CHAPTER II

REFUTATION OF SÉMKHYA-YOGA

PHILOSOPHIES
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Introduction
The Śīmkhya –Yoga schools of philosophy are considered as a pair—system in Indian philosophy. One important difference between them is that Śīmkhya does not accept the existence of God, while Yoga accepts it as the 26th principle apart from the 25 principles accepted by Śīmkhya.

Śīmkhya Philosophy

Śīmkhya philosophy is systematized by the great sage Kapila. It is considered to be the most ancient of all the philosophical schools. Śīmkhya accepts three pramīs: pratyākṣa, anumāna and śīlā. They accept twenty-five principles.
Theory of cause and effect

The Śāmkhya-s accept the theory of Pari,iva, according to which there is a real transformation of the cause into the effect, like wood being transformed into a chair and milk into curd. They developed elaborate explanations to establish that the cause changes into the effect. They gives five proofs for the establishment of this theory.

They are, asadakṣra, upadanagrahana, sarvasambhavibhiva, ājktasya ājkyakṣra, a, and kṣra,abhiva. Through these proofs, they say that an effect must already exist in its cause before it is produced'. By means of
these arguments the Śāṅkhya philosophers established the theory of

Pari, jñāvājda.

According to this theory, an effect is already existent in

unmanifested form in its cause. The Śāṅkhya philosophers hold the view

that no one can convert non-existence into existence nor can that which

exists be entirely destroyed. For example, gold ornaments such as rings

and earrings are not different from the gold used to make them.

**Unconscious and Conscious Principle (Prakṛti and Puruṣa)**

(1) Prakṛti
The Śāmkhya philosophy accepts the ultimate cause of the world as Prākṛti. Prākṛti is neither atomic substance nor consciousness, but it possesses the three guṇas-sattva, rajas and tamas. The balanced condition of sattva, rajas and tamas is called prākṛti-“satvarajas-tamoguṇīṁ śmyvastha prākṛti”. One can only imagine a state in which all nature is balanced and there is no levity, no motion, no heaviness, no light, no darkness, no opposing forces, in which the imagination itself, being a product of the mind, is dissolved. The Śāmkhya philosophers describe this state as uncaused, unmanifested, eternal, all-pervading, devoid of effect-producing actions, without a second, independent and partless.
(2) Puruṣa

Śāmkhya is a dualistic philosophy. It aspects two realities, that is, Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Puruṣa is a conscious principle, both the subject of knowledge and object of knowledge. Śāmkhya offers five arguments to prove the existence of Puruṣa. They are, samghita parvthatva, trigu, diviparyaya, adhitina, bhoktra, bhavat and kaivaly贸易 pravatti. Through these arguments, they say that there must be a conscious principle. That conscious principle is Puruṣa.

(3) Proof of the Existence of many selves.

The Śāmkhya-s accept the existence of many selves. They give five reasons for approving the existence of manyselves. They are,
Based on these reasons, they accept the plurality of selves that are eternal and intelligent. Śímkhya accepts two realities, \textit{prakṛti} and \textit{puruṣa}. \textit{Prakṛti} is the material cause of the world. \textit{Puruṣas} are many pure concious intelligent entities who are not subject to change. It is from the interaction of these two principles that evolution occurs. That means, the \textit{mahattattva} is originated from \textit{prakṛti}, the \textit{ahamkāra} is originated from \textit{mahattattva}, from \textit{ahamkāra} the sense organs, the physical organs, five \textit{tanmatrās} and manas are originated, from the a
group of sixteen principles, five gross elements are originated⁵. This is the creation process accepted by Śāmkhya philosophers.

**The concept of liberation.**

According to the Śāmkhya concept, the universe is full of pain and misery, and even what is thought of as pleasure is mingled with sorrow. Because all the pleasure ultimately ends in disappointment, which is the basis of misery. The Śāmkhya philosophy states that all the living beings strive to rid themselves of pain and misery. This can be achieved only by the correct discriminative knowledge of reality. That is
called liberation. According to them, the liberation is of two kinds

jevanmukti and videhamukti.

The liberation attained in one’s lifetime is called jevanmukti. In it, a person continues his existence in this world as a liberated being. He enjoys the worldly objects until he lasts in his body. When all the samskāras are finished, then the last breath goes off his body and he is said to enter into videhamukti, which is the liberation after death.

The concept of God.

The Sāmkhya philosophers do not talk about God because they wanted to teach human beings to be independent and courageous so
that they would explore all the potentials hidden within. So the Sāmkhya philosophers do not accept the existence of God.

Yoga Philosophy

The practical aspect of Sāmkhya is the yoga system. Patañjali was the first sage to systematise the yoga philosophy. The yoga system is highly practical. It discusses the nature of mind, its modifications, impediments to growth, afflictions, and the method for attaining the highest goal of life that is kaivalya. This method is described in eight steps and it is known as Āta’gayoga.

The Concept of God.
Patañjali accepts the existence of God: *kleśakarma vibhīgaayairaparīmārgaśā puruṣāvijīṣaṇa eśvara*. This conception of god can give hope to human beings, for, when one overcomes all affictions and does not allow himself to identify with his Karmas and when one becomes free from all *samskīras*, then he becomes liberated and merges into God consciousness.

According to Patañjali, the individual in essence is God. There is only one God. It is ignorance that creates duality from the one single reality called God. When ignorance is dissolved into the light of knowledge, all dualities are dissolved and full union is achieved. When
one overcomes ignorance, duality dissolves and he merges with the
perfect single being. That perfect single being always remains perfect
and one.

Refutation of Śāṁkhya Philosophy

āa’kara considers Śāṁkhya as the chief opponent (pradhīna
malla). In the words of Dr. Shivkumar, āa’kara is the chief critic of
Śāṁkhya. The criticism of Śāṁkhya as offered by other commentators of
the Brahmasūtra does not display any excellence of arguments in
comparison to those by āa’kara. Jerald James also explains: “āa’kara in
Brahmasūtraṭṛabhjāya gives more detailed and precise attention to the
criticism of Śāmkhya than he does to any other system, and is influential in the sense that āa’kara’s criticism not only encompasses most of the important critical issues in classical Śāmkhya in its own time but is considered to be a locus classicus for the criticism of Śāmkhya by orthodox thinkers down to the present day”9. But the crucial problem for the interpreter of Śāmkhya is that there is no extant classical Śāmkhya text. In the classical period, there was a series of commentaries on the Śāmkhyakṣṭrika, and the latter is not a polemical text in the manner of classical philosophical ājṣtra. Dasgupta says: “The basic text Śāmkhyasūtra was not referred to by any writer until it was commented upon by Aniruddha in the 14th century A. D. The present
work Śāmkhyaśutra contains the refutation of other philosophical doctrines”. Therefore, we can say that the present work of Śāmkhyasutra was written after the other Śtras. So Āśākara takes the Śāmkhyakṣrika as the basic text to refute the Śāmkhya concept. Allen Thrasher has noted that Āśākara’s presentation of Śāmkhya clearly shows that the Śāmkhyakṣrika of Śāvakṣaṇā was evidently a potent rival in Brähmaical philosophical circles at the beginning of the 8th century.

Āśākara does not totally reject the Śāmkhya concepts. He has no objection in accepting the Śāmkhya theories such as the important
nature of the soul which does not contradict the position of Advaita, but they do not accept the plurality of self. According to Kolla Chenchulakâmi, “though the followers of Sîmkhya –yoga and also of the áa´kara school of Advaita Vedînta do subscribe to Satkîryavîda, and differ in their explanation of the production which involves real change (pari,jma) of the cause into effect, the followers of the áa´kara school of Advaita Vedînta hold the view that production in the ultimate analysis is only illusory (vivarta) and does not involve real change (pari,jma)”12. The Advaitins do not accept Pradhîna as the cause of the universe13 (Pradhînakîra, avîda).
The main points of refutation of Śāmkhya are:

1. Pradhīna is the cause of the universe. 2. The term īnandamaya represents pradhīna. 3. The term akāra represents pradhīna. 4. The term avyakta represents pradhīna. 5. The term sat represents pradhīna.

