CHAPTER - 1

INTRODUCTION

Origin and Development of Logical Methods

From Vedic Period to 1st Century AD.

Vedas and Upaniṣads are the sources of Indian thoughts. During Vedic period, debate was developed and flourished through pariṣa (Paras), Samitis, Rṣiasabhas and Yajñaman-apas, the centres of scarifies. R.C Majumdar observes that the meaning of samiti referred in Ṛgveda at a place, where people of the same views gathered together and it was meant in the sense of Assembly. The pariṣad in Ṛgveda represented the Judicial assemblies. Various types of serious discussion, and debates were held in these assemblies. In these places the scholars discussed philosophical concepts about the soul liberation etc. So we have to examine how these topics has been
selected for discussion. To trace out these historical facts we should have start with the
period of *Igveda*.

In the tenth Māla of the *Igveda* we can see the references about Sābhā and Samiti. It can be seen that mostly related to the discussion about ‘ultimate reality’. In Vedas discussion of these debates are popularly called as 'Bhramodya'. This discussion was a means to inquiry, which leads to the paths of ultimate reality. Debates and discussions were very popular among the scholars of at that time. The origin of debate can be seen in these 'Bhramodya' and it gives us a graphic picture of the outset and development of Vedas in India during Vedic period.

The origins of philosophy in India can be drawn from the literature of the Veda. Vedas are considered as the oldest scriptures of Indian thinking process. The period of the compilation of Vedas are considered as between 1500 BC to 500 BC. Vedas are of
four in number, viz  \( \text{Igveda}, \text{Yajurveda}, \text{S\j maveda} \) and  \( \text{Atharvaveda} \). Among these the first three are called as 'trayi'. The  \( \text{Atharvaveda} \) is considered as latter work. Each Veda has three divisions, viz, the Samhitas, the Br\( \h \)ma\( \as \)s and the \( \text{\=Era,\=yakas} \). The Samhitas are mostly in verses. The Br\( \h \)ma\( \as \)s are the commentaries in prose. The \( \text{\=Era,\=yakas} \) are forest treatises. The Vedas represent different phases of religious thought.

'Bhramodya' grew up with the characteristics of ritualism. The official conversations in the places of sacrifice evolved into the form of debate and later they became the warm discussion.

Dr. S.C. Vidyabhusana states that many example of this can be seen in the Vedic texts.

In  \( \text{Igveda} \) the word 'Ita' is used in the sense of 'unchangeable law'. It indicates the meaning for 'justice' later it got the sense of 'order'. The scholars of Vedic period
followed more free and rational thinking through reasonable approach for knowing
than later period.

In Vedas we can see many streams of thoughts such as Bahudevatavda, Paramesvaravda etc. Many hymns of \textit{Igveda} explain the essence, which is same as with the creations, the universe, deities etc. According to Vedas these deities are capable for creation, maintenance and destruction\textsuperscript{1}. Vedic scholars call them with, many names such as Agni, Yama, Indra, Varu,a etc, etc.

\textit{Igveda} says, Indra on his birth itself amazed all other devatas in his strength.

The heaven and the earth trumbled in his celestial lusture. He is hyper - powerful.

They praise the Indra, 'You people! may realize, is the deity of all being. He is the deity of all these animate and inanimate objects\textsuperscript{2}. Sometimes Vedic people prayed together to more than one deity. They may, 'the sky', 'the earth', 'the water', the 'Indra' and 'the air'
in some occasions. Their prayer is such. The sun who visualizes every thing there may not be anything unpleasant under his grace. 'Let we live long' etc, etc. These kind of prayers reveal their strain of thought. The progress in the social life and social order made changes in their intellectual side also. The old beliefs had been shackled. The influence of the innumerable deities decreased in number. They began to give more consideration to one and the same deity, as the source of wealth and welfare. The relevance of Indra, the most powerful, was also questioned such as: 'May there is no Indra' and 'who else has seen him'? These types of questions raised. Gradually the infinitum of the powers of Indra are doubted and questioned.

