CHAPTER IV
Let me begin this chapter with a quotation from Verrier Elwin's *A Philosophy For NEFA*, where late Jawaharlal Nehru remarked:

"I am alarmed when I see - not only in this country but in other great countries too - how anxious people are to shape others according to their own image or likeness, and to impose upon them their particular way of living. We are welcome to our way of living, but why impose it on others? This applies equally to national and international fields. In fact, there would be peace in the world if people were to desist from imposing their way of living on other people and countries."

"I am not at all sure which is the better way of living, the tribal or our own. In some respects I am quite certain their's is better. Therefore, it is grossly presumptuous on our part to approach them with an air of superiority, to tell them how to behave or what to do and what not to do. There is no point in trying to make of them a second-rate copy of ourselves."

From the above remark one gets a fairly clear idea of the late Prime Minister favouring a non-interference as far as possible, in what is generally known as the 'tribal' way of life or another 'form of life' in the hope of "reforming" it. There are numerous social scientists who subscribe to this view, for instance, names such as John Collier in America, Rattray in Africa and so on, are familiar upholders of this notion.
The central theme of this chapter is the question of understanding the ideas of 'traditionalism and modernity'. It is often asked as to which of these two notions is the more desirable one. If the enquiry is directed towards weighing the merits of one over the other, the absurdity is certainly apparent. Firstly, every age calls itself 'modern'; it can also claim to be traditional in the sense of continuing with or participating in the observance of certain basic rituals and moral and social norms, without which the expression 'being traditional' can have no sense. Now of course, if the concept of modernity has a historical continuity with traditionalism, the latter must be seen as an evolution of the former. It is perfectly intelligible to imagine a culture which has remained static for a length of time. Thus, the concept of modernity has significance only with reference to the past, and susceptible to alterations in future. This must be so if a culture is to survive, by conforming to environmental and material changes. A progressive or dynamic culture always brings life-enhancing changes in all areas of life. However, just look around and one observes that technological growth encourages, vulgar consumerism at the cost of ethical values and jeopardizes the delicate balance of one's moral or spiritual life with the world of materialism. In every progressive culture,
there is the provision for the uniform growth of both these aspects of man's life. Wittgenstein's remark that 'every language is complete' must surely mean that a culture or a 'form of life' is an autonomous, self-sustaining unit with all the various activities within it imbued with significance and no parts non-sensical. Hence, the well-being of a 'form of life' depends on the multifarious parts acting with each other in a mutually enhancing way. Man is essentially a centre of sanity and wisdom; his aspirations in its nature cannot only be wholly a mechanism for ordering impressions of sensations which the human organism receives from outside and for signalling a variety of messages useful for survival, important though these functions are. Besides being a 'language-wielding', 'self-enquiring' creature, man is also a 'truth-seeking' creature. This aspect of man determines his attitude and relationship with the physical world and the spiritual world. It is perhaps only through this, that one might realise quite distinctive world-views held by man in primordial times and in the present modern situation. This distinction is, very possibly, the most crucial difference between what may be termed as 'Traditional thought' and the modern view of the 'Self'. As to the exposition of the traditional man and
his relation with nature, I have relied quite substantially on the view held by A.K. Saran.¹

It is believed that the main characteristics of traditional man is that he identifies himself as an indivisible part of nature or the cosmos. This being so, man is thus an integral part of the universe. This premise presupposes therefore, a certain unity between 'the microcosm and the macrocosm'; it may hence, be called either as an anthropocosmic or, alternatively, a cosmo-anthropomorphic vision of man.

Secondly, this vision of man is based on what might be called a doctrine of signatures, or the creative theory of language. The fundamental principle of this theory is based on the assumption that, the visible or what is apprehended is the manifestation of the invisible. The underlying significance of this theory is that the invisible imbues substantiality to the visible. It is not, as the argument goes, a dialectic between the known and the unknown; it is not the unknown that calls forth knowledge, but the invisible, the unknowable. Hence, it is the unperceived that lends form and legitimacy to what is seen.

¹. Language Tradition and Modern Civilisation. Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publications, (Ed. Ramchandra Gandhi). Department of Philosophy, Poona University, Pune.
Conversely, therefore, "knowledge and language are always being let, as it were, into a secret".² What this system advocates is that one draws forth knowledge from an inexplicable, ineffable, alchemical reserve of infinite cosmos, which, in its endless bounty remains ever elusive to finite man's attempt at a holistic grasp of it.

The interesting feature of this system of knowledge is its assumed unity. It is not the case that man's pursuit for knowledge culminates somehow contingently, advantageously or maybe, even inconveniently in an integrated unified system. Nor is it the case that such a system is, therefore, quite dispensable. The essence of the matter is that the very system assumes a common core, that is, a centre which is, as mentioned, 'the unknowable' or 'the invisible'. Hence, this traditional theory of knowledge assumes, at the very outset, a unity. In contemporary theories of language, signs or symbols are thought to be a product of language and knowledge. In the traditional view of language, however, knowledge is the product of given signs. Hence, what this vision postulates, is that, knowledge is the result of truth derived from nature.

² Ibid.
Traditional thought maintains that there is no clear-cut definitive distinction between unity and multiplicity. The 'I' carries with it the notion of a symbolic unity with the cosmos, and simultaneously, the possibility of the idea of manifesting itself in plurality.

In the traditional view, knowledge accrues from deciphering the symbols that are manifested, and the explanations always have a gnostic interpretation, unlike, as Saran contends, parochial scientific thought which, because of its agnosticism, is naively and dogmatically impoverished to that extent. Scientific thought pronounces that \( 2 + 2 \) is merely 4, while symbolic thought searches for the hidden meanings hidden behind the number of phenomena. Since these meanings are not sensuously experienced, they remain ever a secret. Symbolic Hindu thought, as the example goes, interprets the number '4' as symbolising the 'universe' and not merely the aggregate of four units. Similarly for the grammarian, the alphabets are not just building blocks, as it were, of spoken or written languages. It is said that the second letter of the DEVANAGIRI script 'kha' symbolises the ether, sky and the cosmic world.

It has been argued that the modern concept of man is an aberration and hence, the only valid question in this
area is not the anthropological question 'what is man?' but the more comprehensive traditional query: 'who am I?'. The approach to the matter in the traditional set up forms a segment or a part of agnostic inquiry into the 'unknowable' whose cosmosity is given, as it were, and in which is contained the symbolic correspondences constituting the invisible life of the cosmos. This cosmosity implies a unity and multiplicity which entail each other. Now, the very notion of anthropology is a modern notion.

First, the anthropological mode 'what is man'? has the consequence of man being objectified, so that this question is on a par logically and substantively with the question like 'what is a table'? or 'what is a blackboard'? and so on. It fails to express the presupposition that man is not an object and thus lets us lapse into the status of objects and this is clearly a paradoxical situation, for although man is considered as something unique, something different from the rest of the cosmos, the anthropological mode of questioning does not, in any way whatsoever, hint at this either logically or even syntactically.

Secondly, if this mode of enquiry is accepted as a basis for investigations about man, then the question starts with a gap between the epistemic and the ontic levels;
between knowledge and being. This is an irredeemable chasm that cannot, in principle, ever be bridged.

The third consequence of all knowledge of man, accrued through anthropological investigation is bound to be impoverishing as the enquiry is principally empirical. Hence, the research results in an account of man of what he has done in the matter of civilisation and culture. The other aspect of man, namely the ontological aspect is ignored. Hence, the form of enquiry excludes man's essence, from the very outset. The modern view, therefore, that man can only have a history and be understood solely through his accomplishments and does not find it necessary to take into account his nature and destiny, is incomplete in its investigation.

Fourthly, the anthropological enquiry fails to offer a coherent account of pre-modern man either in terms of a discontinuous dichotomy, or as in the works of the structuralists, in terms of a continuum linking both pre-modern and modern man. The result is that traditional man is made problematic. Modern thought here faces a dilemma. If history, as such, is denied modern times, it must be considered non-historical. Yet, it prides itself on being historical. Now again, if the history of man is taken into account before the emergence of the modern age, the consciousness
of traditional man may be explained in one of the following ways: It may be explained in evolutionary terms with the process of a continuous development from beginning to modern age, or as the difference between error-ignorance and 'knowledge-truth'. At first, a discontinuity was considered and posited with its inevitable difficulties. However, now modern thought finds it more convenient to explain traditional man's consciousness by positing a continuity as found in the works of the so-called Structuralists, among whom Levi Strauss has earned prominence.

