CHAPTER VIII

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The Philosophical school of Advaita Vedanta has been built upon the basis of various concepts like impersonal Brahman, identity of Jiva and Brahman, relative realities, etc. These main Advaita concepts are strengthened again on the basis of other
philosophical standpoints like cause-effect relationship, hierarchical relation between dream and waking states, etc. All concepts are interconnected to form the whole philosophical school.

In *Brahmasūtra* and *Āṇākara* formulates each concept against concepts of other philosophical schools. Each of Āṇākara’s refuting points would certainly find answers from the viewpoint of other systems, but this study has been limited to examine Āṇākara’s formulation of *Pṛṇapakāsa-s* and the consequent the formation of Advaita Vedānta.

**Observations**
Through the refutation of other philosophical concepts in *BrahmaSutra* , both the false assumptions based upon dualism and the view that *Atman* does not exist have been rejected through *aruti* , *Nyaya* , *Yukti* , and *Anumana* . In *BrahmaSutra* , áa’kara gave more time and space for the refutation of the concept that unconscious principle produces the conscious effect. To refute the *Smkhya-Yoga* (*Pradhana-kriya, avyda*) and *Nyaya-Vaiseika* (*Paramj, u-kriya, avyda*), he gave more importance to this concept. He argues that the conscious principle is the cause of the world. He emphasizes the necessity of regarding any effect as pre-existing in its cause (*Kriyakriya, jnan-yatvam*). According to áa’kara, the world is
created by an omniscient conscious being. From áa’kara’s perspective, Śīmkhya gives a more plausible account of the origin of the world than Vaiṣe Ąika. But Śīmkhya’s account needs to be supplemented by a provisional theism. In the refutation of Nyāya-Vaiṣe Ąika theory of Paramj, ukjra-avjda, he rejects the relation of Samavīya. To explain the relation between two distinct and independent realities (cause and effect) it requires that we posit a third entity, that is, the relation of Samavīya (Invariable concomitance) between them. The third entity requires a fourth entity relating the third entity with each of the first two terms.
So there will be *anavasthī*. So he refuted the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of *Samavṛtya*. In the refutation of the Śāmkhya-Yoga concept of *Puruṣābāhutva*, he clearly says that it is against the *āruti*, because all the *āruti* passages give information about the oneness of Self.

āaṅkara accepts the *Satkṛvyāvṛda* of Śāmkhya as *Satkṛya, avyāda*.

The Pṛvamemjmsaka stand is that and the Vedic statements provide information about *Karma* only. āaṅkara refuted this concept by saying that these Vedic statements provide information about *Brahman*. He clearly says that the only way to obtain knowledge about *Brahman* is through the Veda. They also
hold the view that the external world is real. This is also not
accepted by áa’kara. He holds the view that the external world is
real, in the Vyāvahārika (empirical) level, but from the Pāramārthika
(ultimate) level of reality, it is unreal. In the ultimate level of reality
there is only one real thing, i.e., Brahman. áa’kara refutes their
concept of apārtha as the bestower of fruit. According to him, God is
the efficient and material cause of the world.

Differing from Pīśupata, Yoga, Nyāya–Vaiṣṇava, and
Paścartra philosophies, áa’kara does not accept God as merely the
efficient cause of the world. He refutes their concept on the basis of
the concept of Brahman as the efficient and material cause of the
accepts the necessity of the worship of God (*Sagu, a Brahman*). Due to ignorance, *Brahman* is worshipped as *Iṣvara*. He considered the worship of God as a step for making *Brahman* enter into the intellect. That takes the soul to the ultimate goal, i.e., Self-realization.

*āaṅkara* refuted the *Pāṇḍava* philosophy on the basis of the concept of God. The *Pāṇḍava*-s hold the view that *Pāṇḍava* is the efficient cause of the world. *āaṅkara* never accepts their concept because he accepts God (*Sagu, a Brahman*) as the efficient and material cause of
the world. He strictly refuted their philosophy on the basis of *Yukti* and *Smriti*.

In the refutation of the Pañcarita philosophy, áa’kara mainly used the authority of *áruti*. He says that the Pañcarita concept of the origination of the *Jeva* is against the Vedic statements. So he refuted their concept.

In the refutation of the Jaina concept, áa’kara gave more importance to the theory of *Satttraya*. The *Svâdyâda* concept of Jaina philosophy is refuted by áa’kara on the score of indefinite and unreliable knowledge. According to áa’kara, it is impossible that
contradictory ideas, such as being and non-being, should at the same time belong to one and the same subject, like dark and white. If we accept the Syādvāda concept of Jainas, we cannot get a determined knowledge. So this theory has no practical utility. áa`kara refutes the atomism of Jainas, because it includes the same defects as the Vaiṣeṣika theory of atomism. The Jaina concept of the soul having the size of the body is also refuted by áa`kara, because it is against the áruti. The áruti teaches us the soul as eternal and self-luminous.

So áa`kara refuted the Jaina concept on the basis of áruti and Yukti.

In the refutation of the Dehítmarṣa of Čirvākas (Self identical with body), áa`kara gave more stress to the
aspect of consciousness. He says that even *Lokāyatika*-s are unable to
totally reject the aspect of consciousness in the worldly functions.

