The chapter namely Pramāṇasiddhi of the Pramāṇavārttika is constructed to complement the five epithets of the Buddha mentioned by Diṇgā in the mangalaloka of his work, viz., Pramāṇasamuccaya. These five epithets are Pramāṇabhāvatva (being the means of knowledge, or authority), Jagaddhitaitītva (Seeking the benefit of all living creatures), ājñātavā (being a teacher), Sugatattva (being one who attained the highest esteem and tīyitva (being a protector). However, the concrete relations among the properties of the Buddha referred to by these epithets, is repeated by PG in several contexts, remains hitherto largely unexplored.

The maṅgala-lōka' consists of different interpretation by various commentators. PG follows Ravigupta in interpretation of this verse. 'Tatah' refers to 'Tayin' and
'Sugata'. Manorathanandin interprets this verse with a different view. According to him the term 'tasm¡d' is used in place of 'tatah' which refers to 't¡yitva' alone. He points the term 'sugatatva' and shows the general character of him for telling the truthfulness. Thus he says that sugatatva denotes the characteristic of a persons who speak the truth always. And 'jagaddhitaiÁit¡' and áasttva' are the special characteristics of Buddha.

This chapter has been the object of several meaningful descriptions. It has been regarded as a text which provide the religious face to Buddhist philosophy and epistemology. This gives an overall picture of one which outlines the Buddha’s philosophical biography or his career as a religious teacher.

Pram¡,asiddhi begins by generating Sri Buddha who is unique and embodied the scientific knowledge thus became prama,a by himself. PG raises Buddha to the highest as well as born for the goodness of the world. PG declares that he has written
this book owing to the sympathy towards the people who make arguments on undeserved matters.²

One who has possessed the prama,ṣa can also possess the pramey,ī. This sign of prama,ṣa is visible in Buddha who is the valid knowledge. This jñānamārga is subject to sva-lekṣaṇa. 'One who hopes for the goodness of the world', 'the one who has conquered all sciences', 'the one who has walked on the right path', the one who has exhorted in the right way, etc., are the attributes of Buddha. Thus it is shown that Buddha has both the realization of cause and causation. The realization of cause by idea and practice are of two types. To prove this Perception and inference are the two means of valid knowledge. But sound is not accepted as a valid knowledge. Sound can attain validity when the application becomes valid based on its communication (Vyavahāra). Jñāna is valid when it is experienced. The goodness of the world is the idea and this idea become exhorted when it becomes practised. Here 'hetusampat' is
described as the fulfilling state of these ‘¿ama’ ‘dama’ etc are described like in UpaniÀad’s.³ ‘Phalasampat’ has two dimensions, one is philosophical knowledge and the other one is practical knowledge of enlightening others through the philosophical knowledge. Thus Buddha becomes the valid knowledge who has the qualities of acquisition of knowledge and transmission of knowledge through his teachings. Valid knowledge (pram;i,s) results in the fulfillment of action. PG declares Buddha as the valid knowledge. Sri Buddha is capable of giving un-interpreted fruitful action, which leads to the universal goodness.

Discussions and views become valid even though the sound is not valid. Gautam Buddha advised his followers to travel around and preach the doctrines through dialogues and stories for the sake of human welfare with a universal appeal.⁴ According to him the intention and the idea of implied meaning becomes valid through its practice.
Valid knowledge is an infallible knowledge which creates the attainment of fulfillment. Vatsyayana says in *Nyåyabhyåya* that where there is doubt *Nyåya* will work out. Valid knowledge comprises of completeness. In an infallible knowledge it complete and there is no space for any doubts. Våµåna itself is pramå, for jåµna provides us with knowledge of the topic. But such jåµna cannot be termed as valid knowledge. Valid knowledge is only one which enables us to reach to the right meaning with absolute receptiveness. The knowledge of soundness is in accordance with the knowledge and the opinion of the speaker. But sound is not valid, since it is not directly visible. The valid knowledge should be real which is devoid of error. Fire consumes fuel and cooks simultaneously, here the process of cooking changes the prior state of the object to a new state. After cooking, this process is valid when the speaker can perceive this and thus, this exhortations also become valid. Infallible knowledge cannot be regarded as valid. According to Våtsyåyana, a doubt is indicated here, incase a forerunner of
inferential knowledge. According to PG infallibility of knowledge, and devoid of error reflects its self image of validity. Therefore \( j\mu\)na and \( Vi\Ayaj\mu\)na have also accordingly been decided. The writer is of opinion that sabdaj\mu\)na is not a prama, and hence samvedanaj\mu\)na cannot also be treated as valid. In continuation, there comes the question whether the knowledge can attain fulfillment and it can be valid through the verbal cognition while conveying its idea. If so, every verbal knowledge can be considered as valid. But the experience of a dream becomes invalid when we are awakened. So it is not considered as valid knowledge.

Dream is the reverse state of being awakened. It recognise while affecting the condition of being awakened that is what the substance called in valid knowledge never occurs. It is one that covers or hides the valid knowledge.
The term 'āñbyd®pi' also indicates some doubts about the validity of sound. It does not ensure that sound can be accepted as valid. Here the author shows that sound is only the medium of communication. The word '+E{É comprises of inference and the other related knowledge. We acknowledge a 'flower' with the instances of an object with its smell, shape and quality. The duty of eyes is helping to see the shape. The eyes are unable to interpret the same image with sound, smell or any other qualities in the same way. Similarly nose helps us to know the smell, likewise tongue is for taste. Sound is incapable of bringing out these all senses and therefore, sound can not be considered as valid. The presence of a pot can see by the eyes, its absence also can be experienced with the same sense organs. In other words eyes become irrelevant and sound becomes relevant in verbal expression. Non-apprehensions can never stand alone. PG denies the non-apprehension of an object through anupalabdhi, which is recognized as the valid knowledge by Mēmasṭkas.
According to him only visible objects can be Kumţrilabhaţa in his book 'álokavṛttika' states that it is an infallible knowledge. According to Bhţa non-apprehension is a valid knowledge, should be devoid of error and thus how apprehension also can be termed as valid. Presence is the opposite state of absence. Sound is the medium of expression or communication and therefore sound is valid as a medium of expression. Sound can materialise only when work with inferential knowledge.

Sound is used only in accordance with the expression of the speaker. Sound is helpful to express what is experienced by a speaker. Kaţda, the Vaiţekasţtrakţra, also does not accept sound as a valid knowledge. If a speaker becomes reliable, his words can be considered as valid based on its arthakriyţkarita. There is no scientific proof or supportive of evidence with regard to the topics of the other world (paraloka) etc it makes contradiction in senses and it cannot be termed as 'Valid'. For example
'Yajṣṭa SvargaṃaMa. This is a vedamantā which has no evidence for proving its credits and effect. Nobody is sure of having reached heaven. Thus, verbal knowledge or Veda which does not have scientific basis or visual experience to prove its validity.

Rejection of nīyoga.- 'Yajṣṭa SvargaṃaMa' is a mantra of Yajurveda. It signifies that 'I am directed in doing this sacrifice' (Yagṣṇukṣine nīyuktośmi). Then arises the doubt regarding the meaning of direction (nīyga). The upasarga 'ni' means 'complete' and 'yoga' means union. Niyoga means complete union. This term 'niyoga' is defined in three types by Māṃsakas. They are nyānayoga, ardhayoga and pṛṣayoga. According to them, this is the duty for accomplishing this sacrifice (yāga): who is the person directed to do sacrifice? Māṃsakas explained that the person (niyogin) is gajēcira. In Manusmṛti we can see the references about the brāhmīns who are gajēciras. Then arises the questions, Are the brāhmīns only regarded as 'śisṣas'? What does mean by the term 'brāhmin'? Is it a caste or a clan? Did they come from
br̥hmā? or Are they twice-born? These doubts leads to the interpretation of the term 'Dvija'.

These words are not mentioned in the Vedas and we can deny the intention given for 'niyoga'. Attitude of br̥hmin towards people who belonging other vaṛas is based on some superstitious beliefs. In ancient India people were divided into four vaṛas based on their work. In later period these divisions of working became a decision factor in defining caste of human being. Manu says: 'Br̥hmās, KĀatriyas, Vai̊yas and Ādras are directed in doing their work for preserving svadharma. Among them Br̥hmās and KĀatriyas must learn Vedas. But propagation and teachings of Vedas are to be done only by the br̥hmins. The other castes have no rights to do it. The br̥hmin should practice the techniques for gaining supremacy over other castes with the scientific knowledge of Vedas. They should advise others and observe always. They claim that they have birth right in the knowledge of kṣra, otkarā, both in
learning and teaching activities of Vedas. They should protect, the culture of learning
rituals after receiving Upanayana. Every one should respect Bṛhmin as the lord of all
castes. But we should understand one thing that son of Bṛhmin born from Bṛhmin
women is only called as bṛhmin. The son of kÀatriya from the bṛhmin lady and the
son Vaiśya of a bṛhmin vaṛa are called as 'dvandadharmīn'. We can see some
references about the marriage of bṛhmins to other castes and bṛhmin women to men
belongs to other castes also. And their sons through these marriage alliance can be
called as the offspring on anuloma system and pratiloma system in respectively.\(^\text{10}\)

PG quotes eleven types of niyogavīdins based on the view of Meṃmsaka are
given below.

1. áuddhakārya niyogavīdins

2. áuddha prerā niyogavīdins

3. Prerana Viśa kārya niyoga vīdins
Thus there are eleven types of people who were divided by Vyāsas or Niyogas who consider as right. Pāṇiniya says that all these types of niyogas or niyogavadins cannot be accepted. The intention of a man is not visible in these things and it cannot be called as niyoga. If niyoga has a verbal meaning, then how it can be decided as valid? If niyoga is a valid knowledge, then what is prameya? In fact 'niyoga' is an action of a
man. So it can also be termed as 'tmabhavana'. Where the verbal intention creates the product of sound then rtthebhavana originates the form in the world of action.

Likewise, in the case of Yantraniyogavda, it also has some experience (niyoga). It should have some connection with yantra. If there is no connection, we cannot connect it with yantra. For example 'Water is drawn with the help of a motor, and water can be drawn only when this motor is handled by man'. Here niyogavda contradicts it through by convincing these reasonable thinking.

**The denial of Bhavana:** According to Memjsakas bhavana (imagination) are of two types. They are bd bhavana and rtthe bhavana." If the action is prompted by a sound and it is related to verbal imagination it is bd bhavana. When sacrifice is performed through the advice of a man and it is related with the desire to get heaven etc, it is known as rtthebhavana. Here this is not true in its full sense. Because rtthebhavana is connected with man and his performance of an action. But in
¿¡bd¢bh¡vana, sound or words that make meaning instead of Man's thinking that he is entrusted to do this 'sacrifice'. Therefore it is acceptable to say that niyoga is another word of ¿¡bd¢bh¡vana. Niyoga stands for an action. If so, 'do this' can also be a prayer. The effect is not only related with the man who does the action, but it is the man also who prompts through the word becomes niyoga. Then is it an extra sensory one?

It is wrong to say that niyoga is something what is to be done. No new meaning has been developed from these sentences. It is the man who transmits or teaches the meaning of words by saying these word has some meaning and one has get the other meaning from these words are not directed to so something etc.. The word has no 'so called' capacity to convey the exact meanings of a writer even though he wants to convey it. Here one Êbh¡,aka is very remarkable. When the words are uttered by a speaker he has no right to convey its meaning in a particular way. Here hearer is the only person who eligible to comment there words of a speaker.
Some Memâmsakas believe that vedas are eternal. Many of the dasinikas did not accept this, similarly we also believe that vedas are written by men. In Pânineyasûtra while mentioning this subject he uses Trteyavibhakthi. This stûtra makes feel us only by imagination and imagination is intended to do action and it is not in similar usage such as a substance. Therefore it can't conduct to dimensional or numerical sense (yajeyât,m, yajran).

When we see an object an imagination may form in our mind at the first moment. Then comes the knowledge of its shape colour etc. This relation can not be acquired by inference. This shape has an identity of its own and difference from others. It helps to recognise it from all other features. Each object has its own speciality and thereby the special terms like sacrifice has no other equal term. Here every term has its own implication and has no difference even if it is there, it an imposed difference.
The speciality of sound is that it has some power to create a consciousness related with the past, present or future. Kumjrilaśa, in this way, says that sound is expressed merely to show responses and past actions. Actually what takes place in inference, means when we look at the cloudy sky, we infer the possibility of the arrival of rain. As we identify the form of rain while we experience its effect of shower. Even if sacrifices like Agnihatra, are to be conducted by one who desires to get heaven. Here we aren't sure about its result so PG think that they are unnecessary.

Accepts validity in the visibility of things through practice: I touch the pot that I saw earlier.

