CHAPTER IV

REFUTATION OF PÍRVAMĪMĒMSA

PHILOSOPHY
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Introduction.
Jaimini is known to be the author of *Pṛvamemjmsaśṭra*. It has twelve *adhyayas*. So it is called *Dvidaśalakāśa*. It mainly deals with the Vedic injunctions about rituals, the rules of interpretation of the texts, which remove the apparent contradiction among them with one another, and the philosophical justification of the belief underlying ritualism. So it is also called *Karmamemjmsa*. It believes in the law of karma. It rejects the notion of God, who creates, preserves and dissolves the world. Its philosophy of language, analysis and explanation of volitions, moral impulsion, moral obligation, *Vidhi, Apėrva, Niyoga, and Dharma* is profound. It has made a great contribution to epistemology and logic.

It elaborately deals with the different kinds of *pramājas*. In the *Pṛva-
memśmsa system of philosophy, two different schools exist in accordance with the different views on many philosophical problems.

They are the Prabhākara school and Kumāril school. Kumārika Bhatta is the founder of Bhatta school. Prabhākaramiśra is the founder of the Prabhākara school. The principal difference between Kumārika and Prabhākara’s views are mentioned here. (1) Kumārika accepts six pramīs. They are pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, abda, arthipatti, and anupalabdhi. But Prabhākira accepts only five pramīs. He rejects arthipatti as a pramī. (2) Kumārika recognizes five categories. They are substance, quality, action, community and negation. Prabhākira recognizes eight categories, such as substance, quality, action,
community, inherence, number, potency, and similarity. (3) Kumṣrila admits eleven substances such as earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, self, manas, darkness, and sound. Prabhākara admits nine substances, and regards sound as a quality of ether, and darkness as the absence of light. (4) Kumṣrila regards action and movements as perceptible. But Prabhākara deems it improper. (5) Kumṣrila admits higher and lower actions. But Prabhākara admits the categories of substance, quality and action.

(6) Kumṣrila rejects inherence as an independent category, and regards it as identity. Prabhākara accepts inherence as an independent category, but he does not regard it as one and eternal.
(7) Kumārila considers negation as an independent category and recognizes four kinds of negation. They are prāgabhīva, pradhvamsi-bhīva, anyonyabhīva and atyantibhīva. But Prabhākara rejects abhīva, and identifies it with the locus.

(8) Kumārila rejects the categories of potency, number and similarity recognized by Prabhākara. (9) Kumārila accepts the self as self-illumined. But Prabhākara does not regard the self as an object of mental perception. According to him the self is manifested in every act of perception of an object. (10) Kumārila regards cognition as an act of the self, which is inferred from jñāntatā produced by it as object, while Prabhākara regards cognition as a quality of the self,
Kumārila regards the validity of knowledge as svatāpramāṇa and invalidity of knowledge as paratāpramāṇa due to the knowledge of defects in its sense. But Prabhakara regards all knowledge as valid.

Kumārila regards the cognition of an object which was not apprehended before, which is free from contradiction, and whose sense is free from defects as a pramāṇa, which is different from recollection.

Kumārila accepts vipareta khyāti. Prabhākara accepts akhyāti. Kumārila advocates the doctrine of Abhihitānvaya as to the meaning of a sentence. But Prabhākara advocates the doctrine of Anvītābhidhīna.

Kumārila regards an act of sacrifice as Dharma. But Prabhākara
regards Apêrva as Dharma. (16). Kumêrila regards volition of the self produced by a vidhi as an incentive to a voluntary action, which is called ābdabhīvana. He regards a voluntary action of a person, who is enjoined to act, to realize an end, as ārthebhīvana. He advocates the doctrine of bhīvana, moral transaction. But Prabhîkara advocates the doctrine of niyga, which impels a person to act without any motive. These are the fundamental differences of the Kumêrila and Prabhîkara schools of Përvamemjmsa.

The Mêmîmsaka-s adopt an empirical, naturalistic and pluralistic attitude towards the world. They accept the world as self-existent, which is neither created nor destroyed. Its parts are produced
and destroyed by natural causes. Mëmîmsa believes in the dualism of matter and soul, neither of which is reducible to the other. It does not argue for materialism. It does not consider matter as the sole reality and the soul as material. It advocates pluralism, and believes in the variety of physical objects and the plurality of the finite souls. It assumes that physical causation is regulated by the law of \textit{karma}. Its belief in the law of \textit{karma}, future life in heaven and hell, \textit{Apêrva}, and eternity and authority of the Vedîs are the supernatural elements in its metaphysics. The Mëkâa concept of Mëmîmsa is the transcendental condition of the self, devoid of consciousness. But its doctrine of
Jujnakarmasamucca-yāvāda with emphasis on control of passions, tranquility of mind and sex restraint as the means of māyā is striking.

The Māmśaka-s and Advaitins both accept the authority of the Vedas. The Māmśakas give more importance to the Brāhmaṇa portions of the Veda. But the Advaitins give more importance to the Upaniṣads. The Memśakas accept dharma as their central doctrine. The Advaitins accept Brahman as the central doctrine. So they differ in the concept of the goal and the means to achieve it. áa’kara discusses these topics in
his *Brahmasūtraḥ* Āya. According to S.G. Moghe, “The study of āa’karacīrya’s Bhūya on Bīdarīya, a’s *Brahmasūtra* is made by scholars purely from the point of view of Advaita philosophy. But the real study of his Bhūya cannot be said to be complete without the knowledge of *PŪrvamēmsa*.” The following concepts of the *PŪrvamēmsaka*-s are refuted by āa’kara.