6. The term ajj represents pradhīna. 7. Refutation of the concept, the resting place of heaven and earth in Pradhīna. 8. The theory of Puruṣābabahutva. 9. Authority of Smātis. 10. Refutation of the concept of Īśvara. These are the main grounds for āa’kara to criticize Śāmkhya philosophy.
1 Pradhôna as the cause of the Universe.

In İkâatyadhikara, a of Brahmasêtra, áa'kara primarily aims at disproving the scriptural basis of the theory of Pradhôna of Śiṁkhya. In that adhikara, a, he discusses the following passage of the Chandogyopaniṣad — “śīdeva somyedamagreṣedekamevadvitēyam”, “tadaikātata bahu syīm prajyeya tattejōṣjata”14. According to Śiṁkhya, the word sat stands for the cause of the universe, and the term idam in this passage denotes modifications of the ultimate cause conditioned by names and forms. The passage implies that the world was existent in the form of sat before its evolution. Therefore, the sat
denotes the causal form of the manifold world. This can be explained by the Śāmkhya theory of Satkāryanīda. According to this theory, the effect is the attainment of another condition by a causal substance.

According to Advaitins, āruti speaks of sat as the ultimate self.

Sat is said to be the fundamental entity which enters into objects in terms of ātman. According to āruti, the world originated from sat.

“tasmād etasmādītmānā jīvātā sāṁbhitā” So, the pradhīna of Śāmkhya is not the cause of the world.

The Śāmkhya-s argue that the pradhīna is all-knowingness because it has Sattvā quality. The smṛti also says that “Sattvā brings
the knowledge” 17. áa’kara refutes this by saying that Sattva is not predominant in pradhíña, because the state of equilibrium of three gujas is called pradhíña. If we accept that pradhíña is capable of producing knowledge, then the two gujas (Rajas and Tamas) must be equally capable of retarding knowledge. So Sattva will make it all-knowing, and others (Rajas and Tamas) will make it partly knowing, which is a contradiction. Besides, if the Sattva is not illumined by the witnessing soul, there is no chance to say that it is knowledge. The Śyāmkhya’s pradhíña is insentient in nature. The insentient pradhíña has no power to illumine. Therefore the omniscience of pradhíña does
not happen\textsuperscript{16}. So áa’kara does not accept the Pradhùnakjra,avjda of Sýmkhya.

áa’kara says that the omniscient and sentient Brahman is the cause of the universe. But the Sýmkhya-s have another objection against the causality of Brahman. They say that Brahman is not omniscient in its figurative sense. It is omniscient in its primary sense only. So, the omniscient Brahman is not the cause of the world. áa’kara refutes this concept by saying that the knowledge of Brahman is eternal. It does not depend upon any external thing such as instrument or object of knowledge. For example, in the case of the sun, the natural heat and
light do not depend upon any external agency\textsuperscript{39}. So the omniscient 

*Brahman* is the cause of the world. áa’kara says there is no scope for the 

causality of *pradh\ñna* in *áruti*. But S\ımkhya-s argue for the *áruti* basis 
of *pradh\ñna*. In worldly experience, we can see that the qualities of 
sentient beings are figuratively spoken of as belonging to non-sentient 
objects, like the sentence ‘*k£lam pipateÁati*’ (The bank wishes to fall) 

and *áruti* also says that the qualities of sentient beings are figuratively 
ascribed to fire, water, etc\textsuperscript{20}. Therefore, the S\ımkhya-s argue that the 

*pradh\ñna* is the cause of the universe. áa’kara rejects this concept by 
saying that the *árutis* attribute acts of thinking to water, fire, etc. 

because they are dependent upon *Brahman*. In the context, the water
and fire are identified with the Highest reality i.e., Brahman. The term sat in the passage from the Candogyopaniṣad; sadeva somyedamagreṣit’ ityupakramya ‘tadaikāta… tattejo-svajata’ – refers to the intelligent principle, the Jēva. The insentient pradhāna cannot refer to an intelligent principle like the Jēva as its Self.

The Śīmkhya-s try to reject this objection (cause of the universe is sat) on the ground that the term ītman can be used in the secondary sense, as one person is figuratively called ītman of another man where purpose is accomplished by the former. A king calls the servant who stakes his life for the king, as his own Ītman. In the same way,
pradhīna which executes all the purposes of puruṣa by way of contributing to its enjoyment (bhoga) and release (apavarga) may be called ītman.  

Sankara criticizes this device too. Ītman (Brahman) is the cause of the universe. It is identical with the Je jitman. Counsels like knowledge tattvamasi are given to the disciple for attainment of liberation through the idea of non-difference between the disciple and the Brahman. If the position that sat represents the pradhīna is accepted, the teachings would be falsely equating the two, i.e., non-sentient pradhīna and sentient disciple, which are diametrically
opposed to each other in nature. If the Śijñkhya view was true, āruti would be regarded as teaching that soul is non-sentient, and this would prevent the possibility of release. The term Ātman can be used in the figurative sense. It can however, not lead to assume that figurative sense of word is applicable everywhere. Otherwise it will lead to a general want of confidence. It is also not plausible to say that the same term Ātman denotes sentient as well as non-sentient objects, because a word does not have many meanings. Hence the term Ātman primarily denotes sentient objects and is applied to elements by a figurative attribution of sentience to them. If the word Ātman is used in two senses, the sense applicable in certain contexts cannot be ascertained without
some determining attributive word. The fact that Ėtman is spoken of as the self of āvetaketu is sufficient to decide that it does not refer to pradhjna which is non-sentient in nature$^{27}$.

āa’kara states that the Śimkhya-s infer cause from common properties of effects. All the outward and inward effects are endowed with common qualities of pleasure, pain and indifference. Hence they should have pleasure, pain and indifference as their cause, just as jar, dishes, etc. have clay as their common property. Clay is the Upjdanakaraa of those things. The pleasure, pain and indifference constitute the threefold pradhjna. The pradhjna which is essentially
non-sentient and productive spontaneously evolves into its modifications to serve the purpose of puruṣā.²⁸

āa’kara argues that the existence of pradhīna cannot be established inferentially. It is not conclusive enough to establish non-sentient pradhīna as the cause of the universe. For example, the lump of clay cannot transform itself into a pot. Non-sentient objects without being guided by some sentient being, cannot produce a special form for accomplishment of the purpose of the sentient being. The world with different things, variegated objects, etc. cannot be created by non-
sentient pradhjna. The manifold yet special orderliness in universe leads to the conclusion contrary to the position of áa’kara\textsuperscript{29}.

The cause is twofold, Upd|n|k|ra\textsubscript{a} and Nimittak|ra\textsubscript{a}.

Consequently, the effect has two sets of properties: those derived from the Upd|n|k|ra\textsubscript{a}, like aceta\textit{n}at\textit{va} and m\textit{t}dmakat\textit{va}, and those caused by the Nimittak|ra\textsubscript{a} like the vi\textit{t}araca\textit{n}; as is evident in the jar. S\textit{j}nk\textit{hya} highlights the properties of Upd|n|k|ra\textsubscript{a} and argues in favour of the non-sentient nature of the cause. We are not, however, bound to rely upon the properties of Upd|n|k|ra\textsubscript{a} of world. Relying
upon the properties of Nimittak\(_ra\), we may argue for the sentient
nature of the cause\(^{30}\).

Moreover, the logical reason put forward by S\(_{\text{imkhya}}\) is not
valid. It is not proved that individual objects are of the pleasure, pain
and indifference. The feeling of pleasure, pain etc is internal and is
accessioned by the objects according to the mental disposition of
sentient beings. This is why, even though the objects like sound etc.
remain the same, the particular feeling of pleasure, pain. etc. is
experienced differently by different people\(^{31}\).
The theory that all finite objects originate from the combination of many materials does not prove the existence of Pradhjna as the ultimate cause of the universe. It involves the undesired contingency of admitting some cause for Guj-s also, as they are separate and infinite.