Here this nature occurs after the direct vision is not regarded as valid knowledge. There occurs the realization of the same object that we have cognized earlier and touches the pot realizes the concept of pot, is not valid, but the knowledge about the experience of the pot is valid. Skin there functions only a sense organ to realize. We have already seen the pot and knowledge of it expand to the next layer extensive by the
sense of touching and the first realization occurred with previous moment is the only valid knowledge. The difference in concepts of realization is based on the difference in meaning which dissolved in absent or present nature in the essence of valid knowledge.

Thus the nature of topic becomes the essence of valid knowledge and it becomes the product of the successive knowledge. This essence of valid knowledge is not 'Svathah'.

'Svathah' is the perception of the form from Kevalajñana. This perception of form is the knowledge of shape and therefore jñana considered as valid. In this way, jñana from connection (samyoga) of the eyes is not valid. As an answer to this DK replies:

"|ÉÉ˚ÉÉnäù´ÉɺªÉ iÉ'ùÉ´Éä" 14 If the topic has a form, its meaning can be realised. The form of the topic and its instrument get relevance through these processes. The definition of 'Cause' is quoted from there in PjayasÉtra to denote as its instrument. 15
The shape is determined by the eyes and thus knowledge always make validity in cognition. If any knowledge is covered by 'Badhan', then it may become invalid.

Validity comes when there is no contradiction in perceptual experience. In ālokavyūrtika the knowledge is defined as a processes which becomes powerful through attaining fulfillment. A little child may cries or laugh during the sleep. Here a doubt may arise. As an answer to this doubt, he says that, sometimes valid knowledge may takes place even in the absence of attaining fulfillment, through memory. Each knowledge comes to our mind in accordance with their form, i.e. 'Svatogati'. It means realisation. The expression of valid knowledge should be valid one. Here self-form is the realisation likewise it is right to say validity is the realisation. Here the author says that validity is never become the infinite of knowledge. Self-form can be realized, but validity cannot be realised by the self. It has to get through 'Vyavahīra'. We can touch the water that we have seen, hence there is some uniformity in both the experience
which seen and felt. Such as, some object can touch what is seen by our eyes. Therefore the validity of the knowledge about water can be established. The sameness of time and place should go through the combination of sight and feeling. Attaining fulfillment with the related objects one become mistaken since the eye sight is lessed by glaucoma or other defects. A knowledge becomes doubtful can never be accorded as valid. The knowledge of the matter acts on the basis of all knowledge what is to be acquired. Therefore the first knowledge or realisation is the valid one. The knowledge that comes after the primary knowledge is the qualitative knowledge of the first. This expression maintains that the original knowledge is the basis of all knowledge.

'Vyavahara' acts as the basis of valid knowledge and all vyavahara is not valid at all. Because every āṣṭra is different in its practical application and their approach to validity also different. They are not valid knowledge at all. How it occurs? āṣṭra has different interpretations which are contradicting Has n't? Some say that visible
knowledge has no power to acquire other world. And some say that the other world cannot be inferred, Thus āśtras accept different ways for their interpretations.

Here PG makes some clarifications in defining the nature of āśtra.

¶ÉÉÚÉÆ "ÉÉä½þÊxÉ´ÉiÉÇEò¨ÉÂ." This indicates rationality. The omniscient Buddha who accepts the theory of non attachment to every thing in this world. It leads one to demolish the desire i.e. valid knowledge. For this term knowledge of an omniscient is bound with laws and validity. One, who has the knowledge about the present, past and future, should realise the things in the right way, He can exhort people. 88 Buddha is omniscient and knows every objects such as the present, past and future like an amla in the hand. He can exhort the means how to root out desires and become detached. Thus we can realise the omniscience of Buddha.
The sign of validity is interpreted when the mysterious things are subjected to knowledge. The illumination of mysterious knowledge is the true and valid knowledge. Like the exaggeration of infallible words, some thing as 'there are two moons', it creates hallucinatory, Memory can grasp and the grasped things are invalid knowledge since there is exaggeration, because of the absence of conviction to others. If this is devoid of 'badhan' such saying as we gives that the person as enlightened with the real with meaning. This is the infinite meaning (kevalajñāna).

Svalakāya is infinite and this infiniteness is the principle factor of the infinite knowledge. PG clarifies it through some verses. When one difficult to get perceptual knowledge through vision we have to infer it. 'Svalakānati' illumines the mysterious meaning of an object what is to be proposed for fulfillment. It is different from Śmjñāyalakāya. DK gives the nature of perceptible knowledge in NB also.
Buddha, the Infinite: The svalakṣaṇa of an object is beyond 'Vijñāna'. Common perception is depended on time and space. Validity of an object is stated for others is the inferential process of a visible object. Buddha himself exemplifies what he validates with the knowledge. Since he has the ability in illuminating the knowledge of mysterious object, Buddha himself reaches the state of 'Pramāṇa-abhāṣṭata'. Hence the sayings of Buddha become valid. He is the infinite knowledge. So we can consider him as enlightened through validating of such omniscience. Here the perception and inference are helpless in deciding enough to prove this; If so. This is not enough to consider an omniscient or embodied valid knowledge? If any one has such doubts, PG replies: 'According to you 'God is omniscient'. If so, unnecessary difficulty should not be raised by you to consider Buddha as Pramāṇa-abhāṣṭa? Through these answering PG states that a permanent object is not valid since there exists no means to validate 'the knowledge itself'. An object, which has ability to attained fulfillment, becomes valid
and the knowledge of an external object can be obtained through the external structure. The real knowledge is only the valid knowledge. Causes are of three types. A log is split with the help of an axe, here axe is the cause. The knowledge of the senses is explained as the example of second cause. The meaning through jµ¡na such as svalakÀa leads to s¡d¤¿yajµ¡na, is considered as the third cause. And there is no other causes other than this.

Knowledge of sound helps to convey the knowledge to other listeners also.

Sound is short lived and subject to decay. Then how can a far off person can get the knowledge of meaning. The same idea is expressed by sage Jaimini in his text also."

Since God is eternal and omniscient he is able to see, know and enjoy, How does God get the knowledge of the past and future state of the knowledge of the matter?, Thereby God is eternal, and his knowledge is also eternal. The phenomena of the topic of this eternal knowledge also tends to be eternal. This knowledge is not real, since it has no
evidence to prove it. While exemplifying the nature of god some can say: 'He is pure as the bud of a lotus'. This metaphor is also not worked as a measuring scale to assume 'the validity that God is eternal'. If an eternal object be able to give birth to something, that object also would be eternal. One who doesn't undergoes the agony and misery he cannot promote other from it. Since God does not depend on anything, he can be called nirñjraya, nirñmaya etc.. He may not have misery. Such a person cannot be compassionate to others.

The consciousness about happiness, sorrow etc are related to desires should experience only those who have experienced it. God does not experience this happiness or sorrow related desires. If someone told such as 'God is to acquirable', there occurs the defect of interdependency. Because the validity of God is explained in his teachings and the validity of his teachings in him. This defect occurs in the example, when we get the visual knowledge that the fire is capable to burn something from the experience of
its capability for burning things. But the existence of God is not visible to us. Therefore
the permanence or impermanence of God cannot be acquired through knowledge.

The rejection of the existence of God: The acquisition of God in subjectivity of action is
explained by the Naiyāyikas on the basis of three reasons. They are the retrieval to the
old stage the originality of shape and the attaining fulfillment. When in an object,
atoms are conjoined together and it goes to the state of composite as a whole
themselves. We need the help of an architect to build mansions, palaces etc. similarly
for the creations of this universe, a creator should work. Oceans and rivers serve for
attaining fulfillment by the order of that creator and therefore it is clear that the
creator also be very intelligent. These are the views of a Naiyāyikas about God.

PG says that all these statements above mentioned are all wrong baseless. Here
nothing is right. As an instrument axe is not used by God. According to Buddhist
philosophy karma is the cause for a living form of life. Consciousness is the most alive form of a living being. How can God prompt others while he himself not do any work? If God is a prompter. As an answer to this statement, he states: 'Every one would do only the good things if God prompts others to do only good'. If so there would be no wickedness in this world. When God prompts, only good things take place. If God is for universal welfare, how can he prompt to do evil? Then why the sinner who is prompted by God, is send to hell? Good actions make one eligible to get heaven. If so it is to encourage good and make heaven available for all. Then they may not be evil. Moreover this is an injustice from the side of God's part that to show partiality over his subjects. Then as the sage Vyasa referred, if these are the play of God, does God find happiness in making trouble his subjects? Does God act as mischievous towards his subjects. Did God motivate the leaders who composed the ájstras like Cïrvïka, Buddha and Jaina? If so, why there is so much difference and
contradictions in their teachings? If he is not responsible for the composition of all these things then he may not be the creator of all these worlds. If so every āastra and every word would be seemed alike. If God does all these things, he will be the omniscient. An omniscient would advice others to lead to be good. But here such a person is invisible. If God is not omniscient, then the potter who makes the pot also can be termed as God. If God prompts everyone, there would be someone behind his promotion. Here is also some defect. By seeing the shape of earth etc it is not acceptable with the saying of God as the creator of everything. Because, God is not visualised in the construction of mountains. The shape of the tree is decided by its seed only. Similarly the cause of a pot is clay, and no one finds the prompting of God in these case.

A pot is formed as result of will or desire and he moulds it. And all types clay have no capacity in giving form of a pot. Clay has no definite form also. As an answer
to these remarks, the author makes clear it through another example that the shape
and colour of seed reside in seed. Otherwise how can it get such a shape and colour?

Whether one can decide which is first: the sprout or the seed? Then only action gets
more importance than the will of God.

*The negation of 'Pradhña':* S;/khya says that God is not the cause of universe. In
puruśa’s presence prakṣaṇi acts as the cause of this. Every man acts with positive
energies for getting pleasure and other Puruṣārthas. Therefore getting pleasure is the
cause of every action. Earth, water etc have their role to motivate human mind to acts
for pleasure, misery and ambition. Therefore, their reason is also based on the mental
cognition of the pradhña. Moreover, the writer says that pradhña, has three qualities
such as sattva, Rajas and tamas when taken in terms as cause of matter, essence, light
etc and then only associations occur with an object. Therefore it becomes necessary to
find out other cause with this action.
In prakṛti or pradhāna, colour and shape and such other qualities have no relevance at all. There pradhāna cannot be the cause of colour and shape. If each one has a cause, then the problem of a series of causes occur there. Even though Pradhāna acts as the cause in terms of matter, pradhāna cannot be considered as the cause on the basis of its three qualities. Here this construction is also creates some defects such as 'Anavastha' (absence of gradation).

The negation of the argument that karma is the cause of heaven or other world:

Karma is the basis of all these in the universe. It is of three types, Mental, Verbal and Physical. Mental work is related with 'cetana' and other karmas originate from cetana. Vasubandhu has pointed out that his views about human actions are closely related with the mind and the relevance of karma is started clearly. As an answer to this, PG says that mental work leads to all other towards karmas and therefore it is important.

It is not visible to naked eyes that is why its pervasion with anvayavyatirīka also are
invisible. Therefore it is difficult to establish the process of the cause, causation and meaning. Thus the actions of good and evil are not left owing to the oddness of the world. God is not responsible in making such as desire anger etc.. Men who have the defective in desire will get hell. Thus the punishments mentioned in Dharma\text{\textregistered}stra will be irrelevant.

**The Negation of atom as the cause of things:** It is wrong to say that every object is formed from a param\textsubscript{u}. The object 'pot' is not with a big shape. What is needed is some molecules. What is atom, why the atoms and the pot are different in shape? This is a pot and it has a shape and size but the atoms have not the shape or size of a pot. If we accept that the creator of the pot as God other than potter, there occurs the defect called 'anavastha'. If an atom has a definite shape, is it octal or dual in its number of atoms? The formless atoms cannot have mutual union and this is clarified by the author in this work. He asks: how the pot and other things get shape without the union
of the atoms? Atoms are invisible to us. God is also not able to seen by us. If God is able to see the atoms before the formation of its composite, it will be appear like the knowledge of matter. When one mistakes jewel as silver. When the first object takes place after mutual union of atoms, it has also an indefinite shape. For example the seed of a big tree grows from a seedling we may not be able to identify the seedling. Thus the seedling and the big tree are entirely different in the beginning stage. We cannot see the union of atoms there. The atoms which join together in the sky and it creates invisible objects. If so, the view of sêkhyas becomes right here. IêvarakêAêA clarifies this in Sêkhyakêrika that the lamp lights by consuming oil and thus oil is changed into a new substance, i.e., light. Likewise objects which have existence or luster (light) are consumed by man and it will lead to the result in attaining liberation. Here God has no role in creating this world and protecting it. Here the condition of the creator comes to a physical matter in its final stage. The light is also a physical
object which illuminates the objects such as pot etc. which is at home and this light shows us it, light shines itself also.

PG$^{39}$ clarifies that the shape of the earth is made by man as he makes the pot.

