CHAPTER VI

REFUTATION OF JAINA AND CÆRVÆKA

PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER - VI

REFUTATION OF JAINA AND ČERVĚKA PHILOSOPHIES
This chapter has two parts. The first part discusses ākaṅkara’s refutation of Jaina principles. The second part deals with his refutation of Cārvāka principles.

1-Refutation of Jaina Philosophy

Introduction

Jainism is considered not only as a religion but also as a spiritual philosophy. It is enlightening to the human life, both internal and external. The basic principles of Jaina philosophers are ahimsā (non-violence), aparigraha (non-passion), and anekāntavāda (non-absolutism). According to them, the padṛthas are seven in number. They are - jēva, ajēva, asrava, samvara, nirjara, bandha and
mokā. According to P.C. Nahar and R.C. Ghosh, "all our life, all our conscious thought then moves between these two terms which are distinct from and even opposed to each other. Yet though this set is in antagonism, which can never cease, because with its ceasing the whole nature of both would be subverted, they are also essentially related, for neither of them could be conceived to exist without the other. The consciousness of the one is, we might say, inseparably blended with the consciousness of its relation to the other. We know the object (ajeva) only as we bring it back to the unity of the self and we know the self only as we realise it in the object”. They also accept theories like Śyādvīda, Saptabhaṇḍaṇaya, and eternity of the soul. To
them, the universe is a self-existent unit. This part discusses the Jaina principles like *Syādvīda* and the soul having the size of the body which are refuted by áa’kara through the *bhāya* of *Okasminadhikara* of *Brahmasūtra*.

**Refutation of the concept of *Syādvīda***

The Jainas accept seven *padarthī*: *jeva, ajeva, asrava, bandha, samvara, nirajara and mokāza*. These seven *padarthī*-s are mainly classified into two groups, i.e., soul and non-soul. áa’kara presents Jaina concepts like this: They speak of these two in another way thus:

There are five categories called *aTikṣyas* : the category of *jeva*, the category of body, category of atoms, the category of merit, the
category of demerit, and the category of space’ (want of hindrace).

Aññitiy¿s means pad¿rtha-s. Besides it ,they accept an infinite number of variations of these aññitiyas, by their so called synthetic logic known by the name of Saptabha¿genaya-“sapt¿n¿mbha¿gen¿m sam¿h¿ra¿ saptabha¿gi tasya nayo ny¿ya”’. Probably it is, probably it is not, probably it is both and not, probably it is ineffable, probably is not and is ineffable, ineffable and it is, is not and is not is ineffable. Saptabha¿gi form of reasoning is also directed to the determination of such notions as unity, plurality, eternity, identity, difference, and the like. áa’kara says that this view cannot be accepted because it is inadmissible on account of the impossibility of
occurrence of all these states in one thing. In other words, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same, like cold and hot.

áa`kara says that following to the Jaina view we cannot get any certain knowledge. He pleads that the thoughts of Jainas have no authority because the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, the knowing subject and the act of knowledge are infinite. áa`kara asks the question how the followers of Jaina philosophy act on a doctrine the matter of which altogether is indefinite.
Regarding their doctrine of categories also, áákara raises the objection that in one view of the matter, they are five, and in another view they are not five, from which the latter point of view it follows that they are either five or more than five. It is not logical to declare these categories to be indescribable. Therefore áákara says that a man who proclaims a doctrine of altogether indefinite contents does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a mad man.

According to the Jaina view, the heavenly world and final release exist or not, they are eternal or not eternal; from one point of view, they are eternal and from the other point, they are
impermanent. According to the Jaina principle, we cannot arrive at any certain knowledge. Through this philosophy, this world, heaven and even freedom will become doubtful to us. áa’kara states the view that the probablism accepted by Jainas is multifaceted. The theory looks like the words of a lunatic. Again, the judgements cannot be indescribable, for they are clearly set forth. To describe them and to say that they are indescribable is a contradiction in itself. According to C.D. áarma, “the theory of Syādvāda itself may not be correct. Relativity cannot be sustained without the Absolute, which is rejected by the Jainas”7. If everything is endowed with certain aspects of every other thing, then one and the same thing can be described as being
and non-being. If we accept the Jaina doctrine of Śyādvṛda it opposes their own concept, i.e., liberation is eternal. So āākara refutes their concept. The Jaina’s theory of causation is also refuted by āākara, because they accept the pudgala (atoms) as the cause of the world.

