PART—I

CHAPTER I:
THE THEORY OF DHVANI — ITS BACKGROUND
SECCTION 1: THE GENESIS OF POETICS

The story of the birth of poetry goes like this in the Rāmāyaṇa. Engrieved by the sorrowful sight of the wounded stork, Vālmīki, the author of the Rāmāyaṇa, spontaneously pronounced the ādi-sūkha:

\[
\begin{align*}
mā niśāda pratiṣṭhām tvamagamaḥ sāśvatiḥ samāḥ \\
yat krauṇḍa-mithunādekaṁ avadīḥ kāma-mohitam
\end{align*}
\]

Such a sūkha having been spontaneously flowed out from Vālmīki’s mouth, he exclaimed in naïve astonishment, “What is this that has been uttered by me (kim idaṁ vyāḥṛtaṁ mayā)?”

This wonder over the mystery of poetic creation expressed by Vālmīki gives expression to the eternal wonder and curiosity of the poetry-appreciating (kavya rasika) human mind. What is this wonderful and charming string of words which the poetic-genius creates: ‘kim idaṁ’? The answer to this question brings into existence the study of poetics (alaṅkāra-śāstra). Its purport is to enquire into what the soul or essence of poetry is.

Although the writing of poetry is quite ancient in our country, scholarly people did not turn their attention to its discussion early enough. We cannot trace the origin of poetics in the ancient literature. Alaṅkāra śāstra is never mentioned in the Vedāṅgas, Vedic Saṁhitās, Brahmāṇas, Śrauta and Dharma sutras. It is true that the conception of upamā or similitude affected the Vedic language. But it had only a grammatical significance, and provides no real basis for a system of poetics.

The first evidence of a definite activity in this direction (although from the linguistic standpoint) is tracable in the Nighaṇṭu and Nirukta. The term alaṅkāra in its technical sense does not occur in the Nirukta. However Yāksa used it in the sense of ‘one that adorns.’ In the Nighaṇṭu, a list of twelve varieties of particles of comparison is given. Six of such varieties are indicated by the particles iva, yathā, na, cit, hu, and ā. Yāksa also mentions bhi, sī, ru, su, among other varieties of comparison. He mentions four kinds of upamās: bhutopamā, rupopamā, siddhopamā, and luptopamā or arthopamā. Incidentally Yāksa quotes the grammarian Gārgya’s definition of upamā. According to Gārgya, upamā occurs when an object which is dissimilar is reckoned, through similarity, with an object having similar attributes. It also states as a general rule that the
standard of comparison should be superior in merit and better known than the object of comparison. The definition establishes a very early conception of the poetic upamā.¹

In between Yāksa and Pāṇini, there lies a gap of nearly fifty years. Pāṇini belonged to the sixth century A.D. He incidentally discusses the conception of upamā (comparison). From his sūtras, it is evident that he is well aware of the three ingredients of upamā: upamāna, upamita (which is upameya of the posterior period) and sāmānya. He explains the influence of upamā in linguistic expressions. From the same linguistic outlook, a discussion on the idea of similitude has been made in Kātyāyana’s Vārtikas and Śāntanava’s Phīṣṭūtra. Patañjali in his Mahābhāṣya has defined Pāṇini’s use of the term upamāna: A māna or measure is that which is employed in ascertaining a thing unknown; upamāna is approximate to the māna and determines the thing not absolutely (but approximately), e.g., when we say ‘a gavaya is like a cow.’²

However, all these analyses are from the grammarian’s point of view. Beyond this grammatical interest, there is no indication of the existence of a system or theory of poetics during this period. But these grammatical analyses have an indirect bearing on poetics. They formed the theoretical background of the discipline. The whole analysis of the two functions of a word, called abhidhā and lakṣaṇā, was borrowed from the grammatico-philosophical ideas already elaborated by the grammarians. The dhvani theory of Ānandavardhana is an advancement on this quasi-grammatical sphoṭa theory.

Poetics as a separate technical discipline began to develop in the first few centuries of the Christian era and probably flourished in a relatively developed form with the flourishing of Sanskrit learning and literature in the 4th and 5th centuries under the Gupta emperors. The course of this development is unfortunately hidden from us, until it emerges in a more or less self-conscious form in some chapters of Bharata and in the Kāvyālaṅkāra of Bhāmaha.

Bharata’s Nāṭyaśāstra is the oldest extant work and the most authoritative treatise on poetics. The Nāṭyaśāstra is an encyclopaedic manual on dramatic art. In older times the school of dramaturgy had an existence separate from the orthodox school of poetics. Almost every aspect of drama and dramatic representation, the origin, production, constituent parts etc. of drama are discussed in the thirty six (or thirty seven) chapters of the Nāṭyaśāstra.
Incidentally, in this work, Bharata also deals with poetry and poetic theory. Poetry comes within the scope of vācikābhīnaya in drama and hence finds a place in Bharata’s treatise. He sets apart a chapter of his work (chapter sixteen) for dealing with ornaments of poetry in so far as they apply to drama (nātakāśraya). The sixteenth chapter of Bharata’s Nāṭyaśāstra gives us for the first time an outline of poetics. Here Bharata mentions four poetic figures (alaṅkāras), ten excellences (guṇas), ten defects (doṣas) and thirty six characteristics (lakṣaṇas) of poetic composition.

Later poetics ascribed most of the functions of lakṣaṇas to alaṅkāras or guṇas. Bharata refers only to four poetic figures, viz, upamā (simile), rūpaka (metaphor), dīpaka (illuminer) and yamaka (repetition of words or syllables, which are similar in sound). He defines guṇa as the negative of doṣas, whereas Vāmana regards guṇas as positive and doṣas as the negative of guṇas. Bharata does not elaborate the ideas of rīti and dhvani which came to the forefront in later days.

Besides being the oldest extant work on literary theory, Bharata’s treatise is well known for its statements on the concept of rasa. Although the concept originated even earlier, oldest extant theoretical writings on this important subject are those to be found in the Nāṭyaśāstra. According to Bharata, bhāva (an emotional state of mind) becomes rasa when it attains sthāyī bhāva (a state of permanence) and is intensified by vibhāva (major causes) and anubhāva (minor causes) and vyabhicārabhāva (accessory facts). He says:

\[ \text{vibhāvānu bhāvavyabhicāriaśyogādrasā-niśpattih.} \]

(Nāṭyaśāstra, VI.32)

Bharata deals with rasa as an attempt to explain the aesthetic objective of dramatic representation. To him, the primary element of drama is rasa. Hence in his treatment all the other elements, viz. lakṣaṇa, guṇa, doṣa and alaṅkāra become subordinate to the purpose of awakening rasa. In this he anticipates and probably influences the view of Ānandavardhana and his followers who borrowed Bharata’s idea of rasa from the case of drama and applied it to poetry. These elements constitute the vācika abhinaya which forms an important factor, the anubhāva, in calling forth the rasa. Hence Bharata is concerned with the guṇa, alaṅkāra, doṣa and lakṣaṇa chiefly in regard to rasa niśpatti.
The date of the composition of *Nāṭyaśāstra* cannot possibly be assigned to a date later than the 6th century A.D. In the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, there are clear evidences, which bear testimony to the fact that at least a century ago a systematic tradition had been in existence. Bharata had been held in high esteem by all later writers on poetics and his work continued to remain a source of inspiration to them.

With the progress of years there arose four main schools (*prasthānās*) of poetics which maintain different views with regard to the essential characteristics of poetry. Thus from time to time, *alaṅkāra* (figure), *rīti* (style), *rasa* (aesthetic pleasure) and *dhvani* (suggestion) have been declared to be the essentials of poetry. The *Dhvani* school, however, grows to be the most important of all the schools of *alaṅkāra* literature. Ānandavardhana, the author of the *Dhvanyāloka*, is known to be the pioneer of this school. His commentator Abhinavagupta also contributes in bringing out the importance of the doctrine of *dhvani*.

But what is the cause of this ramification of Indian poetics into four *prasthānas*? *Śabda* and *artha* is the medium of linguistic expression. The materials of word (*śabda*) and sense (*artha*) constitute the essential elements of all literature and language. The earliest definitions of poetry also start in terms of *śabda* and *artha*. Nearly all writers and *śaṅkārins* agree that the *sāhitya* of *śabda* and *artha*, which means unity as well as inseparability of the two, constitute poetry.

However, mere *sāhitya* of *śabda* and *artha* is not poetry; it is a grammatical fact, common to all speech, to the utterances of ordinary life, of *śāstra*, of *ākhyāna*, as well as of poetry. The *sāhitya* of poetry must be of a special kind. Poetic speech must have a special charm, which distinguishes itself from ordinary speech. *Śabda* and *artha* in their unity bring about a special beauty in poetry which is not found elsewhere; poetry is not merely linguistic expression, but beautiful expression. So the *sāhitya* of *śabda* and *artha* in poetry must have a *viṣeṣa* or speciality as well. As Samudrabhandha, the commentator on Ruṣyaka’s *Alaṅkārasarvasva*, observes, “*iha viṣeṣau śabdārthau kāvyam*.” Some theorists approach the problem from the standpoint of outward expression and declare the *viṣeṣa* to be the attributes (*dharma*) of *śabda* and *artha*, which could be analysed into the categories of *lakṣaṇa*, *alaṅkāra* or *guṇa*. Some dive
deeper into the context and maintain that it is the poet’s peculiar way, the work of his poetic imagination, the kavivyāpāra, which is the viśeṣa. Others opine that the speciality of poetic speech is produced by the suggestive sense (vyaṅgyārtha), which transcends the primary meaning (vācyārtha) and the implied meaning (laksyārtha) (iha viśiṣṭau śabdārthau kāvyam tayośca vaiśiṣṭyaṁ dharmamukhena, vyāpāra mukhena vyaṅgyamukhena vā iti trayaḥ pakṣāḥ – Samudrabandha). Samudrabandha speaks of five pakṣas or views about kāvya, namely (i) of Udbhata (alaṅkāra prasthāna), (ii) of Vāmana (guṇa and rīti prasthāna), (iii) of Kuntaka (vakrokti vāda), (IV) of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (bhukti vāda; bhukti is enjoyment due to generalization of vibhāva etc.) and (v) of Ānandavardhana (dhvani vāda). The Vakroktijīvita-kāra (Kuntaka) and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka were unable to supplant the dhvani theory. They accepted the concept of a suggested sense, but when they endeavoured to explain it in a different way, they could hardly find a patient hearing. So broadly we can classify Indian poetics into four inclusive systems: alaṅkāra, rīti, dhvani and rasa which emphasizes respectively the Alaṅkāra, Rīti, Dhvani or Rasa theories.³ Bhāmaha, Udbhata and Rudraṭa were the earliest formulators of Alaṅkāra system, Daṇḍin and Vāmana of Rīti system, Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta of Dhvani system, and Bharata of Rasa. However none of them can be considered to be the absolute founders of the particular doctrines of alaṅkāra, rīti, dhvani or rasa; and with them we do not start at the absolute beginnings of the discipline. The earliest known writers on poetics acknowledge their indebtedness to still earlier authorities.

SECTION 2 : THE ALAṅKĀRA SCHOOL

Bhāmaha is one of the earliest rhetoricians who made a systematic discussion of poetic embellishment after Bharata’s treatment of figures. Between Bharata and the definite formation of poetic theories which begins with Bhāmaha lies a long gap of which we do not possess much knowledge. Bhāmaha is, by common consent, the earliest available authority on poetics. He himself refers to earlier authorities like Medhāvin and others and admits that a critical study made by him of the older authorities provides the base upon which he has constructed the structure of his work. Bhāmaha is placed approximately
in the period between the last quarter of the seventh and the middle of the eighth century.

Bhāmaha’s *Kāvyālaṅkāra* is the first authentic treatise on *Alaṅkāra* school. It declares that the principal element of poetry is *alaṅkāra* or poetic figures. Here Bhāmaha mainly concentrates on describing poetic decorations and puts off the question regarding the soul of poetic feeling. He cares more about objective and external charms than about subjective and inward sweetness. The question as to what constitutes the inward sweetness, the aesthetic fact, does not arise until Vāmana and Ānandavardhana come to the field. Earlier authors on poetics like Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin remain confined to the *kāvyā-saṅgīra* or the body of poetry, and pay no attention to its *ātman*, its soul or animating principle. The later writers feel the necessity of some deeper principle and attempt to arrive at greater precision first indicated by Vāmana, who makes diction (*ṛiti*) to be the soul of poetry. Ānandavardhana takes the last step in completing this figurative idea by defining systematically the mutual relation of the ‘body’ and the ‘soul’ of poetry. He implies that *vyāṅgya artha* is this *ātman*, the *guṇas* being compared to natural qualities like courage and the *alaṅkāras* likened to external ornaments like bracelets which adorn the body. This view is accepted by Mammaṭa and the final extension of this metaphorical conception is to be found in Viśvanātha. All the Indian theorists, from Bhāmaha to Jagannātha, take the *śabda* and *artha* as constituting the ‘body’ of poetry; and with this idea the theories start, ultimately ending in search for its ‘soul.’

According to Bhāmaha, *śabda* (word) and *artha* (sense) together form the body of poetry: *śabdārthau sahitau kāvyam* I 6 This body should be decorated by poetic figures (*alaṅkāras*). These poetic figures constitute the essence of poetry. As he says in verse I.13 of *Kāvyālaṅkāra*:

*rupakādiralaṅkārastasyānyairbahudhoditaḥ I
na kāntamapi nirbhūṣaṁ vibhāti vanitānanam II*

It means that *alaṅkāras* like *rupaka* (metaphor) etc. presented by various *acāryas* are as necessary for poetry as the ornaments are for beautifying the face of even a charming damsel, without which it does not shine. So poetry is a verbal composition with a definite sense encharmed by means of certain turns of expression which are called poetic figures. Apart from having the characteristics
of being embellished by poetic figures (śālāṅkāra), a kāvyā should also be faultless (nirdoṣa).

Bhāmaha does not admit the literary value of rīti. He thinks that the distinction made by the rīti theorists between vaidarbi and gauḍī is meaningless. Consequently he pays little attention to the guṇas, which in the rīti system form the constituent excellences of rīti. He summarily mentions only three guṇas, viz, mādhurya (sweetness), ojas (strength) and prasāda (clearness) among the ten orthodox excellences of Bharata. That kāvyā is known as sweet which is agreeable to the ear and does not contain many compounds (or big compounds). That composition is clear whose meaning is apparent to all from the learned down to women and children, and which too, like sweetness, does not contain many compound words. Compounding many words into one exhibits strength.

An example of a verse exhibiting strength, as given by Bhāmaha in his Kavyālaṅkāra, is this: mandāraṅkumārapīṇịjāritālakā (Kāvyālaṅkāra, II.2). It means: She whose hair has been rendered yellow by the pollen of the mandāra flowers.

Bhāmaha’s conception of these qualities also differs from that of Bharata. They are not essential in a poetic production. In fact Bhāmaha had no clear marking line between guṇas and alaṅkāras. In the opinion of the followers of the Dhvani school, guṇas may occur only in relation to the rasa. But the followers of the Alaṅkāra school put guṇas at par with the figures by conceiving them without any invariable relation with rasas.

According to Bhāmaha, the only thing of highest importance in poetry is alaṅkāra. As the body of poetry is made up of two elements, so the alaṅkāras can be divided into two distinct groups. Some adorn the sound aspect and are called śabdālaṅkāras. Yamaka, anuprāsa are such types. Their function is to make the sound aspect of the composition agreeable to the ear. Anuprāsa is that in which similar letters are employed: “sarūpavaranvinyāsanuprāsaṁ pracakṣate I” (Kāvyālaṅkāra,II.5). An example of anuprāsa, as given by Bhāmaha, is this: kiṁ tayā cintayā kānte nitāntā (Is the fair one very much cast down by that anxiety?) (Kāvyālaṅkāra, II.5). The repetition of letters differing from each other in meaning but similar in sound is yamaka:

tulyaśrutīṁ bhinnāṁabhidheyaiḥ parasparam I
varṇāṁ yaḥ punarvādo yamakāṁ tannigāyate II (Kāvyālaṅkāra,II.17).
The following is an example of *yamaka*, as given by Bhāmaha:

\[
na \text{ te dhīrdhīra bhogeṣu ramaṇīyeṣu saṅgatā} ~ I
muninapi harantyete ramaṇī yeṣu saṅgatā ~ II
\]

[ Your intelligence, Oh bold one ! does not attach itself to attractive enjoyments. They (the enjoyments) are such that they would divert the minds of even sages (if) beautiful women should be concerned in them ].

(Kāvyālaṅkāra, II.13).

The other kind of *alaṅkāras* adorn the sense aspect and are called *arthālaṅkāras*. *Upamā, rūpaka*, are such types. Their function is to produce the appealing turn of speech. *Rūpaka* is that in which, on account of the existence of common qualities, the identity (*tattvam*) of the upameya with the upamāna is described:

\[
\text{upamānena yattattvamupameyasya rūpyate} ~ I
\text{gūṇānāṁ samatāṁ dṛṣṭavā rūpakaṁ nāma tadvaduḥ} ~ II
\]

(Kāvyālaṅkāra, II.21).

As an example of *rūpaka*, Bhāmaha cites the following verse:

\[
śīkarāṁbhomasṛjasturgā jaladadantināḥ ~ I
niryānto madayantīme śakrakāmuraṃkāraṇam ~ II
\]

(Kāvyālaṅkāra, II.23).

It means: The tall (or high) cloud-elephants discharging spray-ichor delight people when they come out because of the rain-bow (i.e., they cause the rain-bow). Here the chief metaphor (*rūpaka*) consists in *jaladadantināḥ* in which the elephant and the cloud are exhibited as identical. The word has an adjective *śīkarāṁbhomasṛja!ḥ* in which the ichor of the elephant is identified with the rain from the cloud. So this is a case of metaphor (*rūpaka*). Bhāmaha’s definition of similie (upamā) is this:

\[
\text{vīruddhenopamānena deśakālakriyādibhiḥ} ~ I
\text{upameyasya yatsāmyaṁ guṇaleśena sopamā} ~ II
\]

(Kāvyālaṅkāra, II.30).

It means: When the compared object (upameya) which differs from the comparing object (upamāna) with reference to place, time or action is exhibited as similar to the latter, on account of the possession of a small resemblance, then, there is the figure called similie (upamā). The following is an example of upamā: “tavī śyāmā lata yathā” (Kāvyālaṅkāra, II.31). It means: The slim one
(lady) is like the śyāmā creeper. Here the word ‘yathā’ expresses the resemblance between the two differing objects, the lady and the śyāmā creeper. Some other examples are ‘kamalapatrākṣī’ (lotus-leaf-eyed one) and ‘śaśāṅkavadane’ (moon-faced one).

The alaṅkāravādins concentrated their attention on the arthālaṅkāras. They were fond of inventing new and new figures. They discovered subtle points of differences in the already existing ones on the basis of logic and grammar and gave them new names. Thus, whereas Bharata mentions only four alaṅkāras, the alaṅkāras mentioned by Bhāmaha are forty-three in number. At the root of these figures, there lies atisayokti or vakrokti invariably. Vakrokti is the essential principle of all alaṅkāras. It is a collective designation of all alaṅkāras. Vakrokti is a crooked or rather peculiar way of expression that lends charm to a certain piece of composition and hence constitutes the basis of all poetic figures. In order to add poetic charm to a composition, the expression should deviate from normalcy and this deviating strikingness of expression is what is called vakrokti. Atiśayokti or vakrokti is the existence, in the diction and meaning of poetry, of a distinction transcending the common usage.

Hence vakrokti is that which marks the difference between ordinary speech and poetic speech and what converts the former into the latter. It is only through vakrokti that meanings are rendered beautiful. Poets should be assiduous in cultivating it. Without it no figure can exist. A matter-of-fact expression devoid of vakrata (and hence having no claim to poetic appeal) is called vārtā (report). Such prosaic expression like “The sun has set; the moon shines, the birds are winging back to their nests” are not poetry but mere vārtā.

Kuntaka elaborates the idea of vakrokti in his Vakrokti-jīvita. When words are used in the ordinary manner of common parlance, as people without a poetic turn of mind use them, there is no special charm, no strikingness due to atiśayokti or vakrokti. Such svabhāvokti or natural mode of speech is not acceptable to Bhāmaha and to Kuntaka as a poetic figure. No embellishment of poetry is possible without vakrokti. A composition without vakrokti, though written in a good style and so possessed of the qualities such as sweetness and clearness, is not poetry. It is like a song which pleases the ear only. Thus, according to Bhāmaha, embellishment is the most essential element of poetry.
and it consists in the striking manner of putting a striking idea in equally striking word.

According to S.K. Dey, by saying generally saisā sarvaiva vakroktiḥ, Bhāmaha hints at identifying the vakrokti in substance with the atiśayokti. Kuntaka appears to agree with Bhāmaha that some kind of atiśaya is involved in vakrokti, and that the atiśaya is a necessary element in what he calls vicitra-mārga, where vakrokti-vaicitrya prevails.14

In a similar way Daṇḍin says that on atiśayokti all the poetic figures depend, because it is the heightened expression that gives charm to human speech and idea. We have already mentioned that Bhāmaha defines atiśayokti as ‘nimittato vaco yattu lokātikrāntagocaram’ (Kāvyālaṅkāra, II,81). Daṇḍin paraphrases this as:

\[
\text{vivakṣā yā višeṣasya lokasimātivarttinī} \! \\
\text{asāvatiśayoktiḥ syādalaṅkārontamā yathā} \! \\
\text{(Kāvyādarśa, II,214)}
\]

It means that, when there is hyperbolic utkarṣokti i.e. statements surpassing natural limits (lokasimātivarttinī) of a particular subject on hand, there is the alaṅkāra called atiśayokti; it is one of the most excellent figures of speech (alaṅkārontamā) used by the poets. It would seem, therefore, that the atiśaya in the vakrata of poetic figures consists essentially in this lokātikrānta-gocaratā. Abhinavagupta makes this clear when in his locana of Kārikā III. 36 he explains Bhāmaha’s vakrata thus: šabdasya hi vakrata abhidheyasya ca vakratā lokottṛṇena rūpeṇavsthānānityayamevāsāvalaṅkārabhāvah; lokottarataiva cātiśayaḥ, tenatiśayoktiḥ sarvālaṅkārasāmānyam 15

According to Abhinavagupta, the ‘bent’ (vakra) form of a word or of a meaning (ukti) is its presentation in an unusual or striking form (lokottṛṇena rūpeṇa) and this constitutes the ornament of a figure of speech. Now hyperbole is precisely the property of being unusual or striking (lokottarata). Hence hyperbole is a common property of all figures of speech. These ideas of Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Abhinavagupta merely imply that the poet lifts ordinary speech to a poetic level by a heightening of idea and expression.

Since the alaṅkāravādīns considered embellished speech alone as poetic speech, alaṅkāras (embellished factors), in their opinion, were of prime importance in the evocation of poetic appeal. Whatever contributed to poetic
charm was brought within the fold of alaṅkāras and rasa was no exception to it. Rasa could be recognized as a factor contributing to aesthetic delight only by considering it as an alaṅkāra auxiliary and of secondary importance. Alaṅkāraṇavādins, therefore, conceived rasa as an embellishment of kāvyāśārīra. Consequently in Bhamahā, we find that the concept of rasa does not rise to the altitude to which it ascends later on. To him rasavat is a figure of speech. The presence of rasa is not essential in a poetry, but rasa can be expressed through some figures. When rasas like śṛṅgāra etc. are clearly manifested through words, it is called rasavat alaṅkāra. As an instance Bhāmaha quotes the following verse: The Devī, the receptacle of Dharma, arrived unobstructed.16 Where rasa is exhibited as subordinate there arises the alaṅkāra known as rasavat. Similarly, vyāṅgyārtha or dhvani is not, according to him, the life of poetry. It is, however, implied in some of the alaṅkāras, viz. vyajastuti, aprastuta praśaṅsā and samāsokti. That means, the suggested sense is but an accessory to the expressed sense. Thus Bhāmaha is not an abhavavadin (one who denies the existence of dhvani), but an antarbhāvavadin (one who includes the idea of dhvani in other elements of poetry).

Udbhata is a follower of Bhāmaha, who develops Bhāmaha’s doctrine in a clear and skillful manner. He wrote a commentary, Kāvyālaṅkāraṇavṛtti, on Bhāmaha’s Kāvyālaṅkāra. This work has been lost. Udbhata wrote his other work, Alaṅkāraṇasamgraha, in the latter half of the eighth century A.D. It deals with the treatment of forty-one poetic figures. In his treatment of figures Udbhata mostly follows Bhāmaha, enumerating the figures in the same order and even borrowing literally the definitions of a large number of them. Like Bhāmaha he also does not give any importance to the distinction between guṇa and alaṅkāra. Udbhata omits all mention of rīti which Bhāmaha had only referred to in passing. Regarding definitions and elaborations of individual figures, minor differences are noticeable. Again, it is Udbhata who for the first time in the history of poetics talks of vṛttis- (i) Paruśā, (ii) Upanāgariκā and (iii) Komalā. He is also more advanced in recognizing rasa and defining its place in the poetic figures, if not in poetry as a whole. He goes so far as using the technical terms bhāva and anubhāva, which cannot be traced in Bhāmaha. To Bharata’s eight rasas, he adds the ninth rasa ‘śānta’. Udbhata was the first of the literary critics to concern himself seriously with the concept of rasa. He was not prepared,
however, to make it the chief goal of poetry, as Ānandavardhana was to do. All the rasas were treated by him as subservient to alaṅkāras.

All this, however, means an advance, and not a deviation. Bhāmaha’s work was partly elaborated by Kuntaka (who is placed between the middle of the 10th and the middle of the 11th century). But Bhāmaha’s tradition was properly carried on by Udbhaṭa. To later writers, it is not Bhāmaha but Udbhaṭa who is the authoritative exponent of alaṅkāra system.

Rudrata flourished in the middle of the ninth century. Like his predecessors, he also declared that the combination of sound and sense constitute a kāvyā: nanu śabdārthau kāvyam (Kāvyālaṅkāra II.1). Although influenced considerably by the rasa doctrine, Rudrata belongs properly to the Alaṅkāra school. To the ninth rasa śānta as propounded by Udbhaṭa, he adds the tenth rasa preyaḥ (friendship). Though he recognizes rasa, his attitude towards it does not differ much from that of the other alaṅkāra-vadins. Rasa for him is not indispensible for the evaluation of poetry; it is, rather, an extraneous, optional entity that contributes to poetic worth. Like other alaṅkāra theorists, he considers rasa as an alaṅkāra, and devotes much attention to figures of speech in poetry. His work Kāvyālaṅkāra is named apparently after the works of Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa. Like other alaṅkāra vādins, he pays little attention to rīti. But whereas Danḍin accepts two rītis and Vāmana accepts three rītis, Rudraṭa recognizes the fourth rīti lātiyā. So he speaks of four rītis, viz., pāṇcālī, lātiyā, gauḍīyā and vaidarbhī. But he does not seem to be influenced by the followers of the rīti school. Nor does he define rīti in the manner in which his predecessors did it. He does not raise the topic of the guṇas at all. Rudraṭa’s discussion of rīti is attempted without any reference to guṇa. Rīti is determined on the basis of compounds in the writing, short or long. According to him, pāṇcālī is characterized by short, lātiyā by middling and gauḍīyā by long compound words.17 In vaidarbhī there is a complete absence of compounds.18 He prefers vaidarbhī in poetic composition. To Rudraṭa, compound is the only differentiating factor in poetic diction and hence it is related to sound only. Rīti is therefore called samāsavatī vṛtti of śabda.

Regarding the treatment of figures, Rudraṭa’s path deviates from the traditional one followed by Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa. To Udbhaṭa’s limited number of poetic figures, Rudraṭa adds nearly thirty more independent figures. He divides
figures on the basis of sound and sense, and subdivides them on a principle of his own.

Rudraṭa’s work is remarkable for its analysis and systematic classification of poetic figures, though “his direct contribution to the theory of Poetics cannot be valued too highly.” His contribution to aesthetics is not as noteworthy as his contribution to rhetoric.

SECTION 3: THE GUṆA-RĪTI SCHOOL

Rudraṭa is the last great exponent of the Alaṅkāra school. After him the school began to decline. The prominence given to alaṅkāra began to appear to be indiscreet in the eyes of some literary critics in course of time. They engaged themselves in search of a more internal property. Ultimately they traced the life breath of poesy in guṇa (excellence) and rīti (diction). The decline of the alaṅkāra system was perhaps hastened by the rise of the rīti doctrine.

Daṇḍin and Vāmana were the pioneers of the school which laid down that the life of poesy is rīti (diction) which itself really means the sumtotal of the guṇas (excellences). Thus in their hands alaṅkāras became the hand-maids of guṇas, just as still later both became the hand-maids of rasa, and yet later dhvani came to occupy the seat of supremacy.

Although Daṇḍin and Vāmana represent the rīti system, it was probably older in tradition than Bhāmaha himself. “It is probable that the Rīti school ... had an independent origin and history, and existed for a long time side by side with the sister schools ...”

Daṇḍin stands midway between the Alaṅkāra school of Bhāmaha and the Rīti school of Vāmana. Daṇḍin flourished perhaps in the first half of the 8th century. He is the author of Kāvyādarśa. To Daṇḍin poetry appears under the metaphor of a body of words characterized by an agreeable sense: śaṅkṣaṇaṁ tāvadīśṭārthavacchinnā padāvalī. According to him alaṅkāra is that property which beautifies poetry as ornaments do to the human body: kāvyasyoṣbhākarāṁ dharmānalaṅkārāṁ pracākṣate. So a poetic figure is an embellishing instrument which augments the charm of the poetic tissue. A good kāvyya should be embellished by these alaṅkāras. Since Daṇḍin recognizes the importance of poetic figures, many thinkers even associate his name with the
\textit{\textit{Alaṅkāra} school. But the fact is that like Bhāmaha he does not think \textit{alaṅkāra} to be the only essential quality of poetic creation. The essence of poetry lies in the realization of several literary excellences or the \textit{guṇas} (which are also designated as \textit{alaṅkāras} by him), which constitute the essence of poetic manners (\textit{mārgas}) or poetic dictons.}

Regarding the means of ornamentation of poetry, Daṇḍin appears to say that not only the \textit{alaṅkāras}, but the \textit{guṇas} as well constitute the essence of poetic manners (\textit{mārgas}) which beautify poetry. The distinctive feature of Daṇḍin’s work is that it lays emphasis on the mode of expression or diction in poetic composition. Daṇḍin calls it the ‘ways of speech’ (“\textit{girāṇi mārga}” \textsuperscript{23}), which is almost equivalent to \textit{ṛiti}. This places Daṇḍin in the \textit{ṛiti} school.