1. **Refutation of the authority of Vedic injunctions**

In the *Adhyāsabhāya* of *Brahmasūtrabhāya*, ākara raises the question against the Pṛvamemsaka view of Vedic injunctions, prohibitions etc. which constitute the source of the authority of *Dharma*. He clearly states that the knowledge of *Dharma* given by Vedic injunctions, prohibitions etc. is not helpful to achieve *Brahmajñana*. āruti is the source to know *Dharma*. According to the instruction of āruti, *Dharma* has to be performed. But in the case of *Brahman*, āruti leads to its experience. Besides, *Dharma* is
communicated through verbal communication in the form of
injunction, prohibition, etc. which are possible and meaningful. In
Brahmaμjuna, the process of communication does not end by mere
verbal communication, it leads to realization. So, áa’kara says that
Dharmaμjuna is of the nature of mediate knowledge (par°kÂajμjuna) and
Brahmaμjuna is immediate knowledge (apar°kÂajμjuna). On the
contrary, it is opposed to Brahmaμjuna as it involves the differentiation
of agent, object, results, etc. The Vedic injunctions, prohibitions, etc., fall
within the field of Avidyµ. Therefore, that portion of Veda that conveys
this has authority only within the field of Avidyµ."
According to the Pṛvamāṃśaka-s, the main purport of the Veda-s is not Brahman, because the Vedas do not give information regarding such self-established, already existing principles like Brahman, which cannot be known through other sources. The Veda-s generally give information about the principles which cannot be known from other means of knowledge. Brahman, that is, the Supreme Self, can be neither desired nor shunned; such an entity cannot be an object of human effort. So, an existing principle like Brahman is incapable of being desired; therefore, the discussion is useless. That makes the scriptures purposeless. The objection of the Pṛvamāṃśaka-s is that every Vedic passage has a meaning only in so far as it is related to some
action. So, the Vedās have a meaning and it is connected with action (rituals). The texts dealing with the individual soul in Vedānta refer to the agent, those dealing with Brahma refer to the duties, and those dealing with creation refer to spiritual practices. By that concept being supplementary to action, the Vedās will have a purpose. If the Vedās main purport is Brahma only, they will be meaningless. The Memāmsa-sūtras, “jnāyasya kriyārthatv-

‘idanarthakyamadatarthāṁ,’ “tatbḥtānṁ kriyārthena

‘samāmniyāḥ’ “tasyajñānamupadeśaḥ” “vidhēṃmtvek-
avēkyātyātstutyarthena vidhēṃ syuḥ” stress that the Vedās give emphasis to action. They say that the Vedās communicate only through

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the terms of injunctions. There is no passage without the
communication of an injunction. So they say that there is no passage
which denotes *Brahman*.¹

áākara refutes all these arguments through the support of *áruti*.

According to him, the main purport of the Vedas is *Brahman* only. The
*áruti*-s give us information about *Brahman* as the source of the origin,
sustenance and destruction of the world. *Brahman* is the main topic of
all the Vedas. For example, “*sādeva sāmyedamagre aṣed. ekamevādviteyam*” "*jiṣṭa va idameka evīgra aṣed²*. The terms *sat* and

*jīma* refer to the ultimate reality or *Brahman*. The uniqueness of
Brahman is quite apparent because of the absence of form, characteristics, etc. It cannot be realized by direct perception or inference. The origin of the universe is from Brahman; its existence is in Brahman and also its re-absorption is in it\(^3\). The result also is mentioned that through the knowledge of Brahman everything is known\(^4\). When we realize Brahman we know the Universal Reality; we know all the particulars of the world are involved in it. So the main purport of the Veda is Brahman itself.

The next objection to the P\(\text{\£}r\text{\£}vam\text{\£}m\text{\£}msaka-s is based on the purpose of \(\text{\£}r\text{\£}ti-s, in so far as they lay down injunctions for man, such
So the Vedas become meaningful by either persuading a person to act for a particular object or dissuading him from action; some other knowledge of Brahman is enjoined for one who desires for liberation. If the Veda’s aim is injunction, the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined for one who desires for liberation then, just as the Agnihotra oblation and other rites are enjoined as means for him who is desirous of heaven. According to the Memymsaka-s, there is difference in the
enquired object in karmakār a being something to be accomplished as a duty. According to Theos Bernard, “The basic premise of pEvamāmsa is that action is the very essence of human existence”.

According to áā’kara, the object of Veda is the already existent absolutely accomplished Brahman. From this it follows that the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman must be of a different nature from the fruit of the knowledge of duty which depends upon the performance of actions: “jyta va are jyta vyanto mantavyo nidadhyasita vyato”. According to this, we can know that firstly a person who is hearing of the nature of Brahman enjoys thinking of Brahman and meditating on the meaning
of those passages for the attainment of direct experience. Thus they formulate injunctions with regard to the knowledge of Brahman.

