaphysical guarantee of a pre-determined harmony between human being and nature. The ultimate identity of the supersensible substrate of both humanity and nature is what provides the guarantee of the experience of beauty which is the harmony between nature’s forms and our own responses which constitutes the subjective finality of nature. The experience of beauty thus cemented to the metaphysical basis of the relation between human beings and nature further support the intersubjective claim of a judgement of taste.

Not only is the appreciation of beautiful grounded in the idea of the supersensible, the judgement of the sublime too has a basis in the supersensible. The sublime relates to the supersensible because it is itself an Idea and thus is supersensible is the same sense that any Idea is supersensible. More specifically, the sublime is the Idea of a supersensible

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faculty of our mind which is more important than, and have dominion over our sensible faculties, and which has as its object a supersensible reality. The object we call sublime forces us to think of nature as presentation of the supersensible, though we cannot objectively arrive at this presentation.\textsuperscript{115} Thus it is the same Idea of the supersensible which underlies both the sublime and the beautiful. On the basis of this common ground, we demand agreement from others for both our judgements about the beautiful and the sublime. The only difference is that we become aware of the supersensible in case of the sublime in a different way. What makes us aware of the supersensible in case of the sublime is only our ability to think of that which our cognitive faculties are inadequate to grasp but in terms of which they function and towards which they strive, giving us the Idea of the powers of legislation of our faculty of Reason.

The exercise of creative imagination in both the creation and experience of the beautiful projects us to the realm which is above the world of sensibility where our supersensible powers seem to be effective of our purposes. The exercise of the creative imagination gives sensible realization to the necessary condition of morality — our transcendental freedom. The beautiful ultimately pleases because it is the symbol of morality, that is, because it symbolizes the possibility of our supersensible freedom from the causally determined world of nature and our supersensible dominion over it, whereby our will can reign supreme. As Kant says, “Taste makes, as it were, the transition from the charm of sense to habitual moral interest possible without too violent a leap…”\textsuperscript{116}
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