The finiteness of Guj-s is held to be unlimited in magnitude and consequently omnipresent, there will be no disturbance then in the state of equilibrium. Hence to explain the possibility of evolution, the finite nature of Guj-s must be admitted. The reason that alone which is capable produces the effect, also proves the sentient nature of the cause, because no activity can be found in a non-sentient object. The particular nature of the relation of cause and effect also equally points
to the causality of the sentient being. The relation of cause and effect that exists in the case of things like couches, bed etc, can be created only with the help of a sentient agent\textsuperscript{32}.

The theory of Svabhvikaparisma (spontaneous modification) of pradhjna is also untenable. The S\textsuperscript{\textcommath}mkhya\textsuperscript{\textcommath}s held that pradhjna is automatically transformed into effect as the grass, independent of any instrumental cause, is transformed into milk\textsuperscript{33}. According to ā\textcommath\textcommath\textcommath\textcommath\textcommathkara, this analogy is not effective. The grass itself cannot transform into milk. It changes into milk due to some other cause, i.e., when it is supervised by a sentient being. This is made evident by the fact that
grass transforms into milk only when it is eaten by the cow and not when it is eaten by a bull. Moreover, grass eaten by the cow does not change into the horns of the cow; it is changed into only milk. So, this analogy does not prove the svábhávikapárajña of pradhéna.34

According to áá’kara, the state of pradhéna is a condition of balance of the three Gujas (Sattva, Rajas, Tamas), which are independent of each other and in a state of equilibrium before creation. This equilibrium is upset, when one Guja becomes more predominant than the other two. The equilibrium cannot be upset with the help an
external force; there can be no origin of *Mahat*. Hence creation would be impossible.

The Śīmkhya-s say against the above concept that the *Guₐ*-s are naturally unsteady. From this it follows that even during equilibrium the *Guₐ*-s exist in a state of potential divergence. According to āa’kara, this also is refutable because, if we accept the above concept of Śīmkhya, there can be no origin of *Mahat*. So āa’kara refuted the *Pradhīnakṛta,avidata* of Śīmkhya by saying that the sentient object cannot be produced by the nonsentient principle like *pradhīna*.

2. The term *sat* represents *pradhīna*
áa'kara argues that the term sat\textsuperscript{35} does not represent pradhj\text{na}. If it had been intended to be so, the teacher might have made an endeavour to tell the disciple that Pradhj\text{na} is different from what is denoted by sat in tattvamasi\textsuperscript{36}. He might have asked the disciple to discard his own self. The stand on sat or pradhana is taught as the helping stage to reach correct connotation. For example a person intending to inform another as to which star is Arundhati, draws his attention to near by star and asks him to shift his attention to real Arundhati which is adjacent to the one seen first. In the present case, identity between denotation of the term sat and the self is established.

Thus Pradhj\text{na} cannot be the denotation of the term sat.
If we accept *pradhjna* the cause of the universe is denoted by the term *sat* it would imply falsity of the statements like “all is known by knowing one”. According to the *upanisads* through the knowledge of one cause all its effects become known. The knowledge of *pradhana* gives rise to knowledge of its effect through object of experience only.

The subject experience which is not the modification of *pradhjna*, will still remain un-known since the knowledge of non-sentient *pradhjna* cannot generate the knowledge of the intelligent soul.

َاˈkara argues that in the state of deep sleep the *jiva* is unified with its our self (*atman*) called *sat*, *Pradhjna* cannot be this self, as
sentient cannot be unified with non-sentient \textit{pradhjna}. The difficulty cannot be overcome by interpreting self (\textit{jiva}) as \textit{pradhjna} because it will lead to the absurdity of resolving sentient self into non-sentient \textit{pradhjna}. More over, it will contradict the \textit{rut\textit{i}} that the soul in the state of \textit{suv\textit{upti}} is resolved into sentient entity\textsuperscript{40}.

Therefore, the term \textit{sat} denotes the sentient entity in which all souls are resolved.

\textbf{3. Anandamaya does not represent \textit{pradhjna}}

The S\textit{imkhy\textit{i}}-s argue that in \textit{Tattireyopani\textit{Ad}} passage "\textit{tasm\textit{id va etasm\textit{id vij\textit{uanamay\textit{id anyotar\textit{tim\textit{nandamayaA}}}}}"\textsuperscript{41}, the term
jnandamaya denotes pradhjna. Ėnandamaya, being described as an internal factor, can denote cause only and no effect. In this way pradhjna seems to be referred to in the āruti\(^{42}\).

According to áankara, the āruti speaks of the act of desire with reference to jnandamaya. Desire is the quality of a sentient being. The act of desiring cannot be ascribed to the non-sentient pradhjna. The passage of the UpaniĀad speaks about the union (yoga) of the individual soul with the jnandamaya in the state of liberation. The individual self cannot merge into the non-sentient jnandamaya which does not respresents pradhjna\(^{43}\).
1. **The term akāra does not represent Pradhīna**

   āa‘kara establishes that the term *akāra* in the following

   *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣada* does not refer to Pradhīna. *Kasmin nu khalvyaṁ aotaṁ ceta sahoṣcaitad vai tadowsaram gṛgī brahma, a

   abhivadanty asthālam anntu.

   The Śīmkhya-s may argue that the term *akāra* is said to be a

   support of Pradhīna, which is the general cause, and as such can be

   said to be the *śdīra* (support) of everything. āa‘kara says that the

   word *akāra* in the *āruti* cannot denote Pradhīna. Because the *āruti*

   speaks of the art of command with reference to *akāra* and such an act
is not possible in the case of pradhña which is non-sentient in nature. The Non-sentient objects like clay are not capable of commanding the effect, jar and the like. The passage which speaks of akāra negates qualities of principles. Other than Brahman, pradhña may be designated as unseen etc but qualities like seen point to sentient principle and consequently negate pradhña which is non-sentient in nature.

āruti itself speaks of the act of seeing, hearing, knowing, etc., with reference to the cause of the universe. These acts are not applicable to pradhña. So akāra cannot represent pradhña.
5. The term *avyakta* does not represent *pradhjna*

The kathopaniÅad says: “*mahatah param avyaktam avyakti puruÅah param*”\(^{49}\). á’kara attempts to establish that the term *avyakta* in this passage does not refer to the S¡mkhya concept of *pradhjna*.

According to S¡mkhya, the term *avyakti* denotes the *UpadÅnakra, a* of universe, i.e., *pradhjna, prakåti, avyakti*. The term *avyakti* is conventionally used in the sense of *pradhjna*. The derivation of the term supports the view of S¡mkhya. Etymologically, *avyakti*
means that ‘which is not manifest’. This corresponds to pradhña of
Sāmkhya which is devoid of sound and other qualities.

According to āaṅkara, the meaning of the word avyakt; can be
understood in two ways, etymologically and conventionally. The word
avyakt; is neither etymologically nor conventionally applicable to
pradhana. Etymologically, the term avyakt; means that which is not
vyakt; or manifest. It is applicable to anything which is subtle, thus it
cannot be restricted to the pradhña of Sāmkhya. This convention of
Sāmkhya goes against the sense of the āruti. As regards the order of
mentioning the categories, āaṅkara states that the identity of objects
cannot be proved by similarity of order of treatment, unless the identity is recognized independently. No sensible person, who comes to perceive a cow in place of a horse, comes to ascertain that what he is perceiving is in fact a horse.\[51\]

Śāmkhya controverts this argument by stating that the kathopaniśad itself speaks of Pradhāna as the object of knowledge.\[52\] The qualities attributed to the object of knowledge in the āruti are the qualities which are ascribed to pradhāna by āamkhya. āa’kara refuted this point. According to him, that which is referred to in such passages is not pradhāna. The subject matter of this passage is the Supreme self.
In all the statements of the *Upaniṣads*, such attributes as soundless etc. are connected with the self alone. *Pradhīna* is neither spoken of as object of knowledge nor is said to be endowed with qualities mentioned in the āruti. If the passage is regarded as referring to *Pradhīna* it will not improve the position of Śāṅkhya. The Śāṅkhya-s do not mention that one becomes free by knowing *Pradhīna* only, but they connect that result rather with the recognition of the intelligent self (*puruṣa*). Thus the āruti passages in no way prescribe the knowledge of *pradhīna* for attainment of liberation. So the word *avyakti* also does not denote *pradhīna* for the terms in āruti are not used in the technical sense as decided upon by Śāṅkhya. In the case of *Mahat*, it is interpreted by
Śimkhyā as the first evolute of pradhīna. In āruti, it is used in quite a different sense as the term is used in connection with the highest self\textsuperscript{34}.