In the hymns of Ígveda, the questioned mind often strode ahead 'who is that omniscient one'? I ask to the learned ÍÀis. 'What is that unknown entity'? This kind of misgiving spread everywhere. From these, 'Sandehav¡da' came out not mere disbelief but emerged out new concepts of belief. The deity who was believed there had been
regarded as the summation of the powers of all other deities and he is supreme and
thus all deities are the same. Some hymns in the first Ma,ala of Ígveda reflects this
changed attitude. For example the fire which is burnt everywhere is the same. The
similarity of these qualities represent the totality of all them. They believed that Agni,
Surya and Varu,a are all indeed the same power. They are different in forms with same
power. They call it as Indra, Mitra, Varu,a, Agni etc.. Such plurality of deities also can
be seen in the Ígveda.

Ígveda bears the witness of the continuous efforts of, ancient masters who
strove hard to understand the mysteries of nature and the relation between man and
nature. They made search on every thing to make their life is be pleasant and perfect.

What is the root cause of all these? They throbbed to get into the miseries of life, nature
and the universe. Their inquisitiveness made them restless. We can see the search for
the answers to the questions related to the facts of the universe. The nature of these
questions is such as 'who am I'? 'I don't recognize', man is born and dead. Nothing in
the world is permanent. The world is a flux. In this flux 'Is there anything everlasting'? What is the power behind this universe? How is this universe formed? etc.

'The famous SriAtiget in the tenth Ma, ala of the Iviseda gives a typical example for the courageous and incessant enquiry and inquisitiveness of the ancient masters.

The existence might be assumed only on the basis of nothingness. To describe nothingness, existence is essential. Without the essence there is nothing present. There is no beginning and there is no end. There is no time and space, day and night. The immortal is 'That one' (tadakam). That one is present with its own power without any other's help. It breathed without exhale. There is nothing other than this 'that one'. Therefore there is no difference between 'this' and 'that'. That one which evolved into many without of any externals help. It is the natural instinct to become one and many based on its desire. Motion and changes are inseparable part of that 'infinite self'.
There is no creation and creator and there is no need for Gods. There was no God in the beginning. Gods emerged there only after the emergence of the universe with its names and diversities. Then how the earth and its collateral and flexible matter were evolved? Who knows all these? Thus this canto is an important one which shows a prominent period of the growth of Indian thought.

Then there was no vacuum, no essence, no air, and no sky beyond it. Then what was hidden there? Where is it? Under whose protection were these deep and gigantic oceans? There was no death and eternity no sign of day and night. This one with its own power breath without air. This was nothing beyond that. It was covered with darkness and there were no lines to separate darkness from light. It was watery. Its origin was covered with the infinite vacuum. By its own glory and knowledge, it came into being. In that 'one' entered the first feeling of desire. Therefore the first time came out, from the mind, sperm. The sages through their meditation and intellectual
ability could find this. Essence from the emptiness, there rays spread light streaming against darkness. But the one supreme, was 'It' above or below in front of us.

What is the nature of infinite knowledge? Who shall declare the cause and causation of it? Gods came into existence after the creation. Then who knows how it has emerged? Who created 'It'? Who didn't create it? Is abode the sky, or not? etc.

Only the supreme one knows it and perhaps it also doesn't know.

The Vedic sages believe in dharmas (righteousness). When they are live through the rituals and donations and they began to seek pleasure even after their death. What is the basis of this universe? Has there anything motionless in this moving universe? How is the origin of this universe? These types of doubts can be seen in the Nisadeyasékta of the Īgveda. These visions were framed from the outset of the debate being the solution of these problems.

Upaniṣad
The end of the Vedic period a new age arose known as 'Upaniśadic' or 'Vedāntic' as the part of Āryas. Upaniśads are probably representing the period about 900 to 600 BC. In these period numerous text were compiled by various teachers. The main theme of these work was development of concept regarding the metaphysical subject like the Abhyudaya and Nihṣreyasa, soul and nature of knowledge etc..

The thinkers of the Upaniśads tried to seek the truth, which is infinite beyond the worldly truth. They contemplated about the origin of the universe, the fleeting nature of life and the relationship between man and nature. They reached several kinds of speculations. Their intellectual bravery, intiring search for truth, the quest for finding out the meaning and the goal of life are evidenced through out the Upaniśads. These scholars discussed all topics such as Soul, God etc. It is recorded that Ēnvekāikevidya originated from these discussion. Debate became the part of human
life during the age of Upaniãads. Plenty of examples can be seen in Upaniãads such as Chñndogya, Bãhãdãranyaka, Prã±na etc.

