CHAPTER IV

THE CONTEST FOR PESHWASHIP AND ITS EFFECT AT BARODA

The Troubles from Poona:

The contest for the Peshwaship at Poona proved a turning point in the contest between Govindrao and Fatehsinghrao. It was a well known fact that Peshwa Madhavrao by an order in 1771 had recognised Sayajirao and Fatehsinghrao as the rightful rulers of Baroda. This order was revised by Peshwa Raghunathrao in 1773 and he had accepted Govindrao as a rightful successor of Damajirao. Not only that but Raghunathrao helped govindrao with men and guns against Fatehsing his brother. This is for the first time that the Peshwa took keen interest in the contest for succession. Govindrao was also given letters recommending him to the English by Peshwa Raghunathrao and thus the English power was invited to interfere by the Poona authorities.

Fatehsing tried to protect himself single handed against the combined forces of Govindrao and Khanderao but he was practically be sieged in the fort of Baroda. He was sure that the Peshwa Raghunathrao would not support him, inspite of his last treaty with Peshwa Madhavrao by which the support of the Poona authorities was promised to him. This was great situation for him, and out of dire necessity he had turned his eyes towards the Bombay government for help.
Govindrao with recommendation of Peshwa Raghunathrao approached the English authorities at Surat to secure help from the Bombay Government. Under such circumstances the English power thought wise to be neutral and the Gaekwad brothers were allowed to decide their futures themselves.

There were also far reaching changes at Poona in 1774. Raghunathrao was deposed from power and he tried his best to regain his lost authority. In the beginning he expected help of Maratha Sardars such as Holkar, Sindha, Bhosley and Gaekwad brothers and such others against the ministers. But the birth of Madhavrao Narayan, the posthumous son of Narayanrao Peshwa affected the position of Raghoba.

This young child of Narayanrao was declared as the Peshwa by the King of Satara on May 28, 1774 and Maratha Sardars declared their allegiance to him. Thus Raghunathrao lost many close followers. The ministers of Poona being boldened by this sent an army under Haripant Phadke to chase Raghunathrao. Manadji Sindhe and Tukojirao Holkar were to augment to make greater this army by their forces. Raghunathrao, hotly pursued by the ministerial army entered Gujarat and the ministerial army, following him entered Gujarat.

The ministers at Poona deprived Govindrao of his title Sena-Khas-Khel and Fatehsingrao was given the title of Sena-Khas-Khel. In order to help the latter, the ministers
sent an army of 5000 men under Naro Anandrao. Thus in Gujarat Fatehsing secured the support of the ministerialists at Poona and was helped by the ministerial army under Haripant Phadke, Holkar, Sindia and others.

Haripant Phadke and other leaders of the ministerial army at one time or other were co-workers of Raghunathrao. They were acquainted with his bravery and efficiency and though they were against Raghunathrao, yet they regarded him favourably and wished for a compromise to be affected in the Peshwa family. This scramble for power at Poona affected the relations of the Peshwa and the Gaekwad too much for a period of seven years.

Fatehsingrao's early successes:

Fatehsing came out by the help of the ministerial army and he chased Govindrao and Raghunathrao. Raghunathrao was never sure of his followers and he was in a hurry to join hands with the English, and at the same time he desired the co-operation of Sindia and Holkar also. Many leaders of the ministerial army were also trying to win over Raghoba by persuasion. Haripant Phadke and Fatehsing were exasperated with the delaying tactics of some members of the ministerial party. At the instance of Fatehsingrao the ministerial army attacked the army of Raghunathrao near Vasad on the north bank of the river Mahi. Raghoba was defeated severely. The
battle of Vassad was won mainly by the strategy of Fatehsing.

Thus the arrival of Raghoba which was looked upon as a circumstance much in Govindrao's favour proved extremely harmful to him. By this battle Govindrao lost what he had gained in last ten months. Govindrao also lost the greater part of the revenues which he was collecting from the Gaekwad Paraganas. Khanderao and Govindrao of led to Kapadwanj. After their defeat, Raghunathrao with only seven hundred horsemen, and only a few elephants and camels went towards Cambay. The Nawab of Cambay was not ready to entertain him as he was being closely pursued by the ministerial army. He approached the chief of the Cambay factory, deposited his jewels and with his help went towards Bhavnagar by sea. Here he came across a ship bound for Surat and he soon arrived in Surat.

Raghunathrao at Surat:

Raghoba came to Surat almost alone for he had left his most loyal followers on the north of the Mahi. At Surat he found the English, waiting for him. The Bombay Government had sent Col. Keatings with the army to help Raghoba for reestablishing him on the supreme government of the Maratha

1 Gense and Banaji: Vol.II, p.244.
Empire. Col. Keatings came to Surat on February 20, 1775. The Governor of Surat Mr. Gambier informed him of the recent defeat of Raghoba at Vasad. Col. Keatings saw Raghoba on March 3 and the treaty of Surat was signed on March 6, 1775. 4

Raghoba after his rout at Vasad was completely at the mercy of the English, who were out to make a hard bargain. To quote Gense and Banaji, "They made capital of Raghoba’s dice need. They gradually prevailed on him to make concessions of the Paragana revenues, the magnitudes of which will for ever remain a matter for wonder and surprise and it can only be explained by Raghoba’s eagerness to defeat his enemies at any cost."