Poetry consists in correct arrangement of appropriate expressions of appropriate ideas, which is technically denoted by the term \textit{mārga} or \textit{ṛiti}. Since there are various modes of expression (\textit{vīctramārga}) prevalent in different parts of country, Daṇḍin recognizes two extreme and clearly distinguishable modes, namely \textit{vaidarbha} and \textit{gauḍīya}. Poetic excellences constitute their essence. Of these two types, Daṇḍin gives preference to the \textit{vaidarbha mārga}, for in it, ten \textit{guṇas} are harmonized which are essential in a good composition. They are tightness (\textit{śleṣa}), lucidity (\textit{prasāda}), evenness (\textit{samatā}), elegance (\textit{mādhurya}), absence of harshness (\textit{sukumāratā}), explicitness (\textit{arthavyakti}), elevation (\textit{udāratvam}), forcefulness (\textit{ojas}), agreeableness (\textit{kānti}) and metaphorical expression (\textit{samādhi}). Reverses of these ten \textit{guṇas} are generally found in \textit{gauḍīya-mārga}.\textsuperscript{24} According to Daṇḍin, some of the qualities belong to \textit{śabda} (word) only, some others belong to \textit{artha} (sense) only, and still some others belong to both these elements.

We enumerate here some of the \textit{guṇas} as described by Daṇḍin:

\textit{Prasāda : Prasāda} is the excellence which conveys a sense which is well-known (\textit{prasiddhārtha}) and easily comprehended (\textit{prātiśi-subhaga}). Too much strain required to arrive at a meaning spoils the charm of poetry. The illustration given by Daṇḍin is this: \textit{indor indīvara-dyuti lakṣma lakṣmīṁ tanoti}. It means, “The moon’s spot resembling the glow of a blue lotus increases its beauty.” Here the words \textit{indu, indīvara, lakṣmī} and \textit{lakṣma} are so well known that the expression conveys its sense without any effort. The \textit{gauḍas}, on the other hand, who aim at learned expressions, prefer even what is not
conventional (nātirūḍha). They appear to hold that poets can achieve distinction only when they have mastered etymologies and vocabularies and can use difficult words and round-about expressions, while the vaidarbhas aim at making their composition lucid and easily intelligible to every reader by the use of well-understood expressions.

Mādhurya: It consists in the establishment of rasa in the word and in the theme. Rasa, here, in Daṅḍin’s treatment, does not involve the technical sense in which it is used by the rasa and dhvani theorists; rather it should be taken in the non-technical sense of pleasing poetic flavour generally. Mādhurya involves vāg-rama and vastu-rama. Vāg-rama consists of repetition of sounds belonging to the same śruti (śrutiyanuprāsa). This is not alliteration consisting of repetition of the same or similar syllables, but it is the name given to the specific grouping of similar sounds (śruti-sāmya) which exists in letters belonging to the same sthāna or place of utterance and effort (e.g., kaṇṭha, tālu, danta, etc.) or homogenous letters. The example is: eśa rājā yadā lakṣmīṁ prāptavān brāhmaṇa-priyaḥ (Kāvyādarśa 1.53), where the use of s and r, y and l, t and d as well as p and b produces śrutiyanuprāsa. It involves an economy of effort in articulation, and thereby gives a special pleasure to the vaidarbhas, who avoid for fear of incurring monotony, mere varṇanuprāsa or the alliteration consisting of repetition of similar letters. The gaudas, however, are fond of varṇānuprāsa. The example given by Daṅḍin is the following:

cāru cāndramasam bhīru bimbam paśyaitad ambare I
manmano manmathākrāntam nirdayaṁ hantum udyatam II
(Kavayādarśa, 1.57)

Here the repetition of ca, ba, ma, and na in the words produce the desired alliteration. Here the gaudas take special care to see that too many syllable do not intervene the repetition of similar letters for that would destroy the immediateness of the effect.

Vastu rasa connotes the absence of coarseness and vulgarity (agrāmyatva).

Sukumarata: It consists in the absence of harshness due to the use of mostly soft syllables. The soft syllables must remain mixed up with slightly harsh ones and conjunct consonant here and there, and the total effect must be a certain elegance. The following is an example:
It consists of an admixture of *alppraṇa* syllables slightly with *mahāpraṇa* ones, as well as conjunct consonants, but the general effect is not harsh or inelegant. Wherever the *vaidarbhas* accept *sukumāraṭā* in which expressions consisting of unharsh vocables generally predominate, the *gauḍas* have an eye to a ‘glaring composition’, and consequently they do not mind if their poetry involves harsh vocables requiring much strain for pronouncing them. The example given here is this: *nyakṣeṇa kṣayitāḥ paṅṣah kṣatriyaṇāṁ kṣaṇāt* (*Kāvyādarśa*, 1.72). The verse consists of harsh vocables.

*Ojas:* It consists in the superabundance of compound words. Whereas the *gauḍas* are indiscriminately fond of long compounds, the *vaidarbhas* employ it with greater discretion and with certain restrictions, and admit them in verses only when they serve to afford charm without much strain.

Dāṇḍin uses the word ‘*alaṁkāra*’ in the general sense of that which beautifies poetry. Thus according to Dāṇḍin, *alaṁkāra* and *guna* stand on the same footing. Both are nothing but beautifying elements. What makes their difference is that poetic figures are *alaṁkāras* common to both the *mārgas* (śādhāraṇa), whereas *guna*s are *alaṁkāras* belonging exclusively to the *vaidarbha mārga*.

Among *alaṁkāras* Dāṇḍin attaches much importance to *arthālaṁkāras* (ideal figures) and mentions thirty-five poetic figures. He mentions thirty-two divisions of *upama* (simile). Like Bhāmaha he declares that *ātiśayokti* is essential in all poetic figures. He uses the term *vakrokti* as a collective name of all poetic figures other than *svabhāvokti*. Dāṇḍin’s view is here opposed to that of Bhāmaha. According to him, even such statements as “The sun has set; the moon shines; the birds return to their nest,” have their relevance when indicating time. If Bhāmaha had said that there is no figure without *vakrokti*, in Dāṇḍin’s scheme, the whole realm of poetic figures can be divided into two distinct groups: *svabhāvokti* and *vakrokti*. Not only this, he accords *svabhāvokti* the primary place (*ādyā alaṁkṛtiḥ*). In the case of *svabhāvokti* the poet, by his discernment, sees the essence of a thing and sets it out in plain and direct speech. It is opposed to all the rest of the poetic figures which are classed under
vakrokti – crooked, non-natural, figurative, artificial and ingenious description. Daṇḍin is almost unique among Indian rhetoricians in that he prefers a natural and simple description (svabhāvokti) to an artificial and figurative description (vakrokti).

Daṇḍin is aware of the existence of rasa, but to him it is only a poetic-figure called rasavat. Daṇḍin’s exposition of the figure of rasavat is representative of the view of the old ālāṅkārikas. Rasavat is where some of the nine rasas are found charming and intensified: rasavadrasapesalam (Kāvyādarśa, II.275). Rasa is manifested in this figure through vibhāva etc. The refined reader cognizes this manifestation and finds delight in it. Daṇḍin discusses with separate illustrations all the eight rasas (excluding śānta) constituting rasavat alāṅkāra. Out of these eight rasas, four (viz, śṛṅgāra, raudra, viรa and karuṇa) are explained in further detail. The respective sthāyībhāvas corresponding to these four rasas are given. The sthāyībhāva turns into rasa when it is intensified to the highest pitch. The intensification is through abundant nourishment (by factors such as vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyābhicārībhāvas). Thus he says that rati (love) turns into śṛṅgāra, when it is nourished with other elements (rūpabāhulya yogena). Krodha (anger) on reaching extreme height (param kōtiṁ āruhya) becomes raudra. Hence rasa is the effect of the combination of sthāyībhāvas with other factors, and the relationship between them is that of cause and effect. Abhinavagupta in his Abhinavabharati, commenting on Bharata’s rasa-sutra, gives this interpretation of the rasa-process as one of the three earlier interpretations of the same and quotes Daṇḍin to club him with Bhaṭṭa Lollata.

Daṇḍin thus had a clear grasp of the rasa-concept as known in his day, and was aware of its aesthetic relevances. However, the limits of the poetic theory he was adhering to precluded him from giving it a place other than that of an alāṅkāra.

From the point of view of the chronology and from that of the evolution of the conception of poetry, Vāmana comes next after Daṇḍin. Vāmana lived probably between the middle of the 8th and the middle of the 9th century. He attempts to improve upon the system of Daṇḍin. He develops fully and sets forth carefully what is vague and unsystematic in Daṇḍin. Vāmana is therefore regarded as the best representative of the rīti system. He is given the credit of
being the first writer on poetics, who, before Ānandavardhana, “gave us a well thought-out and carefully outlined scheme of Poetics, no longer naïve or tentative, which in spite of its theoretic defects, is in some respects unique and valuable.”

In the history of Sanskrit poetics, Vāmana, for the first time, talks of the soul of poetry as distinct from the body. He is the pioneer in the field of probing into the inner essence of poetry, and thus has left behind a stamp of individuality. He declares in his Kāvyālaṅkārasutra, “ṛitiṣṭā kāvyasya.” Ṛīti is the soul of poetry. Ṣabdārtha (word and sense) form its body. Ṛīti is a particular arrangement of words (vīśīṣṭā padaracanā ṛītiḥ) and this particularity is due to guṇa (viśeṣo guṇātma). Ṛīti depends on the way the guṇas are combined in a composition. The particular nature of the arrangements of words consists of a specific combination of guṇas and ṛīti is to be grasped through them. In addition to vaidarbhī and gauḍī types of diction, as recognized by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, Vāmana mentions a third type, called pāṃcālī. According to Vāmana, the names are geographical. They are due to the fact of particular excellence of diction being prevalent in the writings of particular countries.

The vaidarbhī style was associated with Vidarbha in the Deccan, the gauḍī style with Bengal. The third style fell aesthetically and geographically somewhere in between.

Like Bharata and Daṇḍin, Vāmana enumerates ten qualities (guṇas). He treats each of the excellences under two heads as śabda guṇa and artha guṇa. “Vāmana is the first writer to give a classification of Guṇa-s into those of śabda and those of artha.” Thus he really doubled the number of guṇas admitted by his predecessors.

We enumerate here some of the guṇas. As śabda guṇa, ojas is gāḍha-bandhatva or compactness of word-structure, by which is meant the cohesiveness due to the frequent use of conjunct consonants specially. For instance—‘vilulita-makarandā maṇjarī rātayanti.’ Here the compactness of structure due to conjunction of consonants like n and d, n and t, r and n is noticed. But in the illustration ‘vilulita-madhudhārā maṇjarī rātayanti,’ the conjunct consonants noted above are absent. Compactness of structure is lost in this illustration. As artha guṇa, ojas is boldness in the expression of ideas.
As śabda guṇa, prasāda is śaithilya or looseness of the word-structure. Prasāda as artha guṇa is clearness of meaning.

As śabda guṇa, mādhurya consists in the distinctness of the words, associated with the exclusion of long compounds. The illustration is – ‘Astyuttarasyāṁ diśī devatātmā himālayo nāma nagādhīrājaḥ.’ Its opposite is illustrated in “calitaśavarasenāddattagosṛṅgaçaṇḍa-dhvanigakitavārāhavyākula vindhya-pādāḥ,” which contains long and cumbrous compounds. Mādhurya as arthaguṇa is strikingness of the utterance.

As śabda guṇa, saukumārya is ajaraṁhatva or freedom from harshness in the word structure. This harshness generally arises from the use of paruṣa or harsh syllables and conjunct consonants. Here Vāmana does not differ essentially from Daṇḍin. The illustration of saukumārya is – ‘Astyuttarasyāṁ diśī’ etc.

As arthaguṇa, saukumārya is apāṛuṣyaṁ, or avoidance of statements that convey disagreeable or inauspicious ideas. For instance; the use of ‘yasahśesam gatam’ instead of ‘mṛtam’, or of ‘devatādvitiyam’ in place of ‘ekākinam’.

According to Vāmana, the best poetry is that which possesses all of the qualities. That is why he enjoins that the vaidarbi style should be followed. For it unifies all the qualities. He rejects the other two, namely gaudī and pāñcālī, because they have only a few of the said qualities. Gaugī abounds in ojas and kāntī, while pāñcālī is endowed with mādhurya and saukumārya. As gauğī rīti abounds in compounds and harsh words on account of the absence of mādhurya and saukumārya in it, pāñcālī is devoid of compounds and harsh words, on account of the absence of ojas and kāntī.

Vāmana takes a similar attitude towards the rasas as Daṇḍin. They both give a small place to them in their works, but there is an essential difference. Following Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin brings the rasas under the alaṅkāras. Vāmana, on the other hand, treats them as the essential features of the arthaguṇa ‘kāntī’. Since this guṇa is admissible in all rītis, and is essential to poetry, rasa by being brought in it is admitted as one of the essentials of poetry. Vāmana’s arthaguṇa kānti corresponds to figures like rasavat of the alaṅkāra system. Kānti is radiant rasa: diptarasatvam kāntiḥ (Kāvyālaṅkārasutra, III.II.15). Kānti consists in having the various rasas well delineated. Rīti system thus assigns to some of the guṇas the functions which other systems assign them to alaṅkāras.
Vāmana’s arthaguṇa and arthavyakti is nothing more than the svabhāvokti of Daṇḍin.

Vāmana emphasizes the importance of alaṅkāras next to that of the guṇas. Alaṅkāras have ‘subsidiary importance.’ Vāmana declares that poetry is acceptable because of embellishment (kāvyam grāhyam alaṅkāratā 36). He uses the term alaṅkāra not in the specific sense of poetic figures only, he takes it in a broader sense to mean poetic beauty (saundaryamalaṅkāraḥ 37). Guṇas are the causes of poetic charm (kāvyāsobhāyāḥ kartāro dharma 38) — a function which is assigned to both guṇas and alaṅkāras by Daṇḍin — while alaṅkāras are the heighteners of such charm (tadatiśayahetavaḥ 39). “The Rīti and its constituent Guṇas come in as a sine qua non in the production of this beauty, but the poetic figures only contribute to its heightening.”40 So while Bhāmaha is indifferent to guṇa, Daṇḍin restricts its scope to a particular type of diction, and Vāmana, for the first time, makes a clear distinction between the concepts of guṇa and alaṅkāra. He conceives poetry not on the analogy of a beautifully decorated lady, who though beautiful, would not look to be so in the absence of ornaments, as Bhāmaha has done. For, according to the latter, the poetic embellishments on the body of poetry have the same importance as have the ornaments on that of a beautiful lady. According to Vāmana, poetry is like a picture. And the comparative importance of the embellishments and the qualities in it is the same as that of paints and lines respectively in a picture. Just as the beauty of a picture depends upon the lines of which the sketch is made, and paints simply enhance it, so the beauty of the poetic production depends upon the poetic qualities, which are the essentials of the style, and the poetic embellishments simply enhance it. So guṇas are essential qualities of poetic art while alaṅkāras, in their restricted sense, are non-essential requirements. The guṇas are said to be nitya (permanent) dharma, the alaṅkāras are anitya dharma, for there can be charm of poetry without alaṅkāras but no charm without the guṇas (tairvinā kāvyāsobhānupapateḥ 41). The guṇas reside in poetry in samavāya relation, samavāya implying inseparable connexion or inherence (nitya sambhandha), and alaṅkāras stand to poetry in saṃyoga-relation, saṃyoga being explained as mere conjunction. Thus Vāmana’s view is that guṇa is related to the ‘soul’ of poetry (viz. rīti), whereas alaṅkāra rests merely on the body of poetry, i.e., sabdārtha (word and sense). “The Alaṅkāra without the Guṇa, cannot of itself
produce the beauty of a poem, but the latter can do so without the former.”

Vāmana treats only thirty figures of speech. He describes only two śabdālaṅkāras, viz, yanma (rhyme) and anuprāsa (alliteration). According to him, upamā (simile) is the basis of all poetic figures. He defines all poetic figures with reference to the idea of comparison, or in terms of the relation of the upamāṇa and upameya. He divides the whole range of aṅkāras into two broad types: upamā (simile) and upamā-prapañca (figures based upon simile). According to him, simile is the mainstay of poets.

The rīti teachings mark a great advance on the aṅkāra doctrine. The Rīti school seems to have first suggested and started the enquiry as to what constitutes the essential element of poetry. Ānandavardhana pays an indirect compliment to the Rīti school for having first perceived, though dimly, the true nature of poetry, although he does not agree with its peculiar theory of rīti. The Rīti school also goes a step further than the Alaṅkāra school in including rasa among the necessary characteristics (in kānti as an artha-guṇa).

However we have seen that till this stage, rasa has not been treated as a sovereign concept, though it was certainly not unknown. Bhāmaha laid down that a mahākāvyya should portray all the rasas. Daṇḍin also said so. But rasa was not regarded as the very soul of poetry. Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin considered it as one of the figures of speech (viz. rasavat). Daṇḍin knew rasa and bhāva but regarded them as elements of aṅkāra. Vāmana defined kānti guṇa (brightness) as dipta-rasatva (having glowing rasa). Udbhaṭa referred to Bharata’s eight rasas and added to it another rasa namely śānta rasa. But he treated rasa from the standpoint of its being an element in the aṅkāra called rasavat. Rudrata added to the above said nine rasas a tenth, viz, preyas. But in all these writers we have no indication of their realization of rasa as the innermost essence of poetry. They were more busy with the formal point of view, the external aspects of style and trope than with the emotional and aesthetic content of poetry.

SECTION 4: THE RASA-DHVANI SCHOOL

The later development of aesthetic doctrine was in the direction of more penetrating principles, which were rasa and dhvani. Both Indian aesthetics and Indian metaphysics progressed towards the innermost core of being. It reached
the doctrine of *rasa* in the former and the doctrine of *ātman* in the latter. The later history of aesthetics in India is only the history of the exposition of the doctrine of *rasa* and *dhvani* and of the working out of the nature of aesthetic beauty from within.

The older writers, who laid emphasis on *alalhikāra* or *riti*, were cognisant of that aesthetic delectableness which must be present in all poetry, which is *rasa*. But they could not harmonize it well with their theory of externals and treated it more or less as an embellishment of the language. They could recognize *rasa* only in the way of treating it more or less as an embellishment of language. It is partly for this reason that Ānandavardhana condemns earlier theories as crude and insufficient for the purpose of explaining the nature of poetry.

The *rasa*-doctrine sprang up chiefly in connexion with dramaturgy. As we have already pointed out, the concept of *rasa* as an ulterior aesthetic principle with regard to dramatic art was originally formulated by Bharata. There can be no sense of a work of art without *rasa*, says Bharata (*na hi raśādṛte kaścidarthath pravartate*).

To this concept of *rasa*, the *Dhvani* school gave an added grace by the concept of *dhvani*. The doctrine of *dhvani* was expounded by Ānandavardhana in his *Dhvanyāloka* in the middle of the ninth century A.D. and was further elaborated by Abhinavagupta, who is placed at the last quarter of the 10th and the first quarter of the 11th century. Abhinavagupta wrote his *Locana* commentary on *Dhvanyāloka*. His *Abhinavabhāratī* yet throws new light on the concept of *rasa-dhvani*. In his *Dhvanyāloka*, Ānandavardhana reached certain conclusions which have been accepted, with rare exceptions, by all later Indian aesthetic thinkers. They found in the theories of *rasa* and *dhvani* about poetic beauty the depth of metaphysics but for which Indian aesthetics could hardly be incorporated in systematic philosophy. Indeed, Abhinavagupta was himself a philosopher of the highest order. He propounded *Śaivadarśana* which is generally perceived as a variant of the *Vedānta darśana*. Also is implied in Ānandavardhana’s theory of *dhvani* the theory of universal consciousness, truth, beauty and goodness being the three facets of that supreme reality. Aesthetic delight, Ānandavardhana will explain, is the joy of self-realization which is nothing other than the realization of *Brahma-caitanya* i.e., universal
consciousness. With these few words by way of a prelude we may proceed to discuss the theory of poetic beauty as explained by Anandavardhana and as further developed and illustrated by Abhinavagupta in their details in the following chapter.
REFERENCES:

2. Ibid., page 5.
3. Ibid., Volume II, Chapter II page 33, foot note.
4. Ibid., page 36, foot note.
5. Ibid.
7. *gauḍīyamidametattu vaidarbhamiti kiṁ pṛthak* I
   —*Kāvyālaṅkāra*, I.32.
8. *śravyaṁ nātisamastārtha kāyaṁ madhuramiṣyate* I
   āvidvadaṅganāvaḷapratīṭārtha prasādavat II
   —*Kāvyālaṅkāra*, II.3.
9. *kecidojo’bhidhītsantaḥ samasyanti vahunyapi* I
   —*Kāvyālaṅkāra*, II.2.
11. *nimittato vaco yattu lokātikrāntagocaram* I
    manyante ’tisayoktiṁ nāmalaṅkāratayā yatha II
    —*Kāvyālaṅkāra*, II.81.
12. *saiśā sarvaiva vakroktirantarho vibhāvyate* I
    yatno ’syāṁ kavinā kāryaḥ ko ’laṅkāro’nayā vinā II
    —*Kāvyālaṅkāra*, II.85.
13. *gato ’stamarko bhātīnduryānti vāśaya paksiṇaḥ* I
    ityevamādi kiṁ kāyaṁ vārtāmenāṁ pracakṣate II
    —*Kāvyālaṅkāra*, II.87.
16. *rasavaddarśitaspaṭaśṛṅgārādirasaṁ yathā īy\[\text{devī samāga}\text{nd̄haṃ māmāsakarīṇya}\text{ṭirohitā ām}]

—Kāvyālaṅkāra, III.6.

17. *dvitripadā pāncāli lātiyā paṅca sapta vā yāvat īy\[\text{śabdāḥ samāsavanto bhavati yathāśakti gauḍīyā īy}]

—Kāvyālaṅkāra of Rudrāta, II.5.

18. *vṛtt eradāsamāsāyā vaidarbhi rītirekaiva. (Kāvyālaṅkāra of Rudrāta, II.6).


22. Ibid., II.1.

23. Ibid., I.40.

24. iti vaidarbhamārgasya prāpāḥ daśagunāḥ smṛtāḥ īy\[\text{eśāṁ viparyyayāḥ prāyo dṛśyate gauḍavartmanī īy}]

—Kāvyādarśa, I.42.

25. prāk prītidadṛśita seyaṁ ratiḥ śṛṅgāratāṁ gataḥ īy\[\text{rūpabāhulyayogenā taddaṁ rasavadvacaḥ īy}]

—Kāvyādarśa, II.281.

26. ityāruhya parāṁ kotiṁ krodho raudrātmataṁ gataḥ īy

—Kāvyādarśa, II.283.


29. Ibid., I.II.7.

30. Ibid., I.II.8.

31. vidarbhādiśu dṛṣṭatvāt tatsamākhyā.

— Ibid., I.II.10.


33. samagramuṅgā vaidarbhi.

—Kāvyālaṅkārasutra, I.II.11.

tāsāṁ purvā grāhyā guṇasākalyāt.

—Ibid., I.II.14.
34. ojaḥ kāntimāti gauḍīyā. —Ibid., I.II.12.

35. mādhuryasaukumāryopapannā pāṇcālī. —Ibid., I.II.13.

36. Ibid., I.I.1.
37. Ibid., I.I.2.
38. Ibid., III.I.1.
39. Ibid., III.I.2.


42. Sushil Kumar Dey, op.cit., Vol.II, Chapter III, page 100.
CHAPTER II:

THE THEORY OF DHVANI AS DEVELOPED BY ANANDAVARDHANA AND AS FURTHER DEVELOPED BY ABHINAVAGUPTA
SECTION 1. ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF DHVANI

At the very outset of the treatise Dhvanyāloka, Ānandavardhana denies any credit for himself for having laid down an original theory. The dhvani theory, which he is going to put forward in the Dhvanyāloka, is not being propounded for the first time. In the very first Kārikā of the Dhvanyāloka, it is stated: “Kāvyasyātmā dhvanirittī buddhairyāḥ samāmnātapūrvaḥ.” The author here asserts that the idea of dhvani as constituting the soul of poetry is an ancient one, and that it was designated by learned men. The word ‘samāmnātapūrvaḥ’ does not mean ‘elaborately treated in books’, for there is not a single reference to such books in the whole range of Sanskrit criticism. Abhinavagupta brings out the significance of the expression samāmnātapūrvaḥ thus: “paramparayeti / avicchinnena pravāheṇa taretaduktāṁ vinā’pi viśiṣṭapatustakeṣu viniveśanādityabhiprāyaḥ I”¹. It means that the dhvani theory has been orally handed down in learned circles with an unbroken tradition, though unrecorded in books. The plural number in the word ‘budhaiḥ’ signifies that the claimed acceptability of the theory is not simply based upon the affirmation of a stray critic, rather its importance is proved by the consensus of opinion prevailing amongst a famous circle of cultured critics. Moreover, the upasarga ‘sāṁ’ in ‘samāmnātapurvaḥ’ may be taken to mean ‘samyak’ meaning ‘well’, ‘with great interest’. Had the theory of dhvani been incredible, scholars of repute would not teach it with so much interest.²

These learned critics of the past were well versed in the principle of literary appreciation, as it appears from the Vṛttī ‘budhaiḥ kāvyatattvavidbhīḥ’ etc.³. However, the ancient writers on rhetoric (kāvyā-lakṣaṇavidhāyi) stuck to the conventional categories and ignored the doctrine of dhvani. To supply this want in the standard works on rhetoric was one of the objects with which the Dhvanyāloka was written.

Thus the dhvani theory was not thrown into the field of Sanskrit literary criticism all of a sudden. It was very much in vogue in a famous circle of cultured critics and though it was never committed to writings, it was being traditionally handed down as a valuable treasure from generation to generation. In the Dhvanyāloka, we have the following Kārikā:
The word ‘sūri’ here alludes to the sahādayas who spoke of dhvani for the first time. The Vṛtti says “sūriḥ kathitāḥ itī vidvadupajñeyamuktiḥ, na tu yathākathaṅcitpravṛttīte pratiṇādyate.” This means, “The expression “is designated by the learned” brings out the fact that this designation was first devised by the learned and that it has not gained currency in a haphazard fashion.”

These literary critics felt that the underlying principle of poetry, the element of aesthetic appeal, could not be attributed to formal and external aspects of poetry, like alaṅkāra and guṇa. It is something more fundamental and intrinsic. Although it can be cognized through the means of words and their meanings in poetry, still it was something outtopping them, endowing them with a new lease of life. A word can give rise to a meaning altogether different from conventional one which is the source of all aesthetic delight. In order to obtain credibility for their theory, these literary critics sought the protection of the grammarians’ authority. The word ‘sūri’ might also be taken to hint it out. The Vṛtti states; “prathame hi vidvāṃso vaiyākaraṇāḥ, vyākaraṇamūlatvātsarvavidyānām I” The grammarians were considered to be the foremost among the learners because grammar lies at the root of all studies. These critics, therefore, looked forward to logic and grammar for light and guidance. They took their cue from the mystical principle of sphoṭa of the grammarians and developed the idea of dhvani by analogy.

According to the grammarians, the individual letters which make a word are inadequate to explain the word-import or the sense that the word conveys. They ask: Does each of the letters of a word or do all of them together produce the sense of the word? If each of the letters produces the sense, then one will be enough and the remaining letters are useless. Neither all of them together or the ‘samudāya’ can produce it, because all sounds according to Nyāya philosophy last only for two moments (śabdajñānakarmanāṃdvikṣaṇāvasthāyitvan) and when there is the experience of the last letter of the word, the letters uttered prior to it disappear, and so there is no samudāya. Then what does a word signify? The grammarians argue that we have to postulate the existence of another entity called sphoṭa or eternal
(nitya) and indivisible (avibhāga) word. The sounds that are produced through the contact of our sense organs are by themselves momentary and isolated, but they serve to suggest the eternal word (sphoṭa), which is one and indivisible (akhaṇḍa) sound-unit and cannot further be analyzed into constituent sound-units, and which in its turn reveals the meaning. The sphoṭa, again, is not indiscriminately suggested by the several letters, but by the last only as conditioned by a sequential mental impression of the previous letters (pūrvapūrvavarṇanubhāvatāsāmśkasāрасacīvena antyavarṇanubhāvena abhivyajyate sphoṭaḥ). The grammarians refer to the momentary empirical sounds, that are suggestive of eternal sphoṭa which alone is significant and expressive, as dhvani (dhvanātiiddhvanīḥ). For example, the word ‘gauḥ’ is comprised of three letters or sounds or dhvanis, viz., ‘ga’, ‘au’ and ‘visarga’. Each of these dhvanis suggests the sphoṭa of the word as a whole. Each of the three dhvanis is a ‘vyāñjaka’ (suggestor) of ‘gopadasphoṭa’, and ‘gopadasphoṭa’ is vyāṅgya (suggested). This sphoṭa which is of a unified character gives rise to the meaning or ‘artha’, viz., the ideal of an animal possessing dewlap, hump, hoofs and horns. Though sphoṭa is suggested by every letter successively, it is not completely grasped till it is finally suggested by the last letter. Sphoṭa becomes clear and significant only when it is suggested finally by the utterance of the last letter, viz., the visarga of the word. The real nature of all the letters is grasped only at this stage, when one has the awareness of the sphoṭa as suggested by the last letter.

Just as the grammarians applied the term dhvani to the momentary sounds pronounced by our speech organs that manifest the sound-essence or the eternal sphoṭa, the literary critics also used the term dhvani to signify words and the expressed sense that severally and jointly suggest the unexpressed (pratiyamānārtha).