In Upaniãadic period 'Sabhã' and 'Samiti' were the remarkable places where the philosophic discussion held. Here 'Pariãad' is meant a group of advisors who are engaged in philosophical debates. The 'Samiti' contained a group of four or ten or twenty one Brãhmins who were well versed in Vedic and Vedãntic topics. Rjasabhas were elected them as their royal advisors; on the basis of their skill in the verbal fight when debates took place. These debates developed through these royal courts.

Chñndogyopaniãad.

The Chñndogyopaniãad is related with the branch of Sãmaveda. Scholars remarks that this is the earliest Upaniãad. It is probably a pre-Buddhist text and it can be assigned to the seventh or sixth century BCE.
*Chñndogya* says that several Brñhmin scholars became disciples of Ávapathi, the king of 'Kekaya'. In *Chñndogya* we can find a story of Úddhakrṇuni, a Brñhmin of 'Kuru Prñchñla' who spent his time to learn about nature and man with rational outlook. Through observations and experiments he could get conclusions. He states whether the cause is realized, matter can also be realised. It is impossible to have something from emptiness. It is against reason and law. Therefore he declare that this universe which seems in varieties was essentially one with its non-dualistic form. This can be seen in the debate between ávetaketu and Éruni. Éruni says to ávetaketu, "If we take an example from 'clay'- It can be moulded into different things, perceives that everything made of clay is nothing but mere clay. And this earthen thing has different names such as pot, lamp etc". Similarly one who has identified gold can recognize that everything made of gold is golden. One who knows this truth can realizes that all varieties in the universe are mere names and the only real thing is the 'one', which has
become its cause. Uddālaka's sphere of thought is such a way. The argument on emptiness before creation is against the reason and order. So everything is to be realized on the basis of these observation and experiment.

On the basis of Upaniṣads, Chīndogya, Bhādrapāyaka, Lījyāsya, Aitareya, Taittiriya, Prajña, Kena and such eighteen Upaniṣads need our attention. Among these only the earliest and the prominent come under the topics of our special attention. So we have to discuss Bhādrapāyaka, Prajña and Kena because of the contents of the topic of such nature and relation with our topics.

Bhādrapāyakopaniṣad

The Bhādrapāyakopaniṣad is regarded as a compilation of the concluding section in the ‘āatapata Brāhma’ of the ‘White Yajurveda’ (āuklayajurveda). This great Era.yakopaniṣad represents the character of both the Era.yaka and Upaniṣad. It is recorded as an earliest Upaniṣad. It is also considered as a pre-Buddhist work and it
can be compiled between in the period of the seventh to six centuries BCE. Yjµavalkya is the main character of this UpaniÂad. Yjµavalkya debates with Janaka, G¡rgiv¡caknavi, á¡kalya, Maitreyi etc. Bhad¡ra, yakopaniÂad refers that the kings were the patrons of philosophers. In this work we have got reference about the king Janaka, who has chaired a number of philosophic meetings and has treated as a good friend of the famous philosopher Yjµav¡lkya.

This UpaniÂad deserves a special attention owing to its size, the way of narration and its contents. The prominent visioner of this UpaniÂads is Yjµavalkya. He interacts with Maitreyi, G¡rgi and Janaka on topics of eternity of soul.