áa’kara refutes the oppositions by saying that the fruit of karma is entirely different from fruits of Brahman. So Brahmajúña is not a part of upásanávidhi. After describing the nature of Brahman, the Vedas enjoin on the man to realize Brahman through intuition: ītma are dixáavyá,23 yí ītma apahatapípmasönveáavyá,24 ītmetyevapaseta ītmanamevalokamupjetas,25 Brahmavid Brahmaivabha-vati.27

These injunctions rouse in us the desire to know what that Brahman is. Therefore the task of the Vedas is to set forth the nature of Brahman and they perform that task by teaching us that Brahman is eternal, all-
knowing, absolutely self-sufficient, ever pure, intelligent and free, pure knowledge, absolute bliss. When the illusion of the snake is removed from the rope, the rope manifests itself; likewise, when ignorance is removed, Brahman manifests itself. The identity of the individual soul and Brahman is set forth in the Upaniṣadic words like aham brahmaḥ 28. Therefore, the knowledge of Brahman depends upon human endeavour. It is impossible to say that Brahman or the knowledge is connected with any action 29. Neither can Brahman be said to be the object of the act of knowing: anyadeva tavidit/da-thōvidit/dadhi 30. In the same way, Brahman is denied as an object of worship: tadeva Brahma tvam viddhi nedaṁ yadidamupīsatē 31.
Therefore the āruti-s never describe Brahman as this or that, they only negate manifoldness which is false\textsuperscript{32}.

2 Objection against the definition of superimposition

In the introductory part of Brahmasūtra, ākara defines the superimposition thus: It is apparent presentation to consciousness by way of remembrance of something previously observed in something\textsuperscript{33}. It is an apparent presentation (pūrvadvājag) i.e., knowledge which is subsequently falsified. In other words, it is illusory knowledge\textsuperscript{34}. According to Vi\textit{c}aspa\textit{ti Mi\textit{ś}ra, this is the fundamental characteristic of superimposition and the rest of the definition only differentiates it from
those given by other schools of philosophy\textsuperscript{35}. But the author of

*Ratnaprabh*\textsuperscript{ि} takes ‘apparent presentation in some thing’ as the

characteristic mark of superimposition and this seems to be more in

keeping with áaʾkara in his commentary. All these definitions agree in

so far as they represent superimposition as the apparent presentation of

the attributes of one thing in another\textsuperscript{36}.

As it is impossible to have illusory knowledge without the mixing

up of two things, we find the words “something previously observed” in

the definition. These words, together with the words “apparent

presentation”, make it clear that the thing superimposed is not the real
object seen some time before, but something like it. It is a new experience and not a reality that is ‘previously’ observed. The experience should not be a present one, but a past one, as indicated by the significance of the word ‘previously’. So the thing superimposed is false. But the thing on which it is superimposed is a real thing.

The words by way of remembrance exclude all cases of recognition where the object previously observed again presents itself to our senses, as when a person seen at a particular place is again seen at another place. In remembrance, the object previously observed is not in
renewed contact with the senses. It points to remembrance that operates
in the case of superimposition.

This definition of superimposition given by the Advaitins meets
an objection of the Prvams. They say that an unreal thing
cannot be an object of experience. According to them, all knowledge is
real; there can be nothing like false knowledge. They uphold the
intrinsic validity of all knowledge, for every knowledge produces a sense
of certainty in us and we have no doubt about it at the time. If it were
otherwise, then we should always be in doubt and never arrive at any
certainty. So every knowledge is true for the time, though subsequent
experience may prove that it was wrong, as in the case of illusion. But, from the definition of superimposition given by áa’kara, we find that a particular thing which is experienced does not, for that very reason, become real. A thing may be unreal and at the same time may be experienced; otherwise, the mirage would be a reality which in effect we know is not.

áa’kara refuted this objection. In the case of a mirage, what we find actually are the sun’s rays refracted by layers of air. According to the Pürvamemśa-s, a mirage is nothing but the negation of water and it is therefore self-evident that the phenomenon we experience
cannot be water. Neither can they say that the water in the mirage is not real, since it is experienced\textsuperscript{38}. So, the water in the mirage is neither real nor unreal, nor can it be both at the same time. Therefore, we have to accept the phenomenon as something beyond our comprehension\textsuperscript{39}.

3 Refutation of the meaning of ‘atha’ ¿abda, as prescribed by the Mèṃṣaksaka-s.

\textit{Athj}\textsuperscript{40} means ‘after’. This raises the question ‘after what’? Is it fulfilling \textit{Dharma}¿yna? áákara answers that the objects of enquiry of pÉrvamèṃṣsa and Vedanta are different and unrelated. \textit{Dharma} and \textit{Brahman} are their objects respectively\textsuperscript{41}. These are not related as main
and subordinate so as to warrant a consideration of one after the other.

One undertakes the enquiry of Brahman before Dharmajñāna or after it, or without it. Dharmajñāna is irrelevant for Brahman.\textsuperscript{42}

In fact, the goals of the two systems are different. Dharma is meant for the prosperity within the field of avidyā. Darmajñāna is intended to cross over avidyā. Dharma has to be performed, while Brahman is to be realized. Dharma has to be accomplished in future while Brahman is ever present\textsuperscript{43}. So the two are totally different and unrelated. According to ākara, the real knowledge gives rise only to the knowledge of Brahman.
In the Jijµs¡dhikara,a, áa’kara discusses the meaning of the word atha. The word atha occurs in five different meanings. They are mangala, anantara, jrambha, prajna, kyrtsyam. áa’kara accepts the sense of anantara or ‘after’ . The Mµmsaka-s raise their objection: ‘after what?-after Dharmajµna or after Brahmajµna’?

They say that the Brahman is pre-existing, eternal and does not depend on human effort. Besides, the knowledge of Brahman serves no useful purpose such as the attainment of liberation. For these reasons, an inquiry of Brahman is not desirable. áa’kara refutes this view of Mµmsaka-s and says that Brahman is desirable. There is some indefiniteness with respect to Brahman, for we find various conflicting
views concerning its nature. One attains true knowledge from the
discriminative knowledge of soul and non-soul.