Similarly, the term avyaktī also cannot denote the technical sense of pradhīna in āruti.

6. The term ājit does not represent pradhīna

The Śimkhyā argues that the term ājit in the following upaniṣad portion denotes pradhīna.

“ajmekim lohitāuklakṣā, ājit

bhāveā praJayāṣajāṃjīm sarāpīh
According to them, the three adjectives of aj denote the three gu-ś of pradhīna. Rajas is symbolised by lohit because of its colouring and influencing quality. The Sattvī is indicated by ākula because it is of the nature of light and kṣaṇa signifies tamaṣ on account of its covering and obscuring property. The state of equipoise, i.e., prakṛti is expressed through qualities of its avayavadharmīs (components). The word ajś means unborn and refers to pradhīna in its derivative sense pradhīna, which produces manifold effects of
uniform nature, in so far as they are endowed with the three guj-s, is uncaused and is the cause of everything. The second half of the verse under consideration speaks of two unborn principle. Of the two unborn principles, one is deluded by indiscrimination which falsely identifies itself with prakāti and is considered itself as the experiencer of pleasure and pain. The other puruṣa, whose power of discrimination has been aroused after enjoying her discards aj{(prakāti) and attains liberation. This provides scope for the ārutipramjya of Śimkhya.

According to the Advaitins, the passage itself is incapable of justifying the philosophical position. The term ajj denotes different
principles. The passage contains no special characteristic to enable the term \textit{aj} to signify \textit{pradh\=na} and to exclude its other possible connotations. Its purpose and the context of the passage do not favour to S\=mkhya to \textit{\=aruti} without consideration of its context, purpose etc.

The passage afterwards speaks of power of the highest Lord. The subsequent passages also describe the same on the ground of the general context. We may conclude that no entity independent of \textit{Parame\=var\=a} can be indicated by the term \textit{aj}.\textsuperscript{60}

\textbf{7. Refutation of the concept, the resting Place of Heaven and Earth in \textit{Pradh\=na}}
According to áankara, the sūtra ‘njanjnam atacchabdhn̄m’ proves against that Pradhāna is the resting place of heaven and earth mentioned in the Mundakopaniṣad passage—

“yasmin dyuṣ pāthvecintarekāam
otam manaḥ sahapriyaśca sarvaiḥ
evaikam juptmanm anaya

vico vimucathamsatyaiāsetu”

Śīmkhya may argue that the abode of heaven and earth is declared to be the bridge of immortality. The bridge pre-supposes
something else beyond it. Brahman cannot serve as the bridge, for, there is nothing to be beyond it. Pradājna being the cause of everything, can be the general abode.

Advaitins criticize the stand of Śāmkhya on the ground that there is no word in the passage to denote pradājna. On the contrary, there are several words indicating that this abode is the sentient principle. The Mundakopaniśad describes Ākāra Brahman as the abode of heaven and earth. The same is called the bridge of immortality because it is the knowledge of the Ākāra Brahman, which leads to liberation. The passage in the Mundakopaniśad, ‘brahmavit
brahmaiva bhavati shows that the subject matter of the whole upanisads from beginning to end is this Brahman. Therefore, it is the same Brahman which is spoken of as the abode of heaven and earth.

2. **Refutation of the theory of Puruṣabahutva**

The term puruṣa has been used in the Vedic literature to denote both the jīvātma which means the embodied being or personality, and the supreme creator⁶⁷. The author of Śīmkhyasūtra has dealt with these in two separate sūtras, viz., śīmkhata parjñatvāt, and triguṇadvi viparyayāt⁶⁸. According to Śīmkhya the puruṣas are many and identical in nature⁶⁹. All puruṣas are of the nature of pure consciousness, devoid
of qualities and all pervasive in nature. Śāmkhya puts five proofs for establishing *puruṣābāhūtva*. According to Śāmkhya-Yoga, there is a separate *puruṣa* for each individual, which provides enjoyment and liberation. Anima sen Gupta says that, “the first four arguments seek to prove the existence of the soul as the controller and enjoyer of the world of composite things. The last argument is based on the observed facts of the world which is striving for freedom, and that itself is the Supreme goal. Dr. Radhakrishanan, says that, the *puruṣas* have different sense organs and motor organs and they undergo death and birth separately.

If the soul were just one, the knowledge gained by one would mean the knowledge by all, i.e., liberation of all. The above argument strictly
speaking, is not helping to prove the plurality of the puruṣa which is explained in the Kṛiṣṇa.\footnote{73}

ākara negates this theory of Śūmkhya in a logical way. The theory of Śūmkhya implies confusion of the acts done by the beings and their fruits. The impressions of acts as well as their fruits in here with prādhīna. Every puruṣa will equally be associated with happiness and sorrows of all puruṣas.\footnote{74} The Śūmkhya-s may object to it by saying that prādhīna will evolve in a certain direction to cause the difference of actions in assigning them to different puruṣas. The prādhīna will evolve for puruṣas who are bound and will not effect the release. It will
desist from a particular activity for a particular puruṣa. In this way, there will be difference in respect of happiness and sorrows of puruṣās.

āa’kara says, that the difference is not meant for explaining the motive of pradhīna’s evolution. There should be some proof for the difference too. In the absence of such a proof we cannot think of release which presupposes such a difference.

The Śīmkhya-s may further argue that the unseen result of actions in a-ājña will regulate the experience of pleasure and pain.

According to them, a-ājña or the unseen principle is religious merit or
demerit acquired by the souls; it inheres not in the soul, but in the
pradhīna. The pradhīna is common to all souls. So there is nothing to
fix that a particular a.-ṣāga operates in a particular soul.\textsuperscript{177}

The resolution also cannot restrict the particular a.-ṣāga of
action to a particular person. They are produced from contact of
internal organs with the soul. The soul, being pervasive, will come into
contact with all internal organs. So there is no restriction to balance the
pleasure and pain.

The Śāmkhya-s may further argue that the limitations can be
furnished by space. The ṇtman is all-pervasive, and the particular
experience of pleasure and pain will pertain to that part of the soul which comes into contact with the internal organ. It will involve further absurdities. All the souls will permeate all bodies because there is nothing to restrict a particular body to a particular soul. There will be the confusion of acts and their fruits. The supposition of parts of souls implies that two souls having the same potential results of acts may experience the results of acts by one body. The supposition of souls will further lead to the impossibility of enjoyments in heaven; the \textit{a·ṇāṭa} is effective in a particular place, i.e., the body. After, there is no body so there is no enjoyment in heavenly world. Therefore soul, being devoid of \textit{a·ṇāṭa}, cannot experience the fruit of \textit{a·ṇāṭa} in heaven.\textsuperscript{28}
Dr. Radhakrishnan has rightly pointed out that the Śāmkhya arguments for the existence of puruṣa turn out to be proof for the existence of the empirical individuals and not of the transcendental subjects. Let us see the arguments that establish the multiplicity of the puruṣa. The Śāmkhya system recognizes the plurality of puruṣa.Śāmkhya argues that puruṣa is the spirit, the subject, the knower. It is neither body nor the mind, nor ego (ahamkāra) nor intellect (buddhi). It is not a substance which possesses the quality of consciousness as is held by the system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It is consciousness which is pure immutable.
The Sāmkhya view of puruṣā is determined by the conception of ītman in the Upaniṣads. It is without beginning or end, without any qualities, soluble and omnipresent, an eternal seer, beyond the senses, beyond the mind, beyond the sweep of intellect, beyond the range of time, space and causality, which form the warp and woof of the mosaic of the empirical world. It is unproduced and unproducing. Its eternity is not merely everlastingness, but immutability and perfection. It is of the form of consciousness (cidrēpa). Puruṣā is unrelated to prakṛti. It is a mere witness, a solitary, indifferent, passive spectator. āākara accepts the Sāmkhya concept of the puruṣā as pure consciousness. He refutes their concept of puruṣābahiḥ, because there is no proof for
the plurality of souls. According to áa’kara, there is no worldly example to support the all-pervasiveness of many entities. It can be controverted on the basis of common experience. He states that there is only one Self.