Thus, now it is rather clear to apprehend that the modern form of the question 'what is man'? jeopardizes or disrupts the traditional conviction of a unity between man and the 'divine', since man, in this mode of questioning has been reified. This separativeness, though, inevitably encourages unacceptable conclusions, there is seemingly, within this framework, a redeeming theory which advocates that man must become, to the extent possible, master of the world. This is not, on the final analysis, a solution to the problem, but it explains modern man's vision of himself, and his ambitions and has indeed, drawn the attention of social scientists as a prestigious anxiety. The conquest of nature by man, by its very logic, is description of the unity and is thus responsible for the reversal of the normal
relationship: whereas, knowledge should control its applications, the possibilities of application now control knowledge.

Lastly, the nature of the question 'what is man?' though excludes the questioner (which could in theory be a non-human being) it is an indubitable fact that it is man himself who is asking it. While on the other hand, the autological question 'who am I?' includes the questioner both semantically and syntactically. Thus it might be called a pseudo-question from a certain point of view.

In the modern scientific mode, knowledge of man is necessarily through his works, and since man himself is the enquirer, it is quite plain to admit that the object and subject of enquiry here is one and the same. In the human sciences, man is both the object and subject of enquiry, unlike in the natural sciences where he is only the subject and not the object of enquiry. However, from the point of view of traditional man the subject of enquiry, say the natural scientist, is not distinguished from nature. So, whether man is investigating nature or himself, it is the same phenomenon he investigates. However, in the modern view,
with the loss of the unified anthropocosmic view, which as we have seen, pre-modern man had elaborated, there is a feeling of objecthood and alienation which modern man seeks to overcome, with no hope of success, by trying to reshape the cosmos in his own image. It is the modern view's slogan that we can understand only what we have made, and so, since nature is not man-made, we cannot ultimately have valid knowledge of it. However, as history is made by man, he can have systematic, valid knowledge of history. It is also a postulate of traditional thought that we can understand only what we ourselves make. The crucial difference however, in traditional thought is that the world and man are not man-made, so a holistic grasp of either by man is not possible. Therefore the logic of modern thought leads man to pronounce that since he cannot understand what is not made by him he employs science at his command and disturbs the normal science-technology relationship which a healthy scientific climate would require.

This modern attitude to life has certain tremendous adverse consequences. The first being that man's relationship with the material world is inverted. It was normally the case that man finds his earthly limitations as a negation or an obstacle, albeit temporarily, to his identity with the infinite cosmos. Now this, being the
case, the anthropological question of making the subject and object of study the same, inverts this relationship. And so, given the rupture that separates man from nature, there is a categorical division between the natural sciences, where man, along with other natural phenomena is the object of study, and the human or social sciences, where man is a problematic subject - object of investigation. The moment that this need for the knower and the known to be identical arises in the context of enquiry, the enquirer faces the principle that you can only understand fully what you have made or done yourself, and thus concludes since we do not understand fully what we have not made, we will have to make our own universe so that we may come to understand it, by reshaping it under our control. So man, a finite, empirical being, whose vision has narrowed down to the point where he sees himself as an object, ends up determined to play the role of an infinite, transcendental, environment reshaping being. Thus, an empirical theory of transcenence is presupposed in this mode and the very enterprise rests on the efficacy of this mode.

However, since this enterprise rests on a misunderstanding of our own nature, as well as that of the cosmos, there are grave and ultimately prohibitive costs within the modern form of investigation and its associated
technological adventure. These costs, characterised as unassailable 'residues', left by the modern endeavour become indubitably pronounced within the modern perspective itself; and the costs are so high that, some day, people will have to return, as the argument goes, to the traditional view of things.

The residues which modern thought about man leaves and recognises have been explicated in the following ways: they are the residues of temporality, experience and imagination, identity and rationality.

First, the residue of temporality. No one has any memory of one's birth, nor experienced the overtaking of death. As opposed to the traditional world-view, where life and death, sleeping and waking, demons and angels have all the appropriate ontological explanations and form a part of the totality of the cosmos besides other phenomena, modern thought fears and so basically avoids any theory related to the idea of death. But this is mainly in the individual level and so pronounced that science as such, is not concerned with the individual. However, if one looks at pre-history for instance, or geology, archaeology and anthropology in the light of ethnography one finds that a time has been posited when nature and earth existed, but man's existence had not yet
evolved. But when one conceptualises it, it is done as if mankind were already there, because the modes of perception through which this is done are human modes. This is an obvious contradiction, since if mankind had not existed then, a description is not possible at all. It is not like saying today's man is not the Roman man or a Chinese and so on, because we do posit some continuity between ourselves and the people of the races mentioned. Similarly we might even posit a link between ourselves and pre-historic man. However it seems to be an absurdity to talk of a continuity between a time uninhabited by man and times inhabited by him. This impermissible description of such a residue of time seem to be basic to some theories of the social sciences as regards the construction of pre-history.

There is, similarly, no relationship seemingly, in man's life, between the past and future. One is related to the past through memory, and the future only through experience. However these are pure subjective concepts and so, unless one can appear to a non-subjective theory of memory and hope, the conceptual discontinuity between past and future, and the existential continuity between them will never be bridged. This is yet another instance of a residue of temporality, not only palpable but actually created by modern thought, and still unfortunately incapable of absorbing it.
Secondly, there are the residues of experience and imagination. What is observed is the unaccountable wonder that man's energy exceeds his experiences, and also that strange laws and demands are imposed upon him. How is it that man has been the subject of a language which has been formed without him, and within which he is obliged to lodge his speech and thought? Is it that the words he uses merely animates a segment of his varied energy to innumerable possibilities? In other words, the concepts we use for understanding ourselves in contemporary thought have as its basis in a frame of imagination which man in terms of anthropological knowledge lacks. Thus, this becomes a residue.

The next residue is that of man's identity with regard to the explanation of it in modern terms. A description of the 'Self', whatever the description maybe, in whatever aspect, the implication is that the 'I' is always 'n plus 1'. What is meant is this: that 'I' apart from being the knower, is also the known. And the known must be 'n plus 1' because it cannot be equal to 'n' which he knows. Now this being a residue, modern thought has no way of coping with it, but indeed ironically, it has engendered it. The problem is not that valid human theories do not know of residues. As mentioned and implied
all along, traditional thought has its basis on the concept of residues. So in this conceptual framework, the notion of residues has its rightful place in the Ontological scheme of things.

The residue of rationality appears rather strongly as the culmination of the earlier ones. Its characteristic seems pronounced in three main aspects of life. They are unreason or irrationality, the unconscious and sex.

1. Even in the modern frame of thinking, the 'unconscious' is taken to be an autonomous concept, which means, it is not believed to be a part of the conscious and which, in due course of time will become conscious. The notions of sleep and death are accepted as independent generic concepts. In certain ways, the unconscious as a concept is the discovery of modern thought itself. Marx might, therefore, have been hasty in pronouncing that in some future time, man will have full understanding of all that there are and that there will be nothing unexplainable, for those who recognise it, cannot honestly speak of it as being abolished at any time.

2. On the surface, the idea of 'irrationality' looks like a lower form of rationality, one might very well be tempted to brand it as a kind of sub-rationality. On analysing the form of irrational structures, however, as
discovered by modern social sciences, one will not think of them as a derogatory form of rationality which could be overcome with the development of human reason. Modern thought recognises various irrational structures of which religious form of life is one. The idea is also understood in terms either of a combination of unconscious motives and irrationality, or purely as irrational structures of which there are many. Therefore, it may not be correct to say that religion as such, and not just certain mistakes inherent in it, will disappear altogether when there comes a day when man understands everything about the natural world. The notion of irrationality is as independent and autonomous as the concept of reason, similarly as the idea of the unconscious which is inborn with man and employed as a principle of explanation and theory construction in modern social sciences.