This knowledge is not a product of Vedic injunctions. The
result of true knowledge of self is liberation\(^{45}\). This knowledge is
attained neither by the study of the Vedas nor by the knowledge and
performance of rituals prescribed by Karmak\(j\),\(da. But it is acquired by
certain spiritual requisites. These spiritual requisites are —

\[ \text{“nityinityavastuvivekaA, (discrimination between the things which are} \]
permanent and transient), \(\text{ih\(j\)mut\(j\)r-thabhalabh\(j\)gavir\(j\)gaA} \]

(renunciation of the enjoyment of action in this world and in the next),
¿amadañiḥdiṣṭūk-асampattiṃ (attainment of the six qualities i.e.,
¿ama, dama, uparati, titikṣa, raddha, samīdhīnam), and

mumukṣautva (the intense desire for liberation)⁴⁶. According to

 añkarā, after these spiritual requisites one wishes to know Brahman.

This is the meaning of the ‘atha’ ṣabda used in the sūtra — “athito
brahmaṁjaµśa”⁴⁷

4. Refutation of the concept “the world is real”

The Pārvamēṃjśas say that the world is eternally existent.

How can the world be unreal or non-existent? There is neither creation

nor destruction of the world⁴⁸. Non-existence is not a category by itself;
it can be conceived only in relation to an object. When we think of a pot
in terms of a cloth, we say the negation of the cloth is the pot. That is all
that is meant by non-existence. It has no reality. An unreal object can
never be the object of our experience. So, this world, if it were unreal,
could never be the object of our experience\(^49\). Therefore, the world is
real.

According to áa’kara, the nature of objects is two-fold, real and
unreal\(^50\). The first is manifested by its very nature, depending on the
object itself. The second, i.e., ‘unreal’, depends on some other thing for
its manifestation. In a mirage, reflection of the sun is real but the
appearance as water is unreal and depends on something else, the impressions (samskīrṣas) produced by seeing water. That which is real always continues to be so, but the unreal is ever changing. Brahman, the reality, remains unchanged, but māya and its products which are assumed to exist in Brahman are unreal and therefore ever-changing. The world phenomenon is neither real nor unreal, nor both. It is indefinable.

In the case of a mirage, the sun’s rays refracted by layers of air are real. According to the Pārvamemīmsaka-s, it is nothing but the negation of water and therefore it is self-evident. That means the
phenomenon we experience cannot be water. Neither can they say that the water in the mirage is not real, since it is experienced. So the water in the mirage is neither real and nor unreal nor can it be both at the same time. Therefore, we have to accept the phenomenon as something beyond our comprehension (anirvacaneya)\textsuperscript{51}.

5 \textbf{Refutation of the concept that Liberation is not eternal}

In the \textit{P\texttext{\textv{E}}rvamem\texttext{\textv{I}}msaka} view, liberation is not external because it is connected with action. The \textit{\textv{A}ruti\texttext{-s}} state that there are differences in the degree of pleasure of all embodied creation from man upward to Brahma. From the differences it is inferred that there are differences in
the degrees of merit acquired by actions in accordance with religious
duty. These differences are moreover known to be affected by the desire
of certain results, worldly possessions and the like. According to the
differences of religious duty, automatically a difference exists between
the performer and the fruits of duty. Those who perform the
JyotिÇšmйdй sacrifices, in consequence of the pre-eminence of their
knowledge and meditation, go to the northern path. Therefore, those
who perform the minor offerings and work of public utility only go
through smoke and the other stages to the southern path. In the same
way, we can understand that the different degrees of pleasure which are
enjoined by the embodied creatures, from man downward to the
inmates of hell and to immovable things, are the effect of religious merit as defined in Vedic injunctions.

āa’kara replies that the knowledge of Brahman or mākāa is eternal, because all philosophers who recognize mākāa (mākāavādyins) do not agree on such a contingency. A number of áruti passages declare release to follow immediately on the cognition of Brahman as said in brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati kĀeyante cṣya karmśi, i tasmin dāte parjvare, abhayam vai janaka prīptśi, etc. Brahman is an already existing entity. We cannot say that Brahman involves an act (ritual) having for its result Brahman. When ignorance is removed,
Brahman manifests itself. For example, when the illusion of the snake is removed, the rope manifests itself. Here the rope is not the creation of any act. The identity of the individual soul and Brahman is set forth in phrases like *aham brahmajmi*. It is not an imagination but an actuality. Nor is this knowledge of self being one with Brahman a mere combination—*anantam vai manananta vijvedeva anantameva sa tena loka jayati*. Nor is it a superimposition. It differs from meditation and worship as prescribed by the scriptures: *man brahmyupseta dity brahmetyde aA*. Therefore, the knowledge of Brahman does not depend on human
endeavour and hence it is impossible to relate Brahma with the action.

Neither can Brahma be said to be the object of the act of knowing. The passages like aham brahma\textsuperscript{62} and tattvamasi\textsuperscript{63}, which declare that the fruit of cognition of Brahma is the cessation of ignorance, would be contradicted—bhidyate h\textsuperscript{64}daya-grandhi\textsuperscript{64} echidyante sarvasam\textsuperscript{64}aya\textsuperscript{64} k\textsuperscript{64}eyante c\textsuperscript{64}iya karm\textsuperscript{64}, i tasmin d\textsuperscript{64}ge par\textsuperscript{64}vare. Hence the knowledge of Brahma is not derived from the active energy of man, but is analogous to the knowledge of those things which are the objects of perception, inference, and so on and thus depends on the object of knowledge only\textsuperscript{65}. It is impossible to establish Brahma or its knowledge by reasoning.
The ājñāstik’s purport is not to represent Brahman definitely as this or that object (vāja); its purpose is rather to show that Brahman is the eternal subject. It is never an object and thereby it is impossible to remove the distinction between objects, known, knower and the act of knowledge, etc., which is created by nescience. The release is shown to be the nature of the eternally free self. It cannot be changed with the imperfection of non-eternity.