The Acquisitions of the English by the Treaty of Surat:

The English Company acquired vast tracts of land on west coast of India and in Gujarat. The Bombay authorities entered into this very speculative enterprise without consulting the Governor General at Calcutta. The Company were to get Bassein, Jambusar, Olpad with all their dependencies and the islands of Salsetta, Karnaja, Kanery, Elephanta and Hog island for the paltry military assistance. Raghoba agreed to pay one and half lakhs of rupees in advance every month and ceded as security his share of revenue of the Paraganas of Ankleshwar, Amod, Hansot and Bulsar. Raghoba

4 Aitchison: Treaties, sanads and engagements (1876), Vol. No. 5.
by this treaty ceded the territories including some of Gaekwads, yielding a revenue of more than nineteen lakhs of rupees. (See Appendix V, p.246.).

The Execution of the Treaty:

Within fifteen days of the signing of the treaty a junction was to be formed by the British force with Raghoba's force. The combined armies of Raghoba, Govindrao and the English could however achieve nothing.

General Keatings and the English, when they had moved against the ministerial army they had thought that Holkar was more inclined towards Raghoba, and that Mahadji would not support the ministerialists and therefore they expected to gain the upper hand soon, so Raghoba would be restored to power at Poona. But this did not happen in short time, so the English tried to win over Fatehsing. Mr. Shaw in one of his letters attached great importance to the winning over of Fatehsing, whom he considered "As the life and soul of the Enemy's party." He further wrote, "Fatehsing has now a large force and may give us trouble being so connected and acquainted with the country and the people."

Haripant Phadke was very active and his army troubled the British army. There were engagements four times between the two armies but an important engagement was at Arras on

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May 18, 1773. It was a decisive victory on the part of the English but it was costly one. Really speaking it was the sharpest reverse that the company's arms had yet suffered from an Indian adversary. More than three hundred Europeans were killed. This battle of Arras was equally disastrous for the ministerial army. Many were killed and many more were wounded. Raghoba and the English were disappointed and Raghoba's troops were deserting him for what of pay. Raghunathrao and the English wanted to march towards Poona before the rainy season but Govindrao wanted an immediate reduction of Baroda.

Fatehsingh forced to join Raghunathrao:

The English Company now knew the weakness of Raghoba and his allies and they wanted to win over Fatehsing and consequently to give up the cause of Govindrao. Raghunathrao and Govindrao had no money and their troops ran in arrears. With the advance of the season Mahadji Sindhia and Holkar left Gujarat, and Haripant Phadke wanted to cross the Narmada and the Tapti before the setting of the rainy season. The ministerial army left Gujarat for Poona defeated, and disappointed before June 24, 1775. The English army was at Dabhoi to attack Baroda, and they threatened Fatehsingrao. Under such circumstances Fatehsing's position was a precarious one.

To him the alliances with the Poona Minister was merely a means to an end and then he saw that the ministerial cause was not faring well in Gujarat he determined to look after his own interest. Thus he was thinking of peace with Raghoba. Moreover the English Company also covered his help because of all the leaders of the ministerial army, he was the bravest. It was due to his help that the battle of Vasad was won by the ministerial forces. The company also persuaded Raghunathrao to give up the cause of Govindrao. Govindrao was given to understand the weakness of Raghunathrao and Col. Keatings tried to bring reconciliation among two brothers.

Col. Keatings as a diplomat:

After capturing Dabhoi, Col. Keatings on June 23, 1775 gave a clear understanding to Govindrao, "that whatever services the English army might render him, must be recompensed by the finest grants of territorial revenue made over in the fullest manner to the Company for such assistance. ... and I have no doubt of obtaining some very valuable acquisition for this services." Col. Keatings also, in friendly tone advised Fatehsing to settle matter with Raghoba and the company. He in the same tone wrote tonim, "Whether Govindrao or Fatehsing succeed in the possession of Baroda, or whatever terms may be settled between the

Gaekwad family and Raghoba, I doubt not of being able to get some valuable acquisitions for my honourable employers from the share the English have had and must still have in the negotiations." Thus his aim was territorial aggrenisement with little risks. Which he achieved by the treaty signed between fatehsing and Raghoba on July 18, 1775. This treaty has been considered as, 'the crowning success of the struggle for supremacy between Raghoba and the Poona Ministers." Though this treaty was scrapped by Upton's later treaty it was no doubt an outstanding achievement for the Bombay government because from this onwards Fatehsing continuously remained on the side of the English (See Appendix VI, p.249).

