CHAPTER III

REFUTATION OF NYÉYA-VALÉÉÍKA

PHILOSOPHIES
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INTRODUCTION
The Nyāya and Vaiṣeṣika schools are considered as pair systems (samāññatandra) in Indian philosophy. The Vaiṣeṣika system is older and develops metaphysics. But the Nyāya system accepts most of the metaphysics of Vaiṣeṣika, with a difference. The Nyāya develops logic and epistemology. The Naiyāyikas recognize the concepts such as the reality of god, the finite souls, physical things and atoms of earth, water, fire, air and space. They insist on the plurality of the individual souls. They both entertain the theistic conception of God. Both of them advocate realism and pluralism. They admit the reality of the external world independent of the perceiving souls. They accept the plurality and distinctness of the
finite souls and physical objects. They recognize the dualism of matter and spirits which are irreducible to each other.

But the Nyāya - Vaiṣeṣika systems differ from each other in three main points. (1) Nyāya emphasises epistemology and logic, while the Vaiṣeṣika specializes in the philosophy of nature and structure of the world. (2) Nyāya recognizes sixteen categories, but Vaiṣeṣika recognizes seven categories. The Nyāya categories are logical and the Vaiṣeṣika categories are metaphysical. (3) Nyāya accept four pramāṇas - pratyakṣa, anumāṇa, upamāṇa and abda. But Vaiṣeṣika accepts two pramāṇas - perception and inference.

Vaiṣeṣika
The term Vaiśeṣika is derived from the term Viṣeṣa. The Vaiśeṣika system lays stress on the ‘Viṣeṣa’ of the external substances. It clearly propounds the doctrine of atoms. Vaiśeṣika specializes in the philosophy of nature. Kaṭāda speaks of seven categories. They are *dravya-guṇa-karma-sīṃśya-viṣeṣa-samavṛya-abhijña*. Vaiśeṣika discusses the nature of God, and His creation of the world out of the atoms and dissolution of it into them. Vaiśeṣika discusses the nature of the finite soul, the proofs for its existence, plurality of finite souls, and their bondage and liberation.

The atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣika is flatly refuted by Āaṅkara in his *Brahmaśāstrabhāṣya*.
Nyāya

Gautama or Akṣapāda is the founder of Nyāya philosophy. He is the author of Nyāyasūtra. Nyāya is the science of demonstration (pramāṇa-pratijñāna) or the science of inference (tarkajñāna). Nyāya deals with sixteen topics. (1) pramāṇa-pratyakṣa anumāna and ādāna (2) prameya-self, body, sense-organs, object, knowledge, manas, voluntary actions, faults, transmigration, fruits of actions, pain and liberation: (3) samavṛja-indefinite knowledge of an object as either one or the other, in which the mind oscillates between two alternatives; (4) Prayojana- it is the end of voluntary actions, which is the attainment of good or the rejection of evil. (5) Dvājīnta - an
instance in which a problem is found to be accompanied by a probandum, and which is admitted to be valid by a disputant and an opponent; 6. *Siddhānta*, proved by *pramāṇas* and accepted as true; 7. *Avayava*- The *avayava*-s of a demonstrative inference are proposition, reason, exemplification, application and conclusion; 8. *Tarka*- It favours one of two alternative hypotheses by showing the absurd consequences of the other; 9. *Nirāya*- It is the real nature of an object which is due to the consideration of a disputant’s argument for a thesis and an opponent’s counterargument for an antithesis; 10. *Vāda*- It is a logical debate between a disputant and an opponent with the help of five-membered inferences for the
ascertainment of truth without a desire for victory; 11. Jalpa- It is a
debate actuated by a desire for victory. 13. Hetyjdh;sa- These are the
non- reasons which appear to be valid reasons; 14. Cchala. It is the
refutation of an argument by taking a word in a sense different from
what is intended by the speaker; 15. Jiti— It is a sophistical refutation
of an argument on the ground of mere similarity or dissimilarity of
the subject with an example; 16. Nigrahasthjna- It is the sophistical
refutation due to non-comprehension or miscomprehension of the
real character of an object.