3. Lastly, sex is basically a residue because it is usually treated as a kind of primal energy not essentially a part of human life, so that its form, transformation and perversions are usually recognised against the background of a combination of the unconscious and sex of in terms of itself. This is quite evident in the modern attitude to life, where language, being a repository of a 'form of life' reflects the monopoly of the scientific and industrial
mode of production over the traditional mode of cosmic perception. The language of modern society particularly the industrial nations identify the worth of labour with the outputs of industry. The seemingly total materialization of consciousness is self-reflected in every activity of life. Schools have, as their aim of production 'education', while earlier, people ask what children 'learn'. "The functional shift from verb to noun highlights the corresponding impoverishment of the social imagination. People who speak a nominalist language habitually express proprietary relationships to work which they have". Modern people, whether they be labourers or bureaucrats, talk about having-work, while peasants say they do it. Those who have been modernized expect industries not only to produce more goods but also more work for more people. People acquire knowledge, mobility even sensitivity or health. They have not only work or fun but even sex. Hence, the sexual aspect of man which is treated traditionally as a necessary adjunct to human or animal life is treated now as something 'extra' which may or may not be had according to choice. The perversion of this instinct is too evident, particularly in the modern Western societies where science has determined the evolution of, what is known popularly as, the 'permissive society',
Of course, this is not to say, (it will be too wrongly naive to claim that it does) that even in former times, licentiousness does not exist, nor celibacy considered virtuous, but each has its proper explanations, unlike modern times, which basically, tries to ignore it from the realm of morality. Problems in this regard are solved merely jurisprudentially. Hence, this is also a residue of rationality since reason is regarded as the basic tool and a sufficient one for understanding and coping with them. Yet they are not subsumable by reason alone and regarded as sovereign and autonomous from other areas of life, with their own particular needs and demands.

We have seen some of the problems basic and inevitable to society which views man as an object, illustrated in the question: "What is man?" or a distorted transition from the traditional self-enquiring, truth-seeking "who am I?" The traditional concern by its very nature of the enquiry reflects the very idea of self-consciousness, which, by implication, would mean a perpetual anxiety for the 'Self' and its relationship with the non-human world. The 'I' as in speech, is established as a manifestation of our independence from causality in the narrow but humanity-defining area of our lives where self-consciousness explicitly reigns. Thus, it seems to me that, in a broad sense,
the 'Self' must have precedence over the material world and not, as is often the case, presently in many societies, be subsumed under it. Intemperate consumerism is the inevitable result of identifying the 'Self' with the world of materialism. This inversion of perspective from the traditional to the modern leads to an inversion of values.

What is now quite expected to be asked is: 'What is the idea of progress?' Does it mean technological sophistication alone with the spiritual aspect relegated to a mere contingency? The ills of this perspective is all too evident in the irreligious, unmetaphysical scientifically—advanced countries. The spiritual poverty renders them liable to fall prey to all sorts of meretricious cults with temporary remedies. Hence, poverty in the spiritual aspect of one leads to self-destructive consequences. For instance, the high rate of suicide in the West testifies to a contempt of life as difficult and meaningless. On the other hand, one cannot rationally advocate a social system where science and technology are vehemently discouraged to the extent of threatening earthly existence. Common sense recognises that scientific discoveries can be used in at least two different and opposite ways. Namely, where the essence of man or the 'Self' is relegated to serving
machines, and where technology is subservient to it. The first leads to "specialisation of functions, institutionalisation of values and centralisation of power and turns people into the accessories of bureaucracies or machines. The second enlarges each person's competence, control and initiative, limited only by other individuals' claims to an equal range of power and freedom."³

To formulate a theory or framework about a future society which is considered modern and at the same time not dominated by industry, the principle concern should be the recognition of natural scales and limits. The first case to bear in mind, it would seem to appear, is that only within certain limits can machines replace human labour; "beyond these limits they lead to a new kind of serfdom".⁴ Similarly, within certain limits can education be relevant to a man-made environment, beyond that, it leads to a naive dogmatic system. Likewise, politics, too, has its place—aits concern ought to be towards the distribution of maximum industrial outputs rather than with equal inputs of energy or information. If the limits of these activities are recognised, then it may be possible

⁴. Ibid.
to articulate the triadic relationship between 'persons', 'machinery' and a 'new society'.

The issue that concerns us next is, the modalities that would be required in establishing what might be presumptuously labelled as a progressive, balanced modern society. Now a culture, being a form of human life, must of necessity be 'open-ended' if it were to survive in time by adapting itself to the needs and ingenuity of its people. As long as the changes are however not so drastic as to jeopardise other activities within that form, then such ideas are easily incorporated. But if they were to have an adverse effect on the fabric of that form then such ideas would be unwelcome.

Having arrived at this juncture, it may now be appropriate to concern ourselves with the task of answering just how ought a society, for want of a better word, to 'progress'? It will, of course, be inadequate to talk of modernity without taking into account the aspect of technological progress as well. What has been objected to in the Western model is the total, or near total, exclusion of the spiritual aspect of man, thereby, losing sight of the essence of the Self, which is a miraculous synthesis of mind and body.
For a culture to survive, it must have the element of dynamism in it. In fact, its very survival is its dynamism, which ensures its progressiveness. The truth of this is evident in any of the spoken languages which 'couches' as it were, the spirit of a people. We have had the occasion to mention in a previous chapter that, what lends 'life' to a language is precisely the vibrancy of the culture of which it is a part. Thus, any contemporary language is a 'live' language. Conversely, a 'dead' language (e.g., Latin, Sanskrit or the language spoken during the Harappan civilization) reflects a 'dead' culture. So, unless a culture keeps growing, debilitating inertia would ensure its destruction. A state of entropy is a sign of regression. So, a resistance to change under the garb of cultural loyalty would ironically and tragically only ignorantly auger for its extinction. Thus, obscurantism in cultural life is self-annihilationism. Now the growth of a culture appears to depend mainly on the interaction between self-generating evolutionism (which perhaps could go by the name of 'ingenious creativity') and the internalization of external influences (which might be described as 'innovative adaptations'). This brings us right back to where we have begun: namely, 'how ought a society modernize?' To assert 'this ought to be undertaken within the cultural
framework' is merely begging the question. To attempt an answer to this question one could not, one feels, do without a clear understanding of the notions of 'reform' and 'revolution'—terms which are so popularly in use in human society these days in modern times.

Before exposing the literal conceptual difference between these two terms, let us first see the natural link between the social life and political life of any given society, so that these notions are better understood which might, hopefully assist one in making a rational choice of either, according to the need of the times.

A political act is usually vindicated by its context. In traditional life, the act of governing is an organic part of the cultural ensemble. In modern times, too, this truth, though very often forsaken, must at least in principle, be recognised. Weber asserts that when an action is directed towards the others, it is then, a social action. Thus, political actions must be such actions which usually find sanction under two main legitimising conditions. They are namely, (1) through the idea of 'Assent'... which is that the expediency of an act rests on the authority of a culture. (2) 'Dissent'... this form normally espouses a general principle without any cultural reference. Thus, such an act becomes merely formal.
If one really apprehends culture of a people, there are, one finds, various forms of delight in its institutions. The totality is reverence for the culture. It has been said that 'man', besides being a terrestrial creature, is also a social being. So an action, which conforms to this need, by recognising and pursuing this fact, for the general welfare of society, is constitutive of a 'good life' on earth. The political laws must be such that they always leave open the possibility for the human imagination to exercise its creativity. The section dealing with a 'Critique of Judgement' as found in the Critique of Pure Reason, reports that Kant opines the faculty of 'imagination' builds a schema between what he calls the 'pure' concepts and the 'sensuous' concepts. Hence, the faculties of 'understanding' and 'sensibility' naturally fall together in imagination (e.g., the appreciation of beauty).

Cultural meanings are usually embedded in two forms, They are, namely, (1) Contextualization or specificity, and (2) Decontextualization or universality (or symbolisation). They are not ontologically different but are two aspects of cultural significations. Symbolisations may be called transcendental concepts, for, as the word suggests, decontextualization transcends situational specifics and thus, effectively serve as exemplars, (e.g., Hamlet — the meaning
is so fecund it can be used as countless generalities and expressed over and over again). Culture may said to be the totality of exemplars, which thus, in principle, cannot be defined exhaustively. They are organic unity orchestrated where each exemplar plays a role. Now, any action has (1) Behaviour — which includes not just involvement but an understanding by the perpetrator, of what is being done and (2) Text — which embodies a representation of a classic communication and may express its meaning either in (a) Hermeneutical form, and (b) biographical form.