The king Janaka’s court was very famous for debates where the prominent masters of `Kuru P¡nch¡la assembled. There Yjµavalkya defeated many scholars with scientific discussions.
Once Janaka performed a sacrifice having several 'offerings'. Then Janaka longed to know who was 'Devajµa', 'the most learned' among them. He brought thousand cows and each horns of the cow had been tied with gold of rich value. Then Janaka declared in the assembly, "one who was the Brahmajµa among you, can take these thousand cows". No Br¡hmin dared to come forward. Then Y¡jµavalkya ordered his disciple to lead these cows to his ashram. Hearing this all Br¡hmins became furious and came forward to question him. He responded with them very reasonable answers in the presence of King Janaka. In the second chapter of B¤had¡ra¸yaka we can see a debate between Aj¡ta¿atru, the king philosopher of Kasi and G¡rgya Bıl¡ki. It is described thus G¡rgya declared that he worships Ëditya (the sun) as Brahma; Aj¡ta¿atru retorted that 'Ëditya' is not Brahma. Then G¡rgya began to argue that one can worship the natural powers like the sun, the moon, the lightning, the sky, the air, the fire, water etc., because they are the basis of divinity. Aj¡ta¿atru did not agree with
this remark. He wanted to make the reflection in mirror the sound of strides, the Gods of the four sides are shadow as Brahma; Ajita exposed the futility of that argument of Garga. The soul in the body can worships with such a spirit. Ajita retorted that one who is after pleasure and works for it and it cannot be Brahma. Thus Ajita, the king of Kasi defeated that Brahmin Garga Bliki. Later that Brahmin became the disciple of king Ajita. In this debate Ajita states that senses come out from the spirit of knowledge. Such as, 'one spider makes many threads in the cobweb or the same amber emits many sparks, the senses came out from this soul of knowledge'. Senses are indeed real and the soul is more truthful than the senses. Soul in fact does not work or enjoy the senses. The soul is non dualistic and ever pervading (omnipresent)

In the fourth chapter of Bhadrayaka, Janaka asks to Yajvalkya; 'what kind of light does man enjoy when the sun sets and the moon fades and the fire extinguishes
and when words fail? Yjµavalkya replies that 'the soul is his light, for he walks, sits
and works owing to the light of the soul'. Because Yjµavalkya himself exhorts his wife
Maitreyi that the soul returns to himself with death. "As a handful of salt put into
water, it will dissolve into water and it cannot be taken back. But any part of that water
tastes salt likewise soul is eternal, infinite and material elements of knowledge (jµ±na).
It originates from the material elements and dissolve into them. If this is separated
there is no life." When Maitreyi is frightened by certain answers, Yjµavalkya says,
where there is the consciousness of dualism, there one sees the other. One smells and
hears the other. The one speaks to another and one thinks about the other, and one
knows the other. But how can there be an approach with the thought everything is in a
soul? Who shall know? which and what? How can one identify the cause of all these
knowledge? How can one identify the omniscient? Can the eye be able to see itself?"
The soul out of the experiences of the body assimilates different kinds of knowledge and thus becomes knowledge itself.

*Kenopaniṣad.*

This is the Upaniṣad in the Talaṇḍa branch of the Śrīvaṁśa. The *Kena* is considered as the oldest one. The verse of this Upaniṣads contains many themes, such as the search for one God who is both the creator and the prompter who works for liberation in human beings. This is composed probably in the last few centuries before Christian Era. This Upaniṣad is divided into four Kṣatras (chapters).

The *Kenopaniṣad* begins thus: By whose desire does the mind get attracted to the objects? By whose directions does it work? By whose command does the first life move? By whose desire does these words are spoken? Which god makes our ears and eyes inactive or active?
Prañopaniṣad

"Prañopaniṣad" is recorded as the part the Atharvaveda. Prañopaniṣad is written in prose. The Prañopaniṣad consists of the sage Pippalāda's answers to six questions posed by six learned Brāhmins. The title of the Upaniṣad, Prajña (Question) is derived from these questions. Each of its six chapters is also called a prajña or 'question'. Prañopaniṣad deals with the distinction between the apara and the paravidya, with the cosmological problem regarding the creation of the world, and with the conditions of sleep and dream.
The theme of *Prajñopaniṣad* develops through the questions of the disciples and answer from Pippalīda. It describes how the method of induction to deductive method by which an acute enquiry is made up to the level of the nature about the knowledge regarding the soul.

Once Sukeśa, Satyakīma, Gṛgga Kauṭalya, Vaidarbhi and Kabandi, with some students approached the Guru Pippalīda to know about Brahma. The sage asked them, to live in meditation and in celibacy and after the completion of one year they would ask him the doubts. Then he would tell them, if he knew the answer.

