CHAPTER VII
CHAPTER VII

REFUTATION OF BHÄGAVATA

(PAÑCARÄTRA) AND PÉáUPATA

PHILOSOPHIES

253
Refutation of the Bhāgavata (Pañcarātra) and Pīṣupata Philosophies.

This chapter has two parts - the first part includes the refutation of Bhāgavata (Pañcarātra) principles, and the second part contains the refutation of Pīṣupata principles.

1. Refutation of Bhāgavata (Pañcarātra) Philosophy.

The Pañcarātra doctrines are very old and associated with the Puruṣāśekta of the Ṛgveda. It is the foundation of the later Vaiṣṇava philosophy. The name of the Pañcarātra system is connected with the five principal subjects treated by this system. They are Tattvapraṇada,
Muktriprada, Bhakti-prada, Yaugika and Vai\'ayika. So, the term r\'tra can be taken as denoting the principle of a system. It is not known how the word r\'tra, which originally meant night, has come to mean tantr\'i or samhita. Shrader, says in his work Introduction to the Pa\'ucar\'itra-

‘the Puru\'as\'ekta and Sahasra\'er\'a section of the Mah\'ini\'rya,opni\'aad plays a prominent role in the explanation of the Pa\'ucar\'itra cosmology and mantra exegesis’. So the name has its origin from its central principle Pa\'ucar\'trasattrı. This is interpreted philosophically as the fivefold self-manifestation of God by means of His para, vy\'tha, vibh\'ya antary\'imin and arc\'i forms.
According to this system, the ultimate reality is \( \text{Vishudeva} \). He is the \( \text{upādīna} \) and \( \text{nimitta kīraṇa} \) of the world. He possesses six ideal \( \text{guṇa} \): \( \text{jñāna}, \text{aiśvarya}, \text{ākāti}, \text{bala}, \text{verya and tejas} \). The other concept of \( \text{Paścaritra} \) philosophy is its \( \text{caturvyāha siddhi} \). The word ‘\( \text{vyāha} \)’ is derived from the \( \text{dhatu ‘u} \) and the upasarga ‘\( \text{vi} \)’; ‘\( \text{u} \)’ means shove and \( \text{vi} \) means ‘asunder’, so the word means ‘shoving asunder’. Each \( \text{vyāha} \) represents \( \text{Viṣṇu} \) Himself with His six \( \text{guṇa} \). According to them, the \( \text{vyāha} \) has two activities, creative and moral. The creative activity is connected with the origin of beings. The moral activity is connected with their ethical progress.
Regarding the creative activity, the Viśvāmītṛa Samhitā says that

Saṅkarāja, by means of his gu, a bala bears all this, and Pradyumna by means of the gu, a aśvarya creates all movable and immovable beings.

Aniruddha, by means of the gu, a and ākāti, supports and protects this whole world, the Infinite Egg.

As for the ethical activity, Saṅkarāja teaches the theory of Monotheism (aikyntikamṚga). Pradyumna teaches, its translation into practice. Pradyumna introduces all religious rites performed by Paścaritra. Aniruddha teaches the gain resulting from such practice (kriyāphala). He makes known the whole truth about the ultimate aim of the soul.
There is another aspect about the vyāha theory of Paµcaritra. In the NîrîyaneYA section of the ā'înîthi Parva of the Mahîbhirata and âankara’s commentary on Brahmasîtra, it is stated that SãkarÃa represents the individual soul. Dr. Shylaja, in her text, ‘A Study of Vedanta in the Light of Brahmasîtra,’ says that the doctrine of vyāha is a distinct mark of the Paµcaritra philosophy. Vîsudeva is the highest principle and other vyâhs originate from that principle. Two principles of Paµcaritra philosophy are refuted by áa’kara: The origination of jeva from Vîsudeva and the non-eternity of jeva. In áa’kara’s words, of the four vyâhs, Vîsudeva is the highest reality, the paramitman. From Vîsudeva is born SãkarÃa, who denotes the
individual soul or \textit{jiva}. From \textit{Sa\'kar\'a,a}, \textit{Pradyumna} is born, which stands for mind. From \textit{Pradyumna} is born \textit{Aniruddha}, which stands for egoity or \textit{Ahamk\'ra}. The adventees of \textit{Pa\'car\'tra} regard \textit{V\'sudeva} as the highest reality. According to them, the means for the attainment of the highest reality are to worship Him (\textit{V\'sudeva}) and meditate on Him.