A hermeneutical author is not an empirical author. Here the anonymization of the author transforms the empirical author into a subject or the self. The text has a universal addressee and severes the spatio-temporal bonds. The character or the actor of the text is made 'larger than life', and thus acquires a characteristic which is more than a mere person. The figure becomes a 'Personage', whose speeches and actions seem to be prophetic. An epochal actor seems to be adopted by Time to perform a providential act, by articulating the consciousness of the community. The very expression of the text unifies and projects the vision of the good life, besides articulating the longing of the group which they may not even be aware of. So, when politics and culture interact, one becomes
aware of prolific sources of imperatives. Political acts derive its significance from the culture of a people which it seeks to serve; though, however, they are not really parasitical on culture. Any conscientious political act must thus respond to a situation and derive its legitimacy from either or both moral and cultural grounds. So now, we might say with some measure of confidence that 'politics without culture is blind, and culture without politics is empty'. This is not to mean, however, that the cultural aspect of a people is the only source that lends legitimacy to political acts, or that is, political legitimacy is based necessarily on cultural sanctions. One can observe — as in the revolutionary Marxist governments — that traditionalism in such systems has only contingent applications (as in the selection of cultural items such as, songs, dances and literature etc.). The purpose of this discussion is not to show which system of government is more valid but merely to expose the organic relationship that exists between 'culture' and 'politics', — since the idea of politics as conceived traditionally, is as much an integral part of the cultural life as, say, the institution of 'marriage', or religious rituals etc.
On passing we can briefly glance over the doctrine of nationhood which involves a transformation of both politics and culture. Only through this two fold transformation from what is the case, what ought to be, could be envisaged a political culture that would infuse legitimacy into nationhood and statehood. The concern here with nationalism is primarily with nationalism as a doctrine rather than nationalism as a movement, with what constitutes its core ideas rather than with what lends appeal to these ideas at any particular juncture of time and circumstances. There can be little doubt however, that variance of the projected and transformation (of culture and politics) are capable of serving national movements as legitimizing ideologies. And in so far as they are, neither of them are immune to ideological distortion. Which of the two variants lends itself more easily to ideological perversion is however, less relevant to my argument than it is to determine if there is such a thing as an a-political or non-political form of nationalism. The thrust of the argument points to a negative answer. My contention is that both doctrinal variance involve not a shift from the political to the non-political but rather a redescription of the political itself, and a radical re-appraisal of its basis of legitimacy.
If I am correct in this, the significance of the cultural nationalism lies not in its being a-political or non-political but in directing attention to a profound change in the source of political legitimation. Culture now emerges as something not only potentially relevant to politics but as something indispensibly necessary. A nation is no longer simply a group of people owing political allegiance to a common sovereign but to a community bound by spiritual ties and cultural traditions. Indeed I would suggest that it is precisely the infusion of culture with political content and the infusion of the political with cultural content, which characterize modern nationalism. Nationalism in this view is unthinkable without the appeal of some cultural values. But for this change to come about, for culture to be invoked in the making of political claims, culture itself must first be viewed in its political contexts. Languages, dances, folk songs, plays, legends, philosophies, religions, poems, paintings and so on all require political handling (or manipulation) to be politically serviceable. It for this reason that I refer to a dual transformation: not only culture but politics too undergoes a drastic change in the propagation of nationalist doctrine. And it is this dual transformation which constitutes the change in the political legitimation and marks the historical transition from the state-nation to the nation-state.
I have no wish here to rehearse all the well-known objections to the diverse nationalist claims based on the cultural (linguistic, religious or ethnic) criteria. It is obvious enough that the "trinity" of anthropological, psychological and ethical assumptions which underlies the idea of cultural nationality is far from self-evident, and indeed may require more than purely logical argument in order to acquire persuasive force. Clearly, it is more than arguable whether nationality is inherent in human nature, whether a person "needs" to live with those sharing his nationality, and whether states not based on a distinctive national culture fail to be rightful states. Clearly too, it is one thing to grant the plausibility of national culture as a criterion of a state's legitimacy but quite another to decide what in a particular case constitutes a distinctive or dominant culture. In the final analysis therefore, the questions posed by cultural nationalism seem to me to be unanswerable. The marriage between culture and politics may indeed prove a source of lasting bliss and its offspring the truly just society, but by the same token culturally based states may turn out to be no more just, peaceful or harmonious than non-culturally based states. There is simply no logical, historical or any other kind of argument necessarily governing the outcome in any particular case at any particular time.
Much the same could be said about the international order among culturally determined nation-states. Potentially, international relations can be cooperative and peaceful, but they can also be competitive and torn by conflicts. Conceivably, wars, should they occur, might be less bitter but, just as conceivably, they might be far more intense than wars between state-nations since the gains or losses in cultural terms could be viewed more seriously than those involved in purely political bargaining. When the purity of a language, the sacredness of a civic religion, the survival of cherished traditions, or the very core of a people are at stake, compromises do not easily suggest themselves.

My point in raising these questions is to demonstrate the impossibility of making wholesale judgements one way or the other. National culture, as a legitimizing principle, is subject to the same range of contingencies as any other legitimising principle. There simply is no basis for deciding on general grounds that a state based on national culture is inherently superior to a state which does not invoke culture as its legitimising sanction.

It follows that the cultural sanctions in themselves are no more capable of serving as sufficient legitimising warrants than the purely formal sanctions of man-made laws whenever political legitimacy is in question. A doctrine
that has come to be closely associated with the idea of nationhood, the doctrine of national self-determination, seems therefore, to have as much need to press moral or (quasi moral) categories into service as the older (but no less complex) doctrine of natural law. In the form in which it is usually put, the doctrine of national self-determination derives its additional legitimizing force from making a specific type of political consciousness the essential condition of man's moral consciousness, thus rendering political indistinguishable from moral obligation. It does so by merging two highly persuasive but commonly opposed principles: the principle of traditionality and the principle of rationality. The former invokes the "logic" of history, the latter the logic of moral reasoning. By means of this simultaneous appeal to tradition and reason "emergence" and "creation" converge. One's understanding of oneself as a free moral agent is wedded to one's self-consciousness as a member of a community, that is at once a historical growth and a rational-ethical creation. It is this ingenious fusion which confers on the doctrine of national self-determination its impressive ideological comprehensiveness and vigour.

Yet the undeniably persuasive force of the doctrine is apt to conceal the fact that political legitimacy generally involves at least three levels of applicability: the
who, how, and where of government. By tending to focus on the third level of political legitimacy - the ethnic composition of the population and its territorial boundaries - it either disregards the first two levels (who should properly rule, and in what manner) or views them as necessary entailments of the third, thus collapsing the three levels of political legitimacy into one. What is more, the principle of self-determination which the doctrine invokes is a notoriously problematic principle. In its collective application it rests on the additionally questionable assumption of complete identity between national ends and individual ends. At best, therefore, "national self-determination" is but a vicarious expression of Kant's (and Rousseau's) moral principle while, at worst, it threatens to deny individual choice entirely. In any event; it has as a principle of political legitimation, little in common with a doctrine of political obligation which makes subordination to governmental rule contingent on the consent of persons viewed as individuals and not as mere components of national cultures.

Cultural criteria of political obligation, then, are no more self-evidently rational or ethical than any other criteria of legitimation taken by themselves. National culture as a contextual requirement may conceivably enrich or
indeed transform our understanding of the political; but from this it does not follow that it necessarily renders the legitimization of politics less problematical.

However, as the general part of the discussion involves centrally on the aspect of the organic relationship between 'culture' and 'politics', let us now focus our attention on the 'close-knit' nature of the institution of politics with that of culture, as highlighted succinctly by Ashis Nandy in his article: Cultural Frames For Social Intervention: A Personal Credo, where it has been shown that the (British) Imperialist policy had systematically carried out a system of oppression by denying the subjects certain vital traditional practices crucial for their social cohesion; this is instantiated by Amilcar Cabral, the African freedom fighter, who spoke of the "permanent organised repression of the cultural life of the people" as the very core of colonialism. "To take up arms to dominate a people is to take up arms to destroy, or at least to neutralise... its cultural life". A theory of culture has to be the core of any theory of oppression at our times. A stress on culture reinstates the categories used by the victims, and this is taken as a deviation from the modern idea of expertise, an idea which demands that even resistance be uncontaminated by the 'inferior' cognition or
unripe revolutionary consciousness of the oppressed. A stress on culture is taken to be the antonym of post-Renaissance European faith that only that dissent is true which is rational, sane, scientific etc. according to Europe’s understanding of these concepts.

Hence, the relationship or the link between culture and what might be called critical consciousness of the past and the present situations, and the social change in this country of ours is not an experience unique to India, but a general response of societies which have been the victims of history and are now trying to rediscover their own visions of a desirable society in basing on their own version of values. When modernity of the western model threatens every non-western culture with its meretricious attraction to the extent of overwhelming these cultures, the slogan of the last century proclaiming cultural-protection as pure claustrophobic obscurantism loses its credibility.