Teachers in the Upaniṣadic period were very anxious and they inquired about many things. They wanted to know the relation between the cause and causation. But their thoughts were in different ways. So the answers to the questions were also different. Some were dualists and some were non-dualists among these thinkers.
There were materialists and spiritualists also among them. A single truth is attracted by every thinker. They could understand that nature, the universe, men and everything change. Some visible things instantly disappear. Some other things appear all on a sudden. The universe is a series of complex events. It is an endless chain of cause and causation. But where is the beginning? Is there a root cause? If so, what is it? Some call the root cause as Brahma. They claimed that the indescribable and truthful Brahma is the basis of this universe. Some others argued that there is no Brahma other than this nature and universe. All these animate and inanimate objects are parts of this universe. Thus different views were developed.

**Epic period**

Indian philosophy emerged from the practical need of the material and logical pressures. Indian thought is not only spiritual but also material. It has been existing
since times immemorial in history. In certain epochs, material thoughts gained predominance. Actually Indian thoughts developed from the conflicts of spiritualism and materialism. The *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata* deals with several kinds of materialistic views.

The Epic *Rāmāyaṇa* originated, at an unknown time, as ballads transmitted orally and sung by two classes of people, viz., Śṛtas the musicians living in royal courts and Kuṇalavās, who were travelling singers comparable, to a great extent.

A long period elapsed before the above ballads came to be written. It is not known when the above ballads came to be written. It is not certain when the *Rāmāyaṇa* was written for the first time. The *Rāmāyaṇa* is, perhaps, the result of evolution through the period between the fourth or third century BCE and the second century CE.
In the great epic text, such as *Vilmeki Rñmya*, we can see reflections about the assemblies of ministers and learned people. In these assemblies, many topics like how to decide the value of political affairs were discussed.

In the 82\textsuperscript{nd} sarga of the Ayodhya Kñ¿, we can see the description of the royal assembly. In the 100\textsuperscript{th} sarga, we can feel the philosophy where Rñma makes friendly talks with Bharatha. Rñma reminds Bharata that the ministers, who are skilful in rule, valorous and having scientific with reasonable knowledge, Jitendriyas, and illustrious.

The knowledge about the justice of the learned ministers was the reasons for the success of many kings. The discussions with the ministers must not be known to others even if there is controversy and spy work. The Cñrñkas, who argues for argument sake, must be respected. The evil scholars must be reversed otherwise ominous things would happen and they might be the so called moralists who would argue meaninglessly.\textsuperscript{20}
In sarga 108 of the Ayodhya-jīli, a materialist asks reasonable and intelligent questions to Rāma. Who else is related to the other? Whose act has brought benefit to anyone? Which life has become helpful while in death or birth? Every life is born and gone alone? One who has infatuation for parents is almost mad. There is no life dependent on other. One who is fond of long travels will take rest in a house? He will resume the journey to the next day. So parents, home, wealth and the like are similar to the above. The house, which he thought his own, is only a temporary abode. He compares the life with a long journey and he adds. One who is wise he will not be attached to it. Therefore the kingdom of your father should most be abandoned by you. You may enjoy the pleasures of the palace, leaving aside the tragic side of life, and rule like Indra.

Who is Daśaratha to you? Who are you to Daśaratha? Therefore you may do as I suggest. The king Daśaratha went to the place where he was obliged to go. Every
life has the same turn. You worry without cause. Worry comes to him who holds
Dharma (Righteousness) abandoning the Artha (wealth). It makes him sad. One who
laments over the death of someone, will be a miserable condition. People perform the
árđddhas like Ashtaka 'Pitṛjyāṛddha' etc.. How much rice is wasted for these? Can the
dead come and enjoy these meals? Can the food one consumes nourish the other? Can
árddha be reached as a meal parcel for the dead. Contradicting the claims of Jīvāli,
Rjma says, what you say is baseless as well as meaningful. The good will not respects
the vulgar and the prodigal. The good people who know about 'Satkarma' will not
respect you if you think that this is 'dharma'. No one will respect the 'so called
moralist'. They would think that he is a sinner or destroyer. My subjects who are in
heaven will annoy me if I don't follow truth. The subjects live in earth should follow the
life with obedience of the king. The sublime duty of a person in this world is the
practice of truth doing his duty and protecting his dharma and nothing else. Why you
can reasonably and logically stated these are 'dharmas'. I pledged my throne to Bharata and gave word to father that I will live in forest. Then how can I retrieve my kingdom and power? How can I renounce the order of my father for these petty and paltry things like power. Thus Rāma and Jībi engaged in interesting controversial topics.