**The Importance of the Treaty of Baroda:**

The treaty showed very clearly that the English and Raghunathrao made capital out of the helpless condition of Fatehsing. Raghunathrao though deposed of his power and territories was still shown as a legal ruler and sovereign of the Maratha State. On the contrary Fatehsing was taken up as the Jaghirdar of the Peshwa. The annual tribute was raised by rupees twenty-one thousand, Fatehsing was bound to serve the Peshwa Raghunathrao with men and money even though he was not the actual Peshwa. There is no mention of

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Offensive and defensive alliances. Raghoba is not in any way bound to help Fatehsing Gaekward against his brother Govindrao so the question of protection of Fatehsingrao stood as it was in the beginning of the contest. Fatehsingrao and the members of the Gaekward family were forbidden to have any communications with the ministers at Poona.

The Advantages of the English by the treaty of Baroda:

The roll played by the Bombay Government clearly showed its purpose. First it offered to stand as surety for Fatehsingrao Gaekward and thereby acquired a legitimate standing. The East India Company in Bengal had legalised its possessions and position by securing Diwani at the hands of the Moghula rulers in 1765. In the same manner they wanted to secure and legalise the cession of the share of the Gaekward in the revenues of Broach by Raghunathrao. Soon after signing of this treaty the company asked Fatehsingrao to surrender the sands for the revenues of Broach.  

The English got the Parganas of Ghikhli, Variav, near Surat and Koral near the Narmada on account of the peace brought out between the two parties. These Parganas were expected to give more than one lakh and half per annum.

Govindrao was given to understand that he would get a jaghir of ten lakhs in Deccan, from the Peshwa Raghunathrao.

and he had to relinquish his claims of three lakhs of his Jaghir in Baroda State. The English were not sure of this promise to Govindrao but it made the signing of the treaty smooth. Khanderao was allowed status quo. Moreover the Bombay government pretended that it had no interest but it stood as surety for Fatehsingrao Gaekwad. Thus it got a chance to interfere in the affairs of the Baroda State.

Govindrao and the English out for gains:

Govindrao was in the beginning satisfied, but later on he offered more lands and better terms to the English and Fatehsing 11 was not trusted by the English. Moreover the English did not want the dispute to be settled by the contending parties, so Col. Keatings continued to play a dubious role. Govindrao's demands increased and Fatehsingrao had to give more and more concessions. He even had to agree to deliver one-third of the Gaekwad State of about eighteen lakhs to Govindrao. 12 But Govindrao had hopes of complete acquisition of Gujarat with the help of Raghoba and ousting Fatehsing of all his powers. Unfortunately for him Fatehsing foiled all his best efforts.

Col. Keatings, finding Fatehsing in his grip did not miss to press more demands on him. He demanded payment of money due to Raghoba. On one occasion he threatened bombarding

12. Ibid, pp. 317 to 318.
the town and extorted Ten lakhs rupees by August 21, 1775.\textsuperscript{13}

By November 1775 the English East India Company took Bhatgam situated between the Parganas of Olpad and Hansot, Bhatgam connects Olpad and Hansot, and on request from the company, Fatehsing had to code it. The company like wise solicited the grant of some villages called the autgums, situated in the centre of Broach Pargana. Fatehsing had no alternative but to give the four villages known as autgums. Adjacent district of Olpad also was taken away along with other districts.

Raghoba was for all the times in Gujarat, and Govindrao was supported to some extent by him. When he heard that Govindrao was not satisfied even by one-third of the State, producing an income of eighteen lakhs of rupees he began to show doubts about end of the disputes between two brothers. But the Ministerial party at Poona had thought of another plan to settle this dispute.

\textbf{The Policy of Poona Government after the Treaty of Baroda :}

No sooner Fatehsing joined hands with the British and Raghunathrao, the ministerial party confiscated the Gaekwad territory and placed the same under the direct charge of their officers. Govindrao being dejected with Raghunathrao and the British, joined hands with the ministerial party.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid, p.300.
He was taken up by the ministers and a grant of several Paraganas including the Peshwa's share of the Paragana Bisanpur and the management of some districts was made over to him in 1775.

The aforesaid treaty was abrogated by the Bengal Government and the alliances with Raghunathrao was soon dissolved. The British conveniently threw out their former ally Raghunathrao as he had with Govindrao and concluded a treaty with the ministerial party on March 1, 1776 known as the Treaty of Purander.

The Interference of Governor-General Warren Hastings:

The treaty of Surat was signed by Raghoba on March 7, 1775, and it was ratified by the Bombay Government on March 16, 1775, without the knowledge and permission of the Governor-General. The Regulating Act and its terms by which the Bombay Government was required to furnish an account of its actions to the Governor General in Council, let to a conflict between the two Governments. The Governor General in Council disapproved the support, which was being given by Governor Hornby to Raghoba and desired the early withdrawal of their support and the suspension of the negotiations with Raghoba.

The Bombay Government however, was in no mood to accept this policy and they represented their case both to the Governor General in India and the Board of Directors in London. Warren Hastings in his famous letter of May 31, 1775 condemned the measure of the Bombay Government drastically. He also declared the treaty as invalid and war with the Maratha State as 'impolitic, dangerous, unauthorised and unjust' and required promptly withdrawal of Company's forces. Thus the Central Government disapproved the treaty with Raghoba and particularly of the action of the Bombay Government in sending troops in his support. Thus Raghoba's successes in Gujarat were short lived. Warren Hastings sent Col. Upton to Poona and concluded the treaty of Purandher. This Treaty of Purandher severed the relations of Raghunathrao and the Bombay Government. Some articles of the treaty are concerning the relations of the Peshwa and the Gaekwad.

