Prajñākara Gupta (PG) is the author of Pramñavarttikākāra. This is a sub-commentary of the Pramñavarttika of DK, the commentary on Pramñāya of Dignā. Pramñāya is marked as the magnum opus of Dignā in Buddhist logic. PG is remarked as a veteran scholar who belongs to the post Dharmakirti period in the long history of Buddhist logic. The details about PG’s life is available only in the scattered form. Lima Tirñath mentions this scholar in as a native of Bengal and he lead his life was as a householder in his pūrvaĀrama. Dr. S.C. Vidyabhusana records that the time of PG may be fixed at the first half of the 10th century AD. He quotes that PG is called as Prajñākaramati, a monk and a keeper
of Southern gate of the Vikramaśila University during the period of Canaka dynasty.

Another work, viz., Sahıldvalambhananîcaya is also ascribed to this writer by him. But later scholars did not admit this remark. According to them Prajñaśkaramati is different from PG. L. M. Joshi remarks that PG is the teacher of Vinetadeva⁴ who probably flourished in the later half of the 8th century AD. So Joshi states that PG might have been lived in C.800 AD. Moreover Yamjri, the author of Pramjś,avyrtiśkla/kīrateka, wrote a commentary on PG's Pramjś,avyrtiśkla/kīra, who lived in the period between AD 800-900. The Japanese writer H.Nakamura⁵ says that the time of PG might have been fixed as later half of the 7th century AD.

Dr. Radheśyamdhar Dwivedi⁶ gives some remarks about the life of PG. According to him PG belongs to as the period between 700 - 750 AD.

Th. Stcherbatsky⁷ states that PG is designated as the great exponent in the third stage of Buddhist logic. This stage mainly tries to disclose the deep philosophical content of
the system of Diṅgā and Dharmakirti regarding it as a critical system of logic and epistemology. This school aims at development, improvement and perfectness of the system. These attempts must have been happened round about the year 800 AD. PG is also regarded as one of the founder of the school of commentators. Th. Stcherbatsky follows the opinion of Tīranāth about his native place and he remembers that the Udayanacarya of 10th century AD. has criticised PG frequently in his work. Th. Stcherbatsky says that the followers of PG can be divided in three sub-schools of which the exponents were Jina, Ravigupta, Yamāri in respectively. Among them Jina was the most dedicated and spiritual follower of PG and the developer of his ideas. Ravigupta was the direct pupil of PG. He was popular as the exponent of more moderate approach to his teacher PG than other followers. Yamāri also tries to develop the unexplored field of the content in the work of PG. The great scholar Rahul Śīmkṣṭyāyana is of opinion that the date of PG can be fixed as the second half of the 7th century AD. From these
references mentioned about the time of PG can be fixed as the later half of the 7th century AD.

Another independent logical work namely Sahālambanirāyāsiddhi is ascribed to PG by L.M. Joshi. Original of this work in Sanskrit is seemed to be lost. Its Tibetan translation exist in Tanjur.

_Pramāṇavārttikā-lakṣaṇa_ – An Analysis

_Pramāṇavārttikā-lakṣaṇa_ is a sub-commentary of Dharmakirti’s _Pramāṇavārttika_ based on _Pramāṇasaṃuccaya_. Dr. S.C. Vidyabhusana observes that the Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exist a Tibetan translation and it is divided into two parts. In Tibetan language it is known as _Tshad-ma-rnam-hgrel-gyi-rgyan_. This translation was prepared by the great Kashmirian pandita Bhavyaraja and the Tibetan interpreter Blo-idan-scs-rab. This work was prepared under the
supervision of numerous sages of great monastery of Vikram̄ila and the great Pa,ıtás named Srisunaya-sremitra, Kum̄rasri of Kāmīre etc.. This work Pramj,a-vīrttikabhśya or Vīrttikā la'kira of PG is a commentary of the chapters from 11rd to 14th in Pramj,aavyrtta. He leaves the first chapter accepting the traditional order, i.e., the first chapter is commented by the author himself. This work is preserved as Tanjur collection in two large volumes. PG. did not gave it usual title, like a comment. His work is named as a 'Ala'kira'. So this author PG. became popular by this title as 'Ala'k,rakira' or 'master of ornament'.

Th. Stcherbatsky states that the author wish to intimate the attitude towards the real content which require much more space. It requires the attitude from the students with extra ordinary power of comprehension. Therefore author composes a short ornamentation in order to elicit its ideas. The salient points of these doctrines are meant for the community with less gifted intelligent.
The text *Pramấvârttikâ-la’kira* (*PVA*)\(^2\) was discovered by the great scholar named Rahul Śāmkātyayana and published from K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute at Patna in 1953. Another publication with Hindi commentary is done by Swami Yogendraṇanda namely *Vârtikâ-la’kiraḥ-Āyavyākhya* from āaddarśana Prakâśan at Varanasi in 1991.\(^3\) Swâmi Yogendraṇanda is considered as a great living savant of Varanasi. In this work he puts forward not only the translation based on word to word but he gives its purport with timely explanation through references.

The text in *PVA* is divided into three chapters, viz. *Pramấsiddhî paricheda*, *Pratyakâparicheda* and *Pararthînumînaparicheda*. PG starts to comment the second chapter viz. *Pramấsiddhiparicheda* deals with the attainment of the validity of knowledge. In this chapter he defines the need of philosophical basis to develop Buddhism as a religion.
The ‘Pramāṇavṛttika’ begins with the commemorate ‘Buddha’, "the redeemer and chief who worked for the universal welfare. He is also the consultant of a darśana". The chapter named Pramāṇasiddhi commences with glorifying Buddha who is the source of valid knowledge and the consult of all science related to knowledge.

The third ālaka tells us that infinite knowledge is permanent non-polemical and the means for fulfillment. Heat or fire is the basis of cooking, and the basis of a fulfillment is called non-contrary or non polemical.

Buddhists admitted that perception and inference become valid knowledge and verbal cognition has nothing to do with the validity of knowledge. We may doubt that verbal cognition is a knowledge since sound is the medium of communication. We may also doubt that this is a the sign of pramāṇa such as we mistake the colour of the couch as yellow. The process of cooking is still there, while we dream of it, but actually there is
no such process. Therefore the above said sign of valid knowledge has the defect, viz. 

Ativyipti. If we add 'faultless' as a sign of it, there is nothing wrong with it. It is also 

wrong because verbal cognition is based on sound and it is a cognition by sound. The 

relevance of sound is only when there is communication. Because sound, smell, feelings 

etc are represented through sense organs. We make use of sound to put across 

something inferential or seen. Therefore verbal cognition cannot be termed as an 

independent source of valid knowledge.

Then he discusses about the advantages of verbal cognition. The Vedas are 

transmitted through sound. They are not divine, because it developed as the result of 

man's attempt. If Veda has only one meaning can many interpretations by the 

masters? Vedas are also not valid knowledge since their mantr's can be interpreted in 

many ways in accordance with one's vision. Thus vedas are not self explanatory but
contradictory. Now we come to know that sound is used for communication as to get verbal and it is not regarded as valid knowledge.

The answer to the question 'whether vedas are eternal or they were composed by any God? If so they were written by whom? Or entrusted with it? And PG, asks them what 'niyoga' is? Here the author does not accept that 'Niyogin's are the persons appointed by brāhmins to perform the rituals. Memāmsakas says that Niyogens are the persons to perform sacrifices and they belong to the brahmin caste. Then some question may arise, who is a brahmin? Are they belongs to a race or a caste? Here some arguments about the karmas belonging to four varṣis namely the brāhmins, the kāatriyis, the vaiṣyis and the śdris are discussed.

Eleven types of Niyogavidins are described here. They are:

1. āuddha kṛitya niyogavidins.
2. āuddha prāraṇa niyogavidins
Here PG. refutes all these arguments defining the term 'niyoga'. It means when man voluntarily involves in his duties he is called as 'niyogi'.

**Bhavna nir\(\text{\text{	extacutesc}}\)sam (Negation of imagination)**: Mem\(\text{\text{\textacutesc}}\)msakas says imaginations are of two types. One is \(\text{\text{\textacutesc}}\)bdhe bh\(\text{\text{	extacutesc}}\)vana and the other one is \(\text{\text{\textacutesc}}\)rthebh\(\text{\text{	extacutesc}}\)vana. \(\text{\text{\textacutesc}}\)bdhebh\(\text{\text{\textacutesc}}\)vana is
the action done by a man either by compulsion or prompting of another. It is a verbal
duty. This verbal imagination is not niyoga at all. Niyoga is karma or duty and it is not
merely verbal. Erthebhįvana involves an action (Kriya). Exertion of one's duty results
in sacrifices and it is Erthebhįvana. But imagination itself is futile since the mantį's
in vedas do not bear any fruit. Action should have a result. PG states that there is no
visible result in the Yįgįdikriya and it is not believable and here occurs the negation of
imagination.

The cooking process results in a preparation but yįgįdikriya have no such result
at all. Therefore, it is futile and the author gives special emphasis to deny it. 77

Vyṇvahįrika pramį̄ta (Utility gets authenticity) :- Sense organs are invalid while
wisdom is valid. Jįna (knowledge) helps one to reject what that is to be rejected and to
accept what to be accepted. For example, I see a pot and I touch it. Here perception
takes place in the form of knowledge. According to Buddhism the real knowledge is pure perception. The identification of 'pot' as an object other than a pot is the real one and this first perception leads to real knowledge. According to them the name 'pot' is actually attributed to that object.18

The form of the pot and the ability of the senses constitute that perception, 'a pot'. A knowledge different from this stream of thought is not real knowledge. The perception of this structure of the pot leads to the summation of knowledge. This knowledge is from the information of the senses and not by practice of any.

Pramāṣabhālabhedaḥ pramāṇaḥ (Knowledge identified by further knowledge).- We identify an object by its form and shape or form brings us knowledge. It is not spontaneous. If it is spontaneous, we would get the valid knowledge. So perceptual knowledge is also authentic and real.19
Utility brings validity, but we feel action in dream but they are not valid. Dreams cannot make any utility by themselves, for there is no action. Dreams do not satisfy perceptory inference. More mental pictures or visions in dreams cannot be valid and that is why we depend on inferential knowledge. The knowledge about 'fire' become valid only when there is burning or cooking. The concept of liberation is clarified by the edification of the āśstras. Knowledge becomes valid only when the unknown is given known shape, form and perception. At first we get structural knowledge or sensual knowledge and then it leads to inferential knowledge and thereby to the generalisation. The word 'fire' is acknowledged by the sight of fire and there we get the generalised knowledge that 'fire' is a burning thing which is the real knowledge. Later the word 'fire' itself brings us the perception of its structure and shape.
We make use of inferential knowledge for those, which are incomprehensible.

