CHAPTER V

REFUTATION OF BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER 5

REFUTATION OF BUDDHHA PHILOSOPHY

Introduction.

āā’kara refers to the three main schools of Buddhism. They are Sarvāstivāda, Viśuddhāna and Āśrayāna. The Sarvāstivādins
accept the reality of both the outside and the inside world. The Vijñānavādins maintain the theory that thought alone is real. The Āśānyavādins agree that everything is void, but all of them agree that everything is momentary. According to Nataliya Īṣayeva, “As shown by the Advaitist, the Buddhists are classified under different sects in accordance with their interpretation of reality. Some maintain that everything exists ‘Sarvo jñāna sarvajñāna, others allow for the existence of consciousness, that is, Vijñānavāda, and there are some who claim everything to be void, that is, Āśānyavāda. The general definition applied by Āśākara to all Buddhist schools is derived from the term Vināśa, destruction, annihilation; it points out the core of
the teaching, namely, the idea of the non-existence of Ê̆tman as a separate ontological reality. Therefore, Buddhism is determined by him as Vainj̄ikamata, which can be roughly rendered as a teaching about non-existence. āaṅkara has been regarded by his opponents as a Crypto-Buddhist (Pracchanna-Bauddha). Many opponents of āaṅkara regarded him as a Crypto Buddhist, because there are parallels between Advaita Vedānta and Mahāyāna Budhism, especially in connection with the principle of avidya and two truths—the Paramartha (the absolute) and the Vyavahārika (the practical). Both these systems accept avidya as that which is to be removed, and both of them accept the twofold division of avidya-cognitional and
conational aspects. But áa´kara gives more emphasis to investigation and inquiry. But Baudhā gives more emphasize to mind control and morality. Avidya, in its cognitional aspect, has provided a ‘path’. According to Baudhā concept of Avidyā: ‘path’ is the practice relating to prañña. According to áa´kara, the path consists of investigation into the Vedānta texts, and the inquiry into Brahman. Against the Baudhā notion of momentariness, áa´kara emphasized on eternity of fundamental principle. These are the points of difference between áa´kara and Buddhists. The following concepts of Baudhā philosophy are refuted by áa´kara. They are:

(1) theory of causation, (2) the concept of Ēkādaśa, (3) the theory of
origination of an entity from absence, (4) the concept of self intuition, (5) the concept that object entity and cognition are the same, (6) The concept that all worldly cognitions are unreal like dream, (7) the concept of *svasamvedana pratyakṣa*, (8) the concept of *Vīśaṇa*, (9) the concept of *alayavijñāna* as the abode of *vīśaṇa*, and (10) the concept of *antarjayaarāpa* as object entity.

**Sarvāstivāda**

The Sarvāstivāda school of Henayīna Buddhism is in its approach realistic. It is divided into two: Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika. The Vaibhāṣika attaches itself to *Vibhāṣa*.
commentary on Abhidharmakosā work and it may be called presentationalism (The doctrine that in perception the mind has immediate cognition of the object). The Vaibhāṣika-s maintain the independent existence of mind and matter.

The Sautrāntikīs are attached to sūtra and they may be called advocates of representationalism. (The doctrine that perceived objects as only a representation of real external objects). The Sautrāntikīs maintain the theory that all external things are inferable. But the scholars agree that both these schools are equally realistic. Āaṅkara refuted these two schools bearing the name of Sarvāstivāda.
Refutation of the Buddhist theory of causation

The Buddhist theory of causation is called Pratītya-samutpada or the theory of dependent origination. Regarding the concept of causation, the Sarvāstivāda holds the view that all constructed things are independently originated. The famous Buddhist thinker Kamalaṇḍila says that it is the chief jewel among all the teachings of the Buddha. According to Dr. Vijaya Rani, this theory has a wide scope. It covers the problem of causal relationship, the theories of momentariness, of disconnected flow, of no soul, of Enyata and so forth. The effect elements come forth only when the cause element is there (dharma-sthitita).
According to áa’kara, the term *samudya* can be interpreted in two ways: (1) the evolutes having as cause the elements of fire, water, earth and wind, and (2) the mentals having thought as their cause. The Sarvāstivādins and their followers recognize the view that the external reality is either element or elemental and the internal reality is either mind or mental. They say that both these together make up this universe. The external world is made up of the aggregation of atoms. These atoms are four kinds i.e., atoms of earth, i.e., hard, (b) atoms of water, i.e., viscid, (c) atoms of fire, i.e., hot, (d) atoms of air, i.e., mobile. These atoms are gathered together in to aggregates. With the connection of the internal world, the five
personal skand\(\text{i}\)s are the cause. They are: \(r\text{\£pa skandh}i, vij\mu\text{na skandh}i, \text{vedan}i\text{ skandh}i, \text{samj\u{u}j skandh}i\) and \(\text{samsk\text{\r{a}r}a skandh}i\)”. By the aggregation of these skandh\(\text{i}\)s the internal world is produced.