Secondly, an alternative explanation of sphoṭa, which subscribes to the wave theory of sound, holds that the first origination of sound due to contact and separation of the internal air with the various organs of speech production is called sphoṭa; the subsequent sounds given rise to by the original sound are called dhvanis. In this whole series of sounds, the last sound alone is clearly perceptible. The wave theory of sound asserts that the first sound produces a second sound, this second sound gives rise to a third one, and so on; and this
process continues till such a time the last sound reaches the cavity of our auditory organ. The initial sphaṭa may be compared to the first ringing sound of a bell, and the other series of sounds produced later on to the prolonged resonance of the first ring. Such numberless sounds emanating from sphaṭa are also termed dhvani. Dhvani in this sense is not vyaṅjaka of sphaṭa. It is a vyaṅgya. Similarly the ālaṅkārikas or the rhetoricians applied the term dhvani to mean suggested sense. As dhvani, in the grammatical context, signifies the subsequent sound appearing after the original sound, so also the term ‘dhvani’ in the context of literary criticism was used to convey the idea of the implicit, the comprehension of which occurs after the apprehension of the expressed.

Thirdly, Abhinavagupta refers to the theory of the science of language which holds that there are two categories of sound, the natural and the unnatural (prākṛta and vaikṛta). The term ‘dhvani’ has been employed to convey both of them. The prākṛta dhvani refers to the sound which is sufficient to reveal the eternal sound essence (sphaṭa). Vaikṛta dhvani, which has no contribution towards revelation of sphaṭa, makes only the sounds felt as long and short, soft or harsh, quick and slow, and so on. Thus an effort that is required in excess to that which is absolutely necessary for revelation of the eternal sound-unit in order to procure harsh or sweet, quick or slow, sounds, is dhvani. Similarly, in the view of the ālaṅkārika (rhetorician) also, a function that is required in addition to the three well known functions of Denotation, Indication and Purport to bring into comprehension the unexpressed content of poetry is dhvani.

Thus the term ‘dhvani’ which was found to be used by the grammarians in a threefold sense was borrowed by the ālaṅkārikas and they applied it to all factors of suggestiveness in poetry viz., the suggester (whether word or sense), the suggested meaning and the process of suggestion. It follows from this that the word “dhvani” can be employed in the following ways:

1. Dhvanatiṁ dhvaniḥ :- That which suggests – the words and the sense.
2. Dhvanyata iti dhvaniḥ :- That which is suggested – the sense.
3. Dhvananaṁ dhvaniḥ :- The process of suggestion.
4. Dhvanisamudāyaḥ dhvaniḥ kāvyam :- The whole, viz., work of literature, formed out of these elements of dhvani.
However, the similarity existing between the vaiyākaraṇa (grammarian) conception of dhvani and the conception of dhvani as elaborated in alaṅkāra śāstra (rhetorics) is only external and not genuine. Intrinsically the two theories have scarcely any mutual connexion. What the ālaṅkārikas really wanted was an authority for their assumption of the power vyañjanā, and the theory of sphoṭa of the grammarians, which holds that the varṇas of a word reveal the ideal word, afforded an analogy which could at least boast of the authority of the vaiyākaraṇas, the prathame vidvāṃsaḥ. As far as dhvani is concerned, Ānandavardhana employed that much which was useful for his purpose – the rest of the grammarians’ proposition he discarded altogether. Only the nomenclature and the manner of operation (process) were adopted. The theory, its principles and the method of approach were as original and fresh as those of Pāṇini in vyākaraṇa (grammar). Suggestion or dhvani in poetry is poles apart from the dhvani in grammar; so much so, that the early grammarians did not even grant vyañjanā vṛtti as a separate function.

SECTION 2: THE POWER OF VYAÑJANĀ

Before the theory of dhvani was established, three powers of words were admitted. They were the abhidhāsakti, the tātparyaśakti and the lakṣanāśakti. The terms vṛtti and vyāpāra were also used as synonymous for the term śakti.

The power of abhidhā:

Abhidhā or the function of denotation or expression is that function by which the word gives the conventional significance (saṁketa artha), or the primary meaning. The word here becomes vācaka, and the sense is termed as vācyārtha. Abhidhā conveys to the understanding the meaning attached to the word by convention, the core meaning with which the word always has been identified. Thus, for example, the word ‘gauḥ’ by abhidhāvyāpāra means sāsnādimat-paśuviśeṣa or an entity having a dew-lap, horns etc. This convention (saṁketa) consists in particular word conveying a particular meaning. This conventional or the saṁketa artha is gathered directly by observing what takes place in the world (vyavahāra) and, hence, is called the mukhyārtha or the principle meaning of the word. Quite naturally, abhidhāsakti is also called mukhya-śakti of a word.
The power of tātparya:

Abhidhā and lakṣaṇā are the functions of words taken separately. The meaning of the sentence as a whole is conveyed neither by the abhidhā, nor by lakṣaṇā, but by a separate power of the sentence called tātparya. The meaning of the sentence is thus termed as tātparyārtha. The tātparyāsakti is that power which assimilates the sense gathered by abhidhā and gives a new sense (abhinavārtha) which is not just an assimilation of vācyārtha (i.e., not yogamātra), but is something unique (apadārtho 'pi vākyārthaḥ). The votaries of tātparyavṛtti are called abhihitanvayavādins. Abhihitanvayavāda means that anvaya or correlation between the meanings as expressed by words through their respective conventions is what constitutes the significance of a vākya. Individual words give rise to individual sense. There exists a connection which is not expressed by words but by a special function based on compatibility, expectancy and proximity. This propositional import is not the collective meaning of the words in a sentence. It is something more than the mere sumtotal of the significations of component parts. This function pertains to the sentence as a whole, and neither to the isolated terms nor to isolated concepts. Compatibility means the absence of absurdity in the mutual associations of the things signified by the words. For example, the sentence “Sprinkle with fire” (vanhīna śiṅcati) seems to be entirely absurd, ‘fire’ being incompatible with ‘sprinkling’. Expectancy means that there should not be the absence of the completion of the sense. If a person utters the word ‘aśva’, the listener will desire to know “what about the horse?” But if it is said that ‘aśva dhāvati’, the desire to know will be satiated. Proximity means the nearness of words in a sentence in the absence of which the combination of padas (terms) cannot produce sense. If we utter “Devadatta” just now and “goes home” after period of an hour, the words will fail to produce a correct judgement. Each of these is an essential causal factor towards cognition of the import of a proposition.

So the individual words when taken together make up the sentence meaning, the “purport” of the sentence (tātparyam), which conveys the mutual relationship of each word with the adjacent words thus expressing the entire and complete intention.
The power of lakṣaṇa:

Lakṣaṇa or the power of indication is that function of a word which brings into comprehension a meaning, connected with the primary one. The word that gives the secondary sense is called lākṣaṇika, the sense, lakṣyārtha, and the function, lakṣaṇa. Because of its secondary character, lakṣaṇa also was given the names gauṇī-प्रत्यय, upacāra, āropa and bhakti. This function starts to operate relying either on usage (ruḍhī) or on some motive (prayojana) when the primary meaning signified through the function of denotation becomes incompatible with the rest of the sentence. From this definition, it follows that there are three conditions which are essential for operation of lakṣaṇa. They are (i) the vācyārtha must be inapplicable (mukhyārthabādha) (ii) the lakṣyārtha must be such as is connected with the vācyārtha (mukhyārthayoga or tadyoga) and (iii) the lakṣaṇa must be promulgated by some popular usage (ruḍhī) or a definite motive (prayojana).

To take an example. Consider the expression, “The impetuous Kāliṅga” (Kāliṅga sāhasīka). Here the word ‘Kāliṅga’, if taken in its own sense — such as that of a particular country on the Coromandal Coast, is incompatible with the epithet ‘impetuous’. Now the second power by which the word ‘Kāliṅga’ causes one to think of not the country that the word denotes naturally by its power of abhidhā, but the men connected therewith, is the power of indication or lakṣaṇa. The reason why the word denoting the region of Kāliṅga has the power of indicating the inhabitants of that region is usage (ruḍhī) — it is familiarly known that the name of the region is employed to signify its inhabitants. Here the relation linking the primary meaning (mukhyārtha or vācyārtha) with the secondary (lakṣyārtha) one is that of container and the contained.

To consider another expression, “A herd-station on the Ganges” (Gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ). Here the word ‘Ganges’ naturally denotes by its power of abidhā a river, i.e., a mass of water, and, as such, is incompatible (bādhita) with the matter in question, viz., the actual site of the station of herdsmen. Thus the plain tātparya of the sentence fails. The herdsmen could not have built the huts of which the herd-station consists on the surface of the mass of water. Now the second power by which the word “Ganges” causes one to think of something connected with itself by the relation of proximity etc., such as the river’s bank, is the power of indication or lakṣaṇa. Here the reason why the word “Ganges” has
the power of indicating the bank of the Ganges is the motive — it causes one to think of the extreme coolness and purity pertaining to the Ganges itself, which would not have been thought of from the exposition of the same matter in the shape of the expression “A herd-station on the bank of the Ganges.”

Some ālaṅkārikas like Mammata point out that the power really belongs to the vācyārtha (ārtha-vyāpāra), though it is attributed to words and is thus an āropita sabdavyāpāra. Thus in the instance ‘Gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ’ the lakṣyārtha of Gangātata is conveyed by the vācyārtha, viz, Gaṅgāpravāha, and not by the word ‘Gaṅgā’. The idea is that the power of the word (śabda) ‘Gaṅgā’ becomes exhausted after giving the abhidhārtha (vācyārtha) ‘Gaṅgāpravāha’ and as such cannot convey the lakṣyārtha viz. Gaṅgātata.

The power of indication functions only as much is needed for producing the sentential sense and stops. This function can be compared to a worker who makes a contract to perform a specified piece of work and slips away as soon as it is over. As it follows the denotative function, and functions only when the denotative function fails and only up to a certain extent, it is called the tail of denotation.\(^\text{12}\)

\[\text{The power of vyañjanā :}\]

Almost all ālaṅkārikas prior to Ānandavardhana held that words denote primarily a conventional meaning and secondarily an indicated one. Ānandavardhana endeavoured to prove that words have not only their primary or denotative (abhidhā) and secondary or indicative (lakṣaṇā) sense, but also have suggested sense or dhvani. The Dhvani school pointed out that the richness of poetry was not so much due to the direct import of words that actually lie on the surface, but due to the deeper suggested sense. The Dhvanyāloka says that in poetry there is something which is beyond the expressed sense and it is this that is the true essence of poetry — “kāvyasyātmā sa evārtha”.\(^\text{13}\) For the realization of this implied, or the pratīyamānārtha or vyaṅgyārtha, i.e., the suggested sense, the writers on ālaṅkāra have established a separate function or vṛtti of a word, which is termed as vyañjanavrētī, and which is not identical with either abhidhā or lakṣaṇā. All good poetry contain words and senses which are charged with a powerful hidden meaning, ‘a deeper sense’, which can only be revealed by the vyañjanavrētī or power of suggestion.
When the three well known functions of abhidha, lakṣaṇā and tālparya cease to operate after having done their respective duties, that function of a word or its sense by which a further meaning is caused to be thought of, is what is termed as suggestion (vyāñjanā). When in such an expression as “A herd station on the Ganges”, the power of denotation has desisted after causing one to think of such an object as a mass of water which the word “Ganges” denotes, and thereto the subsequent power of indication has desisted after causing one to think of such an object as the bank, then that power by which such a thing as the excess of coolness and purity – the motive for employing the particular form of expression – is caused to be thought of, is the power called suggestion. As has already been explained, the speaker uses the word “Ganges” instead of “the bank of the Ganges” due to the fact that this idea of coolness and sanctity of the herd station is delightful when suggested from “A herd-station on the Ganges” which is not so when understood expressly from “A herd-station on the bank of the Ganges is very cool and holy”. This is because “in getting at the idea there is in the former a peculiar exercise to the mind which only an intellectual man can take, and it delights him, while in the latter this is totally absent”. It is the same in the case of “As soon as it saw its mother, the child’s face bloomed.” Here the literal sense of the expression ‘the face bloomed’ is incongruous, because blooming is the activity of a flower. Hence the indicative sense (lakṣyārtha) “As a flower blooms and expands, the face expanded” comes to the fore.

Now there is an advantage in resorting to the indicative mode instead of conveying a meaning literally. When we listen to the original statement, there arises the idea that the face of the child, like a bloomed flower, expanded in extreme joy, happiness, elation. If it had been stated, “As a flower blooms and expands, the face of the child expanded as soon as it saw its mother”, it is doubtful whether this idea of ‘extreme joy’ would have occurred to us. The great advantage derived because of taking recourse to indication and not stating it literally cannot be summarized in words. It can only be felt. “The advantage emerging from “bloomed” is not perceptible to the denotative or indicative function. The child’s happiness, joy, elation – all these are presented to the consciousness by the word’s suggestive function.” It is this advantage which is the suggested sense here.
When words are used in their secondary meanings through convention or usage, neither the speakers nor the listeners generally have any advantage in view. The discussion of such conventional indication and also indication of slight usefulness is not important in poetry. When an indicative mode is taken recourse to by a poet, immense advantages are perceived which chiefly attract our minds. It is here that the suggestive function is clearly seen.

Ānandavardhana’s entire theory rests on the recognition of this new function of words called vyañjanā. Poeticians apply the word dhvani to this function of vyañjanā which is over and above the well known functions of denotation, sentence meaning and secondary usage.16

SECTION 3: THE THEORY OF DHVANI

In the opening Karīka of the Dhvanyāloka, Ānandavardhana states that dhvani is the soul of poetry: “kāvyasyātmā dhvaniḥ”. Ṣabda, artha, rīti, guṇa, alaṅkāra etc. are on the level of śarīra, but dhvani, the ātman of kāvya, is on a different level. It is not the external structure of kāvya. Dhvani is that which makes the kāvyāśarīra live. Dhvani is present in and through the kāvyāśarīra and is manifested through the limbs of its śarīra. The charm and significance of kāvya is really due to this ātman, though it is at times attributed to the body as a whole or its individual parts. The kāvyāśarīra is admired and appreciated not for the sake of the śarīra but for the sake of ātman, just as in Indian metaphysics, the ātman is regarded as the end in itself and everything else is for the sake of the ātman. Thus in the Third Uddyota Ānandavardhana says, “sarvathā nāsteyeva saḥdayahṛdayahāriṇāh kāvyasya sa prakāro yatra na pratīyamānārthesāmśparśena saubhāgyam I tadidāṁ kāvyarahasyaṁ paramiṁ sūribhirbhāvanīyam I”17 It means, “Certainly, there is not a single variety of poetry holding out an appeal to the heart of cultured critics which does not attain artistic excellence by the slightest touch of Suggested sense. The learned should deem this as the greatest secret of Poetry.” 18

In Karīka 1.2, Ānandavardhana states that the most important element in poetry is its meaning which has two aspects: vācyā (the expressed) and pratīyamāna (the implied or suggested). Vācyā is that dimension wherein the primary and the secondary orders of meaning are at work. So Ānandavardhana includes in vācyā all types of denotative and designative meanings: abhidhā,
lakṣaṇā etc. The implied or the *pratīyamāna* is what is evoked through vācyā. The quintessence of the works of all first-rate poets is this implied meaning, which is also the most beautiful element in a work of poetry.\(^{19}\) It does not catch the eye of the critic as readily as the vācyārtha does. However, critics of culture are certainly alive to this primary presence in literary works like the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*.\(^{20}\)

The beauty of the suggested sense is not identical with the beauty of its components, but something over and above it. Just as charm in ladies famous for beauty exceeds the beauty of all the individual parts observed separately, and delights the eyes of the passionate onlooker in a most unique fashion like the veritable nectar of Gods, so also the implied meaning shines out supreme and towers above the beauty of the well-known outer parts:

\[
pratīyamānaṁ punaranyadeva vastvasti vāṇiṣu mahākāvinām
\]

\[
yattatprasiddhāvayavātiriktaṁ vibhāti lāvanyamivāṅganāsu
\]

\(\text{(- Dhvanyāloka, I.4)}\)

According to Abhinavagupta, though charm of a lady is expressed in and through the combination of bodily parts, it is a new character which is not identical either with the defectlessness of a body or the ornamentation of it. A well-ornated lady free from any bodily defect like kāṇatva etc. may be devoid of any charm, whereas a lady, wearing no ornaments may be lit with ambrosial charm. Likewise, mere presence of guṇas and alaṁkāras does not elevate a composition to the level of poetry, although the presence of dhvani in a piece of composition is a reason enough to adorn it with the name poetry. Hence the dhvani or the implied meaning (*pratīyamānārtha*) is different from and transcends the expressed meaning (*vācyārtha*).\(^{21}\)

Lāvanyā (charm), though not an object as the body and its limbs, is yet experienced in and through the bodily figure, and it is dhvani in a kāvya, Ānandavardhana opines, which is also experienced in the same way. So dhvani in a kāvya likens to what lāvanyā is in a body. To put it in a more concrete fashion, “...dhvani is the lāvanyā that is experienced in and through the lady Poetry’s bodily beauty.”\(^{22}\)

Thus the word and its expressed sense are both the body-parts of poetry, its cloak. The essence of poetry is different. It is the suggested sense. If what is expressed explicitly in the word and the expressed meaning were the essence of
poetry, then one who has merely the knowledge of the nature of expressed meanings and expressions would have the taste of poetry. But the fact is that the implied meaning \( (pratiyamānārtha) \) remains beyond the understanding of persons who have had merely a grinding in the sciences of meanings and words, but are averse to the aesthetic contemplation of the intrinsic significance of poetry.\(^{23}\) As is stated in Dhvanyāloka I.7:

\[
\text{sabdārthaśasanānamātreṇaiva na vedyate I} \\
\text{vedyate sa tu kāvyārthatattvajñaireva kevalam II.}
\]

It means, “It is not understood by a mere learning in Grammar and in Dictionary. It is understood only by those who have an insight into the true significance of Poetry.” \(^{24}\)

Through the word and the explicitly stated meaning, the poet points his finger at another meaning, which he can never state in words. Even in cases where it is possible for him to state the implied meaning openly in words, he takes recourse to the path of suggestion, with a view to striking the imagination and touching the heart of the connoisseur, a function which lies beyond the scope of the explicit which merely reaches the mind and, as such, fails to produce the charm which the implied \( (pratiyamānārtha) \) does. Hence, the soul of poetry is invisible to the superficial view. The sympathetic reader should apprehend it.

The implied meaning or \( pratiyamānārtha \) of poetry is what is called \( vyaṅga \). However, the \( vyaṅga \) is \( vācyasāmartyāksiptaḥ \). It is the power of the \( vācyā \) which leads to the \( vyaṅga \), or, the inner experience. What is seen and heard in a \( kāvyā \) is the \( vācyārtha \) and through this aspect another dimension is evoked. In and through the \( vācyārtha \) the reader experiences another level of reality, the level from which he could perceive the \( kāvyatattvārtha \). \( Vācyārtha \) is like standing on a ladder to get a definite view. “One stands on a ladder but the purpose of standing is not the ladder. From the ladder of \( vācyārtha \) one perceives the \( vyaṅgyārtha \). It puts the reader in a particular frame of mind so as to enable him to see in a specific way.” \(^{25}\) Here lies the importance of \( vācyārtha \) which Ānandavardhana never ignored.

Ānandavardhana gives two metaphors to highlight the manner in which \( vācyārtha \) functions in relation to \( vyaṅgyārtha \): one is the \( dīpāśikā \) and the other is \( padārthavākyārtha \). Just as a man interested in perceiving objects in the
dark directs his efforts towards securing the flame of a lamp since it is a means to realize his end, so also does one who is ultimately interested in the suggested meaning first evince interest in the conventional meaning:

älokārthi yathā đīpaśikhāyāṁ yatnavāñjanaḥ I
tadupāyatayā tadbadarthe vācye tadāḍṛtāḥ II

(— Dhvanyālōka, l.9).

Vācyā reveals the hidden vyaṅgyārtha in the same manner as the dīpaśikhā reveals the object in the dark.

The second analogy is this: Just as through the door (dvāra) of word meanings sentence meaning is grasped, so also the suggested sense is reached only through the conventional sense (vācyārtha):

yathā padārthadvāreṇa vākyārthāḥ saṁpratīyate I
vācyārthapūrvikā tadvatpratipattasya vartunaḥ II (— Dhvanyālōka, l.10)

However, when the suggested sense is apprehended, the expressed sense is not driven away to a distance. Since the suggested sense is always grasped together with the expressed and yet distinctly, so there is the simultaneous presence of both vācyārtha and vyaṅgyārtha in dhvani. The Vṛtti on Dhvanyālōka III. 33 runs thus: na hi vyaṅgye pratiyamāne vācyabuddhirūrībhavati, vācyāvabhāsāvinābhāvena tasya prakāśanāt. I

At this stage the ghaṭapradīpanyāya is brought in to explain this aspect of dhvani. Just as the light of the lamp will not recede as soon as the perception of the pot is brought home to the observer, so also the expressed sense will continue to shine out even after the apprehension of the suggested sense has been achieved — “yathaiva hi pradīpadvāreṇa ghaṭapratītāvuttpannāyāṁ na pradīpaprakāśo nivartate tadadvyaṅgyapratītāu vācyāvabhāsāḥ I” (Vṛtti on Dhvanyālōka III.33). In the light of these considerations the remark in the Uddyota I that the relation of vācyā and vyaṅgya is similar to that of padārtha and vākyārtha must be understood with some reservation, as referring broadly to their similarity in general, a similarity in respect of their being means to some other end.

At this juncture, it would be convenient for us if we take an illustration of dhvani as demonstrated by Ānandavardhana in the Vṛtti of Kārikā l.4. The illustration runs thus:

bhrāma dhārmika visrabdhāḥ sa śunakodya māritastena I
Godābariṇādīkūłalatāgahanavāsinā drptasirīhena II

39
It means, “Ramble freely, pious man!
That dog to-day is killed
By the fierce lion that dwells
In Godā-river dells.” 26

The verse is from Hāla’s anthology of Prakrit lyrics known as Gāthāsaptaśati. The verse quoted in the Dhvanyāloka is in Prakrit. Abhinavagupta in his Locana has given its Sanskrit rendering which we have quoted. 26(a) A grove situated on the bank of the river Godāvari is the rendezvous of a harlot and her paramour. A virtuous ascetic is in the habit of daily plucking flowers from the grove which creates disturbances in their secret meetings. The harlot wants to drive him away without letting him know her intention and informs him, nervous even at the presence of a dog, of the advent of a lion in the locality, thus covertly hinting that his wanderings are not safe henceforth. Abhinavagupta thus puts forth the motif of the harlot: kasyāścitsaṅketasthānaṁ jīvitasarvasvāyamānaṁ dhārmikasaṅcaraṇāntarāyadośāttadavalupyamanānpallavakusumādivicchāyīkaraṇāccca paritrātumiyamuktiḥ 27

Now the meaning of the harlot’s words cannot be grasped either by abhidhā or tātparya or lakṣaṇā. Abhidhā expresses the primary sense or the generally accepted sense of a word (sadhāraṇa artha). Abhidhā or denotation only gives the conventional significance (saṅketa artha) of a word. It cannot signify any special sense (viśeṣa artha). Here the abhidhā gives only the conventional meaning ‘ramble without hesitation’ and becomes exhausted. The power of tātparya leads us to apprehend the connexion (anvaya) among the meanings of the constituent words in the form of the import of the whole sentence. After conveying the connected meaning, the tātparyaśakti ceases to operate. In case of the given gāthā, the tātparyaśakti merely helps us to get a coherent meaning of it. It is that the dog, which is the cause of his anxiety so long, since it has been obstructing his free roaming, has been conveniently killed, and hence the traveller can ramble confidently. So even the tātaparyaśakti cannot convey the intended prohibition (niṣedha), that is, the prohibition of the free movement of that virtuous in that place. The power of lakṣaṇā also cannot be of any help here, because no incongruity arises in accepting the primary meanings of the words ‘proud lion’ (dr̥ptasiṁha), ‘religious man’ (dhārmika) etc. In case of the classical instance of “Gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ”, it
is impossible to relate the hamlet with the current of water in terms of the relation of the location and the located (ādharadheyabhāva). But nobody can say that the roaming about of pious brāhmaṇa is equally impossible when the dog, of which he was afraid, has been killed. The primary meanings, as they arise in the consciousness after hearing the words, are not as impossible of being put in a harmonious relation as Gaṅgāyāṁ and ghoṣaḥ. Hence, there is no scope of employing the power of lakṣaṇā.

Thus in the present case the three powers of abhidhā, tātparya, and lakṣaṇā cannot help us in getting the intended idea of prohibition (niśedha). So we have to postulate the additional power of language, vyañjanā, to explain how in this case a negative meaning arises from a positive assertion. Will the man, who fears a dog, freely move about at a place frequented by a lion which has given a positive proof of its ferocious nature by killing the dog? After hearing the above statement, he will flee the place as quickly as possible. And this is due to the fact that he will understand a negative meaning in a positive statement. The negative meaning, stated plainly, would be, “Do not frequent this place hereafter”. And if so, the question arises: “Why does a positive statement have a negative meaning?” The exponents of the fourth power of the language maintain that the negative meaning, which the hearer gets, is due to vyañjanā.

According to Ānandavardhana, though pratiyamāṇa is seen through the vācyarthā, the pratiyamāṇa or the vyañga element must be positively intended to be prominent. That is why he says that the implied meaning and that rare word which possess the power of conveying it (tadvyaktisāmarthayogyi śabda) – only those two deserve the careful recognition of a master poet. Master poets (mahākavi) achieve their status of master poets only by their proper usage of suggested meanings and suggestive expressions and not by a mere composition of conventional meanings and the use of conventional words. The Vṛtti on 1.8 says “vyañgyavyañjākābhyañmeva suprayuktābhyañ̄ mahākavitvalābhō mahākavīnāṁ, na vācyavācakaracanāmātreṇa”. Though knowledge of the suggested sense is invariably preceded by a knowledge of the conventional sense, its importance does not grow less on that account. Just as once the total meaning of the sentence is grasped, the individual meanings of the component words, which convey sentence import through their own power, slide into the margin, so also the suggested meaning suddenly flashes across
the mind of the sensitive reader the moment he turns away from the conventional meaning:

\[
tadvatsacetasaṁ so 'rtha vācyārthavimukhātmanāṁ I
dhau tattvārthadarśinyāṁ jhaṭṭityevāvabhāsate II.
\]

(−Dhvāṇyāloka, I.12)

Abhinavagupta’s observation in this connection is that though the vācyārtha is cognized first and then follows the cognition of the vyaṅgyārtha, yet the sequence between the two is not noticed by the sahṛdaya, in as much as his mind is keenly bent on the realization of the vyaṅgya sense which succeeds. Unsatisfied as he is by a mere cognition of the expressed sense, his keen intellect, capable of probing into the very essence of things, lights, in quick succession, upon the suggested sense, and is not further aware of the separate existence of the expressed sense. And this eagerness (raṇaraṇaka) for the vyaṅgya sense is the mark that establishes its superiority (prādhānya) over the vācyā sense.28 Thus from the viewpoint of the sahṛdaya the suggested sense is all-important and the priority in the cognition of the expressed sense is no ground for attaching to it any superiority.

In a good poetry the vācyā element (the word and its literal sense) becomes subservient to the suggested sense and finds its fulfillment in expressing it well. As Ānandavardhana says, the kind of poetry wherein words and meanings lose their primary signification into suggesting other things, is signified by the name dhvani:

\[
yatrārthaḥ śabdo va tamarthamuparjanīkṛtvasārthau I
vyaṅktāḥ kāvyaviśeṣah sa dhvaniriti sūrīvih kathitaḥ. II
\]

(−Dhvāṇyāloka, I.13.)

This phenomenon of the prominence of the vyaṅgya element over the vācyā element is repeated again in the Vṛttī on Kārikā. III. 33: “vyaṅgyasya hi kvacitprādhānyaṁ vācyasyoparjanabhāvaḥ kvacidvācyasya prādhānyamaparasya guṇabhāvaḥ I tatra vyaṅgyaprādhānye dhvanirityuktameva; vācyaprādhānye tu prakārāntaraṁ nirdekhyaṁ I” In some instances, the suggested will be principal and the expressed subordinate. In other instances the expressed will be principal and the suggested will be subordinate. Where the suggested sense happens to be principal, it is dhvani.
Where the expressed itself is principal, it is designated as another type of kāvyā, viz. gunībhutavyaṅga.

Dhvani-kāvyā is that species of poetry, in which dhvani is the aṅgī, and the alaṅkāras, guṇas and vṛttis are its limbs (aṅga). As there is an antagonism between a slave and his master, so also the aṅga and the aṅgī are contradictory to each other. Therefore the aṅgī cannot be included in the aṅga, nor they can be identified with each other. Taking a part (avayava) of a united whole separately (prthakbhuta) as the whole (avyāvī) itself is quite unheard of. Even all the parts taken collectively (aprthagbhāve) will be but a part of the whole and not the whole reality.

Even where one of the elements (which are normally parts) does constitute a case of dhvani, dhvani because of its vast range is not limited to it. The realm of dhvani is more fundamental. So it is mahāviṣayatvāt. Dhvani is not another aṅga, rather dhvani, the inner principle, which gives life to the aṅgas, controls, guides and unifies the various parts from within. That is why it is aṅgī.

Now the question is how to determine which of the two senses (viz., expressed and suggested) is principal and which of them is subordinate. According to Ānandavardhana, the sole criterion is the determining of the relative excellence of charm. The Vṛtti on I.13 says, “cārutvotkarṣanibandhanā hi vācyavyaṅgyayoḥ prādhānyavivakṣā I” The predominance of the suggested sense or the expressed sense depends upon the excellence or attractiveness of the one over the other. Ānandavardhana cites the following verse to illustrate this point:

\[
\text{anurāgavatī sandhyā disvastatpurassarāḥ I} \\
\text{aho daivagatiḥ kiṃṛktathāpi na samāgamaḥ II} \\
\text{(Vṛtti on Dhvanyāloka I.13.)}
\]

It means, “Twilight is full of love (also, red colour),
And the day is moving in her front;
But oh, look at the decree of Fate —
The twain do never meet!”