Unmixed modernity is no longer, as the argument shows, desirable even in the modern world. The ultra-positivists and the Marxists, once so vehemently and arrogantly anti-traditional have revised their perspectives substantially to criticise, if not the modernists vision in its entirety, at least some crucial parts of it. Two
prominent members of such "revisionist" schools namely, Lionel Trilling and Peter Gay had gone so far as to pronounce such modernist dislike for modernity as indeed a unique feature of modernity itself. Instances of this transformation of this attitude can be cited in the works of Picasso with its underlying primitivism, and the defiance of science and rationality in surrealism. One exponent of this idea is associated with the name of André Breton. These appear to be cogent indicators of how modernity at its most creative finds its opposite indispensable, that is anti-modernity.

These criticisms, however, might be said to be 'internal' to modernity in so far as they try to abide by the values of European enlightenment, and the idea of modernisation is an attempt to realise these values. They can thus be called forms of "critical modernism", as found in those models of scientific growth or technological transfer in the third world which accept without question the content of modern science; and also the critiques of the existing world-order which take for granted the modern nation-state system; as also the kind of critical modernism which believes that happiness can be attained by displacing the elites or classes who control the global political economy.
On the other hand, are the criticisms of modernity from outside. Those reject the values of the Enlightenment, and thus seem, to say the least, bizarre to the modern man. Emerson, Thoreau and Tolstoy, to name a few, are some of the better known critics of modernity in the West. In our times, perhaps Gandhi had been the most consistent and vehement critic of modernity who rejected the modern nation-state system, modern science and technology, urban industrialisation, and so on, while cherishing the traditional ideas of the state, science and technology, civic living, and social transformation. Many so-called Gandhians never could fathom this part of the Mahatma, but as Gandhi was not one given to fantasies, this idea is tolerated as an integral segment of his cosmology. Yet despite the similarity in their dislike for modernity, Gandhi and Ananda Coomaraswamy differed in their attitudes towards traditions; the latter kept open the possibility of assessing or altering traditions from the point of view of traditions. However, as it appears, he was trying to do for past times what the anthropologists attempt for distant cultures, there was no significant criticism of traditions in his works.

On the other hand, Gandhi never praised the Indian village nor exhorted for a return to the past. He sought
to reorder the hierarchy of skills and instil the idea of the dignity of labour and delegitimise the Brahmanic arrogant aloofness. Being a realist, he despised the dirt and diseases that accrue from unhygienic living, and personally undertook its removal with a passionate plea for cleanliness, which became almost religious in its intensity. His love for traditional values practised in villages made him remark with acerbity towards Catherine Mayo's *Mother India* as a 'drain-inspector's report' for taking count only of what is visually perceived as representing Indian tradition in its entirety. His own version of this facet of village life is summed up in the expression 'dung-heap'. Yet his understanding of the eternal values were not clouded, as was the case with Mayo, by impressionistic impulses. Gandhi was a social reformer, and his means of doing so was religion. He believed that the means justified the ends and not as it is usually the case, the other way around. Even though the ends may be frustrated many times, as truth cannot be judged by its effects, the means, proper to an end, is based on the idea of 'love' which cannot be compromised. Coomaraswamy, who also defended tradition, perhaps equally fervently, has had his notions set seeming­ly, on strict traditionalism, including the practice of *sati* which he unashamedly defended. Gandhi, in this regard, is not an obscurantist - only that his framework is
traditional, in the sense that traditional values gained precedence over technologically based values of human relationship which he feels obfuscates one's spiritualism. Though the frame within which Gandhi sought to operate were traditional the specifics within the frame were frequently modern. For instance, he found no dispute between his rejection of modern technology and his advocacy of the bicycle, the lathe and sewing machine. Many modernists quite expectedly, find this hypocritical and are prepared to accept such eclecticism only when the framework is modern.

However, it is virtually impossible to make a choice between modernity and traditions in their pure forms. The choice therefore is between critical modernism and critical traditionalism, or that is, a choice between two frames of reference and two world-views.

Now critical traditionalism refers to living traditions which includes a theory of oppression. For our times, no tradition is useful or even valid, unless it has an awareness of the nature of evil in modern times. This is to say that no theory of oppression make sense unless it is understood in terms or categories used by the victims of our times. This is not to be understood as a restatement of the ideology of instrumentality which dominates
most theories of oppression, nor is this suggested as a strategy of mass mobilization which includes certain compromises with the so-called false consciousness of the historical societies. This is rather to be taken as a comprehensive cognition of those at the receiving end of the present world system, and of the primacy which should be given to the political consciousness of those who have been compelled to develop categories or understand their own suffering, and who reject the so-called nativism of modern theories of oppression using, hypocritically, the idiom of nativism to conscientize the cultures of the oppressed. The resistance to modern oppression must be the denial of the connotative meanings of concepts such as 'development', 'growth', 'history', 'science and technology', for they have become associated with mystifications for new forms of violence and injustice. The resistance must include an awareness of the links between cultural survival and global structures of oppression in our times. What is meant here by the expression 'critical traditionalism' is akin to Rollo May's concept of authentic innocence as opposed to what he calls pseudo-innocence. Authentic innocence, according to the author, Ashis Nandy, "includes an updated sense of evil; pseudo-innocence does not. Pseudo-innocence thrives on what psychoanalysis calls secondary gains from the oppressive system."
What this idea expresses is that the living traditions of the non-Western societies must include a theory of the West to recognise the fact that the relationship between the West and the non-West has become deeply intertwined with the problem of evil in our times.

The problem confronting us now is: 'can we construe such a tradition so as to have a native theory of oppression?' The possibility of this idea lies in apprehending traditions as an 'open-ended' phenomena rather than a rigid, closed one. The (Indian) civilisation has for long, survived the vicissitudes of history not only because of the 'valid' or 'proper' exigencies of the traditional texts but also because of the 'improper' or 'deviant' or 'far-fetched' interpretations of the sacred and the canonical. There is, for instance, the first social and religious reformer of modern India, Raja Ram Mohan Roy (1772-1833) 'legitimately' interpreting Shankara's Monism as mono-theism, and the instance of Gandhi as 'legitimately' borrowing his concept of Ahimsa or non-violence from the 'Sermon On The Mount' and claiming it to be the core concept of orthodox Hinduism. However odd such distortions might appear, they are the means the Indian civilisation has used to update its theories of evil and to ensure cultural survival while keeping open the possibility of such large scale interventions. Now to apprehend
such reinterpretations, one must acknowledge three, what might be called 'languages', which often conceals the implicit native theories of oppression in many Non-Western traditions. These are, namely, the languages of 'continuity' of 'spiritualism' and of the 'self'. On the surface, they may look like aspects of a primitive false consciousness to the moderns; however, they continue to be the means of cultural survival for the non-Western victims of history.

The language of continuity assumes that every change can be seen as aspects of deeper continuities, that is, any change, howsoever enormous, is still a special case of continuity, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. In the dominant Indian tradition, each change is thus accepted as another form of the unchanging, another revaluation of the existent.

Interestingly, the language of continuity is mostly spoken by the victims of the present oppressive system, and expectedly the language of 'disjunction' by the powerful and the rulers of the system. Also by those who opt for the status-quo. For instance, the Shah of Iran spoke of modernisation and social change, while the opponents of this idea placed emphasis on cultural identity and conservation. Military rulers in South America jingoistically
talk of transforming their societies into powerful nation-state systems, while their opponents are more concerned about the protection of the native Indians and their cultural life. It is quite apparent, therefore, that the language of continuity was employed by those who ran the older oppressive systems. Hence, words such as 'development', 'maturity', 'scientific temper' and so on are in the vocabulary of those who see themselves as either deservedly ruling the world or, as its future rulers.