According to áa\’kara, the above view of Sarv\(\text{\v{s}}\text{tiv\text{i}d}a\) is unacceptable because no cause is established for the existence either of the aggregate of elements and evolutes or of the aggregate of thought and mental”. These two types of aggregates can never be formed at all. The unintelligent momentary atoms and the momentary skandh\(\text{i}\)s cannot form any systematic whole. áa\’kara continually says that if individual atoms could engage in activity on their own account, then their activity would never cease”. So there is
no aggregation. Without the aggregation the worldly things cannot exist. But the Sarvāstivādins suppose that on the basis of the series of the dependent origination (pratetayasāmulpāda) the aggregate can be formed. Dr Vijaya Rani gives two definitions to Pratetayasāmulpāda, i.e., an origination after getting the causes, and an origination after the destruction of the causes. On the basis of the formation of aggregates the series of Pratetayasāmulpada can be explained. The series is — avidyā, samskāra, vijjñāna, nīma, rūpa, Ādyatana, sparśa, vedanā, trīṣa, upadiṇa, bhīva, jati, jara, maraṇa, ākā, parivedana, dukha, etc. Through this series an uninterrupted chain of cause and effect is constituted. This chain cannot take place
without the aggregates. The Sarvāstivādins hold the view that the aggregates are the reality, by the sūtra: itaretarapratyayāttvāti cennolpattimatra nimittatvāt. ākara refutes these concepts of Sarvāstivādins. According to ākara, the formation of the aggregates are explained by the mutual causality of the series of dependent origination. He refutes them by saying that though the preceding one is the cause of the subsequent one, there is nothing which can be the cause of the whole of the aggregate. According to him, the atoms cannot combine themselves even when they are assumed to be permanent and eternal, because the atoms are momentary aggregates without which the nidānas would be deprived of an
abode. He says that Baudhās ṭe may accept nescience as an efficient
cause for the aggregates, Since the aggregates follow one another in a
series. The aggregates are formed on the basis of nescience, they
follow one another as a series in an endless world. It causes an
aggregate being born distinct from an aggregate, which is born
similar according to rule, or is born either similar or dissimilar,
according to no rule. In the former case, a man could never be
reborn in a different state. In the latter case, he could in an instance
be transformed into something else. Āaṅkara argues against the
Sarvāstiva concept of series by asking how aggregates can be born
from other aggregates in an endless series. In that case, liberation
would be desired by one but attained by another. So, the series stands in a relation of successive causality and it cannot be the cause of the aggregates, and there being no permanent enjoyer, there is neither any need of the aggregate. The mere existence of the preceding moment means its causal efficiency. This also cannot be acceptable because no effect can arise without imbibing the nature of the cause which is permanent as it continues to exist in the effect and thus the Bauddha doctrine of momentariness is not acceptable.

Through the commentary of the śEtra –uttarolpide ca pErvanirodhitā, ākara establishes that the successive causality spoken of in the series of avidyā, samskāra etc. is untenable. The
Sarvāstivādins argues that everything is created; the antecedent thing would already have ceased to exist at the next moment \((ulpanna vināṭā)\). According to the Abhidhar-makota, “the uninterrupted succession of moments following one another is duration. The latter moment is the substitute of the former moment because of similarity” \(^{20}\).

ākara refutes this argument thus - it is intended by the Sarvāstivādin that the entity having a perfected condition in the previous moment cause of entity in a later moment. This is not possible, because of the occurrence of connection with a second moment when there is the hypothesis of the further activity of an
entity. áa’kara states that if existence (bhīva) of the cause be its activity (vyāpāra), then the effect is imbued with the nature of the cause. The cause lasts for more than one moment and the principle of momentariness is trespassed. The Sarvāstivādin say that existence is its activity. áa’kara refuted the point saying that it is impossible because of the impossibility of arising of an effect. As that which is not imbued with the nature of the cause since everything is momentary, the antecedent thing would already have ceased to exist at the next moment, when the subsequent thing is created. So it can be the cause of the other.
According to the view Sarvāstivāda, ākaśa says that the cause and effect can continue to exist without the colouring of the effect by the cause. ākaśa replies that such a position would bring about confusion.

ākaśa says that the Sarvāstivādin cannot admit any causal process issuing from the momentary cause and influencing effect. The characteristic of cause influences the characteristic of the effect. That concept cannot be denied by the Sarvāstivādin. If it is still maintained to be the cause, then one has to accept that existence comes out of non-existence. For example, the cloth is produced by the non-existent yarns. Otherwise, one can think that clay can
produce the cloth. The doctrine of momentariness would go against
the principle that the effect is the cause in a new form. This principle
shows that the cause existed in the effect, which means that the
process of the causation is not momentary\textsuperscript{24}.

According áa’kara, on account of the momentariness of things
‘origination and destruction’ will be synonymous. A momentary
entity as a product must go through the state of origination,
existence and destruction. So, every entity must have a life span of at
least three moments. áa’kara examines that three alternatives for
explaining the origination and cessation. 1. Svar\textit{\Lp}a (entity exists in
Vastvantara (production of an altogether different thing). The Abhidharma kośa also presents the concept of origination and cessation constitute by the Sarvástivādins, through three alternatives, i.e., a thing in its own form (svaraśpa), another state (avastvantara) and altogether different thing (vastvantara) as the characteristics of dharma. These alternatives pointed out by ākara cannot be applied logically to the Sarvástivādins doctrine. ākara says that according to the first view, the origination and destruction constitute the own-formation of a given thing. So the origination and destruction are equivalent to thing itself. According to the second view, ākara’s position that the origination and cessation represent
the initial and final stages of the given thing which presuppose an intermediate stage. Then the given thing will have relation with the three moments and is no longer momentary. Therefore the Sarvāstivāda concept is trespassed. According to the last view, the given thing is altogether disconnected from origination and destruction. So, it must be regarded as everlasting. Therefore, the Sarvāstivāda concept is refuted by ākara’.

Some Sarvāstivādins says that the origination and cessation of a given thing signify merely the perception and non-perception. It is in opposition to the Saunātika concept. The Sarvāstivādins say that
“there is no pramāṇa for the cessation and origination of a given thing”²⁷.

āa’kara refutes this concept and says that if our perception and non-perception of a given thing constitute the birth and cessation, one will have to say that these are the characteristics of a seer, not the characteristic of a given thing. So āa’kara thoroughly says that the ultimate nature of a given thing is permanent and it is not momentary²⁸.

According to the Sarvāstivāda concept, cause and effect exist simultaneously at the next moment. That means the cause lasts for
more than one moment. This opinion is against the Sarvāstivāda theory of momentariness.