The pot made by man has a definite shape, but earth is not so. The shape of a moth house is also made by the moth and not by God. Likewise we can perceive the shape of oceans and mountains and the man made places and their shapes. This doubt denotes the defect called $k$iryasama.$^{39}$ PG denies it as the cause and says that $k$iryasama is a defect in the cause spread in short lived objects. Something that seems as matter and it may not be believed to be come out from the cause.

"Sabdo anitya$^{\text{A}}$ $k$iryatva$^{\text{d}}$" here $k$iryatva can be said in two ways. The water we get from the dug well and the clothes that we get after wearing are the two examples of these two ways. While dealing with the defect $k$iryasama PG interprets $k$iryavibh$^{\text{g}}$a.
In *Nyaya darśana* cause and causation are in two forms namely is Janyatva and Ajanyatva.\(^3\) The absence of an object is described with the cause Āvara, a. The absence of the cause acts as a covering. The Kṣryasama interpreted by Akāpaṭa is illogical. ‘āabdo anitya kṣryatvat, ghaṣavat.’ Here the cause described in three varieties are pakāvavattti, sapakāvavattti pakāamtravavattti. In the first example the cause is contradictory since the cause is functioning without a cause and there occurs the another defect viz. ‘vyāpyatvāsiddha’. The second one is not with pakāa and therefore it is asiddha and the third one is asādhra, a because sound is also temporary such as the temporary objects like pot etc. When the discussion on union of atoms in the pot and the pot are temporary while the sound is not temporary. The shape is owing to the will of potter and it is short lived. But in the brown colour of the cow, that brown colour is a natural one and it is not the product of human action. The term ‘Gau’ has several meanings. To understand the meaning of term ‘Gau’ sound, animal etc, are wrong
steps. To perceive that animal we depend upon the animal who have horns and called as 'Gau'.

Another usage such as "the horn of a rabbit", creates some confusion in assuming its intention, 'Is this called not eternal', or is the invisibility act as non eternal.

The absence of an object can be assumed its negation. Through these examples the expression of Jaina's opinion about death which is controversial one is also clarified by the author. Buddhists do not accept that a tree is dead when the leaves skins etc. are withered. Ēcīrya Vasubandhu, in Abhidarmakoṭa describes the form of the span of life in this way. 'Ēyu' is the word used to denote that lives inside the body. It is depended on the warmth and knowledge of the person. The things which have no motion have no Ēyu. Only animate objects have death. Trees have no death. We call it as dead, when they dry up. Thus non eternity is interpreted. Sound is expressed through words but in ājstras sound is a quality of sky when related to air. The Buddhists do not accept
this. Sound is directly acquired with ears and the sense of its creation and creator are acquired with inference.

Vaiśeṣika states that when atoms take shape, they get immortal but these do not agree with the Buddhist vision of infinitum (mārtatvam).³³ Buddhist do not accept this insufficient, definition of the infinitum of Vaiśeṣikas. According to Buddhists, the infinitude is related to the sense of touch. Here the author opines that it is wrong to say that God, the absolute is the cause of creation. At the time of deluge, God is not the cause, and when this universe prosper God becomes its cause so, it is wrong to say that God is the creator. According to Vaiśeṣikas you the sky is also permanent as God and so sky can also be the cause of the universe. If it is out of context that we say that God is the creator, it is equal to 'Kṣatreyanyāya'.³⁴ (Palm seed falls as a crow sits on the palm tree.) It is absurd to say that the falling of the palm seed is caused by the presence of the crow. Has God created the world devoid of his dharma, adharma or karma? Has
he created everything along with karma. The potter is the cause of the pot, but the wheel, and other things are also the cause of its production. How can God, who is indifferent and detached create the world? If God created the world out of his mercy and kindness, there why hell, or a place of fortune is made? Then where is his mercy and bounty? Who has the power to create and make others work? In this matter 'Kumrila bhaga' remarked something. This power is not in God. One who advocates prosperity and well being cannot promote destruction and chaos. So Mamsaka advocates that God has no role in deciding man’s fortune or misfortune. God is only a witness devoid of desire and ambition. Manusamhiṭa has stated that the detached persons are only eligible to attain nihshreyasa. Then if creation is on the basis of karma, each life maintains with its own karma, then each one is God. If God is omniscient and then there is the need of another omniscient to know whether God creates a defect.
As a solution to this issue raised by Kumārila bhāṣya, PG says that Buddha has
the power to uplift this world. There is no man omniscient on earth. The knowledge of
heaven and other world is not known to anyone. How can be called omniscient if one
has not the knowledge of the super physical? How can we believe something that is not
visible? Mind comprehends the external with the help of the senses and senseless mind
cannot absorb anything from the external. Constant exercise on science or jñāna brings knowledge, but omniscience is not attainable. Kumārila bhāṣya has said that
one can advice others only when he is devoid of desire, ambition etc. only such a person
can inspire others. Sarvajña is a person who attain the whole through the knowledge
of births and deaths.

As an answer to these statements PG says that truth is attained through the
advice of a truthful man. Pure thought and the capability to philosophies the
knowledge, makes a man truthful and valid. If we observe the validity of four noble
truths, we get good results out of it. Buddha, who is sharp and keen in observation, has the knowledge of noble truth and he becomes valid knowledge. Those who know the ways to salvation are valid knowledge and he is omniscient who has acquired the means to salvation. 'Agnirhimasya BheAajam' according to the verse of 'Taîtireyasamhita' we understand fire removes cold. All the omniscient may not be valid. As an answer to this, it is said that undesirable objects, like misery annihilates joy etc are to be avoided. The reliable teacher who teach us the knowledge is valid. One who knows, what is misery the reason for misery, and the eradication of misery and the eight pathways to avoid these, can be considered as valid knowledge. The same is given from the knowledge of salvation attaining Kaivalya etc.

Ignorant man are unable in identifying these valid personality, so he says that there is no Valid knowledge in Buddha. But the omniscient knows everything. The welfare of this world works out from the mercy of Buddha. This mercy is acquired
through exercise. The mercy of the previous births is to be acquired through the cycle of rebirths. In the perfection of that mercy one becomes capable of uplifting the world.

Only the merciful are capable of rooting out the misery from the world. The exercise of mercy gives one the knowledge to eliminate misery from the fellow being and only the merciful persons are capable of it.

**The negation of the power of five elements:** The senses are dependent on the body since they are in the body. The body with the five elements has no power to go to the other world. In response to this, PG says that prajna, apjna, etc., senses and intellect are not merely qualities of the body; they have flaws and weakness and they are not merely originated from their forefathers. The progeny is a mixture of behaviour acquired from previous births and their parents. Is there behaviour in the previous birth a realiable source? The flows visible in some animals are caused by the continues exercise of flows of their previous birth. In the sixth gloga DK states that the self nature of
knowledge should be acquired by self and not by the otherness. There is no other world different from knowledge. There is no world where occurs the revolution of their five great elements. These are not all connected with kevalavijñāna or vijñānavāda. Here it is stated that world, time, volume, cause, causation, expression etc. are the terms used to denote the affairs of this world. The defective desire does not lead us to the celestial bliss. The defect in desire is an impediment to achievements. The perception that the lives of the living being, return to the great elements is wrong, and it is also wrong to say that the five elements are the source of life. There is no a beginning for the life of the living things. The defect of desires will not come to end until the end of the world. Eyes and the other senses are to perceive the external. It has been the nature of the senses since their origin.

**Wisdom is not from the elements:-** It is unbecoming to say that five elements is the source of prāna, senses and wisdom. The pot is made not out of clay only, but clay is the
most suitable and all kinds of clay cannot be moulded into a pot. Likewise, mere five
elements cannot be the source of life. Dissimilar objects may not join together. Mental
perception is the basis of the activities of the senses and not based on the elements.  

The mental impulses like fear and sadness can be expressed through the
senses. Though the blind is without his eyesight, his mental impulse is not lost.

Object is not compulsorily dependent on the sense by which it is perceived.

Vasubandhu says that senses are the cause of the cognition but cognition does
not come from the senses. These senses can create Vijñana. To the question, whether

body and mind are complementary, the answer is that body makes use of the mind

which depends on the body. This mind is dependent not only on a single body but it is
capable for universal dependence. Mind is related to conscient state through different

births. Wisdom depends throughout the cycles of birth. 'tadabhāvabhāvah' it means
in the existence of the cause of that beingness works because of the presence.

Consciousness depends on the experiences of the previous births. Wisdom, senses body etc are related to the nature of the consciousness of the previous births. Thus we get the cycle of births.

The Cārvākas also accept something contradictory to 'paralokasiddhi', these two worlds have contradictory implications like light and darkness, like snake and mongoose. The citta of a dead person does not sustain the two contradictory feelings simultaneously.

The state of ārhatatva does not occur in an ordinary man. Buddhists admit the state of arhatship. It happens because of the efficiency of the culture of mind set acquired through the previous births. Body is the cause to acquire the culture of mind. Is the body inclusive of the sense or exclusive? Knowledge based on the senses is
doubtlessly right in their perception. But mental knowledge is not so. DK says 'the body related to each sense does not create knowledge'. The mind, which follows the eyes does receive the knowledge through other senses also. Each sense fulfills its own responsibility in receiving knowledge. It cannot have the power to function for the other senses. If it functions so the fallacy called śādhyasama will occur. In NyāsEtra it is defined as the duty of soul but in effect, it is meaningless.

The conveying of knowledge in the body creates some feelings in the mind also. If the body is struck by an arrow, that pain affects the mind also. Body does not depend on the knowledge of mind. Mind is also not based on body. Ēcṛya Vasubandhu in his Vijñaptitimśika says that the duty of the mind is to think and there by gets knowledge in mind. To indicate the inseparable connection between mind and body, 'Saptami' (locative) case is used by him. To show the 'causal relations the ablantive case DK uses.
**The cause of Causation** - 'YadupalabdhipErvik; YadupalabdhiÅ tat tasya kíra,am'.

This given significant is always not correct. Because the cause of an object is decided by the nature of its earlier stage. But the cause of a pot is not decided by the potter only. In moulding a pot stick, the wheel and the other related things are also associated as its causes. In response to this, the cause of an object is determined by its earlier stage and the helping agents also responsible for its present stage.44

Something that we can take with the help of our hands can not be taken with the help of our legs. Similarly something that can be sliced by the nail could not be sliced by the axe. Clay is the cause of a pot. In order to emerge this as causation, a series of causes may be necessary.

According to Círvíks, body creates the mind (caitanya). So with the degeneration of the body this caitanya also decays. In effect, there is no soul, god other
world etc. But one who believes in heaven says that body is not the cause of the mind.

But Buddhist says that fire is helpful to mature the pot, likewise body is helpful to mature the mind. The pot remain even after the fire is put out. Likewise conciseness remains even after the body is lost. This conciseness transmigrates from one body to another, thus fulfills the cycle of births and rebirths. If body is the cause of the mind, how this body can sustain the soul? What happens to the soul in the decaying stage of the body? If mind is present in the corpse, then how death takes place? If the mind is present in the dead body whether breathing takes place or not? PG answers that breathing will be absent when the body devoid of mind. Mind is the cause to the presence of caitta, the consciousness. Breathing is not because of the mind, the exhale and the inhale is a physical exercise. In this theory mind is the cause of breathing when mind is related to consciousness.
Mind is emerged from consciousness: Mind is developed out of consciousness. If so, mind can be untruthful like dream. In fact this doubt is out of place. For example we see dreams almost everyday. What we have seen in dream is culture based. Since, there is fulfillment in enjoying a delicious feast in dream what we having dream is not untrue. What occurs there is the result of our previous culture. But it is untruth since there is no effective result in the awakened stage. Dream takes place without physical action. Similarly a new life starts from the embryonic stage, and ends with death. The citta gets into another body. But this transmigration of the citta is invisible. PG clarifies this doubt through these words. We cannot see the change from puberty to adolescence, from adolescence to youth and from youth to old age. Likewise the journey of the citta from one body to another is also invisible. It is not necessary that the nature of the parent may become inherent in progeny. Because the child may inherit the qualities of the parents of his previous births also. The cycle causes the
changes of the heritage. The state of awaking is different from the stage of slumber. If one feels that the vision in his dream is true, as the dream of mating, it is based on his inherent hereditary instinct.