Though Nyija and VaijeSaika are considered as a pair system
of Indian philosophy, the Naijyikjs do not build up theories of the
world. The system does not intend to build up philosophical doctrines of its own, such as those concerned with world-creation, God, etc., and the early Nyāya works handle the Vaiṣeṣika doctrines and defend them only by way of illustrating how to apply the method of investigation the system teaches. In Brahmasūtra, āśākara gives more stress to the refutation of Vaiṣeṣika philosophy. In it he does not make a direct attack on Nyāya. In fact, in Samanvajñāna and Patyadhika, āśaṅkara has quoted from Gautama. Gautama is the only philosopher of a different stream, whom āśaṅkara has quoted. In Samanvajñāna, āśaṅkara refers to Gautama, not by the name but by the word ‘Eciyā’-‘Eciyapra, etam
never mentioned the opposing concepts of Nyāya philosophy, such as: (1) The embodied soul (jīva) is the very knowledge itself (jnānaprajñā). (2) The Self, therefore, shines of its own accord (svaprajñā). (3) It is ultimately and totally identical with the Supreme Brahman. He gives more stress to refute the VaiṣeĀika principles, like (1) Pramāṇa, upadhyēra, avida, (2) Concept of Āsūgā, (3) Concept of Samavēya, (4) Permanency of origination and destruction, (5) Paramāṇas as eternal, and (6) The concept of God as the efficient cause.

Refutation of Paramāṇa, upadhyēra, avida.
In *Brahmasūtra*, áa'kara refutes the Vaiṣeṣika concept of *Paramāṇus* as the cause of the world structure, and conjunction of *Paramāṇus* and relation called *Samavya*. áa’kara explains the Vaiṣeṣika arguments in the following way. According to the Advaitic theory, the world is insentient and it originated from *Brahman* which is sentient and blissful. According to the Advaitins, the cause and effect are similar in nature and the effect inherits all its qualities from those of its cause. For example the cloth and the yarns from which it is woven are similar to each other in colour texture, and other qualities. The Cloth is derived from the cause, i.e., the yarn. The white yarn causes the production of white cloth. From the red yarn
we get red cloth. In their view, the causation is of three types, *samavìya, asamavìya and nimitta*. The yarns are the *samavìyikìra*, a (inherent cause) of the cloth. The qualities of the yarn are the *asamavìyakìra*, a of the various qualities of the cloth. The weaver and his equipment are the *nimittakìra*, a (efficient cause) of the cloth. The similarity between the cause and the effect is obtained only between the *samavìya, asamavìya* and their respective effects. The *nimittakìra*, a has no similarity to its effect. The VaiùeÀika system argues that if the first two, causes and their effects, are similar, how can Vediùints accept that the sentient *Brahman* is the cause of the insentient world? According to the VaiùeÀika theory, the *paramìus*
are the cause of the universe. There are four kinds of atoms. They are-

atoms of earth, atoms of water, atoms of fire and atoms of air. They say that in the process of creation, these atoms stay for some time in their rudimentary \( p\text{rimj};\text{alym} \) state without producing any effect³.

At the time of creation, the atoms of air are set in motion by \( ad\text{vAna} \) and two atoms combine to form a \textit{dyad}. Three \textit{dyads} combine to form a \textit{triad}. Four \textit{triads} form a tetrad and in this way, gross air is created. Similarly, the other elements are created from their respective atoms and \textit{dyads}. According to the \textit{Vai\text{\textae}ika SE\text{\textae}tra},

an atom is infinite and small; a \textit{dyad} is minute and short; and
compounds from triads upwards are great and long\(^4\). In the creation, the two atoms which are spherical produce a dyad which is short and long. There, the sphericity of the atom is not reproduced.

Four dyads, which are short and minute, produce a tetrad, which is great and long. The shortness and minuteness of the dyad are not handed down to the tetrad. So, it is clear that all the qualities of the cause are not reproduced in the effect\(^5\). Therefore, áaˈkara says that there is no chance for any objection to an sentient Brahman being the cause of the world.

**Refutation of the concept of Adāṅga**
In the context of discussing Paramàjâgadâkšvara, Svâda, ákara puts forward some arguments against their adzâja concept. The atom is the culmination of minuteness, where this division (avayava and avayâna) between the whole and its parts ceases. The Vaiśeṣika-s say that the world is created by the combination of atoms. They say that the cloth is made from yarn. So the cloth has parts. These parts are connected with each other. In this world, whole things like mountains, ocean, etc., have their own parts. If one thing has parts, that thing has beginning and destruction. This world has its own parts. So, this world also has beginning and destruction. The world is
created by the combination of atoms. So atoms are the cause of the world.6

Here áa’kara raises the question ‘what are the causes of this combination?’ If we accept a seen cause, it is not possible before the creation of the body. A seen cause can either be an endeavour or an impact. Before the creation there is no body and therefore no mind.