The plurality of selves is accepted by Advaita, as only a product of ignorance and not as a reality. The self, according to áa’kara is all-pervasive and eternal.

9. Refutation of the authority of smātis

In Smātyadhikara, there is a discussion about the authority of smātis, like Kapilasmāti (Śīmkhya), Patañjalasmāti (yoga), Manusmāti, etc. There, the pErvapakāins raises the problem of
If it be said that the Brahman is the cause of the world, there would be the defect of leaving no scope for certain Smśritis. The Śāmkhya-s argue for the validity of Śāmkhyasmśti.

They say that the Smśritis and Tantras are written by great sages like Kapila and accepted by the good people. The Smśritis of Kapila are composed from the standpoint of the fullest insight leading to liberation. The vedic passages should be interpreted in the light of the Smśti of Kapila which is primarily concerned with philosophical knowledge. The Smśritis composed by eminent men like Kapila, Manu, etc, are the authentic source of interpretation of Vedic passages for those who are unable to understand the meaning of the Vedas.
themselves. The *Smrtis* of Manu etc. find their aim fulfilled in laying down the rules regarding religious duties and moral conduct. The sage Kapila is extolled in *áruti* as possessing unobstructed knowledge. Therefore his opinion about the philosophical doctrines, should not be doubted. Moreover, the views of the authors of the *Smrtis* are supported by reason. The theories propounded in the *Smrti* of Kapila should be interpreted in the light of these *árutis*.

The Advaitins deny the arguments of the *Pردvapakśins* and argue that all the *smrtis* are not valid. According to áa'kara, if the particular *smrtis* which propound the causality of *Pradhña*...
accepted, the rest of the śārūti
tis which declare the causality of Brahman
will be irrelevant. In case of conflict of views among the Śārūtis, those
which conform to śāruti should be accepted\textsuperscript{82}. śāruti is the absolute
authority regarding matters which are not cognized by perception and
other means of empirical knowledge. The Śimkhya-s say that the śārutis
have to be interpreted in the light of the Śārūtis. The argument that the
views of eminent sages like Kapila should surely be accepted is also not
faultless. It is not reasonable to question śāruti on the basis of words of
persons even though they may possess supersensuous powers, because
the attainment of these powers depends upon religious duties enjoined
by śāruti.
áa’kara states that the interpretation of áruti, offered by eminent sages like Kapila, should not be attached to any Smâti without ceasing and should ascertain the truth on the basis of Smâtis based on árutis. Otherwise, the final decision regarding the ultimate reality will be unstable because there are different Smâtis holding different views. As regards the mention of Kapila in áruti as possessing unobstructed knowledge, áa’kara says that there are several Kapilas in tradition\(^{(82)}\). It cannot be ascertained which Kapila is praised in the árutis. The exponent of Śiṁkhya (Kapila) is criticized by Mahabhirata for the multiplicity of souls\(^{(83)}\). Moreover, Kapila cannot be allowed to monopolize learnedness. Manu, the author of a Smâti, is also praised in
the áruti and emphasizes the unity of the self which condemns Kapila’s view of multiplicity of souls. Thus, the authority of the Veda being direct and final, requires no further proof. Hence the Smáti of Kapila deserves no consideration in so far as it contradicts áruti.

Refutation of Yoga philosophy.

áa’kara refutes the Yoga philosophy through the commentary of Brahmasutra-etenā yogā śāntā pratyuktaś. In it, he says that by the refutation of the Śímkhya Smáti, it is to be understood that the Yoga Smáti is also refuted. Because, like the Śímkhya philosophy, the Yoga philosophy also accepts the non-sentient pradhýna as the cause of the
world and the principles of *Mahat* and *Ahamkra* are derived from *pradhyna*. These concepts are contradictory to *áṣuti*. At the same time, Yoga philosophy is spoken of in *Upaniṣads* like *ávetajvataropaniṣad* Bṛhadṛṣṭra, yakopaniṣad, Kathopaniṣad, etc. Yoga helps the concentration of mind and it is a means to knowledge.

So Yoga *Smṛti*, being based on the *āruti*, is authentic. So áa’kara says that the portions which are in accordance with *āruti* are accepted by him, and other portions which contradict *āruti* are unacceptable to him.

Therefore, áa’kara refuted the Yoga philosophy in a special *adhikarana*.

*(Yogapratyuktyadhikara, a.)*

Refutation of Ívāra
The major difference between Śīmkhya and Yoga is about their concept of God. Śīmkhya does not accept the authority of God. So it is called \textit{nirēvara} Śīmkhya. But yogins accept authority of God. So they are known as \textit{seēvara} Śīmkhya. According to their principles, God is the ruler of \textit{pradhīna} and \textit{puruÅa}. Patañjali says that \textit{Īvara} is a special kind of being, untouched by ignorance and products of ignorance, not subject to karmas or the result of action: \textit{kleēa karma vibhīgaayair-raparamÅtÅ puruÅa viēeÅaÅ} \textsuperscript{87}. Yogins, say that God is the ruler of \textit{pradhīna}. That is why Patañjali describes God as a “special kind of Being”. Man is subject to the law of birth and death and the laws of \textit{karma}. But \textit{Īvara} is unborn and undying. Man is subject to his
simskaris. Īvara is free from simsāris and desires. He is not involved in the results of action. According to the yogins, the kaivalya means liberation, the amalgamation of sattī and puruṣā.

āa’kara refutes the above concept of God. He says that the Lord (Brahman) is both the material and efficient cause of the world. The Yogins view is that the Lord is the ruler of pradhīna, which shows that pradhīna is different from him. This idea leads to inconsistency, because it makes the Lord partial to some and prejudiced against other, for some people are well off in this world, while others are miserable.

āa’kara says that the Lord cannot be accused of any partially. He directs the individuals according to their merits and demerits earned in their
previous experience of life just as the rain helps different seeds to sprout each according to their nature. So the God is the efficient cause in bringing the latent tendencies of each individual to fruit⁸⁸. Therefore, áa’kara says that God has no partiality. The scriptures declare eÅa hyeva sjdhu karma kirayati tam yamadha nineÅate⁸⁹, and Pu,yovai pu,yena karma;i bhavati pipaÄ pipena⁹⁰. SmÅti also says: that ye yath;m;m prapadyante tamstathaåva bhajmyaham⁹¹

If we accept the Lord as a “special kind of being”, that also is untenable, because the puruÅa is admitted to be indifferent⁹².

If we accept the concept that God is different from pradhana and puruÅa. He cannot rule them unless it be through some relationship.
But the relationship of conjunction is not possible because the
pradhīna, puruṣa and God are omnipresent and partless. So āśākara
says that the argument of Yoga about God is not acceptable. According
to Advaitins the relationship of God with the world is of
inexpressible identity, because it depends on the āruti, soyam
devatākāta hantāhamimāstīsro devata anena
jīvenītmjñanamupravīṣya njmarēpe yajkaravi,eti. tisim tvaśtam
tvaśtamekaikām karavi,eti ⁹³. So the Yoga concept of God is not
accepted by āśākara.
**Resume**

According to áa’kara, the Símkhya concepts are refutable because there are various contradiction in their principles. For example, sometimes Símkhya says that the senses are seven and again they are said to be eleven. In the case of tanmítṛṣṭis, in some places they say that tanmítṛṣṭis are derived from Mahat, and in another place they say that tanmítṛṣṭis are derived from Ahamkāra. Sometimes they mention that Antakaraṇa are three in number and sometimes they mention Antakaraṇa as only one number. This contradiction of Símkhya theory with áruti and Smāti is well known. So áa’kara refutes the Símkhya
philosophy. By the support of áruti, Smṛti and Yuktí áa’kara refuted the unacceptable concepts of Śīmkhya and Yoga. áa’kara employes yukti on the basis of dṛṣṭa, i.e., parallel instances available in our daytoday experience. According to him, through he īgama and īgamaṇusṛitarka, we can arrive at Brahman as the cause of the world.