Bhāṭayākṣra, in Nyāyaśāstra has stated that it is 'vikalpasama' when one feels physical reality in dream. According to the definition of vikalpasama, the way of the mind also will have this vikalpa. The travel of the previous 'citta' to the cycle is invisible to the eye. The firewood which has burnt into ashes may not return to its earlier stage. Likewise, can the body return after death? If one dies of rheumatism, can he have the same decease in his rebirth? Such doubts of the Cārvakas are answered by DK. The decease like rheumatism and fever can be healed through medication. Thus illness will be cured. Death occurs not because of disease, it is the process of transmigrating the soul from the body when the body is degenerated like firewood reaching upto the ashes. Fire changes the firewood into ashes. Why the same fire does
not change gold into ashes? Everything happens in accordance with their inheritance or culture. Death is the degeneration of life. The clay may change into pot. But citta does not change though the body undergoes changes. It is impossible to associate the cause and causation with the mind and the body. (Upadìnop§d¾yatv¡bhñva). Fear and sadness are not reflected in the body, yet there is emotion in the Citta. Body is essential for the existence of the Citta. But Citta is different from body. Worm emerges from dissimilar objects like cow, dung etc. which is its cause. He clarifies through the, v¡rtika that seed is the basis of wheat. The seed could be destroyed by the fire. But knowledge which is the basis of citta never decays. According to him the reason for knowledge is knowledge. It does not decay. We have no dreams when we are awake. Here the interpretation is given not for explaining the nature of knowledge, but for explaining the culture acquired from the previous births also. This culture based knowledge can be seen in dream also. Knowledge of the embryonic stage and the
knowledge of dream are based on the knowledge of previous cycle of births.

Bhāyakīra has explained this point. NS says that knowledge has no interruptions.

Because knowledge works as the means of the absence of desire. PG clarifies that body is not the basis of knowledge. Knowledge is the basis of knowledge.

In the case of a picture on the wall, when the wall is decays, the picture also decays. It is stated that citta is not dependent on the body. So it is not correct to compare the picture on the wall citta in the body. There are not interdependent.

Permanent things do not require dependence. The dependence of citta to the body is not based on karma. Citta is viññāsvarṣpa, and it is not a matter based on karma.

Body is the basis of Karma. Water is invisible in oases, Similarly citta in the body is also invisible. We can only assume that it since it has the base and a basic form. Here the inherent relation of Vaiṣeṣikas is rejected. Inherent relation is not possible where there is no inter relation between adhirā and adheya (adhirādheyābhīva).
Praśastapāda has given the definition of samavāya that different objects become one with interdependence. Inherence is used to denote the state of interdependence. For example the colour of the cloth is related to the colour of its thread and its relation with cloth is permanent. Even though if there is no consensus among the thread and the cloth is existed. Basic form does not exist without any destructive form. The dependence of each object begins with the atom. The basic form of the pot from 'Kapila' is not permanent, yet the pot is seemed to be permanent. Therefore, Vaiśeṣika states that every dependence is permanent. They accept the connection as inherent in dravya with guṇa. Thus they think that the connection between avayava and avayava is inferable. PG replies that soul in the body is not applicable to citta in the body, yet the basic source of citta is the citta of the previous birth. Thus there is dependence. Light and lamp is closely connected. This feeling of dependence happens in the act of dependence also. The feeling of citta is in the form of a benefactor owing to the feelings
of cognition. Happiness and the knowledge of sadness are gifted with knowledge and
they are not mere bodily knowledge. Phlegm, humor and bile make rheumatism
dementia and the like diseases when their balanced system is failed. But they are not of
the body. Each feeling is inhibited on the basis of the self-sprung and of co-existed
feeling of the previous citta. All these feelings are more or less dependent on citta.

It is supposed that citta originates form the senses, since senses are worthy of
experiencing sadness. For mental knowledge is visible in the senses also. The
dependence of mental knowledge comes in series, and how one can say the body is
irrelevant to the mind? The realization of fire results from the smoke. Likewise, the
realization of the body occurs in the realization of the mind, PG clarifies these doubts
through these word that without sensual knowledge, the knowledge of mind never
occurs. It is an eternal product of the previous inherited state. This knowledge occurs
from the exercise of knowledge as a phenomenon from the culture of the mind set of
previous births. Such as, the smoke from the fire and the smoke without fire have not
the same flame. Here the knowledge has the same shape.

If the son has to inherit the nature of his father he should work to acquire for it
from his previous birth. Then only one can acquire it in the present birth. If one longs
for the nature of the teacher, he will get it. If the son wants to avoid the miseries of his
parents, the citta of the son works depending on the citta of his parents.

**Rebirth:** Living beings always want to become happy and therefore they long for
pleasure avoiding sadness. If a life doesn't have longings, that life does not take
rebirths. Thus one gets liberation. The zygotic point of birth may be the decision of
god? As an answer PG says that it is not compulsory that everything should take place
owing to another one's prompting. Motivation comes from one who longs for self
realization. The prompter also has the same desire. It is because of the inefficiency of
the senses that we can't see the process of joining when sperm and ovum getting into
life. It can be seen by the yogins. They can see the amalgam of sperm and ovum as we
see the form of water taking shape in the pot. According to the opinion of the people
who believe in other world etc., the meaning of death is the transmigration from one
body to another. The body from which the soul migrates is the previous birth and the
body, to which the soul gets into is other birth. Vasubandhu, in his *Abhidharmakośa*
has opined that in order to get from one body to another, a third body is necessary. This is called ‘antarābhava’ha’. Dream becomes an illusion owing to the lack of
strength in the culture and the stage of consciousness is owing to the strength of
culture. The person who dies in Pātaliputra can be born in Kanauj or in a remote place
other than this. This cycle of birth is eternal. But this cycle does not occur to one who
has liberated oneself from desire.
The rejection of Avaya (the composite as a whole):- The knowledge of form of the external and the pleasure of the internal is speculated in the form of the knowledge of shape and the knowledge of happiness. The knowledge does not exist without this shape and happiness. According to Nyāyabjaya, we acknowledge the form and feeling in the way as we know form and feeling. According to Vedanta the man concerned with a citta calls as 'I' and the self other than 'I' is 'you'. Knowledge is self illuminatory. According to the theory of non-dualism, the matter and the instrument are not material, but ever pervading. Nāgārjuna rejects this through the theory of nothingness. An object has some capacity to create some construction from the shape of knowledge and it is depended on knowledge. Therefore body, as a composite is considered to be the locus of knowledge as not a material object: Sense and knowledge are the related with things to identity an object through the sensation. Vasubandhu qualifies this with touching 'trīka sa’gamīt sparśa'. Thereby, we know
that body can recognise the physical movements and the objects like pillars have not sense of touching and they are not fit to do any physical movements like human body.

Knowledge accommodates with the body and as an answer to this doubt, he says that this eternal soul (imperishable soul) with each atoms of the universe. The working soul has numberless amalgam of this atom. According to Naiyāyikās, the Karma takes place in the body. It means that the body is the composition of atoms and there atoms alone could not make movements of the body. The composite whole according to Naiyāyikā is soul (atma). The atoms are not the characteristics of the body. Infact, shape of the body is based on atoms and the same atoms have this shape of atom. In short body is its shape and by its constituents it is atom. But Vasubandhu has said that this paramāsatta is not present in the body.
According to Vaiśeṣikas lifeless body does not have matter, movement quality etc. But in bodily form, avayave is eligible for action or movement. Atom is different from avayave, and it is not covered by anything. But avayave, as a composite whole has material covering. The eye cannot see abstract things, likewise atoms also have no amalgamator. They say that perception occurs from the contact of sense with an object (‘Sannikarotpannam jñānam pratyakṣam’). Here the reason for connection doesn’t agree with the features of Vaiśeṣikas. The cause for connection or separation (Samyogavibhāga - ávakṣam gu, a). Here the laksanam can be justified when atoms act alone, it is worthless to connection. The relevance of ‘body’ is meaningless is its atomic structure. In atomic structure inherent, reason is necessary and it is the connection (Samyoga) of atoms. (Ihādamiti yatha kṣayakṣa, ayo śahasamavijñā).59

The concept of a blue lotus brings us not the concept of the lotus only but the source of blueness in a lotus also. Here the inherent tendency of knowledge is based on one’s
mind set which accumulated from the cycles of birth. The semblance and dissemblance
have common factors. The word, blue lotus gives a common concept, but in colour
needs separated from flower, blue from the flower lotus, it could be achieved by
repeated perceptions of so many lotus flowers on various situation. The white lotus
brings a variant meaning. According to Vaiśeṣika matter and quality have no
difference. Here the quantity is based on its number and activity. But Buddhist do not
accept this view. According to them substance could be perceived by sense organ but
quality is perceived by inference. A pot doesn't come, out of an atom, 'Pot' is the
amalgam of a number of atoms. A pot is moulded with the help of wheel and stick and
when we get the shape of a pot to that vessel we call it as a pot. Such a shape makes it
capable of holding water. Later these views can be seen in the philosophy of Viścāspati
Miśra also. Objects like pot are formed with the amalgam of atoms. The cause and
the causation becomes one, they are mutually blended. The form is visible only with the
union of different atoms. Then only we will be able to see an object.

Knowledge is the cause of everything: The body which is made out of the five elements
functions with their wholesomeness. If so, PG asks, if one of the elements is lost, can it
function or not? Innumerable causes are essential for the existence of the matter. The
whole objects in the body can be regarded as the cause for knowledge. We get
knowledge from the function of the each limb in the body. The exhale and inhale of air
do not create any knowledge. If many knowledge comes out a single intellect, how it
creates numberless knowledge simultaneously? According to Buddha, knowledge is the
source to generate another knowledge and only the single knowledge comes out from
another single knowledge. It acts as a store house of consciousness. Body without
consciousness cannot generate knowledge and knowledge cannot exist without
previous exercise.
Similarly, it is wrong to say that the body gives birth to the senses. We get the knowledge of other birth when we get the link of extra sensory from the senses. Thus we get the culture from the previous birth. PG clarifies this in the verse of PVA. The senses cannot function in a dead body for in a dead body mind and consciousness become inactive. Here citta transforms into another and thus there a transcendental transition occurs. If there is no birth, it means that the mind has reached the state of salvation. Infatuation or attachment leads us to the cycles of birth and rebirth. The wheat comes from the seed of a wheat, likewise, a series of transitions occurs here. Thus we may receive the series of experience from this birth to the next one. Everything is acquired through exercise. Water is hot only if its heat is maintained. Likewise practice is essential for any Karma. We earn knowledge through continues practice or exercise, from what we experience in this life and it create some result. The knowledge to destroy miseries is sustained only through practice. The mental qualities like 'mercy'
or compassion could be maintained only through practice. The nature of mercy is the result of the constant practice from the cycle of rebirth. The quality such as 'mercy' can generate only from similar experiences. PG clarifies this idea through some verses that mercy is generated only from mercy. Only those who can pacify others from their sufferings and maintain sympathy for the living beings are able to lead others to good.

**Buddha is valid knowledge since he exhorts people:** Buddha is enlightened with the means to eradicate the sadness of others. He can instruct the ways to salvation so he always advises his fellow men that desire is the root of misery and one who wants to root out the misery, has to control desire which is cause misery. Then only salvation can be attained. Self love, even though it is a spiritual one, will lead him to misery. If one is to get rid of this self-love, he has to give up desires. One who fails to overcome his own misery, can't save another from sadness. In *Pitajjalayogabhāya* we can see that the misery may be permanent or temporary. This description is not right, If the
reason for misery is annihilated misery will not take place at all. Misery will not have
an end when we think that there is a self in the body. Misery can be rooted out only
through the conviction of the theory of no soul. (nairītmyadarśana). We don’t feel
true happiness when we put on new clothes changing the old one. Another type of
misery comes on there in the form of preserving the new cloth. The state of death is
also similar to this. Because our self becomes always aware of protecting our new body.

Citta acquires another body by leaving out of the present one. Therefore in the state of
death there is no scope for misery. We have to accept the eight paths to root out
misery. Six types of steps are described to complement the strength of the mind of
scholarly men. Buddha, the righteous has acquired this knowledge.

It is said that Buddhatva is acquired only through the observance of these six
steps. To get this philosophic knowledge, one has to obliterate desire, which causes
defects aversion anger etc. If something is performed for this effect, the person also is
blessed with the same. The ascetics or yogins have the power to know about the past, present and future. To get this power the means to valid knowledge such as inference and perception also help them. Yogic vision is able to see the size and form of things and their intuitive power covers the time. Common man cannot get this power. Only the compassionate can find out the means to get rid of sorrows and misery. PG states that Vedas are baseless and we are not sure whether the Vedic passages had the same meaning as we use them today. Here what the Jaimineyas£tra says about mantras are remarkable. Yogins, through their intuitive means, can advise before laymen to get rid of their sorrows and miseries. We can acquire everything through constant practice. Yogins are also human beings like us and they acquire this ability through constant practice. Thus Buddhists accept the importance of yogic meditation.

To state this an example is shown by him. Those who take food three time a day must reduce it to twice a day and then to once a day. Yogic persons can live without food
through their rigid practice. Like wise one who wants to uplift the people should do constant work for that purpose. How shall we practice these things? As an answer to this doubt, Buddhists say that advise shows the way get rid of this misery. The advises develops the right personal our personal motifs. Ego and thoughts related to it are eradicated through selfless vision. Here Buddha exemplifies his life before us. The selfless vision can be developed only through the no soul theory. Vasubandhu in his 'Trinjiki' states that knowledge is the essence of the world. The importance of developing the no soul theory is stressed here. A righteous person has his own qualities. He will be respected by all, and he will not have rebirth. Since he gets out of the defect called 'avidyā' and he practices the soul vision he becomes enlightened. Buddha has these qualities and he can be termed as valid. He is a personality of such qualities.
Kumārila claims some doubts about the state of 'enlightened.' PG clarifies that these defect are not permanent. He replies that desire etc has an origination, ('rñjdayañ janyañ utpattimatvñ'). It means that the desire is a created one and every created object will perish. Thus desire also will perish. Desire makes all defects. If one succeeds to overcome this he will succeed to put an end his miseries. No soul theory is to be accepted and practiced by him.