Article of the Treaty of Purandher: 15

The Marathas do agree to give to the English Company for ever all right and title to their entire share of the city and Pargana of Broach, as full and complete as ever they collected from the Moghuls, or otherwise without retaining claim of Chauth, or any other demand whatever so that the English Company shall possess it without participation or claim of any kind.

Article 5:

The Marathas do agree (by way of friendship) to give for ever to the English Company a country of three complete lakhs of rupees, near or adjoining to Broach, on which there is no claim of Chauth, or any other demand whatsoever. Two persons on the part of the company and two persons on the part of Row Pandit Purdhan to proceed and determine the place and boundaries, when the Peshwa will give the Sanads.

Article 7:

The English do agree that every part of the Gujarat country, ceded to the Company by Raghunathrao, or taken possession of by them, shall be forthwith restored with all the forts and towns there unto belonging, except what is settled by this treaty. The country ceded to the English by Sayaji or Fatesing Gaekwad shall also be restored, when it is proved by their letters and copies of the Sanads granted by the former Peshwas, and now in their (the Gaekwads') hands, that they do not possess power or authority to make such cessions. The paraganas of Chikhli and Koral with the town of Variav, three villages of the pargana of Chorasi, and the village of Bhatgam are to continue as pledges in the possession of the English until the sanads of the country of three lakhs are made over. The Gaekwad's Government argued for a long time that its property (Broach) had been surrendered to the English without
its consent. All treaties and agreements subsisting between the English and Raghunathrao are hereby annulled, and those of Sayaji and Fatehsing Gaekwad are to be also annulled, when the above mentioned proofs are produced and these treaties are to be destroyed in the presence of the Peshwa's Ministers when they come to hand.

G.S. Sardesai writes about this treaty "It was the patch work of compromises and not an agreement heartly assented to by other parties." 16

The treaty and the House of Gaekwad:

The above quoted articles No. 7 was more thorny and debatable. It challenged the validity of the cessions made by Fatehsing by the treaty of Baroda. This article brought the question of the sovereignty of Gaekwad to the front. It effected the status of the Baroda rulers i.e., whether they were on equal footing with Peshwa or they were his Jagirdars. It was very bitterly commented upon by the Bombay Government, which after much serious consideration characterised the provisions, as most in adequate and highly injurious to the reputation, honour and interest of the company.

The article clearly provided that the cessions made by Fatehsing should be restored to him if it could be proved that he had no authority to make them without the

previous consent of the Peshwa's Government. This article was really a trap for the Baroda Government because if Fatehsing produced the sanads that the Gaekwad had not the power to make cessions without the Peshwa's consent, the precedent would be a dangerous one in after times. If Fatehsing did not produce the Sanads he would lose his ceded districts. By this the ministerial party tried to induce Fatehsing to acknowledge his dependence on the Poona court. In February 1778 Fatehsing was recognised as Sena-Kha-Khel.

Treaty of Fatehsingrao and the Peshwa 1778:

The Peshwa and the ministers at Poona sought the alliance of Fatehsingrao so the Nazar of five lakhs was given for the title of Sena-Khas-Khel. This was perhaps the smallest sum of all the same which a Gaekwad ruler ever paid for his investiture. A demand of five lakhs was made for all his arrears. Fatehsing asked for an indemnity for five lakhs of territory (Broach) ceded by the Peshwa to the British. Fatehsing also demanded the protection of the Peshwa against the British and complained of Govindrao at Ahmedabad.

Govindrao Gaekwad was never satisfied and he was promised a Jagir of three lakhs only from the Peshwa.

17 The Gazetteer of the Baroda State, Chapter VII, p.476.
18 Ibid, p.476.
Fatehsingrao's tribute and indemnity for service of troops were excused as in return for his services against Raghunathrao. The Poona Government also settled that as long as the British were in Gujarat there would be no demand or indemnity for service of troops of Fatehsingrao at Poona. Moreover his tribute was also lessened and fixed at four lakhs. In this treaty we see Fatehsingrao never relinquished his demands for the loss of his share in Broach and that the Peshwa never denied that he had a right to expect some return for his loss. Later on both Manaji and Govindrao also renewed their demands for their share in the revenues of Broach. This question was never settled though it was argued over and over again till the Peshwa's rule came to an end. Thus this treaty of 1778 proved an important one.

The View of the Treaty:

By the very first article it was stated that Govindrao was not to be helped by the Peshwa. But he should get a Jagir of three lakhs of rupees and Govindrao should serve with five hundred horse when ordered.