āa’kara cannot accept the theory of momentariness, because his Advaita principle of eternal entity is contradictory to it. That is why āa’kara refuted the concept of Sarvāstivāda emphatically.

**Refutation of Vaibhāṣika theory of Destruction**

āa’kara criticizes the Vaibhāṣika view that the pratisamkhyā-nirodha, apratisamkhyā-nirodha and ṕāṭa are indefinable, non-placeable and external. āa’kara regards these as definable, placeable and external. The pratisāmkhya-nirodha is
concerned with the momentary existence of *dharm*-s and is admitted to have a cause, e.g., when a jar is broken by a man with a stick. The *apratisamkhya*:nirodha is concerned with the cessation of an entity, e.g., natural decay of things. The famous Buddhist thinker Vasubandhu defines *pratisamkhya*:nirodha as the cessation of the *Sarvāvadharmas* by means of transcendental knowledge. Yamakami Sogen pointed out that this is the summon bonum of the *Sarvāstivādin* who considers it to be synonymous with *nirvana* also, the *Viśnudīns* consider it merely as a stage leading to *nirvāṇa*.
Vasubandhu defines the *apratisamkhyānirodha* as a complete cessation of the mixing of elements (*dharmā-s*) due to the unavailability of the required conditions.  

The famous Buddhist logician Vasubandhu asserts that “the destruction of existent things is without any cause (*kasmikāhetuka*); Because a produced thing has its causes but destruction is only the negation of existence and hence nothing can be done of that which itself is non-existent.”

The Vaibhāṣikas think that the *pratisamkhyànirodha*, *apratisamkhyànirodha* and *jkāja* are non-placeable insubstantial and indefinable. The destruction proceeded by the mind of entities is
known a cessation with understanding. The destruction preceded by without the mind if entity is known as the *apratisamkhyñnirdha*.

The absence of hindrance is known as *jaصلja33*.

According to áaˈkara these two kinds of destruction do not happen because the series of dependently originated *dharmas* cannot be broken, the *nidanas* are related to each other as cause and effect. The *nidanas* of dependently originated *dharmas* must be inseparably connected with its previous states. So the indefinable destruction is not possible.

áaˈkara argues that these two kinds of destruction cannot be found in the individual members of the series. In the momentary
existence of each member, there is no conscious destruction. It is not
an unconscious destruction also, because the individual member is
not altogether destroyed, e.g., When a pot is destroyed we find the
eexistence of clay. On account of the heat, the drop of water
disappears and we see it existing in the other form like steam. In
Bauddha concept of vinjéa, there is nothing related to any other
form or other substance34. So their concept is not accepted by
áa’kara.

In the words of Yamakami Sogen, áa’kara has mistaken in
representing the said two nirodhês. áa’kara critically says that the
two kinds of destruction are either the result of perfect knowledge or
of the meaninglessness of the path. Thus, both concepts are not accepted by áaˈkara. If we accept the first idea it is against the Baudhaka principle of causeless destruction. If we accept the later concept, there is the cause of the meaninglessness of the path. Thus, both concepts are rejected by áaˈkara.

**Refutation of the concept of Ėkīḍa**

According to the Buddhist philosophy, *pratisamkhya-nirodha* and *apratisamkhya-nirodha* are indefinable. Refutation of these have already been described earlier. Then he takes the third entity Ėkīḍa.

According to the Buddhistic view the Ėkīḍa is also indefinable. The indefinability of Ėkīḍa is refuted
by áaˈkara in Brahmāstrabhāya. According to Abhidharmakośa, the Sarvāstivādins define ākāraka as that having for its measure the absence of tangible.

According to Sarvāstivādins there are two kinds of ākāra: (1) unconstructed dharma (2) the space as element. The space element included within the sense base of the visible. Ākāra as unconstructed dharma has for its nature non-hindrance.

In áaˈkara’s words, like the pratīṣamkhya-nīrodha and apratīṣamkhya-nīrodha, the ākāra is also a given thing. From verse,

\[ \text{"śtmaniḥ ākāra sambhātah"} \]

we know that ākāra is a substance. As the Baudhā do not accept the āruti as a pramāna, the anumāna is
also be adopted to prove the substantiality of ēkā. ēkā is similar to earth, air, etc. They are recognized to be entities in consequence of their being the substratum of properties like smell, cold etc, similarly the ēkā, it being the substratum of sound, ought to be recognized as an entity. Therefore ā’kara refuted the Baudhā concept by saying that ēkā should be definable.

ā’kara refutes the Sarvāstivāda definition of ēkā i.e., ēkā as the absence of material flow without hindrance (sapratigha dravyabhīvamitra). He presents the example of the flying of the birds in the sky. When a bird flies in ēkā, there is the presence of
obstruction, hence another bird that may try to fly will find no scope
for doing so. In this case, anything with the help of which the absence of obstruction,
is specified will itself be the possible entity - \( jk\dot{u}a \), and it will not be
mere absence of hindrance\(^{38} \). In the series of question referred to Baudha dārṣana, there is a question of “what is the basis of earth.”
They say that the wind is the basis of earth. The next question is, “what is the basis of wind?” Their answer is the \( jk\dot{u}a \) is the basis of wind. From this we get the conclusion that if \( jk\dot{u}a \) is not a given
thing the above answer is not correct. Therefore \( \text{kaka} \) must be an entity.

Refutation of the origination of object entity from absence

According to \( \alpha \alpha\prime \kappa \alpha \), the Sautr\'intikas notion that birth as existence subsequent to non-existence (\( \text{abh\'etva bh\'vutpada} \)) is questionable. Their idea is not accepted by \( \alpha \alpha\prime \kappa \alpha \). Because they do not accept the permanent and eternal cause of a given thing, but they argue that an entity is derived from non-existence. For example, they say that, from the destruction of a seed a sprout is formed. Like, when the milk is
destroyed, the curd is formed, from the lump of a clay a pot is formed. So the Sautrîntikas say that from the absence the entity is formed.