One may go to the temple to offer oblations, and recite prayers. The entire world beginning from Brahma down to the grass is a form of the Lord \textit{V\'sudeva} (Bhagava-dvy\'ha).

\'{a}a\'kara accepts the \textit{Pa\'car\'tra} view that \textit{N\'ri\'ya,a} (\textit{V\'sudeva}) is the highest reality. He is the material and efficient cause of the world \textit{saekadh\'j bhavati trid\'hj bhavati}. \'{a}a\'kara acknowledges that this
theory is not against the Vedâs. The meditation on the Lord (çvâramñam) is also accepted by the çruti-s and smâta-s.

The part of the Paµcarâtra theory, which is objectionable to áa’kara, is as follows. The concept of creation in the Paµcarâtra view is that the individual soul is born from Vîsudeva, from the individual soul the mind is created, from the mind the ego also is formed. That is not acceptable to áa’kara. According to him, such creation is impossible, because the origination of the individual soul, i.e., Sa’kara, from the supreme being is untenable. If Jeva is considered as originating from Vîsudeva, Jeva becomes non-eternal and then it does not get the release
6. This causes the attainment of God to amount to the destruction of jeva.

There is no evidence in the world to see an instrument being produced from the agent. The woodcutter uses the axe to cut down the tree. Here the axe is only the instrument of the woodcutter. We cannot say that an axe has originated from the woodcutter. áa’kara says that the Paµcarítra theory of creation is similar in nature. According to Paµcarítra, from the paramítra the jeva is born, and from the mind ahamkíra is born. There is no scripture in support of such a doctrine, because all scriptures clearly say that everything originates from Brahman7.
According to áa’kara, the Paµcarítra concept is that Sa’karÀa,a, Pradyumna and Aniruddha stand for the individual soul, mind and ego respectively. But they are the parts of the Supreme Lord. They are powerful beings endowed with qualities such as knowledge, ruling capacity, strength, valour, glory etc. The Paµcarítra concept is that there is only one real entity, Vsudeva. On the other hand, they say that the one lord possesses all these different forms, possessing equal attributes originates from Vsudeva. Here áa’kara raises the question how there can be the origination of one from the other, when they are characterized by the same attributes without any supereminence. From our daily experiences we can know that some extra quality
(atiṣṭaya) is to be found in the cause over and above the effect, e.g., in the case of clay and clay pot, clay is more extensive than the pot. Without this atiṣṭaya or supereminenence on the part of the cause, the effect cannot be comprehended. By the lack of this ‘atiṣṭaya’ the Saṅkarśaṇa is never born from Viṣvdeva, the Pradyumna is never born from Saṅkarśaṇa, and Aniruddha also is never born from Pradyumna”. The origination of the one from the other is unthinkable. Being equal in all respects, none of them can be the cause of another, for the effect must have some features that are lacking in the cause. Again, the forms of Viṣvdeva cannot be limited to four only. The entire world, beginning from Brahma down to the grass, is a form of the Lord (Bhagavad Gītā).
One the contrary, the Paµcarätra-s argue that the entire world originated from Vüsudeva. On the other hand, Bhagavadvyäha, i.e., the different forms of Vüsudeva, are regarded as the whole world, and its products as the forms of Vüsudeva. Moreover, their theory involves many contradictions. Sometimes, it speaks of the four forms as qualities of Ėtman and sometimes as the Ėtman itself.

Resume

This philosophy sometimes accepts the eminence of jµjña, aigvarya,

çããu, daãa, vãrya, and ujas which are enumerated as the qualities of ViĀ,u. In some places they are spoken of as self, i.e., Vüsudeva.
According to ākara, these passages are against the Vedic concepts. In Siddhônta Bindu, a commentary of Dañjñloki, Madhusûdanasarasvati says: *evam pûamatam paµcarõtramâyam ca matam ērutiyuktibhûtatvatyâyukram*53. Like Sûmkhya, Pûpata, Jaina and Paµcarõtra theories are improper because they contradict ēruti and yukti as they advocate difference between Jeva and Ðèvara. So they could be considered as Dvaitins. Das Gupta also observes that the Paµcarõtra doctrines are a repudiation of the smûti texts founded in the Vedîs. The Paµcarõtra texts are considered by the opponents as invalid and non-Vedic. It is for this reason that Bôdariya, a also refutes the philosophical theory of the Paµcarõtra in Brahmasûtra. ākara refuted this on the
basis of ṛuti. He says that the Pañcaritra principle that ṇeva originated from Viṣudeva is not traceable to ṛuti. Through this refutation he establishes the Advaitic doctrine that ṇeva is eternal, it is identical with Brahman.