According to them, at the time of creation, pudgala (atoms) are set in motion by A-ṛti, and two atoms combine to form a dyad, three dyads combine to form a triad, four triads form a tetrad, etc. By the combination of atoms the world originated. This theory is the same as the Vaiṣeṣika theory of Paramāṇa,ukṣra,avidā. So, āākara does not make a separate attempt to refute the Jaina’s causation theory.

**Refutation of the Soul having the size of the body**
According to the Ērhatı (Jaina) principle, the soul has the same size as the body. The Jaina’s view about the empirical self is that it grows with the growth and shrinks with the shrinkage of the living body that it occupies. So, the soul cannot be eternal because it would be limited with the parts. Āṅkara refuted the above statements, viz., the growing or degenerating self cannot be eternal like jar, pot etc.

The bodies of the creatures are different in size. The soul of an ant, taking an elephant body as a result of its past work, will not be able to fill up that body. Otherwise, we can say that the human body being relegated to the body of an ant would not be able to find sufficient room in it. The same difficulty arises with respect to the different
stages like the stage of pregnancy, childhood, youth, old age, etc, in a single individual. So there is no way to think that the soul consisting of an infinite number of parts is capable of undergoing compression in a small body and dilation in a big one.

The Jaina-s continue their arguments like this: When the soul enters into a big body, some particles are accepted in it and when the soul enters into a small body, some particles are withdrawn. áa`kara criticizes the above standpoint based on the śśtra. áa`kara’s view is that if such a standpoint is acknowledged, two types of defects will have to be imposed on the soul. They are the soul undergoing modification and consequently being non-eternal. If the soul is non-
eternal and everchanging, bondage and liberation cannot be predicated of it. The Jaina-s hold the view that at the time of release, the soul is of eternal nature. But áa’kara says that this theory of bondage and release is untenable. Mıdhavıcyra says in Sarvadarjanasanmgraha that the soul which is in the state of bondage is encompassed by the octad (group of eight) of works and is sunk in the ocean of samsıra, rises when its bonds are sundered. If the soul is eternal in the time of release, it cannot have been created. The soul does not have changes in the beginning, infancy, youth and old age. It must have existed in the beginning and middle as well. Then we get the conclusion that the soul in the different bodies has one and the
same size and that the soul cannot enter into bigger and smaller bodies. In other words, we can say that the size of the soul remains always the same. For this reason, āa’kara concludes that the doctrine of the Jainas has to be set aside as it is not in any way more rational than the doctrine of Buddha.

**Resume**

āa’kara has maintained that the empirical object cannot be treated as absolutely real and absolutely unreal. The absolute Brahman cannot be characterized as real or unreal, because in Advaita view the Brahman is indefinable and uncharacterizable, and eternal. So, āa’kara thoroughly refuted the above concepts of Jaina.
ä`kara accepts three levels of reality: *Vyavahärka*, *Prathibhäsika* and *Pramärthika*. So, ä`kara’s multi-dimensional approach is related to his theory of three levels of reality.

According to Govind Chandra Pande, Jainism was a typical *rñmanic* doctrine, ascetic, atheistic, realistic and pluralistic. Although ä`kara advocated asceticism in the sense of the renunciation of life, he did not particularly favour austere self-mortification. Atheism and pluralism were totally rejected by him and realism was admitted only at the empirical level\textsuperscript{15}. ä`kara criticizes the *Jaina* concept of *Syädväda* and the soul having the size of the body, because he argues for the eternality of the soul and permanency of realization.
II. REFUTATION OF THE ČĒRVĒKA PHILOSOPHY

The word Čirvika is synonymous with Laukijatika or Lokijata. áa'kara, in his commentary on the sūtra athito brahmajijñāsa, mentions the name Laukijatika associated with the crude masses who regard the sole conscious body as soul. The sources of the Čirvika concepts mainly are opponents views, which are present in other philosophical schools like, Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika, and Pūrvamāṇya, as well as texts such as Sarvadārjana samgraha, etc. Bṛhaspati is considered as the founder of the Lokijata school.