According to āa`kara, the consciousness and object belong to
ontologically different levels. So, āa`kara refuted the Čīrvika concepts
using the independent *Yukti*.

āa`kara refuted the Sautr̥ntika (Bauddha) concept of the
emergence of combination (*Samudajya*) by saying that such a
combination cannot be accomplished without the purposeful activity
of a conscious agent. He attacks their concept of *Nirodha* by saying
that cessation is equal to counter-balance and eternal rest of all
dharmas. That is why it should be defined neither as identical with Skandhás, nor as different from them. áákara refuted the Vijñānavāda theory that the waking state is similar to the dream state, by saying that the characteristics of dream and waking states are completely different. Any object perceived in dreams, magical illusions, mirages, etc., can be appraised as unreal after waking or overcoming that particular state.

The Vijñānavādins recognize that consciousness is the Ultimate Reality, which takes the form of subject and object. There is no difference between Jñāna and Jñāya. In the refutation of their
concept, áa’kara takes up their concept that consciousness is the Ultimate Reality. But their concept about consciousness is not acceptable to him, because that also is momentary to them.

According to him, consciousness is everchanging and eternal.

The idea of causality is closely connected with the relation of substance and its attribute (Dharmadhar-mibhīva). The Buddhists deny such a relation. In Advaita, the Dharmidharmibhīva is regarded as a mere limited application of the relation of organization (cause and effect). In this way, this relation is connected with
creation of the world by Brahman. All the limitations ascribed to Brahman are conditioned by Avidyā, which is understood not only as personal ignorance but also as a sort of universal evolution. So the definitions of a living soul (Jīva) which is considered to be of atomic size, active, etc., are valid only on the profane level of discussion.

According to ākāra, the grade (level) of the reality of the phenomenal world is not definite as real or unreal (Sadasadāntirvacaneyā).

In the refutation of the concepts of philosophies other than Advaita, ākāra rejects them according to his concept of consciousness and unity. All schools of Indian philosophy, with the
exception of Advaita Vedānta, admit different measures of both
certainty and difference into consciousness. The Buddhists admit only
differences into the structure of consciousness. Differences are either
internal or external. External differences are either Sajteya

or Vijteya. Śīmkhya admits the difference between Purvāa and

Prakṛti, i.e., Vijteya. The same concept of consciousness is admitted

by the realist philosophies like Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika and Mēmmsa. The

concept of the world, according to them, is outside of consciousness.

In the concept of many Purvās in Śīmkhya philosophy, they admit

the Sajteya concept of consciousness. The Svasamvrdanavīdins of

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Buddha philosophy, \((Sautr̥n-tikas \text{ and } Vaibh̥āvikas)\) accept all kinds of difference. It is different from matter, which they admit to be real. There are many streams of consciousness, each different from the others and each stream having internal differences between the events which constitute it. The Yogācāra school of Buddhism takes \textit{Vijñāna} alone to get rid of \textit{Vijñeya} difference. According to them, \textit{Vijñāna} only is real. But áákara accepts consciousness alone as real; there are neither external nor internal differences within it. So he rejects all the natural and causal accounts of the origin of knowledge as well as consciousness. He also pleads that nonbeing cannot
become being. Consciousness cannot arise out of non-conscious conditions. According to him, consciousness is self-luminous. So he refutes all the philosophies on the basis of āruti, Yukti, and Smāti.

Conclusions

Many phases can be seen in the history of evolution of Advaita Vedānta philosophy. Brahmaśtrājā-karabhāya gives ample evidence to the fact that each different philosophical school acted as a touching stone in the evolution of other schools. Starting from āa’kara’s refutation of Śimkhya-Yoga philosophies, one can trace a conceptual framework of Advaitavedānta. It begins with the higher philosophical conceptions related to impersonal Brahman
and courses down to the bottom of the conceptual structure, exploring the notions about rituals, ethical duties and personified Īśvara.

Some philosophical concepts are uncompromisingly accepted by āa’kara, like non-duality, eternity, impersonality and conscious nature of the ultimate principle. From there proceeds āa’kara’s refutation of schools like Śīmkhya, Vaiṣeṣika, Baudhā and Čhvāka philosophies. But, while dealing with different schools, he gives stress to different aspects. Responding to the Pīrvamemjmsa view of Karma, āa’kara strictly demarcates between Karmamemjmsa and Jūjna-memjmsa, Here, the borderline is between material/ external
and the abstract essential/internal principle. Jaina theory of Syādvāda is refuted by him for its incapability of leading to a specific theoretical position. The theistic philosophies like Piśupata and Paścaritra raise questions about causality of Brahman and the world, the relation between Jeva and Brahman etc. Āśākara responds to these by examining the identity of Jeva and Brahman.

The philosophical development of each school of thought in India has occurred countering the different standpoints of other schools of the time. Āśākara is one of the philosopher who consistently adopted this method in a systematic manner. So,
viewing Advaitaved\'nta vis a vis the principles of other philosophical schools gives a clear picture of its conceptual formulations.