!!Refutation of the Pتاupata Philosophy

The Patyadhikara of Brahmasṭra contains the refutation of the views of the Pتاupata school. In this section, āṅkara criticizes the non-Vedic concept of ṇiva. C.D.āarma quotes, In the Outlines of Indian Philosophy, “the verse from āvamahimḥstotra – trayeṣṭṛyāmḥṣṭṭraḥ pत友好तितमतम् vaiṇ,avamiti – which shows that
Sāmkhya — Yoga, Pjñāupata and Vaiṣṇava schools of thought were regarded as different from *trayi* or the *Vedic religion*”.

According to the *Pjñāupata* school, the Lord is the efficient cause of the world. ārēkantha, a follower of the Kashmirīaiva school, says in his commentary on *Brahmasūtra*, upholding the view of áiva as *Brahma: áiva* is the greatest, the merciful one, the Saviour (*mocaka*) who removes the curtain of *pjñā* that consists of *mala, miya* and *karma* intended by the term *Brahman*. He establishes that *Parameśvara* is the *Upaniṣad* of the world.

Madhavīcīrya says in *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* about the *Pjñāupata* school, how the principles of the system affected the other
systems and what are the different concepts about the five padMAPth is.

The fivefold categories are the instruments of true knowledge. These categories are different from those of the other recognized systems. For example, the cessation of pain is in other systems (SmykhyA) the mere termination of miseries. But in the Pjiupata system, it is the attainment of supremacy. The concept of ‘creation’ in other systems represents that which has become, and which shall become, but in this system it is eternal. The idea of principium (kryra,am) presented in other systems is determined in its evolution; in this system the principium is the Lord.

According to other systems, ‘union’ results in isolation, but in this system, it results in cessation of pain by attainment of divine
perfections. In other systems, ‘Paradise’ and similar spheres involve a return to metampychosis, but in this system they result in nearness to the Supreme Being, either followed or not followed by such return to transmigratory experiences\textsuperscript{15}.

The Mahe\={i}var\=is accept five pad\=rth\=is, i.e., effect, cause, union, ritual and the end of suffering\textsuperscript{16}. These are the basic things of the P\=rupata school, these five pad\=rth\=is are taught by the Lord P\=rupati. These pad\=rth\=is help the animals to break their bond from the world. So they say that P\=rupati is the efficient cause of the world. According to their views the kir\=va is threefold i.e., vid\=ya, k\=ila and pa\=\=u. K\=ira\=a is pati.

He is the Anugr\=jhaka of all creation and destruction. He possesses
infinite power, knowledge and action, is in possession aiṣvarya for all
time. Yoga is defined as the communion between ātman and Īśvara
through the medium of citti. The fruit of the yoga in this system is the
realization of the supreme power (pīramaiṣvarya). But it is not the same
concept of kaivalyā as in the Śīmkhyā-Yoga school. Vidhi is the name of
the function which aims at dharma or arthā. Vidhi is twofold, i.e.,
primary and secondary. The end of pain (dukhñta) means not only
the negation of sorrow, but also realization of the supreme lordship.

According to the Advaita view, the Lord (Brahman) is the
efficient and material cause of the world. But the Naiyāyikās, Vaiśeśikās,
Yogins, Pāucajīrīs and Māheśvarīs say that the Lord is the efficient
cause of the universe. In their view, the material cause of the world is either atoms according to *Nyaya-Vaijñavāikṣa* and *pradhīna* according to *Śāmkhya-Yoga*. According to the *Pañcarātras* the material cause of the world is *Viśu*. The *Pippalipaṭas* believed that *Pañcupati* is the efficient cause of the world. The five categories of effect, cause, union, observances, and the end of sorrow have been taught by Lord āiva for the removal of the bondage of creations.