For example when we say sound is finite, we infer the finiteness of sound. For example "sound is a created one and all creations are subject to decay". Therefore we infer that sound also will decay. Thus inferential knowledge, which has logical sequence can be considered as valid knowledge.

_Bhagavata Pramāṇa (Buddha, the valid knowledge)_

Perception and inference are valid. How Buddha can be valid? Buddha is a perceptory form and therefore there is valid knowledge and thereby he is the "infinite". He is the dozen of the four noble truths and therefore he is the valid knowledge. This validity is not self sprung, but by the testimony of others. Validity is the accreditation of other people. It is true that Buddha who has the knowledge of non-dualism had valid knowledge.
Since substances are mortal, the knowledge about them is also mortal. For if they are to be valid, we have to prove its validity. The knowledge that God is eternal is wrong for knowledge is acquired and any acquisition is a subject to decay. The knowledge of God has also the same destiny. God is beyond perception and if we acknowledge the eternity of God, we acknowledge the invalidity of it. By perception, we know, fire burns but the power of God is imperceptible and we are helpless to say whether God is eternal or not. Therefore we must acknowledge Buddha as the God who is perceptible.²⁴

Iñwaraduraprjnąm (Absence of the sufficient means of knowledge to realize God)²⁵:-

Naiyāyikas realise God by retrieval to the old, the shape of the pot and their utility.

Atoms end in atoms themselves. Each object has different structures and quality. Each one is placed in its perfect position such as river, the ocean etc. Therefore, they need a creator and thus God gets validity. But these inferences are insufficient to establish the
entity of God. It is not right to say that God is behind each action. If so God instead of
the potter may mould the pot. But we don't perceive the intervention of God in any
action. It is wrong to believe that the potter is prompted by God. If so who prompts
God to make so, is it another God? Then it is a continuous absurdity.²⁶

God is eternal and expects universal welfare. If so, God is responsible for the
mistakes and he cannot establish welfare. Thus it is clear that there is no God. God
does not give shape to anything. The clay has no shape at all. The pot is shaped by the
imagination of potter. If it is God, the clay itself will have the real shape of a pot.²⁷

Pradhñña nírsam (The rejection of pradhñña)²⁸:- According to the súkhya, God is not
the cause of the universe. Earth, water and everything is a mixture of well ness, sorrow
and desire and therefore they are not real. The created things have shape and colour
and so they are not real. Therefore the cause and causation of pradhñña is not God. If
so we have an unending series of cause and causation. So we cannot admit pradhīna as the cause of universe.\textsuperscript{29}

*Karma kṣra,anirṣam (The negation of action as the cause)*\textsuperscript{30}:- Action is the basis and cause of the universe, action has three dimensions mental, verbal and physical. Mental work is the vital force. Verbal and physical actions are from mental process and they are not visible. Therefore we cannot feel their presence or absence. The virtue and sin from action are also invisible and action cannot claim the cause.\textsuperscript{31}
Paramāj, u kīra, ata nirīsam (Negation of atom as the cause)\textsuperscript{32}:- Atom or paramāj, u cannot be termed as the cause of everything. If atom is the cause of a pot, the atom itself should have the shape of a pot. Atom is keen and limbless, and a limber object cannot reproduce and without it, it is invisible. Buddhists do not admit that atoms have a shape at all and the reformed atom is not the cause of the universe.\textsuperscript{33}

Like the pot, earth has a shape therefore if the potter is the creator of the pot, there we can infer that God is the creator of the earth. As a reply to this, It is said that pot has a definite shape where as mountains and earth have no definite shape. It is only a nominal shape. We have measure for one cloth but oceans and mountains have no definite shape.\textsuperscript{34}

Bhagavad pramāj, ati-jañnavatīt (Buddha is the valid knowledge because of omniscience)\textsuperscript{35}:- Buddha is valid since he has omniscience. Buddha finds out reasons
for man's misery and he suggests measures to overcome it. Only the omniscience can lead and guide in such a manner. Only one enlightened can provide us with the knowledge of salvation, pradhāna and prakṛti. Therefore it is not wrong to consider such a person as the valid one.36

Buddha suggests measures to root out misery and he is the advisor of 'four noble truths'. Desire is the root of all miseries and we can avoid miseries by non-attachment. Misery and its reasons to misery, its eradication and the means of eradication comes under the four noble truths', which Buddha suggested. The knowledge to this truths are unique one and thereby itself. Buddha can be termed as 'pramā'. He gets pramāṇa through the micro - minute findings of these truths and their means.37
Buddha is the valid knowledge since he is compassionate and only a compassionate man can feel the misery of others and suggest means to avoid it. This compassion is not acquired by this birth. This is an acquisition from the cycle of rebirths. It is based on a continual process. It is acquired by practice. The mercy which has been transferred from the cycle of rebirths gets fulfillment and then one gets the ability to renovate and reconstruct the whole universe. Buddha is the redeemer and reformer in the sense that he has mercy and sympathy which can save the world from all its miseries. Therefore Buddha is termed as valid knowledge.

**Bhetacaitanya nirsam** (The negation of the vitality or validity of the five elements)

Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Sky are the five elements. No one can admit its permanent vital force. Fifty is a number, which comes under the numerical of one hundred, likewise each element is not perfect by itself. The sky has sound as its quality, air has touch, fire has touch and structure and water has touch, structure and taste while
The earth has all these along with smell. Buddhists reject this, since all these are absolute nothingness where as Buddhists accept life as unreal. Each substance is the product of a 'cause'. The senses and intelligence are sources from a particular 'cause'. Body is not the source of its origin. If its origin is from the great elements, then everything should have 'life'. This doesn't occur and the life of animals is not eternal. This will resume till the end of this world. Whether intelligence is not a source from the elements? If we admit elements as the source of prajña senses and intelligence, there is the defect, viz, 'Atiprasa'ga'. Sense functions are accordance with the knowledge of the mind. Senses do not function or obey the elements.

DK clarifies it through the forty-first loka that says mental cognition is not intervened even if any of the sense organs gets lost. If mental balance is lost through fear or sadness, sense organs take no difference of feeling. Therefore sense organs are in working condition based on mental ability. Intelligence is incomparable and there is
nothing a kin to it, even the sense based body is not a part of intelligence. It has separate entity and sense organs depend on it and intelligence does not depend on anything.

\textit{Vijñ\textsuperscript{a}na siddhi (Attainment of wisdom)}\textsuperscript{45}: \textit{Jñ\textsuperscript{a}na} (knowledge) is the cause of everything.

Senses and intelligence are complimentary. This complimentary basis constitute the universe. Intelligence is related to whole of births and rebirths like a seed generates the next tree. Matter is based on a cause and the cause of this birth is the cause of the last birth as experiences are based on the previous birth. Forty sixth \textit{\textsection\textsuperscript{loka}} clarifies the possibilities of the cycles of births and rebirth.\textsuperscript{46} The cause of the constituents like cognition, senses of body are from the cycle of births and rebirths. The former is the cause of the latter. In short, desire of the previous birth is the cause of this birth. A birth that has got fulfillment has no rebirth at all. Fulfillment or liberation is getting knowledge and we get knowledge when we erase attachment and desire for the
knowledge can take us to ‘liberation’. When one erases desire and attachment, he
overcomes the senses and acquires state of being liberated.  

Matter is depended on ‘upadānakāra’, i.e., body decays through death and
Citta which is full of knowledge remains. The लोका fifty-one clarifies, it with the help of
‘Saptame Vibhakti’, while interpreting these state. The Interpretation of
‘asminsatidam’ Buddha states the sign of ‘cause’ as "this from that". The infinite cause
becomes finite cause. Without the Infinite there is no finite. Here occurs the abstract
and the concrete infiniteness.

*Kṣaṇa pādāsthā* (*Cause as a substance*) - The pot is the product of the joint venture
of the potter, wheel, clay etc. They are the causes of a pot. Here which is the real cause?

The answer is that the last event before the substance is regarded as real the cause of
the pot.
Cārvākas find vitality (caitanya) in the body. Therefore caitanya decays along with the body. Their liberation is inaccessible. The Paralokavādins do not accept this. According to them body does not have caitanya. Therefore fulfillment of body does not result in mental or spiritual fulfillment (cittanivṛtti). In effect we get the transcendalism of births and rebirths. When there is citta (mind) there is life and its external actions (praṇā). Praṇās are not the cause of citta. 'Citta in action' is called as 'cetana'. In that form cetana is also the cause of prāṇa, apāṇa (inhale and exhale etc.).

_Vasanābalādutpatti_ (Mind as the result of the mindset culture)\(^\text{52}\): An erotic dreams is co-active or partially active therefore it has truth. The existence of such dreams depends on the culture or mindset of the person. Transcendalism is the process like the childish mind turning into the mind of the adult. For example, there is a knowledge in dream and it is not conscious and the conscious mind does not create a dream. In other words
we cannot be both conscious and non-conscious simultaneously. When the body decays, the citta transcends, to another even into a far off one.\textsuperscript{53}

Perceptual knowledge cannot acquire this mystery of transcendent meditation.

We depend on inferential knowledge for the knowledge of this transcending life of citta. Degeneration is not out of cause. If destruction is by destructive forces, what shall be the basis of ‘existence’. Existence becomes valid until there is destruction. Destruction of any substance is a natural process. Citta has existence as far as the forces of destruction are absent. If body is the abode of the citta, body becomes only an instrument for the manifestation of the citta. Citta is the cause of all knowledge. It is not an active substance like the body. So it is dependent of the body. The citta gets into caitta by the absorption of the consciousness of the cycle of births. Then there may arise a question, whether these will be a universal citta on the basis of all these numberless cittas such as threads in a single cloth. PG follows the opinion of DK that
we make use of instruments like pot to restrain the flux of water. Likewise knowledge, action etc. are inactive in substance and action, and it is futile to ascertain any basis on them. Therefore body is not dependent on citta. Body and citta are a co-habitual experience. Citta migrates from one body to another. Knowledge and other cittavyāpāra exist through practice. It is not by the exercise of the body. Knowledge does not occur in the body. Knowledge takes place in the citta and its basis is on the previous citta of previous body. Therefore the only reliable thing is not the body but the citta which has a transcending nature. Lamp is the source of light, and it is wrong to say that body is the source of citta, for the things based on knowledge like the 'rasyana' are not of the body but of the citta.