áa’kara argues against their concept. He says that if a thing can arise out of absence, then anything can arise out of anything. áa’kara says that if this theory was true, then no one would have to exert himself to attain any end, since ends could be attain without means. If the nirvâna is born from absence there would be the perfection of the lazy people also because the attainment of absence is very easy. Therefore áa’kara thoroughly refutes the view that there should be no evidence to prove that the entity is born from absence.
Refutation of Vijñānavīda

Vijñānavīda

The Vijñānavīdins argue for the non-existence of external objects. In *Brahasūtrasākarabhāṣyā*, ākara has presented five arguments put forward by Vijñānavīdins to prove the non-existence of external objects (1) If external objects exist, they are either atoms or aggregates of atoms. But they can be neither and are therefore non-existent. (2) Even those who admit the existence of external objects, admit different forms of their cognitions. But if forms of cognitions are admitted, they suffice for the practical purpose of our life, and
the existence of external objects becomes unnecessary. (3) Objects and their cognitions are invariably perceived together. Therefore they are identical with each other. (4) Waking cognitions apprehend themselves like dream cognitions. Both are similar to each other. Both are not produced by external objects. (5) The variety of \textit{pratyaya vaicitra} is due to the variety of \textit{visan\- vaicitra}. These arguments are refuted by \textit{\=a\~kara}.

\textbf{Refutation of self-intuition.}

The concept of self intuition of Buddhists is connected with the non separation of three factors that is subject, object and self.
intuition. In Pramāṇa samuccaya, Dinnīga proves that these three factors are inseparable.

According to the concept of the Vijñānavīdaṁ the jñeya is not different from jñāna. The famous Vijñānavīdi Dharmakirti says that when we see a blue lotus, the blue and cognition of blue are not different entities. One should recognize their difference as due to the false cognition. Like the astigmatic seeing the double moon, but the moon is single.

āā’kara in his commentary on the Brahmaśtrā “nabhja upalabde”\(^{40}\) tries to deny the dependent object entity of Vijñānavīda. He puts forward the five types of the pūrvapakāṇa. (1)
According to āa’kara the Vijñānavādins note that the object entity is composed of atoms. It is untenable. If object entities are different from atoms, they can no longer be said to consist of atoms. He continually says that if they are identical with atoms they cannot be aggregates. For example, about the objects like posts, there will not be the notion of atoms etc. There is no collection of atoms such as posts, etc because of the impossibility of ascertaining the posts etc., by means of otherness or non-otherness from atoms.

(2) The Vijñānavādins argue that the variety of cognition is explained only by the variety of sense object. Therefore, the sense object have a formation similar to their cognitions.
(3) In áa´kara’s words, the Vijµñaṅdins argue that the ascertainment of sense-object and perception are identical.

(4) According to áa´kara Vijµñaṅdins say that consciousness is to be considered as similar to a dream. The images occur in a dream without the presence of corresponding object entities. Likewise in the waking stage also the images occur without the eternal object entities. For example, the concepts of gandharva nagara, marumarecika, magic, etc, are only the imaginary subject and object, there is no eternal reality.

(5) According to áa´kara, the Vijµñaṅdins say that the variety of concepts can be explained by the presense of viṣaṇa".
These are the five arguments put forward by āaṅkara for refuting the Vijñānavādin’s concept. It is very interesting to examine the refutational attempts of āaṅkara against the Vijñānavādins as a revelation of his own philosophical concept. According to āaṅkara there is an external object on the ground of perception itself. There is no absence because of perception. The absence indeed of an outer object entity cannot be ascertained. The outer object entity is perceived in accordance with the notion as post, wall, pot, cloth, likewise. The absence of a thing being perceived is not possible.

Refutation of Antarjñeya as the object entity
áa’kara criticizes the famous Vijñānavādin, Dinnīga’s concept antarjñāyatrāpana as the object entity. He takes a verse from Dinnīga’s Ālayamaparekāśa which defines the object entity as the inner form of knowledge which appears though it were external;

“yatantarjñāyatrāpan tu bahirvad avabhāsate”

áa’kara raises his objection against the Vijñānavādins saying that their usage “bahirvad” betrays their acceptance of the external object-entity. “The external thing is well known to the whole world, then why do you apply the affix vat is (as if). How should you say the affix ‘vat’ as external to objects?” áa’kara asks.
áa´kara employs his argument for identity of objective reference against the Vijµñavïdins. According to his principle, x is y, not x is like y. This is a post, this is a wall, these type of knowledges are produced by the people for the worldly existence of the sense-objects of perception. áa´kara says that people say that “this is a cow, not an animal like cow”. If the Baudhda argues the object-entity is bahirvat (like external), on the ground of the impossibility of external things, áa´kara answers to it that the possibility or impossibility of the things is to be determined on the basis of pram¿,a44.

Then the Vijµñavïdin says that the sense-objects correspond to our cognitions45. So there is no necessity of sense-object. áa´kara
refutes the point by saying if there is no sense-object, there is no
cognition also.

Refutation of the theory that object entity and cognition are the
same.

The Vijñānavādin views that the simultaneity of notion and
sense object are identical. For example, blue and the notion of blue
occur simultaneously. āa’kara replies that the simultaneous
experience of notion and sense-object proves only that sense-object
constitutes the means to the notion.

āa’kara argues that there is a distinction between sense object
and its notion on the basis of the difference between vijñātā, a and
He presents, cognition of a pot, a cloth and a jar etc as example. In connection with a white cow and a black cow, the difference lies in between whiteness and blackness. It is not based on cowness. So áśkara says that the object entity and cognition are different.