So endeavour cannot take place, and similarly the impact.7

The VaiṣeĀikas, like the Vedāntins, accept the unseen cause, i.e., advāga. Then áa’kara raises the objection, ‘Is the advāga inherent in the soul or in the atoms?’ It is not inherent with the atoms because advāga is non-intelligent and so it cannot act by itself. If the
Adabra is inherent in the atoms, being always present in the atom it will be always active. So the dissolution of the world will not happen. If the soul is without parts like atoms, there is no possibility of any connection between the soul and atoms. Adabra always inheres in the soul; it cannot influence the motion of the atoms not connected with the soul. So, in all cases, the initial activity in the atoms is not possible. In the first creation also, the atoms cannot possess any action for producing conjunction because there is no cause for that action. Similarly, at the time of dissolution, the atoms will have no action because there is no well-determined cause which can be noticed to make them act. Hence, in the absence of any cause, there is
no conjunction, and disjunction will lead to an absence of creation and dissolution. Thus, the theory of Paramj, ujagatkira, avida is refuted by āa‘kara⁹. Therefore, the VaiṣeĀika theory, that the world is created by the combination of atoms, is untenable.

Refutation of the concept of Samavya

According to the VaiṣeĀikas, the combination of two atoms makes a divya, uka or dyad⁹. The quality of the divya, uka is utterly different from its cause, i.e., the paramj, u. But divya, uka is connected with samavya relation. Samavya itself is different from these dyads and atoms. Another samavya will be required to connect these, and it will require another samavya to connect it with the first samavya,
and so on without an end. It will cause the *anavastha*. One can find that the *samavāya* is not a quality”. So there is no need for any relation with others. áa’kara says that it is not correct because one *samavāya* is entirely different from another. So it is not able to overcome the *anavastha*. By the *anavastha*, there takes place no creation”. The Vaiṣeṣika concept of *samavāya* as an eternal relation between the atoms and their products, makes the creation and destruction of the world impossible.

**Refutation of the concept of Permanency of Origination and Destruction**
With the explanation of the Śētra nityameva ca bhūyāś, ā’kara raised a question against the VaïeÄikas whether the atom is pravṛtti svabhāva, nivṛttisvabhāva, ubhayasvabhāva or anubhaya svabhāva°. If we accept that atoms as pravṛtti svabhāva, then creation will be permanent and dissolution does not happen°. The atoms cannot naturally have both activity and inactivity, for that is irreconcilable owing to contradiction. If we accept the svabhāva of the atoms are nivṛtti, then the dissolution would be permanent and there will be no creation. This is also impossible. If they are neither active nor inactive would depend upon an efficient cause like adṛśa. Adṛśa is eternal and always connected with the atoms;
they will always be active, so the creation would be permanent. If there is no efficient cause or adhāja, there will be no activity of the atoms and there will be no creation. Based on this theory also, the atomic theory of Vaiṣeṣika is inadmissible.

Refutation of the concept that the Paramāṣṭu are eternal

The Vaiṣeṣikas argue that there are four kinds of paramāṣṭu, namely, pāthvi paramāṣṭu, jalaparamāṣṭu, tejanāparaṣṭu and viṣṇuparamāṣṭu. These paramāṣṭus join together and make the multifaceted world. This theory is not accepted by āa’kara. It does not happen because all the effects, compared to their cause, are gross and impermanent. For example, the yarn is the cause of the
cloth, but the cloth according to its cause, the yarn, is impermanent.

The yarn, according to its cause, is also impermanent; similar is the case of the paramj, u also.