If any one posses the experience in all āyātras in his previous births, surely he has the excellence of it in this birth. Life, memory and intelligence are the dimensions of knowledge. Happiness produces desire and sadness makes anger and thereby we assess
that body is not responsible for desire and anger. Such as the increase of humor, phlegm, choler makes fever and dementia. This is caused by the spontaneity of citta.

Son may represent the nature and character of his parents. Therefore parents are the cause of the son and not the previous birth. They are like the parent trees. It is not compulsory that the son should possess all nature of his parents. Some natures also come from the issue of self exercise.

**Punarjanma parigraha (Acceptance of rebirth)**: Birth takes place by conception. Life has self love and therefore it has the quest to renounce misery and enjoy happiness. The servant works according to the will and pleasure of his master. Similarly citta transcends to another by the will of God. This concept is wrong since the work of all is not by the compulsion of others. Citta transcends in accordance with its own desire.
Antharjñabhava dhā (Transmigration of the citta)⁶⁰:- Why don’t we experience life getting into another? Because our senses are not competent to experience it. Senses are helpless to lead this transmigration. This transition from one body to another is mystic and invisible. But it happens and this transmigration may take place to distant places. This knowledge is available to yoges. They practise it to eliminate desire and other things from their life and so they have no transition at all.⁶¹

Avayavaniñśa (The negation of organs)⁶²:- Knowledge is not away from the body. Body is the amalgam of molecules and whether each molecule has this knowledge in acquisition to be answered. The whole of the molecules constitute a single body and it has only one organ and that organ is the basis of physical function.

According to Naiyáyikas, different organs constitute the body, they have no isolated function. Organs are dependents of body. Every thread in cloth does not
reflects colour, likewise every organ in the body is not valid by themselves. A ‘pot’ is the amalgam of molecules, have not the shape of a pot. In short atoms lack shape from and size in its widest extent.

Then he arises a counter opinion about the body. If it composite of paramāṇu or dvaṇāka etc knowledge can be produced or acquired by a single organ etc. In other words the organs of the body have no isolated existence. If each organ can acquire some knowledge at a time, then there are much knowledge acquired at a time. His replay is that 'this is inadmissible'? Atoms without an organ has no union and therefore atoms themselves have no validity.⁶³

Vijñāna kṣaraṁ (Wisdom as the cause)⁶⁴:- Body is a product of the great elements. Even if an organ is mutilated knowledge takes place ceaselessly. According to Buddhist,
vijñāna comes out from jñāna and an experience of it may produce a single one. In other words, experience are divergent.
**Karmasiddhi (Attainment of action)**: It is wrong to assume that body is the source of Vijñāna. Valid knowledge comes from jñāna and jñāna begets vijñāna. Body which is devoid of jñāna cannot get vijñāna. If body is the source of vijñāna then where does Buddhijñāna comes from? It is a transitional knowledge from karma. The knowledge about cloth does not bring in the knowledge of a "pot". The collective consciousness of Vijñāna is termed as "karma". Some philosophers think that the doctrine of karma has more importance than dharma. According to them karma designs the body as the abode of desire of a person. PG replies to this that the co-existence of the karma and Vijñāna is mystical and invisible. Body is not the source of Vijñāna. Transmigration takes place even without a physical body and the cause of this transmigration is the mind which is evolved from the karma.

**Karuñbhyaṣa (The practice of compassion)**: Omniscience gets through practice. Compassion will get solutions to everything. Practice brings up our logical reasoning...
and thereby we get the ability to solve problems. Compassion is acquired by practice.

When we feel 'to be compassionate' we become competent enough to give relief to others and their problems. Hatred is to be eliminated through practice. Compassion is the practice of mercy. We get non-attachment by practising, mercy and this compassion helps one to relieve the living beings from their miseries.

Buddha is valid since he is the redeemer. He is non-attached and capable of eliminating misery and he is valid one. Only the non-attached one can deprive others from their misery. One becomes worthy of exploration only when he can solve the problems of man and thus lead mankind to mokkha. The eradication of misery should be achieved through practice and thereby one can get liberation. Misery disappears when one renounces the self, desire and ambition.
Transmigratory knowledge is an indirect acquisition. Knowledge relates action and its results revealing the cause and causation. Inferential knowledge works as in direct and they are also useful for self realisation. Realisation is the work of the senses. The knowledge of the future takes place through inferential knowledge.

Yoge get prophetic powers through the zenith of their mental cognition. The knowledge is the result of abstinence from desire and ambition. For example hunger can be eliminated by constant practice. The good and evil comes from practice. Buddha renounced desire and ambition and there by he eliminated the misery of others. He showed others, the means to escape from misery.

Sugata means one who has attained his 'self'. Buddha is valid since he had attained himself. So he could empty his self through self realisation. Anıtmavıda or no soul theory is the result occurs from the absence of self. Self realization through self-
denial results the eradication of misery. The craze for praṇastata, (being recognized) janmabhivata (to be free from rebirth) and niṠesata. NiṠesata means the absence of weakness of the body. The use of evil words and re-foundation are causes for the weakness of the body. Buddha has nothing of these and he could lead others to the right path so he is valid.

Buddha is valid owing to his paripulana karma. He was compassionate and renounced the world and spent his life in extreme 'yoga' (tapa). Buddha followed the four noble truths and illuminated others with his compassion and thus he is valid.

Therefore noble truths are the capacity to know the nature of misery, the cause of misery, its prevention and the means to its prevention.

According to him misery, desire and ambitions are the causes of misery. Ego and egoism leads to misery. Its absence is the state of wellness. Desire makes one well or
happy. The desire is a permanent one and wellness comes out of it. For example the
misery of 'hunger' can be satisfied by food and thereby wellness is created. Thus
wellness or happiness is acquired while misery is even pervading. It cannot be acquired
since it is already present.\textsuperscript{73}

Desire is the cause of misery which is not of phlegm, choler and melancholy
which are known as "Trido\textcooper{\textyn}a" it is wrong to ambition comes from phlegm and choler
begets hatred, and water creates desire (r\textcooper{\textyn}ga). Desire and ambition are inherent.

\textbf{Bh\textcooper{\textyn}atacaitanya nir\textcooper{\textyn}sam (Negation of desire as a product of the elements)}\textsuperscript{74}: Here PG
negates the trido\textcooper{\textyn}a theory of s\textcooper{\textyn}khyas or their followers. Desire is not the result of
'phlegm' the elements have their inherent nature. The emphasis on earth and water
result in 'desire' and the emphasis on fire and air results in 'anger' and the emphasis
on water and air results in ambition. This is a false statement. The element has no structure. The hardness of earth, the coolness of water, the heat of fire are their eternal basis. Wellness is a process of interior experiences. Wellness and knowledge do not occur from the elements. Wellness has no shape, it is an experience. Viññāna is from the cycle of births and rebirths desire and ambition are the reason for this rebirth. Wellness is a form of eternal ignorance (avidyā) and it is peripheral and not real. This universe itself is a place of misery.

The salient features of misery, are Anityata, Dukhata, áneyata and Anítmata. The experience of misery is occasional and therefore it is not permanent. Everything is not available simultaneously.

_Samudaya satya (Cause of misery):_- The causes are of four types viz. Hetuta, Samudayata, Prabhavata and Pratyayata. Misery and the cause of misery are
occasional and therefore it has no permanence. Desire is the root of all misery. The
desire has three dimensions namely the desire to be well, the desire to have rebirth, the
desire to get rid of misery.

Every substance has a natural quality, but it need not be of a eternal nature.

For example the sharpness of a needle may not last long. Misery is with a reason, but
God is not its reason, if we infer an eternal substance as the cause of misery it will be
altogether a countless misery. Desire is the root of misery. In the absence of desire,
rebirth ends. Self-love is the source of desire. Love is inherent in the self and this self
works for happiness out of self love which is related to ignorance, desire and karma of
worldly things. But karma doesn't inspire one without desire. 

Nirdhasa (Knowledge of the features of one who overcome the whole miseries)

Nirodhata, vientata, uttama, nirmuktata are the features of nirdhatasa. Those who
are in the bondage of the world can never set themselves free. Those who are non-attached will get mokṣa (liberation). Those who like to eliminate other’s misery, must not be miserable. To eliminate misery, one should avoid desire and get into work without any thought of return. He will not have rebirths. Only those who are compassionate may feel empathy. The spirit of karma never declines a man who is compassionate.79

*Satkṣayadātivigama (Negation of satkṣayadāti)*: The eight path of right resources is the means for the prevention of misery. Rebirth does not take in the absence of self-love, one who has craze for, wellness and desire not to have sorrow gets into self love. His motivation is only for wellness. Rebirth does not occur to one who has selflessness.81

*Bandhamokṣa (Release from bondage)*: The stage after mokṣa is happiness. The moment of liberation and moment of parinirvāṇa are different. Deliverance is from the
release of bondage. Eternal happiness occurs only after the attainment of liberation and it is ever lasting.

A substance cannot be valid and invalid simultaneously. Presence and absence cannot go together, either presence or absence is the only material fact.

**Mrgasatya (The four structures of the means to the prevention):** The means to the prevention of misery have four spheres. Mrgarpa, antarpa, Uttamatva and nissara. The key to the prevention of misery is selflessness. Selflessness can be acquired only by practice. A self-motivated person can never avoid the 'DoAa' (defect) in him. He has only self-love and is not able to realize the 'DoAa' or defect of him.

Yogins have the power to get devoid of their self-love. They also suggest the means to avoid the misery of the whole universe.
Mrgabhavana (The means of imagination)\textsuperscript{85}:- The vision of selflessness is the right one.

One has to eliminate the desires in order to access it. The thought of the 'self' leads one to desire and 'do\textasciitilde{\textacutes}{\textacutes}a' leads to hatred. The sukhas\textij{dhana} of the self is merit and its dukhas\textij{dhana} creates demerit. Self sacrifice is the means of selflessness. Citta is the dependant on intelligence, wellness and sorrow. When one rejects all these and gets into wellness and he reaches liberation. PG. quotes the theory of Vai\textij{\textiacute}\textij{\textiacute}ike\textij{\textiacute}ikas to refute it "the existence of the soul is related to substance and this is the valid according the Vai\textij{\textiacute}\textij{\textiacute}ike\textij{\textiacute}ikas. Soul is a state of consciousness with wellness and this is related to body and it is joint consensus. Soul is absent where there is no consensus between body and soul.\textsuperscript{86}

Anytmav\textij{\textiacute}da (No soul theory) \textsuperscript{87}:- Soul is sinful by itself. Man is with a stick only when he uses it. Likewise the knowledge of desire comes only when one comprehends 'desire'.