Khanderao was to get an allowance of rupees thirty thousand and he was also to serve with five hundred horse. Fatehsingrao asked for Dabhade's estates but the Peshwa definitely stated that Dabhade's estate had been given over
to the right owner and Fatehsing should not ask for it. Fatehsingrao by article eleven of the treaty asked for an indemnity for the five lakhs of country ceded to the British but the Peshwa rejected this demand. By article number fourteen Fatehsing was allowed to admit an officer for the Government of Ahmedabad. Fatehsingrao wanted that the Peshwa should not help Govindrao and this demand was completely agreed by the Peshwa. Not only that but the Peshwa undertook to arrange the matters if Govindrao or any of his people tried to disturb the peace of the country.

The Peshwa undertook to help the Gaekwad if the British were to invade the Gaekwad territory. In this treaty there are articles for the mode of repaying the debt of the Gaekwad. Fatehsingrao saw that the mediation of the English which he had purchased had effected nothing. It was only in the month of June 1778 that the Peshwa's Government Confessed that the proofs mentioned in the treaty of Purandhar were not forthcoming. The result of all was that the Gaekwad never recovered his own territory from these two powers. The cessions were definitely confirmed by the treaty on November 28, 1778. This treaty did not last long, because the war between the Peshwa and the British broke out afresh and the Gaekwads' alliance was soon sought by the British.

Non-observance of the treaty of Purandher by the British:

The Board of Directors utterly disapproved and rejected the treaty of Purandher. They cooly said, "We approve under every circumstances of the keeping all territories and possessions ceded to the Company by the treaty concluded with Raghoba." They also directed Governor General Warren Hastings forthwith to adopt such measures as may be necessary for their preservation and defence.

The treaty of Purandhar had caused misgivings to the Bombay Government and it was practically rejected. It also continued to give asylum to Raghoba. The Bombay Government got further weight to their pleadings when the Board of Directors had given their approval to the treaty of Surat.

There was also a remarkable change in the attitude of the ministers at Poona to the division in the Peshwa family. There was a split in the ministerial party. One party headed by Moroba, the cousin of Nana Fadanvis, supported by Holkar and adherants of Raghoba at Poona wanted to restore Raghoba as a regent of young Peshwa. On the other hand Nana Fadanvis and Shinde were against such a scheme.

20 G.S. Forrest: Selections from the letters and dispatches and other state papers in the foreign department of the Govt. of India from 1772-85, Vol.II, p.399.
Quoted by Thomson & Garret, Rise and Fulfillment of British rule in India, p.143.
This scheme of Moroba of bringing Raghoba as a regent failed and Nana Fadanvis and his party gained ascendancy. Nana Fadanvis objected very strongly against the company's holdings of the cessions made by the Gaekwads. Nana Fadanvis was suspected, by the English of Secret agreement made with the French on representation by St. Lubin. The British feared that existence of such an agreement might endanger the company's possession in West of India.

Warren Hastings supports the Bombay Authorities:

With the changed circumstances Warren Hastings renewed the alliance with Raghoba and he resolved to make new alliances with Raghoba on the terms of the treaty of Surat. He was fully supports by the Board of Directors in this treaty.  

There was a clear understanding that Raghoba was to be placed in power merely as a regent for the young Peshwa during his minority. This attitude of the British affected greatly the Baroda Government. As early as October 26, 1775 Warren Hastings had allowed the Bombay Government to retain the possession of the town and pargana of Broach and the district of Koral, Chikhali and Variay ceded by Fatehsingrao Gaekwad.

21 P.E. Roberts: History of British India, p.194.
22 Secret proceedings, Fort William, 21st May 1772.
After the treaty of Purandhar the ministers of Poona were not in a position to produce the Sanads to the satisfaction of the Governor General, so he was not ready to restore the territory ceded by the Gaekwads. A new treaty was concluded in 1778 between the Bombay Government and Raghoba. Hastings over-ruling Francis and Wheeler, the members of his executive council, sanctioned this treaty. By this treaty Raghoba was to be reinstated as a regent of the minor Peshwa and on application from Moroba Fadanvis, the Bombay Government was to escort him to Poona, with a view to place him on the post of Nana Fadanvis.

Raghoba and the English towards Poona:

By the treaty of November 24, 1778 the Bombay troops were to march towards Poona to establish Raghoba in the regency. A troop was also sent from Bengal to help the Bombay army under Col. Goddard. Raghoba was with the Bombay troop and the army mounted the Ghats. But at Talegaon the whole Maratha army was waiting. The retreat of the English army was cut off and the English were compelled to sign the Convention of Warangaon in January 1779.

The Convention of Warangaon:

This Convention tried to restore all the cessions made by Fatehsingrao to the English. The contention laid down that the whole of the territory acquired by the Bombay

25 Ibid., dated 1st Feb., 1779.
Government, since the death of Adhavrao Peshwa was surrendered. All English possessions such as the islands of Salsette, Olpad and other places like Jambusar, Broach, the Gaekwad cessions of Broach, Chikhli, Variav etc. were to remain as they were in the time of Late Peshwa Madhavrao and the territory should be delivered back to the Peshwa Government or the Gaekwad Government.

The British army was allowed to retreat after giving two hostages for the fulfillment of the convention. The Government of Bombay repudiated the convention.