In 17th sarga of Rāmāyaṇa, i.e., the Kiskindhākṣaṇa, we can see the discourse between Rāma and Bāli when the body of 'Bāli' is lying with the arrows of Rāma. The reasonable and rational replay of Rāma on that occasion also. Bāli asks thus: 'You, 'the noble', killed me without a direct fight. What benefit did you gain out of it? What crime have I done to you who never attempted a direct fight with you? I have done no crime in your kingdom or city. I have not belittled you. Then why should you kill me? You are the king of the rational men. Normally the desire for wealth, earth and gold leads to war. Which do you prefer among these? Is it in the fruits in the forest, which is
my food. The king should reign having consciousness for justice and injustice. More
over one should be able to identify blessing and killing with discrimination. It is not
good for a king to be despotic. If I die, the kingdom goes to Sugriva. So it is quite
against justice that you killed me. Is your action justificable?

As answer to B̄li, R̄ma says in the eighteenth sarga of this text, 'Oh Hariśvara! you annoy me child like without knowing the Purusārthas such as Dharma,
Artha, and Kāma, observed by the noble men. Why do you spurn at me. Why you
behave to me, with the silliness of a monkey without consulting to the masters and the
learned. You are the king of monkeys! The observations of the noble men are sharp
and deep. The soul, which is omnipresent, can identify the good and the evil. A born
blind cannot see anything with the help of another who is also a blind man. You are
slain in accordance with the laws of the dharma. You are killed by the order of justice.
There are some other reasons for killing you. You should not be enraged. The words with prudence and reasons are listened to.

In the 24th sarga of 'Kīśkindhakī', Hanuman comforts Thīra. There Bīli is depicted as one who knows the law and skilful in all the accomplishments. Therefore it is said that his virtuous life would reach where the good souls reach.\(^{23}\)

_Mahābhārata._

The present text of the _Mahābhārata_, the 'Greatest Epic of India',\(^{24}\) passed through the earlier narrative stages of 'Jaya' and 'Bhīrata'. It came to be developed from a small beginning, first incorporating the story of the triumph of the Pāṇḍavas over the Kauravas and then the narrative in detail of the entire Bhīrata race, and finally became the present encyclopedic 'āatasāhasri samhitā'. As we have it in popular recensions it
represents a literary activity of the Indian mind covering a vast period of about eight centuries.

There are references of many kinds of materialistic views in *Mahabharata*. There is a story in *Antiparva* of *Mahabharata*. Thousands of Brähmins gathered together at the palace gate to greet the Pāṇḍavas who returned triumphantly to the palace after the war. Among them there was a Cārvaka. The Cārvaka, pushing the crowd, came forward and declared before Yudhikṣhira thus: ‘This community of Brähmins curse you since you have killed your own relatives. What did you gain by killing the king and the elders? Therefore you should die’. Here Cārvaka raised a moral question whether the battle between the brothers and the victory gained by killing the close relatives could be justified. In the Vanaparva of the *Mahabharata*, Draupade says to Yudhikṣhira that her brothers and herself had learnt the demerits of polyandry and how it act as a curse to humanity.
In the Vanaparva of the *Mahābhārata*, the arrival of Aśvapati and Āvetaketu at the court of Janaka is described. The incident of their participation in the discussion is described thus. They two reached Mithilā and tried to enter the house of sacrifice. They were prevented from entering and the doorkeepers said to them-

"Children! You are not permitted to enter in. Only the learned and the old are permitted to enter such a sacred place". Aśvapati replied that no one becomes old by living long years or by getting their hair grey. One who can talk about Veda is great. I observe the rules of the Ṛṣis and I like to see Vandin in the court. You should inform this to the king for his sake. You may find us discussing with the learned to day. During the heated argument you will find your Vandin defeated. The sentinels took them to the court. Aśvapati said to the king- "Oh king you are the most prominent emperor among the Janaka dynasty. It is heard that a scholar named 'Vandin' is here
in your palace. He will defeat the Brâhmins in the discussion of āstras and the
defeated will be thrown into water. We have came here to discuss āstras with him”?

The king replied that the skill of Vandin has been known to the learned
Brâhmins. You have come here to discuss with little knowledge with out knowing his
abilities. ĀÂ£}vakra said; Vandin has not argued with people like me, he will be
defeated and silenced today.