Caittaj\textij{\textiacute}\textij{\textiacute}na is related with yogi j\textij{\textiacute}\textij{\textiacute}na. It has micro dimensions. It is invisible to
common man. Ignorance is the reason for anger and it leads to the knowledge of the consumer and consumption makes the world complicated and thereby the consuming self also creates doṣa.

According to sākhyā, the feeling of the union between prakṛti and puruṣa does not help one to get deliverance from misery. But the knowledge about the prudence of prakṛti and puruṣa results liberation. Puruṣa is pure by itself. Prudential knowledge delivers liberation to the self. This remark is refuted by PG here (See Vs No. 251). He says that prakṛti and puruṣa are variant. The degradation of body and rebirth are different from the self. Self-centered motivation in puruṣa makes 'anurūga' with his soul with senses and the misery formulated by it. Self motivated puruṣa will not be non attached. The attachment to self creates desire and elimination of desire is the deliverance from misery.88
Similarly he states that Verbal authority of the Vedas do not lead to liberation.

We can acquire knowledge about the self through Vedas and Mantyas. Material pleasures are the subject to decay and its pleasure has no permanent effect. The misery can eradicate through acquiring the intention from the teaching of great men. These teachings get validity. But all verbal cognition from Vedas can’t be accepted as valid knowledge.

He exemplifies 'The fried seed do not germinate, they become impotent because of heat'. Likewise, if desire is fried in the fire of non-attachment, rebirth will be stopped for ever. It means if we have the attitude to erase our desire and get to the stage of non-attachment. Ignorance begets desire. And thus practice of no soul theory brings us knowledge. 89
Sins are immaterial, since soul is formless. Soul has no form. But matter has a form. It is wrong to say that virtue has a form and sin is its deformation. Sin and virtue are not substances. The solution to sin is the attainment of liberation, rituals based on hymns incantations or praise of Gods do not bring us liberation. Through the karma of the previous birth we get desire and false knowledge. The new birth is the result of previous one. Those who have attained liberation has no emotion in worldly affairs. If soul is eternal, there is no question of rebirths.

The self has always possesses rișiđidoÂa. Through the two hundred and seventieth āloka he rejects the argument of the VaiṣeÂikas who give much importance to soul. If soul is to be pure, it should free itself from rișiđidoÂa, VaiṣeÂikas argues that soul is the lord and the consumer. Neither one can do something be a consumer nor he is a producer. Nothing can be good and bad simultaneously. So the realization of the soul is rejected by the author.
He replies that it is difficult for the self to recollect the previous experiences. It also does not get the effects from the actions of previous birth. For the person remembered and the person experiencing are different. Karmaphala cannot be transferred. Mind is numberless, so karma is also numberless. Self is only one, then where the individual difference will occur? Self cannot be identified by inferential knowledge. It is impossible to know about the self through the Vedas. Then why self is absent from the universe? In answering to this question, Buddha proposes the four noble truths. Sthirākāra, Sukhākāra, atmacyākāra and Ītmākāra these are the devices to eliminate tāta (desire) and its roots from the world.

The true vision of selflessness, and thereby the destruction of desire and acquisition of liberation, through Bandhamokāa. Ignorance can be eliminated and desires are to be eliminated. Liberation is through tearing of karma, the destruction of
Karma occurs when desire is eliminated. If karma is destroyed, the body disappears.

Then desire is to be eliminated and thereby we can avoid karmaphala and rebirth.

Liberation attains through the destruction of karma. Body and karma do not disappear unless desire is eliminated. The personal mind takes a universal attitude i.e., the misery of the world becomes one with the person. The person who get liberation has no pleasure or sorrow. Wellness is through áubhakarma. Then we should work for wellness. In this context there is no state as wellness. Everything is misery wellness is an illusion. It can be an important experience except in liberation.\textsuperscript{92}

Sugatatva is through providence when we infer the sign of fire through, smoke.

Likewise the four noble truths helps to infer the sign of providence in Buddha. The word sugata means, the one who attained the true knowledge, eternal knowledge and permanent objects is never reborn. So Buddha is valid. Since Buddha is capable of
interpreting the four noble truths and quenching the misery of the universe. Sugatatva is one who has exhorted and exemplified the four noble truths. \textsuperscript{93}

Buddha, the teacher attains validity through absolute knowledge. The compassionate Buddha tried to quench the miseries of others. He is the valid knowledge, since he is compassionate and non-attached. Buddha is the valid one and our inferential knowledge becomes valid. We realise him as the absolute knowledge. Thus Buddha becomes valid through the means of valid knowledge. So he becomes the object of valid knowledge and means of valid knowledge. \textsuperscript{94}

\textbf{Pratyakṣa Paricheda}

After discussing the general features of the two valid knowledge, viz. perception and inference. \textit{PG} starts to discuss its specified meaning or terminal identification. \textsuperscript{95}

Both these valid knowledge have infallibility and given validity. When substances have
perceptible connection, they have svalakṣaṇa and when they are inferential they have general knowledge. There is no other valid knowledge without these two distinctions. We get the complete or the perfect knowledge of a substance owing to our first knowledge about an object.

Knowledge of association gets from the perceptual knowledge to the inferential one. Knowledge of association is impossible without the visual knowledge of an object.

The water in the desert is a meaningless one since water is not available or seen in the desert. Similarity and dissimilarity or semblance and resemblance are the different state of knowing based on perception. Perception makes true knowledge possible as memory makes inferential knowledge. Possible memory of perceptibility in knowledge leads to inferential ability. Perception brings us knowledge about something and it is through the senses. Perception of knowledge is self-sprung or spontaneous.
**Paramārthasat and samvatsāt** 97:- Fire gets suitability through burning. Likewise, according to Buddha, paramārthasat are not so as called samvatsāt. Paramārthasat is the original sign and samvatsāt reflects general sign. Everything in this world is based on this type of both knowledge and those object based not on this knowledge is devoid of error. This infallibility is not acquired by perception or inference.

Buddhists do not accept the concept of the soul theory of Naiyāyikas. Buddhist accepts only two types of valid knowledge as valid, and they believe that the soul has no eternity. An eternal object cannot make the cognition of an object. According to Naiyāyikas soul is eternal and knowledge is the quality of soul. Soul is the abode of knowledge dharma, adharma etc. 98

Inferential knowledge doesn’t bring the knowledge of causation before 'cause'. It means that there is no inference of something having not proceeded by perceptual
knowledge. In other words without perception inference is not possible. The subject of inference does not involve perceptual knowledge, if so inference does not work there. If cognition and cognisant are different and we infer infallibility on both, it is equal to a saying that burning is there without fire. For example we feel the process of burning, in a dreaming stage but actually there is no such process at all.

If we visualise an object, we get perceptual and sensory knowledge of it. Inferential knowledge is an indirect means and inference also comes out from perceptive memory. The inferential knowledge is possible only through the knowledge of association with sense organs and object.  

-Sāmâyaniśam (The rejection of saṃjñya kalpana)⁹⁹⁹:- If there is no relation between cause and causation, everything become weak. We know that the germination of the plant is from its seed. The knowledge of causation attained from the cause is the
samvrti knowledge. Inference leads to perception or perception leads to inference, both there is, it has a cause and without cause there is no matter. The matter is visible in world through mental construction (world). It is wrong to say that every visible object has its own validity. Validity or futility is based on 'samvrtijµña'. Thus Buddhist rejects common things through samvrti. 

\textit{Sāmnyacinta (Thought of generalization)}: It is wrong to say that infallibility is both in svalaka, and sāmnyalaka; infallibility is not possible in sāmnyalaka. For example eyes help us to get the knowledge of shape from the association or contact of object based on our intellect. Here svalaka, and sāmnyalaka has nothing to do with vision other than the eyes. Intelligence is depended on the impression, which is acquired in the former birth and it is not depended on common knowledge. It is wrong to say that, we get perception of an object only if it exists. Knowledge which is contrary to perception also can create consciousness of the matter. No substance is different
from its form. Each substance has a common reliable factor. When clay is moulded, we get a pot and the wholes. *Someness of the pot makes its possible to contain water.* If the pot is piece by piece, it cannot contain water.

Generalisation is an inferential topic. Verbal knowledge is also a general cognition, therefore we cannot say the sound is valid; one lacks the other. Buddhist opines that generalisation of the state of being generality (Samññīm bhīva) The pleasure from the sound is a mere feeling. It is an illusionary knowledge. Therefore Buddhists do not accept verbal cognition as valid. The word 'pot' does not give us any knowledge. When we see 'pot' we get the knowledge of its shape. It cannot be considered as a verbal cognition. The things we see in dreams such as black elephant, white clothe etc. give the feeling of real knowledge but the knowledge from dream can not accepted as true knowledge. The elephant that we see in our dreams is as same as the elephant we see in real. In its shape and form elephant is the same but it lacks
presence and that is why we lacks its material apprehension. So we can't see the elephant when we awake from the dream at the next moment. Thus we rejects the opinion of others related with simśya. We cognize mere general conditions through sound and not in person. It is wrong to say that to understand the person, senses are essential, because when the person is absent the knowledge of 'mere essential' does not possible. The awareness of common sensory knowledge gets only from the presence of individual object. According to Buddhist the knowledge of shape is from the sensory connection with objects and senses. But the knowledge about the qualities like black, white etc. get from inferential knowledge.

The awareness of matter is of two kinds, Inferential and sensory, Pratyaksa is through the sense organs. The shape of one man is different from another. This term man is individually different and it has no shape. Cow has the common features of a cow and it can be called as cowness (gotva) similarly man can be designated as a
person being possessed with manness (manuAyatva). Here the general term 'manness' is applicable to all men even though the shape of each man is different from each other.\footnote{105}

The 'yellow colour' of a couch is a material acquirement. Samanyajati cannot be defined by the shape of a person or by its different dimensions. 'There is a pot', 'there will be a pot' etc. represent samanyaj\u0111na and they are also representative based on the term of 'potness'. But we cannot say that cloth is a pot as it entirely different from the later.

"Hare has no horn", we cannot make such assumptions. This is a non-existing thing and 'hare-horn' is an example of non-existing thing. There are two valid knowledge since there are two valid objects. This states that there are two valid knowledge and they materialise the Buddhist theory. S\u0111m\u0101nyalak\u0101, a is inferable with
differences and it cannot be termed as 'paramārthasat'. Inferential can be acquired by conventional (vyavahara). So it cannot be accepted as 'paramārthasat'.