General Goddard came to the help of the Bombay Government early in 1779. He was instructed to endeavour to negotiate peace with Poona State, bearing in mind the terms of the treaty of Purandhar. His chief care was to exclude the French from the Maratha Territories. Negotiations were continued many times but no final settlement was in view. The ministers insisted on the restoration of Salette and the surrender of Raghoba as preliminaries to any treaty.

General Goddard and Gujarat:

General Goddard gained some successes in the campaign of Gujarat. Maratha Sardars tried their best to defeat the army of the English in 1779. Mahadji Sindhe wrote to Fateh Singh to intercept the progress of Raghoba and to arrest the march of Raghoba who was going to join the English.

In July Fatehsing informed the Peshwa about the march of Raghoba and he requested help from the Peshwa, against Raghoba. The Poona authorities informed Fatehsing regarding Raghoba's intentions to create disturbances at Ahmedabad and asking Fatehsingrao to send some troops to Ahmedabad to protect the city. With all his efforts Fatehsing could not check General Goodard in capturing the territories of the Peshwa in Gujarat.

The Winning over of Fatehsing Gaekwad:

After the Convention of Wargaoon, it was proposed to reduce the Maratha Power by concluding separaties with different Maratha States. The aim of the English was to acknowledge the independence of such states of the Peshwa. Goddard was in Gujarat and he started negotiations with Fatehsing Gaekwad, with a view to detach him from the Peshwa's side. The views of the Bombay Government are expressed by William Hornby in his letter dated December 23, 1779 to General Goddard. He writes in his capacity as a president of the Bombay select committee, "that a move of concerted action is not very likely but he is asking for financial and military help from Bengal. Not only that but Garrison is to be supplied to Broach and Surat." He advised General Goddard in the same letter, 'to form connections with some of the country powers particularly

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27 Ibid, letter No.72 of 24-7-79.
28 Ibid, letter No.74 of 31-7-79.
with the Gaekwad for the better prosecution of the war and for the security of our northern possessions. 29

Why FatehSing should be detached?:

The Bombay Government received a great setback by the Convention of Warangaon as General Goddard was to approach the ministers to make peace, 30 on the lines of the treaty of Purandher. But Poona authorities rejected the proposals and General Goddard continued negotiations for a long time. On the other side the Bombay Government tried one more scheme of conquest for securing considerable annual pargana revenue by putting an end to Poona's influence in Gujarat. This was a great attempt on the part of the Bombay Government as it contemplated alliance with FatehSing with a promise to free him from the Peshwa's control. 31 The conquest of Gujarat was considered sound for political, military and financial reasons, and it was

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29 In this letter dated September 30, 1779 General Goddard informs to the Bombay Select Committee that he has learnt from reliable source that "The Ministers and Sindhia, in conjunction with Hyder, Nizam Ally and Moodajes Bhosle, mean to make a general attack upon the English at their several settlements and have entered into and sealed written agreements for that purpose."

30 Secret and Public Department letter No.21, dated 5th April 1780 from Warren Hastings to Bombay.

31 Gense and Banaji, Vol.III, p.35.
thought that the hold of Poona Government on Gujarat was very slander. After the treaty of Purandhar, Fatehsing was helpless against the power of the Peshwa and his relations with Poona Government were now already estranged, as he was not helped against the English, by the Peshwa.

In the south-east Gujarat there were many different routes by which the English army can easily penetrate into the Poona territory. Moreover the English thought that with the control of Gujarat, they could penetrate and lay waste the whole Maratha country if there was a strong ally in Gujarat, and without such an ally it was dangerous to advance. Moreover the Gaekwad dominion extended throughout Gujarat and upto Daman. It was not advisable to pick up quarrels with Gaekwad for he might cut off English communications from the coast, dislocate regular supplies of provision, and the army might have to face the enemy in front and also in the rear.

With these views in mind, the English desired to avoid hostilities with the Gaekwad. According to Carnac, "A junction with Fatehsing was most adviceable as his state could be used as a buffer between the English and other Maratha Territories. He also hoped that the polite treatment with Fatehsing would induce other Jagirdars to shake off the Maratha Yoke.

33 Ibid, p.45 also select committee Proceedings, Bombay, dated 16-11-1779.
How Fatehsing was detached:

This time the company had taken special care to plan a campaign in Gujarat. The plan was recommended to General Goddard in December 1778. First he had to proceed with the redactions of the Maratha possession south of the Tapti and their Parganas Olpad, Hansot, Anklesver, Deherebarah, Amod, Dabhoi and Versavi - the districts lying between the Tapti and the Mahi. Care should be taken not to molest the Gaekwad Chauthias and Collectors, and in the redactions of these places the chiefs of Surat and Broach had to assist the army.