This is a case of ākṣepa (paraleipsis), where an apparent negation (niṣedhābhāsa) is expressed only to convey with much greater force the intention of the speaker (vakṣamān). The negation might refer to something about to be spoken (vakṣamāṇa) or the negation might be the negation of a
statement already expressed in words (*ukta*). The apparent negation which is expressed in words, being incompatible with the context and such other factors, gives rise to the cognition of the ultimate intention of the speaker. The ultimate intention (*iṣṭa*) of the speaker is suggested and not expressed. However, in *ākṣepa*, it is the expressed that is predominant even though it gives rise to the knowledge of the suggested sense. In the above verse, semblance of negation in case of union between ‘*sandhyā*’ (evening) and ‘*divasa*’ (day) is that which suggests their probable union. But this suggestion of the probable union is not enchanting; the primary sense, which is the description of the advent of evening and the conclusion of day, has become all the more beautiful. Hence, since the suggested sense is not of inexplicable beauty, and the expressed sense (the mode of expression) excels the suggested sense in beauty of form, the expressed sense must be held as superior to the suggested, and as such, the above instance cannot be a case of *dhvani*.

The above instance may be a case of *samāsokti* as well where the behaviour of another is superimposed on *upameya* or the subject of description. In the above verse we have the attribution of the behaviour of a lover and his consort to *divasa* and *sandhyā*. But this suggestion of the behaviour of a pair of lovers is not enchanting. The suggested sense here is subordinate to the expressed sense, which is more charming. So this isn’t a case of *dhvani*.

We can cite another example from *Dhvanyāloka I*, where the mode of expression constitutes the chief striking element and the suggested sense becomes subordinate to the primary sense:

\[
\text{upoḍhrāgeṇa vilolatārakam tathā gṛhitam śaśinā niśāmukham I}
\]
\[
yathā samastam timirāṁśukaṁ tayā puro’pi rāgādgāltam na lakṣitam II
\]

(Vṛtti on Dhvanyāloka I.13)

It means, “The twilight (the heroine’s face) with twinkling stars (shining pupils) was illumined (was kissed) by the moon (the hero) glowing red (overcome by emotion) so suddenly (with such love) that the entire mass of darkness (black garment) disappearing in the east (slipping evening front), due to illumination (love) was not at all noticed”. This is an instance of condensed metaphor (*samāsokti*). Here the main subjects of description are the night and the moon. And the behaviour of a heroine and that of a hero are attributed to them (only
secondarily). The description of the moon and the night is contextual and constitutes the chief import of the verse, the particular behaviour being suggested. The verse owes its beauty to the primary sense with its accompanying suggestion and not to the suggested sense exclusively. Thus the expressed sense being predominant, it is not a case of dhvani, but a case of guṇībhutavyāṅga.

So, mere suggested sense for its own sake is not important to poetry. Almost any word or expression can convey a suggested idea. But all of them do not come within the scope of poetry. The suggested element must possess that peculiar quality of camatkāra or cāru (poetic charm, poetic appeal) whereby the heart of the appreciative reader opens up in a mood of wonder. It is also necessary that the suggested element must be sputatva, i.e., it must not be too obscure. It should be capable of being grasped easily by the cultured sympathetic reader. It should not be too far-fetched and should demand no intellectual exercise for its comprehension. Thus the Kārikā I.12 says: buddha tattvārthadarsīnyāṁ jhaṭityeva vabhasate. The suggested meaning flashes suddenly across the truth perceiving minds of cultured critics. In Dhvanyāloka II.31 it is stated:

\[
yatra \; pratiyamāno \; rthāḥ \; pramliṣṭatvena \; bhāsate \; \| \vācyasyāṅgateyā vāpi nāsyāsou gocaro dhvaneḥ \II
\]

It means, "If in an instance the implied sense is such that it can be caught only with great difficulty or if it is only subordinate to the Expressed sense, in either case it will not be an instance of suggestion." According to Ānandavardhana, the implied sense is two-fold: distinctly or indistinctly manifested. Where the implied sense, which is conveyed by the power of either the word or the sense, is distinctly manifested, there is dhvani. There is no dhvani in the second kind of implied sense.

SECTION 4: KINDS OF DHVANI

Depending upon the nature of the suggested sense, dhvani has been divided into three kinds: vastudhvani, alaṅkāradhvani and rasadhvani. Though vastu, alaṅkāra and rasa, can all be conveyed by suggestion, the difference between them is that while the first two can be conveyed through denotation (abhidhā) as well, the last one is always and invariably suggested and never expressed. Questions here may be raised as to why one should resort to
suggestion if *vastu* and *alaṅkāra* can as well be conveyed through denotation (*abhidhā*). To this the *dhvani* theorists would assert that an idea conveyed through suggestion is more effective and charming than the one expressed directly through denotation and this is attested by the unanimous verdict of all true connoisseurs of art. As Ānandavardhana states, “*te’laṅkārāḥ parāṁ chāyāṁ yānti dhvanyāṅgatāṁ gatāḥ*” (*Dhvanyākoka*, II.28).

When the suggested sense is of the nature of a mere poetic idea, it is *vastudhvani*, *vastu* being an unembellished matter of fact or thought which is distinct from emotive content. The stock example of this kind of *dhvani* is given by the expression ‘The hamlet in the Ganges,’ where the term ‘Ganges’ evokes the idea of coolness and purity. Ānandavardhana here cites the example of the verse “*bhrama dhārmika*”, which we have already discussed in Section 3. In that example, the expressed is injunctive in force, and the suggestive sense is prohibitive in character. The sensitive reader readily picks up the true idea of the absence of free movement.

Another instance of *vastudhvani* may be cited here where the position has been reversed. While the explicit idea prohibits, the suggested idea positively invites:

*śvaśrūtra śete athavā nimajjati atrāhaṁ divasakaṁ pralokaya* ।
*mā pathika rātryandha ! śayyāyāmāvayoḥ śāyiṣṭhāḥ* ।

It means, “Mother-in-law lies here, lost in sleep;
And I here; thou shouldst mark
These before it is dark.
O traveller, blinded by night,
Tumble not into our beds aright.” 37(a)

A married lady, whose husband is away from home, addresses this verse to a traveller. The traveller for the time being is a guest at her house and intends to meet her, though baffled due to her mother-in-law’s presence there. The woman is also somewhat loose in her moral principles. That is why she consoles him and gives him a veiled invitation through the above verse. Here the prohibition, “Don’t you tumble into one of our beds” etc. is apparent. Through it, the lady gives covert hints about the hour of meeting and makes him cautious of the mother-in-law’s resting place so that he may not mistake the mother-in-law’s bed for that of his love. Hence through the above prohibition what is cleverly expressed is the acquiescence of the lady to the traveller’s request.
The verse “snigdhaśyāmala” etc. mentioned in the Vṛtti of the Kārikā II.1 of the Dhvanīyāloka may also be cited as an example of vastudhvani. Rāvaṇa has carried away Sītā deluding Rāma. The rainy season sets in. Unable to bear any longer the pangs of separation from his wife, Rāma exclaims:

\[
\text{snigdhaśyāmalakāntiliptavīyatō velladbalākā ghanā}
\]
\[
vālāḥ śīkariṇāḥ payodasuhṛdāmānandakekāḥ kalāḥ 1
\]
\[
kāṁ santu drghaṁ kāṭhorahṛdayo Rāmo’smi sarvam sahe
\]
\[
vaidehī tu katham bhaviṣyati hahā hā devi dhīrā bhava 11
\]

It means: “The quarters all are painted deep
With the glistening black of clouds,
And the cranes in circles fly (with excitement);
The breezes are moisture-laden,
And these friends of clouds, the peacocks,
Send their joyous notes in the wind.
Let them all confront me!
I shall bear them all, as I am Rāma
Whose heart is adamant to be sure.
But how will Sītā fare! —
Alas! Alas! My dear queen!
Be bold, I beseech thee.”

Ordinarily a proper noun has no connotation. But here Rāma does not mean simply Rāma, the son of Daśaratha or the husband of Vaidehī, but qualified with various epithets like ‘sakaladuhkhhabhājanatva’, ‘rājyanirvāṣitva’ etc. So the word ‘Rāma’ here denotes the various vicissitudes he had been subject to. His banishment on the day of coronation (rājyabhīṣeka), innumerable miseries in the forest life where among other hardships he had to suffer the demon’s stealing away his beloved wife, all these pictures of his past life are recalled before his mind’s eye, but none of the happy ones present themselves. All these meanings are simultaneously suggested. The conventional sense does not come to the fore, though it is present as the string in a garland and weaves all the pearls in one. This unity in multeity is the secret of the charm of suggestion, for no other relation displays a number of meanings simultaneously. One word ‘Rāma’ suggests his several attributes.
The suggestion of a figurative idea (*alaṅkāradhvani*) is the second type of suggested meaning. In Sanskrit poetics, figures are of two types: verbal and ideal, ornament of speech (*śabdālaṅkāra*) and ornament of thought (*arthaṅkāra*). As an ornament of speech, the Sanskrit *ālaṅkārikas* mention alliteration (*anuprāsa*), for the charm there is purely verbal. Simile (*upamā*) and metaphor (*rupaka*) are ornaments of thought, as their charm depends on comparison of ideas or meanings. Some figures like pun are of dual nature, because word and meaning both contribute to their charm. The figures of speech have certain single ideas at their base. In case of *upamā* we have a basic idea of similarity, in case of *vyatireka* we have the basic idea of superiority of either the *upameya* or the *upamāna* over the other. When such ideas are presented in a charming manner we have an *alaṅkāra*. If the charming idea is expressly conveyed, then we have a *vācyālaṅkāra* and if the charming idea is suggested we have a suggested *alaṅkāra*. Here Ānandavardhana’s point is that *alaṅkāras* are generally found expressed, but for the sake of charm and effectiveness, they are also often hinted at the *dhvani* way.

As an example of *alaṅkāradhvani* we can cite one from *Locana* on *Kārikā* II. 26: *tasyāḥ pāṇirayaṁ nu mārutacalatpatraṅguliḥ pallavaḥ* [38(a)]. This means: Is this her hand, or a twig with finger like leaves tossed by the breeze? In this verse, the poet expresses a ‘doubt’. However the source of the charm of the doubt here is the suggested figure showing the comparison between the lady’s hand and the twig. The figure of simile or metaphor is the suggested meaning, while the expressed meaning is a figure known as ‘doubt’ (*sasandeha*). Another example of a figure suggesting another is cited here:

```
virāṇāṁ rame te dhusṛṇāręṅe na tathā priyāstanotsaṅge

dṛṣṭī ripugajakumbhasthale yathā bahalasindūře
```

It means, “The eyes of heroes will not so delight
In their beloveds’ red- anointed breasts
As in the temples of enemies’ elephants,
Painted deep in red arsenic” [39(a)]

In the above verse the expressed meaning is that the temples of enemies’ elephants succeed better than the beloveds’ breasts in drawing attention of the heroes. Hence, there is an expressed *vyatirekālaṅkāra*. But the beauty of the verse lies not in the description of superiority-inferiority, but in the suggested
upamā alaṅkāra resulting from the simile which effects a striking portrayal of the excessive valour. Temple trampling the enemy horrifies all men except the hero. Temples are adored by the hero only, for there is point of similarity between the bloomed breasts of lover and the temples. The breasts are as large as the temples and hence attractive. But this idea of similarity is not expressly conveyed and hence we have a suggested alaṅkāra upamā which predominates over the vyatireka and gives charm to the verse. 40

Ānandavardhana states in Kārikā 30 of Uddyota II that when one alaṅkāra is suggested by another alaṅkāra, it will be raised to the status of dhvani provided the charm of the composition lies in the suggestion of the alaṅkāra only. The beauty of the quoted verses “tasyāḥ pāṇirayaṁ” and “vīrāṇāṁ ramate” lies in the suggested alaṅkāra, and hence, the suggested alaṅkāra is one of alaṅkāradhvani.

The suggested alaṅkāras are also matters of fact in a sense. But they are not dry statements; the suggested alaṅkāras happen to be more charming and involve some of the basic ideas underlying the different vācyālaṅkāras.

According to Ānandavardhana, the suggested alaṅkāra can be evoked by the power of word or its meaning. Thus when in a poem an alaṅkāra is implied on the strength of śabdaśakti, i.e., power of word, it is said to be dhvani based on śabdaśakti. Ānandavardhana says in verse II.21 of Dhvanyāloka:-

ākṣipta eva alaṅkāraḥ śabdaśaktyā prakāśate ।
yasminnanuktaḥ śabdena śabdaśaktyudbhavo hi saḥ ॥

It means, “Only that instance wherein is present a figure that is not expressed directly by any word but conveyed solely by the suggestive power of word itself, should be regarded as suggestion based on the power of word."41 Here, Ānandavardhana also cautions us that an alaṅkāra, even when it is implied, falls out of the province of dhvani, if it becomes expressed by some other word. Only if another figure is conveyed merely by the suggestive power of word, it deserves to be regarded as an instance of dhvani.42

In the figure śleṣa, two ideas are simultaneously communicated by virtue of the equivocal words used; and both the ideas will be equally plausible, since there is nothing to decide in favour of the one or the other. Now in Udbhaṭa’s view there is the apprehension of other poetic figures in the cases of śleṣa, and so there is no real difference between śleṣa and śabdaśaktimuladhvani, and the
latter can be easily comprehended under the former. As a guard against such a
difficulty, Ānandavardhana uses the word ākṣipta (implied). In the case of śleṣa,
that other figure is expressed in words and not suggested. But in śabdaśaktimuladhvani, a new figure of speech is suggested besides a second
idea on the basis of equivocal words and not expressed. So in śabdaśaktimuladhvani, the cognition of the poetic figure (of the nature of a
distinct relation between the contextual and the noncontextual ideas) is
generated through the power of suggestion and not that of denotation.

As an example of an expressed figure conveyed directly, (i.e., not
suggestively) by the power of word, Ānandavardhana gives the following
illustration:

“tasyā vināpi hareṇa nisargādeva hāriṇau
janayāmāsatuḥ kasya vismayam na pāyodharau II”

It means, “Her bosoms without a garland though
Garlanded (also, ravishing) by nature were;
Whom would they not amaze!”

Here the word ‘hāriṇau’ is śliṣṭa. It has two meanings. It may mean ‘they must
captivate one’s heart’ or it may mean; ‘possessing a garland’. So here we have
the use of a śleṣa aḷaṅkāra. There is also poetic-contradiction (virodhābhāsa) in
the verse “without a garland though garlanded” (vināpi hāreṇa...). Here the
word ‘api’ (though) directly denotes a contradiction and so forces the denotative
power of ‘hāriṇau’ into a double meaning. Without the word ‘api’, we would take
the word ‘hāriṇau’ only in the first sense, which is the common sense, and
understand the verse to mean that men wondered at the maiden’s breasts which
happened to be without a garland, because they were naturally charming. The
word ‘api’ makes us look for a contradiction, which we find in the second
unusual meaning, and we understand the verse to mean that men wondered at
the contradiction, viz, that the maiden’s breast could have a garland without
having a garland. Thus the above verse also contains virodhābhāsa aḷaṅkāra
(poetic contradiction), besides having the aḷaṅkāra śleṣa, and this poetic
contradiction has been conveyed directly by the word ‘api’.

In an instance of śabdaśakyudbhavaaḷaṅkāradhvani, a figure of speech
in addition to śleṣa is made to appear only by the suggestive power of words. In
case of an aḷaṅkāradhvani based on sound, words have two conventional
meanings and they should not refer to two distinct things nor the purpose of the second meaning should be the embellishment of the previous one through the force of any additional or special word as ‘api’ in the prior illustration. Yet the other sense should embellish the previous one. The embellishment should not be directly expressed but suggested through the suggestive power of words. As an instance of alaṅkāraṇdhvani based on power of words, Ānandavardhana quotes the following line from Harṣacaritam:

atrāntare kusumasamayugamupasaṃharannajrmbhata griṅmabhidhanaḥ phullamallikādhvalāṭṭahāso mahākālāḥ

It means, “In the meanwhile appeared (also, yawned) the Terrible Time (also Lord Śiva) of the name ‘Summer’ putting an end to the two flowering months (also bringing an end of the aeons) and with radiant laughter in the form of mansions festooned with blooming jasmines (also with boisterous laughter like full-blown jasmines).”

The poet Bāna describes the advent of summer. Here the word ‘mahākāla’ has been used with two meanings — one referring to long summer (mahān kālaḥ) through yogaśakti and the other to God Mahākāla, a name of Śiva, through rūḍхи. The former is conveyed through denotation, as it is contextual (prākaraṇika). The latter meaning is noncontextual (aprākaraṇika) and it appears by the power of words (śabda śakti). Ānandavardhana’s opinion is that this second non-contextual meaning is also conveyed by abhidhā.

Abhinavagupta’s opinion is that here the denotative powers of the words are restricted by the context, namely, a description of summer season. The denotative operation has been completed with the description of summer season. The apprehension of the other sense (viz. the sense of Śiva) which takes place afterwards is the result of the power of suggestion based on the denotative power of words.

Now in order that the sentence should not convey a second meaning that is unconnected with the first meaning, one imagines a relation of the standard of comparison and the object compared (upamāṇa-upameya bhāva) between the non-contextual meaning (e.g. Śiva) and the contextual meaning (e.g. the summer season). The imagining is made possible by the inherent capability of the situation (sāmarthyādityarthākṣipta), namely the similar properties of summer to those of Śiva, the similarity being that both the summer and Śiva put an end to a period of time, the summer putting an end to a period of time named
spring, while Śiva puts an end to a period of time named aeon. In the previous example of “Her bosoms without a garland” etc., the lack of connection between the two meanings of ‘hāriṇāu’ was prevented by the word ‘api’ (though or even). Here the idea of a relation of similarity of the non-contextual meaning with the contextual is not expressly stated, but conveyed to us as the suggested content of the piece. As in this example the relation of similarity between the non-contextual and the contextual content is suggested, we have a suggested upamā (upamā dhvani), based on śleṣa. According to K.C. Pandey, the relation of the second meaning of the word ‘mahākāla’ is not indicated by any separate word such as ‘api’ as in the earlier illustration. Hence the power of the word itself suggests the relation of this meaning as an embellishment to the first meaning and “presents God Śiva with his white laughter as a standard of comparison.”

According to Abhinavagupta, in denoted figures of speech our pleasure ends with the apprehension of the objects which are brought into relation by the figure, e.g., the object compared (upameya) and the standard of comparison (upamāna). In suggested figures of speech, it is the imagining of the relation that furnishes us with the chief goal of aesthetic delight, and not the objects which are brought into relation by the figure.

There can also be created an alaṅkāradhvani based on arthaśakti. Says Ānandavardhana:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{arthaśaktera} & \text{alaṅkāro yatṛāpyanyah pratiyate} & 1 \\
\text{anuvānopamavyaṅgyah sa prakāro paro dhvane} & \text{h} & 2
\end{align*}
\]

(Dhvanyāloka, II.25)

It means, “Contexts, where a new figure of speech is seen to result from the mere power of sense and is suggested in the form of resonance should be deemed as instances of another variety of Suggestion.”

So when a new alaṅkāra is implied on the strength of meaning, an alaṅkāra which is other than the expressed one, it is termed as arthaśakyuddhava-alaṅkāra-dhvani. In Kārikā II.26 Ānandavardhana says:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{rupakādiralaṅkāravargo yo vācyatāṁ śrita} & \text{ḥ} & 1 \\
\text{sa sarvo gamyamānatvāṁ bibhrad bhumā pradarśita} & \text{ḥ} & 2
\end{align*}
\]

Ānandavardhana is of the opinion that though poetic figures like upamā, rupaka etc. are usually found expressed (vācyā) they can also become suggested
(vyāṇga). Thus in the case of sasandeha (poetic doubt), other figures upamā (simile), rupaka (metaphor) are apprehended in the background through suggestion. As an example of it, Abinavagupta in Locana mentions partly the verse “tasyāḥ pāñirayāḥ etc.”, which we have already dealt with in page 48. Thus the suggestivity of one embellishment through another is not difficult to indicate. The example “virāṇāṁ ramate etc.” which we have demonstrated in the same page is also an instance in this regard.

According to Ānandavardhana, even if a new figure is seen to be conveyed by an expressed figure, it will not merit the title of dhvani. In order to be counted as a case of dhvani, the expressed one must also show extra beauty in its principally hinting at the other figure. So it is that though simile is hinted at in figures like ellipsis, we don’t call the suggested simile by the name suggestion since the beauty of the figures like ellipsis is not contributed by the suggested simile. Ānandavardhana gives in this context the following example:

\[
candramayūkhairnīśā nalinī kamalaiḥ kusumagucchailatā ī
haṁsaiśśāradaśovā kāvyakathā sajijaniḥ kriyate gurvi ī ī
\]

It means:  
“To night is greatness brought by moon-beams
And to the lotus-plant by flowers;
To creepers by bunches of flowers
And to the glory of autumn by swans,
And so it is to poetic works
At the hands of good critics.”

In this instance, though the figure simile is implicit, all the beauty is centered only in the expressed figure ellipsis (dīpaka), and not in any subservience of it to the suggested figure. Here the same attribute of bringing greatness is predicated of the subject in hand (prastuta), viz., ‘good critics’ and ‘poetic works’, as well as of the others which are not the subject in hand (aprastuta), viz., moon-beams, etc. The moonlight renders the night brilliant and enjoyable; lotuses give the lotus plant beauty, fragrance and wealth; bunches of flowers give the creepers attractiveness and charm; swans make the autumn a delight to the ear and charming. All these effects of bringing greatness (kriyate gurbi) are granted to poetry by good listeners. The connection between the prastuta and aprastuta by the same attribute of “bringing greatness” is what is principally expressed in the above verse. Though moon-beams, lotuses, clusters of flowers and swans have
similarity with good critics on the one hand, and night, lotus-plant, creepers and
the beauty of autumn with poetic works on the other hand, this idea of similarity
is not intended as principal in this verse. Thus the beauty of the above verse is
occasioned by the operation of dipaka, and not by the suggested simile.

Only instances where the expressed is utilized as wholly directed
towards the communication of the suggested alone, may be called after the
suggested figures. The Vṛtti of Dhvānyaloka II.27 says, “yatra tu
vyāngyaparatvenaiva vācyasya vyavasthānaṁ tatra vyāngyamukhenaiva
vyapadeśo yuktāḥ I” The following is an example in this regard:

sa vaktumakhilān śakto hayagrīvāśrītān guṇān I
yo ‘mbukumbhailḥ paricchedam jñātum śakto mahodaheḥ II. 51(b)

It means: “He alone can possibly recount
Hayagrīva’s merits in full,
Who by single pots can measure
The capacity of the mighty main.” 52

In the above verse, exaggeration (hyperbole: atiśayoktī) is the expressed figure,
because measuring the ocean in pots is a purely imaginary action that exceeds
the bounds of reality. The expressed exaggeration here leads to paraleipsis
(ākṣepa), for the impossibility of describing the innumerable qualities of
Hayagrīva and his extraordinary greatness has been suggested here by means
of the expressed exaggeration. Paraleipsis occurs when something, really
intended to be said (iṣṭavastu) is suppressed or denied, for the purpose of
conveying a particular meaning. In this verse, though description of the
innumerable qualities of Hayagrīva is what is actually intended, there is an
implied denial that the virtues of Hayagrīva can be enumerated or described,
and this denial is due to bringing out the extraordinary greatness of Hayagrīva.
Thus the ākṣepa of the indescribability of Hayagrīva’s goodness has been
suggested here. 52(a) In this instance the whole charm of the verse is ascribable
to the suggested figure alone.

According to Ānandavardhana, the difference between expressed and
suggested poetic figure is that when figures are expressed, they appear like
popular ornaments such as necklace, bangles etc. Even when they are
beautifully employed by a good poet as to become so closely related to the body
of poetry as such objects of decoration as saffron-paste etc. are to the body of an experienced lady, they still remain nothing but external appendages. They cannot even be considered as part and parcel of the body of poetry, attaining the status of the soul of poetry remaining a far-off thing. But these self-same poetic figures, when conveyed through the function of suggestion, attain to the highest and rarest beauty that was foreign to them when expressed in words and are turned into the very soul of poetic art.

**Alaṅkāras** are suggested in two ways. They may be suggested either by an expressed idea or by another alaṅkāra. When alaṅkāras are suggested only by a vastu (an idea), they invariably form a variety of dhvani (arthaśaktyudbhavadhvani), for in such cases the whole poem comes into being in dependence on this sort of suggested figure. Otherwise, if the idea did not suggest any striking alaṅkāra, it would just be an ordinary discourse, and would be failing to reach the status of poetry. As the Vyṛti of Kārikā II.29 says, “yasmāttatra tathāvidhavyaṅgyaḥalaṅkaraparatvenāṁ kāvyam pravṛttam । anyathā tu tadvākyamātrameva syāt ।” When alaṅkāras are suggested by other alaṅkāras, they will be raised to the status of dhvani provided the charm of the composition lies in the suggestion of alaṅkāras only. We have already illustrated cases where one alaṅkāra is implied by other alaṅkāras. Now we give here an instance where alaṅkāra is implied by vastu (expressed idea). In this instance, the poetic suggestion of contrast (vyatireka dhvani) is possible by the power of meaning. The instance is as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{jāye} & \text{yeva} \text{ va} \text{nondēśe} \text{kubja} \text{ eva pādapo gali} \text{tapatrah} \ 1 \\
\text{ma} & \text{ mānuṣe} \text{ loke tyāgaikaraso daridraśca} \ 2 \ 55
\end{align*}
\]

It means,

- “I would rather be born as tree,
- Stunted and shorn of leaves, in the forest,
- Than as a generous but poor person
- In this world of men.”

The expressed idea in this example is ‘censure of the life of a generous-hearted poor person and praise of the life of a bare and stunted tree’. An extremely generous person, who was in the regular habit of giving alms to beggars, is now thrown into a distressed condition and could not satisfy their needs any more. He is still desirous of giving although he is impecunious at present. He laments over his penniless state and utters the above sentence. A leafless tree is even
incapable of offering shade to any traveller, what to speak about its blossoming and fractuation. It is born in a forest, so no one would cast a glance at a stray tree. Added to these, it is crooked too, and hence there is also no way of making wooden articles out of it — such a worthless being it is ! But inspite of the poverty of the leafless tree in the forest, its condition is better than the person. It might serve as a roost for owls, it might also be used as fuel. The person’s state is far more miserable than the tree. The tree has at least some use - however little it might be, but the person is utterly useless. There is upamāṇa-upameya bhāva between the said tree and the person in question. By comparison of such a person to the tree it is forcibly suggested that such a person deserves more pity than the tree, which is the predominant meaning in the verse. Thus the whole sentence forcibly suggests vyatireka-alaṅkāra (contrast) on the basis of similarity, for contrast is always based on similarity.

The third variety of dhvani is rasadhvani, which occupies the first and foremost position in the trifold classification of dhvani. When we read poetry or any other good piece of literary work like story, novel, drama etc., composed in a masterly fashion, we get pleasure out of it as a reader, and when we watch a drama on the stage, we enjoy it as a spectator. Pleasure of this kind is named ‘rasa’ in Indian poetics. Rasa is an exquisite joy caused by the rumination of a sentiment felt by the reader with sympathy for the hero etc. of the kāvya. The feeling is suggested to be belonging to the poetical character, but because of an identification of the sympathetic reader with the poetical character the reader experiences the feeling as belonging to himself also, though it is not a personal feeling of the ordinary life, since he experiences the feeling in a generalized state in sharing the feeling with the poetical character and the sentimental poet and also the other readers like himself. Thus when the reading of a poem develops in the heart of the reader also the sentiment of pathos, the poem is said to have the suggested meaning as karuṇa rasa (pathetic sentiment).When the reader enters into the world of poetry, his continued experiencing of the same feeling of pathos turns into exquisite joy.

Ānandavardhana calls the third variety of dhvani the ‘rasādī’, which means rasa and the like, and among ‘rasādī’ he names rasābhāsa, bhāvabhāsa and bhāvaprasānti. A few words will be said about rasābhāsa etc. later on.
Rasa is the aesthetically experienced emotion. The term rasa designates the aesthetic state of consciousness, the aesthetic pleasure. Rasa means both tasting and what is tasted. Bharata says that it is impossible to talk of anything regarding poetry and drama without first talking of rasa.\textsuperscript{56} Rasa is the very root of poetic feelings:

\begin{quote}
\textit{“yathā bijādbhavedvṛkṣo vṛkṣātpuspāṁ phalam yathā I}
\textit{tathā mūlaṁ rasaḥ sarve tebhhyabhāvā vyavasthitāḥ II}
\end{quote}

\textit{(Nāṭyaśāstra, VI.38)}

It means: Just as a tree grows from a seed, and from the tree comes flowers, and from flowers fruit, so also rasas are the root, the emotions have their settled position for the sake of the sentiments.

Abhinavagupta explains the metaphor as follows: The tree stands for poetry. Flowers etc. stand for such activities of the actor as abhinaya etc. Fruit stands for the aesthetic enjoyment of the spectator. Thus everything (the whole world) is made of rasa.\textsuperscript{57}

The doctrine of rasa was originally associated with dramaturgy and later on applied to poetics. The oldest known exponent of the rasa theory in the history of Indian poetics is Bharata, although critics believe that the concept existed even before him. Rasa as a dramaturgic concept is first met with in \textit{Nāṭyaśāstra} of Bharata Muni, whom Ānandavardhana himself, in applying the rasa theory to poetics for the first time, names as his original authority.\textsuperscript{58} According to Bharata, aesthetic creation is a presentation or representation (abhinaya), the form of which is shaped by the aesthetic sentiment which is intended to be communicated. Bharata’s account of rasa in \textit{Nāṭyaśāstra} is nothing but the analysis of the emotional experience through which the spectator goes, while watching a dramatic performance on the stage. Thus the emphasis is laid on the standpoint of the spectator. The nature of dramatic experience and the delight it gives to the cultivated spectator are the essence of Bharata’s theory of rasa.