The valid knowledge on perception is based on the knowledge of self nature and inference is based on its general feature. Inferential knowledge is also valid since it is inferable. Fulfillment and infallibility can ascertain its validity. Perceptible knowledge identifies the object with its specific signs. But inferential knowledge identifies the object with its general signs. Perceptual knowledge receives only what is sensible. Perception and inference are complementary. Without one, the other is impossible. It is meaningless to say perception occurs after inference or inference comes after perception. The knowledge of fire on the mountain cannot be identified without sensory perception.
Knowledge is of two types and these topics also gets two dimension of matter, which may not get due dimension of knowledge. Because knowledge is an experience of the thing what is to be acquired. The object of knowledge can lead some one to the means of knowledge. Inferential knowledge does not get access in the absence of the object. According to Naiy\text{\textvisiblespace}yika absence can be acquired, through verbal knowledge. But according to Buddhists, inference for sake of others can acquires absence.\textsuperscript{108} Infallible knowledge is valid and the symptom of valid knowledge in inference and therefore inference is also valid.

The áim\text{\textvisiblespace}apa tree and it distinctive features and are one and the same as a tree.\textsuperscript{109} We get the sense of other world through verbal communication, likewise we get the knowledge of inference also. Senses work according to these worthy eyes. Without eye, sight is futile. Sight brings worth to the eyes. Likewise all senses become self accomplished only when they have their own power as valid. Because it helps to
remember only those that have been experienced. The visualised object is valid when it remember them and they are present in memory. Memory helps to recognize an identified object.

*Anupalabdhi*(Non-apprehension)*:-* Non-apprehension helps to get the knowledge of the absence of an apprehended object. We cannot get the awareness from any saying like 'Fire is Cold', because of the contradicted state of fire and cold. And it is practisedha. Non-apprehension is the absence of something. It is the continuation of another object other than this such as fire brings heat and thus there is the absence of cold.

The common features of a cow resemble in all other cows. áimङ्का is a tree and it has the common features of treeness and áimङ्कपत्वः. So the memory of the association as a tree is related with the áimङ्का which is experienced by us. This
association between this object with that object relies on the experiences based on other similar objects.

Pratyakṣa (Perception) " According to Buddhist, perception is a knowledge which is devoid of error and imagination. Then it becomes valid knowledge, when we are free from all external thought and mind is fully concentrated on that object. The knowledge what comes through the eyes it is called visual perception. But this perception through senses cannot be perceptive when it comes through memory.

Memory is only a knowledge, which acquired in the past and it is a continuation of the acquired former impression. We get cognition through many ways. But only one knowledge takes place at a moment. There is only one knowledge occurs at a moment. Pot has a common dimension and this common feature makes the knowledge of its shape and form. 'Pot' has no specific meaning when we hear this term
for the first time and it does not represent the intention specified. It is the work by
which we are able to express a meaning that we have gone through the senses. But it
does not apply visibility there. It is mere ‘imagination’. The wrong and rightness of the
same topic in our mind creates different world based on mental worlds. But we feel the
two mental worlds are the same and the compatibility of knowledge about the same
thing is only repetition and it is not a variant of the first five sense organs make five
experiences and theory do not create five types of Knowledge. It is wrong to say like
āankaraswāmin that true knowledge is experienced through the senses as the children
may do.112 Because children may go wrong in their perception. Therefore the knowledge
through senses may not lead to the right perception.

Śyāmyanirasa (Rejection of commonness or generality)113 – The man with a stick shows
that the man is having a stick with him. And if they are to come in our memory, we
should have the previous knowledge of a man and a stick. We should know that a stick
is like this. But the qualities or features of a man is not decided by these commonness or generality. So the knowledge from senses may not be the true knowledge. When we say a 'cow' we get the memory of its shape but we don't have its qualities. In such case we perceive it through the knowledge of its structure.

Avayavinirṣa (The negation of the self through limbs or organs): Clothes are made of threads and threads unite together to make a cloth. But cloth without threads is a meaning perception. The waving of a single thread does not produce air, but when we wave a piece of cloth, we can feel the presence of air. So the connection of threads makes a cloth and like wise we identify an object with its different features.

Nanumṇyat śṛṇyasiddhi (Inference does not lead one to identify quality): Quality does not include in the shape of an object but it is something adjacent to it. It is impossible to distinct persons and quality. Man has manness and cow has the cowness.
But it is impossible to sort out as quality of an object. Man is with manly qualities and it is not to be guessed out. When we see a man we can recognize manness through gestures.

\textit{Anypoha cinta (Each object has its own specified identity)}\textsuperscript{16}: The name itself indicates its specified identity. Cow, the word itself denies all other signification like cloth, pot etc.. The word is self explanatory, pot has a shape and the things other than pot having other shapes are do not belong to potness. This is 'anypoha'. A woman have different roles like mother, sister and daughter. These are different from Kevalajñína. Every woman has the resemblance of womanness. The word 'cow' brings us knowledge based on its shape, then comes the verbal consciousness. The true knowledge takes place at the first and then it follows the other qualities. Thus every object represent its own objectivity other than it. It is called 'anypoha'.
śabdakalpana nirasa (The negation of validity of verbal knowledge which happen through sensory experience)"\textsuperscript{17}: The true knowledge based on sensory perception has no verbal knowledge. Like wise verbal memory is also absent there. We see only the 'mere objects' through the eyes, here there is no memory or adjectives, verbal memory cannot come from vision. After the vision, the sound or verbal recognition makes it possible to identify it. In other words verbal cognition comes after sensory participation. Eyesight brings only visual perception of the object, not memory. Can we cognize an object at first sight without any adjectives or qualification? Then verbal cognition follows and identifies an object with name, genus etc. At the final stage also the absolute knowledge only exist without the qualifications. Thus Buddhists accept that we get the perceptual knowledge only at the first moment. In the second moment we get the knowledge of its extended level. Thus we get different layers of knowledge of an object.
Two experiences are always different. When we feel or know the heat of the fire, we have no experience of cold. The knowledge through the sense can't be experienced as verbal knowledge. We identify objects through senses and in it knowledge memory also has role. The expression 'cow' brings us the knowledge about the shape of a cow.

Sensory perception means the perception with the help of the senses. Here senses are more important than the objects based on senses. 'Pot' is an amalgam of different atoms and we can see the pot, but we cannot see the atoms independently, which contained in the pot as a composite. We can't perceive so many objects at a time. But we can perceive an object where it is an amalgam of many objects in a particular form.

We can see a peacock of multi-colours. Here the knowledge which we get through the perception and there multi-formed knowledge help to get the idea of a single object in our intellect. In our intellect or cognition we get the idea of many constituent like multi colour shape and the structure of that creature, its sound its,
posture, its expression etc. which occurs simultaneously in our knowledge. Here multi
coloured peacock and the perceiver have some roles in the process of attaining
knowledge. Through this attainment the process of seeing will be accomplished
through its fulfillment. Intellect is only helpful to perceive some things. When we
perceive an object, we may not congnize to all its features, but concentrate mainly on
that object other than on its salient features. Later we understand the uniqueness and
features of that object and there by we get the true knowledge about that object.

*Arthakriya (Attaining fulfillment)*\(^1\): Substances are different owing to their nature.

When we see something there are the minute parts of it, but eyes are not capable to see
these particles. Then how does eyesight works without seeing the atoms? We can see
the pot while accumulating the union of atoms, but then why the eyes do not see the
atoms directly. DK tries to explain this through these verse.\(^2\) He says that the known
objects, and the objects to be known are different. We identify those that comes under
our knowledge and those beyond cannot be identified, because, our senses are powerless in identifying the remote object. To identify them, we have to practice in enriching our experience. Then PG tries to analyse how the absolute knowledge can be accumulated through practice. For attaining this he initially explain the nature of true knowledge.

The primary and secondary steps of perceptions are not attained by vision and they are not memory also. Memory comes from inference. Knowledge through the senses is valid since they bring us fulfillment. Sensory knowledge becomes clear with self nature and verbal knowledge is not clear in that sense. Verbal expression is attributed by someone to an object and validity depend on the person who instructs about that object. So we include it in inference. But sensory knowledge is different and it depend upon the sense organs. The knowledge through touch are different from smell because of the variety of organs.
**Mnasapratyakṣām (Mental perception)**: Visibility are of three types mental, self-realised and intuition or Yogipratyakṣā. Mental vision occurs in the mind. Realization comes through the senses. Yogipratyakṣā is intutional. Desire and knowledge in the mind is also a kind of self-erected one. Mental cognition may be comprehended that what cannot be comprehended by the senses.

The first sensory perception gets into the mind and then gets contemplation.

The knowledge of an object occurs through senses in the first moment and mental cognition follows as the second one. There are many causes for a single object and object of comprehensions is the knowledge of that cause.

**Svasamavedanapratyakṣā (Perception of self realization)**: It is the perception of desire, anger, happiness and sorrow, these are mental impression such as the feelings like desire etc that takes place in one's own self and not in others.
If one believes that the knowledge about happiness or pain have occurred as a result of the action in his former birth that knowledge becomes its basis. If one believes that the knowledge about desire and other things from his inherent base, that knowledge is a wrong one. Karma is the reason of this. Happiness is also connected with cognition and it is related to mind. Senses do not enjoy happiness when they are centred on mind. If happiness is the product of exercise like the learning of a child to walk, it is not a conscious effort. Happiness and other things are consciously made.

We get cognition through imagination, likewise happiness also comes out of this imagination. This happiness from imagination is experienced through cognition.

Citta is eternal and free and it does not depend on anything. But happiness and other feelings are the qualities of it and these qualities are short living. Then how can this eternal happiness can exist externally without soul? Buddhists do not accept the concept of soul, they call it Cittasambandha or Caitta. A non-existing thing does
not depend on anything, therefore soul does not exist. It is said that eye enjoys sight and this is wrong. Happiness is enjoyed not by eye, it is by the mind. Through sense organ we only identify external objects and happiness is decided by the mind.

Knowledge brings happiness and ignorance brings sadness. Happiness is through the pure knowledge because of its relation with knowledge.

ŚŚkhyas believe that happiness, sadness, desire structure are external things and these experiences can be acquired through the union of nature. It is perceived through the union of prakṛti with puruṣa. To them it is wrong to mingle happiness and sadness without knowledge. Therefore they think that it is essential to consider happiness as structure of knowledge. The ŚŚkhyas give dominance to nature and they think that happiness is through nature and they reckon external happiness as the real happiness. If intelligence is one which gives happiness then happiness cannot be seen as external thing. If so the Caitanya puruṣa which they accept is unhappiness.
Without object and perception how can happiness be felt? Soul is permanent and happiness is temporary, so they are different. It is wrong to say that soul enjoys happiness in effect. Because it is an experienced one. According to sākhya cause and causation are of the same category and this is not so.