General Goddard was to reduce the parganas which were ceded by Raghoba by the treaty of Surat. Then negotiations with Fatehsing were to be started on clear understanding that he was to be declared independent of the Poona Government. Then to make an absolute and specific partition of the territory between him and the Honourable Company, according to the proportions of the revenues and each party to have distinct and sole government and possession of the division might be allotted to them in the new settlement. General Goddard was instructed that Govindrao was not to be encourage at all even though he was the friend of the English. The campaign was against the Poona Government. The Nawab of Cambay should be also properly attended. Finally

when the treaty had been signed Fatehsingrao was to be helped in taking Ahmedabad. The conquest of Ahmedabad would lead to the final partition of Gujarat. The castle and city of Surat along with the Chorasi of Pargana in the south of the Tapti might be given to the English and the Gaekwad should have the region on the North of the Mahi. 35

General Goddard marched in Gujarat with the beginning of the 1780. He took possession of Hansot, Anklesvar, Amod Desbara. 36 Negotiations were started with Fatehsingrao and he was silence. Dabhoi was occupied by the English on January 20, 1780.

All the time Fatehsing waited for a substantial help from Poona. Mahadji had some doubts about Fatehsing's attitude and in his letter dated October 8, 1779, he asked Fatehsing to clear his position. 37 Chandarrao Udaji Pawar was sent by Peshwa to the help of Gaekwad, 38 with the Sanads of Dabhoi. Visaji Appaji, Peshwa's Governor at Ahmedabad, wrote to Fatehsing that he had come to join

36 Ibid. pp. 61-62.
37 His. Sel. from Baroda State records. Vol.II. letter No. it of 6-10-79.
38 Ibid letter No. 85 of 27-10-79.
Fatehsing and he inquired for the place for conjunction of the two armies. This help was not adequate to meet the English. There was a threat to Baroda and Fatehsing had no alternative but to settle with the English so a treaty was signed near the village of Kundhela in the Pargana of Dabhoi on January 26, 1780.

The merits and demerits of the Treaty:

The very first article clearly lays down that it was a general league of defensive alliance against all foreign enemies and it was offensive against the Poona Government, to exclude them from all share in the province of Gujarat. This was a mutual engagement to defend and support each other in the respective shares to be allotted to each other. Fatehsing was required to furnish a body of 3000 horse to act in conjunction with the English army during the present war. Absolute and specific partition of the whole country was desired between the company and Fatehsingrao. Ahmedabad and the country north of the Mahi hitherto possessed by the Poona Government was to be conquered and then to be allotted to Fatehsing in lieu of which the English were to be put in possession of the Gaekwad division of the country south of the river Tapti and known by the name of Athavisi, and their share of the revenues of Surat. Two separate governments were to be establish. Moreover
Fatehsing was to be supported in withholding the annual tribute hitherto paid by him to the Poona Government, until a final peace shall be concluded. It was also promised that the interest of Fatehsing shall be attended equally by the English with their own. For this Fatehsing had to grant the district of Sinor to the English. The treaty did not make any provision for Govindrao.

By this treaty the company got all the important forts, ports and places from Daman to the Mouth of the Mahi. The most fertile and populous part of Gujarat, Surat and Athavisi were transferred to the Company, while the interior parts, the North-East part of Gujarat, ( which is of a scanty population ) was given to Fatehsing. The claim on Ahmedabad of the Peshwa was to be there and as Fatehsing was expected to be in charge of Ahmedabad he might have been required to shoulder the wrath and responsibility of the Peshwa. Then it was intended that Fatehsing's State would be just a buffer state between the powers of Central Indian and the English. The imperialistic game of the English was clear and they wanted to reduce the dominion of Gaekwad to the conditions of Oudh or Carnatic. This was the typical imperialistic strategy. They wanted to make an alliance with Fatehsing ostensibly for his safety and to give him a force for which he was to pay heaviness for their own designs. The aim of the English was the expansion of the British Empire.
This miracle was achieved by General Goddard mainly due to the inactivity and negligence of the Poona Government. Fatehsing after much hesitation agreed to the cession of Sinor. He greatly feared the occupation of Dabhoi by the English, which due to its nearness to Baroda had a great strategic importance and he was very apprehensive of this place being, 'in the hands of such a formidable neighbour as the English.'

The possessions of the English were of immense magnitude. The company got a large territory yielding an annual revenue of thirty lacs while the benefits of Fatehsing were little. The cession of Sinor completed the line of Northern Territories for the English. This engagement was really an accomplishment of the long felt ambitions of the Bombay Government.

Fatehsing and the English as Friends:

The country of Gujarat was a subject of harassment due to the movements of the armies, Northward and Southward. People were not in a position to carry on their professions. Agriculture and trade suffered and rapacious army leaders and administrators tried their best to exact money from the people. Fatehsing's army also ran in arrears and General Goddard recommended a loan for Fatehsing. Fatehsing on his

40 Gense and Banaji. Vol. III. p. 79.
part was ready to accept a resident at his court. The Nawab of Cambay was acquitted for the Chauth in the city of Cambay by Fatehsing, at the interposition of General Goddard. Ahmedabad, the capital of Gujarat was taken up by the combined forces on February 18, 1780.