But how does the creative poet organizes the aesthetic presentation which enables the aesthetic sentiment to be experienced and relished? Bharata gives a formula that explains the modality of the arousal of the poetic emotion by the organization of the poetic context:

\begin{quote}
vibhāvāṇubhāvavyabhicārisamāyogadrasa-niśpatiḥ I
\end{quote}

\textit{(Nāṭyaśāstra, VI.32)}.
It means, when the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and the vyabhicāribhāvas unite, rasa emerges. Since this formula is given after referring to the very important concept of the sthāyībhāva, a fuller rendering would be this: when the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas combine to awaken the sthāyībhāva, the awakened sthāyībhāva finally develops into rasa.

In dramaturgy the word bhāva is used in the sense of mental mode. Love, anger, fear, wonder, worry, eagerness, bashfulness, joy and such others are mental modes. Man’s mental modes are many. However, all of them do not have equal importance. Some feelings reside in him since his birth, as latent impressions. These are not acquired by any experience or training, but are gathered up in the mind from past birth as saṁskāras or vāsanās. Indian philosophers believe that an individual’s experiences and actions leave such impressions as are also stored up in the mind. They are known as saṁskāras or vāsanās. They are psychic potentials. They are the directional impulses, the formative principles that determine man’s character and his birth. These basic tendencies are eight in number: love (rātī), laughter (hāsa), sorrow (śoka), anger (krodha), heroism (utsāha), fear (bhaya), disgust (jugupsā) and wonder (vismaya). Some rhetoricians recognize detachment from worldly affairs (nirveda) as the ninth basic tendency. What direction man would take depends upon what basic tendency predominates in his heart. Life continues rolling one way or the other owing to these basic tendencies. There is no living being bereft of these mental modes. Their different proportions explain the different character traits of people. They are fed by a number of minor feelings called transitory or accessory feelings. These basic tendencies, which reside in all human minds, are called sthāyībhāvas, permanent mental modes or basic emotions.

Sthayībhāva is the root of the sprout of gustation: asvāda anikurakando’sou (Sāhitya Darpaṇa, III.178). It is that continuous undercurrent of the basic emotion which runs through other mental states like the thread of a garland. Abhinavagupta in his Abhinavabhāratī explains how we all possess each and every one of these mental modes. There is a general principle that all living creatures “hate to be in pain and eager to taste pleasure.” Accordingly, every living creature since its birth will be possessed of these nine forms of consciousness. Love is hating pain and being devoted to the enjoyment of pleasure. Humour is making people happy saying, “I am happy, he is
Sorrow is grieving when he is forced to part with happiness (that there will be danger for his happiness). Anger is getting angry against the causes of such separation. Fear is getting frightened when he finds himself in danger. Heroism is showing energy in overcoming the danger which threatens him. Disgust is being attacked, while judging a thing to be displeasing, by a sense of revulsion directed just towards this ugly object. Wonder is being surprised at the sight of extraordinary deeds done by himself or others. Detachment (nirveda) is attaining serenity by getting rid of worldly desires and renouncing things. Abhinavagupta concludes: No living creature exists without the latent impression of these mental movements. 60

When we equate sthâyîbhâva with the stable appetitive tendency, we should not confuse the latter with the crude primitive equipment, but its profound transformation by the socio-cultural process. As Krishna Chaitanya observes, “The Sthayin (Sthayi Bhava) is not pure instinctual legacy, but the result of its further development by the cultural process.” 61 The Sanskrit theoreticians not only admit inborn tendency or disposition (naisargika vâsanâ), they speak also of acquisition through experience and study (saṁskâra). The crude emotion associated with primary instincts has been banished from the arena of art, because Sanskrit theoreticians believe that the delectability of an emotion depends on the fineness and complexity which it attains in the course of evolution.

Vyabhicâribhâvas are transitory feelings; they are neither inborn, nor permanent. They arise from special causes. They can never arise if the corresponding causes do not exist. Unlike that of the sthâyîbhâvas, when their causes cease, they disappear without leaving any traces of themselves in the form of latent impressions. 62 These transitory feelings are born out of the basic emotions themselves. When a sthâyîbhâva is in action, many feelings of the second category appear and disappear in the middle, as required by the occasion. Hence, they are called vyabhicâri (transitory) bhâvas. They may be compared to coloured beads of crystal, glass, mice, topaz, emerald etc., held together in the form of a garland by the thread of sthâyîbhâva. The sthâyî gets affected by the polychrone reflections of the jewels and gets variety of colour from their colours. The vast region of the sthâyîbhâva has also been compared to an ocean. The vyabhicâribhâvas are the waves that rise from it and after a
momentary stay disappear in it. Thus, for example, when the sthāyībhāva of rati (love) is aroused, endless transient feelings like anxiety, eagerness, joy, sorrow etc. concerning the lover or the beloved rise and disappear. They originate from the sthāyībhāva rati and in turn reinforce it. The transitory mental states are thirty three in number, e.g., weakness (glānī), apprehension or fearing some calamity (śaṅkā), envy (asūyā), intoxication (mada), weariness or strain of the body and mind (śrama), indolence (ālasya) etc.

The sthāyībhāva is not rasa, but the possibility and promise of it; it is unmanifested rasa. In aesthetic attitude, the sentiment is not generated as a nascent dynamism for immediate motor expression in a practical encounter; rather, the sentiment is contemplated, relished, savoured. The terms like rasana, carvāṇa, āśvadana are used to denote this aesthetic relish. These terms are borrowed from the physiology of taste, especially the tasting of a liqueur of fine vintage. Now sentiment cannot be communicated by descriptive verbalization. Only sympathetic induction can communicate sentiment. This can be done if the spectator confronts a situation identical to those in real life which excite his emotion, but of course more idealized, far more sensitively organized. Therefore, the stimulus-situation of ordinary life has to be transported to art. The stimulus of any emotion in real life – when presented in any piece of creative literature, is called the vibhāva. According to Abhinavagupta, the causal relation that exits in actual life between a stimulus and the rise of emotion is significantly altered in the transposition to art. Vibhāva stands for the dramatic situation presented on the stage which is not the cause but only the medium through which emotion arises in the actor. The sentiment in the spectator is due to identification with the hero. Thus in real life the sight of a pretty girl may trigger the erotic emotion into nascent erotic feeling. But in dramatic situation, the spectator experiences the erotic sentiment by sympathetic induction from the actor, who is therefore a medium for the spectator. In the same way, the heroine is the medium, not the cause, through which the emotion arises in the actor himself. Vibhāva is so called because it arouses emotion in a manner quite different from that in which emotion arises in actual life. The ordinary cause (viz., the actual character, which forms the locus of rasa) leads to pain or pleasure, as the case may be. But the vibhāva, which is a literary symbol carved out by the literary artist to signify this actual character, rouses emotion which always leads
to unalloyed joy or unmixed bliss. The vibhāva has been further defined as the focus of knowledge or cognition which makes the three kinds of representation, through words, significant bodily behaviour and emotional display, capable of being sensed.

Vibhāvas are distinguished into two kinds, ālambana vibhāva and uddīpana vibhāva. Ālambana vibhāva is the basic stimulus, the object which is primarily responsible for the arousal of emotion. Uddīpana vibhāva is the enhancing stimulus. It is the environment, the entire surrounding, which enhances the emotive effect of the focal point or the object which primarily stimulates emotion. Thus in the case of the erotic sentiment, woman is the basic stimulus and a garden, the moon, the spring season, the south wind, the singing bird (kokilā) etc. are the enhancing stimuli.

Anubhāvas are the results of the excitation produced in the vibhāva, say, the heroine, as the dramatic situation develops. When an emotion is excited in the mind, it is followed by certain physical changes in the speech and behaviour of the individual. In actual life, these physical changes are looked upon as effects of emotion, and, in the context of rasa, they are called anubhāvas to distinguish them from the physical effects of emotion which arises in real life. In the erotic sentiment, the glance is the most common example of anubhāva.

According to K.C. Pandey, anubhāvas are called so, because “they communicate the basic emotion to the characters, present on the stage, or make known the nature of emotion in the hero, as also because they make the spectator experience an identical emotion (Anubhāvayati).” Anubhāva makes the three kinds of representation actually sensed. Anubhāvas are voluntary expressions of emotion, such as changes of eyes and eyebrows, which spring from the intention of the person, swayed by emotion, to communicate it to others. But Bharata also mentions a new category, the sāttvika bhāvas, which are physical changes and movements that automatically follow the rise of emotion. These are involuntary expressions of emotion. When an emotion is excited excessively in one’s mind, there are unconscious changes, brought about by hormonic or endocrinal action, glandular discharges. For instance, we can cause laughing by tickling the skin, but we cannot cause a blush by any physical means, that is, by external action on the body. It is the mind which must be affected, when it emerges as a smooth, involuntary expression. Such
expressions constitute the sāttvika bhāvas. Sāttvika bhāvas are eight in number: rigidity (stambhaḥ), sweat (sveda), horripilation (romāṅca), crack in the voice (svarabheda), shivering (vepathu), change of the facial colour (vaivarmya), tears (aśru) and swoon (pralaya). These sāttvikabhāvas are considered by many ālāṅkārikas to be a special kind of anubhāvas. Some believe that since they are of the nature of anubhāvas, they need not be mentioned separately in the theories of rasa. 64

So when any sthāyībhāva (basic emotion) of a reader or spectator is correlated with these three — excitant (vibhāva), ensuant response (anubhāva) and transitory feelings (vyabhicāribhāva) — it is converted or manifested into poetic pleasure (rasa). All the nine basic emotions are transformed into their respective sentiments: love into erotic sentiment (śṛṅgāra) laughter into comic (hāsya), sorrow into pathetic (karuṇa), anger into furious (raudra), heroism into valour (vīra), fear into terrible (bhayanaka), disgust into odious (vibhatsa), wonder into marvellous (adbhuta), detachment or serenity (nirveda) into quietistic (śānta). The Indian rhetoricians compare the conversion of the basic emotion into rasa to the conversion of milk into curd or cheese when mixed with anything sour.

According to Bharata, rasa is so called because it is capable of being tasted. How is rasa tasted? Just as people in a contended state of mind (sumanasāḥ), eating the food prepared well (saṁskṛta) with various spicy things taste the various flavours and obtain delight and satisfaction (harṣādīn), in the same manner spectators, in the right (receptive) frame of mind (sumanasāḥ), taste the permanent mental conditions spiced with various kinds of mental states enacted and combined with verbal, physical and sāttvika acting and obtain pleasure and satisfaction. It is for this reason that they have been explained as nāṭya-rasa. 65

Though Bharata uses the concept of rasa in the context of drama, no doubt can be raised as to whether the explanation of dramatic rasa can apply to poetic also. For the division of visual poetry (drṣṭya kāvya, which is drama) and aural poetry (śravya kāvya) is only imaginary. Both are visual and aural. If the listener while grasping the words of poetry takes them just as words, he would be devoid of aesthetic enjoyment. A stage has to be created in his mind according to the poet’s description, where the characters of the poem should
appear as living individuals and exhibit their varied behaviour. The reader, to get the aesthetic relish, should make appear, by dint of his imagination, the whole theme of the poem before his inner eye. Thus there is no aesthetic enjoyment unless poetry becomes dramatized. The goal of both is the production of rasa. As Abhinavagupta observes in Locana, “kāvye’pi ca lokanātyadharmisthānīyena svabhāvoktivakrotiprakāradvayenālaukikaprasannamadhurajavishabdamalāngavādīyogādiya-meva rasavārtā l”. According to him, the occurrence of rasa in poetry is wholly analogous to its occurrence in drama. Where drama makes use of realistic style (lokadharmī) and theatrical style (nātyadharmī), poetry uses the styles of direct expression (svabhāvokti) and artificial expression (vakroktī). In both cases rasa is produced in these styles by the combination of extraordinary vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas presented in the language that is clear, sweet and forceful. So what we get in both are the vibhāvas and anubhāvas. They are presented chiefly through description in poetry and through acting in drama.

Rasa is made up of joy. The relish of rasa is the arising of joy in the soul from the contact with the matters of poetry. In the Locana, Abhinavagupta defines rasa in the following terms: 

śabdasamarpymaññahṛdayasaṅṅivādasundara-

vibhāvanubhāvasamucitapraṅgvinivīṣṭaratyādīvāsanānurāgasukumārasv-

asaṅṅividānandacarvanāyāpyāparaṣanīyarūpo rasaḥ, sa kāvyavāpāraikagocaro rasadhvaniriti, sa ca dhvanireveti, sa eva mukhyatātmety I 67. According to him, rasa is tasted through the act of blissful relishing (tasting) the beautitude of one’s own consciousness. This tasting is pleasant in that the consciousness is coloured by the latent traces of the mental states of love etc., pre-existing in the minds of the spectators (or readers). Such traces are aroused by the corresponding vibhāvas and anubhāvas, which—pleasant (beautiful) because of their appeal to heart — are transmitted by the suggestive words of the poet.

The Dhvani school tried to harmonize the idea of rasa with the theory of dhvani. Ānandavardhana himself says in the Vṛtti of Kārikā III.19 that the poet should write only with a view to delineating sentiment. He also says that his object is not merely to establish dhvani, rather his effort has all along been to make it clear that the proper goal of poets is to infuse suggested sentiments into their works. 68 It was realized that poetry was not, as Dāngīn thought, the mere
clothing of agreeable ideas in agreeable language; the feelings and moods play an important part in it. The poetic context is a creatively organized context for the communication of feeling. Feeling cannot be communicated through propositional statement. In fact many critics believe the term ‘communication’ is misleading. Feeling is essentially private, and the poet cannot donate feeling, as a man can donate money or some physical object, to another. The feeling ultimately experienced by the reader is his: it is the movement of his sensibility, the stirring of his heart, a self manifested state of his mind. Now feelings and moods are in themselves inexpressible. At the most we give a name to a feeling, e.g., we can call it love, sorrow or anger. But by mere naming of the feeling or mood, the poet cannot arouse it in the reader. The poet can at best directly express the three factors which bring about the *rasa*, viz. the *vibhāva*, the *anubhāva* and *vyabhicāribhāva*. The poet builds up a system of objective correlatives, essentially identical with the context of stimuli in life which can elicit the emotional reaction. Bharata had used the word *niśpatti*, emergence or outcome, for the appearance of *rasa* when the prime (basic) and the ancillary (transitory) stimuli etc. were creatively organized. Ānandavardhana’s claim is that this *niśpatti* really means *abhivyakti*, manifestation, as the emotional reaction is ever abiding in the reader as latent reactivity. And since what made the *rasa* manifest itself in the poetic context was not the communication of a propositional meaning but the presentation of a sensitively organized complex of stimuli, he affirmed that stimuli and reaction, *vibhāvas* and *rasa*, stood in the relation of suggestor (*vyañjaka*) and suggested (*vyañgya*). Therefore the poet can only suggest the *rasa* with the description of the *vibhāvas* etc. He can awaken in us, through the power of suggestion inherent in words and their meanings, a particular *alaukika* (dissociated) condition of the soul. It is true that the same mood or feeling felt by the original historical character or the hero (say Rāma) cannot be aroused by the poet. However, he can call up a reflection of the mood, which is similar in some respects, and which the reader realizes as a particular condition of his mind. The reader realizes the feeling depicted because “the artistic creations are generalized, and in this generalized form the reader realizes them as his own, through a certain community of human feelings, and because the germs of the feelings already remain in a latent form in his mind.”

The particular *alaukika* (dissociated) condition of the reader’s
soul in the enjoyment of such feeling is in poetry and drama the relish of *rasa*, which can be brought into consciousness only by the power of suggestion inherent in words and their meanings.

Ānandavardhana calls the third variety of *dhvani* the ‘*rasādi*’, which means *rasa* and the like, where Ānandavardhana names *bhāva*, *rasābhāsa*, *bhāvābhāsa*, and *bhāvapraśānti* as ‘*rasādi***’. According to Abhinavagupta, *rasa* appears when a stable state of mind (*cittavṛtti*), constantly directed toward a proper object, is aesthetically relished. *Bhāva* appears when a transitory state is so relished. The improper variety (*ābhāsa*) of *rasa* or *bhāva* appears when either of them is directed toward an improper object. When Rāvana’s love is directed toward Śītā, it is a case of the improper or spurious erotic. An emotion (*bhāva*) which goes to form an improper *rasa* is an “improper emotion” (*bhāvābhāsa*). Regarding *bhāvapraśānti* Abhinavagupta says that as the cessation or checking of an advanced emotion which is suggestive of *rasa* is especially delightful to the heart, it is separately mentioned in the list of *rasādi*, although it is actually included in the term *bhāva*.  

Vastudhvani and *alaṅkāradhvani* can be expressly and directly denoted. On the other hand *rasa* etc, though they shine forth having been evoked through the potency of the *vācyā*, can never be an object of direct denotation. *Rasa* etc. appear rather as matters that come to life in the process of being relished (*āsvādyamāṇa*), and for this there is no explanation other than the operation of suggestion. Here there is no scope of operation of the power of *abhidhā*. Moreover, any of the conditions of *lakṣaṇā*, such as blocking of the primary meaning, cannot also be at work here, because there is no halting gait in the journey from word to meaning. In the words of Abhinavagupta, “*rasabhāvatadā-bhāsataprāśamāḥ punarāt kādācābhidhiyante, atha cāsvādyaṃnātāprāṇatayā bhānti l tatra dhvanaṇaavyāpārādṛte nāsti kalpanāntaram l skhaladgatitvābhāve mukhyārthabādhāderlakṣaṇāni-bandhanasyānāśaṅkanīyatvāt I”.

Abhinavagupta further holds that this suggested entity, *rasa* or the like, is not generated within us after the fashion that joy is generated from the direct force of the words “A son is born to you.” The denotation and secondary powers (*abhidhā śakti* and *lakṣaṇā śakti*) are able to give us only cognitions or concepts. The joy that may follow from “A son is born to you” or the grief that may follow
from “Your unmarried daughter is pregnant” is a subsequent development growing out of the word-meanings or concepts. In the case of suggestion, on the other hand, the meaning itself is the *rasa*, the flavour that we relish. Aesthetic pleasure is not the result of a meaning; it is the meaning itself. *Rasa* makes itself felt (*parisphurat*) as something the whole life of which consists in the ongoing process of relishing and which thereby differs from something like ordinary joy or grief that is a finished or frozen state (*siddhasabhāva*). The meaning produced by denotative force of words generates a fixed mental reaction, pleasure or grief. The suggestive force of words, on the other hand, produces an ongoing process of relishing or enjoyment. This process of tasting (relishing) arises in a person possessed with aesthetic sensibility (*sahṛdaya*) through his empathy upon apprehending the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*, an empathy made possible by his heart’s being in tune with the poetic message and also the hearts of other persons. In the *Vṛtti* of *Kārikā* 1.4 it is stated that *rasadhvani* is *vācyasāmarthyākṣipta*. So in case of *rasādi dhvani*, suggestion is an operation of a word as helped out by that word’s literal meaning. But this literal meaning (*vācyārtha*), which will be a *vibhāva* or the like, does not generate emotion like the joy generated by the birth of a son.

So *rasa* does not fall within workaday expression. *Rasa* is something that one cannot dream of expressing by the literal sense. Ānandavardhana argues in the *Vṛtti* of *Kārikā* 1.4 that were it been granted that *rasa* could be directly denoted, then it would have been possible either by its proper name or through the delineation of the setting etc. (*vibhāvādi*). If the first alternative were accepted, it would mean that there would be absence of the experience of *rasa* etc. in instances where there is absence of proper names signifying them. As a matter of common experience we do never have a reference to the *rasas* by means of their proper names. Even in instances where proper names are present, the experience of *rasa* is due to the delineation of *vibhāvādi* leading up to the *rasa*, and not because of the names. The *rasa* experience is merely referred to by means of the proper names; it is not caused by it. And in several other instances, we do not have the names of the *rasas* at all and yet we experience *rasa*. There will arise no *rasa* by a mere mention of words like *ṣṛṅgāra* etc. in a *kāvyā* where the delineation of *vibhāvādi* is absent. Since there is an experience of *rasa* only through the special *vibhāvādi* without the proper
name of that *rasa* and since there is no experience of *rasa* only by the use of proper names, we may conclude, on the light of these facts, both positive and negative, that *rasa* etc. are only implied by the latent power of the expressed, and in no way denoted explicitly by their proper names.

In the *Kārikā* I.2, as against the contention of the *dehātmavādins* like Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin etc. that poetry is embodied in word and meaning (*śabdārtha  śarīram tāvat kāvyam*), Ānandavardhana argues that it can be inferred from the reference to a body that poetry must also have something as a soul to give it life.\(^75\) So at this initial stage, Ānandavardhana applies the phrase ‘*kāvyasyātmā*’ to the general meaning of poetry.\(^76\) This meaning of poetry, which is its soul, even as the soul is of a body which is naturally charming by the configuration of graceful and proper limbs, has two varieties: the literal (expressed or *vācyam*) and the implied (*pratiyamāna*). Now we do not say something to be poetry solely from its having a meaning. Both everyday sentences and Vedic sentences have meaning without being poems. There must be something special about a poem’s having a meaning which wins the admiration of cultured critics. This special something is the part of meaning that is implied (*pratiyamāna*) and that is determined by cultured critics to be the soul of poetry because it is a cause of the special property of poetry.\(^77\) This *pratiyamāna* is again divided into *vastu*, *alaṅkāra* and *rasa*.

Though Ānandavardhana stated *dhvani* to be threefold, he attached the highest importance to *rasadhvani* only. In *Kārikā* I.5, Ānandavardhana says “*kāvyasyātmā sa evārtha*”, meaning “It is just this that is the soul of poetry”. The *Vṛtti* of *Kārikā* I.5 says, “*vividhavācyavācakaračakaračanaṇa-prapaṇa-śāraṇaḥ kāvyasya sa evārthaḥ sārabhūtaḥ*” It means: It is just this meaning that happens to be the quintessence of poetry whose outward charm is secured by the combination of varied and uncommon expressed meanings, expressions and art of composition. Abhinavagupta in his commentary of the above *Kārikā* says that by the word ‘*sa*’ (‘it is just this’) what we are here to think of is the third variety, namely suggested *rasa* (*rasadhvani*).\(^78\) So it is *rasa* that is the soul of poetry. *Vastudhvani* and *alaṅkāradhvani*, however, regularly end up in producing *rasa*. And it was in order to mark their superiority to the ordinary expressions (literal sense or expressed sense) that it has been said in I.1 that *dhvani* in general is the soul of poetry: *kāvyasyātmā dhvaniḥ*. So though one can discern
other types of suggested meaning, they can all be understood from the synecdoche of *rasa* and *bhāva* since those are the most important representatives of the rest.\(^78\) Abhinavagupta also observes that *bhāvadhvani* etc. also simply help the delineation of *rasa*. So *rasa* is the most important and appealing factor in *kāvya*.

Ānandavardhana presented not only the theory of *dhvani* in its proper perspective, but also gave new fillip to the theory of *rasa*, which had been almost lost in the maze of dozens of rhetorical categories (*alaṅkāras*) promulgated by poeticians, from Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin to Ānandavardhana’s own times. In other words, the *rasa* theory came into its own, only when it was officially amalgamated with the *dhvani* theory.

### SECTION 5: A FURTHER CLASSIFICATION OF *DHVANI*

We have seen that Ānandavardhana makes a division of *dhvani* into *vastudhvani*, *alaṅkāradhvani* and *rasadhvani* on the basis of the nature of *dhvani*. In the *Vṛtti* of *Kārikā* I.13, he makes a further classification of *dhvani* which is the most fundamental division (*sāmānya*) of *dhvani* and includes within its scope the *vastu*, *alaṅkāra* and the *rasadhvani*. Now the question naturally arises as to what benefit accrues from this additional classification. Abhinavagupta’s explanation is that by this new classification Ānandavardhana wants to indicate the co-operation of the operations of denotation or *abhidhā*, sentence meaning or *tātparya* and secondary usage or *lakṣaṇa*, and that of the sympathy of the relisher and what is wished to be said on the part of poet in the operation called *dhvanana*.\(^79\) So this additional classification is based on how the suggested is related to the suggestor, since there is no suggestion without the suggestor.

Broadly considered, *dhvani* is of two types: *avivakṣitavācyya* and *vivakṣitānyaparavācyya*. *Avivakṣitavācyya* is that type of *dhvani* where the expressed sense (primary sense or *vācyya*) is not intended, i.e., not intended to predominate over the suggested. This type of *dhvani* is based upon *lakṣaṇa*, and is called *lakṣaṇāmula*. Here the expressed sense is not intended for such reasons as that it makes no sense in the context. *Vivakṣitānyaparavācyya* is that type of *dhvani* where the expressed sense is intended but is subordinated to a
second meaning. The expressed sense is intended in so far as it does make sense in the context, but by the power of its beauty it extends our apprehension to a suggested sense. This second type of dhvani proceeds directly on the basis of the primary sense (expressed sense) and no part is played by lakṣanā. So this dhvani is called abhidhāmūla. Due to this fact, in the second type a meaning (artha) is primarily the suggestor; in the first type a word.

The avivākṣitavācya variety has two more subdivisions: arthāntarasanākramitavācya and atyantatirāskṛtavācya. In the former case the expressed sense is shifted (saṅkramita) to a different (associated) sense, whereas in the latter it has its utility in suggesting another sense and is, then, destroyed completely or set aside entirely (tiraskṛta). The vivākṣitānyaparāvācya dhvani can also be divided into two categories: saṅālakṣyakramavāŋgyadhvani and asaṅālakṣyakramavāŋgyadhvani. In the first alternative, the temporal sequence between the cognition of the expressed and the suggested sense is noticeable. In the second alternative, the sequence between the two is not perceptible, and the suggested sense is grasped simultaneously with the expressed. The saṅilakṣakramavāŋgyadhvani is again distributed into two varieties: it is ṣabdaśaktimūla when it is based on the suggestive power of words, and it is arthaśaktimūla when it is based on the suggestive power of meaning. The arthaśaktimūla variety is again divided into three categories. The first is that where the suggested idea (vastu) concerned is objectively possible, i.e., can be found in the world of nature, and is called svataḥsambhavi. The second category is called kaviprauḍhoktimātrasiddha. Here the suggested idea is invented by the poet’s own imaginative faculty and hence the existence of this type of suggestion is real only in the ornate expression of the poet himself. The third category is called kavinibaddha-prauḍhoktimātrasiddha. Here the suggested idea is brought into being not by the poet’s fancy but “by the imagination of some one among the characters created by the poet—the creatures of the poet’s Muse.” So the existence of this type of suggestion is real only in the ornate expression of a character created by the poet.

Abhinavagupta in his Locana brings out the characteristic features of arthāntarasanākramitavācyadhvani:

(i) The literal meaning (expressed sense) is possible, i.e., it is not entirely out of place.
The literal meaning, however, is not congruent enough to bring out the complete sense of the sentence, and is not as such of any use.

In order to bring out the intended sense of the sentence, it becomes associated with any property other than the property of vācyatva, and, as such, it indicates (lakṣīta) a different sense by the power of indication (lakṣāṇā).

As the expressed sense (vācyārtha) is thus developed into a different sense based on the power of lakṣāṇā, it remains present here as an unnoticed property-possessor like the thread of a necklace.

Abhinavagupta here uses the analogy of ‘the thread of a necklace’ (ṣutrayāyena) because both the saṅkramitavācyā and the thread of a necklace are unnoticed property-possessors. What are noticed are the meanings suggested by the vācyā and the flowers or gems strung on the necklace.

The arthāntara saṅkramitavācyadhvanī is instanced in the following verse:

\[ \text{tadā jāyante guṇā yadā te saḥṛdayairgrhyante } \]
\[ \text{rabikiraṇānugṛḥītāni bhavanti kamalāni kamalāni } \]

It means, “Virtues blossom when admired by men of taste. When graced by the sun’s rays a lotus becomes a lotus.”

The idea here is that if virtues are not recognized by others, they become bereft of their values and ultimately get lost, in the same way as the flower of the dense forest withers silently, unseen and unenjoyed by any one, though it has its beauty to charm the eye and fragrance to amuse the heart. The suggestive word here is the second ‘lotus’ in “a lotus becomes a lotus.” It suggests that when the rays of sun fall on them they fully blossom and possess the superior beauty, fragrance and the glory of being the sit of the Goddess Lakṣmī etc. In this verse there is failure of the literal sense of the second occurrence of the word ‘lotus’ in “a lotus becomes a lotus.” Taken in its literal sense, the second occurrence of the word ‘lotus’ becomes useless, for it would merely be a repetition of the prior occurrence. So there is a shifting from the expressed to the secondary sense (lakṣyārtha). The lakṣyārtha of the second ‘lotus’ is lotus.
transformed by such property as being the abode of the Goddess of beauty, viz, Lakṣmi. The purpose of employing the secondary usage is to achieve a suggestion. The secondary sense is only that from which the suggestion arises. The suggested properties here are the full blossoming, the beauty, the fragrance, the tenderness etc. In this example, the suggested sense does not differ very noticeably from the lakṣya sense. Kamala conveys the sense of an object endowed with excellences referred to just now.

In this verse there is no intention to express the literal sense. So it is an example of avivakṣitavācyya. However, the literal sense in the form of property possessor is not totally set aside in favour of a secondary sense, but it is carried along in the sense of lotus which is qualified by such properties as being the abode of Goddess Lakṣmi, having exquisite beauty and fragrance. So this verse is an example of arthāntarasāṃkramitavācyadhvani.

The characteristics of atantyatirāṣṭavācyadhvani are the following:  
(i) There is the literal sense,  
(ii) The literal sense is not possible in the context,  
(iii) It serves merely a means to perceiving some suggested sense.  
(iv) As soon as that end is attained, it runs away as it were.

Ānandavardhana cites the following verse of the First Poet Vālmīki as an illustration of atantyatirāṣṭavācyadhvani:

\[
rabisaṃkrāntasaubhāgyastuśārāvṛtamanḍalaḥ  
niḥśvāsāndha ivaḍārṣaścandramā na prakāśate  
\]

It means, “All his charm to the sun hath fled  
And his orb is hid in snow;  
Like a mirror by breath blinded,  
The moon now does not glow.”