Śīmkhya believes that through inference we can know that pradhīna is the cause of the world. In refutation of this concept, áa’kara says that anumāna cannot give us any knowledge about the cause of the world.

Because áruti says that the cause of the world is a sentient object. This sentient object Brahman has no connection with other means of knowledge. This is the view of áa’kara, whereas in Śīmkhya anumāna
has a major role to play in determining *prakṛti* or *pradhana* as the cause of the world. This is a major difference between Śīmkhya and Advaita.

According to āa’kara, Brahman is the *Upādhyakṛta* and *Nimittakṛana* of the Universe. Words such as *avyakta*, *akāra*, *sat* etc, used in the *Upaniṣads* do not represent the Śīmkhya concept of *pradhāna*. They are not independent. Moreover, the plurality of *puruṣa* is also unacceptable to the Advaitins, because *āruti* in no way admits plurality. So, that theory also is denied by āa’kara with the help of
áruti, Smṛti and Yukti. Those doctrines of Śāmkhya which do not clash with Advaita, are accepted by āśākara.
Notes and References

1 asadakri,adupinagraha,itsarvasambhavibhad akta yayakya

kara, jkira, a bhivid ca satkiryam. Sa.Ka.9

2 trigu, amavivekeviAayaA simnyam acetanamprasavadhar-

mevyaktam, that PradhnamTadviparetastath ca pumjn Sa.Ka11

3 samkhita pariRthatvtrigudiviparyaydadihijnad

puruAostu bhoktobhivid kaivalyirtham pravatte ca. Sa.Ka.17

4 jananamara,akirnnm pratiniyamadayagapat pravatte ca

5 \textit{prakrterm̐hāinstataḥhamkjraṣtaṃśaṃdga, aṣaḥcaḥodaṣakaḥ} ta
\textit{saṃdapiḥaṣaktaḥ paurusebhyaḥ pauracahEt} ṇi. \textit{Sa.Ka.18}

6 \textit{prjpte ṇarerabhede cīrīṛthātvaḥ aikantika-}
\textit{mītyantikam ubhayam kaivalyamapnoti} \textit{Sa.Ka.68}

7 \textit{Y.S,1.24}

8 Dr. Shivkumar, \textit{Śaṃkhya thought in the Brāhmaṇical Systems of Indian Philosophy}, p. 182.


10 S. N. Das Gupta, \textit{A History of Indain Philosophy} Vol. 1, p. 222
11 Allen W. Thrasher, *the Dates of Mandana Miṣra and Ākara*, p. 117

12 Kolla chechulekshmi, *The Concept of Pari,ma in Indian Philosophy*. P. 88

13 \( sîmkhyadâyistu pari,istam vastu pramî,antaraga-myameveti manyîmanîÅpradhînîdinî kîra,întara,înu-mimînistatparatayaiva \)

\( vedînta vîkyîni yojayanti BSSB . 1.1.5.5 \)

14 Ch. Up. 6.2.1. and 3.1

15 sataÅ sajjayate iti vîddhiÅ.S.K. p. 223

16 Tai. Up. 3.1
17 satvat samjayate jµñam. B.G.14.16

18 yattEktaṁ sattva dharmaṁ jµñenasarvajµṇimpradhanam bhaviĀyateti, tannopaphyate, nahipradhǐnavasthiyamgu, a

jmytsatviedadharmajµṇamsambhīvītmanEKtaṁsarvajµṇa, jaktimadv
enasarvajµṇam bhaviĀyateti. tadipinopaphyate yadigu, jsjmyesati
satvavyap jrayamjuṇa, jaktimjoritya sarvajµṇimpradhanamucyeta,
kimamra jastamovyapiśra-yamapijuṇa

pratibandhaka, jaktimjoritya kimcijµamu-cyeta. apicanaśikākī

sattvvāttirjñtin; bhidheyate. nj-
cacetanasyapradh\n\n.pradh\n\n.nasya sarvajnatyam. BSSB 1.1.5.5.

nasau \jj\n\nnanityatvedo\Aosti.j\n\nnanityatvej\n\nnavi\Aaya\Avs-
\ntantryayapade\onopapadhyataiticenna, \pratatau\A,ya-prk\i\ipi

savat\ri dahi prak\i\iapatit\i savat\itry vyapade\Aa dar\i\nat. BSSB 1.1.5.5.

\tat\teja\ik\Aata\t\paik\Aaantaitic\ctanayirap\iptejasosc- \ctanac
dupic\i\ra dar\i\anjt. Ch.Up.6.2.34.

Ch.Up.6.
22 jevo hi nīma ctanaṭ āreridhyakāaḥ praṇīṁ dhīrayita,
tatprasiddhernirvacanīcça. BSSB. 1.1.5.6.

23 yadhi hyacetanam pradhīnām saccabdavyaṁ tadjseti
gṛhyenmumukĀu cetanam santamacatanositi. tīṭivpa-retavidi

ījstram puruṣasyinarthiyetryapramj, jm. BSSB. 1.1.5.7.

24 Ch. Up. 6.14.3

25 api ca kvacitgau, jā ‘labdo’ dṛṣṭa iti naitavata labdaprāmja, ake

jṛtha gau, ekalpanjnyya, sarvatṛṇijv-isparsaṅ. BSSB. 1.1.5.7.
26 yattuktam cetan|cetanayo| sadhir|a, a itma|abda| kutu-
jalanayoriva jyoti|abda iti, tanna, anekarth|va|y|yy-yyat. Ibid.

27 prak|tam tu sadiksita|, s|mnehita|cetana|vetaket|A, nahi
cetanasya }vetakoracetan|ma sambhavatetyavoc|ma Ibid.

28 yattadsukha duhkha moh|tmakam sam|nyam tatrigu, am pradh|nam
m|dvat|cetanam cetanasya puru|jthe sadhayitum svabh|venaiva
vicitre,a vic|itmana vivartata iti.BSSB 2.2.1.1

29 tatedam jagadakhilam pathvy|di nin|karmabhalopabho-gayogyam
|hyam, adhy|tmikam ca |rer|di ninjat-yanvitam
pratiniyat|vayaviny|samane|akarmabhal|nu-bhav|hi|jnam

100
dāyamīnam praṇītvādbhiṣā sambhāvi-tītamaiḥ śilpiḥbirmanasa

pjilocayuṭu masakyam satkātaḥ-ḥam acesanam praḍhīnam racayet.

Ibid.

30 ato racanīnupatteṣaḥ hetorṇcetanam jagatkṛṣa,amanu- mītavyam

bhavati. Ibid

31 nahi bhavijhyātmikṣyāṃ bhedāṇm sukhadukhamoha-tmakat

ayinavya upapadhyate, sukhadinam cintā-ratvapratetāḥ,

śabdādenaṃ cātadvpatva pratetāḥ. tan-nimittatva pratetāḥca.

Ibid.
32 kṣṛyakira, abhivyāstupēkālapārvakaniṁ mitijām ẓayanj-sanjdenjāṁ

āja iti nakṣṛyakara, abhivyātīhyadhytm-ikijām bheda

nijmacetanāpārvakavitam ẓakyam kalp-ayitum. Ibid.

33 yathā tā, a pallavodakādi nimittāntaranirapekāam sva-bhivyideva

kṣerijhyākireṇa parinamatā evampradhijān-amapi

mahādhyākireṇa, a pari, amasyāja iti. BSSB. 2.2.1.5.