The VaiṣeĀikas put forward the second reason to prove that paramj, us are eternal i.e., anityamiti ca viṣeĀataĀ pratiĀedhībhīvaĀ

16. One cannot say that the paramj, u is ‘anitya’ because of the eternity of paramanu. Then, ‘āa’kara says that there is another eternal cause different from the paramj, us, i.e., Brahman. This Brahman is eternal, i.e., proved by the pramj, is. So it is not accepted by āa’kara that the paramj, us are nītya. Therefore, the VaiṣeĀika concept, that paramj, us are eternal, is not valid.
The four gross elements, पथ्वि, उप, तेजा, and व्यु, originate from the atoms. For example, the पथ्वि has the qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour. It is a gross element. Water has only three गु; taste, colour, and touch. It is subtle. The air has only one guna, touch. It is subtler. So we suppose that their respective atoms also possess the same number of qualities. But we can see that the atom of air, which has only one quality, is the subtlest, and earth has four qualities. In this world we find that the nature of grossness, subtleness, etc., is found in the four elements. Then, आकार asks the Vaiṣeṣika-s whether they accept these kinds of grossness and subtleness in atoms also. If you accept the grossness of the qualities
of the earth, that also cannot be an atom, because one can see in the
world that all the qualities of the cause are reproduced in their effects
also. It is illogical to maintain that the atoms are eternal. For having
its qualities like colour, touch, etc., they must be as temporary as a
pot or cloth.

áa’kara concludes the refutation of the Paramj-
,ujagadk;ra,av;da of Vai;eÄika by saying that it is postulated by
some dull-witted persons17. and that there is no question as regards
the non-authoritativeness of all doctrines based merely on reasoning,
like the atomic theory of Ka,ida.
According to áa’kara, Símkhya philosophy is accepted by some scholars because it is similar to the Vedántin’s concept of satkýra, avída. But the Paramít, ukýra, avída is not accepted by scholars like Manu etc. Therefore he says that the Paramít, u-kýra, avída is strictly refutable.

**Refutation of the concept of God as the efficient cause.**

The VaiṣeAikís hold view that God is the efficient cause of the world and That the atoms are the material cause of the world. The primodial matter, Paramít, u and Karma, being themselves unconscious, are found to act when, prior to beginning, they have an intelligent agent to control them. Such an agent is called ñívara. The
Naiyikis find *pravarttan\lak\a, a do\a* — when there is an impulsion to work it can be inferred that there are such defects.

\a'kara says that, here nobody is seen to engage in any work for one’s own or for somebody else’s sake, unless one is impelled by these defects. As a rule, all people serve other people’s purposes only when they are impelled by their own interests. If there is any selfishness in the nature of God, the God’s Godness is lost.

The Nyija-Vai\E\a\ka-s infer the existence of God and they say that God directs the atoms, as the potter does the clay. \a'kara refutes this idea also because atoms are not the objects of perception like the clay. So God cannot direct them. If we accept God as the
ruler of the atoms, it accounts for the omniscient and eternal quality
of God. They argue that God is omniscient and eternal which means
that it is not subject to destruction. So they argue that an infinite
nature and infinite soul are different from one another. These
congcepts are not acceptable to áa’kara. He says that God is not only
the efficient cause of the universe. He would be a mere Superior and
not a Creator, nor would He have any inner and necessary
relationship with atoms. áa’kara a stresses that God cannot be proved
through inference²⁴. He is proved by áruti only. áa’kara accepts God
as the Upjñānakṣra, a and nimittakṣra, a of the universe.

Resume
áa’kara refuted the Vaiṣeṣika concept on the basis of consciousness. According to him, the conscious object is the cause of the world. But the Vaiṣeṣika-s argue for the unconscious as the cause of the world. áa’kara could not accept their concept of Samanvya also. He refuted all the Vaiṣeṣika principles on the basis of āruti and yukti.
NOTES AND REFERENCE
1 Pravartanājakā,dojō. Nya.Su. 1.1.18.

2 Ibid. 1.1.2.

3 paramā,avaō kila kacikālamanirabdhakīryī yathīyogam rśpī
dimantaō prīmī, alyaparīmī, aço tiāanti teca
paōcīdadājīdipurassārī samyogasacīca santo dye,-
ukō dikrame, a kātsnam kīryajtamīrabhante. kīra,agu,- ič ca kīre
gu, jntaram. BSSB, 2.2.2.11.

4 kīra, abahutvītkīra, amahatvītpracayviōcā jīca mahat. Vai.su.7.1.9

5 nacasannidhīnavīōcā jītkūtacītkīra, abahu tvīdenyevīra bhantenapriṃī, alyadīnityucyeta, dravyāntare gu, jntare
vīrabhyamī, e sarveōmeva kīra, agu, jnjm svīr-
ayasamavijnvite

tasmatsvabhijdeva

parimaji, a-

lyijdenamanarabhakatvam, tathij cetanaya apetidnAJavigav-yam.