Yogajapratyākṣa (Yogic perception): The knowledge of Yogins are real. Their imagination and perception are visible knowledge and it is clear and comprehensive.

Buddha was a sage and his knowledge is considered as Yogaja. He found reasons for everything and interpreted four noble truths through his yogic perception. It is accepted by the Buddhists. Buddha is one who realized (interpreted) the four noble truths and his words are infallible and leading to fulfillment. Therefore he is valid.

Yogins can eliminate things regarding knowledge and acquire the true and exact knowledge.
Pratyakṣabhāṣacintā (Thoughts on fallacious perception)\textsuperscript{197}: In the absence of absolute knowledge imaginary perception does not become valid. Self-form is with structure and matter is subject to change. Imaginative cognition are of three types. Fallacious perception e.g. there is water in the desert of doubtful knowledge such as knowledge based on the first vision with shape form and other qualities make a ‘pot’ cognizable. Likewise water in the desert may seems to be true, but here it is a mirage or fallacious perception. A person who has glaucoma may see hairs in the sky and this is fallacious perception. According to the Ēciṇya like Kaśyapa says that the knowledge of two moon in the sky (dvicandrajñāna) is an illusion of the mind. This knowledge is similar to the knowledge that there is water in the desert may create from a mirage. We feel it and when we reach there, there is no water. It is like assuming a rope to be a serpent. There are all contrary to the visual knowledge. Perception means realizing knowledge and
knowledge which is not illusionary or hallucinatory. So DK states that the knowledge should be non-erroneous.

Pramāṇa, aphalacinta (The result of valid knowledge): We cannot acquire everything out from one karma. The knowledge should occur based on a subject and is out knowledge related to that subject. We are ignorant about a thing until we come to know of it. The visual knowledge brings us knowledge about the visual object. Knowledge is the ultimate result of everything and we see the Vijñānavāda of the Buddhists here. By sensory intervention we get logical and attributory knowledge of an object. The core of the thing is the generation of knowledge and the reason for it is the senses.

Karma and its related cause have no topical difference. The action of cutting gives two results (the cut tree has two parts). Every karma has a result.
Svasamvedanaphala (The result of self realization): 'Black' is an identification by vision. Black object or black cow and thus we get cognition of it with a shape. When we say a 'pot' we get the knowledge of 'pot'. Then we don't think that this is a pot, because many molecules and atoms have formed it. We cannot see 'pot' in its atomic forms.

'Black' is identified with other colour in memory of association.

Pratyabhijñä (Recognition of the colour blackness): The colour 'black' brings us the experience of 'blackness' we see a pot because of light and not by itself. In answer to this doubt it is said, eyes have light and light in the eyes makes us see things. Darkness is the original thing and when light comes there, it disappear. But light is relevant in the presence of darkness. Knowledge is likewise, it comes where there is knowledge.

Ignorance is the original thing and removing this ignorance, comes the beams of light in the form of knowledge. Ignorance is the effect of biotic forces. Salvation is realised only when the ignorance is removed and knowledge is permitted to set in. There is no
difference of object and senses according to the vijnanavadinś. Absolute knowledge is
the sum total of previous experience. Fulfillment can be attained only through
acquiring true knowledge there by avoiding illusionary knowledge.

*Bahyrythanirṛsa (Negation of external reality)*: External meaning is illusionary or
hallucinatory and it does not bring the different connotations. In effect there is self-
communication only. Knowledge depends on the object and if one is unable to identify
the object in its external and internal sense, one cannot understand things like 'black'.

When we see blue colour we understand not mere the sense of that colour but there
takes place a disassociation of black from other colours. When we see 'black' as an
object black colour is seen in our mind. When we memorise the object 'pot', it is from
real knowledge of it or the identification of it. The cognizable object is pramṛya, the
shape of the object is valid and its result is communication to the mind or brain.
The two classification of knowledge are Bodhārpa and Ajñārpa (conscious and unconscious). If an object can make some impact through experience it can exist in memory. Knowledge is such one. Whether we consider structure of knowledge and external meaning which are different their conscious takes place in numerous form. Therefore external or peripheral meaning is also self-communicating. For example happiness and sadness are the result of karma. External and internal causes are based on knowledge. When we accept the peripheral existence of an object, we get 'svasamvedana'. Though we have the appearance or visibility of an object, its comprehension is based on intelligence. Sautrāntikas accept reality in external meaning in association.

Arthasamvedanaphalam (The result of meaning for communication): External sensing is an outcome of identifying the object by self. Knowing 'the object' is also a reflection of self made knowledge. We could feel the presence of water even if there is
no water in the deserts. The knowledge of water comes through experiencing when we see the oasis. Sátkhyas consider this as the theory of naturalism in the process of creation and Naiyáyikas gives respect to the creator. All these are the outcome of the inherent nature. Thereby we acknowledge its futility. All external objects are being perceived by the inheritance of the previous nature.

**Vijjaptimatrtyam pramāṇa-aphalavastha** (The result of validity of knowledge in accordance with the theory of knowledge)**:\** The expressions of knowledge and object are not different in themselves. Object and knowledge seems to be different is the result of inherent nature of the ignorance. The lessons of mantras are cited as the examples.

As an answer to these doubts, quotes mantras by the author do what the golden pieces attributes in store can be inferred as hidden in the earth.\(^{33}\) The attainment of absolute knowledge is the search for the differences in the object and knowledge. It is owing to the eye that one cannot differentiate the earthen and the golden which inside it. We
feel the presence of 'gavaya' in cow because of the illusion of knowledge and this is meaningless. This illusionary knowledge would eradicate when the valid knowledge occurs in our intellect. Internal disposition is responsible for making such type of differences. Actually there is no difference at all. The inherent feelings never make illusion. To an idealist what is understood is valid and identification of it by self-nature is the result of it.

According to Naiyáyikas four types of pramáyas are necessary to get valid knowledge. And four conditions are also occurring in a knowing process. They are the knower, the object of knowledge, means of valid knowledge and valid knowledge. But Buddhist are of opinion that only two valid knowledge, viz. perception and inference are necessary to fulfill the process of knowledge of an object. So they didn't accept comparison as a separate means. They state that comparison includes in inference through these examples of gavaya and cow. Here Buddhist says that these reflections
are born in mind only, these are only mental reflections. Similarly knowledge of an object occurs through the contact of eye and sense organs with object. Knowledge is the result of the association of different components and its last stage of subject only exist in the form of knowledge. For example, to bring forth a child may like parents, food, climate are responsible. But the resemblance of one of the parent would be visible and other causes becomes marginalised. Thus the object of this manifold is reflected as a multi-faced nature. Only the nature of absolute knowledge of an object should exist its own form. Similarly object reflect only its nature and not even the relation of sense organs with it. Knowledge is self illuminator and its perceiver is not another cause. It means that one who enlightens with knowledge he attains the form of knowledge. Infact knowledge is self realising. Mental knowledge is based not on the subject but one's desire.
Memory is not valid in nature. Memory causes out from experience. But the knowledge from an object becomes meaningful with clear objective evidence. Memory does not included in valid knowledge. Because the explanation of memory is the process between the speaker and listener. If the speaker and listener is a single man then only the memory gets a clear shape. Otherwise the memory did not create any new knowledge. Then how can we believe that the experience of a person is valid in the form of memory. Then the reliability of the speaker is the only measuring scale. So we have to conclude the reliability of a speaker is based on reasoning and this also comes under the heading inference for the sake of others.

**Smṛti (Memory):** The cognitive object makes a definite shape with the experience from the memory of an object. If so, whether the same cognition from memory makes a valid meaning is an important question. If an external object makes a valid knowledge, naturally every person should have the same cognition based on this experience. If the
material knowledge based on memory makes a perpetual one then why is it not a kin to
other? If we say memory based knowledge is related with self then what can be the
relevance of it? Then the question arises whether the soul is along with knowledge or
knowledge comprises of the self. If the external object reflected the same thought in
every person, then it can be termed as valid knowledge. But here the generality of
shape does not take place as it is, in every person. If the self is knowledge based surely
the communication or knowledge of the object will be same in every person. Here the
perceived knowledge differs from the speaker and the listener. The unity based on
analogy it cannot make any resemblance. The answer to this question is that the
knowledge of analogy is different from person to person. To one it may seem to be
direct and to other it may be indirect. When the acquired knowledge is transmitted,
our personal judgement influences it. It is impossible to compare use of smrti in two
persons because it differs from person to person. Without external help no knowledge
of an object does make sense to another. If so jµñna becomes meaningless. Even the knowledge will be capable in making extending knowledge by annexing the acquired knowledge. When we say how the knowledge make experiences, this can be exemplified. Smâtijµñna is different from experience and experience is different from Smâtijµñna. They have similar qualities which are complementary to each other. Thus this knowledge can attain perfectness in through inferential knowledge. The 'Ëkµra' of the jµñna whichever deals with 'blue' and I have that jµñna of blueness. The exposition of this jµñna becomes definite by other objects or by its meaning. This jµñna of the real 'blue' colour does not occur other than blue. Every one gets jµñna out of his past experience of jµñna. Some people concern only the external meaning of an object. The intentional knowledge in the world cannot be termed as the omniscience. 'That objects which is the object of my present knowledge takes place in me', he replies to this question. It is wrong to say that such an impression like omniscience is that type. The
nature of knowledge does not satiate from its intention. Jñásvarpa, when displays has its partial mystery. Jñanirpa is incomplete based on intention and is without the phenomenal knowledge shape and the like. The Knowledge of an object is the comprehension of both the knowledge and the object. For example difference can change the meaning but it is wrong to say that this case makes the change in meaning.

The difference of an object makes different knowledge through several means and it has no difference in object.

Even interpretation can change according to its situation. In effect, we cannot interpret the colour 'blue' without a visual object with blue colour. But this blue colour cannot define the names of different objects in blue colour. The knowledge of the blue coloured object is the result of the intellect related to blue colour and the shape of the object. How can we experience a blue cloth without the consciousness of this blue colour? Thus the previous knowledge of blue colour and the shape of the object
summate together and create the nature of self. Thus an object different from the colour 'blue' is also perceptible. So the colour 'blue' has certain common features and the difference of this colour from others make 'bhedājñāna'. The colour blue helps to identify the colour because of its reasons namely blueness which exist behind this object. The shape of a pot gives us knowledge since it has a definite shape but when we think of its existence, we don't have the thought about the potter who made it. If there is jñāna of an object from its different dimensions it must have been thought simultaneously. The memory of a pot is not related to its potter. Even then it is not necessary for having any personal partiality. The general knowledge of an object should insist not only its matter but also its absence and presence of it in our memory, which is essential. Therefore the identity and meaning of an object rest with the difference of it from other objects. Even if an object has some similarity to some other objects, there should be a little difference. Identical twins have also certain dissimilar
features. But viṣṇa never includes meaning and shape. Thus the perception of an
object has also no meaning and shape. Thus the perception of an object has also no
meaning when it makes viṣṇa. This can concern the implied meaning of an object
and this knowledge leads to condition of perception. Thus we get the objective
knowledge. When we perceive an object, we get its knowledge of shape along with its
memory and it can be recollected. As we perceive the identity of twins, we can also
separate the difference and later we can recollect the difference and similarity,
simultaneously. When we perceive a āśā tree, we perceive both the shape of its
genus and the shape of the tree. At first sight the object can perceive without any
adjectives and its implied and dimensional possibilities are apprehended later. The
first experience brings the knowledge of an object (cetas) of self nature that comes
under wisdom and then we get its manifold nature (ṣaṇa of bhinna-abhinna).