But the Bṛhaspatya sūtras are lost.
The Čārvikam metaphysics is based on a particular epistemology. Perception is the only source of valid knowledge. Whatever perceived is real and whatever not perceived, is unreal. According to the Čārvikas, the whole world is made up of four elements, i.e., earth, water, fire and air. The combination of these elements in various ways is the only fountain head of the whole process of evolution. The conglomeration of the four elements in various forms satisfactorily explains the origination of all worldly phenomena. The destruction of the worldly objects is also nothing more than a relapse of the constituent elements into their primal form. According to the Sarvadarśanasamgraha, the Čārvikas do not accept jñāna as an
element because it is not perceived. Črvjka is the only Indian philosophy which rejected the traditional doctrine of karma and samsra. According to Nataliya Isayeva, “the Lokyatikis maintain that consciousness merges through specific combinations of inanimate gross elements. Unlike the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy, the materialists denied the existence of limitless ether or space.

They do not accept the existence of God because we do not perceive God. Each material of this world has its own svabhva (nature). “The fire is hot, the water is cold: by whom came this variety? From their own nature was it born?” They believe that there
is no conscious purpose behind the emergence of this world. The production of effect is purely accidental. The combination of the four elements, which is the sole source of the creation of the whole world, is not determined by any conscious purpose. This is the Accidentalism (yaddasaccvda) of C̱rv̱ka thought.

According to the C̱rv̱ka view, the reality is only of one kind, i.e., matter. Consciousness is not a reality independent of matter. It is merely a product of matter under certain circumstances. The material elements, devoid of consciousness in themselves, produce consciousness, when combined in the form of body (brain), in the same way as the fruit juice and rice etc., when made to torment, give
rise to the quality of inebriation, which was not present in them originally\textsuperscript{20}. The C\textit{\textacute{r}v\textacute{\v{s}}\text{ka}} concepts are directly refuted by \textit{\textacute{\textacute{\texta}}\textacute{k}\text{ara}} in the commentary of the third \textit{adhy\textacute{\text{\acute{y}}\text{ya}}} (53\textsuperscript{21} and 54\textsuperscript{22} \text{S\text{\textacute{u}}tras}, but at many other instances in the text, he has referred to the C\textit{\textacute{r}v\textacute{\v{s}}\text{ka}} philosophy and examined their principles and negated them.

In the commentary of \textit{\textacute{\textacute{\texta}}\textacute{k}\text{ara}} of \textit{\textacute{B}rahma-s\text{\textacute{\textacute{s}}\text{\textacute{u}}tra}}, \textit{\textacute{\textacute{\texta}}\textacute{k}\text{ara}} presents the C\textit{\textacute{r}v\textacute{\v{s}}\text{ka}} philosophy in the following way. Man is only a body, having consciousness for its quality and that consciousness is like the intoxicating property that is produced when certain materials are put together, None of
them is singly intoxicating. The Čīrvēka system arrived at the conclusion that consciousness is seen to exist only when there is a body. Independent of the body, it is nowhere experienced. Hence it is only any quality of the body. Therefore, there is no separate self in this body.

In the commentary of Racan{jnupaptyad{hikara, ā also, āa‘kara presents the Čīrvēka philosophy as ṁrvaṇapak{a as follows. While refuting the Pradh{nakrana-vida of Sîmkhya, he refers to the Čīrvēka concept as it is nothing but the difference of a living body from a mere insentient chariot etc, that sentient being can be inferred to exist in association with the body etc. which serve as the seat of the
tendency to act. And it is from this very fact of sentience and activity being perceptible that a body exists, but being imperceptible, that the body does not exist. So they infer that even sentience belongs to the body itself. Therefore they advocate that the body is the soul.