Buddha, who renounced the family and practiced hard penance, thus showed us the means to get rid of misery. He has found out the means to deliver others from misery. He speaks of Nairutmyadarśana while narrating stories before layman. Thus the great teacher Buddha became 'Tathagatha', who proved his theory through his practice.
The Four noble truths: The presentation of Nairtmyadargaṇa resembles the presentation of means of attainment of Brahman in Vedanta. Even the thought about self is a cause of misery, to root out this misery we have to stop its cause. For that we have to seek its ways to eradicate the causes. There is no means to achieve liberation.

They senses give us some sensual happiness through their function. Misery like hunger reduces happiness but it is regained through food. Therefore the first thing is misery. No one works with the intention to create misery. Everyone works to get happiness. But misery is the basic nature of life.

Pataujali in the Yogasūtra gives some definitions of misery. Culture based on merit or demerit are of two kinds. One is from memory and the other is from Karma. The culture from karma develops a moral consciousness. This culture has acquired in the life with birth, old age, death and such events of misery. Desire and other related
defects are not a product of practice but a product of phlegm and bile. Bile creates hatred, humour creates desire and Phlegm creates ambition. But according to PG these three doAs make problems when they become excess or insufficient in the body. If it is in a balanced state, there occur no problems. The strenuous misery produces anger. Desire is related to happiness and not to humour. PG clarifies that desire and the other things take place owing to the effects of culture. Desire, anger etc are not the effects of phlegm. PG also denies the interdependence of these things. The earth does not depend on the colour white etc. But the qualities like whiteness belong to some elements. They are not isolated from quality. The elements exist with qualities inseparably and it is difficult to describe them separately although elements and qualities can be refereed as isolated terms. In fact desire not the products of these elements.
The statements of śiṅkhyas about the nature of knowledge is indicated here for clarification. It is not necessary to say that knowledge comes out of knowledge etc. Sīkhyas say that each matter has its own seminal power. The quality of the essence is the power of that knowledge. In this world there are three qualities. The quality of 'Satva' is based on nature of an object. Therefore knowledge of an object occurs in the material body. PG quotes the opinion of DK who disagree with the idea of Sīkhyas. If the power of knowledge and the object is different, there is ignorance. Birth doesn't take place where there is no desire etc. To support the theory of knowledge, about an object we will have to reject other world. You the śiṅkhyas think that this world is perceptual and the other world is inferential. Here ignorance acts, as eternal, then the form of every world is misery. The first noble truth related misery can be interpreted in four ways. They are Anityaṭi, Dukhaṭi, Ānyatī, Anītmatī. Misery occurs only occasionally in these four conditions and they are impermanent. But how can we
say it as eternal. Sadness also occurs as impermanent. It is not acquired by perception. There is no means for inference also. There is a famous idiom of common people ‘Sarvam paravañjam dukham’. "Every thing is affected by misery". When we connect misery with causes we should disconnect it them cause and then misery become formless. It is anitmarśpa. Misery that has no witness or subjective representation becomes śnyata. The soul is not eternal, hence for it does not have a proper order. The happiness and misery which we feel during different times is not from a single cause.

The components of the reason of misery are four types. They are Hetutā, Samudayatā, Prabhīvatā and Pratyayatā. Misery is occasional and its cause is also occasional. The objects like pot which is formed in this world will perish, when its reason will perish. Desire is the cause of misery. Buddha has described it in his speech as: Desire is the root of misery. They are of three types. The desire to acquire wellness,
rebirth, and the desire to root out misery. Based on the view of Swami Yogendrananda we can compare the above three types with Vedantic concepts of sat, cit and ananda.

Svabhāvavādins argues that all are natural not causal such as the sharp edge of a thorn. According to them misery is also causeless. It occurs accidentally or naturally.

Naiyāyikas says that every thing in this world is related with some cause DK also replies the throne has the nature of sharpness it is not sharp in nature, it cannot be termed as a throne. Every thing is wisely done in this universe with contextual reference. We get the situation of every object with its self nature. Everything exist as a result of its nature. If the pot has a cause, the thorn also has it. The matter and object are closely related with each other. Thus misery has also a cause. But God is not the cause of misery. But if God is regarded as the ultimate reason for misery then a collective form of misery may take place. For an everlasting object, God, does not depend on other causes. Misery takes place owing to many reasons and therefore desire is regarded as
the real root of it. If desire is not the cause of misery then birth also does not take place.

In short if there is no desire, there is no birth. Desire makes birth. Desire is the cause for living. Desire is the root of misery. Patañjali in his Yogasūtra instructs to avoid the object which hurts in future (’hāyam dhukhamangatam’). The future birth is also because of desire. Moreover, we should develop the desire to get salvation. The different forms of this desire are like the different role of a woman. She should act as a daughter, grand daughter, daughter in law, wife, etc.  

The main cause of misery is self-love. According to Yogadāsana, the inability to discriminate between permanence from impermanence, purity from impurity, happiness from unhappiness and soul from No soul are the causes of misery. These four reason causes ambition and desire. Thus self-love is act as a reason for rebirth.
Gautama also advocates this view in his work *MS* that 'there will be no birth for one who becomes detached' ('Vetarīga janmā darśanāt'). He clarifies that the person who does not have desire escapes from rebirth. If so, where there desire, anger etc are located? According to PG the desirous man acquires birth by desire. The Čīrvaka rejects this opinion. They think that body contains desire not because of the desire belonging to its previous birth. The relation between body and desire is like the relation between seed and plant. Desire is not the root of birth.

*Muḍākopanīd* says that ignorance is the result of karma. Ignorance, desire and Karma are the causes of the world. Ignorance and Karma are prompted by desire. Karma and birth cannot take place without desire, for the man who acquires kingdoms through Karma, leaves it when he becomes desireless.
To root out misery, one has to end his desires. We get cessation of misery through Nirodhati, ājñatā, Uttamatā, and Nirmocanatā. Only the merciful can deprive others of their misery. Rebirth does not take place in a person who has given up desire.

Mercy takes place at the moment that one looks at misery. Ambition is the root cause of desire and anger. Yogasūtra tells this as 'Avidyā kāetramuttarām' in this sense.

Moreover the continuation of action weakens the possibility of not having rebirths. Unless the excess of result though action is lost, the life in this world continues.

The eight paths are indicated as means to prevent misery. To get rid of the relations of the cycles of rebirth, we have to end our self-love. If self-love is annihilated, rebirth comes to an end. Those who longs for happiness, works for the absence of misery and are self centered are known as 'Satkhyadusī'. This so called self centered action leads to the cause of misery in the soul. This is called bondage. But PG declares that the permanent soul does not produce any misery and hence it is not the cause of
misery. There is cause with the soul and the absence of misery also. If there is a cause of misery in the soul there will be a way eradicate that cause also. Salvation is attained when the soul is incapable of producing misery. According to Vaibhāṣika, this soul is eternal. Soul is not the basis of salvation. Therefore soul cannot be attributed to any partnership.

The means to Nairṛtyadarśana: The forth noble truth has four subdivisions. They are Mārgaṇapatį, āṃśaṇapati, Pranatį and Nissaraṇa. We remove ignorance through the valid knowledge based on the vision of No-soul theory. When Bhadraṇakopanidāda says 'Tm vi are dāgavaya',79 According to Nairṛtyatadarśana it has no meaning. Buddha replies that the man with self love, interrupts salvation because of bondage. A self loving person becomes desirous of his well being. He thinks always about his own wellness by affection and thus does not know the real sense of itmadarśana. Love is with defect while soul is defectless. The
arguments that qualities as love etc., affects the body in some context but the soul is not affected by pain, love etc., is baseless. In short, effect, self and consciousness are interconnected and they are the causes of misery. In this way Buddhism rejects ñmavïda. Poisonous food with honey should be avoided. This food gives happiness along with misery. Similarly one should avoid self centered vision to get absolute knowledge.

**Defect in the theory of Soul:** Kumïrilabha in his aïlokavïrtti 'ka has stated that Soul is to be known as self communicable. Yogins cognise the real nature of soul. Soul does not depend on Karma or consumption. Nairïmyadarïana rejects self love. Buddhist says that the concept of Soul is defective and this defect is the result of the past deeds. Only the detached can have the temperament of renunciation. After happiness comes the tremendous sensation of misery, and after misery comes happiness. Thus misery is essential for the generation of happiness. The person who cares about his self can never
have detachment. According to sākhyā, desire comes from the union of puruṣa and prakṛti. According to them the union is the cause of misery. Puruṣa becomes inactive when it is disconnected from prakṛti. Sākhyapuruṣa has no knowledge and wisdom.

Desire and memory are natural instincts. During the union of puruṣa with prakṛti the basic natural instincts felt by puruṣa are all dependent on prakṛti. Puruṣa always relies upon the prakṛti for action. The thoughts sākhyā about such a concept of puruṣa make no soul theory relevant. The words of Buddha in Mahāvagga are uncovering this idea.80

Etamavidā as the result of Etmadarjana: Ignorance is a state of mind which occurs from illusion. Ignorance is not different from soul, they are the same. According to Īgveda 'puruṣa evedam sarvam'.81 Etmadarjana is the result of ignorance produced from the past or previous experience.
Vedas says that soul is accessible. Liberation is acquired through 'Śidhanānusajña. In Vaiṣṇavādeya we get examples of who are seers with extra sensory perception. Their words are not affected by inferences.

As a reply to this PG says that inferential knowledge is related with reasonable evidence and only the visible can be accepted indirectly with the help of a sign. It is impossible to treat that sounds are valid means of knowledge unless they are able to convince others. According to Buddhist philosophy, it is wrong to say that soul gets liberation. There is no such thing as a soul. In the opinion of Ītmanvīdins word should have the capacity to express the idea. Yogasūtra also support this view. How the soul is realized with the only the word, without the help of realised the sight and touch the means of direct perception. It is not visible in the cause of yogins for the extra sensory of the past cannot be perceived with senses. In the absence of perception inference is also not possible. It is impossible to state that the knowledge occurs from the basis of
memory. Moreover memory cannot be treated as valid, it is accepted by all that Karma and body do not decay as far as there is desire. Such deficient Karma gives us happiness. Then it is wrong to say that everyone should work for pleasure. In fact the idea of pleasure stated by the word 'pleasure' does not exist. Everything is full of sadness. If ignorance degenerates, we can acquire liberation. Thus, since Buddha illuminates, the four noble truths, he is called 'Tiyi'.

Buddha has the attribution of five epithets in the first āloka of 'Pramāṇasamuccaya': It is 'Buddha is valid', and 'the one who is desirous of universal welfare', 'advisor', 'one who walks along the right path and the one who can display the four noble truths in practice'. Buddha prompted with mercy and desirous of universal welfare is termed as 'Bhagavān'. This is stated in the Pramāṇasamuccaya. In the chapter namely 'Pramāṇasiddhi' it is well defined. Buddha is valid owing to seven reasons. They are since he has knowledge.
Since he can explain cause and causation, since he is merciful, since he is an advisor, since he walks on the righteous path, since he practices four noble truths, since he convinces people with reasonable arguments.

PG has defined Buddha in four ways: merciful, advisor, one who walks on the right path and the one who interprets the four noble truths. These are known as ‘Kṣra,acatuJaya’. Éçrya Manorathanandin states, ‘it as therefore originated from former cause to the latter cause’. Gautama the author of NS in his second stitra has also stated this. Thus the first chapter ends with the attainment of validity of Buddha.