Therefore the knowledge become viṣṇa (objection). In the first moment the object
is perceived and then all other meaning comes out from it. This perception is called
("arthasamkalanašeṣeṇa>buddhi"). It means covering of the combination of different
dimensions of an object.

Is kevalajñāna a combination of meaning, shape and other related things of an
object? Or is kevalajñāna a wholesome perception of an object? As an answer to this
doubt, doubt leads the state of unbecoming. Because the remains of doubts about the
perceived idea, makes clear that the object has not realised by the perceive properly.

The object of perception to preceptor also is doubtful. Doubt comes from the
śaṃśīnyajñāna, somebody is seen this statement testifies that the speaker is uncertain.

The general law is that if, the perceiver himself is doubtful about an object, then the
jñāna of the meaning of the object is not in him. Then how can he perceive the object?

The secondary thought of the object brings out an acquired knowledge and make a
comparative study of the similar objects that he has come across. The third and fourth
thought would imprint a meaning of the object in his inner mind. This knowledge in the self leads him to svitmasamanodana. Then he becomes capable of recollecting this acquired knowledge. Therefore kevalajñana do not take place in the second thought. It takes up to levels of meaning and creates a meaning related to those levels. There by it gives a memory related to the similarity and dissimilarity of the object and there is the memory of this even in its absence and thus we can interpret it later. On the contrary, the combination of acquired knowledge and mysterious one may lead to senselessness.

As an answer to this question, it is said that the knowledge of an object is 'Arthakṣaṇa'.

The memory of the acquired knowledge is a combination of both. An intelligent man perceives that the memory of knowledge is same as the memory of that object. But memory of knowledge is attained through the light and silence of mind. Whenever there is object based combination of meaning and word, there comes the necessity of the combination of this light. Because it is impossible to perceive an object without
light. That is the knowledge of an object combined with the matter the self-realization is absent. Mental knowledge is thus related to light.

Thus perception of an object occurs through cause and causation. For example 'pot' cannot be isolated with the potter. Therefore it does not mean that appearance of shape can attain through light alone. If the object of lamp do not luminate the objects and the object of lamp itself then how can we perceive an object? Thus lamp which gives light formulate shape with meaning. Then we have the knowledge of that object through the presence of light. Lamp lights up the shape of the flame likewise knowledge also lights up the shape. We cannot see the lamp without its form. Likewise we perceive an object with its shape essential. How one can claim vijñāna, without this light of shape and form. Therefore shape helps one to get the knowledge about the structure of an object, i.e., the Vijnāna. That vijnāna should be attainable by dharma
called 'causality'. Every jµ¡na is the experience about the shape depending on meaning.

Therefore jµ¡na and the subject have no difference.

Perception of completeness does not take place at the first sight or all on a sudden. It merely makes a sensory perception. The second thought brings the relation between meaning and shape and it makes a comparison with the acquired knowledge.

In the second step of knowledge the identity of the object is created. Then the meaning of the object goes to the memory in the form of arthak¡ryata. Then arises the doubt, how can opposite action get united? As an answer, Buddha says, permanence and impermanence make this contradiction. For example, the thought of two moons in the sky does not make any contradiction. Because moon is the same and since there is no contradiction. For the knowledge of shape based on a single moon makes wholes knowledge of the moon. We know this with help of anvayavyatirekavy¡pti. Hereby we come to know that there is really no anvayavyatirek¡bhjiva, Such there is no artha or
samveda. When we identity the colour 'blue' the same things will happen. One who identifies the differences between artha and jñāna can identify them with the reason of their differences. Therefore one who knows these differences, makes use of this to acquire the complete knowledge about an object. If it be so, how can this difference of identity can be expressed? Which is to be received and which is to be avoided? Here the difference is not in the object, the perception or memory recollects the form which requires special attentions in perceptive knowledge. So what is dependent on or what is the basis? Here Ēcīrya says that future knowledge is not the result of acquired knowledge. But acquired knowledge helps one to acquire more. Otherwise it will be 'Viśayabhṛsa'. Present knowledge does not lead one to the acquired knowledge. How can this object to be depended. Every knowledge is based on subject which gives us experience meaning and these are inter dependant in acquiring jñāna, there by it is clear that knowledge and the topic are not different, how the knowledge becomes
product and knowledge is the identification of it. The subject is filled with knowledge and the process of reasoning is the union of matter and understanding. It is difficult to infer blue colour by rejecting the object other than that of blue colour.

It is wrong to say that happiness should be based on svarāpañjana. According to some darsanikas happiness is the state of knowledge. Blue colour is identified with an object, but the cognition of happiness should comes from inside, even though it doesn't create the attainment of object. Really it is impossible to accept this state of cognition which is both internal and external. These two does not posses any object. Therefore happiness etc has no perceivable nature like the colour of blueness. Even then such phenomenon is here. In specified nature of cognition, where this blue colour is perceived, we get the shape of an object with blue colour. Therefore it is impossible to perceive blue colour without an object, and that illuminated blue colour without the object, the interpretation of blue colour i.e. Blue colour or without an object is
impossible. If such separate identity is experienced, it is hallucinatory. This knowledge of difference like the knowledge of two moons is not based on laws of cognition. Now let us know how this knowledge is impressed in mind? If the object of perception can be differentiated based on its difference in perception. Here a doubt may arise. If there is difference of perception in the same object, because of the fact it causes the perception to be difficult. How can an object be identified in two ways? It is wrong to say that an object is different in its self-form and external form. It is difficult to perceive external form without perceiving the self of an object. Structural knowledge cannot take place without an object. If an object has no identify, then how can it be exhibited before others? Likewise how a pictorial depiction can be made without the help of the identity of the object what is to be portrayed. Likewise, in the vision of two moon also, this identity cannot be experienced. It is because of the inability to interpret the phenomenon of the self and the universal. For the acquired knowledge of this two
moon-vision, it does not leads one to any help for the accumulation future knowledge of it. Therefore the illusion of difference develops a hallucinatory feeling. Likewise how can this percept of blue and yellow comes to cognition with co-existing objects with colours of blue and yellow? For the artist the picture which to be portrayed by him is the one and from same perception. BhinnayogakÄhemata\textsuperscript{139} is the identify of and we negate it and we perceive what is perceived by all. The knowledge of an object is related with the time, place etc not of a perceived object. May a different opinion can takes place about the same object it should be settled with the cause and the theory of causation. The knowledge of blue colour comes from an object and that object becomes the cause of our perception because of the presence of blue colour. Indeed, in the case of S¡m¡nyatodrÄta, a branch of inference, 'Vyatir\textsuperscript{9}ka' becomes the active element here. Even if there is the presence of eyes, light and mind, the concept of a pillar does not occur without the contact with a pillar. It means that in the absence of an object,
perception is impossible whatever it may be an object of valid knowledge. Even if it is with an external existence, how can it be seen, even though it is beyond our visual perception. Therefore external objects cannot be termed as the object of valid knowledge even if there are other means to perceive an object except its visual presence? Is valid knowledge contains transitive power. As an answer to this strict rules are not coming under this. Because every object has its own rules. It defines that visual perception is impossible without the way of visibility. Ēcīrya gives impermanence in the case of invisible object. Only the visible objects have shape and the other qualities. Other perceptions are meaningless according to visual perception. Visual perception is based on visibility. Then arises a question, the structure of a tree does not take place its mental construction without the visibility of the tree, thus external visual object makes the shape of an object. When one can be heard about particular object initially and later he sees it. Then the person who has acquired the knowledge of the
object first and now it comes to the person as visual. The knowledge that comes later is the experienced knowledge. The meaning of an object comes in force only when it is experienced and the previous knowledge of the object before experience is only in direct
or guesswork. It has no basis about the meaning in mind; whether the previous
knowledge without meaning and its experience is instinct? How we can guess it? It is
to be enforced by the knowledge occurs gradually (Samanantharapratyaya). This
cognition creates the knowledge of a term through its sensual appearance. But it is
useless to say that knowledge should come following some way. Then it is be said that
bhyapramāyata is external perception that comes under the inference of different
causes. Then how can be realized the nature of cause and causation through expressed
method. If meaning cannot be explained by external appearance then how can this
cause and causation to be indicated. Ecjrya clarifies that doubt about with or without
blue and other colours such 'yellow', 'black' etc can be identified. In this case 'yellow'
without yellowness cannot exist or identified. Therefore the word ‘yellow’ is less important other than the colour yellow. Likewise blue colour is the cause of blue form.

But we cannot assert such a law. They are irrational by means of mutual co-existence.

While speaking the external being is the cause of a blue cloth as qualified with its blue colour. This phenomenon as far as blue colour is concerned is the knowledge occurs gradually. It helps to create dimensional knowledge by indicating the analogy of co-existence. The knowledge occurs gradually, instead of creating different cognition, creates the knowledge arise in conscious. The cognition of a matter is the amalgam of a different series of objects, thus creates blue colour. Then the question arises how white couch be termed as yellow? How thus sense of much, little and too much is formed?

The answer is that the absence of comprehensive vision leads to a series of illusionary knowledge. Then a white couch is attributed as yellow. This knowledge is invalid and it is wrong to consider it as harmful likewise the bud forms from the seed. But
Vijñānavādins assert no insemination is necessary beyond the production of it through denying the Co-existence of seed and its bud. It is an impediment to transaction.