34 dhenvaiva hyupayuktam tā, ādi kācērbhavati na prahena

ma, a udāhyupayuktam va yadi hi nirmittametatsyidd-

henu jārerasambandhitanyatrāpi tā, ādi kācērbhavet. naca

yathākimām mīnu āairna ẓakyam sampādayitum-ityetvātā
nirnimittam bhavati. bhavati hi kimcitrjryam

m̄nūasaṃp̄j̄dhyam kimcita daivasamp̄j̄dhyam. manu-Ayj api

jaknsvantye vocitenopiyena t̄a dyup̄diya

k̄c̄ramm̄j̄patayitumprabh̄̂tam hi k̄c̄ram k̄mayama-naA

prabh̄̂tam k̄hasm dhenum cjarant. tatac̄a prab-h̄̂tam k̄c̄ram

labhanta. tasṃ̄nna t̄a, idivat svabh̄̂jvikaA pradh̄̃nasya pari, imaA.

Ibid.

35 sadeva somayedamagrejset. Ch. Up. 1.3.

36 yadhyanitmaiva pradh̄̃n̄am ‘saccabadvicyam’ si itma tattvamasi

itchopatiĀgam sýt̄sa tadupadēj̄rava, ada-n̄tmajµatayi ,
tannīśom jhṛtīti mukhyatmānām-upadījākāūstasya, 

heyatvam brṣyit. BSSB.1.1.5.8.

37 ekaviṃjīnena sarvaviṃjītam pratiṃjītam Ch.Up 6.

38 uta tamadeśamapriṃkāyo yenīcrutam īrutam bhavatya-amatam 
matamaviṃjītam viṃjīmitikatham nu bhagavaḥ sa īdeṣo 

bhavatetiyaḥ somyaikena mṛṇāṇena sarva-mṛṇaṃ, mayam 
vīṃjītam syād viśrambha, amvikīro ni-madheyam mṛṇāṇiketyeva 

satyaṃ evam soma sa īdeṣo bhavateti. Ch. Up. 6. 1. 1 - 3 

39 naca satccabdavicye pradhīne bhogyapavargakira,e 

heyatvenḥyatvena va viṃjīta bhokṣvargo viṃjīto bhavati,
apradhjnavikaratv¡dbhoktavargasya tasmínna pradhi-nam

saccabdavyayam. BSSB.1.1.5.8

40 YeÀ¡ ërutiÅ svapitetyatpurÀasya lokaprasiddham njma nirvakti.

sva¿abdenehítmocyate.yaÀprakàtaÁ saccabdav-accyastamapeto

bhavantyapigato bhavatêyarthA BSSB .1.1.5.9

41 Tai.Up.2.5 T.V

42 sjmkhya parikalpitam acetanam pradhi-nam ñandamay-atvena

kjra,atvena vipékâitavyam BSSB.1.1.6.18

43 ñandam brahma, o vidvÌn nabibhedi kutaìcana (Tai.Up. 2.9) tatra

prÌkêareridhylpatterabhidìyinam sâjyÌn-ìnìm ca
vikīr,imsṛAturavyatirekaĀ sarvakīrāśuĀji,ca na parasmi,dtmano anyatropapaphyate. BSSB.1.1.6.16.

44 Br.UP.3.8.7.8

45 syidetāt ki,ryasya cītkīra,īdhēna,tva,mambar̥ntaghrītīma,ab hyupagamyate, pradhīna kīra,avīdinoapeyamupapadh-yate.

BSSB.1.3.3.10

46 etasya vj akārasya pra,j,śana gīrī sēryacandramasa,au vidhūtattau tiĀṭau. Br.up.3.8.9
praṣjasanam ca parameṣṭivaram karma, cetanasya, pradhīnasya
praṣjasanam bhavati na hyacetanamen ghaṇḍikra, inim
madjenm ghaṇḍivaiyam praṣjas-anamasti. BSSB.1.3.3.11

tatrādāgatidyapadeṣaḥ pradhīnasypīpi sambhavati. dāgaḥśtvidi vyapadeṣastu na sambhavatyacetanatvīt. BSSB.1.3.3.12

Katha Up. 1.3.11

yaduktam radhīnasyāḥabdatvam tadasiddham. kṣucit-ccjkhīṣu
pradhīnasamarpa, ṭhīṣṇīṃ, sabdīṇīṃ īřyamī, atvīt atāḥ
pradhīnasya kṣra, atvam vedasidd-hameva mahadbhih
paramāśībhiḥ kapilaprabhāśībhiḥ pariṣṭhitamiti prasajyate.

BSSB. 1.4.1.1

51 na ca kramāytratrasāmyataṃsaṃjñīrthapratipattirbhavat-iyasati

\[ \text{tadṛṣṭa pāpraṭayaḥ} \text{bhijunyānaḥ} \text{vastiḥ} \text{ngim pa} \text{yannāyaḥ} \text{voyamitya mṛ o adhyavasyati. Ibid.} \]

52 indriyebhyāḥ pariḥ yarthāḥ arthebhyāḥ caparam manaḥ manasastu

\[ \text{parībuddhir} \text{buddheratmaḥ} \text{hīn para} \text{maha-taḥ} \]

\[ \text{paramavyaktamav} \text{yaktattputu} \text{aḥ para} \text{puruṣaḥ} \text{na para} \text{para} \text{hīnna param} \]

\[ \text{kimcits} \text{kJiṣ } \text{sīparīgatā. Katha. UP. 1.3 10, 11} \]
nāhi pradhānātmtram nicayya mañcaryumukhāṁ pramucyata iti

sīmkhyairīAyate. cetanātmavijñāṇidhi mañcaryumukhāṁ pramucyate iti
tejājmaṁabhupagamaĀ. Tasmānna pradh-ṁasyitrā jāyvatvam

avyakta ābdanirdistatvam vij BSSB 1.4.1.5.

yathā mahatccabdaĀ sīmkhyaiĀ sīttimatrepi prathamaje prayukto

na tameva vaidikepi prayoge abhidatte. BSSB 1.4.1.7

Sve. Up. 4-5

na jīyata ityajā syāt. mañlapraṭītiravikāṇītīḥ ityabhupag- amīt. BSSB 1.4.2.8
57 anyaÅ punarajaÅ puruÅa uḷpannavivekajñino virakto jahītyenam

prakṣtim bhukta bhogapavargo parityajati, mucyata ityarthāĀ.

Ibid.

58 arvagkilascamasāj ārdhvābhādhnaĀ Br. Up. 2.2.3

59 ityasmin mantre svītantrye, iyaṁ niṁsau camasobhi-pretati na

āṇyate niśeṣayitum BSSB 1.4.2.8

60 māyāmtu prakṣtim vidhyāniṁjiyinam tu maheśvaram iti yo yonim

yonimadhiti ātastyekāĀ (Sve. Up. 4.10,11) itica tasya evvagamṇṇa

svatantrya kacitprakṣtiĀ pradhīṇam niṁjanmṇṭre, jmnīyata iti

āṇyate vaktum. BSSB. 1.4.2.9
atra yadetadhyuprabhūtinīmotavacanadayatanam kici-
davagamyate, tatkim param brahma syād-hosvidart-hjntaramiti
samdihyate. tatrjīrtjntaram kimapyjyatanam syāditi priptam.

Kasmīt, amūdasyaiśa setuā iti śrava, it. pṛravā, kiśa loke setuā
prakhyātaś na ca parasya brah-mā, aśa pāravatvam
jākyamabhypagantum, anatamapī-ram (Br. Up. 2.4.12) iti srava, it
arthāntare cijyatane parigāhyamīma, e smātiprassiddham
pradhīnām parigṛh-hetayam tasya kṛṣṇa, atvijayatanatvopapattē ā.

BSSB. 1.3.1.1

64 puruṣa evedam viśvam karma tapo brahma parīṁśtam iti.

“Brahmaivedamamāṁ tam purastābraham paścit brahma
dakāi, jatācottare, a” iti ca. Mun. Up. 2.2.11.