The language of 'spirit', often expresses an analysis of oppression which rejects the analytic categories of the rulers or the elite. Both the 'respectable' versions of the language of spirit which even the spiritually-minded themselves reject as mere trickery, often serves a number of purposes of the oppressed. For the enlightened, such analysis is seen as not only camouflaged self-interest, but also seemingly, paradoxically, as sentimentalism and a subjectivist hoax. What is meant in the above statements is simply this: if it is only sentimentalism, it cannot, at the same time, be a camouflaged statement of self-interest, and also, if it is an indirect statement, of self-interest, it cannot quite be that subjectivist after all. Marx seemed to have acknowledged this when he spoke of religion as expressing the pain of the oppressed.
However, he either failed or did not go so far as to take seriously, the cognitive 'frame' which went with the pain. He might not have noticed that, (1) the frame criticised the society as it existed, (2) it also rejected the conventional (i.e. the 19th century), concepts of science as irrational and inhuman. The language of spirit also has a sub-category which rejects the idea of history, that is, the idea of historical laws as a new tool of oppression. Instead, the language seeks to reinstate the mythopoetic language, which is closer to, and understood by, the victims of history, on the assumption that myths for traditional man express and communicate life experiences and cultural roots, while history conceals them.

Finally, the language of self includes what is known as, the idea of 'fatalism' of the primitive mind, against which the process of conscientization plays an inseparable role. The language of self also implicitly expresses the world, that is, the not-self, and thereby contains a theory of oppression. To use some psychological terms, it can be said that 'autoplasticity' contains in this case, 'alloplasticity'. As detailed in the beginning of this chapter, that in many of the non-Western traditions, the 'Self' has a plurality of centres. Perhaps the Vedantic cosmology vouchsafing the many-centredness of the Self is the most
convincing. It is held that the 'Self' is not only included in the laws of nature and society but also that, nature and society are subsumed in the self. Notions such as 'self-enrichment', 'self-realisation' include the principle of intervention in the outside world.

In the present age, with its own theories of oppression, and its obsessive predilection for the language of discontinuity, impersonality and ultra-materialism, it has become fashionable to arrogate to itself the capacity to represent the sanity of the oppressed. These theories have given birth to a new elite—the revolutionary vanguard with new sets of values, poised to break-down the pre-scientific temper of the masses. Tragically, however, these new systems operate not only similarly to the way the older system it had rejected by legitimising violence and dominance and greed, they have also engendered to (1) produce systems which reject, what are known as the cardinal virtues by encouraging violence and employing means which are unjust and expropriatory in the name of 'liberation' and freedom, (2) mobilize public opinion in the adoption of a system which seek to justify dissent. Hence, in such a system, dissent becomes just another form of conformity, unless, of course, it seeks to subvert the rules of the game and the language in which the rules are framed. It may not be quite wrong to assume that George Orwell
realised this. He opined that the oppressed, when it comes to the issue of survival, had no obligation to abide by any model, or any rule of the game. Hence, seemingly, the only way to check such 'methodological anarchism' is, (1) to recognise with a sense of urgency, the experience of man-made sufferings and (2) which invites analysis of every remedial suggestions for its removal.

The method of adoption of the means to realise a change now seems crucial to a given society which seeks to (a) either redress an inconvenient practice(s) and supplant it with a more helpful one or, (b) totally reject the entire 'form of life' that is, the age-old cultural tradition in its totality and acquire a new identity. In order to undertake either of these, one needs to be clear about the conceptual distinctions between 'reform' and 'revolution' as suggested earlier.

When the discontent with the state of things in society becomes acute enough to stimulate action, it will produce different effects according to whether it attaches importance to particulars or not. To the query what causes the discontent and the consequent suggestions to its removal, there are basically two kinds of responses. One of these responses consists of stating particular cases that are considered wrong, such as, poverty, racial and caste
discrimination, alcoholism, prostitution, drug abuse, and so on. The other form of response denies this method as inadequate on the presumption that nothing can be corrected short of a new beginning altogether, that the whole system as such, is wrong. So when it comes to the question of strategy, the first response will lead to proposals for reform; the second, a fervent call for revolution. Reform proceeds in a methodological step-by-step precision, while revolution overthrows the basis of the system so that no part remains unaffected by it.

The content of a reform can thus be listed exactly since it is only a partial change in a system whose other components are thought of as remaining constant. Thus one might seek to reform educational policy or electoral rolls etc. on the assumption that such elements of the system can change quite radically without disturbing or necessitating radical changes in the other elements. One cannot, of course, rule out the causal influences of the constituent elements on one another. In such an eventuality, various mutual adaptations will have to take place which will require a certain amount of systems-theoretical sophistication if they are to go on smoothly, but the understanding of complex systems has advanced sufficiently, however, to provide that. It is, besides, entirely possible that reforms might proceed in all the elements of the system
simultaneously so that the effect is total, but since each component would have the partial character of a reform the entire process would not be thought of as revolutionary.

Though the last remark is not necessarily in agreement with the generally-held notion of revolution. It is, according to Peter Caws, "a rather special meaning for 'revolution'." Since, ordinarily, we would be prepared to say of a process that had changed every aspect of a system that it had amounted to a Revolution. It is in this light that one speaks of the Industrial Revolution or the Copernican Revolution. As such changes are historically significant for having generated complete social changes without the means of violence, which is the criteria for the usual cases of revolution, its distinctiveness is recognised by labelling them epochal revolutions. The other form of revolutionary change takes place primarily in one component of the system, namely, the political, and consists of a more or less rapid and violent seizure of total political power by a revolutionary group. The paradigms for this are the French Revolution and the October Revolution. They are political revolutions, which seek to reject an existing constitution and replace it with another, and not merely one batch of enthusiastic political actors wrestling

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*Reform and Revolution* in Philosophy and Political Action; Editors, Virginia Held, Kai Nielsen, Charles Parsons.
the machinery of government, that is, the legislative, executive and judicial powers from another, without affecting the constitution of the State. Thus, Aristotle states: "the one affecting the constitution, when men seek to change from an existing form into some other for example, from democracy into oligarchy, and from oligarchy into democracy or from either of them into constitutional government or aristocracy, and conversely; the other not affecting the constitution when, without disturbing the form of government, whether oligarchy, or monarchy, or any other, they try to get administration into their own hands..."** only the former count as a political revolution in this sense.

As is well-known, the Marxist brand of revolution considers that the main focus of attack must be the set of economic relations in bourgeois society that constitutes the base on which bourgeois politics, law, religion, and the like, have been erected as superstructure. We note here another possible distinction between revolution and reform: reform merely alters the superstructure, while revolution changes the base, whether that is considered to be economic or otherwise. An interesting question now confronts us: 'Would not a series of reforms that affected every element of the superstructure turn out to have changed the base?'

**Aristotle Politics
Again, 'if politics belongs to the superstructure, is there any guarantee that a political revolution will affect the base?' A political revolution, being confined to only one of the many aspects that together characterise a society, can only be part of the story and thus remain an open question whether such a success can be linked to an epochal one. To all intents and purposes, Marx's revolution certainly appears to be epochal as it envisages a complete change in man's social and historical condition, in their relations to each other and to the world. The aim is to abolish the class structure and the adoption of a system that would overcome the alienation between man as a producer and the means and fruits of his production. As this will naturally involve changes in the political power structure, Marx in his life, felt many a time, that conditions in certain countries were appropriate for his brand of revolution, that is, violent seizure of power possible. Quite surprisingly, however, despite his claims to the theory he had helped found as scientific and therefore inevitable, none of the countries he had predicted would fall did so under the rule of the proletariat. However, the epochal revolution which also was heralded by him is evident not only or even mainly in the places where successful political revolutions have invoked his name.
It appears that what led to the association of the two forms of revolution in Marxist doctrine was, mainly because of Engels' adoption of the Hegelian law of the passage from quantitative to qualitative change, an idea that is recognised now as a mistaken scientific model. The accumulation of small quantitative changes in society produces internal tensions, thought Engels, which consequently, mount towards a critical level without any accompanying apparent change. When this level is reached, a sudden and violent change occurs, as the theory goes, which overturns the society and ushers in a new and qualitatively different social order. The sequence of cumulative changes gives the appearance of an epochal revolution, while the sudden transformation looks like a political revolution; therefore, the theory concludes, an epochal revolution is successfully achieved by political action.

Engels had based this view on nature, particularly that of water changing into steam at boiling point. However, the process of water changing to steam is not particularly sudden or violent. Science explains that it takes seven times as long to convert water to steam as it takes to boil it, starting at room temperature; and provided there is space for the steam to expand into, the process goes perfectly smoothly. What makes it look dramatic in kettles is that the change takes place at the bottom, where the space
is evidently already occupied by water, so that the steam emerges at the top. As an analogy for repressed change, this seems to hold good, but it is not a mass phenomena, since a small amount of water produces a large quantity of steam—and, this is the crucial point, that there is nothing inherent in the change from water to steam that would sustain the revolutionary analogy.