In the next chapter PG discusses the nature of two valid knowledge, and then the definitions of perception. The perceptual and inferential knowledge is valid. These are valid owing to infallibility. Their functions are based on perception and inference
so they are valid. The object of valid knowledge also is two kinds. One is the particular
nature of an object and other is general. Diṅga in his Pramāṇasamuccaya states that
the object of valid knowledge are two: Svalaka, and Śīṃnyalaka. Svalaka is
the result of perception Śīṃnyalaka is the result of inference.87

Without perceptibility the self-natured object cannot be inferred. Perception
works without inference and it is self-explanatory. Without perception inference cannot
make meaning. Perception and inference make validity in the subject. Perception and
inference are useful through the pervasion of invariable concomitance. In Nyāya
also we can see the effect of those valid knowledge giving the same result as its
paramāphala.88

The fire in the mountain is first realized by perception. The common
knowledge of fire is acquired through sight. Without sight, inference does not become
meaningful. Perception is acquired by self practice. By this we come to know that perception is self valid while inference is meaningless without perceptual experience. It is not reasonable to say that an object is useless since it has no use at present. There may not be any use in future. No one wants to acquire a useless thing. According to PG, perception depends on inference through memory and in effect perception and inference get validity by self nature. For example, in the knowledge 'this is a pot' the common perception of a pot comes through the memory of association. Thus the sight clarifies something that was known. But it is wrong to say that perception has no relevance in abstract things for knowledge is spontaneously acquired. That object is abstract, which gets perception and depends on the function of the abstract. Size and form are perceived through the senses while knowledge is self communicative. Like the preparation of the food by fire, state of mind attains maturity through severe practice of paramārthasattī. In the example quoted above, the term this represents the
perceptual knowledge which is the devoid of imagination. This is the real nature of perceptual knowledge. The term 'pot' represents the universal knowledge of potness and it is similar to samvatsatisatt. Because of the term pot is attributed to that object. The term 'This' represents paramarthasatt. There is no permanent or temporary object in this world. All objects are momentarious. Its fulfillment cannot be perceived through perception. To clarify these he says that an everlasting object has no skills and ephemeral objects are transient. Then it is difficult to describe the matter and cause. The present moment is followed by the next moment; the continuity of these moments are based on the relation between the consecutive moments. According to Buddhist an object exists only for one moment; in the next moment a new object is created. This is known as the theory of pratityasamutpada. The object becomes valid because of their efficacy.
The knowledge of similar objects have the same identity, but in their progeny there will be some differences. For example whatever be the similarity of a son to his parents, some difference will be there because of the difference of his inherited mind set culture.\textsuperscript{90}

Knowledge is produced not from a series of substances. The knowledge of double moon may occur because of eye defects such as glaucoma. The present knowledge is acquired on through the basis of the previous knowledge. There the cause and causation are very clear like the seedling coming out of the seed. The recollection such as 'I remember', is not acquired by visual perception. The bringing of acquired knowledge to the present state is the process of recollection. Memory does not appear as ultimate truth. It prevails in this world through avidyā. In Brahma\textsc{\textcopyright}stra also we can see some reference in this sense.\textsuperscript{91}
According to PG it is not right to say that by Anupalabdhi pramāṇa the absence of matter is perceived through the absence of an object. Anupalabdhi comes under inference. It is impossible to decide the absence of the matter of that object which may be or may not be there ever though the cause of the matter might be assumed through time and space.

Kumārabinda criticizes Samvṛtisatta in his ālokavṛttika. He asks 'Is Samvṛtisatta true or illusory? If it is be true, what is the use of it? Truth has two forms. One is illusory truth, while the other one is absolute truth. But one cannot be sure about whether a particular knowledge is Samvṛtisatta and the other paramārthasatta. For example, In the expression yellow cow and black cow. The common factor is 'cowness'. Both truths have the common factor 'satta'. But both does paradoxical in their duty. Samvṛtis is vikalpavijñāna. It can be acquired from the by gone culture of
the boundless past. Therefore it has no validity. The condition of awakening is a stage against to the slumbering state. A thing is endowed with satta, if it creates fulfillment.

A pot is made as a construction of form, taste, smell and touch. The matter is an amalgam of different substance and qualities. If so we cannot acquire the matter different from its quality. Matter and substance are not real by nature but an attribution. Size and form are the phenomenon of the intellect through the eyes. Our experience this matter is a result of our boundless experience of culture. The singularity of matter is valid by its identity. NS tells of the singularity of the avayave. It clarifies that an object is identified by its touch and sight. Likewise to get the difference of the Avayave from avayava we can use the example of the community of soldiers as an army. If the matter is given up which is the basic of form then the feeling like touch and sight are not possible. Actually avayave is different from avayava. Is avayava different from avayave? As an answer to these doubts DK asks,
form and taste are not different how can the difference of size be acquired? How can
one state the difference while there is no difference at all. It will be difficult to say
whether if the object is same or different. Persons with different senses experience
differently. But in some other contexts such differences might not be experienced.

Because if there is perceptual difference with regard to the in the same object by
different persons it is infatuation. The idea of a pot can never be different from its
avayavas. These avayavas help to make the structure of the object. So the Buddhists
accept the pot as a composite of substance, quality and the pragmatic use of this object.

But Naiyiyikas calls it as avayave.

It is wrong to say that senses are essential to enjoy pleasure. Because pleasure
is gained by the taste depending on self. The pleasant words which give pleasure to
others also give us delight. The mind set culture of both persons such as the speaker
and the hearer are responsible for the situation. If the words and meanings are
different, the happiness we get from them also will be its varied nature. We get the
knowledge of the shape and size of a pot in our mind with the term 'pot'. So it creates
an image in our mind. Here, not only the external shape and size but the acquired
knowledge also helps us to acquire this imagination. The culture and the mental
construction can be explained through the sound and perception. How does it get
relevance, if we say that every knowledge contains meaning or fulfillment about its
shape etc.. Its relevance is meaningless in the absence of shape and form. Similarly it
becomes nirvikalpaka when it reaches its absolute state also. Because every knowledge
of dream becomes 'sambana' (dependant) while we sleep. That knowledge of dream
becomes nirnambana (not dependent) while we are awake because of its absolute
nature.

Eyes are essential for the cognition of form and size of an object. If there is no
visual form the eyes will be of no use. If there is no common form, it fails to develop the
commonsense of that object. Without a common form, knowledge is created which is only a mental construction of consciousness. In the same way the verbal meaning has no relation with its shape. The object 'couch' has no relation with its name. It means its form has nothing to do with its name. Sound gives us only a verbal cognition about the idea of an object not the personal. If we want to perceive an object senses are necessary.

Senses are not ineffective. According to PG, this saying is not correct. In verbal communication it is impossible to comprehend the concept of about kevala and samjnya juana without the word or verbal application. The verbal cognition based on 'samjnya' can be perceived only through the perception of the word (name, genus, etc).

The visual sight of an object cannot bring us the name of an object even though its idea is clear. If we are familiar with the object earlier, then mentally constructed idea is enough and the senses are not necessary. The spontaneous conscient of the experienced knowledge of an object with its efficacy represents as a natural co-existence. The name
of an object brings us the knowledge of the form shape, etc of that object. We get only
perception or knowledge of the sound through audition but its idea is not
communicated by the hearing of mere words. Then a doubt may arise whether the class
is different or not from the name. If it is based on structure of an object it helps us to
recognize the shape of each object. If 'genus' is used to denote an object it helps to get
the cognition of a community signifying its common qualities. So the genus in an object
is inferable. Thus it is clear that the idea of Genus in every object acts as common and
helps to differentiate the objects belonging to more than one class.

The form of nature is alike and different at the same time as shown above. It is
acquired by the continues practice. The ideological objects like darkness and light are
efficient to denote satt; and otherness. If one is absent, the related may also absent.

The materialized object in general perception shows generality. In that perception, even
though they are not defined with shape, the knowledge may create some illusions such
as the colour of conch is confused with its yellow or white colour. In the subject of
generality there is the kind of verbal communication, i.e., 'pot', the object 'pot' uses to
qualify with three time such as, 'Here is a pot', 'there was a pot' and 'there will be pot',
etc.

The knowledge of perception generates on the basis of the experience of sense
organs. It cannot be acquired by mere assumption. In assumption the object is not
seen. Then how we can access the truth in it. The statement of the absence of a thing
implies the idea of non existence of that thing. Similarly in the presence of a thing, the
absence of the non existence of that object is indicated. Thus we can state the
important definition of the presence or absence of an object as 'Vastuvidayatvam
mukhyatvam'.
Generality is the result of similarity between various objects. Generality makes the definition of an object generally as the matter of individuality. Vaiśeṣika says that generality is numberless and eternal like the self. But PG says that generality is infatuation. If every object is termed as non-eternal then how can generality can be eternal? If generality is not related with self then no relation can be claimed. The genus in the pot can be qualified as potness (ghaṭatva) and the other relations becomes defective in this situation.

Kumārilabhaṭṭa in Tantravṛttika explains that Brahminhood is perceivable and it is not merely an assumption. PG says that the perception through visual image has no relevance in this context. If visual knowledge does not take place, the thousands of edicts are of no use. Because in visual knowledge one can say that 'I saw this'. But verbal knowledge never takes place when the objects are not seen by the eyes. The knowledge of Brahmana is the knowledge as samvṛti. The knowledge of form and the
like can be acquired only by the senses. There is no real object (satvastu) which isolated from that person. Brahminhood has no form of its own. Therefore it has no reality called generality. General words based on the assumptive culture only acts in Vyavahara. If there is no fulfillment then there is no other option than to state it as ‘asat’. The simnyalaka mentioned here is adverse and it becomes svalaka. In svalaka, it might be the opposite of simnyalaka, a because of the addition of the different attributions to it. Inaccessibility (anabhidheyat) inexpressibility (avicyat) and fulfillment (arthakriyakrit), uniqueness (asdhra ata) are qualities the nature based identity. Simnyalaka helps to infer the form and the other qualities simultaneously. When we say about the statement such as ‘pararupa gatirhriiti’, it is clear that inference has no validity unless it fulfill the objectivity. Since every thing is out of a cause there is no visual cause for inferential knowledge and the inferential knowledge becomes invalid due to the absence of the visual perception. Inference does
not function on sight and therefore it cannot be considered as svalakṣaṇa. Perception based on the prescribed object is only valid. Inference based on assumption is not valid, sometimes it may be a wrong statement. The knowledge, which is not based on mental image, can either be illusion or delusion. These two knowledge have tremendous difference. A person who sees, the jewel by its light, and the identity of the jewel by the rays of its light are examples; one gets the jewel and the other gets the effect of it.

Likewise, the person who works on inference gets an effective work and in some cases one who works on assumption may get ineffectiveness of work. Inference without perception might be wrong. But anyone cannot say that there is no perception without inference. The perception without inference illumines mere form. But there will not be the action pertaining to perception. It does not illuminate the object other than its self-illumination. To complete the perceptual knowledge help of inference is essential.

Which ever matter reflects its presence or absence (anvayavyatirikā) through the
absence of the matter can be signified with svalakṣaṇa. Inference is beyond sensory perception. If there is smoke, there is fire, this knowledge is occurs indirectly. When we see the smoke in the mountain we acknowledge that there is fire. This visual knowledge helps us to get inferential knowledge. Thus there are only two valid knowledge since there are only two object of valid nature (prameya). According to Buddhist concept of other world could not be considered as inferential knowledge. This knowledge is never inferable because of the absence of the help of perception. We can perceive only the visible objects. The other world is never accessible through sensory perception. Its presence cannot be known by any sense organs. So Buddhist doesn’t accept these types of inferable knowledge.

Non Apprehension: Opposite objects get contradictory meaning. If valid knowledge is absent the subject of validity is also absent. According to Naiyāyikas the remarks about the statement as ‘fire is cold when touched’ get paradoxical meaning. When we see the
absence of coldness in fire we did not think it as paradox. The term paradox is here to be regarded as the game between the snake and mongoose. The knowledge of fire is not there when fire is described as cold. Anupalabdhi is invalid according to the Cýrvakas. Their protest is not to reject Buddha's omniscience. In their convention Buddhø na sarvajjah-vakt¤tv¡d' the omniscience and Vakt¤tva has not been contradicted. The knowledge to talk is a personal acquisition and it cannot be contradicted. So this sentence itself is wrong. When we say colour is permanent, we get the idea of it through an inferential appreciation. But colour is decaying in every minute. In Víṣjapti Tríṃśika 'anityat¡' is described through this example. It is impossible to presume 'anityat¡' through common situations. So we have to arrange this with the terms of svalакåa. This difference is due to the effect of the momentary nature. Each moment is different. We lose the first or former to the next one. We cannot perceive the origination of a bud from its seed because our senses are incapable
of perceiving it. Even if the object is felt as the same, in fact it has been changing moment by moment. It changes from varied difference. The same woman has the different reflections like, mother, daughter etc. Similarly illusion takes place in several ways. In fact the object is the same. When we presume fire we must know that this fire has not the same experience as of the first experience of fire. Because presence of a substance or object has no permanence. In effect svalakā, sṃnyalakā creates two valid knowledge through the subject of valid knowledge of visible and inferential.

The definition of perception: 'Pratyām kalpanāpo-hamabhrīntam'. In this definition, the name and its related impressions are called imagination (Kalpanā). When the knowledge is non erroneous and devoid of imagination it is called perception. Nyāyārvrtti says that it is viparyaya. Then he continues to describe the nature of viparyaya. When we see the silver we think that it is Pearl or vice versa. This is
viparyaya. How does imagination work in perception? Generally perception works in object based on visible things. According to Bhartṛhari all knowledge may be signified with verbal imagination. According to him perception is savikalpaka.