65 sarvam brahmeti tu samāhikṣra yam prapūrca-pravilpanīrtam
nanekaresatipratipādanīrtham. “sayatha saindhavakhana
anantanroabhyāḥ kātsno rasakhana evaivam vi
areyamītmanāntarabhyāḥ kātsnāḥ prajā-nakhana eva” (Br. Up.
4.5.13) ityekarasat: rava it. tas-mi:dhyubhv:i:dhy:i:yanam param brahma. BSSB 1.3.1.1

\[66\] yatt:ktam, sethu:ruteÁ seto:capiravatvopapatterbrahm-a,o arth:i

ntare,a dhyubhv:i:dhy:i:yananena bhavitavyamiti. Ibid.

\[67\] Ig.Veda .10.81,10.129.3

\[68\] Sa. Su. 1.140 and 1.141

\[69\] janana mara,a kara,i:n;m pratiniyam:i:dayugapat prav:i-the:i:ca

70 bahavo vibhaścitmanācaitanyamitraśvaraṇa nirguṇaṁ niratīyāyā ca

tadartham sadhāraṇam pradhānam tannimi-ttaiśjm

bhogāpavargasiddha hiriti śīmkhyāt. BSSB 2.3.17.50

71 samkhīta pariṣṭhatvāt triguṣṭiviparyayadhiṣjñjīt


72 Anima sen Gupta, The Classical Śīmkhyā. p.p.1 to 8

73 Dr. S. Radhakrisnam, Indian Philosophy. Vol. II, p. 321

74 tatra śīmkhyānām tivaścaitanyasvaratīpyāt sarvītma-nīm

samnīdhīnadhyāvīṣeṣe ājīcakaśya sukhadukha samb-anthhe sarveṣjīm

sukhadukha sambandhāḥ prījnoti. BSSB. 2.3.17.50
75 bahu śvītmasvīkī śavatsarvagate āu prati śareram bhīyī-bhy
antaravi ē ā, a samnihite āu manovīkkīyairdharmī-
dharmalak ā, amadā śgamuparjyaṭe. BSSB 2.3.17.51

76 abhisamdhī den ī mapi sīdhīra enaśvītmana ā samyo-gena
sarvītmasamnidhau kriyāmī, inm niyamahetutvī-
nupapatteruktado ā jnupraśa’ga ā eva. BSSB 2.3.17.52

77 athocyete vibhutvēpyītmana ā śarerapratī śena manasī samyogā
śareravaccinna evītmapradē śe bhaviśyati atā
pradeśāk bātivavasthībhisamdhī denīmadā śasya sukhar-
adukhayo śca bhaviśyāṭiti. BSSB 2.3.17.53
78 brahma, idévarapradéṣeśvadåśa niśpatteś pradeśin-tara vartitvajcca svargidhyupabhogasya. Ibid.


80 B. S. 2.1.1.1

81 paratantraprajñajstu praye, ajanaś svitantrya, ārtyartha-rthamavadhirayitumāknuvantā prakhyatapra, etkṣu smāttināvalameran tatbalena ca ārtyartham pratipipseran. asmatri-te ca vyakhyāne na viśvasyurbahum; n̄īśmātt-enaṁ prā, etkṣo kapilaprabhādenam cijāam juñnam-pratihatam smaryate BSSB. 2.1.1.1.
82 smatiṣṭa tantrikhyaparamāśipra,eta ījāparīṣheta anya-ṣca
tadanusāriyaḥ smṛtayāḥ evam satyanakāpraṇas-āpa
prasājyena ta-su hyacetanampradhīnām svat tra-jagatā
kīra, amupanibadhyate. asyavarasyasmin-kale anena
vidhīnenopanayanam, edaścaci南京市, ittham vedidhyayam, ittham
samjvartanam, ittam sahadharma-cari, esamyoga iti. Thatī
puruśarthaśca varijārama dha-rmmnnavidhīnvidadhati. naivam
kalpiśdismṣṭinama-nujīeye viāaye avakeṣo asti. mokṣa
ṣidhanameva hi samyagdarṣanamadikṣṭyataḥ pra, itaḥ. ibid.
83 mahābhīratepi ca bahavaḥ puruṣa brahmanuṭiḥ eka eva tu iti
vicīrya ‘bahavaḥ puruṣasāṃkhya yoga vicīri|m iti
parapakṣamupanyasyā tadvyuddhena bahu|m puruṣa|i|m hi
yathāika yonirucyate.tatha tam puruṣaṃ va māṃkhya|i|m
gu|jitdhikam. Ityupakramya “mamantarīma tava ca ya
caṇyedahasamsthitaḥ. sarveṣam śjakābheto asau na grīhyāḥ
kenacitkvacīt”. BSSB 2.1.1.1.

84 B.S. 2.1.2.3.

85 etena śāṃkhya smṛti pratyjñhyena yogasmṛtirapi prati-
yāhyātyodāḥavyetyātyiti. BSSB.2.1.2.3
“trinnutamsthjpyasamam¿areram” (Sve.Up.2.8) “¿rotavyomantavyonididyosditavyaÁ”(Br.Up.2.4.5)“tamyogamitimanya
ntesthir¿midriyadh¿ra,am” “vidhy¿metam yogavi-dhimca
k¿Á,am” Katha.Up.2.6.18.

Y.S.1.24

s¡pekÁo he¿varo viÁamam ¿riÁ¿im nirmimete kimapekÁata iticet.
dharm¿dharm¿vapekaata iti vad¿maÁ ataÁ s¿jyam¿-napra,i
dharm¿dhar manapekaÁa viÁama s¿Á¿iriti n¿yame¿v-
arasy¿paridhaÁ. e¿varastu parjanyiavad¿Á¿avayaÁ. yath¿hi parjanyo
vreheyaviÁ¿d¿Á¿uÁ s¿dh¿ra,am k¿ra,am bhavati
vr̥ciyavādvaiāmye tu tatbejagetanyevṣidhṛa,ini śī-marthyinī
kṛa,ini bhavati, evameṣvarīdevamanuĀydiśr-Agau siddhṛa,am
kṛa,am bhavati deva manuĀydi vaiĀa-myē tu tat
bejagatỳnyevasidhṛa,ini karma,1 kṛa,ini bhavantyevameṣvaraĀ
sapekāatvīnna vaiĀamyīnaikhyi- bhyim dēĀayati. B. SS. B.

2.1.12.34

89 Kau. Brah. 3.8

90 Br. UP. 3.2.13

91 B. G. 4.11
92  
\text{pu}ru\text{\textbar}av\text{\textbar}e\text{\textbar}Aat\text{\textbar}bhypo\text{\textbar}paga\text{\textbar}ma\text{\textbar}ce\text{\textbar}var\text{\textbar}sy\text{\textbar} \text{pu}ru\text{\textbar}asy\text{\textbar}cau-} \text{ disen}

\text{y\textbar}bhyupaga\text{\textbar}m\text{\textbar}da\text{\textbar}sa\text{\textbar}pi\text{\textbar}jasy\text{\textbar}m. BSSB.2.2.7.37

93  
\text{Ch. UP. 6.3.2}

94  
\text{parasparaviruddha} \text{c\textbar}yams\text{\textbar}m\text{\textbar}kh\text{\textbar}n\text{\textbar}mabhypo\text{\textbar}paga\text{\textbar}m\text{\textbar}

\text{kvac\textbar}saptendri\text{\textbar}ya\text{\textbar}yanuk\text{\textbar}manti\text{\textbar}kvacid\text{\textbar}k\text{\textbar}\text{t\textbar}\text{a\textbar}kvaci\text{\textbar}ndri\text{\textbar}y\text{\textbar}yant}

\text{akara\textbar}n\text{\textbar}var\text{\textbar}ayanti\text{\textbar} \text{kvacid\textbar}ke\text{\textbar}kami\text{\textbar}.} \text{prasidd\textbar}haeva\text{\textbar}tu}

\text{\textbar}ruty\text{\textbar}svarakara\text{\textbar}d\text{\textbar}ne\text{\textbar}virodha\text{\textbar}ha\text{\textbar}nu\text{\textbar}varto\text{\textbar}ni\text{\textbar} ca sm\text{\textbar}tya.}

\text{tas\textbar}m\text{\textbar}da\text{\textbar}sa\text{\textbar}pi\text{\textbar}jas\text{\textbar}m \text{\textbar}m\text{\textbar}kh\text{\textbar}n\text{\textbar}m \
\text{\textbar}dar\text{\textbar}anam. BSSB. 2.2.1.10}