BSSB 2.2.2.11.

6 PaAJideni hi loke sivayvani dravyij, i svijnugataireva samyogasacivais
tanthvijdibhirdravyairrabhyami, ini dAJiini. tatsijmye na

yivatkimeitsivayvam tatsarvam svijnugataireva

samyogasacivaiastairdravyairrabdamitiga-myte. BSSB.2.2.3.12.

7 vibhigvasthiyam tavada, £ni m samyogaA karmipekA-oabhyupagantavyA, karmavatim tanthvidenim samyo-
yupagantavyam anabhupagame nimittabhijnna,uAv-ядам karmasy jt. Ibid.

8 ubhayathopi nda¬джанимиттамa,uAv karmivakalpetdndjgaj syjcetanatvijnahycetanam cetanenanadhi¬джитам sva- tantram pravartate pravartayativeti¬мкhyapra¬кривима bhihitam.

итmasamavйtivbhyupagamјcanjd¬джайma,u Аukarman onimittam syдsasambandhit. Ibid.

9 yathачдисарге nimittbhvitsamyogolpatyartham karma

............. ad¬джамапибога prasiddhyarthamnapra-

½ayaprasiddhyartham ityatnimittbhvттnasyja,Лn-им samyogolpatyarthamам vibhиготpatyartham va karma. ataиca
samyoga vibhīgabhavittadīya ttayoḥ sargaprabhavaḥ

tasmādanupapanneyam param-ī, u kīra, avidā. Ibid.

10 dvibhyim cī, ubhyim dya, ukamulpayamāṇi, nāthyam-ṇāthyṁ

ma, ubhyi, manvoḥ samavaitetābhhyupagamy-ite bhavati. BSSB 2.2.3.

13

11 Prasajyāmāṇi, jyām cīnāvasthiyāmāsiddhau sarvasidd-

herdvibhyima, ubhyima, dya, ukam naivolpaḥhyeta. Ibid.

12 na ca gu, atmātsamyogaḥ sambandhīntaramapekṣate na

samavatēyunuttvāditi yujyate vaktum. Ibid.

13 B.S. 2.2.3.14
14 apic, ava pravattisvabhjvi va nivattisvabhjvi vobhayasvabhjvi

vinubhayasvabhjvi vbhyupagamy-ante gatyantaribhjvit. BSSB.

2.2.3.14

15 pravtti svabhjvatve nityameva pravatterbhjvtpra/ayib-
hjvaprasagaa. Ibid.

16 Vai .Su.4.1.4.

17 idinema,vjdividavyapirayenipi kai.cimandamatibhi
vedjntavikyeAu punastarkanimitt;kAepa ijAgyate. BSSB. 2.1.4.12.

18 iAtairmanuvysaprabhttibhiA kencedamjenniparighetaye
a,vj dik,ra, avjdastepi pratiAiddhataya vy;khyita nir-jkatij

dAavyaA. Ibid.
19 samsra eva mahirhuho v askaa tasya bejya, nimitta kira- , a
yetyarthi A etena e vare prami, amapi dargitam bha-vati.

Vijvanthanyiya paucjana, Karikvali; P.13.

20 Nya. Su. 1.1.18.

21 nahi ka cidado apayuktA svirththe parirththe vi pravar-tamino
di yate svirthaprayuktA eva ca sarvo janaA pa- rirthepi

pravartamino di yate svirthaprayukta evaca sarvo janaA

parirthepi pravaratA ityevampyasamaajja-syam,

svirthavatvide varasyine varatvaprasa'git. BSSB. 2.2.7.37
22. Itajñupapattistīrkekaparikalpitasyeṣvarasya. sa hi pari-

rikalpyamīnāḥ kumbhakāraḥ īva mādideni pradhijñide-

nyavadhiātya pravartayet. BSSB. 2.2.7.39.

23. nāhyapratyakṣam rāpidehenam pradhijnamēḥ varasyādh-

iĀteyamsambhavati mādvdivailakāyaḥ. Ibid.

24. vijyārthavicara, idhyavasijanīrvṛttā hi brahmi vagatirn-anumīnīdi 

prami, īntara nirṛttā. BSSB 1.1.1.2