**Refutation of Svasamvedana Pratyakṣa**

ásaṅkara refutes the Vijñānaviṣṇu concept of svasamvedana pratyakṣa. Dharmakirti defined svasamvedana pratyakṣa as self-apprehension of every cognition and every mental phenomenon.
According to áa’kara, the Baudhā concept is that each cognition is of essential self-illuminating nature like a lamp. The presence of perception indicates the presence of an external object-entity on the grounds that it is not of a luminous nature like a lamb, as is the perception. The perception is not experienced for itself apart from the object-entity because of the contradictoriness of activity in itself.

áa’kara says that according to the Vijñānavādins concept, the perceptions are self-luminous and they do not need to be apprehended by a witness apart from themselves. The two arguments given by the Vijñānavādins to explain their concept are
the following. (1) the danger of infinite regression is there that an apprehending agent would again in turn require an apprehending agent. (2) The concept of perceptions, like lamp etc, have light as their nature\(^5\).

\(\text{\`a\text{`}kara}\) explains that the witnessing self is of the nature of the knowing subject and consequently it does not need to be apprehended from the point of view of infinite regression. So we can know the diversity of the self — existence of the witness and the notion\(^5\).

To the second argument \(\text{\`a\text{`}kara}\) replies that the perceptions are self luminous like the lamp. A conscious agent does not involve in
infinite regression. There he proceeds to affirm the necessity of a conscious agent. Such notions are like existence of thousand lamps situated in the middle of a dense cave\textsuperscript{52}.

According to áa’kara, an interior conscious agent is needed for the perception to be manifest. According to him the concept of the Ved\textintins are differ from the Vijn\textnav\textintins because the first phase of the perception involves the association of the eye with the lamp\textsuperscript{53}.

áa’kara points out that self is one and permanent and eternal. But the perceptions acknowledged by Buddhist are momentary and fleeting\textsuperscript{54}.
áa’kara considers the Viṣṇudīn’s argument of infinite regression as directed against the notion of the self. They say that if perception was to be apprehended by another. Then it causes other perception and so on. So there arises the problem of anavasthi.

áa’kara refutes this point by saying that the witnessing self (perceiver) and the viśaya (perceived) both are of different natures related to each other i.e., perceiver and perceived. So their result of their association does not cause the infinite regression.

Therefore the Baudhā theory of consciousness is not acceptable to Advaita Vedānta because no one can say that Devadatta is the son of a barren woman. In áa’kara’s words we get the conclusion that
the very nature of consciousness itself proves the existence of external things different from consciousness\textsuperscript{37}. So the perception is self manifested.

Refutation of the theory that all worldly cognitions are unreal like dream

The Vijñ\textasciitilde{\textacute{a}}\textasciitilde{\textacute{n}}\textacute{\texttilde}dins declared that the waking stage and dream stage are similar in so far as they deny the external objects. But ā\textasciicircumflex{\textacute{\textacute{a}}}kara raises the question that if the dream state and walking state are alike, how does direct perception happen.

On account of momentariness, the mental perception does not operate at the same time as sensory perception but in a moment...
afterwards. There is a question whether the mental perception has the same object in the sensory perception. Dinnīga says that the external object is not being denied here, but the external object of which our representation is a faithful copy is being denied. This means that the form of the inner knowable which appears as if it were external, is the object\(^{58}\). This is denied by the Viśnūnavīdins.

According to the Viśnūnavīdins, the differences between waking state and dream state can be compared to the difference between *upalabdhi* (perception) and *smṛti* (remembrance). Both the mental perception and remembrance occur subsequent to the fading out of sensory perception.
áa’kara refutes the above concept of Vijñānavīda in the following way- how can similarity of the waking state and dream state be established ?. He puts forward two arguments to refute their concept. The contents of the dream state are negated by the waking state. But the contents of waking state is not negated by anything and any where. This is the difference between perception and the waking state.

áa’kara says that the Vijñānavīda argument is not correct. Perception means the direct perception of an object. For example, a father beholds his son rather than merely remembers him.
According to áa’kara, the analogy of the dream only emphasizes the temporal gap that exists between sensory perception which is subsequent to the former. áa’kara concludes that the dream state is a kind of memory and the waking state is real perception of object entity.

Refutation of the concept of vñsana

The Viññavādins explain knowledge on the basis of habitual (vñsana) energies without any reference to external object. The
concept of habitual energy is closely connected with ṇlaya class=

The notions of ṇlaya class= and viṣana are primarily associated with karma and phala.

According to Mahāyānasamgraha the viṣana means the generative cause of things by virtue of their simultaneous birth and destruction. The ṇlaya class= and viṣana are intended by the Vijñānavidins to replace the external object. These ideas are intended by the Vijñānavidins to explicate the process of action and destruction.

aṅkaśa says that the Vijñānavidin’s concept of viṣana should be refuted because viṣana could not originate. If there is no external
object entity. The vīsana is formed by the perception of external thing\textsuperscript{63}.

The Vijñānavādins say that the objects are not perceived externally because it is precisely owing to the perception of objects that a variety of vīsana (mental tendencies) corresponding to the diverse objects can arise. Āa’kara refuted this concept of the Vijñānavādins by asking how a variety of tendencies can arise when no object is perceived. If these tendencies have no beginning, this infinite regression will amount to a baseless assumption like the blind leading the blind.
According to áa’kara, the object entity is external to the mind.

For the establishment of his concepts he puts forward two arguments: (1) the \textit{vīśana} cannot originate independently of the perception of external object-entity (2) The perception of external-object-entities can take place without the \textit{vīśana}.

More over, he says that the \textit{vīśana} is a kind of qualification which requires a basis. But the Vijñānavādins deny such a basis.