Kumrajīrāja in alokavṛttika remarks that knowledge may be nirvikalpaka also. Naming an object is vikalpa. It reflects in self through inference reflects inference. Like water is entrusted with desert, Vikalpa doesn't generate an object of nirvikalpaka.

Svalakāsa of an object will not change in the state of savikalpaka. So savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka create different notions and they never come together. Savikalpakajñāna helps us to determine the object with its name etc from other objects. Nirvikalpaka can be acquired through mental cognition. PG says that it is wrong to think like that. The colour black cannot be yellow and it is wrong to term yellow as blue. Therefore both has difference. If we affirm that the object as is black, we should be able to differentiate black, colour from yellow etc. Objects are identified with its self nature.
which is perceived through the senses. When we say the name of something, the sound of the name reflects not the svala, but the meaning related to the object which is associative memory. In the example of the word 'serpent' the collection of some letters creates the sense of vikalpa. As an answer to this question, senses receives the sound only in primary sphere and the consciousness of the serpent arises only in secondary level of cognition. At first nirvikalpaka happens and then comes the knowledge with all its attributions. At first we become conscious about the object. Then the different qualities of it are known. Here the mind receives many matters related to the object 'manasoyugapada' says DK. Kumirabha in his alokavrtti has quoted this remark of ankaraswamy that the perception of nirvikalpaka is generated by the senses like the cognition of the child, mute, etc. To reject this it is stated that the crying baby stops its cry by getting the milk of its mother. Its mother can recognise the reason for its crying as 'because of hunger'. There also the phenomenon occurs as 'pervipara
The extensive layer of the knowledge in the mind of the child creates some vikalpa. But in the later stage originates the knowledge what is savikalpaka in him.

In Nyāyabindu vikalpajñāna also has the efficiency to attain fulfillment. The knowledge of nirvikalpaka is valid when it is not illusory. Thus the attribution is not hallucinated. Māṁsakas also considers the knowledge of savikalpaka as perception. 'soṣpi pratyakṣatvena sammataḥ'. 'Aksamprativartate' is the meaning designated by Dīnīga who adds the word 'Kalpanapoḥam' to it. DK adds the term 'abhṛnta' to this. Every knowledge of realization is perception. The expression of two moons defines not only moon but also the word 'two' also. Specified cognition described as 'one man with stick' also makes some imagination. Stick and its holder make two knowledge.
Rejection of Avayava: The relation of commonness with individual is inherence. This
relation cannot be perceived by the senses. When we say 'thread and cloth' it makes
separate knowledge but it does not take place separately. The horn of a cow implies not
the cow but the horn. It can also be assumed that cow has usually horns but some cows
are excluded from this. We cannot avoid colour in a single thread. When the thread is
woven into a cloth, it becomes capable of protecting from cold even though a single
thread is not able to give protection from cold. Likewise the man with a stick does not
give us the qualities of the stick, or the quality of the man. The quality of the cow is its
beingness. The perception of the quality can be acquired by the word and here the
inference is not necessary. Quality becomes different based on its individual nature.
Where there quality is not varied there it becomes unimportant (gau,a).

VaiçeAikas state that substances are of six types. It is described in
VaiçeAikasÊtra. According to this an object matter based on substance cannot have
fulfillment without quality. The main element does not come into force by presuming
the form of the matter itself. Here comes relevance of six substances, if they are
different from each other. Buddhists say that substance is only perceived its qualities
are inferred. This perception occurs because of structure or self nature of the object.

Anyāpoha:- The word cow is closely related to its meaning and there is no other sound
which can produce the same effect. Everything other than 'cow' is different from cow
and this is called anyāpoha.\textsuperscript{104} What is the need for conforming to anyāpoha and why is
it necessary? The answer to the question is that mere verbal knowledge may create
illusion. The conceptual meaning takes place for confirmation only by anyāpoha. The
sound 'cloth' is different from the sound 'pot' and thus the verbal knowledge of sound
take place in first moment and then in the second moment it gives different notions.
Here the sound brings different intentions related to the object with its self nature.

This is not related to contexts.\textsuperscript{105}
In the cognition of nirvikalpaka class quality, action and such attributions do not take place. Class and its relation are not related with the meaning and there by it is not applicable.

The knowledge of nirvikalpaka is not eligible for self communication. The past knowledge is not accessible through presumption. It cannot be categorized. It has no form or action and that is why it is dependent. Where inferential knowledge is possible, perception does not occur. The knowledge of shape can attain through perception and the sound of it makes it more powerful in inference. At first moment we get nirvikalpaka and thereby recognition then sound and meaning are fused together. Memory and sight as two things do not take place together. Why is it so? When visual cognition is isolated then memory becomes ineffective. The primary definition of an object creates memory and then it helps to regenerate sight of the object. The knowledge like fragrance or foul smell is not produced by the agents like
nose or eye. Perceptual knowledge is of four kinds: Sensory perception mental
perception, perception related to experience of consciousness and yogic perception.

Sensory perception means the perception related with sense organs. In this process the
object and subject of perceptual knowledge become same. This clearly established in
Nyñabindu by DK. The exact nature of perceptual knowledge is defined as the
knowledge which is devoid of any imagination and non erroneous. There are different
opinions in this matter by various darñanikas. But Buddhist argues that only
nirvikalpakapratyakṣa is valid when it become savikalpaka it comes under inferential
process.

Some think that savikalpaka also is relevant in perception. It is impossible to
identify without inferential knowledge. For example in the case of a pot we can see that
collection of atoms in their wholesomeness is the cause of its composition. The same
sense produces knowledge from the innumerable forms like black or yellow. How can
we perceive the union of numberless atoms at the same time? It is impossible for a
single sense organ to perceive many things at a time. We do not perceive peacock as
bird of innumerable colours. When we identify a blue or an yellow clothe, we mainly
identify the cloth as not its colour. If the avayava is destroyed then body cannot exist.
Thus body itself loses its relevance. If there is no thread there is no cloth. Likewise a
picture can be regarded as the amalgam of a large number of colours. If there are no
limbs there is no body. The picture of an object comes to our intellect with its
wholesome effect.

*Attaining fulfillment:* What is fulfillment? As a matter of fact it is different from its
nature. It is not compulsory that everything should reach at fulfillment. The act which
brings meaning is called attaining fulfillment. The objects like pot has its visual shape.
The innumerable atoms conjoin together and gets this visual shape. The pot is the
union of atoms. The atom stands as a limb of the pot. A paradoxical perception is
impossible in the same object. Knowledge is complete in itself and in it there is nothing as perceptual or perceivable. But what is perceived as knowledge? Buddha has stated that knowledge is beyond its nature: 'nisvabhava sarvadharma prak¡¿it¡'. This is stated in DK in the chapter of Sv¡rth¡num¡na.

'According to S¡´khya, sound, touch, form, taste, smell etc are the components of a pot. In other words every object should be qualified. Therefore when we perceive the sound, we can perceive the different functions of the same sound. Every matter is not different from its cause. According to S¡´khya perception is the last stage and not the primary stage. The evolution of sound is sky. The evolution of touch is air. The evolution of touch and form is fire and the evolution of sound, touch shape and taste is water, and the evolution of sound, touch, shape, taste and smell is the earth. Therefore, the objects like pot also have these innumerable functions. In this case savikalpatva is irrelevant since each object is realised together. Perception is nirvikalpaka itself.
Knowledge based on senses and the sound is common subject. The knowledge from each sense is considered as different. Why is it so? Since the senses are different the knowledge related to sight, touch etc. are also different. By perception the sense does not create additional knowledge on the same object. Sense perceive many things in an instant, and recognition is the result of the transmitted culture which is Kalpitavyavahāra.

**Mental perception:** The knowledge acquired by the sense creates images in the mind which is called mental perception. Then it becomes valid knowledge. The knowledge which is perceived as implied or pertained creates the structure of valid knowledge in mind. Mental cognition is that which could not be cognized by the sensory objects. Then the blind also can see through 'the eye's of his mind'. This usage is not accepted by DK. According to the theory of momentariness sensory perception exists only for
one moment then it is decayed. If mental cognition is valid, then we have to add some
more extension to the definition of perception.

The mental picture is responsible for the cognition of an object through
perception and the actions based on the acquired creates mental picture. Both mental
and physical vision occurs instantly in concrete and permanent objects. This physical
and mental action is not graded as one by one, but an instant action joined together.

Mental perception and sensory perception are two in number on the basis of
perception. The mental cognition of the sensory perception is also perceptual. DK has
cited this in his Ny¡yabindu.¹⁰⁷

The object is conceived at the first sight and mental cognition take place as next
to it. The cause always acts as the previous existence of the matter. The previous
knowledge or the acquired knowledge helps to identify the object and thus the perception of the object leads to mental perception.

**Perception belongs to our own experience:** Pleasure acts a form of self communicator related with mental perception. Desire, anger, ambition and all other mental cognitions are of the mind, which are based on actions belonging to our own experience (Svasamvedana). Desire and the others are identified through the experience of our consciousness. Here the word, meaning and other related things are not possible.

According to Naiyāyika desire and knowledge are related to the sensual world. It has a common factor namely perceptive and perceivable. Pleasure is possible to feel even without the senses. The expression of ability and sluggishness are found in the same intellect, likewise pleasure and misery originates in the same mind. The situation or object is perceived through the senses and through the mental perception the same lead to pleasure and the like. The sensory perception alone cannot make pleasure or misery,
for the external shape is only for perception and does not give us pleasure or
unhappiness. Both the sensory and mental perceptions make us happy or unhappy.

These feelings are recognized with the help of mental cognition.

According to Sākhya the inward happiness is due to the perception of the external objects. The visuals like black etc bring us pleasure. The evolution of pleasure, misery, desire, etc are regarded as the different aspects of the same cognition. From pradhāna comes existence, from existence comes ‘ego’ from ‘ego’ five elements are originated and from these five elements, five senses of intellects, five sense of action and mind also are generated. Sākhyaopines that acknowledge has no difference, in their opinion knowledge does not make any variance in the object.

According to Sākhya mind, citta and caitta are different in nature. But Buddhist says that there is no difference between mind and the action of the mind. Communication
differ from consciousness. In communication and knowledge a slight difference can be
apprehensible in common life. But all these difference ends in its final stage.

**Yogic perception:** This is the knowledge related with Yogins. It is absolute knowledge.

Because this knowledge is clear and real. Dreams also may contain real knowledge,
because the knowledge of dreams are on the basis of one's own memory. The real
images memorised when one is awake comes in dream. The Yogins can perceive far off
things through their vision by practicing the Four Noble Truths. Their knowledge helps
them to reach the true sense and full form of objects. This ontological difficulty stems
from DK’s decision to construct the 'four Noble Truths' as the pragmatic objects of
yogic perception. For him, this ontological problem manifests in an epistemological
corollary with non eternity (anityata) and other features of the Noble Truths are
conceptual. DK approves meditative perception of yogins. How can a non conceptual
cognition apprehend a conceptual cognition? The key aspect of DK’s theory provides a
solution to this problem. Specifically, DK maintains that a concept, when taken as a mental event, can be considered as particular and though it is an object of non-conceptual cognition. In this approach, DK limits the notion of yogic perception as an encounter with real things of the world.  

In Pramj, avinj; caya DK gives the same account of yogic perception in detail. The meditative practice (bhjvana) begins with learning about some object or idea, then contemplating it in a manner that involves reasoning; finally one engages in the meditative practice itself, and finally that practice reaches its culmination (pariniÀpatti). DK maintains that perception is a causal process. In the ultimate state the real things become causally efficient and express their efficacy fully and reach the absolute status.
The Indian contemplative traditions maintain that Yogins can attain extra ordinary sensory abilities. For example, they can see objects that ordinary persons can't see. These abilities occasionally become relevant in philosophical arguments. According to DK Yogic perception must have a 'true object' (bhṛtṛtha) while expressing what constitutes a true object, the examples he gives are of the Noble Truths. The notion about the Noble Truths as the pragmatic objects of yogic perception is also implicit in Dīnāgī's Pramāṇa-samuccaya. DK focuses on the movement from a conceptual understanding of the Noble Truths to a non-conceptual realization of them. Nevertheless, one additional specification must be made, and to do so, it is helpful to consider avoiding error namely, that the movement from conceptual to non-conceptual amounts to ostentation. For example, in the case of a cow, some conceptual intervention might be necessary in order for one to have a perception of it a friend might need to point and say 'look, this is a Cow'. This conceptual ostensive guidance
can be abandoned when one has brought out the senses to bear on the object in the appropriate way. In short, one begins with conceptual ostentation, and ends with non-conceptual perception. The context of yogic perception is attaining liberation (Mokâa) itself. Hence, the direct experience must remove the mediator to be closer to liberation in the practice of Buddhism. This means that the perception induced by meditating on that concept causes changes in one's own mental state. It leads to lessen negative mental states (Kleśa), lessens suffering, gain more happiness. These changes are taking part effectively through the intensity of the yogic experience."