ākara refuted this concept by saying that the Lord is both the efficient and material cause of the world. He is the ruler of *Pradhīna* and such things as souls which are different from him. Such a view leads to inconsistency because it makes the Lord partial to some and
prejudiced against others, for some people are well-off in this world, while others are miserable. In that case, the Lord would be no īvara:

He would be anēvara devoid of Lordliness like any of us.²¹

If this hierarchical difference of living beings is considered to be based upon the different activities, this would lead to the fallacy of mutual dependence.²² According to āa´kara, the entire process being beginningless it will be like that in past and present as well. The beginningless process will be like the endless chain, the blind man leading another blind man. When one does his activity through his intrinsic or extrinsic motives, there is some imperfection also. The man who does his work through his intrinsic motive does not work for
others. If one person works for others, there is also a selfish action. So, if

\( 	ext{\textit{I\textit{v\textit{a\textit{r\textit{a}}}}}} \) does His work with intrinsic motive, He will not be \( 	ext{\textit{I\textit{v\textit{a\textit{r\textit{a}}}}}} \). If we accept that the Lord is the ruler of the universe, it will be similar to the individual soul directing the sense organs. In this context, the individual soul (\( \text{\textit{j\textit{e\textit{v\textit{a}}}} \)) will have to enjoy pleasure, suffer pain etc., through the sense organs. Likewise, the Lord also would suffer pain and pleasure etc. So ‘the Lord is not the efficient cause of the world’ is also not tenable.

\textbf{Resume}
In the view of āa’kara, God is the efficient and material cause of the world. According to the Chīndogya āruti, āa’kara established the above statement 25. The other systems argued that the pradhīna, atoms, maheśvara, Viśu, etc., are the causes of the world, because these things have conjunction to God. There is no relation between substance and attributes. In the Advaitic system, this type of difficulty doesn’t arise because the relation is inexpressible identity (tīḍ/tmya). The Advaitins depend upon the authority of āruti. So āa’kara’s concept of the Lord is acceptable. According to āa’kara, if we accept that God and soul are totally different, there is no way of reconciling the will of God with the will of man or Karma, and the infinity of the one cannot be
reconciled with that of the other. The Advaitic concept of \textit{tijd}\textit{tmyj} alone offers a way out of the dualistic difficulties.

According to the P\textit{ipatpata} concept, \textit{\textlambda}vara is separate with particular qualities from the individual soul. These school regarded that \textit{\textlambda}vara is different from the individual. He has some extraordinary qualities. This concept is refuted by \textit{\textacute{a}kara} through the \textit{Patyadhikara}, a of \textit{Brahmas\text{\'}tra}. \textit{\textacute{a}kara} strictly refuted the statement Lord is the efficient cause of the world with the help of \textit{\textacute{ruti}} and \textit{yukti}. 
NOTES AND REFERENCE

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3 yoasau nîrjya,aÂ paravyakti-prasiddhaÅ paramÄtma sar-vÄtma sÄ

   ītmÄnÄmanÄm anekadhÄ vyÅhavasthita iti, tan-na nirÄkriyate. BSSB 2.2.8.42

4 Ch. Up. 7. 26. 2.

5 ¿rutismÅtyore¿varapra¿dhÄnasya prasiddhatvÄt. Ibid.

6 yatpunaridamucyate vÄsudevÄjÄkarÄa, a uelpadhÄyate sa¿-karÄa,icca

   pradhyumnaÅ pradhyumnÄcàniruddha iti. atra bÅhmaÅna

   vÄsudevÅsajÄkÄtpramÄtmanaÅ    sa¿karÄ-a,asajÄkasya
jevasyolpatti śambhavati anityatvā dido ā-prasa’gīt. ulpattimatve

hi jevasyānityatvā dayo do ā ā pra-sajyeran. tataḥ ca naivasya

bhagavatpriptirmokā ā syāt. Ibid.

\[ \text{7} \] njatmaṁ ruternityatvacca tį bhya ā. B.S. 2. 3. 17

\[ \text{8} \] idam sarvamasā jata yadidam ki/Eca. Tai. Up. 2.6

\[ \text{9} \] athi pi syānna caite sa’karā ā ā dayo jevidhibhenibhip-reyante kim

tarheṣvara evaitē sarve mu’naiśvaryaḥ'aktibala-

veryatejobhiraiśvarairdhamairanvitā abhyupagamyante vī-sudeva

evaitē sarve nirdo ā j niradhiṣjīn j niravadhyāceti. BSSB . 2. 2. 8 44
bhagav\¡naiko v¡sudevaÅ param\¡rthatattvamityabh\¡yu-pagam\¡t.