This is Rāma’s speech describing the advent of hemantaṛtu when he was at Pañcavati. Conventionally, the word ‘blind’ (andha) means one whose sight is destroyed. Now a mirror is insentient and therefore has no sight to be destroyed. As the mirror cannot become literally blind, blindness in its literal sense cannot be applied to a mirror. The word blind can apply to a mirror only in the secondary sense of ‘being incapable of making a clear representation of external objects,’ a sense occasioned by the presence of that similar incapability of visualizing external objects in a man who is literally blind. The purpose in
using ‘blind’ (andha) with reference to the mirror is that it suggests the properties of exceptional loss of beauty, uselessness (the mirror is useless for it has completely lost its power to reflect, the purpose it is intend to perform) etc. of the mirror. The moon, in the same way, is useless too, for it is without its luster, which has passed over to the sun. In this verse, the literal or primary sense of the word ‘blind’ being incompatible is discarded in favour of the secondary sense and the suggested idea arises as the prayojana or purpose of resorting to the secondary sense. After the word ‘blind’ has given rise to the other sense, it looses its significance.

In both the instances of avivakṣitavācyadhvani, the suggested sense is vastu. The reason is that the avivakṣitavācyadhvani is based on lakṣaṇā, and in the case of suggestion based on lakṣaṇā, the suggested sense must invariably be some vastu, and can never be an alaṅkāra, or rasa, for in a lakṣaṇā, the purpose (prayojana) is always some sort of vastu.

In case of the avivakṣitavacyadhvani, the varieties of suggested sense were distinguished on the basis of the literal sense. However, the two-fold division of the vivakṣitānyaparavācyadhvani into saṃlakṣakrama and asaṃlakṣakrama types is made solely within suggested sense itself. In this later case, the distinction is based on the process by which the suggestion operates.

The saṃlakṣakramavāṅgyadhvani is also called anusvānasannivadhvani. The resonance of a bell always appear at an interval from the sound produced by the striking of the bell. Just as the sequence between the first sound and the vibrations thereof is noticeable when a bell is rung, so also the sequence between the apprehension of the expressed and the suggested sense is distinctly noticeable. Vastu and alaṅkāradhvani fall within the category of saṃlakṣakramavāṅgyadhvani.

We have discussed about and instansiated the śabdasaktimula variety of saṃlakṣakramavāṅgyadhvani while analyzing the alaṅkāradhvani. There we have cited the lines “atrantare kusumāsamaya” etc. as an example of śabdaśaktimulaalaṅkāradhvani and have shown its difference from the expressed figure of speech.

In case of arthaśaktimuladhvani, viz, suggestion based upon the power of meaning, the literal or conventional meaning (expressed sense) gives rise to another meaning through its own power of implication, and not through the
denotative power of words. The conventional meaning or expressed sense has such a great force that no additional words are required for suggestion. The suggested meaning is similar to a resonance. As Ānandavardhana states in the Vṛttī of Kārikā II.22, “yatārthaḥ svasāmarthyādarthāntaramabhivyamanakti śabdavyāpāraṁ vinaiva so’rthaśaktyudbhavo nāmānusvānopamavyaṅgyo dhvanih I” Ānandavardhana cites the following verse from Kumāra-Sambhava:

\[
evaṅvādini devarṣau pārśve pituradhomukhi I \\
lilākamalapatrāṇī gaṇayāmāsa Pārvatī II
\]

It means, “As the divine sage said this, The down-faced Pārvatī by her father’s side Counted the petals of the toy-lotus She held in her hand.”

We do not find any incongruity in gathering the expressed sense of the verse. Hence, the vācyā is vivakṣita. Pārvatī’s action of counting lotus and lowering her face, which is the vācyārtha (the expressed sense) leads us to the suggested sense that Pārvatī is feeling shy to hear a proposal regarding her marriage with Śiva. But the description of Pārvatī’s action do not immediately bring in the heart of the reader of the verse the information (i.e., vastu) regarding Pārvatī’s feeling of shyness (which is the suggested sense), for Pārvatī’s counting of lotus petals and lowering her face can be imagined as due to other causes like inattention or naivete. The suggested idea, viz, the idea regarding Pārvatī’s feeling of shyness dawns up in the heart of the reader only after he calls to mind the earlier incidents such as Pārvatī’s austerities to win Śiva as her husband. So the suggested sense comes after an interval, and the transition from the vācyā (expressed) to the suggested sense occurs through noticeable stages. So this verse is an instance of saṃlakṣyakramavyaṅgyadhvani. The expressed sense, which is the peculiar description of the situation, by its own inherent capability takes the reader’s mind to the suggested sense by stages, and this is not done by the operation of words. Hence it is an instance of arthaśaktyudbhavadhvani.

The above example also belongs to the category of svataḥsambhavi arthaśaktyudbhavadhvani, since such a fact as counting lotus-petals can possibly exist in the world of reality.

As an example of kavipraudhoktimātrasiddha arthaśaktyudbhavadhvani, we may take the following verse:
sajjayati suravimaso na tavadarpayati yuvatijanalakṣyamukhān l
abhinavasahakāramukhānnavapallavapatralānananāṅgasya śarān l

It means, "The mouth of spring keeps ready but does not yet fling
The arrows of Cupid, with sharp heads
Of new mango buds and feathers of fresh leaves,
At young women, that targets are?"

Here spring has been personified and figured as the friend of the God of love (Kāma). Spring only prepares, but does not give over the arrows to his friend to use against young maids. The expression refers to the stage of spring when the blossoming of mango-sprouts has just begun. The suggested idea is that torments of love are just beginning and they will gradually grow stronger and stronger. To bring forth this suggested idea in the heart of the connoisseur, the poet has described the particular period of spring when the mango is just coming into bud in appropriate expression. If instead of the above verse, the poet had merely written, "In the spring, the mango begins to bud and leaf," it would just be a statement of fact without suggesting anything. In the ordinary world, it is impossible for the non-sentient season to act just like a sentient being. But in the poet’s world of imagination, conceiving the season as sentient being is not an impossibility, provided the poet uses the appropriate imaginative expression to effect the meaning he intends to convey.

In the previous examples of sequential suggestion arising by the power of meaning (arhaśaktyudbhavasaṁkṣyakramavyaṅgya-dhvanī), a meaning (artha) suggested a fact or situation (vāstu). So those were the cases of vāstuvānī. Now a meaning may also suggest a figure of speech, so suggestion arising from the power of meaning can be an alaṅkāradhvani. We have already exposited it when we were dealing with alaṅkāradhvani based on arthaśakti while discussing about the different varieties of alaṅkāradhvani in Section 4 of this chapter. We may now summarise the entire discussion regarding arthaśaktyudbhavānuraṇanarupavyaṅgya-dhvanī thus: resonance-like suggestion based upon the power of sense is to be understood as occurring wherever a meaning (sense) of any sort, or a meaning in the form of a particular figure of speech, gives rise to a second meaning or a second figure of speech in such a way that the second is predominant by its possessing a greater degree of beauty than the first.
Under the _asaṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya_ category of _vivakṣitānyaparavācyadhvani_ type comes all primary suggestion of _rasas_, _bhāvas_, _rasābhāsas_, _bhāvābhāsas_, _rasaśānti_ and _bhāvaśānti_. Ānandavardhana says in _Kārikā_ II.3, “rasabhāvatadābhāsatasatprasāntyādirakramaḥ”. We will concentrate our attention on _rasa_ only, since the discussion of _rasa_ only is relevant to our thesis. In the above _Kārikā rasa_ is said to be ‘akrama’, which points out the fact that _rasa_ is apprehended almost simultaneously with the apprehension of the primary sense. Logically the two cannot arise at the same time, and it must be admitted that there is some sequence from the conventional to the suggested sense. But the process is so rapid that it is almost imperceptible in the same manner as the piercing of a hundred lotus-petals kept one upon another with a needle appears to occur all at once, although there is a very minute temporal gap between the piercing of one petal and the other just bellow it. In case of _rasadhvani_, the _vācyārtha_ generally constitutes a representation of the _vibhāvas_, _anubhāvas_ and _vyābhicārībhāvas_. When we understand these, the basic emotion or _stāyībhāva_ corresponding to this _vibhāva_ etc. arises in us and is developed to that climax when we taste our own emotion, which invariably occasions an intense state of joy. As Abhinavagupta says in _Locana_ of _Kārikā_ II.3, “rasadhvanistu sa eva yo’tra mukhyatayā vibhāvānubhāvavyābhicārīśaṁyojanoditasthāyīpratipattikasya pratipattuḥ sthāyyaṁśacarvaṇāprayukta evāsvādapakaraṇaḥ”  91

As an example of _rasadhvani_, Abhinavagupta in _Locana_ of _Kārikā_ III.4 cites the following verse from _Rāmābhūdaya_:

\[\begin{align*}
&kṛtakakupitairbāṣpāmbhobhiḥ sadainyavilokitair
&vanamapi gataḥ yasya priyā dhṛtāpi tathāmbayā ī
&navajaladharaśyāmāḥ paśyantiśo bhavatīṁ vinā
&kaṭhinahṛdayo jīvatyeba priye sa tava priyaḥ ī campaigned
\end{align*}\]

It means, “Although with feigned anger,

with tears and with despairing glances,

my mother sought to hold you back,

you followed me in exile out of love,

who now, without you, gaze upon

the horizon black with its new clouds:

how hard this shows your lover’s heart

75
Sitā is far away from Rāma, in Rāvana’s captivity. The rainy season approaches. This intensifies Rāma’s pangs of separation. He utters the above words from the depth of his agonized heart. Here Sitā’s disobedience of her mother-in-law’s command who sought to hold her back, and accompanying Rāma in the forest reflects the depth of her love. Rāma’s addresses as “your lover” and “my love” express his extreme love for Sitā, which is the basic emotion (sthāyībhāva) of love (rati). In the emotion of love (rati), the hero and the heroine feels that love is all-in-all of their lives, that each of them is the very life of the other. Sitā is the alambana vibhāva of Rāma’s love. Now the monsoon has set in. Clouds heap upon clouds in the sky, and all the sides darken. Rāma has always endured the monsoon along with Sitā, but this time he is alone. So “new clouds” heightens Rāma’s love, and therefore acts as the stimulant (uddīpana vibhāva). His love is further intensified by the vyabhicārabhāva which is his mental depression indicated by his calling himself “hard...heart”. The particle ‘still’ (eva) in the phrase ‘still lives’ (jīvateyeba) implies that Rāma continues to breathe, there is no death, and the lover’s will meet again. So the rasa here is love-in-separation (vipralambha śrīgāra), and not tragedy (karuṇa); karuṇa rasa would be effected had the verse pictured Rāma and Sitā as never to meet again.

The basic emotion rati is latent in the hearts of every sympathetic reader. When in the manner described in the above verse, the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicārabhāvas are represented fully in poetry, the rati that is inborn in the heart of the sensitive readers is stirred and developed to that emotional climax, when we, realizing our emotion rati, reach a blissful state of mind. This bliss is the aesthetic pleasure, the rasa, which is the goal of any aesthetic pursuit. This rasa is not realized by any of the words denoting it, but is suggested to us immediately we understand the vibhāvas etc. in the shape of vācyārtha. Rasa is never expressly mentioned by the words śrīgāra or karuṇa. They are suggested from the situations; and only when a feeling is suggested, it calls forth the corresponding emotional mood in us, which is then developed and results in our enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure. As we have stated earlier, though the aesthetic pleasure appears to arise simultaneously with our reading of the verse, there is some interval between our knowledge of the vācyārtha and the suggestion of the
However, the krama or stages by which the suggestion is had from the vācyārtha are not well discernable (asaṃlakṣya).

In the Vṛtti of Kārikā III.4, Ānandavardhana cites a verse from Tāpasavatsarajācarita as an example of rasadhvani:

\[
\text{utkampinī bhayaparishkalitāṃśukāntā}
\]
\[
te \text{locane pratidishaṃ vidhure kṣipanti I}
\]
\[
krūreṇa dārupatayā sahasaiva dagdhā
dhūmāndhitena dahanena na vikṣitāsi II
\]

It means, “You were trembling; in your fear the robe was slipping from your shoulders; and you cast those eyes helpless in all directions. But the cruel fire, pitiless, burned on with swift attack; blinded by its smoke, it destroyed you without seeing.”

In this verse, the suggestiveness is present in a word. The word “those” of the phrase “those eyes” is suggestive of rasa.

A false rumor about the burning of Vāsavadattā reaches king Udayana, who then laments over the death of his beloved and utters the above words. The king calls to his mind the sweet memories of his dalliance with her, when her beautiful eyes used to pleasure him, the qualities of the eyes like motions of the eyebrows (bhrukṣepa) and sidelong glances (katākṣa) would now and then stir in him the emotion of rati. But those very eyes (te locane), with its various qualities, are now lost for ever with the tragic death of Vāsavadattā, exist only in memory as reminiscences of past events. The word those (te) of the phrase “those eyes” (te locane) indicates that he is recollecting the beauty of her eyes and that this recollection only gives rise to the emotion of sorrow (śoka) for śoka arises from the destruction of the beloved. Those eyes, which were always the abode of beauty in motion, were helpless at the time of burning, finding no goal of sight in their terror as if asking, “Who will save me? Where is my husband?”

The words “uktampinī” (trembling), “bhayaparishkalitāṃśukāntā” (the robe was slipping from shoulders in fear), “te locane pratidishaṃ vidhure kṣipanti” (casting those eyes helpless in all directions) express the symptoms (anubhāvas) of the
queen's fear. The thought that those eyes of her were in such a depredated state and he (the king) could do nothing to prevent that fear acts as a stimulant (uddīpana) of the speaker's intense sorrow. The fire, by nature, is cruel. And yet the speaker thinks that in spite of its cruelty, were it not been blinded by the smoke and hence unable to see her, it could not do such a heinous deed. Thus the memory of the beauty of her eyes now acts as a stimulus of sorrow (śoka) which overwhelms the king. All this development of meaning is achieved by the presence of the word 'those' (te) and this development of meaning flashes into our mind almost immediately (asaṃlakṣya krama) with our reading of the verse. Thus the word 'those' serves as the special cause of karuṇa (pathetic) rasa by suggesting various memory pictures of the qualities that her eyes possessed. Qualities like 'bhrūkṣepa', 'katākṣa' by themselves are suggestive of śṛṅgāra (erotic). But in the present context, they are presented as irretrievably lost and existing only in memory as reminiscences of past events, giving rise to the karuṇa (pathetic) rasa instead of śṛṅgāra. This new efficiency of the vibhāvas like katākṣa etc. with regard to suggesting the sentiment of pathetic has been brought about by the employment of the pronoun 'te' as referring to events that are past and present only as memories.

SECTION 6: RASĀSVĀDA

Centering Bharata's aphorism on rasa, two questions are often raised: how the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas combine with the sthāyībhāva to evoke rasa, and by what process the rasa is evoked. Bharata's text is not sufficiently enlightening on these problems. There is ambiguity regarding the exact significance of the terms saṃyoga (combination) and niśpatti (emergence) used in his aphorism. A great deal of controversy has centered round their interpretation, giving rise to a number of theories about rasa. There are four such theories, designated as utpattivāda, anumitivāda, bhuktivāda and abhivyaktivāda, associated with the names of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, Śrī Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta respectively. The works of Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, the three predecessors of Abhinavagupta, are not available to us. Abhinavagupta elaborates their views in the course of his commentary on Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra which is known as Abhinavabhāratī, and
also to the lesser extent, in his *Locana* commentary on Anandavardhana’s *Dhvanyāloka*.

Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa was the first to explain the aphorism. He lived in the first or second quarter of the ninth century. According to him, *rasa* is *sthāyībhāva* intensified (*upacita*) by a poetic description or histrionic representation through *vibhāvas, anubhāvas* etc.\(^7\) The *sthāyībhāva* *rasa*, say for example, *rati* stirs in the hero due to the heroine who is the *ālambana vibhāva*, and *uddīpana vibhāvas* like garden, moonlight, etc. Thus the *vibhāvas* serve only as cause in this process of intensification. The *rasa* thus developed becomes perceived by *anubhāvas* like slide glance, slow gait etc, and *vyabhicāribhāva*, like eagerness, despondency, joy, etc. go to nourish that mood. When the *sthāyībhāva* is thus intensified to its highest pitch by *vibhāvas* etc., it turns into *rasa*. So *rasa*, when not intensified, is simply a *sthāyī*. *Rasa* primarily resides in the actual heroes. For example, it was Rāma who had love (*rati*) for Śītā and as such the *rasa* (*śṛṅgāra*) belonged to Rāma. *Rasa* only secondarily belongs to the actor who enlivens or portrays the hero on the stage. The spectator visualizes the nature of Rāma in the actor and ascribes the *rasa* to the actor for his peculiar dress, intelligent acting (the actor imagines himself for the moment to be the very same character) and stagecraft.\(^8\) Thus pleasure on the part of the spectator is due to his sense of identification of the actual hero with the actor and supposition of the basic emotion (*sthāyībhāva*) of the original personage as belonging to the actor. In Lollaṭa’s view *rasa* is an effect (*anukārya* or *utpādyā*), and the term *niśpatti* means ‘*utpatti*’ and *saṃyoga* means combination in general. Thus this theory is called ‘*utpattivāda*’.

But the defect of the theory is that it ignores the question “how does the spectator get the experience of *rasa*?” It is not clear how the spectator can be charmed by a feeling which does not exist in him. Mere knowing that emotions like love etc. are in an intense state in the characters of the plot and the actors cannot bring delight in the mind of the spectator. When a neutral individual sees in real life two lovers engaged in love, he may either envy the lovers, or shun to witness the love-making of others and leave the place. Many other things may happen according to the taste and culture of the individual. In drama the spectator, while witnessing a scene of love, does not have such inclinations. He does not become engaged to any kind of activity, and simply derives delight.
through a distinct kind of absorption. Lollaṭa’s theory cannot explain how this happens.

The next commentator on this subject is Śri Śaṅkuka. He may be assigned to the first quarter of the 9th century. He went a step further, and tried to account for the spectator’s role in the process of rasa. His thought was that rasa is not produced as an effect but inferred by the spectator, and the inferred feeling is relished by him as rasa. In his opinion, rasa is not a developed form but an imitation of the sthāyi. The sthāyi is specially called rasa, on account of its being an imitated one. The basic mental state exists in the original character like Rāma; but the actor by means of his superior imitative faculty is identified with the original hero, whom he impersonates. This consciousness of identity is different from all the four kinds of ordinary notions such as that of ordinary right notion (viz, ‘Rāma is the man’ which is confirmed by a subsequent cognition that ‘This is Rāma himself’), that of wrong notion (viz, that ‘This is Rāma’ which one gets with regard to one who is not Rāma and consequently removed by the cognition ‘This is not Rāma’), that of doubtful notion (such as ‘This may or may not be Rāma’) and the knowledge of similarity (such as ‘He resembles Rāma’). It is similar to one that we have at the sight of a life like picture of a particular horse when we formulate the judgement, “It is that horse” (citraturaganyāya), and in drama this kind of perception takes the form ‘This actor is that Rāma who was happy.’ Abhinavagupta refers to the view of Śaṅkuka in Locana also. He says, “… pratipattiranukartrālamvanā nāṭyaikagāmini rasaḥ | sa ca na vyatiriktamādhiṃramapekṣate | kiṃ tvanukṛtyābhinnābhimate nartake āsvādayitā sāmājika ityetāvanmātramadaḥ | It means that the apprehension of rasa depends on the actor and is found only in plays. It requires no other basis. But the actor must be thought to be the character portrayed in order for the audience to enjoy the experience. It is wrong to deny the existence of this relation between the character of the story and the actor merely because it is not seen anywhere else in the world. It is an immediate perception (anubhava), evident in and by itself, and it cannot be challenged by any canons of Logic. The actors exhibit clearly on the stage the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas which though artificial and unreal, are not taken to be so by the spectator who by means of a peculiar process of inference thinks the basic mental state as belonging to the actor, now taken to
be the original character. The inferred basic mental state because it is simply an
 imitation of the real mental state of the real hero such as Rāma and because it is
 associated with the enchanting situation, adds to itself a peculiar charm and
develops into an enjoyable condition of the spectator’s mind. It is called rasa
 because of its enjoyability. The actor’s imitation gives the spectator delight, as
he can infer the character’s emotion on the strength of this imitation. Thus in
this theory ‘niśpatti’ is interpreted as ‘anumiti’, and the relation existing
between the vibhāvas and rasa is that of ‘anumāpaka’ and ‘anumāpya’.  
Śaṅkuka’s theory can aptly be termed as anumitivāda. The term ‘saṁyoga’
means universal concomitance (vyapti). The whole dictum means: rasa or basic
emotion is inferred from the vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva with which
it bears the relation of universal concomitance.

But Śaṅkuka’s theory has been criticized by later writers. The chief defect
of the theory is that if the sthāyi is simply inferred to be occurring in the heart of
the hero or the actor, it would be just like an inference of the practical world, and
as such the spectator would become prey of ordinary mental movements, like
shame, disgust, envy etc.; the spectator in such a scene cannot be said to be in
the state of an unmixed pleasure designated as rasa. Further, it is not clear
how can any inference be delightful. Realization of thrill or joy is immediate: it is
possible in direct apprehension. The audience realizes some bliss only in
perceptual experience when he is identified, while witnessing a performance,
with the heroes represented on the stage. Inferential knowledge is not
immediate. Moreover the experience of joy carries with it a sense of fullness,
which the inferential knowledge lacks. So the realization of poetic thrill cannot be
brought about by inference.

Both the theories of Lollaṭa and Śaṅkuka suffer from a common defect.
Both the theories could not establish a direct relationship between rasa and the
spectator, and hence were unable to explain how the spectator can get the taste
of rasa. If it is supposed that rasa exists in strangers like the characters
represented or the actor, the spectator will remain totally indifferent (tāfasthya)
to another person’s emotion. In order to avoid this neutrality of the spectator, it
may be said that rasa is inherent in the spectator. This position has its defects
too. If the spectator imagines that the vibhāvas etc. are personally related to
him, then it may even lead to an experience of sorrow instead of delight (karaṇa
rasa) in case of an emotion like pathos (śoka). A spectator who witnesses a performance just to derive a kind of innocent delight would not like to make himself unhappy or miserable by witnessing a pathetic episode or situation in the perceived piece. But in the light of this alternative, experience of rasa would certainly involve an experience of joy as well as sorrow, depending on the situation. Moreover the spectator will have to imagine himself as Rāma who is the agent of many extraordinary undertakings like the crossing of the ocean and to look upon the holy Sītā as his beloved.

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is the next critic to offer a better interpretation to Bharata’s aphorism. Lollaṭa and Śaṅkuka were earlier than Ānandavardhana. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was later than Ānandavardhana. Though he was an opponent of dvānti school, he admitted (like Abhinavagupta) rasa to be the soul of poetry. He argues that rasa cannot be produced as an effect, because the causes, namely the vibhāvas, being non-realities, cannot bring about real effects. Rasa cannot also be inferred, because the real character, Rāma, not being before the audience, his feeling does not exist as an actuality, and what does not exist cannot be inferred. According to him, rasa is enjoyed in connexion with the vibhāvas through the relation of the enjoyer (bhojaka) and the enjoyed (bhojya).

He maintains that poetic language has three powers, namely, the powers of abhidhā or denotation, of bhāvakatva or generalization and of bhojakatva or enjoyment. The first one is common to all linguistic expressions. It is only by being possessed of the other two functions that an ordinary expression passes on to poetic expression. Abhidhā includes lakṣaṇā or indication in its scope, as occasion demands. The vibhāvas etc. and the sthāyībhāvas are expressed by abhidhā. In poetry the verbal function does not cease with this. It has a second function, called bhāvakatva. It is the process of sādhanīkarana (universalization) which generalizes the vibhāvas, anubhāvas, vyabhicārībhāvas and sthāyībhāvas. Bhāvakatva is achieved in ordinary poetry by the guṇas, alaṅkāras etc. and in dramatic presentation through the four varieties of acting (abhinaya). It makes them sensed in their general character without any reference to their specific properties. For instance, Sītā which is a vibhāva, is understood through this power not as a particular individual, viz, that she was the daughter of Janaka, and the wife of Rāma, and that she lived in Tretāyuga, but in the general character of a beautiful woman. Similarly Rāma loses his
specific individuality and appears as a hero. Thus the characters and the situations related to them become devoid of time and space. Rāma and Sītā become just lover and beloved like any other couple of any space and time and do not belong any more to any particular country or period. The *sthāyībhāva* (here Rāma’s love towards Sītā) is taken as a love in general without any reference to the agent or the object like this Rāma’s or the actor’s or another’s. In this way the audience can appropriate the *vibhāvas* as well as the *sthāyībhāva* as universal. The *sthāyībhāva* which is produced (*bhāvita*) by this generalization (*bāvakatva*) is *rasa*. The perceiver also forgets his individual self and his mundane prepossessions. During aesthetic experience, the consciousness of the spectator becomes free from all practical desires. The spectacle witnessed is no longer felt in connexion with the empirical ‘I’ of the spectator nor in connexion with any particular individual. He becomes free from all types of limitations and prejudices even towards the venerable characters like Rāma and Sītā. They now become for him ordinary husband and wife, lover and beloved, and not respected ones. As a result, he becomes identical with the subject. The emotion or feeling he experiences towards the object is the same that the subject has towards the object. For example, even though the spectator be a female, she experiences the emotion of a lover like Rāma towards a lady like Sītā, and she becomes one with the subject (Rāma), the lover of the object (Sītā). Thus the power of *bhāvakatva* dispels the thick pall of mental stupor (*moha*) which cloaks the spectator’s own consciousness. His limited personality becomes abolished. At that moment the third function *bhojakatva* comes into play. The function is that of enjoyment. By the third function the *sthāyiḥ* is enjoyed in this generalized form, accompanied by the *vibhāvas*, sensed also in a general form. This enjoyment is described as a process of delectation similar to the enlightened, self sufficient and blissful awareness. This enjoyment is different from the apprehensions derived from direct experience or remembrance. The poetic enjoyment is due to the predominance of the basic goodness (*sattva*) of the soul over its adscititious elements of passion (*rajas*) which distracts the mind and brutishness (*tamas*) which makes the mind hard and devoid of responsiveness. The mind becomes steady and the spectator enjoys the bliss of his consciousness. This enjoyment is also characterized by a resting (*viśrānti*) on ones own consciousness (*samvit*).¹⁰³ On account of the
different forms of contact between sattva, raja and tama, it consists of the states of fluidity (druti), dilation (vistara) and expansion (vikāsa). It is different from worldly happiness, being divested of personal relations or interests, has the nature of beatitude (ānanda) and light (prakāśa). Lastly, the delectation approximates the relish of the bliss of supreme Brahmaṇ. Expressing Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s view, Abhinavagupta says in Locana on Kārikā II.4, “bhāvite ca rase tasya bhogaḥ yo’nubavasmaranāpratipattibhyo vilakṣaṇa eva drutivistaravikāśātmā rajastamoavicitrtyānuviddhasattvamayanijacitsvabhāvaniryrttivīśāntilakṣaṇaḥ parabrahmāsvādasavidhaḥ”

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s theory paved the way for the later theory of Abhinavagupta. There is no essential difference between Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta in respect of the concept of aesthetic experience. Abhinavagupta himself states in the Abhinavabhāratī that he is merely improving upon the views of earlier scholars, and not demolishing or carping at them:

\[
\text{tasmātsatāmatra na dūṣitāni} \\
\text{matāni tānyeva tu śodhītāni} \\
\text{pūrvapratīṣṭhāpitayojanāsu} \\
\text{mulapratīṣṭhāphalamāmananti II} \]

It means:

A rich and fruitful harvest may be culled by posterity from the inheritance of thought left to it by its predecessors. Thus the doctrines of the sage of antiquity will only be refined by us here and not refuted.

Abhinavagupta quarrels with Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka only on the point that the latter attributes to poetic expression two additional functions called bhāvakatva and bhojakatva. He thinks that there is no necessity of recognizing bhāvakatva, and bhojakatva as different functions. He brings in the conception of vyāṇjanā. The process of generalization and the enjoyment of emotion are achieved through suggestion only. Bhāvakatva is nothing more than what is included in the use of appropriate qualities (guṇas) and figures of speech for the ultimate purpose of awakening rasa through the suggestive power of word and sense. So there is nothing new about bhāvakatva. Abhinavagupta says in Locana on II.4 “bhogikaraṇavyāpāraśca kāvyasa rasaviṣayo dhvananaṁmaivā nānyatkiṁcit I bhāvakatvamapi samucitaguṇālaṅkāraparigrahātmakaṁ ... kimetadapūrvam?” Absence of poetic blemishes, introduction of figures and
excellences in a piece of poetic creation, and the four recognized types of acting (viz. sāttvika, vācika, āhārya and āṅgika) in a drama, set the mind of the spectator in such a state that the vibhāvas etc. lose their individual character and appear in their general character. The persisting mood (basic emotion or sthāyībhāva) of the spectator also assumes the form of general feeling, independent of its relation to the individual, the appreciator himself. Regarding the other function ‘bhojakatva’ or enjoyment of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, Abhinavagupta contends that it is nothing but the perception or pratiti of rasa. The essence of this pratiti of rasa is its relish (carvaṇa). The bhoga of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is nothing but ‘āsvāda’ or ‘carvaṇā’. So the power of aesthetic enjoyment (bhojakatva) is not a third function of poetic words. The true nature of the self is obscured by the thick darkness of nescience. Aesthetic enjoyment (bhoga) or relishing (āsvāda) which for Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is melting, expansion and radiance comes about from the removal of that obstruction. This removal is brought about by the power of suggestion. When rasa has been achieved by means of suggestion, this power of aesthetic enjoyment (bhogīkṛti) inevitably follows. For enjoyment (bhoga) is nothing other than the incomparable thrill of delight that arises from the tasting of rasa. So the function of bhojakatva of rasa is nothing other than the function of suggestion. Nothing can be gained by coining a new term for a thing already known by another name.

Abhinavagupta’s endeavour to include the functions of bhāvakatva and bhojakatva testifies the fact that he could not ignore them completely. Moreover Abhinavagupta, while expounding his view of rasa, admits, though in a modified form, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s contention that the apprehension of rasa is an extraordinary process (alaukika vyāpāra) and that this apprehension ultimately escalates to a transcendental level and culminates in ecstasy.