āa’kara continually says that the things we observe in common life, which are modifications such as curd, milk, etc., and things which are effects, such as jars etc., are non-eternal. Release is not maintained.
as something to be ceremonially purified, and as such depends on an activity. For, ceremonial purification results either from the accretion of some excellence or from the removal of some blemish. Ceremonial purification does not apply to release, because release is of the nature of Brahma, which is eternally pure. Brahma is not connected with bodily purified activities like sniucamanayaju pavetjdi. They are only for the individual soul joined to the body. The principle of ahamkartri (egoity), the object of the notion of the ego and the agent in all cognition, accomplishes all actions and enjoys their results. Therefore release is not something to be purified. And nobody is able to show any other way in which release could be connected with action. It is
impossible that it should stand in any relation to any action. It is related to knowledge only.

In the *Puruṣārthadīhikara, a* of *Brahmasūtra*, the Pīrvamāṃsaka-s put another objection that *jñāna* is not an independent means of liberation, it is subordinate to *karma*, because *jīvātman* is the agent to perform *karma*. Therefore, *jīvātman* is connected with *karma*. Hence *jīvātman* is also connected with *karma* only. 69

The Māṃsaka-s say, in āruti-s, that the *brahmajñānins* like Janaka took *karma*: *janaka ha vai dehō bahudakāj, ena yajueje, 70 yakāyamō vai bhagavantōha-masāmi†. If we accept that by the
knowledge of the self they had attained liberation, there was no need for them to perform sacrifices. The above áruti-s prove that it is through sacrificial acts alone that one attains liberation. It is specially stated in áruti passages like yadeva vidiyaj karati tadeva veryavattaram bhavatii. These words clearly show the supporting role of jujna. The áruti words like kurvanneveha karma, i jijiviāccatam sama ā evam- evam tvaye nyathista na karma lipyate nare, reveal the importance of the performance of karma. So the PErvamomjmksam-s uphold that jujna is not an independent means of puruṣārtha.
áa’kara criticizes their view saying that, by the word ķtman the P£rvamemjmsaka-s have understood sams芮 śri ķtman here. There is no doubt that the sams芮 śri ķtman is connected with karma as agent. According to him, when áruti talks of Ėtmajumna, it is paramjumna. It is not connected with karma, nor is it not subordinate to karma. Therefore ķtma jumna in the sense of Brahmajumna is an independent means of liberation74. In fact, áa’kara says that by the word puruÅjṛtha, the p£rvamemjmsaka-s understood svarga. For the P£rvamemjmsaka-s, karma is the means for svarga etc. But for the Vedjintins, jµjna is the real means for liberation. Karma is sahaÅrikjra, a to attain jµjna75? It is true that jµjna is an independent and direct
means to liberation. *Karma* does not directly contribute to this and but *karma* assists in obtaining knowledge through *citta*uddhi. Does the performance of *śramakarmis* and *Nityakarmis* help to obtain *citta*uddhi and knowledge? Agnihotra and other *Nityakarmas* are stated to be indirect means to liberation.

āaṅkara says that the Advaitins do not reject the utility of *karma* within the field of *Avidyā*. In fact, they have defined sacrifice within this field. In the *Śترا*, *aśuddhamiticet na ābdjt*, performance of sacrifice and offering of *pau* in a sacrifice is defended. The Advaitins accept
the results to be obtained by sacrifice as valid in the field of Aṛidyā. But 
karmas cannot lead to liberation. The knowledge will nullify the effects 
of the karmas. āaṅkara agrees that ātmajūna cuts the very roots of 
karma. The notions of kartṣṭvaj and bhūktṣṭvaj are the basis of karma. 
Ātmajūna cuts these very notions and hence the effects of karma are 
nullified by ātmajūna.

āaṅkara says that Janaka and others were engaged in work even 
after knowledge. This explains that after knowledge some may choose to 
set an example to others, while others may give up all work. So, there is 
no binding on the knowers of the Self, as regards work. Knowledge
destroys all the ignorance and its products. So also, knowledge has no possibility to be subsidiary to work. áa’kara answers that an action is enjoined as being independent of the nature of existing things and dependent on the energy of some person’s mind. When we realize the nature of Brahman, all our duties come to an end and all our work ceases to exist. áruti says: \textit{ítmnam cet vijneyt ayamasmeti puruṣā kimiccan kasya kimya ṛeramanusajjaret}. Therefore, the knowledge of \textit{Brahman} is not represented as the object of injunctions.

7. \textit{Refutation of the concept of ‘plurality of self’}
Jaimini gives no setrīs for the establishment of the Self.

According to him, the Self is only to be inferred. The great Memīmsaka, āabaraswīmin, gave elaborate proof of the soul which is independent of the body and senses and beyond pleasure and pain⁸¹. According to Pṛbhākara and Kumārila, there are many souls; they are eternal also.

āa’kara refuted this concept by saying that the individual soul is a reflection of the supreme Lord in upādhi, the antākalā, the internal organ ⁸². So the reflections of the Lord in different antākalās are different, even as the reflection of the sun on different sheets of water are different. The trembling of a particular reflection of the sun does not cause the other reflections to tremble. So also, the experiencing of
happiness and misery by a particular Jeva is not shared by other souls\textsuperscript{83}.