On the contrary Mahadji Sindhe showed his readiness by his letter dated January 30, 1780 to join Fatehsing against the English. Not only that but he invited Govindrao in his camp. He came with a large army to Gujarat through Khandesh to help Fatehsing against the English. Haripant Phadke, Sindhe and Holkar wanted to support Fatehsing, against the English. But Fatehsing had already changed the masters and he had severe all his connections with the Poona Durbar. But this friendship of the English and Fatehsing did not last long, as Governor General Warren Hastings interfered.

The Causes for the interference of Hastings:

The Bombay authorities were hopeful of the results of the treaty of Kundhela as it would have added the territorial and financial gains to the Bombay Government. By the end of the year 1781, the English army was not in a

41 Ibid. Vol. III. p.81.
43 Ibid'letters No. 121-122 dated 31-12-80.
position to make any headway towards Poona. Governor General Warren Hastings was informed of a concreted action of Hyder Ali, the Nizam and the Marathas. In order to counteract the growing influence of Hyder Ali, Warren Hastings sent peace proposals to the Maratha camp. The Bombay Government was not aware of the terms of the peace proposals, but they had expected to get the territories secured by the treaty of Kundhela. Unfortunately the hopes of Bombay Government proved short lived; for the treaty of Salbai deprived them of all their territories they had gained. Fatehsing Gaekwad against his wish was forced to revert to his former state of Quasi-Vassalage.\(^4^4\) (See Appendix VII)

Fatehsingrao and the Poona Sarkar after the Treaty of Salbai:

Fatehsingrao had signed the treaty of Kundhela with the English and had tried to throw away the sovereignty of the Peshwa. But the treaty of Salbai was enforced and Fatehsingrao reverted to his pre-war condition. Fatehsingrao was required to sign a treaty with the Peshwa. This treaty was signed in 1782 between Fatehsingrao Gaekwad and the Peshwa.

The tone of the treaty was lenient and Fatehsingrao Gaekwad was not oppressed much as in case of his former treaties. Fatehsingrao asked for concessions for his estates and Mokassa and he was promised to continue as it was formerly. He also asked the protection of the Peshwa.

\(^{4^4}\) Ganse & Banaji: The Gaekwads of Baroda Vol. III p. 82.
against his rival claiments and against his creditors. Govindrao was allowed to receive the same allowance as he did during the days of Peshwa Madhavrao. Fatehsingrao was given a concession for the time being in his tribute. Fatehsingrao was exempted from keeping of troops at Poona and he was asked to remain in his territory till war with the British was over.

By article No. 5 Fatehsingrao Gaekwad asked some indemnity for his districts (Surat, Aththavisi etc.) which were taken away by the British. Also by article 6 he demanded the cession of country of five lakhs ( Broach etc. ) which the English had formerly taken away from him. The Peshwa promised that the lands of the Gaekwad would be negotiated for, when there would be a negotiation for a treaty with the British.

In spite of these demands of the Gaekwad the territory was never restored. The treaty of Salbai was finally ratified on December 20, 1782 and the portions of its affecting the Gaekwad were communicated to Fatehsing in a resolution dated March 27, 1783. The great difficulty however was experienced in forcing Fatehsing to give up Ahmedabad to the Peshwa.

The Terms of the Treaty regarding Ahmedabad:

The hostilities being over, the Bombay authorities instructed their agents at Surat, Broach, Bassien and other
places to deliver up the territories to the Maratha agents as soon as they came. The case of Ahmedabad was a complicated one. Ahmedabad was captured by Fatehsing on his own account and it was solely under his possession. In the treaty of Salbai, there was no provision for the English to ask Fatehsing to restore Ahmedabad to the Peshwa. The Government of the Peshwa reminded the English many times for the fulfillment of the treaty, regarding the restoration of Ahmedabad.

The Bombay authorities after due consideration of the demands of the Peshwa sought the orders from the Governor General. Warren Hastings in his council advised the Bombay Government by their letter dated August 25, 1783 that Ahmedabad should be restored upon the same footing that the Poona Sarkar held it before the war allowing to Fatehsing Gaekwad such share of power and revenues as he enjoyed before. Thus Ahmedabad was to be restored to the Peshwa.

Fatehsing accordingly asked his brother Manajirao, who was in charge of Ahmedabad to hand over the keys of Jamalpur and Raipur gates of Ahmedabad to the Kamavisdar of the Peshwa and to withdraw his own men.

Last days of Fatehsingrao:

Fatehsingrao remained in undisturbed exercise of his government until his death in 1789. He was always spoken of as a wise, moderate and political prince. Circumstances did not allow him to extend his possessions; but the consolidated what he had already acquired, both by his negotiations abroad with the English and the Peshwa, and by his administration. When Fatehsingrao died, Govindrao was at Poona and he was informed by an unknown person by a letter. Here Govindrao was advised to be in readiness to start for Baroda but he did not start.

One Ragho Nilkant informed the Peshwa by a letter about the death of Fatehsingrao and the writer suggested to the Peshwa that he should try to conquer the State of Baroda. This letter fully described the property and the army of the Gaikwad. Manajirao, Fatehsingrao's younger brother assumed the charge of regency on behalf of Sayajirao after Fatehsing's death.

50. Ibid.letter No.153.