Now the law of quantity and quality need not be abandoned, but it is capable of a different application. The most dominant characteristic of an epochal revolution is that everything gradually changes till the whole becomes completely different; so the change between the beginning and the end is qualitative, while the details are quantitative. Hence, a series of reforms might, by sound dialectical standards, constitute a revolution. And this suggests that the opposition revolution or reform is an artificial one. "Unfortunately, it is enshrined in current usage as an opposition between the rapid, total and (probably) violent on the one hand, and the deliberate, partial, and non-violent on the other". Thus, if at all, as believed, revolutionary strategies are opposed to reformist ones, then, reforms that might be implemented while awaiting the revolutionary opportunity, or even working to create it, will appear counter-revolutionary; but
then failing to carry them out will only quicken the revolu-
tion—whence the probable violence—or simply an unne-
cessary delay in the correction of undesirable conditions. 
As mentioned, the opposition to reform may be due to the 
unwillingness to attenuate the spirit for revolution; this 
attitude indicates quite clearly an undue attachment to a 
component of revolutionary activity, namely the political, 
that may, in fact, be even unnecessary to the achievement 
of genuinely revolutionary ends.

Epochal revolutions, expectedly, tend to be rather 
long drawn affairs, and there is a theoretical limit on 
the speed with which they can be achieved. Thomas Jefferson, 
as we find, was fond of pointing out that the adult of his 
day had a half-life span of nineteen years and so there 
should be a constitutional amendment every nineteen years, 
since, on the one hand, an inherited constitution is an 
infringement on the liberty of the new generation and, on 
the other, the new generation might expect, quite reasona-
bly after the half-life, to be in the majority. The rele-
vance to epochal revolution is obvious if stress is placed 
on the disappearance of the old generation rather than on 
the emergence of the new one.

With the advances made in the field of medical scien-
tic, the half-life now is much longer which makes epochal
revolution even slower. While few people change their minds in the course of their lives, most do not, and so, the only way to be sure of having safely established an epochal revolution is to wait for the older generation to pass away or outnumber them overwhelmingly. Thus it is glaringly obvious to note the risks involved in trying to establish an epochal revolution by a political one, since the temptation to hurry the process along by eliminating the unregenerate cannot indeed be ruled out.

The operative part of a political revolution takes place, of necessity, in a much shorter period of time much less certainly than the half-life, since the need to maintain the society at an even minimally operating level, power has to be wielded continuously. Such a revolution, therefore, cannot certainly, take on the character of an epochal revolution, unless of course, suppression of civil rights or massacre, or both, is resorted to, since a comprehensive change entails a change of habits and attitudes. It is perhaps remarkable that most principle figures of political revolutions do not survive to experience the change they wrought, mainly, because such figures being from the old epoch, carry with them the consciousness of that era, albeit unwittingly, and creates dissensions. Hence, it should only be expected that the
advocate of an epochal revolution with political revolution as a means towards it, will almost certainly be disillusioned and may even be ignored. Jean-Francois Revel in his book *Le Marx ni Jesus* described that the epochal revolution which Marx had perceived in America was indeed correct, but the categories in terms of which he came to analyse it, namely, 'class' and 'capital' have turned out to be irrelevant to the course it has taken.

One dominant feature of political revolutions is that whatever may be its various causes and reasons, their immediate end is always political power, even when this is intended to serve more distant ends such as peace and justice. Such ends cannot, by themselves, make a political revolution into an epochal one. Interestingly, the major political revolutions of the last centuries have taken, more or less, the direction as part of the general movement away from tyranny and towards democracy. Towards the latter stages of this process which has been a universal phenomenon and has not depended on revolutions for its progress, a contrary movement as Aristotle noted is quite likely to evolve: "In oligarchies the masses make revolution under the idea that they are unjustly treated, because... they are equals, and have not an equal share, and in democracies the notables revolt, because they are
not equals, and yet have only an equal share".* It is evident that the military coups d'état that have become so frequent have been counter-revolutionary against the threat of revolutions of the first kind. The Fascist regimes of Europe, mainly Italy and Germany also took over too soon, it seems, to make them suitable examples of the second category. Perhaps Spain under Francisco Franco fits the bill. The present Pakistan regime seems to be barely justifying itself of supposedly following the dictates of Islam for fear of a backlash from the masses whose cries for revolution of the first category could hardly be stifled.

A plausible case can be made for the essential similarity of all the standard examples of political revolutions, perhaps the first important one in modern history was the Puritan Revolution of 1640-49. It served to establish a principle that the rights of Kings could be challenged and power transferred to the authority of the legislature. So once this is demonstrated in practice, it was, in one sense, unnecessary for these propositions to be worked out again by revolutionary action. Therefore, it is now understood that the other two great revolutions of the Western world, namely, the French and the Russian, were, in an important sense, repetitions of the Puritan Revolution. The striking similarities, apart from the local

* Aristotle Politics.
differences, were that of a despotic behaviour of a monarch on the one hand, and the assertion of parliamentary rights on the other. In each case, the symbol of monarchical tyranny was eventually executed. By saying that these later revolutions were unnecessary, does not of course mean that in the context of their times, they were either avoidable or even unjustifiable, only that their social, as distinct from their ideological objectives, would probably have been attained sooner or later, by other means. No doubt, in every case, the existential situation appeared incapable of any other resolution.

Having now proceeded so far on the general nature of 'Reform' and the two kinds of 'Revolution', namely, the epochal and the political, let us now examine more closely, the conditions under which the political form of revolution might be successful. The reason for my choosing this particular field, is not because the other two mentioned are unimportant, but by virtue of this being an activity which has a direct bearing on society. According to Marx, the motive force of revolution is a numerically dominant class suffering from an unqualified wrong.* In his time, what he meant by 'class' was the proletariat of the late Industrial

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Revolution whom he expected would become the revolutionary engine. This, however, was not realised. The theory as such, may not be wrong, but he seems to have failed to take into account the psychological factor of man.

It is a fact that the majority of people instinctively reject revolutionary activity unless their situation has reached a level of desperation. Again, Thomas Jefferson had remarked: "Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly, all experiences hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed."*

An extraordinary feature of the so-called revolutionary movement is that the enthusiasm of those who participate in it, is aroused by the sufferings of others, and also by the failures of the government, rather than by conditions affecting them directly. The idea of revolution becomes a matter of morals as much as of politics. However, as John Locke proclaims: 'such revolutions happen not upon every little mismanagement in public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human frailty will be

*Thomas Jefferson: Letter to Colonel Smith, Nov. 17, 1787.
borne by the people without mutiny or murmur.... For till the mischief be grown general, and the ill designs of the rulers become visible, or their attempts sensible to the greater part, the people, who are more disposed to suffer than right themselves by resistance, are not apt to stir. The examples of particular injustice or oppression of here and there an unfortunate man moves them not."* Hence, even if oppression affects a number of people, still knowing as they do that the larger sections of the population is not immediately affected by it, they may decline to be drawn into revolutionary action. Here, it must be mentioned that the oppressed do not often realise they are so, until brought to consciousness of the fact by political agitators — fatalistically accepting their condition as destined (note the conditions of the Harijans in this country). "Though they have a right to defend themselves, and to recover by force what by unlawful force is taken from them, yet, the right to do so, will not easily engage them in a contest wherein they are sure to perish; it being as impossible for one or a few oppressed men to disturb the government where the body of the people do not think themselves concerned in it, as for a raving mad man or

*John Locke: Second Treatise of Government, Chapter XIX.
To conclude the chapter, I wish to add a few more points about the inherent differences of political and epochal revolutions. To be a revolutionary in the political sense when the conditions are not appropriate is irresponsible. It is however, possible to be an authentic revolutionary in the epochal sense even though they are slow and may consist in a series of reforms, having in mind, while doing so, what the eventual state of the whole would ideally be after the reforms had been accomplished.

It is to be noted that the term 'revolution' sometimes has additional connotations in the context of which reforms cannot be, or rather, are usually not accepted as revolutionary. An analogy of this is found (which is expressed more in detail in Chapter III of this dissertation) in the field of religious language. There, it has been shown that having acquired a change of perceivable habit without a corresponding change of 'heart' or 'attitude' is considered inadequate. In other words, reform without conversion is incomplete. Thus, conversion is the evangelical counterpart of revolution, and has some of the same drawbacks. For instance, a person who has improved (in this

*Ibid., Chapter XVIII.
particular context) practically by having stopped certain acts which are considered wrong and started committing other acts which are considered right, by dint of one's own efforts, would, from an evangelical point of view, have achieved nothing.