Hence, there can be no confusion that the results of action and results of fruits enjoyed by different individuals are in different ways.

8. Refutation of the agency of Jeva as real

The Mem\={j}msaka-s say that the Jeva is an agent only, on the basis of scriptural passages like \textit{yajeta}, \textit{juhuyit}. If the soul be not an agent, these injunctions would become meaningless\textsuperscript{84}. They say that the \textit{áruti} describes that the wandering of the soul in the dream state clearly shows that it is an agent. They put forward other causes for the agency of Jeva. They are (i) \textit{Upj\={d}in\={j}it} (the soul in dream state takes the organs
with it, thereby declaring that it is an agent) and (2) \( Kriyāyām vyapadeśa \), (here, by ‘intelligence’ the soul is meant and not the Buddhī), thereby showing that the soul is an agent. On these grounds, the Māmīmsaka-s raise the question whether \( jeva \) is an agent or not, whether his agency is real or superimposed. āa’kara accepts the concept that \( jeva \) is an agent, but his agency is not real, it is superimposed\(^85\).

\( Jeva \) is an agent within the field of \( avidyā \). When he crosses the bounds of \( avidyā \), he has no separate identity. Therefore, there is no question of any agency. The true nature of \( jeva \) is \( nitya\uddhabuddhamuktasvabhava \). āa’kara points out that the Vedic injunctions do not prove the real agency but only enjoin certain duties.
with reference to the agency that is there. So the ājna is not real. Ājna is the reflection of the supreme Lord in anta-ākara, ā.

9. Refutation of the Non-existence of Īśvara

The Memśmsaka-s say that by the performance of sacrifice, āpērva is formed and that āpērva produces the fruits of action. So action itself can give the result, the fruits of action. It is never connected with an inferred God. Āākara criticizes the above concept. The āpērva is ja-a and it cannot lead to the results by itself. The concept of āpērva in between karma and its results is not warranted, since Īśvara bestows the results taking into account the karmas of Įeva. So Īśvara itself is the
giver of the fruits of action. Karma is insentient and short-lived and
cannot therefore be expected to bestow the fruits of action at a future
time according to one’s desires. We do not see any insentient thing
bestowing fruits on those who worship it. Therefore, the Lord who is
worshipped through actions is the bestower of their results too. áruti
also says that ćvara is the giver of the fruits of action. The Vedántins do
not accept the Mēmêmsaka concept of apērva. The Mēmêmsaka-s say
that Karma produces apērva, which ultimately leads to results. The view
of the Mēmêmsakas is rejected by áa’kara. He says that the non-sentient
apērva cannot lead to the results by itself. So áa’kara says that ćvara
is the bestower of the fruits of action. In Devatādhikara,a, áa’kara rejects
the concept of Sphoṣā and the Memāmsaka view that var,śs constitute the word. In this context he quotes the view of Upavarāya, who had commented on both MemāmsasEstras and BrahmasEstras. Concepts such as Vedanitya and Vedapauruṣeya are described in the same adhikara.

Resume

Both the PErvaMemāmsaka-s and Vedāntins accept the authority of the Vedās, but there is some conceptual differences among their systems of philosophy. The PErvaMemāmsaka-s believe that the purport of the Vedās is only to uphold Karma; at the same time, ākara
argues that the Vedās emphasize only jñāna. Even though both of them accept the authority of the Vedās, for the Pṛrvamīmsaka-s, the Vedās stand for Samhīta-s and Brāhma-s (Karmakā, a), while for the Advaitins, Veda is Upanītads (Jñānakā, a). In continuation of their concept of Veda, their ideology also differs. This difference lies in their concepts of Karma and Jñāna. Karma and Jñāna distinguish the reality and unreality of the world. According to the Mīmsakas, existence of the world is based on Karma only.
NOTES AND REFERENCE

tametamavidhyaḥkhyamītmajñatmanoritaretardhyśam pu-raskātya sarve pramāṇa-prameyavyavahāra laukika vādikaḥ ca pravarttaḥ sarvāḥ ca ādṛśāḥ iṣṭe vidhipratīśedh-amokāparāḥ i. prīkṣa thatbhūtātmāvijñāṇaprajñavartanaḥ

ādīstrama vidhyādviāyatvam nātvartate thatāḥi bṛhmaḥ o yejeta ityādeni ādīstre, itamani varāramayo-avasthādvīśeādhyāsām ēritya pravartate, BSSB, A.B. pp.2-3.

vīśeĀjādhyāsamāreyate. BSSB. A.B. p.3
4 dehedriyādiĀvahamamābhimanarḥhitasya pramātātvanu-pappattau

5 na ca pramātātvamantare, ā pramā, apravātirasati. tasmā-
davidyāvadviāaya, yeva pratyakĀjdeni ājstrī, i. BSSB. A.B. p. 4
6  J.S 1.2.1

7  Ibid. 1.2.5

8  Ibid 1.1.5

9  Ibid 1.2.7

10  na kvacidapi vedavijyinam vidhisamsparjamantare, i-rthavant

          ṭopapannā vj BSSB. 1.1.4.4

11  Ch.Up.6.2.1

12  Aitha. Up. 2.2.11

13  yato va imīni bhētiṇi jiyante yena jītīni jevanti yat prayanti

          abhisamviṣanti tat vijijśasva tat brahma. Tai. UP.
ekavijnena sarvajitam Ch.Up.6.3.