Abhinavagupta starts his enquiry into rasa on the basis of the experience of the aesthete. The rasika alone is capable of realizing the rasa. For rasa does not reside in the hero or actor as an objective entity. Rather it is “subjective condition realized by the reader’s own capacity of aesthetic enjoyment.” Rasa is sahṛdayasaṁvāda: rasa is apparent to the heart of sensitive reader or spectator. This sensitivity requires a degree of culture, experience and aesthetic instinct on the part of the reader or spectator. The sensitive person is one whose heart possesses a mirror-like power of intuition: adhikārī cātra
The fact of being possessed of heart (sahrdaya) has been defined in the Locana in the following way: "yeṣāṃ kāvyānuśilanābhyaśavaśādiśadībhūte manomukure varṇāṇīyatanmayībhavanayogyatā te svahṛdayasaṁvādabhājaḥ sahrdayāḥ I"

The word sahrdaya denotes persons who are capable of identifying themselves with the events represented (the vibhāvas etc.), as the mirror of their hearts has been polished by the constant study of kāvya as well as śāstra (Poetics), and who respond to it sympathetically in their own heart. Thus the sahrdaya must be a person with a clear heart in which is reflected, as clearly as in a mirror, the events acted on the stage. Secondly, he must be possessed of the ability to become one with the object presented, and thirdly, he must himself experience the emotion in the poet’s heart, which has been transferred to him through the medium of the play or the poem.

Abhinavagupta admits that the true nature of rasa has already been stated by Bharata himself in the seventh chapter of Nāṭyaśāstra. There Bharata says, "kāvyārthānghavayantīti bhāvā iti." Bhāvas make the poetic contents or meaning a matter of apprehension or contemplation. Abhinavagupta’s own view is that this poetic content itself is rasa, and rasa is the essence of poetry.

The question is how the poetic or dramatic matter or content becomes an object of delightful contemplation of the reader or spectator. A man of refined taste goes to witness a theatrical performance, without the least intention of getting involved in its activities empirically. This is what is called the aesthetic attitude which is different from the practical attitude of real life. The aesthetic attitude of the spectator helps him to fix his attention completely on the stage as soon as the music starts. Automatically, other distracting ideas tend to disappear. The next moment comes the stage manager and announces the play to be staged and introduces a song, dance or music. This appeals directly to aesthetic senses and bring about a state of self-forgetfulness in the spectator. His mind at once is carried away from the ordinary world to the imaginatively created world of poetry. All possible affections of consciousness are removed and his heart becomes as pure and clear as mirror to receive the reflection of the presented.

Now when the hero appears on the stage, his make up and other accessories of stage-craft produce a peculiar sensation in the spectator. He
does not regard the actor either as an imitator or as the imitated hero himself. When the spectator’s mind is immersed in the story while observing the play Śankuntalā, the actor’s personality does not come to his view, nor does the character of the story, that he is Duṣyanta himself of the Dvāpara age. The aesthetic object is alaukika (unworldly). Thus, the elements of space and time drop off both regarding Duṣyanta and the actor. The spectator no longer lives either in the space and the time of Duṣyanta or in the space and time of the actor as such. In a similar way, he cannot infer the moods and feelings of the vibhāvas as pertaining to the actor or original character. The moods appear in their abstract form, having no relation to any particular individual, and as freed from the elements of time, space and individuality. This freedom of the presented from the elements of time, space and individuality is called universalization or sādhanaḥbhāva of the objective aspect. The state of self-forgetfulness being already brought about, and the entire attention being drawn to the hero of the play, the spectator then gets inspired with the purpose of the hero. He sees and hears all that is going on, on the stage, as if it were through the eyes and the ears of the hero. He evaluates the entire situation in which the hero is placed, and incipiently reacts to it exactly as does the hero. In this way, the spectator slowly and gradually gets identified with the hero. This is the stage of identification (tanmayābhavana). As K.C. Pandey observes “Thus the self-forgetful self on the subjective side and the psycho-physical conditions of the hero on the objective side united together bring about a state which is known as the state of identification, technically called ‘tādātmya’.”

We have already stated that the permanent moods inferred from ‘alaukika’ causes remain in the mind of the appreciator in the form of latent impressions. Because the aesthete has completely identified himself with the hero, and as such there must be identity of emotion of the former with the later, the latent impression in him appropriate to the generalized vibhāvas etc. is awakened by these vibhāvas etc. Those impressions corresponding to love, heroism, sorrow and the rest appearing in the story of the play arise in him. The sthāyī, thus called forth, is then developed to that climax when it assumes the form of generalized mood and feeling, and is realized by the appreciator as being devoid of personal or individual qualities, having no relation to him, his friend or his foe. If it is related to him, he will be conscious of his own self and
will take interest in guarding himself from observation, say in love-making, which is sure to interfere with his enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure. His sense of joy and remorse at the success and failure of his friend, and hatred, anger and revenge at his foe’s achievement will likewise stand in the way of aesthetic relish. Thus the basic developed to a high pitch ‘deindividualizes the individual’ (here the aesthete) and raises him to the level of universal. It fills his heart and is cognized as undivided, unlimited and general. It shines all in all, without any hindrance, preventing him from being aware of anything else: Cognizing it through single-minded contemplation is not different from the act of relishing it. Its essence consists in its relishing. The bhāva which is thus revealed and relished is rasa.

Abhinavagupta finds an analogy for the process of generalization in the Purva Mimāṃsā. He refers to some scriptural sentences. The performer of a sacrifice, who is qualified enough and interested in doing something first hears and perceives (pratīti) the literal meaning of the sacrificial statements like “rātrimāṣata” (They lay by night), and “tāmagnauprādat” (He offered it to fire). Now this simple perception which interests him is immediately transformed into a second perception designated as inspiration (pratibhā), intent desire (bhāvanā), injunction (vidhi) and activity (udyoga) etc. It consists in a transfer (saṃkramana) of the literal sense and is presented in the form of desire such as “aste” (I shall myself perform a sacrifice), “pradadāmi” (I shall offer an oblation), etc. In the case of this additional perception, the idea of past tense and the limitations of person and number are completely discarded. This additional perception which occurs to the mind of the hearer in the shape of an action of the present tense belonging to himself (i.e., pradadāmi) in case of ‘agnauṇḍat’ is also recognized as a meaning of the sentence. A similar thing happens in case of poetry. Transcending the words of the poem, additional perception arises in a qualified person. This is the basis of sādhāraṇīkaraṇa.

To take a concrete example. When the appreciator reads a fine verse vividly describing the fright of a running deer as being pursued by Duśyanta, he initially grasps (perceives) the literal sense of the text with the help of abhidhāvyāpāra. Then there appears in his mind an additional perception, i.e., a perception of a different order, which is of the nature of mental visualization, and completely eliminates the spatial and temporal distinctions assumed by that
particular verse. In this stage there occurs the elimination of the tense, person. The king Dusyanta, the terror-stricken deer and the sthāyībhāva — all which appear in this perception become divested of their particularity. Therefore the idea that some particular deer is frightened becomes unreal. So this perception has as its object simply and solely the Fear itself, which is free from its relation to the deer or the time of the occurrence of the deer. This perception of fear is different from that of worldly fear and becomes free from such ordinary beliefs that I am afraid, or he is afraid, or the friend is afraid or the foe is afraid. Any apprehension of such type as ‘I am afraid’ or ‘he is afraid’ would become worldly perception consisting of worldly pleasure and pain, and for this reason would be beset with obstacles. For example, if the spectator or reader apprehended the fear as his own, he would become terrified and would be deprived of the aesthetic pleasure. If he apprehended the fear as belonging to the deer only, then he would become indifferent to it. If he apprehended it as belonging to his enemy, he would become jovial. And if he apprehended it as belonging to his friend, he would become remorse. Each of these mundane passions, viz, terror, indifference, joy and remorse would deprive him of the super-worldly aesthetic pleasure. So fear has reference to no such person as such. And because no one is involved, there is neither the sense of unhappiness or happiness, and consequently, there is no reaction to avoid or take it (hānopādāna). These are obstacles (vighna) and these reactions take place in ordinary perception. Therefore, the fear (bhaya) which is thus free from its temporal and spatial specialities (bhayameva param deśakāldyanālīṅgitam) is cognized in its generic or universal aspect in an unperturbed perception, free from all the barriers like the individualistic elements, and it, as if, enters directly into the heart of the connoisseur and overwhelms it and becomes the ‘bhayānaka rasa’. The spectator relishes it purely in his own self. While there is such a cognition of the sthāyībhāva, the spectator’s self is neither totally obliterated, nor particularly involved. Total obliteration of the self would make the spectator indifferent to the emotion of fear, and particular involvement with it would arouse real fear in him. In neither of the cases, there is the possibility of the generation of rasa. This holds good about any other person, who witnesses the drama or reads a poem. The particular individual while relishing the
generalized sthāyī does not think that it is relished by him alone, but by all persons of poetic sensibility.

This relish is further described by Abhinavagupta as an unalloyed joy. The unperturbed cognition of the sthāyī gives the man of taste an unalloyed joy. The unselfish absorption in an aesthetic mood enables the innate bliss of the soul to shine forth. There is then a breaking of the prison bars of innate delight (avaraṇabhaṅga). This joy is described as camatkāra. Abhinavagupta says in the Abhinavabhaṅratī “sā cāvighnā saṁvit camatkāraḥ”.120 The apprehension of rasa, free from all obstruction, is itself the relish or camatkāra. Camatkāra is an uninterrupted (acchinna) state of immersion in an enjoyment. It is a state of consciousness free from pragmatic requirements, and hence is characterized by a sense of inner fullness.121 Worldly enjoyment is incomplete owing to the facts that ‘in the union one fears the future separation’ (lābe bhāviviyagabhīruḥ) and ‘one thing breeds the longing for another’ (viṣayo viṣayāntarārthitām janayan). In worldly enjoyment we are unable to cut off completely the desire of a thing and hence it is not full, i.e., the feeling of insatiety imposes upon it a tinge of pain. But aesthetic joy is different from the form of joy of practical life owing to the absence of any possible obstacle (longing for earning etc.) and hence it is an unworldly state of enjoyment. Worldly enjoyment is fraught with pain and hence is interrupted. But aesthetic joy is ceaseless.

When the vibhāva etc. assume a generalized form, and awaken the latent sthāyībhāva in the spectator, which also appears in its abstract form, the sahṛdaya loses his sense of narrow individuality, transcends the limits of personal possession, and is raised to a wider and higher plane of consciousness, reaching which he finds himself one with others in the auditorium. Abhinavagupta describes this celestial mental state as ‘sarvasāmājikānāmekeghanatā.’122 When the personality of the spectator is thus sent to sleep, pleasure is derived by him in natural course. The reason is that the curtain of nescience, which covers the bliss portion of our consciousness in ordinary circumstances, is removed by vyāņjanā which comes into play in the ecstatic moment of ‘sarvasāmājikānāmekeghanatā.’

Thus the bliss portion of the soul manifests itself in undimmed splendour, and the appreciator experiences his own mood and being. According to Abhinavagupta, then, rasa is nothing but the permanent mood relished by the
bliss portion of one’s own consciousness. The manifestation of rasa occurs through the function of suggestion, the suggestars being the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and the vyabhicāribhāvas. The term ‘sañyoga’ means the functioning of suggestion, and the term ‘niśpatti’ is interpreted as manifestation (abhivyakti). Abhinavagupta’s theory of rasa is therefore called Abhivyaktivāda. Thus the relation between the rasa and the vibhāvas etc. is that of vyārignya-vyañjaka bhāva. The vibhāvas and others reveal the rasa through the function of suggestion. In this revelation, the sthāyībhāva, which existed as an innate impression, discloses itself as rasa.

According to Abhinavagupta, vibhāvas etc., which are causes of rasa, are not worldly causes. Therefore their effect rasa too is said to be of a supra mundane or alaukika nature. Vibhāvas etc. are not the material cause of the production of rasa, for the relish of rasa lasts only as long as the vibhāvas etc. last. When the vibhāvas etc. are withdrawn, rasa also disappears. The vibhāvas etc. are not also the indicative cause of rasa, for rasa is not an accomplished object which the vibhāvas etc. merely reveal. Rasa does not come into existence until the vibhāvas etc. present themselves. Rasa is a unique entity in which the traces of vibhāva and others are not perceived separately. Bharata uses the analogy of sādava rasa to explain the relation of the constituents of rasa. Just as the ingredients of sādava rasa, viz, condiments, herbs, rice, guḍa, salt etc., each of which has a distinct taste, when put together in due proportion and cooked properly by an expert cook, a new flavour, which is distinct and more relishable than that of any one of them separately, arises, so rasa as presented in drama arises only when the excitant, ensuant responses, transient emotions and persisting emotions are so harmoniously united together in due proportion by a poetic genius that they present something that is quite different from what each one of them is separately. So rasa is an organic unity. Like the sādava rasa, the final rasa as presented in drama, is unique in its flavour.

The word rasa, so far, have been used in the sense of the object of relish – rasyate iti rasḥ. The universalized basic mental state is relished by the universalized subject and it is rasa. As it is stated in the Locana of Kārikā I.4, “aucityena praṭītāu cittavṛtt̄terāsvādyatve sthāyinyā raso...” 123 Rasa appears when a stable state of mind (cittavṛtti), constantly directed toward a proper object, is aesthetically relished. Rasa is the sthāyī appearing in a blissful
consciousness. Here the self experiences itself as affected by the sthāyi and hence the rasas are variously named as śṛṅgāra, karuṇa etc. But this is not the final stage of aesthetic experience. K.C.Pandey observes that Abhinavagupta refers to another level of aesthetic experience in Abhinavabhāratī occasionally and briefly which is very difficult to identify.124 Here rasa means the act of relishing (rasanam rasaḥ). In Locana on Kārikā I.4, Abhinavagupta says “rasyamānatāsāram rasaṁ.” 125 This means that rasa consists essentially in the process of relishing. At this level, the introversion ascends to an intense state, the basic completely ignored, and thereby the subject — object dichotomy vanishes. At this level, even the basic mental state sinks back into the subconscious, and there is relish and relish alone. Now the relish is nothing but the blissful consciousness. Thus in the final analysis of Abhinavagupta, the blissful consciousness itself is rasa. The blissful consciousness is the realization of the self by itself. So realization of rasa is the realization of the self by itself. At the final level, then, the self relishes itself in its aspect on ānanda, i.e., pure bliss. The self, now kindled to a steady glow of bliss, experiences a self-sufficiency, a repose within itself (niravacchinna svātma parāmarṣa: svātma viśrānti). There is no distinct object of relish now; the object has been assimilated into the self as its euphoric exaltation.

As in Abhinavagupta’s final analysis, the realization of rasa in the above way is the realization of the self, many aesthetic philosophers discovered a close kinship (sahodaratā) of the experience of rasa with the mystical experience of Brahmasāksātkāra (realization of Brahman). In Vedāntīn’s mokṣa, the self-luminous self is not produced but is made manifest by the removal of the enveloping obstacles of avidyā (ignorance), kāma (desire) and karma (activity). Similarly rasa is also ‘abhivyakta,’ and its manifestation consists not in the expression of something new, but in the revelation of something already existing, when the obstacles are removed by the generalized vibhāvas. Both these states, viz, the states of rasāsvāda and Brahmāsvāda stands higher than that of everyday life, which is generally characterized by personal interests of one kind or another and therefore is fraught with mental tensions of variable degrees. We have observed that rasāsvāda is a relish in which the contemplation of anything else but rasa is lost (vigalita-vedāntara) or which is free from the contact of aught else perceived (vedāntara-spraśaśunya), and
hence the state of experience of *rasa* is like the state of mind lost in the philosophic contemplation of *Brahman*. Like the experience of *Brahman*, the experience of *rasa* also results from pure contemplation.

However, the two experiences are only of the same order, and not identical. As Abhinavagupta says that *rasāsvāda* is on a par with the *Brahmāsvāda: parabrahmāsvādasabrahmacārtvam cāstvasya rasāsvādasya*. In case of the experience of *Brahman* one rises above the narrow interests of routine life and the mental strain generated by them once for all, and there is no further return to the life of agitations. The ideal state, when attained, necessarily becomes a permanent feature of life. But the detachment and the consequent joy that art gives is only transient. The art experience does not endure long but disappears after a time, for it depends for its continuance upon the presence of the external stimulus which has evoked it. Art thus affords only a temporary release from the ills of life. No one can spend his entire life in contemplating works of art. And when one returns to common life, one returns to desire, strife and suffering.

From the foregoing discussion, it appears that all *rasas* are of the nature of joy. Now in worldly experience, all the *sthāyībhāvas* by themselves are not of the nature of joy. The *sthāyīns* like *soka*, *jugupsā* and *bhaya* are *sthāyīns* of such types. However, in *rasa* experience they give joy. If the *rasas* like *karuṇa*, *vībhatṣa* and *bhayānaka*, which are the transformations of the *sthāyīns* we have referred to were painful, no one would turn a look towards them, for no one, possessed of understanding, knowingly engages himself in paining himself. And yet everyone enters with engrossing interest into the *karuṇa* etc. If there were pain in *karuṇa* etc., no one would be attracted to go through such heart delighting compositions as the *Rāmāyaṇa*, for the leading sentiment of the *Rāmāyaṇa* is the pathetic (*karuṇa*). Now the question is how the emotional mood pertaining to *karuṇa*, which is *soka* or grief, could lead to the realization of joy. Abhinavagupta’s reply is that even at the time of *karuṇa pratīti*, the mind is completely absorbed in the scenes represented and in this absorption the mind forgets the mundane sorrows and worries and achieves a rare and complete repose. And it is this repose of the mind, free from any obstacle (*antarāyaśunyaviśrānti*), that is called *sukha* or bliss. *Dukha* or pain is the restlessness of the mind due to the disturbance of this repose (*aviśrāntirūpataiva ca duḥkham*).
In *karuṇa rasa*, the mental absorption is very deep and complete, and joy is realized in an intense form. Abhinavagupta here gives the example of women engrossed in toying. At the time of toying, women, though bitten and scratched by their lovers, feel pleasure, because they find in the pain itself the fulfillment of all their desire which brings about a rest in their own heart. Therefore, the pain here is pleasure. Pain occurs when the mind finds no rest in what it contemplates due to its desires for things other than the object of contemplation, desires which act as the obstacles and interrupt the homogeneity and compactness (*ekaghanatā*) of consciousness.

**SECTION 7 : THE PLACE OF GUṆA, RĪTI AND ALAṆKĀRA IN THE DHVANI SCHEME**

The *dhvani* theorists gave full recognition to all poetic elements accepted in the earlier schools, characterizing them in the light of their revised conception of poetic beauty. Since *rasadhvani* is considered by them to be the most prominent factor in poetry, the other elements, in their opinion, stand subordinate to it. The charm of the *alaṅkāras* and *guṇas* was judged by them not on their own account but in terms of the part they play towards the realization of *rasa*. While *alaṅkāras* constitute more or less external factors of poetry, *guṇas* concern directly the inner nature. Ānandavardhana says in *Kārikā* II.6.

\[
\text{tamarthamavālmābate ye 'ṅginam te guṇāḥ smṛtāḥ} \\
\text{aṅgāśritāstvalaṅkārā mantavyāḥ kāṭakādivat}
\]

He says that while the *guṇas* belong to and are properties of *rasa* (the *aṅgī artha*), the *alaṅkāras* are related to *śabda* and *artha* (*aṅgāśritāḥ*). Bravery, modesty and the like are the attributes of the soul, whereas, the necklace and the bracelets decorate the mortal frame. Similarly *alaṅkāras* are the ornaments of the body of poetry. *Guṇas* enhance the charm of the inlaid sense; they are analogous to the human virtues like bravery etc. *Guṇas* are the properties of *rasa* and not of *rīti* as propounded by Vāmana. Ānandavardhana mentions only three *guṇas*, namely, *ojas* (energy), *prasāda* (lucidity) and *mādurya* (sweetness), instead of the usual ten of Bharata, Daṇḍin and Vāmana. These three *guṇas* have been classified on the basis of the particular mental conditions involved in the perception of *rasa*. Śṛṅgāra is a *rasa* which melts the heart to a
great extent and mādhurya resides in a poem where this rasa prevails. Similarly dīpti, which is a mental condition involving a brilliant expansion of the heart, is taken to be the character of rasas like raudra, vīra etc. Ojas resides in the śabda and artha which are suggestive of these rasas. Prasāda is unaffection and clearness of the word and meaning. It does not dwell in any particular rasa. It engenders quick comprehension and hence is appropriate for all rasas. Vyāpti or pervasion of the mind is the important aspect of the prasāda guṇa. Hence, the three guṇas exist in the form of three aspects of the human mind — melting (drutī), expansion (vyāpakatva) and pervasion (dīpti). Abhinavagupta remarks in the Locana on Dhvanyāloka II.7 that guṇa like mādhurya resides primarily in rasa like śṛṅgāra and it is said to belong to word and meaning only secondarily i.e., in the sense that these latter possess the capacity for producing it.129(a) So guṇas have an inseparable relation with rasa. The question of guṇa does not arise, when there is no rasa.

The element of rīti too, is unnecessary in poetry. According to Ānandavardhana, rītis were introduced by theorists who only dimly understood the true significance of poetry.129(b) This implies that when rasadhvani is accepted as the all important element in poetry, there is no need of conceiving a separate poetic element as rīti which, at its best, produces no more than a sensuous delight. It is something entirely external in form. Abhinavagupta remarks in the Locana of Kārikā III.46 that the rītis are made to resolve into the guṇas, and since guṇas belong to the rasas, depending on them rīti can be one of the means of the realization of rasa.129(c) Rīti is, therefore, one of the external factors of literary compositions and it depends on guṇas (word and sense). It just helps to mar or magnify the beauty of rasa. At times, melting, illuminating and pervading the mind, rīti assists the sthāyībhava to reach the rasa stage.

SECTION 8: KAVIPRATIBHĀ

The Indian rhetoricians correlated the conception of the poet with the ancient sayings, “nāṛṣṭिः kurute kāvyam” and “rasayaḥ krāntadarśīnaḥ.” In speaking of the greatness of the poet, they called the poet a sage and a seer. A sage is called so because of his vision. Vision is insight into truth about all the manifold materials in the world and their various aspects. A poet, too, possesses
this vision of truth. He sees through the nature of every object, and not merely the appearance. He is aware of the significance of things, which is not mere information, but a deeper insight into reality. An ordinary or a common man takes objects of the world from a pragmatic point of view — what benefit he will get from the things around him. The cry of the krauña-bird enters into his ears just as another sound in the world of birds and trees. The incident is extremely trivial to him — he is not struck by the unique reality behind that cry. But for Vālmīki, it was an eye-opener. He perceived in it something more than a mere cry of the bird. For, the activity of the poet is contemplation; it is a kind of meditation. He sees great significance in what appears to the layman to be extremely trivial. His alert genius penetrates into the inner essence of the world. To his discerning vision, the world evokes an experience that touches the very depth of his personality.

But mere vision is not enough. The operation of poetic imagination is both a vision and a creation. The poet must be endowed with the power to translate into words the numberless things that his imagination pictures before his mind. Abhinavagupta describes genius as “the capability of creating novel things.” Without this power of creative description, or objective presentation, the seer does not become a poet. Poetry is not mere vision, but vision objectified in poetic cast (varṇana). Though Vālmīki had the vision of a sage, he was not hailed as a poet by people until he embodied it in a descriptive work.

Describing the creative power of the poet, Ānandavardhana composes the following verse in III.42 of the Dhvanyāloka, a verse in which the poet is compared to Brahmā:

\[
\begin{align*}
apāre kāvyaśaṁsāre kavgirekaḥ prajāpatiḥ & 1  
yathāśmai rocate viśvaṁ tathedaṁ parivartate & II  
śrīgārī cetkaviḥ kāvye jātaṁ rasamayaṁ jagat & I  
sa eva vītarāgaścenniṁrasaṁ sarvameva tat & II  
bhāvānacetanānapi cetanavaccetanānacetanavat & I  
vyavahārayati yatheṣṭaṁ sukaviḥ kāvye svatantratayaṁ & II
\end{align*}
\]

In the boundless world of poetry, the poet alone is the sole creator. He transforms this universe according to his whims and fancies. Whatever be the sentiment (either erotic or pathetic or valour) with which he charges the poem, the whole will be suffused with that sentiment. But if he be void of sentiment,
everything becomes dry and insipid. The creative magic of the poet is unparalleled. In poetry, a good poet freely designs even insentient objects to act as sentient ones and sentient objects to act as insentient ones, as he likes. Here the word ‘parivartate’ (transforms) in the above verse indicates the fact that the poetic imagination has the eternal freedom to transform one thing into another. ‘Pratibhā’ is nothing but this free mind of the poet. Prajāpati requires for the creation of the world the material cause such as atoms and the effects of karma as the efficient cause. But the poet manifests his world on the substratum of his own will. To create the poetic world, he requires nothing else than the independence (svātantrya) of his will power, the consciousness that can body forth ever fresh presentations (prīṇa-navanavonmeṣaśālinī), which is the kavipratibhā. Abhinavagupta goes even to a greater length in his famous hymn at the beginning of the Dhvanyāloka Locana:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Apūrva yadvastu prathayati vinā kāraṇakalāṁ} \\
jagadgrāvapракhyāṁ nijarasabharātsārayati ca \\
kramātp rakhyopākhyāprasarasubhagaṁ bhasayati tat \\
sarasvatāstattvaṁ kavisaḥṛdayākhyāṁ vijayate
\end{align*}
\]

He declares that in poetry, there is not the operation of any causal phenomena. The poet creates brave new worlds from naught. By the poet’s deft touch, the hardest stone-like substances in the world are made to lose their hardness and become soft and soothing and full of brimming sentiments. Everything within the reach of the poet is rendered bright with a beauty constructed out of the poet’s genius and the words with which he communicates.

All these the poet does by infusing suggested meaning into the poetic work. So pratibhā is also that power which produces a poetic work throbbing with the suggested meaning. Now in order to enable the poetic work to create aesthetic experience in the mind of the reader, a high sensitivity is also required on the part of the reader. Dhvani proper comes into play between the evocative language of the poet and the aesthetic sensibility of the reader. The relationship between the two conditions the scope of dhvani. So pratibhā is the sine qua non not only of the creative poet to produce a poetical work, but also of the aesthete to grasp the suggested meaning of the poem. It enables the reader to identify himself with the focus of the situation, forgetting one’s individuality. Abhinavagupta following Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, compares this experience with cow’s
milk which flows from the udder prompted by her affection for the calf. Pratībhā in a poet is that type of inspired capacity (buddhi) which produces flawless and beautiful new aesthetic situations, which can be grasped by the aesthete not by his reasoning power but only by getting merged into it through identification with the focus of the situation. The poetic vision is constantly engaged in presenting vibhāvas etc. through proper descriptions and ends in sentence structure (saṅghatana) which results in suggesting such a mental state as is aesthetically relished by a reader of sympathetic heart. The vision of the poet instantly shines forth in such readers. Thus ‘pratībhā’ has the double sense of creative imagination, (kārayitī pratībhā) and of aesthetic sensibility, the appreciative aspect (bhāvayitī pratībhā). Though the appreciative aspect is generally discussed with reference to the role of the reader or spectator, it also refers to the poet’s own appreciation of the world which is the vision (darśana), and which is later enshrined through the power of objectification (varṇana).

We have already stated that the poet sees into the significance of things. Now it is in rasa experience that one comes in touch with the essence of things. So the operation of the pratībhā has its start at the blissful state of the poet’s mind (rasāvesa) and realizes its completion in filling the reader’s heart with the same kind of bliss (rasāsvāda). The creative process is spurred into activity at all because of rasāvesa. As Abhinavagupta says in the Locana of Kārikā I.6, “tasyā ‘viśeṣo’ rasāvesavaiśadyasaundaryam kāvyanirmāṇakṣamatvam I”[3]. The special genius is the capacity of composing pure and beautiful poetry on being possessed by rasa. Ānandavardhana cites the testimony of Ādikavi Vālmīki as a proof in this regard. A grief was caused in the heart of Vālmīki on hearing the wail of the he-curlew afflicted with separation from its slain mate, and Vālmīki burst into the verse “ma niśāda” etc. As Ānandavardhana states in the Vṛtti of Kārikā I.5, “tathā cādikavervālmikeḥ nihatasahacarīvirahākātarakrauñcakrandajanitaḥ śoka eva ślokatayā pariṇataḥ I” Thus Ānandavardhana believes that in order to delineate rasa (sentiment) in poetry the poet himself must be sensitive, i.e., he must already realize the rasa. Abhinavagupta in Locana of I.5 quotes from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s Hṛdayadarpaṇa in this context, “yāvatpūrṇo na caicena tāvannaiva vamatyamum.” The source of poetry is an intense feeling of sentiment in the heart of the poet and any composition of such a poet imbubed in sentiment is destined to be rich in the
suggestion of rasa. The verse “śṛṅgārī cetkaviḥ”, which we have already cited in page 96 strengthens this position of Ānandavardhana. According to Abhinavagupta, the spell of rasa that the poet undergoes is different from raw personal emotion. Vālmīki did not have the worldly and personal emotion of grief when he heard the pitiful lamentations of the she-curlew. In that case he would actually be in pain, pained by that grief, and would not compose a śloka, for the exalted state of being able to write a śloka does not belong to one who is afflicted with pain. The intense constructiveness of the poet’s vision goes beyond the object of physical sight. The experience of grief (śoka) was so intense and sincere that it got universalized. Abhinavagupta, in his Locana commentary on Kārikā 1.5., says that the grief which arose from the separation of the pair of curlews was the basic emotion (sthāyībhāva) of the sentiment of pathetic (karuṇa rasa). By the poet’s ruminating upon the vibhāva which is here the she-curlew separated from her mate and on the anubhāvas such as the wailing of the surviving curlew, the basic emotion grief met with a repose from his heart, and then there occurring the identification (tanmayatā) of the bird’s grief with the grief in his own memory, the basic emotion was transformed into a process of relishing and became the flavour of pathetic (karuṇa rasa). Thus the poet’s personal memory of grief was liberated into a universal, impersonal flavour. This karuṇa rasa is different from ordinary grief because it is relished in the melted (drutā) state of one’s mind. The universalized feeling of śoka then got manifested in the form of a verse in the manner of the waters flowing over the brink of a jar.