The valid knowledge defined by Buddhist cannot be grasped as such by common people. But it can be grasped through constant practice. It is stated that Veda is not considered as the work of scholarly merit. In that work also we can see paradoxical ideas. If it is composed by a single person how can this varied opinions come into existence. The feeling 'I, my, etc' leads us to misery. The diseases like fever,
etc are not the causes of misery. Sometimes it creates physical agony or mental pain.

These things can be explained only by a scholar or well versed persons in the subjects concerned. Through medication we can get release from these troubles. The ignorant never knows who the omniscient and therefore who is a the 'bhikṣu'.

**Fallacious perception**: Inferential knowledge can never be valid, if there is no valid reason. We don't get the true knowledge without the self nature of an object. The cognition of self nature makes a clear structure and thereby it becomes nirvikalpaka like in the example 'this is something'. It is absolutely correct and not corrupted in meaning. If one fails to access the correct nature of the object by its structure or self nature the knowledge becomes illusory. This knowledge affects the concept of the self nature of an object.
This structure has no verbal meaning. It may be savikalpa or nirvikalpa. It has no relation with fulfillment. Therefore the absence of sound is also creating some idea which is beyond explanation. The knowledge of imagination are of three types, they are 1) fallacious perception a (bhrntijana) as the feeling of water in the desert 2) Samvdisana from samvati, 3) Lagumaya jyna which is based on previous perception or the experience of acquiring culture. Among the fallacious perception (pratyaksa; bhisa) the perception corrupted by defects of sense organs such as glaucoma etc are explained. The presence of water in the desert occurs from the defect by sight. This is accepted by Naiyiyikas also illusory as cited in NS, while discussing 'perception.' According to NS perception is the exact knowledge occurs through the union of the sense with objects. If so the first knowledge of water in the desert is a mirage, but when we reach that position, we understand that it was only an illusion.

The water in the desert is mere imagination. Imagination means the state of intellect
which creates from memories. The *Brahmasūtra* has also stated this. It is because, we experience the memory of water that we saw in desert earlier. Buddhists accept three types of *pratyakṣa-bhīṣa* which occur from defects on sense like glaucoma, absence of real knowledge and misinterpretation of previous experience based on perception.

Dīnīga has stated that *pratyakṣa-bhīṣa* also might be considered as a division of anumāṇa what we feel commonly, ‘*idam api pratyakṣam nirvikalpabhaīt*’.113 DK modifies his opinion by defining the term *kalpanāpo-ha*. It is difficult to show it through *viśeṣa-numa*. So DK adds the term *abhṛnta* with the definition of perception. According to *NS* the definition of perception is the knowledge occurs when an object connected with the sense organs and it is non definable, non erroneous and determinative. Otherwise it may be fallacious.
The statement on result of valid knowledge: The effect of validity in the form of knowledge which is stated as the knowledge of an object becomes valid knowledge, as stated this in NS14. According to Mindākṣyānīka the experience of black and yellow is always the same. Because every object is present itself with some cognition. Visibility and invisibility are the basis of this cognition. So it is cognised as perceivable and non-perceivable. The nature this cognition is of knowledge ‘asyāḥrhasya-ayamadhigati’. It is object based knowledge. Nirvikalpaka- jñāna is related to the senses and based on specific knowledge, without any qualifications of adjectives. DK and PG argues that the cause and causation becomes one and the same. The union of the senses is considered as valid when and the object based knowledge results from it. The cycle of the previous cognition generates the series of knowledge which comes later as a flow.

Here the śāstra of the Aśādhyāyī of Pāṇini helps us "sādhakathamam karaṁ", Union of
senses with objects cannot be considered as valid. It becomes valid only if it create the knowledge which can attain fulfillment.

All knowledge occurs with the connection between sense organs and object. If it has infallibility it becomes valid. Here the cause and causation can be perceived through each sense organs. Kumārilabha says that sound makes the sense of its idea and partiality we get the intention of the speaker. According to Māṃsakas only vedas are reliable and valid. The meaning of sound is not dependable. Because of the absence of validity of its meaning. Therefore there is no paradox. In response to the usage such as the Chandrajñāna of ālokavṛtttika PG states that the knowledge of a single moon takes place first as valid and then cognition of the second moon does not happens from the perception of union of sense organ with the object moon.
Both Kumārila and DK are of opinion that in this world sound cannot produce any valid knowledge. Without verbal knowledge sounds are unable to convey its intention. This shows that similar persons think in similar ways. According to Kumārila the effect of salvation is not fulfillment. PG opposes this. Because validity of knowledge is based on the infallibility of meaning. It is different from absolute knowledge. Intense practice is needed to reach the absolute state of knowledge. Artha pratyaya is not directly connected with word. It is an attribute. The person who has not seen a serpent cannot have the idea of a serpent in a rope. The sight of the serpent on the rope is an illusion. Self realization leads to valid knowledge which is originated through the projection of the self. It is not through the external meaning. Because it has no power to show the external meaning. The knowledge which is based on the peripherals of the object cannot be called as real knowledge.
The two variances of knowledge: Knowledge has only two forms: conscious form and illusionary form. Actually experience is one. Even then, experience differs as we have pleasure or misery. Like wise the shape of an object creates the concepts through the visibility of the eye. This visual knowledge brings an idea as its effect. The same knowledge can be interpreted as perceivable. The form is visible, it has also abstractness and it can be presumed. Here the para
driyata works to get the nature of the form but it has no validity at all. It is uncertain. A madman out of illusion understands the brick of clay as brick of gold. However if ones eyes are not defective such illusion will not take place. Knowledge is valid if it is of self nature. PG says that the four means of valid knowledge proposed by Naiyiyikas is not correct. According to PG perception and inference are the only valid means of knowledge. Here perception means only nirvikalpaka which is devoid of Kalpana or imagination. All other pramājas of the opponents could be put under the frame of inference. Memory
also cannot be clarified as valid since it is purely subjective. It could not be conveyed to others with reasonable evidence or supportive arguments.
Notes:

1. Swami yogendra ad - Pramj, avartika of Dharmakrti with Varttikala' kra -


2. Eli Franco, Dharmakrti on Compassion and Rebirth, Arbeitskreis Furtibetisc and Buddhistische Studien universitat wien, wien, 1997, p.28.

3. Prof. J.L. Sastri, (Ed) Brahma Sutra (aankarabhj Aya with the commentaries,

BhjAyaratnaprabha of Govindananda, Bhjmati of Vicaspati Miira,

Bhamati:- ¶É¨Énù¨ÉÉÊnù °ÉÉvÉxÉ°ÉÆ{ÉiÉÂ - ¶É¨Énù¨ÉÉä{É®úÊïÉ
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4. Bhikkhu, J. Kashyap - Anguttara Nik¡yp¡li, Ekakanip̣ta, Dukanip̣ta, Tikanip̣ta, Pali Publication Board (Bihar) Motital Banarsidass, Varanasi, Sole Agents, 1960,

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™ôÉäEöÉxÉÖEò¨{ÉÉaÉ =ìÉÉaÉ È½þÉÉaÉ °ÉÖJÉÉaÉ*
5. Sachidananda Miśra, (Ed) *Nyāyadarśana - The St̄ras of Goutama and Bhāṣya* of Viśyājana with the Sunanda Hindi commentary; Bharateya vidya prakīṭan, Varanasi, Delhi, 1999. Bhāṣya, 1/1/1, p.6.

6. See *PVA*, p.3.


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10. The son born out of Vaisya women is known as 'Ambājan' and born of Āśdra is known as 'Niśdan' and 'Parājara'. The son born of Kātriya from Āśdra virgin has mixed quality of the Kātriyas and Āśdra and he is known as 'ugran'. Sons of brāhmīs from the other 3 castes and Kātriya from the other two castes
and Vaiśya from Śdra, thus in six births of these castes are 'nikrājśis'. The son of brāmin from ugrakangaka is avrthan and from Ambaśtan girl is 'Adira' and from 'Ayigarakṣyaka is 'dhwiganan' and the son of kāatriya is 'dhwiganan' and the son of ksatriya from sudra woman is 'kāetav' and the son of sṛdra from a brāhmin is 'chandala'. The son of kāatriya from a brāhmin woman is sṛta and a son of 'sṛta' from kāatriya woman is magadhan and son of vaiśya from a brāhmin woman is 'vaidehan'. The mixture of caste takes place owing to adultery among castes and marriage within the clans and the renunciation of ritual based karma.


14. *PVA*, p. 51

15. See *Aṣṭāṅgaśāstra* of *Pñjīni*, p. 185.

17. _PVA_, p. 55.


23. *Brahmas£tra áankarabh¡Àya with the commentaries Bhamati Kalpataru and Parimala, Pandita Ananta Krishna áastri and Vasudeva Laxman áastri Panikar, Krishnadas Academy, Varanasi, Reprint 2000, p.480,

25. See PVA, p. 90.

27. *PVA*, p. 96.

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28. See Ėjrya Nigamaçarma,(Ed), S`
khakrika of Iswarakrish,a, p.76.

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29. *PVA*, p. 98.

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31. Ibid., p. 456.


33. See Sri N¡raya¸a Mi¿ra, *Va¿eÀikas£tra of Kaa¿da with Upask¡ra of ári¿ankara Mi¿ra*, p.

34. "É®ú˚ÉhÉ¨ÉÉâ%ÊxEìºÉÉ& °ÉÚliÉ¨Éi˚ÉÉÉÁ*"
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35. Acarya Jagadeśalal āastri, Manusmṛti with the commentary of kullukabhatta, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt; Ltd; Delhi,


36. See Vijayasharma, Mamamsa álokavṛttika, p.496.

38. See *PVA*, p.125.

39. Ibid., p.51.
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40. Ibid., p.149.

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41. See Sachchidananda Mi¿ra, Ny¡yadar¿ana, p.85.

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42. Stefan Anackar, Seven works of Buddhist psychological Doctor Va$ubandhu,

Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt; Ltd, Delhi,

1984, p.422.

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See \textit{PIA}, p.154.


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\textit{Ibid.}, p.168.

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\textit{iÉÁ}*,450.

See Dr. Sachhid\textit{ñ}and Mi\textit{ñ}ra, \textit{Niyadá\textit{nana}}, p.433.

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47. PVA, p.177.


49. See Ny¿ya Bh¿j Äya, p.251.

50. Ny¿yadar¿ana, p.251.

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52. See Swami Dwaridas ¿stri, Vasubandhu, Abhis¿rdarmako¿am, p,19.

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53. See Nygyadarjana, p.22. 1/1/4.


57. See Stefan Anackar, *Seven works of Vasubandhu*, p.422,


60. Ibid., p. 440, 7/2/26

61. Ibid., p.50.

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63. See PVA, p. 247, Verse.105.

64. Bangali Baba, Y°gasÉtra of Patanjali with the Commentary of Výśa, Motilal Banarsidass Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 1976, p.42.

¹½äp³ÉÆ nÖù&JÉ¨ÉxÉÉMÉiÉ¨ÉÂ** 26.


See Stefan Anacker, p. 422.

See Kum+jra+abha, 

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69. PVA, p.291.

70. Ibid., p. 293.

71. See Pandit Dhundherj áastré, Yogas£tra of Patajali, p.75.

72. See PVA, p.190.

73. Ny¡yadar¿ana, p. 363.

75. Nyâyadarśana, p.250.


77. See Yogasutram, p.63.
78. See PVA, p.345.

79. Swami Mādhavananda, (Ed) The Bhādārāyaka Upaniṣad with the commentary of āṅkarārya Published by Advaitāśrama, Culcutta, p.387.


84. See PVA, p.406.


89. See *PVV*, p.422.

90. See *PVV*, p.143.

91. See J.L. Shastri Sankaracarya, *Brahmasutra aankarabhasyam*, p.34.
See Nygyadirsana, p.228

Ibid., AS 2-1-36, p. 138.

Ibid., p.3. see NBh

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96. See Stefan Anacker, p.423.


98. Padma¿ri Pandita Rajhunatha áarma, *V¡kyapadiyam* (Part-1 Brahmak¡ndam) with the commentaries Svop¡uva¹itte by Harv¡Aabha, p.183.
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\text{EE} \text{E} \text{E} \text{do} \text{T} \text{E} \text{E} \text{E} \text{n} \text{u} \text{EE} \text{E} \text{Y} \text{E} \text{ExEE} \text{E} \text{O} \text{ou} \text{EE} \) 

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100. See \textit{PIA}, p.604.

101. See \textit{NB}, p.62, Svārthanumana paricheda. 25.

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102. See \textit{PIA}, p.613.

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104. See *PVA*, p. 638.


109. John D. Dunne, "Realizing the unreal: Dharmakirti's theory of Yogic Perception",

Published in Philosophical Quarterly, Pune Online, Springer, Science &


110. Ibid., p.505.

111. Ibid.,
112. See *Nyådarjanam*, p.21.

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113. See *PVA*, p.812 (|É. {É)


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