J.S. 1.1.5

Ibid 1.1.25

Ibid 1.1.1

atapuruamkacitvaiayepravartayatkuta citvaiayiniv-

arthoyam cirthavatci tram. BSSB. 1.1.1.4

sati ca vidhiparatve yathisvargidikimsyignihotr-disadhanam

vidheyate, evamanatatvakimsya brahma-jimnam vidheyate iti

uktam BSSB. 1.1.4.4.

21 Br. Up. 2.4.5

22 āraṇa, ottarāk̐layormannanidhy̤sanay̤vidhi dar̤janīt tasmīt

pratipattividhi viyāayataiva āstrapramākaṁ

brahmībhupahantavyam iti BSSB. 1.1.1.4

23 Br. Up. 2.4.5

24 Ch. Up. 8.7.1

25 Br. Up 1.4.7

26 Ibid 1.4.15

27 Mun. Up. 3.2.9

28 Br. Up. 1.4.10
manobrahmaṇyupājñeta, jñāṇa brahmaṇyadeśa Ā Ch.Up. 3.18.1

katha. Up. 1.4

Ibid. 1.5

avidyā kalpitā bhedanākṣattitvāt jñāstrasya BSSB. 1.1.1.4

śūttirēpa paratā prārvadājñāvahāsa BSSB, A.B. p.1

yatā yadadhyaśa tadvivekāgraṇa nibandhano bhrama iti. BSSB. A.B.p.2.

anyasya anya dharmaṃkalpanaṁcātā sa cānirvacaneyeta
tadapāpādita. tenā sarvāṇiṃ pariṇākākṣiṃm mate
anyasyānyadharmaṇakalpanārṣaṇanirvacaneyatvāyāmbhīvinetyanirvacan
eyata sarvatansviruddhi ityarthā B.S. Bhāmati A. B. p. 8.

36 sarvathāpi anyatṛṇyadharmābhāṣaṃ sa vyabhicarati BSSB. A. B. p. 2

37 api ca svagocaravyabhicṛre vijīṃṣanīm sarvatṛṇaṭa-prasāṅga

tasmāt sarvajīnam samecenaṃ āsteyam. B.S. Bhāmati A.B. p. 3.

38 tasmād nīsat nīpyasat, nīpisadasat parasparavirodhāt, itynir-
vacyameṇyopyaṃtām mareciśu toyaṃstheyam, tadyena
krameṣāhyastam toyaṃ paramārthoyamiva, ataeva pṛva-
dāgamaṃ tattvastau natoym na ca pṛvadāgamaṃ kimtvijñata-
manirvacyeyam B.S. Bhāmati, A.B p. 3.
na kevalam iyam anatati parekākṣaṁ iṁ siddhiṁ api tu Brahmajujña?

B.S. Bhamati AB. p.5.

sati cīnantaryārthatve yatḥi dharmajujjyuṣa yatpṛavaśttam niyamena

apekṣate tatvaktavyam. svidhyānantarīyam tu samj-nam. nanvihā
karmāvabodhaṁ nantarīyam viśeṣāh na dharmajujjyu-sīyāḥ prīgapi

adhetavedantasya brahjjjyu-sopapatteḥ. yathāca

hādayādhyāvadīnanamīnandar-yaniyamaḥ

adhikṣātōdhikare viṣ pramaḥbhūt. dharmabrahmajuṣyayoḥ

phalajujjyuṣyabhedaḥ ca. BSSB. 1.1.1.1
41 abhyudayaphalam dharmajµñam taccanuàaṇiṇipekäm
   niçreyasaphalam tu brahmavijµñam na canuÀín-tarïpekàam.

Ibid.

42 tatrìthìabdaÅ jantaryìrthaÅ parigòhyate. Ibid.

43 niçreyasaphalam tu brahmavijµñam na çìnuåjìntara-pekàam.

Ibid.

44 athaìabdaÅ jantaryìrthaÅ. Ibid.

45 abhyudayaphalam dharmajµñam niçreyasaphalam tu
   brahmajµñam. Ibid.
46 nityānityavastuveka, ihamutrīrthaphalabhogavirīga,

\[ \text{amadam} \text{ādi} \text{sādhanasampat, mumukṣutvam ca. te} \text{āhu hi prīgapi} \]

dharmajujñya ērdhvam ca ākyate brahmajujñ-situm jujtum ca,

na viparyaye. Ibid.

47 tasmādathā ābdena yathoktaśādhanasampatynantaryā-

mupadiṣyate. Ibid.

48 tasmadadhyāvadeviṇa sarga praṣayakalpana samastasya

janmabhyaṁ na siddhyapramiṇa ṭa tasmāt prīgapi sar-vopi sāguṇā

śan pīdīdayaḥ anveśavayavaharoyamani-direva viññhibhiṣ-S.V

Sambandhākāpariḥprā. 113.
49 na kevalam iyam anuvatit parekākāśīm siddhi. api tu laukīm. BS.

Bhamati. AB. p.5

50 svarāpa parāpyābhyam nityam sadasītmake vastuṁ jūyate

kimcitṛpam kaścit kacdāna BSSB. A.B.p.5.

51 anirvacaneyvatvam hi tat. BSSB. 1.1.1.4

52 dharmatratamyātadhikaritratamyam prasiddham cṛthi-

tvasmārthyaṅdvamadhikāritaratamyam. Ibid.