Therefore áa’kara says that there is no birth of \textit{vīśana} without the
perception of the object-entity. He negates their concept, i.e., the vijñāna is associated which the notions of action and effect.

**āNyāvyāda**

āNyāvyāda of the Bauddhas goes counter to everything. It goes against the āruti, Smāti and every other means of right knowledge.

So āā’kara refuted the whole concepts of āNyāvyāda by the help of āruti, Smāti and yuktī. āā’kara dismisses the āNyāvyāda saying that system is more contradicted.

**Resume**

In the refutation of Bauddha concepts āā’kara gave more importance to yuktī. Through the refutation, āā’kara
did not distinguish between Sarvajistiva and Sautrantika schools.

áa’kara dismisses the álNyavida by saying that the system is contradicted by Smäti, Yukti and áruti. áa’kara abandoned the main principle of Baudhña (kÄ,ikavìda) saying that the cause lasts for more than one moment.
NOTES AND REFERENCE

1 kecit sarvįstivįdinaĀ, BSSB. 2. 2. 4. 18 tadastivadįijĀtį ā yehi sarva

masteti vadanti atetaman-igatam pratyنتائpannam sarvįstivadį ā (A.

K. and A. K. bhįĀya v 25)

2 kecitvįįįstivamįtravįdiniĄ, BSSB. 2.2.4.18
3 kecit sarvaḥ lnyatva vidinaḥ, BSSB.2.2.4.18

4 Nataliya Isayeva, *Sankara and Indian Philosophy*, pp. 146 - 147

5 pratetyasamulpidopadeśapradhīnamidambhagavatā


6 Dr. Vijaya Rani, *Buddhist Philosophy presented in memi-msaśloka

vṛt-tīkā. p. 110. IV

7 samudhyā ubhayahetukepi tadaprāptiḥ, B.S.2.2.4.18

8 Yoyamubhayahetuka ubhayaprakaraḥ samudhyā pare-Āśmabhi

preto, uhetukaḥ ca bhṛtabhautikasamhatir ēpaḥ skandahetukaḥ ca

paṃcaskandherēpaḥ tasminnubhayah-etukepi samudhyēabhi

preyāṃśe tadaprāptiḥ syītsa-mudhyapraptiḥ. BSSB.2.2.4.18.
9 bhūtam bhautikam bahyam cittam ca kamadhyantarāmiti

vibhīgaḥ, Ibid.

10 tatha rūpavijñāna vedana samjñā samskṛtasamjñākā

paṃcaskandḥ, Ibid.

11 Yoyamubhayahetukā ubhayaprakṛtaḥ samudayaḥ pare-

Ājimabhipreto, uhetukāḥ ca bhūtabhautikā samhatirṛpaḥ

skandhahetukāḥ ca paṃc-askandhāṛpaḥ tasminnubha ya he

tu kepi samudaye abhipreyamīne tadaprīptiḥ syā- 

dsamudṛyaprīptiḥ, Ibid.
anyasya ca kasyacicitanasya bhoktu\textemdash pra\textemdash jisiturva sthi-rasya

samhanturanabhyupagam\textemdash t nirapek\textemdash Aapray\textemdash tyabh\textemdash yupagame ca

pravy\textemdash tyanuparamaprasa\textemdash git, Ibid.

Dr. Vijaya Rani, *Buddhist philosophy presented in M\textemdash c\textemdash m\textemdash sa\textemdash loka va\textemdash r\textemdash i\textemdash tika*. p.no. IV

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{13} heturatra samupt\textsubscript{da\textemdash } samutpannam phalam matam.

hetubh\textemdash tama\textemdash gam pratetyasamupt\textsubscript{da\textemdash } samutpadhyate

samadetik\textemdash tv\textemdash phalabh\textemdash tama\textemdash gam pratetyasamutpan\textemdash am.

evam sarv\textsubscript{i\textemdash },yang\textemdash nyubhayath\textemdash isiddhyati. hetubha-lavat na caivam

satyavyavasth\textsubscript{i\textemdash } bhavan\textemdash tyapek\textemdash Abhed\textemdash it. yadapek\textemdash Aya
\end{quote}
pratyasamutpado na tadevapekṣya prate-tyasamutpannam


15 tecjvidyājayovidyā samskaro viṣṇujnam, niṣma ṛṣiṇam āśa-yatanām

sparśo vedani trīśi, upāsīnam, bhava, jītirjarī, mara, am, oka, parivedana, dukham, durm-anastetyevamjateyaka

itaretarahetuka saugate samaye kvacitsamkāpta nirdista

kvacitprapaścitā, BSSB. 2.2.4.19.

16 B.S.2.2.4.19

17 atha manyase samghīta evaṇadau samsre samatāyin-urvartante

tadīcryanīrayācavidhyādaya iti, tadapi sa-

mghītīsamghītīntaramul-padhyānām, niyamena va
sādāmevolpadhyate, aniyamena vij sadām visa-dām vālpadhyeta. BSSB.2.2.4.19

38 B.S. 2.2.4.20

39 kā, abhā'gavēdinoyamabhypagama uttaransmin-kā, a

ulpadhyajne pṛervaA kā, o nirudhyata iti. BSSB.2.2.4.20.

20 uttarottara kā, ānubandhā sṭhitirīti pṛervasya kā, a-syottaraA

kā, ā. pratinidhibhētaA sādāyatataA sa

pṛervaA kā, ādyapavatiājata, iveti kātvottaraA kā, ā

sthitirucyate. A.K.II.46.

nirudhaminasya niruddhasya vij pṛrvakā, asybhīva-

grastavruttarakā, ahetuvēnupapatte ā. atha bhīvā-bhētaA
pariniप्रपंजvasthaः p_rvakः, a uttarakः,asya
heturityabhip्रजyastathःpi nopapadhyate. bhvabheśta-sya

punaryjprakalpanियम kः,intarasambandha-prasa’git.