By the ŚŚtra, vyātirekaṁ tadbhavabhavyāt natunyapalabdhiṇadvā. āṅkara refuted the Cārvaka theory to the ordinary human experience. āṅkara exposes the nature of relation between body and consciousness. According to him, the Cārvaka-s are unable to reveal the real nature of consciousness because they also do not accept any principle besides the four elements. These four elements are essentially jāda (inanimate). From these elements and their
compositions, the world has originated. So he says that consciousness could not be immediately perceived by them in any way\textsuperscript{27}.

ákāra says that consciousness cannot be a quality of the body. It cannot be produced by material elements because they and their products are apprehended by it. It is the subject and the objects of knowledge. The \textquote{knower cannot be produced out of the known. There is no doubt that, the physical body is an auxiliary condition or empirical manifestation of consciousness, but it does not imply that the latter is a quality of the former. Light is a device of visual perception, but on that ground, the visual perception cannot be said to be a property of light\textsuperscript{28}. Nor can the invariable co-existence of body
and consciousness be proved, for example, the activity being perceptible when a body exists, but being imperceptible when the body does not exist. The body itself is \( \text{j}t\text{man} \). There will be no experience in dream state of the things already experienced in waking state.

In the commentary of the third \( \text{adhy}a\text{ya}, (53^{rd} \text{ and } 54^{th} \text{ s\text{\£}tras}) \), Áa\'kara introduces the term ‘upalabddhi’. The word is usually translated as perception but Áa\'kara uses this word in the sense of ability to cognize, to perceive, anything identical with \( \text{j}t\text{man} \).

In Áa\’kara’s words, \( \text{j}t\text{man} \) is by nature the very essence of perception.
itself. So áa’kara explains that the conscious (jíman) is behind our physical body and physical experience.

The Çrivíka system denies the existence of jkíṣa. But áa’kara acknowledges jkíṣa as one of five elements ‘bh£t:jkíṣasyípi vayvídikrama, a kíranatvopatatth. Vijúyate hi –‘tasmíd vi etasmid jitmanah jkíṣah sam-bh£tah. Ékíṣatvíyuh vayoragnih’ityídi, bh£t:jkíṣasyípi. Tasmíd:jkíṣasabdena bh£tasya grahanamityeyevam prapte br£mah–‘jkíṣatallí’git’ jkíṣa:abdena brahma, o grah-am yuktam. kutah talling’t. parasya hi brahma:abdam lingamsarvani ha va imñi bh£t:ñnyakíṣabdeva sam-ulpadhyate iti’. These
passages show áa´kara-s description about ‘jñāna’ which is theoretically distinct from that of Āśāvāda.

áa´kara negates the Āśāvāda approach to life also from the standpoint of ethical and religious ideas. In commentary to Aikītmyādhikara, a (ŚEtram 54), áa´kara considers that the ethical position of Āśāvāda philosophy.

**Resume**

In the refutation of the Āśāvāda concept, áa´kara gave stress to the aspect of consciousness or caitanya. He says that even Lokāyatikás are unable to totally negate the aspect of consciousness or caitanya. According to Advaita philosophy, the consciousness is self...
luminous. The self is a nonsubstance. In Advaita philosophy, the relation between the self and consciousness is important. The consciousness in Advaita philosophy is the essence of all worldly phenomena. Throughout the refutation of the Cārvāka concept, ākāra takes consciousness as the basic principle. Advaita Vedanta stands at one end, by treating all objective reference to be a construction of ignorance superimposed upon the pure self, i.e., the being of consciousness. They reject the natural and causal account of the origin of knowledge as well as consciousness. According to Bina Gupta, their rejection is based on the belief that non-being cannot become being. Consciousness cannot arise out of non-conscious
conditions, although non-conscious conditions may make consciousness manifest. According to the Advaita view, consciousness is self-luminous. The self is not a non-conscious substance. áa´kara is of the view that consciousness relates to the self as its essence. áa´kara refuted the Cjrvjka theory on the ground that consciousness is objectifiable and, therefore, cannot be known objectively. The consciousness and objects are ontologically different. So áa´kara strictly refuted the Deh`tmavrjda concept of Cjrvjka, which reduced consciousness to a mechanical conglomerate of sense organ functions.
NOTES AND REFERENCE


2. *jevi jevasravabandhasamvara nirjara mokÄstatv¡ni*, V.S. p. 176

3. *nahyekasmindharmi, i yugapatsadasatv¡diviruddhadharmasamve _g¡_aÅ sambhavati _eto_¡vat*. BSSB. 2.2.6.33

4. *katham pram¡¸abh£taÅ samst¡tethakaraÅ pram¡¸apra- meyapram¡¸tøpramiteÁvanirdhir¡t¡s£padiÅm _åknuyit*. Ibid.