53 yigidhyayanāglyinméva vidhyāsamādvihīveduttare,
pathingamanam, kevalairāgāpyaṛtadattasādhanaṁdhēmād-ikrame,
daṅinena pathingeamanam, tatṛpi sukhatrata-myam
tatsadhanītīratamyam ca īśtīt ‘yīvatsampīt-amūdītvā’ (ch.up. 5. 10. 5) ityasmīdgamyate. Ibid.

54 nityaśca mokāśā iti sarvairmokā śavādibhirahyupagam-yate. Ibid.

55 Mun. Up. 3.2.9

56 Mun Up. 2.2.5

57 Br. Up. 4.2.4

58 Ibid. 1.4.10

59 Ibid. 3.1.4

60 Ch. Up. 3.18.1

61 Ibid. 3.19.1.
kim tarhi pratyakṣaṣṭipramāṇaḥ, avyayavastuṣṭanalavastut-antrij.

BSSB 1.1.1.4

na hi āstramidamityaṃ viṣayabhṛtāntaraḥ pṛṣṭhāntarip- 

ipṣadyati kim tarhi pratyagitaṃvatmaḥviṣayataya prati- 

ṣadyadyavidhyākalpitam veda veditāvedanādi bheda-mapanayati.

Ibid.

nitya āuddhamuktasvabhāvāḥ vāt mokṣaṣya. Ibid.
68 karmiddhyakaa sarvahEtidhiva\��a\a s\k\i ceta kevala nirgu,a \ë ca.

Sve. Up. 6.11.

69 kartatven,\ëtmana\ã karma\ëe\ëatv\ët tatvij\ëjnamapi karma-
sambandhyeva ityata\ã tasminnavagataprayojana \ëtma-j\ëjney\ë

\ë phala\ërut\ësi arthavyda iti jainmini\ã \ëcarya manyate. BSSB. 3.4.1.2.

70 Br. Up. 3.1.1.

71 Ch. Up. 5.11.5.

72 Ch. Up 1.1 10

73 \ëga. Up. 2.
yadi samśryevitma Śīrērā karti bhokti ca Śarērā-mitravyatireke,a
vedīnte āupadīg a ā syattato var, ītena prakare, a phala-ı-
ruterarthavīdatvam syit adhikastva-ccarēṛdtmanosamsirevarṇara ā
kartatvīdisamsiridharm-arahitopahatapamvatvīdivīe-āa,ā ā
paramītmi vedhya- tvenopadēyate vedīnte āu. BSSB. 3.4.1.8

yajūjdenī jamadāmjdeni ca yathījramam sarvīyevaj-īramakarmī, i
vidyolpattau apekāitavyani. BSSB 3.4.6.27

api ca karmīdhikraheto kriyājprakaphalalakāa,asya sa-masthasya
prapaujasyavidhyākātasya vidyāsamardh-
yītsvarēpopamardamāmananti. BSSB. 3.4.1.16
yannitvam karma vaidikamagnihotridi tattatkriyayiva bha-vati,

jµ;nasya yatkriyam tadevasyipikriyamityarthaÅ. kutaÅ ‘tametam
ved¿nuvacanenabrahma,i vividÌanti yajµena dÅnena (Br.up.4.4.22)

ityÌdidar¿an¿t nanu jµ;na-karmanorvilakaÅ,a-
karyaikatvitanupapattiÅ. naiÅa doÅaÅ.

jvarÌmara,akaryayarapidadhivaayorgu-am;trasamyukt-
yotripÅh¿jikriyadar¿an¿t BSSB 4.1.12.16

yatpunaruktam pa¿uhims¿diy¿da¿udham karma tasy¿n-iÅgamapi

phalamavakalpat¿ ityato mukhyamev¿nu¿j¿yinam ............

77 78
¿¡stra¿ca himsanugrah¿dhy¿lmako jyoti¿Gomo dharma

ityavadh¿rita¿ s¿ kathama¿uddhamiti sakyate vaktum BSSB 3.2.6.15

79 Br.Up.4.4.12

80 ata ev¿nu¿teyakarmaphalavilak¿a,am mok¿khyama¿a-raratvam

nityamiti siddham.BSSB1.1.1.4

81 nitya¿ sarvagati¿ pum¿n. S.L, ¿tmav¿dam, 73.

82 antakara¿avaccinnam caitanyam jeva¿. V.P, pratya k¿apariccedam,

p.24.

83 ityevam¿dhy¿ ca ¿rutir¿ramakarm¿,jm vidya sadhan¿-bh¿vam

s¿cayati. BSSB.3.4.6.26
KartciyamjevaÅsy¡t. kasm¡t? ¿¡str¡rtavatv¡t. evam ca ‘yajeta, juhuy¡t dadhyat’ ityevam vidham vidhi ¿¡stra-marthavat bhavati. BSSB.

3.2.14.33.


ataev¡nuÅteyakarmaphala vilakÅa,am mokÅ¡khyam a¿a-reratvam nityamiti siddham. BSSB 1.1.1.4

athedancmaupaniÅadam¡tma¡jµ¡nam kimadhik¡ridvare,a karma yevjuprav¡gyat¡hosvitsvatantrameva puruÅ¡rtha-sadhanam
bhavateti memjmsamjnaA siddhantenava tara-dupakramate

puruAjrta iti. BSSB. 3.4.1.1

athocyeta m¡bh£tkarmantaram phalotpadaA. Karmakjryj-
tap£rvjtphalamutpasyata iti tadapinopadhyate ap£rva-
syjcetanasya k¡AaloAjasamasya cetanenjprav^titasyam prav^ty-
anupapatteA. BSSB. 3.2.8.38.

var,j evatu¿abdaA iti bhagavnupavarAaA. BSSB.1.3.8.28.