BSSB.2.2.4.20.

22 bhvasya vyijraितyabhip्रjyasthatियpi naivopapa-tyate. BSSB. 2.2.4.20.

23 bhvabheśtasya punaryjprakalpanियम kः,intara-
sambhandhaprasa’git. Ibid.

24 evamaprydhyantamadhyakः,atrayasambandhitvःtva-stunaः
kः,ikatvःbhyu pagamahaniः atathatyantavyati-

riktrvikolvपदिनिरधाहु वस्तुनां sytmaःvamahiःa-vad, tato
vastu ulp;danirodh¡bh¡h¡msams±̣Am¡miti vas-tunaÁ izìvatatva

prasa’gaÁ. Ibid.

apicolpadanirodau n¡ma vastunaÁ svar;pameva v¡ sy¡-
t¡mavasth¡ntaram v¡ vastvantarameva v¡ sarvath¡pi

nopapadhyate. Ibid.

lakÀa,¡nipunajanijar¡sthitiranityat¡ etani hi sams±̣tasya catv¿ri

lakÀa,¡ni yatrait¡nihavantis¡dharmaÁsamskar-t¡lakÀyte

viparyayadasams±̣taÁ tatrajstust¡ndharm¡-mjanasthitiÁ

sth¡payati jar¡jarayati anityat¡ vina¿yati. A.K.Á.45-46.

taded¡k¡¿am pa¿yata iti sautr¡ntik¡Á na hyete j¡tyad-ayo dharma
dravyataÁ samvidhyante yath¡bhivyaµjate kim k¡ra,am?
pramāj.bhayāt. nahyeĀj m dravyato-stitveki/Ēcidapi pramāj.amasti

pratyakĀj.nuṃjanāptī-gama vī yathj rāpjdenjm dharmāj.miti.

A.K. ll .46

28 yadi ca darājandarārne vastuna ulpadanirodausyātjm evamapi
dāt-Āgādharmo tau na vastudharmīviti vastunaĀ āyvatatva

prasaṅga eva. BSSB 2.2.4.20.

29 dvividho hi vinīja siddheĀ pratiĀedha lakāa,aĀ tathā-
hikāa, didharmā bhīva eva kāle vinaıyateti kātvā vinī-ā

ityıkhyiyate yadvī bhīva svabhīva pracyutilakāa,a

pradhvamsjparanāma vinījiṇm vinaıyatatra pērava-sminiāē

235
yadyayam hetumatvasidhana parynuyogakah kriyate


30 Yamakami Sogen, Systems of Buddhist Thought, p.1.6

ulpidatyanta vighno nirodhapratisamkhyayi. A.K.1.6

31 kacamiko hi bhavinim vinijàa. kim kìra,am kìry-asya hi kìra,am

bhaati, vinijàcìbhivaA. yaìcìbhì-vasya kim karthavyam. A.K.

bhasyam. p.569

32 api ca vainìkiA kalpayanti buddhibodhyam trayòdan-

yatsamkÀtam kÀa,ikam ceti. tadapi ca trayam pratis-

aëkhìpratisaëkhìnirodhìvakìam cetyìcakÀate tra-yamapi

caitadvastìbhìvamìtram nirìpìkhyamiti man-yante
buddhīpūrvakaḥ kila vinīḥo bhījñāṁ pratisākhyāt khyānirūdho

nāma bhāyate, tadvipareto apratisākhyāt nirodhaḥ. BSSB.

2.2.4.22

34 niṇpi bhīvatgocarau sambhavataḥ nahi bhījñāṁ nira-nvayo

nirśrikhyo vinīōaḥ sambhavati, sarvāvapavyav-asthīṣu

pratyabhīṣe, bālen-ṁvavaccedāraṇāṅ. Ibid.

35 jkīasyedāṁ nirūkriyate. jkīe ācyukto nirūpakhyā-

tvahyupagamaḥ. BSSB. 2.2.4.24.

36 Tai. Up. 2.1

38 api civa, bhivas-tatra, kijamiccatamekasmin-su-par,e

patatyivarasa, asya vidyam-jatvisupar, intara-

syolpittisatonavasatvaprasagayaatraivar, bhivas-tatra

patAyatericet. yenjvara, bhive vigeAyate tattarhi

vastubhetamevksiamsyt, njvara, bhivas-tram. BSSB.2.2.4.24

39 saugate hi samaye pAthvi bhagava kim samniraya ity-asmin

prativacanaprvhe ‘pAthvydenamante’ ‘vivu kim

samniraya ityisyapaunasyaprativacanam bha-vati

‘vivurki samniraya iti. tadkijasyavastute na samajjasam

syit tasmidayuktam kisasyavastut-vam. Ibid.

40 B.S. 2.2.4.20
41 svapñ¡divadcedam dñÀtavyam. yath¡hi svapnam¡y¡-

marecyudukagandharvanagar¡di pratyaya vinaiva bahy-

enjerthena grñi hyagrñi hakñi kara bhavanti, evam jñgarita-gocara api

stambhñi diprayayam bhavitumarhantetyava-gamyate

pratyayaviñeÀt.BSSB. 2.2.5.28

42 Hattori Masaki, Dinnñga on perception. p.107

43 atascaivameva sarve laukikñ upalabhante yatpratyñca-ñkñ, am api

bñi hyñrthameva vyñcakñate yadantarñueya-rñpam

tadbahiravadabhñsata iti. tepi sarvalokaprañ-ddhameva

bahiravabhñsamanñ nam samvidam pratilabhñ-mñnañ
pratyakhyutukmaśca bhyamartham bahirditi vatkram

kurvanti. itaretara hi kasmidbahirvaditi brṣyuA BSSB. 2.2.5.28

44 nanu bāhyasyārthasyasambhavat bahirdavadabhisata

ityadhyavasitam niyam sūdhuradhyaśaya atā pram-

i, apravatapravattipvakau sambhavsambhavādhrityate na

punaA sambhavsambhayapāvive pramjā-pravatapravatitA.