5. *tath¡ paµc¡n¡mastik¡nym paµcatvasamkh¡y¡st¡ v¡ n¡sti veti vikalpyam¡n¡ sy¡tt¡vadekasminpak¡e, pak¡¸intere tu na sy¡d¡tyato ny£nasamkh¡y¡tvamadhikasam-khy¡tvam va prapnuyit*. Ibid.
ataṇḍanirdhṛitṛtham āṣṭram praṇamāttonmattavaṇḍanupiḍeyavacanaṁ syāt. Ibid.

Chandradhar Sarma, *Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy* p.263.

charera parimā, o hi jeva nityārhati manyante. BSSB. 2. 2. 6. 34.

chareraparimā, atiyam ca satyamāksno asarvagataṁ pariccinni

ītmetyato khaṇḍadānityavamitmanaṁ prasajyeta. Ibid.

chārerā, iṃcjaṇavasthitaparimā, atvijnmanuḥāyaivo manuḥ-āya charera

pari mī, o bhūtva punaḥ kenacitkarmavipāke-ṇa hastijanma

prapnuvannakālsnam hastiḥ chareram vyapn-uyāt. puttikjanma ca
prapnuvanna katsna puttikarere sameyeta. samanj eAa

ekasminnapi janmani kaumrayo-uvanasthivireudoAa. Ibid.

naca paryajdapyavirodho vikrididhyaA B.S. 2. 2.6.35.

avayavopagamipagambhyim hyaniqamipiryami,asyapakAeyamnasya ca jevasya vikriyavatvam tivadap-arihryam, vikriyavatve ca carmdivadanityatvam pras-

ajyeta tataAca bandhamkAbyepagamo bidhyeta

karmAakapariveAitasyajivyasyiibuvatsamsirasigare

nimagnasya bandhanoccadadrdhagmitvam bhavateti. BSSB.

2.2.6.36.
apicyntyasamokāvasthahbhuvinojva paramjasya

nityatvamīyate jainai. Ibid.

S.D.S.3.

Govind Chandra Pande, Life And Thought of Sankaracarya 333 to 334.33 F.

dehamātram caitanyavijājamanīmetiprākātyajānlauki-yatikacca

pratipannā. BSSB. 1.1.1.1.

yasmindāyate pravattitasyaiva seti yuktamabhayā

pratyakātva. na tu pravatiśrayatvena kevalācetano

rathadeva pratyakāyā. pravatiśrayadehīdisamyuktaśayaiva tu

cetanasya sadbhīvasiddhāyā kevalacetanar-athādivailakahāyam
jevaddehasya dāṣājāmīti. ataeva ca pratyakṣa dehe sati
darṣanadasati ca darṣanadde-hayaiva caitanyamapeti
laukiyatikā prətipannā. BSSB. 2.2.1.2.

18 agniruḥ, o jalam. ētam samasparasthānā śilaḥ kenedam citatam
tasmśvabhāttadvavasthitā. S.D.S.I.

19 tebhyaḥ dehiṣṭarami, atebhyaḥ kinnvidibhya madaḥ-ak-
tivaccaitanyamupjiṭiyate S.S.S. 1.

20 eka jtmānaḥ ūcāre bhīvit. B.S.3.3.30.53.

21 vyatirekastadbhīvabhīvitynna tēpalabdhivat. B.S. 3.3. 30. 54.