A similar case is observed in political revolutions: when the triumphant regime is just as oppressive (towards different victims to be sure), as the one it had overthrown, still its ideological virtues absolve it. Whereas, in contrast, a government which, over a long period, inspite of numerous difficulties, managed to bring a society nearer to the ideals of justice and equality might appear to have achieved very little, if this were done without the dramatic excitement of a political revolution. The reason for this seems to be a psychological one, in that, the revolution may come to seem more important as a struggle between good and evil in which the wicked are punished, than as a means of liberating the oppressed.

Now exploiting the analogy between the individual and the state, there may be a use for the notion of revolution as interior, to refer to a kind of secular and political conversion which consists in the refusal in one's own person, of the inequities of the repressive regime without
involving, its actual overthrow as a matter of immediate strategy. Under this interpretation, the idea of revolution becomes a question of attitude rather than of activity, the individual or the group is in a state of permanent revolution, since the attitude is one of openness, to radical change, denying the fixed categories of the received social, economic and political order. According to Kojève this is precisely the condition of Hegel's slave when he has transformed the world by his works and is about to achieve the final dialectical overcoming of the Master. It is typical of the Master whose route to self-realisation lies in a fight to the death for pure prestige and to depend on a fixed order in what concerns the Slave's relation to him; he, the Master, as Kojève declares is the true conservative, embodying the values of the old regime. What the Master does not realise is that the Slave has become more human than himself and that the Master's humanity has always been dependent on, or parasitic on, the Slave's, while the latter has won an autonomous humanity against a hostile world and so can dispense with the rigidity of a fixed, unchanging system.

Interestingly, although the Slave has been presented as being ready to fight again (for recognition) that he previously abandoned by yielding to the Master (thus
originally entering into his condition of slavery) the revolution that he accomplishes is not against the Master but against the world. For the first time he becomes equal to the world, and by conquering its hostility, has brought himself into harmony with it. This process can only be an epochal revolution and thus is the realisation of the permanent revolution. No political revolution can help this process — since, some opposition such as the one between King and Parliament or bourgeois and proletarian or between radical and conservative, is not only necessary for the occurrence but also necessarily survives it, whereas, such oppositions under the conditions of the permanent revolution might be expected to disappear, or be reduced to a formal level — such as the two-party system in which the policies of the two are very similar. Now in connection with the last point, it is possible or rather, at least conceivable that institutions suitable to the permanent revolution might come into existence before the people are ready for them. In such a case the challenge would be double: to educate the population to the level of its opportunities and to resist the temptation to destroy the institutions because they might have been incapable of preventing errors and abuses on the part of leaders as yet uneducated.
Let us now look at another reason why the arguments that defend institutions are unattractive to a certain class of revolutionaries. Political revolutions besides being sudden and morally dramatic are also violent and hence people do tend to get confused between the term 'revolution' and the word 'violence' as being synonymous, even in the case of epochal revolutions. In such cases the fear of revolution is really a fear of violence. Of course violence seems to be inherently satisfactory, at least it might appear to be justified in conditions such as long standing injustice (Gandhi of course would object to this, but that, under the circumstances, is a different matter).

What is being objected to is not, in this sense, violence itself, but rather the hasty use of it. If for instance, violence has already entered the situation on the part of an oppressive regime, it is quite natural to oppose it with equal violence. However, the danger of initiating violence in an otherwise calm situation, no matter how oppressive, is the likelihood of provoking a disproportionate reaction, or worse to be taken advantage of by the regime in power. What must be kept in mind is the question whether a well prepared and restrained use of violence is ever possible outside a military organisation, such as a disciplined guerilla force. An unorganised wielding of force would not only be senseless dissipation of energy but
suicidal. Most important the disposition of the populace has to be carefully assessed. Many social injustices, such as slavery, child labour and so on are abolished not from violent manifestations from slaves and children but from the moral concern of men. Hence the point at issue now, if violence is to be eschewed is to concentrate available energy and information behind reforms in those parts of the system most likely to yield to rational reform or reconstruction in the short-run, while simultaneously pursuing a strategy of education with respect to principles and the less tractable parts of the system. The rationale is that if the reforms are accepted to the people, they will in principle have the power to implement them. On the other hand, if the proposed changes are not accepted by the people, no one has the right to impose them.

Hence, what is at stake is "whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice." What this explicitly means is that it is to the reason of the people that the reformer must appeal. If not, the alternative is to accept the somewhat distressing conclusion envisioned by Plato: "Man never legislates, but accidents of all sorts, which legislates for us in all sorts of ways. The violence of war and the hard necessity of poverty are constantly overturning
governments and changing laws"*. However, there is also a hopeful note to save man from anarchy. He was convinced of the necessity for careful systematic intervention in the process of government: "Let the change if possible, be one thing only, or if not, of two, at any rate let the changes be as few and slight as possible. In the light of what has been said, the change he went on to propose has, even now, immense practical wisdom: "I think that there might be a reform in the state if only one change were made, which is not a slight or easy though still a possible one — until philosophers are Kings, or the kings or princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those common natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils, - no, nor the human race, as I believe, - and then only will this our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day".**

This celebrated passage is usually in danger of being read as a cliche. The expression 'philosopher - King' has erroneously become the paradigm of the concept but by "philosophy" Plato did not mean an academic discipline —

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* Plato: Laws, 709.
** Plato: The Republic.
at least, not a discipline among others; and the philosopher-king is not necessarily a philosopher who becomes a king — he may equally well be a king who becomes a philosopher. The philosopher, as Plato goes on to define the notion, seems to be one in whom the permanent revolution has taken hold, who refuses the fixed and closed and maintains an attitude of openness towards the world.

It may be recalled that mention has been made, indeed emphatically, that a people must remain ever open to the idiosyncracies of the world for their society to remain dynamic. What is imperative to continuously maintain this is 'education', that is, the communication of possible solutions to people who are in a position to implement them justly. Men are rational not in the sense that they can, by the aid of reason, solve their immediate problems, but in the important sense that other things being equal, they tend to recognise rational solutions when they see them. But other things are usually not equal, as all sorts of prejudices and dogmas intrude themselves. True education performs principally two functions: it makes dogmas and prejudices harder to survive, and it imparts the accumulation of selected rational strategies that we owe to preceding generations and to mankind in other parts of the world.
Thus, once some of the kings have become philosophers in Plato's sense, they may be encouraged to become philosophers in Marx's sense, that is, men who can recognise not only reason but also alienation when they see it, who arrive not only at theoretical understanding but also at 'practical criticism' which means the overcoming in their own persons of the alienations of economic and political institutions and the modifications in the institution of lessening the alienation for others. Hence, it is quite apparent that the word 'philosopher' as Plato envisaged is one that connotes rational decision in practical matters and otherwise. The implication of this is virtually impossible to be defined exhaustively.

In conclusion, I would like to quote a passage from an article entitled The Maasai Coming Of Age which, I feel, is relevant here. Thus:

"She is determined to persuade her people of the value of education, but she is opposed to any dilution of Maasai rituals."

"We need to maintain our integrity and culture", she says.

Even for the majority of Maasai who welcome change, there are painful choices. Some Maasai clans have already been forced to choose farming over their traditional lives as nomadic cattle herdsmen. Others have succumbed to government pressure and abandoned
herding in favour of ranching on prescribed lands. The Loita Maasai are determined to resist government efforts to carve up what remains of their reserve into privately-owned segments. The reason is simple: At the heart of Maasai culture is the concept of land being communal.

"At 99, Ole Sentue is said to have 22 wives and 100 sons... He does not oppose change.... He has just given the latest group of Loita Maasai their new name IWANTAI, after a famous Maasai wizard who long ago blessed his people with courage greater than any lion, buffalo or man, and conferred upon them the title of "The chosen people."

"In the future Ole Sentue knows the courage of the Maasai is to be tested in a struggle not so much against lions as between warring principles. He is afraid government will impose too many changes before the Maasai are ready for them. "Many," he says, "may die from shock because they cannot change so fast." He quotes a Maasai proverb that counsels the wisdom of gradual evolution. Says the old Maasai holy man: "God, give me life that comes slowly over the hill."*

*Time: July 1985.*