ath\¡yamabhipr\¡ya ekasyaiva bhagavati ete ca-tv\¡ro vy\£\¡stulyadhart\¡,a iti, tath\¡pi tadavast\¡ evolpa-tyasambhavaÅ nahi v¡sudev\¡tsa\¡karaÅ,asyolpattiÅ sam-bhavati sa\¡karÅ,icca pradyumnasya pradyumnjccn-iruddhasya ati\¡ayibhiv\¡t. Ibid.

nahi v¡sudev\¡tsa\¡karaÅ,asyolpattiÅ sambhavati sa\¡kar-\¡c
cca pradyumnasya, pradyumnjccaniruddhasya, ati\¡-ayibhiv\¡t.

bhavitavyam hi kirya\¡ra,ayorati\¡ayena yath\¡ m\¡dkh\¡ayoÅ. Ibid.

v¡sudeva eva hi sarve vy\£\¡ nirvic\¡eÅ, i\¡yante nacaite bha-
gavatvy\£ha\¡,catuÅ\¡khy\¡ymevivati\¡e
eren, brahm\¡dist-
ambaparyantasya samastasyaiva jagato bhagavatvyaḥ hatv-jāvagamat.

Ibid.

13 S.B, p. 56.

14 samastasvaḥ isamhīraṇugrahakīra kīra,am. S.S.S. P. 168

15 catvaro maheṣvaraḥ-ṣaivaḥ, pījupataḥ kīru, ikasiddhīnti-nākṣṇikāceti sarvepyamem; heṣvaraprokti gamṣṇugī-mītvīnasuṣvarāya ucyante. kīryam mahad-dikam, kīra,-am pradhīnameṣvaraica, yogaḥ samādhiḥ, vidhistāvīna snanadiḥ, dukhinto mokṣaḥ iti paṃca padṛṣṭhaḥ. . S.D.S, p. 160.
16 kiñjyam mahadjidikam, kiñra, am pradhîjnameçvaraïca, yo-gaÅ

samadjhiÅ, vidhistâvîna snanadiÅ, dukhiñto mokÅ-aÅ iti paµca

padjîrthaÅ. S.D.S, p. 160.

17 cittadvîre, a çìvaraasambandaheturyogaÅ. Pi¿u. SÆtra 5. 2.

18 dharmarthi, sidhaka vyipiro vidhiÅ. si dvividhipradyñ-

abhêtagu, abhêta ca. S.S. p. 265

19 tathj hi anyatra dukhanivttireva dukhantah iha tu pîramai-

êvaryarpîptiïca. anyatrabheîtvîbhîvi kiñjyam iha tu nityam paîvadi

anyatra sîpekÅam kiñra, am iha tu nirapekÅo bhag-avîneva anyatra
kaivalyādi phalako yogaā. anyatra punara-vāttirēpa svargādi phalako
vidhiā ihatu punapunār-vātti rē-pa simēpyādi phalakaĀ. SDS. P. 268

20 kecitṭivatsā’khyayogavyapaśrayaĀ kalpayanti pradhīna-
puruśayoradhiājīta kevalam nimittakīra,ameśvara itereta-

ravilakā,ā pradhīnapuruśameśvarī iti maheśvaristu manyante

kīrṣyakīra,ayogavidhidukṣhitaĀpaμcapadṛthiĀ paūpatineśvare,a
paūpāvivimokṣa, iyopadiājīā paūp-atireśvaronimitta

kīra, amitivar, ayanti. BSSB 2.2.7.37
21 henamadhyamottamabhjvena hi pr,ibhyvedanvidhata eva-varasya

rigadveJdidolAsprasaktersmadivadanaev-a-ratvam prasajyeta.

Ibid.

22 KarmergyarayoA pravartyapraykritve itaretaryrayadoA-aprasa’g’it. Ibid.

23 svirthaprayukta eva ca sarvo janA parirthepi pravartata

ityevamapyyasamajjasyam, svirthavatydevarasyaneva-
ratvaprasa’g’it. puruAa vijeyaattyahypagmicevarasya puruAasya

caudisneyahypagamidasamajjasyam. BSSB. 2.2.7.37
24 bhogitidānāṇidāh kīra, agrīmasyādhiĀtatvatvam gamyate nacitra
bhogadayo dvāyante kīra, agramasīmye vibhyu-pagamyamīne
samsari, imivāśivarasyāpi bhogadayah prasajyeta. BSSB 2.2.7.40

25 tadaikāta bahusyām prajiyeya. Ch.Up. 2.3.