Ibid.

45 na ca jyānasya viāayasārpayadviāayanio bhavati, asati viāaye

viāayasārpayinupapatteA, bahirupalab-deṣca Ibid.
46 ati eva sahopalmabhanjyamopi prayayaviÀayorupi-

yopeyabhìvahetuka ni bhedahetuka ityabhupagana-tanvam.

Ibid.

47 api ca kaµajµinam paµajµinamiti viëeÅa, ayoreva kaµ-

apaµayorabhedo na viëeÅasya jaµnasya. yathì ìuklo gauÅ

kµ, o gauriti ìauklakaµ, ayoreva bhedo na gotv-asya. dvìbhyìm

cà bhedìdevìsyà siddhobhavatyeka-smacca dvayoÅ.

tasmìdarthajµinayorbhedaÅ. Ibid.

48 sarvacittacaìtìnjìtmasamvedanam. Nyaya Bindu. 1.10

49 bìhyopyarthoanubhayata eveti yuktamabhyupagantum. atha

vìjìnam prakììtmakatvitpradepavatvsayame-vìnubhìEyate na
that; bahyopyartha iticet, svatmani kriyavirodhīdevi. BSSB

2.25.28

50 nanu vijñānasya svarāpavyatirkāgṛhyatve tadapya-nyena

gṛhyam tadāpyanyenetyanavasthit prīnāoti. api ca

pradāpavadavabhīśitmakatvatjiśneāa jūṣāi-ntarm kalpayatā

saṃtvīdvāyīvabhīsakabhijnupa-patteā.

kalpanaṇaarthakhyamiti tadbhayamapyasat. Ibid.

51 vijñānamubhayata eva vijñānasjākāi, o graha,jīdṇa-kāa,olpādiā

anavasthitāśākimupapatteā. sīkāi prat-yayayo'ca svabhīva

vaiāAMYidupalabdupalabhībhj-vopapatteā. Ibid.
kimcñyat pradeśpavadvijña namavabhiṣakántaranira-pekāam

syam-eva prathat iti brēvat;mcaprami,aga-myam

vijña namavagantākami-tyuktam syāt. āśikāhana madhyastha pradeśaśāgasahasraprathanavat. Ibid.

bīde mevam , anubhāvīrupatvattu vijña nasyesto naā

pakāastvīyaujµ;yata iti cet. na anyasya vavagantuṣca-kāuā

sđhānasya pratep-điprathana darāṇi; t. atovi-juṣṇasyaya

avibhiṣyatve avertisātyevanyasminnavaga-ntari prathinam pradeśpavadityvagamyate. Ibid.
54  sākā, ovagantuā svayamsiddhatā mūpākāipata svayam prathate

vijūñamityeāa mama pakāstvaya vijoyukt-yantare, iñrita iti
cet. Ibid.

55  nanu vijūñasya svarōpa vyatirikta grhyatve tadipy-anyena

grhyam tadipyanyena ityanavastha. Ibid.

56  sākāiprātyayayoṣca svabhāvavaiāamyadupalabdhp-
alabhyaḥbhivopapatteā. Ibid.

57  ataā pradeśpavād vijūñasyāpi vyatiriktvagamyatvamasmabhīā

prasādhitam. Ibid.

58  yat analarjāeyā rōpam tu bahirvad avabhāsate sorthāā (quotes

by Hattori Massaki Dinnaga on perception pp. 102 .61)


59 \( \text{b}d\text{hyate hi svapnopalabdam vastu pratibuddhasya} \)

\( \text{mayopalabdhomahijanasamigama iti, nahyasti} \ldots \text{naivam} \)

\( j\text{igaritopalabdhamvastustambhidikam kasya-cidapyavsthayam} \)

\( \text{b}d\text{hyate. BSSB. 2.2.5.29} \)

60 \( \text{api ca smatireyatsvapnadar\text{\textasciitilde}anam upalabdhistu} \)

\( j\text{agaritadar\text{\textasciitilde}anam Ibid.} \)

61 \( \text{smatyypalabdl\text{\textasciitilde}a pratyak\text{\textasciitilde}amintaram svayamanu-bh\text{\textasciitilde}yate} \)

\( \text{sarthaviprayoga samprayog\text{\textasciitilde}makam\text{\textasciitilde}am putram smar\text{\textasciitilde}mi} \)

\( \text{noplabdha up- alabdumic\text{\textasciitilde}meti. BSSB. 2.2.5.29} \)

62 \( \text{M.S p. 226.} \)
anupalabhyam; neâu tvartheâu kimnimitt;j vicitr; vis-ani

bhavyuÀ an;ditvepyandhaparamparîny;yen;prâ-

thiÀaiv;navasthî. BSSB. 2.5.30

api ca visanî njma samskîra viçeÀaÀ, samskîra;ca

içe rayamantare;i vakalpante evam loke dÀåÇatvit. na ca tava

visanî;rayaÀ kàcidastim pramî,atonupala-bdheÀ. Ibid.

sthirasvarÇpatve tvalayavijµînasya siddhiñtahîniÀ api ca

vijµînavîdepi kÀa,ikatvîbhyupagamasya samîñît-vadhyîni

bhîhyîrthavîde kÀa,ikatvanibhandhanani du Àa,iñyudbhîvitani

uttarolpade ca pîrvanirodhî; itye-vamîdeni

tînih;pyanusamghîtavyîni. BSSB 2.2.5.31

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¿Enyavyādi pākāsta sarva pramāṇa, a vipratiśiddha iti
tadnirīkara, iya nyādaraṅg kriyate. Ibid.