In the Fourth Uddyota of the Dhvanyāloka, Ānandavardhana specially deals with such pratibhā or poetic imagination. The imagination of the poet actually comes from his knowledge of the varieties of dhvani. As Ānandavardhana states in Kārikā IV.1:

dhvaneryaḥ sagoṇībṛttavyaḥgyasyādhvā pradarśitaḥ
anenaṁnanyamāyāti kavīṁ pratiḥbṛgaṇaḥ

It means, “By the ways of principal suggestion as also subordinated suggestion shown thus far, the quality of creative imagination in poets will assume endlessness.” That is why the several varieties of dhvani are rendered effective only by reason of the poet’s imagination.
In the *Vṛtti of Kārikā* III.14, Anandavardhana says that the poet does not give newer themes every time for which we have the *Itihāsas* and the *Purāṇas*. Rather he infuses new beauty even to old themes. The poet, endowed with the power of imagination, effects this infusion by infigurating into the poetic expression, embodying only a trite idea, even a single variety of *dhvani*. So imagination or genius is the faculty which produces new aesthetic configurations, by introducing new suggestions in the presentation of what has already been said by ancient poets. Genius is like the fire which gives new shining to the faded colour of pure gold. The phenomenon of a trite subject in poetry acquiring freshness by recourse to the variety of suggestion has also been compared by Anandavardhana to that of the trees which put on new glory with the advent of spring. In *Kārikā* IV.4 Anandavardhana says:

\[ \text{dṛṣṭापुर्वा अपि हयरथा ह काव्ये रसापरिग्रहाः मा द्रुमाः} \]

Anandavardhana profusely illustrates this fact with the help of old stanzas dealing with one idea and new stanzas dealing with the same idea, yet appearing more beautiful as a result of the poet’s imaginative touch. Consider the following two verses:

1. *yaḥ prathamah prathamah sa tu tathāhi*

   *hatahastibahalapalaśī*  

   *śvāpadagaṃṣu sīṇhāḥ sīṇhāḥ keṇādhārikriyate*  

   It means, “He who is first is first indeed. And so the lion eating the mounded meat of his slaughtered elephant, is a lion to other beasts. Who is there that can put him down?”

2. *svatejahkrātāmahimā keṇānyenātiśayyate*

   *mahadbhirapī mātaṅgaiḥ sīṇhāḥ kimabhibhūyate*  

   It means, “He who has bought his greatness by his valor is overcome by none. Is the lion ever defeated by elephants for all their size?”

---

135
136
137
138
139
According to Ānandavardhana, verse (2) is an older verse. It unfolds the same idea as verse (1). Yet verse (1) appears novel because of its association with that type of dhvani where the expressed sense is unintended and where the expressed sense is shifted to the unexpressed sense (arthāntarasaṃkramita avivakṣitavācyadhvanī). In verse (1), the literal sense of the word ‘first’ used for the second time, has been shifted to such suggested properties as irresistibility (aparājeyatva), supremacy (pradhānatva) and uniqueness (asādhāraṇatva). Thus the word ‘first’ mentioned for the second time has put on a new significance. In similar fashion, the literal sense of the second instance of the word lion has been shifted to such properties as heroism (vīratva), autocracy (svanirbharatva), and the calling forth of wonder (vismayaspadatva). In this way, verse (1), though it expresses the same idea as the older verse (2), brings a kind of freshness in its taste that verse (2) is lacking, thanks to the gift of poetic genius.

According to Ānandavardhana, in the production of the ever fresh charm in literature, the contribution of rasa deserves a special mention. Even dullest themes are endowed with a new lease of charm by the agency of rasa. Though there are several varieties of dhvani, the poet desirous of securing novel poetic themes should concentrate his effort towards achieving beauty of rasa. He should marshal all his material towards the one goal of rasa and devise his plot, characters and style in due regard to the principle of unity of rasa in the midst of a variety of shifting rasas and bhāvas. The main thread of angī-rama is never allowed to be lost in the midst of a thousand and one āngas. The poet must keep various āṅga-rasas and bhāvas within the merits of propriety so that the angī-rama shines out in full splendour. Thus the poet must be devoted to the claims of rasa at every step. In a work as a whole, the delineation of a single rasa as the predominant one will endow not only novelty of content but also abundance of charm. Vālmīki’s concentrated attention to the principal sentiment of karuṇa or pathetic in the Rāmāyaṇa and Vyāsa’s all out emphasis on śānta or quietude in the Mahābhārata are instances in point. In the Rāmāyaṇa the karuṇa rasa has been incorporated by the first poet himself, where he says that his “grief has taken the turn of a verse.” The same rasa has been kept as predominant till the very end of the work, because the work has been concluded only at the point where there occurs Rāma’s final irreversible separation from
Sītā. The *Mahābhārata* too, which is at once an instruction and poetry, comes to an end with the total annihilation of the *Viṣṇis* and the *Pāndavas*. Such a conclusion of the epic in a note of despair ultimately produces in the mind of the reader a disenchantment with the affairs of the world. The reverend sage Loknātha himself has declared:

*yathā yathā viparyeti lokatantramāravat ī*

tathā tathā virāgo 'tra jāyate nātra saṃśayaḥ ī II \(^{140}\)

It means, “The more the world’s affairs go wrong for us and lose their substance, the more will disenchantment with them grow, there is no doubt.” \(^{141}\)

This fact reveals that the two subjects intended by Vyāsa as primary are the human goal of liberation from worldly life and the *rasa* of peace (quietude). This is the ultimate meaning of the *Mahābhārata*. Although the *Mahābhārata* contains the other human values of dharma, artha and kāma, it ultimately shows the miserable end to which they come. Thus mokṣa has been meant as the foremost of human values. By stating the insubstantiality of all else, the author here suggests the indifference (*nirveda*) to worldly things which arises from knowledge of their true nature as being merely empty as a mirage. Since this *nirveda* is the *sthāyī* of the *rasa* of quietude (peace), this is aimed as the most predominant sentiment in this epic. The other rasas and human goals are only subordinate to it.

Even though the endlessness of poetry arises out of the literal meaning too, owing to differences in time, place, circumstances etc., this use of literal meaning really shines only in the association of sentiment. The infinite possibilities of poetry are thus due to the clever use of the various shades of primary and suggested senses with a touch of *rasa*. Ānandavardhana here compares the infinite possibilities of poetic theme to the resources of Mother Nature. Though the Primordial Nature has manifested this numerous worlds containing varied objects over legion cycles of past aeons, her ability for the creation of new objects cannot be said to be worn out. So also, the infinite possibilities of poetic themes can never be drained off even by a thousand Vācaspati working with all their might simultaneously, provided the poet is careful in incorporating *rasa*, *bhāva* etc., by following the principle of *aucitya* and
taking into account such differences as those of time and place. The realm of poetry will not grow less, although it has been worked over by the minds of countless poets. Ever new artistic abilities will contribute new shades of charm and the province of poetry will become richer with newer and newer possibilities.

In spite of all this, one can trace, now and then, coincidences of thought amongst great minds, since all great men think alike. But a critic should not judge all these coincidences as deliberate plagiarisms. Coincidence in poetic theme is just another name for the similarity of one poetic theme to other poetic theme. There are three kinds of coincidences: the first is like that of a reflected image of a person (pratibimbavat); the second is like that of his portrait (ālekhyākāravat); and the third is like some one’s body which resembles him (tulyadehivat). Some poetic theme is like other theme in the way that a mirror image is like a person; some other is like portraits of other poetic themes; still some is like other in the way one person resembles another.142 Of these, a wise man should avoid the first kind of coincidence, which is like mirror image. The reason is that this type of poetic theme is ananyātma i.e., it has no soul of its own, for it owes its soul or nature to a poem of prior composition. The form by which it assumes beauty was conceived by a previous poet, so that it is simply an image of that form. This type of poetic theme lacks any real substance (tāttvika śarīrasūnyam). As the mirror image cannot design anything new from the real object, so also in this type of poem, nothing new is imagined by the latter poet. The second type of coincidence, which is like a painted portrait, also deserves to be avoided by the wise, for although it has a substance similar to another’s, its soul is worthless (tucchātma). In a painted portrait, we become aware of what is imitated; but immediately we also become aware that the minium and other paints, in which the painted portrait actually consists, has no real existence. So also this awareness (pratīti) does not lead to any charm. Hence the soul of a poetic theme possessing this second type of coincidence with other theme is worthless.

Now the question inevitably arises: which type of coincidence is acceptable to the poet? Ānandavardhana’s reply is this: “ṭṛtīyaṁ tu vibhinnakamanīyaśarīrasadbhāve sati sasarśvādamapi kāvyavastu na tyaktavyāṁ kavinā ī”143 The third type of coincidence in poetic themes need not be avoided by the poet. The third type of coincidence is resemblance in bodily
features: ‘tulyadehivat’. If this type of poetic material has a body of its own which is beautiful (‘kamanīyaśarīrasadbhāve’), and, as such, has a separate soul of its own due to its having a body, even if it agrees with other poetic material (sasaṁvādamapi), the poet need not avoid it. It should not be rejected on the ground that it is a mere repetition of the earlier and has no originality of its own, for it is not at all possible to affirm that two living persons who bear close resemblance of features are identical with each other. Where there is a different body as well as a soul, there is no fear of mistaking the one for the other. The separate essential substance, i.e., the soul (tattvasya sārabhūlasasyātmanah), which has been mentioned here, is the suggested meaning, the dhvani, which is the soul of poetry. Provided there is the presence of dhvani, even a theme, modeled upon a previous pattern, will shine all the more, just as the delightful face of a woman will appear charming in its own way in spite of its close resemblance with the moon. As a body acquires new grace when it is supported by old beauty and splendour, so also poetic theme, if graced by a resemblance to lovely shades of meaning in earlier works, will attain the highest splendour. So an older theme will not appear to be repetitions in a new poetic creation, if this new piece of poetry is endowed with the essential suggested content; on the other hand, this new creation will acquire new luster.

In the Vṛtti on Kārikā IV.7 Ānandavardhana quotes a Prakrit stanza from Viṣamabāṇalīlā:

\[ \text{ṇa a tāṅ ghaḍaī ohī ṇa a te dīsanti kaha vi puṇaruttā} \]
\[ \text{je vibbhām piṇām atthā vā sukavāṇīṇām} \]

Abhinavagupta in Locana gives its Sanskrit version:

\[ \text{na ca teśām ghaṭate 'vadhīḥ, na ca te dṛṣyante kathamapi} \]
\[ \text{punaruktaḥ} \]
\[ \text{ye vibhrāmāḥ priyāṇāmarthā vā sukavāṇīṁām} \]

It means: No bounds can be fixed for them; never are they seem to be repeated – the graces of lovely woman and the meaning of great poetic expressions. In making the readers spell bound, the poet often handles the self-same material, which one and all are wont to use in their day to day existence. The words employed by poets are none other than the ones current in everyday life. The meanings attaching to them also are the same as in ordinary parlance, only the magic is different. The magic is the touch of suggestion.
REFERENCES:

2. na ca budhā bhūyāṁso 'nādaraṇīyaṁ vastvādareṇopadiśeyuḥ;
   — Locana, Ibid.
3. Vṛtti on Dhvanyālōka, I.1
7. teṣāṁ ghaṇṭānuraṇanarūpatvarīn tāvadasti, te ca
dhvaniśabdenoktāḥ I
   — Locana, op.cit., page 138.
8. śabdasyordhvamabhivyaktervrāttibhede tu vaikṛtāḥ I
dhanayaḥ samupohante spōṭātmā tairna bhidyate II
   — Bhartrhari, as quoted by Abhinavagupta in Locana, op.cit., page 140.
9. teṣu tāvatsveva śrūyāṁreṣu vakturyo’nyo drutavilambitādivṛttibhethātmā
   prasiddhāduccāraṇāvyāpāradhyadhikāḥ sa dhvanirūktaḥ I
   — Locana, op.cit., page 140.
10. evam catuṣkamapi dhvaniḥ I tadyogāccha samastamapi kāvyam dhvaniḥ I
    — Locana, op.cit., page 141.
12. abhidhāpucchabhūtaiva lakṣaṇā.
    — Locana. op.cit., page 159.
14. A Sankaran, Some Aspects of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit or


16. asmābhīraṇi prasiddhebhyaḥ
 śabdavyāparebhyo bhidhātātparalaksanārūpebhyo ‘tirikto vyāpaḥ
dhvanirityuktaḥ

———Locana. op.cit., page 141.

17. Vṛttī on Dhvanyālōka III.36.


19. sakalasatkavīkāvyopaniṣadbhūtamatiśāṁśyaṁ... l

Vṛttī on Dhvanyālōka, I.1

20. atha ca RāmāyaṇaMahābhārataprabhṛtīni lakṣye sarvatra
 prasiddhavyavahāraṁ... l

———Ibid.

21. lāvanyam hi nāmāvatvasaṁsthānābhivyaṅgam-
 avayavatyāriktaṁdharmāntarameva I na cāvayavaṁmeva nirdoṣatā vā
 bhūṣaṇayogo vā lāvanyam, prthasīnirvanṣamānakāṇādidoṣa-
 sūnyaśarīrāvayavayogīyāmapaloṣaṁkrāyāmapi lāvanyasūnyeyamiti,
 atathābhūtāyāmapi kasyāścillāvanyāmṛtaśraddhikayamiti sahrdayānāṁ
 vyavahārāt

———Locana, op.cit., page. 49.


23. atho ca vācyavyacakalaksanāmātrākṛtaśrāmaṇāṁ
 kāvyatattvārthhabhāvānāvimaṁkāṇāṁ svaraśrutādilaksanāmāvapragīṁānāṁ
 gāndhavalaksanāvidāmagocara evāsāvarthaḥ

———Vṛttī on Dhvanyālōka, I.7.


26(a). Locana, op.cit., page 52.

28. prādhānyādeva tatparyantānusaraṇaraṇaraṇakatvaritā madhye viśrānti na kurvata iti kramasya sato'pyalakṣaṇaṁ prādhānye heṭuḥ
t—— Locana, op.cit., page 100.
29. yataḥ kāvyaviśeṣo 'ṅgī dhvaniriti kathitaḥ tasya punaraṅgāni — alaṅkāra guṇā vṛttayaścetī pratipāda/yiśyante
——Vṛtti on Dhvanyāloka, I.13.
30. ....na tādātmyamalarāṅkārāṅāṁ dhvanesca yāvat—svāmibhṛtyavadaṅgirūṅgarūpayorvirodhādityarthaḥ
—— Locana, op.cit., page 136.
31. aprthagbhāve tu tadaṅgatvaṁ tasya I na tu tattvameva I
——Vṛtti on Dhvanyāloka, I.13.
32. yatrāpi vā tattvam tatrāpi dhvanermaḥāviśayatvānna tanniṣṭhatvameva
—— Ibid.
33. Translated by K.Krishnamoorthy, op.cit., page 11.
34. Translated by K.Krishnamoorthy, op.cit., page 11.
35. Translated by K.Krishnamoorthy, op.cit., page 53.
36. dvividho 'pi pratiyamānāḥ sphuto 'sphuṭaśca I tatra ya eva sphuṭaḥ sabdaśaktyārthasaṇkaṭyā vā prakāśate sa eva dhvanermargo netaraḥ I
——Vṛtti on Dhvanyāloka, II.31.
37. The Locana Sanskrit version of the Prakrit verse stated in the Vṛtti on Dhvanyāloka I.4, Locana, op.cit., page 71.
38(a). Locana, op.cit., page 279.
39. The Locana Sanskrit version of the Prakrit verse stated in the Vṛtti on Dhvanyāloka II.27, Locana, op.cit., page 286.
40. tatra tu yeyāṁ dhvanyamānopaṁ priyākucakudmalābhyaṁ sakalajanatrasakaresvapi śātravesu mardanodyateṣu gajakumbhasthalesu tadvaśena ratimādādānāṁmiva bahumāna iti saiva vīratātiśayacamatkāraṁ vidhattā ityupamāyāḥ prādhānyam
—— Locana, op.cit., page 286.
41. Translated by K.Krishnamoorthy, op.cit., page 37.
42. yatra tu sāmarthyākṣiptaṁ sadalaṅkārāntaraṁ śabdāsaktyā prakāśate sa sarva eva dhvanervaśayaḥ l – Vṛtti on Dhvanyāloka II.21.
43. Vṛtti on Dhvanyāloka, II.21.
44. Translated by K.Krishnamoorthy, op.cit., page 39.
45. Vṛtti on Dhvanyāloka, II.21.
46. Translated by K.Krishnamoorthy, op.cit., page 41.
47. tadanantaramarthāvagatirdhvananavyāpārādeva śabdāsaktimūlat l
   – Locana, op.cit., page 260.
49. tenopamārūpeṇa vyatirecananihṭavādayo vyāpāramāttrarūpā evātrāsvādaprātipiḥ pradhānaṁ viśrāntisthānaṁ, na tūpameyādīti sarvatrālaṅkāra dhvanau mantavyam l
   – Locana, op.cit., page 263.
50. Translated by K.Krishnamoorthy, op.cit., page 46.
51. Vṛtti on Dhvanyāloka II. 27.
51(a). Translated by K.Krishnamoorthy, op.cit., page 47.
51(b). Vṛtti on Dhvanyāloka II. 27.
52. Translated by K.Krishnamoorthy, op.cit., page 49.
52(a). avarṣanīyatāpratipādanamevākṣepasya rūpamābhātrariṣṭatmakaḥ vāt.
   – Locana, op.cit., page 288.
53. sukavirvidagdhapurandhrīvadhbhūṣaṇaṁ yadyapi śīṣṭaṁ yojayati, tathāpi śaṅkratāpattirevāsyā kaṣṭasampāḍyā kurukmapīti kāyāḥ iva l – Locana, op.cit., page 300.
54. te’laṅkāra dhvanervyāpārasya kāvasya vā’ṅgalāṁ vyāngyarūpatyaḥ gataḥ santaḥ parāṁ durlabhāṁ chāyāṁ kāntimātmarūpatāṁ yānti l
   – Locana, Ibid.
55. Vṛtti on Dhvanyāloka II.27.
56. “na hi rasādṛge kaścidarthah pravartate l”–Nāṭyaśāstra, VI. 31
57. tato vṛkṣasthānīyaṁ kāvyam l tatra puṣpādhisthānīyo’bhinayādinaṭavyāpāraḥ l tatra phalasthānīyaḥ sāmājikarasāsvēdaḥ l tena rasamayameva viśvam l – Abhinavabhāratī, Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharatamuni with the Commentary
58. etacca rasāditātparyeṇa kāvyanibandhanaṁ bharatādāvapi supersiddhameveti pratipādayitumāha...I–Dhvanyāloka, III.33
59. duḥkhasaṃśleśavidveṣī sukhāsvādanasādaraḥ I – Abhinavabhāratī, op.cit., page 282.
60. na hyetaccittavṛttivāsanāśūnyaḥ prāṇi bhavati I – Ibid.
62. ...te samucitavibhāvabāhāvjyanamadhye’pi na bhavantyeva I ...yasyāpi bhavanti vibhāvabalātītasyāpi hetuprakṣaye kṣiyamāṇāḥ saṃskāraśeṣatāṁ tāvat nāvaśyamanubadhīnanti I Abhinavabhāratī, op.cit., page 283.
64. sāttvikaścānubhabhāvarūpatvāḥ na prthaguktāḥ
   — Sāhityadarpana, III.l.
65. yathā hi nānāvyāṇjanasamśkytamannamā bhūjānaṁ rasāṅsvādayantī sumanasaḥ purūṣā harṣaḍīṁścādhīgacchanti tathā nānābhāvabhīnayvaṇyaṁ hitān vāgaṅgasattvacetān sthāyibhāvānāsvādayantī sumanasaḥ prekṣakāḥ harṣaḍīṁścādhīgacchanti I tasmānaṁityārasā ityabhīvyākhyātāḥ I
   — Nāṭyaśāstra, VI. 31.
66. Locana, op.cit., page 197.
67. Ibid., page 50.
68. ...rasavandha eva kaveḥ prādhānyena pravṛttinibandhanaṁ yuktam I...rasadīrūpavavyāgyatātparyamevaiśāṁ yuktamiti yatno’smābhīrārddho na dhvaniprātipādanamātrābhīnivesena I
   — Vṛttī on Dhvanyāloka III.19.
70. auctyena pravṛtttau cittavṛtterāsvādyate sthāyinyā raso, vyabhicārīṇyā bhāvaḥ, auctyena tadābhāṣaḥ, Rāvaṇasyeva Śīāyāṁ ratēḥ I... tadaṅgaṁ bhāvabāsaścittavṛtteḥ praśama eva prakrāntyāḥ hṛdayamāḥlādayati yato viśeṣeṇa, tata eva tataṣaṁgṛhiḥto’pi prthaggaṇito’sau I
   — Locana, op.cit., pages 79-80.
71. **tritiyastu rasādilakṣaṇaḥ** prabheda vācyasāmarthāyāksiptaḥ prakāśate, na tu sākṣācchabdavyāpāraviṣayā iti vācyādvibhinna eva

— Vṛtти on Dhvanyāloka 1.4.

72. **Locana, op.cit., page 79.**

73. **na cāyaṁ rasādirarthāḥ** 'putrastre jātaḥ' ityato yathā harṣo jāyate tathā nāpi lakṣaṇayā \\*api tu saḥṛdayasya ṭṛdayasaṅvādabalādvibhāvānubhāvapratiṭau tanmayībhāvenāsvādyāmāna eva rasyamānātaikaprāṇāḥ**

siddhasvabhāvasukhaḥ dīvilakṣaṇaḥ parisphurati

— **Locana, op.cit., pages 80-81.**

74. **yastu svapne'pi na svaśabdavācyo na laukikavyavahārapatitāḥ,...**

— **Locana, op.cit., page 50.**

75. 'śabdārthaśarīraṁ kāvyam' ti yaduktaṁ, tatra śarīragrahaṇādeva

kenacidatmanā tadanuprāṇakena bhāvyameva

— **Locana, op. cit, page 43.**

76. **yo'rthaḥ saḥṛdayaślāghyaḥ kāvyātmeti vyavasthaṇaḥ.**

— Dhvanyāloka, I.2

77. **yo viśeṣaḥ, sa pratiyamānabhāgo vivekibhirviśeṣahetusvādātmeti** vyavasthāpyate

— **Locana, op.cit., page 44.**

78. **sa eveti pratiyamānāmātre'pi prakrānte tritiya eva rasadhvaniriti mantavyam**

— **Locana, op.cit., page 86.**

78(a). **pratiyamānasya cānyabhedadarśane'pi rasabhāvamukhaṇaivopalakṣaṇam prādhānyāt**

— Vṛtти on Dhvanyāloka I.5.

79. **anena hi nāmadavyena dhvananātmani vyāpāre pūrvaprasiddhābhīghātātparyalakṣaṇātmarākṣayeśvāpanaṁrātirātvarthapratīṭeḥ**

pratipattrgatayeḥ prayoktrabhāpṛyarūpāyāśca vivakṣāyāḥ sahakārītvamuktamiti
dhvanisvarūpameva nāmabhyāmeva projjīvitam

— Locana, op.cit., page 145.


81. **yo’rtha upapadyamāno’pi tāvataivānupa-yogāddharmāntarasāṅvalanayānātyātāmiva gato laksyamāno’nungatadharmī**

sūtranyāyenāste sa rūpāntarapariṇāta uktaḥ

— **Locana, op.cit., page 174.**

82. **Vṛtти on the Dhvanyāloka II.1.**

84. *Lakṣmīpātraitvādiparīnātakamala*.

— Bāla Priyā.

85. yastvanupapadyamāna upāyatāmātreṇārthāntaraprātipatti kṛtvā palāyata iva sa tiraskṛta iti.


85(a) *Vṛtti* on *Dhvanyāloka* II.1.


87. Ibid., page 43.

88. iha tu padmadalagonamadhomukhatvaṁ cānyathāpi kumārīnāṁ sambhāvyata iti jhaṭṭī na lajāyāṁ viśramayati ṣṛdayaṁ, api tu prāgyvṛtatapascaryādi vṛttāntānusmaraṇaṁ tatra pratipattiṁ karoti tī kramavāṅgyataiva 1

— *Locana*, op.cit., page 270.

89. The *Locāna* Sanskrit version of the Prakrit verse stated in the *Vṛtti* on the *Dhvanyāloka* II.24.

90. K. Krishnamoorthy, op.cit., page 46.

91. *Locana*, op.cit., page 188.


93. Translated by Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M.V. Patwardhan, op.cit., page 397.

94. priye priya iti parasparajīvitasarvasābhimānātmako ratisthāyibhāva uktaḥ 1


96. Translated by Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M.V. Patwardhan, op.cit., page 396.

97. tena sthāyyeva vibhāvānubhāvādibhirupacito rasaḥ 1


98. Sa cobbhayorapi [mukhyayā vṛttā Rāmādau] anukārye'nu kartaryapi cānusandhānabalāt — iti 1

— Ibid.

111
99. tasmāddhetubhirvibhāvākhyaiḥ...anukarṣṭhatvena liṅgabalatāḥ
pratīyamāṇaḥ sthāyī bhāvo mukhya Rāṁādigasthāḥyayanukaranaṇaṁrupaḥ
anukaranaṇaṁpatvādeva ca nāmāntareṇa vyapadīsto rasaiḥ

100. Locana, op.cit., page 195.

101. yuktayā paryanuyujyeta sphurannanubhavaiḥ kayaḥ


102. na ca śabdānumāṇadībhāyaḥ tatpratīti lokaṣaya sarasatā prayuktā (satā'pi
yuktā) pratyakṣādīva l nāyakayugalākavabhāse hi pratyuta
lajjājugupsāsprhādisvocitacittavṛtyantarodaya vyagratayākāśa (yāneka)
rasatvatmathāpi syāt. I.

— Abhinavabhāratī, op.cit., Vol. I, chapter 6, page 276

103. niṣaṣāvṛddhiśrāntilakṣaṇa


104. rajastamo 'nuvedhacitryabalāddrutivistāravikāsalakṣaṇa

— Ibid.

105. sattvodrekapakāśānandamaya

— Ibid.


108. Locana, op.cit., page 199.

109. bhogo 'pi na kāvyasabdena kriyate, api tu
ghanamohāndhyasarikatatānivṛttidvāreṇāsvādāparānāmni
alaukike
drutivistaravikāśātmanī bhoge kartavye lokottare dhvananavyāpāra eva
mūrdhābhīṣiktaḥ l taccadāṁ bhogakṛttvāṁ rasasya dhvananiyatve siddhe
daivasiddham l rasyamānātodditacamatkārānatiṛktatvādḥbhogasyeti I

— Locana, op.cit., page 200.

110. bhogikaranaṇavāpāraṁśca kāavyasya rasaviśayo dhvananātmaiva,
nānyatkīṁcit I

— Locana, op.cit., page 199.

111. Sushil Kumar De, op.cit., chapter IV, page 135.


114. Nāṭyaśāstra, VII.1

115. tatkāvyārtho rasaiḥ


117. Ibid., page 138.

119. ... vighnabahulebhyo vilakṣaṇam nirvighnapratītigrāhyam sākṣādiva hṛdaye niviśamānaṁ cakṣūṣoriva viparivartamānaṁ bhayānako rasaḥ I

120. Ibid

121. tathā hi – sa cāṭṛptivatirekenāvicchinnā bhogāveṣa ityucyate I

122. Ibid


125. *Locana*, op.cit., page 82.


127. ānandarūpataḥ sarvarasānām I

— *Abhinavabhāratī*, op.cit., chapter 6, page 282.

128. Ibid

129(a). vastuta mādhurya nāma sṛṅgārāde rasasyaiva guṇaḥ I
tanmadhurarasābhivyāṇjakayoh śabdārthayorupacaritaṁ
madhurasṛṅgārarasābhivyaktisamarthataḥ śabdārthayormādhuryamiti hi

129(b). asphuṣṭasphuritaṁ kāvyatattvametadyathoditam I
aśaknuvaddhirvyākartum rīlayaḥ sampravartitāḥ I

(Dhvanyāloka, III,46)

129(c). rītirhi guṇeṣveva paryavasitāḥ yatāḥa – viśeṣo guṇātmā guṇāśca
rasaparyavasāyina eva ... – *Locana*, op.cit., page 552

130. apūrvavastunirmāṇakṣamā praṇīṇā I

*Locana*, op.cit., page 93.


132. na tu muneḥ śoka iti mantavyam I evaṁ hi sati tadduḥkhena so’pi duḥkhita
iti kṛtvā rasasyātmate nirvakāśaṁ bhavet I na ca
duḥkhhasantaptasyaiṣā daśeti I – *Locana*, op.cit., page 88

133. sa eva tathābhūtavibhāvatadutthā-krandādyanubhāvacarvanayā
hṛdayasaṁvādatanmayībhavanakramādāsvādyamānataṁ pratipannaḥ
karuṇarasarūpataṁ laukikaśokavatiriktāṁ svacittadrudtisamāsvādyasārāṁ
pratipanno rasaparipūrṇakumbhelocanaavaccittavṛttinīḥṣyandasvabhāva ... I

— *Locana*, op.cit, page 87.
134. Translated by K.Krishnamoorthy, op.cit., page 136
135. *na hi kaveri* vṛttamātranirvahanena kicītprayojanam, itihāsādeva tātsiddheḥ
136. Vṛtti on *Dhvanayāloka* IV.2
138. Vṛtti on *Dhvanayāloka* IV.2
139. Ibid., page 680
140. Vṛtti on *Dhvanayāloka* IV.5
141. Translated by Daniel J.H.Ingalls, J.H.Masson and M.V.Patwardhan, op.cit., page 691
142. *kiṃciddhi kāvyavastu vastvantarasya śarīrināḥ pratibimbakalpam, anyadālekhyaaprakhyam,anyattulyena śarīrinā sadṛśam*
   — Vṛtti on *Dhvanayāloka* IV.12.
143. Vṛtti on *Dhvanyāloka* IV.13.
144. *nahi śarīrī śarīrinānyena sadṛśo ’pyeka eveti śakyate vaktum*
   —Vṛtti on *Dhvanyāloka*, IV.13.
145. Locana, op.cit, page 515.