22 atraike dehamiṣtratmadarśino lokiyatika dehavya-
tiriktasyātmobhīvam manyamānaḥ samastavyasteū hiyeū
पथ्यविद्यावदम् जमापि कैतास्यम् जारेर् क्रिया-परी, अते अर्थः
भक्ती सौंदर्यात्मक संभव्यावतस्तीभ्यं कैतास्यम्
मदाज्ञातिकविद्विऺम् कैतास्यविधातः जिपः क्रिया अपरिकल्पितम् इति
से हृदयाः... प्रि, असे जितिन्यामस्मात्यिः
दयाः कैत्मधर्मादिवेष्टिन्हिमातः जिम्विदिं तेप्य-नताविः
देहा उपलब्ध्यामिना बाहिः कैत्मनुपलाभ्यामिना

एसिड्डेह देहव्यातितिक्ते धार्मिक देहभार्मायावै भविः
तुम्हार्थांति भस्मीद्यातितिको देहिदातमाः भस्मीदाय-यातितिको
देहिदातमाः इति. BSSB.3.3.30.53
23 BS 3.3.30 54.

24 vyatireka ev\(jà\)ya deh\(jà\)bhavitemarhati tadbhay\(bha\)-vita\(tà\). BSSB.

3.3.30-54.

25 tarhi vi\(à\)ayat\(à\)t\(à\)m na taddharmatvam\(à\)n\(à\)v\(à\)ta sv\(à\)-t\(à\)mani

kiriy\(à\)-virodhi\(tà\)m na\(à\)hyagniru\(à\),\(à\) \(à\) sansvit\(à\)m\(à\)j\(à\)m dahati. nahi p\(à\)\(à\)k

\(à\)ik\(à\)ita\(à\) \(à\)sansv\(à\)k\(à\)ndhama-dh\(à\)rok\(à\)yati. nahi bh\(à\)tabhautik\(à\)d\(à\)harm\(à\)a,\(à\) sat\(à\) cai-t\(à\)nyena

bh\(à\)tabhautik\(à\)niv\(à\)ayek\(à\)tr\(à\). nahi rup\(à\)dibhi\(à\) s\(à\)var\(à\)pam

parar\(à\)pam v\(à\) vi\(à\)ayek\(à\)riyate. vi\(à\)ayek\(à\)riyante tu bahy\(à\)dhy\(à\)tmik\(à\)j\(à\)n

bh\(à\)tabhautik\(à\)n ca\(à\)t\(à\)nyena. BSSB. 3.3.30.54.
26 dehamtram caitanya vijätammeti prjkatjanā laukiyetikaā pratipannā. BSSB. 1.1.1.1.

27 apica satsu pradeppadiāepakara,eāupalabdirbhavatya-satsu na bhavati na caitvat ā pradipādharma evo-palobdirbhavati. evam sati deha upalabdi dharmanā-bhavyasati ca na bhavatiti na dehadharmo bhavitumarhāti upakara,atvamitre,api pradeppidivaddehopayogopa-patteā. BSSB. 3.3.30.54.

28 nahi svapnjdutthitaā svapnādhām sarpadamañodak-asvinidikīryam mithyeti manyamānīmastadvagatimapi kačitetena
svapnadagovagatyabidhanena dehamatr-\textit{\^}tmav\textit{\^}do du\textit{\^}ito veditavya\textit{\^}o. BSSB 2.1.6.14.

\textsuperscript{29} upalabdhisvar\textit{\^}pa eva ca na \textit{\^}tmy\textit{\^}tmano dehavya-tiriktatvam,
nityatvam ca upalabdhe\textit{\^}o ekar\textit{\^}py\textit{\^}t. \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{30} evam sati deha upalabdhirbhavatya\textit{\^}sati ca na bhavatiti na dehadharmo bhavitumarhati. \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{31} nahyasati dehavyatirikt\textit{\^}tmani paralokaphala\textit{\^}codani

upapadhyerankasya \textit{\^{}} brahm\textit{\^}tmatvamupadi\textit{\^}yeta. BSSB.

3.3.30-53
Laukhyatik\( j \)mapi cetana eva deho aceta\( n \)j\( m \) rath-\( iden \)\( j \)m

pravartako \( d\bar{\eta}g \)a ityavipati\( \ddot{a}d \)dham cetanasya

pravartakatvam. BSSB 2.1.1.1

Bina Gupta, *CIT Consciousness*, p.99