Jñāpyajñāpaka is an expression of refusal. For example we presume the presence of fire by smoke. Fire and its related experience are indirect since it comes to the sphere of experience. It is wrong to say that future phenomenon is inference. The seed germinates and there is no external evidence from the seed’s vision. Likewise, smoke clarifies the presence of fire and smoke and fire are different, here is the fallacy of cause and causation. The benefit of this phenomenon is described here about not the privileged for the meaning. Then seed, bud, fire and smoke are complementary with any multidimensional instincts. Therefore its cause causation, cognition, ajñāna, ignorance, beings are related. The knowledge of the seed and germ based knowledge involves the dharma of reproduction. Jñāpyajñāpaka is described in this way then contradictions are hardly as possible. According to Vijñānavādins, this kind of
statement is not acceptable. Such being can be described in terms of cause and causation. Fire and such object are permanent, if so what is the relevance of their visual inference.

Svarājñāna is not by means of presumption. Then how can its essence be established? If so Vijnānavāda is also in the same way. When the vikalpa and meaning are combined by the other visual experiences it becomes established. This visual and verbal perception leads to the similarity and dissimilarity of objects and thereby its difference is described. Thus all terms of knowledge becomes the medium of vijnāna and it helps to find out the cause of seed germination, leaf etc. Likewise smoke comes out from fire and its existential instant is to produce fire. Polemical efforts make analogues results and thus create definite knowledge. Thus smoke results in fire again there before we experienced it. Vijnānavādins claim for its existential insentient. Smoke has an instinct of being smoke. Instinct is the cause and not the external object. Later
smoke is the product of fire. Fire is irrelevant here, if smoke is given its predominance through this instinct. This instinct later creates fire and this knowledge becomes valid when one feel smoke, one is uncertain of the quality of fire consumed inside the smoke. Here the major term fire cannot be inter protected. Can smoke and fire be amalgamated into one being? The answer is no and it does not become valid knowledge. Here they depend on the force of instinct and thereby amalgam of the two.

Instinct is not the single isolated cause of an object. Fire cannot be presumed in an object other than fire. The future phenomena also cannot be inferred. Fire is inferred when there is scope and presence of smoke. And this can be inferred with the help of the reason on effect (kiyahetu).

Knowledge is dependant on whole through the actions. This is called Ėlayavijñāna. For this acquired knowledge never becomes the basis. Positive or negative concomitance (Anvayavyatīkajñāna) also do not come under Ėlayavijñāna. Knowledge
occurs gradually with the cause of manovijnana. Here past knowledge becomes the cause of the present knowledge. Knowledge is based on pervasamkrta. After illustrating memory jneya sums up the state of the two forms of knowledge, viz. the knowledge with a form and the knowledge without a form. The knowledge of object gives the shape, which is known as arthakrta. It means consciousness of the object.

Preceded by perceptual knowledge inference works out the result. Interdependence occurs where the one which exists. If inferential knowledge is not workout perceptual knowledge is also impossible. The knowledge with understanding represents the form with two divisions, viz. Jijnam samvedyam and samvedakam. One is being the identified and the other is identifier. Form brings out the perceptual vision of the object. Inference acts when self transmission is done. The one which has a shape can be understood through intellect. Memory of association is also applied to the intellect, if works for self-transmission. It is to identify with similar form which brings the colour
consciousness like blueness. The concept of shape is formed through the sense like eyes etc. Similarly pleasure, pain etc are related to consciousness. Anyone may doubt about the experience of pleasure etc in a yogi, Its answer is it originates from the senses and their concepts also have sexual experiences in living beings. They can control their senses and they get the purity of thought and knowledge. They develop their ability to maximise or minimise their vision through transcendental meditation or contemplation, ones own misery does not lead to another person to the miserable state.

Thus he makes clear that wellness and sorrow are personal.

Sound clarifies its meaning not on the basis of the view of grammarian. To them the cause of meaning is the exposure of sound. But Ēcērya says that meaning is presumed by the presence of the object. The idea becomes meaningful when words are conveyed through sound and the concept is transmitted to others. And thus if sound is to be valid, and to get validity the communication must be efficient and effective.
Therefore sound gets meaning with connectivity of words. Here PG defends the perceptual meaning established by DK. The purpose of meaning is to convey the meaning. If we can unfailingly transmit the exact meaning of the words with its technical aspects, our verbal efficiency become fruitful. The validity of communication becomes valid when majority of people succeed to convey these ideas to others. Thus PG follows the view of DK and stresses the necessity of fruitful communication among human kind.  

This transmission of idea before society results the state based knowledge (prama). Here the statement by DK is very relevant. The knowledge through sound and its communicative transmission, here creates only 'prama'. Thus he rejects the argument of sound explosion and there by knowledge acquisition.
Parārthānuma Paricheda

Parārthānuma is the transmission of one’s own realized facts to others. If svārthānuma contains a cause, in parārthānuma this reason on effect does not occur as we realise fire through smoke. If inference comes from sound, the verbal knowledge can be assured by the sound. Later Ecjrya establishes that āgama pramāṇam does not merge out in inference. Inference depends on ones personal assumption since it is the subject to prama everywhere while attaining fulfillment of its intention, there is no need to say that inference requires words. Here we can raise the inference of the Sākhyas about their opinion that wellness is not sensory. Intelligence is always constant. Therefore inference is relevant. A view of being known is to be validated with pramāṇa and not with the mind.
Time is referred to as earlier, later, less time or excess time etc. He rejects the concept of time by stating that time as a substance unnecessary since its reference of this time or that time. The old one are referred to as later and the future time is referred to as later, but how can this be without a substance? The same is the case with the four sides. Time is a natural phenomena and verb is related to subjects like Devadatta. Verb is not acquired through perceptual knowledge. Like wise singularity or plurality is a matter of personal assumption. Since these things cannot exist without dependence they are all negated. The shape is related to the object.¹⁴³

Here upamōna is also rejected. Along with the refusal of Upamōna pramāṇa, upanaya is also rejected which is one among the vakyas of paścāvayava of Naiyāyikas.¹⁴⁴ PG says that the word gavaya refers to comparison with cow that comes under inferential knowledge and it is beyond the possibilities of verbal cognition and comparison. Here the cause is presumed. Moreover everything related to sound
depends on inferential knowledge, since there are contradictory reference in inferences.

It is impossible to consider them valid. He rejects the argument that sound is the quality of sky. Form, touch, taste and smell are respectively related to light, air water and the earth. The dependence of sky includes the earth and the other related objects.

Then how can sound be related to such a sky?

On earth and in all shapes sky emerge in unique consensus. There it is impossible to prove that sound is related to sky as smell is related to the earth. Since air is ever pervading, sound can be attributed as the quality of air. The same air brings us the quality of touch. There is no rule that a substance has only a single quality since quality is native in it its reliability is natural acquisition. Smell is experienced when it is pervaded through air which is a quality of the earth. In such matters we are obliged to confer a relation of mutual consensus. When these qualities work complementary to each other, sound also is a quality of the earth. Therefore space which is isolated from
there has no relevance at all. Since the earth comprises of all these things the space is
not to be considered as another element. The sky cannot be the eat of air since air is
ever moving. If so sky also demands support and there the defect of anavastha take
place. If sky is the supreme then why not the stones and other solids become their seats
in the sky. It is also not sight to say that sky is the seat of the soul. If so the soul cannot
be termed in its oneness. Likewise, since the four sides are pervaded everywhere it
cannot be given authenticity. If we say sun shows the sides, it will also be wrong for
there occurs the defect of interdependence. Then he interprets variants of the signs of
pakāa and the like.

Later he states Bṛḍha in four ways. The fallacies related to inference are three
and the Bṛḍha related to perception are four and their differences are derived. Along
with the negation of memory as valid, he explains the condition of sin and virtue
among the common castes brāhmīns and so on. When it is said Brahmins should not
be slain and the word 'killing is not particularly related to Brahmins. But it is a general concept and is not related to mere one caste. Generality cannot be personalised or otherwise it becomes a custom i.e. to give superiority to some persons being the member of particular caste and that is not fair.

To negate the validity of substance he states that a substance without vivid colour or shape or the power of touch therefore it has no appearance. Colour and shape are related not to the matter but to its quality. Size cannot be attained as one, which is isolated from colour. Varna can be qualified by the shape (curve etc). We can identify objects like pot with the power of touch. But that which touches it may not be a substance Establishing these facts he rejects identity which helps memory. As far as memory cannot be valid, memory is related to inference.
When abhīṣva is discussed, it is said that collective consciousness works when the form is invisible, there abhīṣva works. To negate itmāvda of Naiyāyika he states that which has no form is inactive.

A permanent object is always visible since it has no limits which cannot be memorised. Though body is active the infant do not act in the prenatal stage. Since there is the absence of action, the cycle of the soul from birth and rebirth is impossible. Thus he rejects the concept of the eternity of the soul.

Anupalabdhi is difficult from positive knowledge. The past and the future can be available through inferential knowledge. Anupalabdhi is not necessary to state that transport may affect the absence of quality of cloth. Presence and absence can be termed as the special features of an object. Absence can be interpreted only when something is unreal. Then only presence and absence can be interpreted in terms of perception. If something can be perceived either in its presence or absence, there is no
need for mentioned abhĳva. Inferential knowledge occurs where presence can be grasped by its absence and vice versa. When abhĳva is stated the emptied state of something is which is mentioned there.

Quality is not dependent on anything. Dharma depends on the substance. Here a controversy may happen on the quality of the sky. As a result, it is stated that sound is not the quality of the sky and the sky is not included in one of the element.

We can perceive that, though he was able to write an excellent and perfect text like this he had no ego consciousness or self predominance and this can be seen all through out even to the end of his magnificent work he was able to select the language of the common man.\footnote{As we use cosmetics to bright the beauty of the body he makes use of this work as a decoration of vṛttika.}
Notes:


2. Swami Yogendranand - *Pramavrttika of Dharmakirti, with Vjrtikyla’ra - BhjÄhya*, Sanskrit commentary of Prajµkaragupta. â•dar¿ana Praka¿an Sansthan, Varanasi,


8. Ibid., p.43.


12. Ibid.


15. Ibid., p. 29, PVA, 84-104.

16. Ibid., p. 33.

17. Ibid., p. 39.

18. Ibid., p. 50, PVA, 160-163.

19. Ibid., p. 52, PVA, 164.

20. Ibid., p. 61, PVA, 201.

21. Ibid., p. 70, PVA, 225.
22. Ibid., p. 73, PVA, 226.

23. Ibid.,

24. Ibid., p. 74.

25. Ibid.,

26. Ibid., p. 83.

27. Ibid., p. 87, PVA, 278.

28. Ibid., p. 89.

29. Ibid., p. 90, PVA, 288.
30. Ibid., p. 91, PVA, 292.

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32. Ibid., p.93.

33. Ibid.,

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35. Ibid., p.118.

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37. Ibid., p.122.
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108. Ibid., p. 525.

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