Janaka wanted to test the boys. He asked him about the thing with thirty
members twelve parts and three hundred and sixty ares, ĀÂ£}vakra replied that, 'may
the PakÑa of twenty four parvîs, six seasons, the twelve month and 360 days of the
year'. When the king got the right answer, he asked them several questions and
ĀÂ£}vakra promptly gave answers to them. The questions were like these - is the one
that does not close the eyes while sleeping? Answer - 'fish'. Who is the one motionless after birth? Answer - 'egg'. Who else has no heart? Answer 'rock'.

Then Janaka said, 'you are skillful in rhetoric'. Thus the king permitted A§vakra to argue with Vandin. A§vakra turned to Vandin and said; "You think you are skillful in logic and you have made a law to put the man whom you defeat in water. You may answer my questions and I will give answers to your questions. If you do not answer my questions you should stop debating for ever". In the discussion which followed, Vandin was defeated and the audience praised A§vakra greatly. In āñthiparva, Bheśma explains to Yudhiṣṭhira about 'Daśanī' which is approved by the Vedas and the dharma of the king. Veda is dharma itself. Dharma is the means of elite. Brahma, the great grandsire created the universe. Bhesma says that Daśanī advises to compromise between the Vṛdi (proponent) and Prativṛdi (respondent). In
áµntiparва, Yudhiṣṭhira asks Bheṣaṇa how the Pùchaṣikhas and the nihilists were administered in the court of Janaka.

"Great Grandsire, Janaka, the king of Mithila who knew 'Mokādharma' could get mokāa by renouncing the pleasures; how did he get Mokāa"? As a replay to this Bheṣaṇa told the story of king Janadeva who belonged to the race of Janaka. Janadeva had always been thinking about the means of attaining heaven. There were four hundred ācāryas in his court who exhorted how to observe the different dharmas in life.

Once Paµchaṣikha, a monk, who as the son of Kapila, reached Mithila. He was an expert in dharma and a great philosopher. He had no doubt in anything since he had realised every theory. The Sīmkhya followers considered him as the ascetic Kapila himself.

Paµchaṣikha, having acquired infinite knowledge. He reached Mithila, realising that king Janaka who treated his hundred ācāryas with equal credit. He surprised his
subjects with his logical and reasoning skill. The king was attracted by the deep
knowledge of Paµca¿ikha and became his disciple. Paµca¿ikha disciplined him about
the 'MokÀadharma' related to S¡mkhyas. The teacher advised him to renounce the
world after explaining the greatness of karma and futility of pleasures in this world till
one's access to MokÀa. What is benefit of this bodily life, which is ephemeral and
indefinite and loses everything including wife and children. Those who realize this and
renounce the world will not get rebirth. The five elements always protect this body. If
one acknowledges it, how can one be attached with his body. Where is pleasure for the
body, which will be detached by death, one day.

The king was surprised by the innocent and subtle explanations of the spiritual
voice. Janaka asked him; Lord! Is there rebirth for the learned after death?

Paµca¿ikha became convinced that king Janaka was still ignorant about spiritual
wisdom. The monk realized that the king had misconceived the destruction of soul.
Pāµcaçikha knew this distraction and told him, ‘Oh king! the liberated soul cannot be perished. The soul does not take any particular form. The soul is eternal like the river, which renounces its nature while joining the ocean, every creature dissolves into that ‘Mahatsvara' and this is ‘Mokṣa'. How can there be a name for the soul in so far as it is eternal and renounces the name after death.

Janaka's doubts were clarified, as he carefully listened to the learned advice. There was a tremendous change in his attitude. Once the king said while seeing Mithilāpurī on fire, what this city is burnt? and Yudhiṣṭhira realises that his detachment principle liberates him from all miseries. Thus we see the growth of philosophy in Mahābhārata. In Sabhāparva, when Draupade was dragged out in Kaurava court, she asked 'the elders of the court whether they do not see the decline of dharma? Drona, Vidura and Bheṣama were witnessing this immoral act. Kaurava, the cheat, prompted Yudhiṣṭhira in gambling and seized his wealth through fraud means.
Pāṇḍavas always accepted the prince Yudhīśṭhīra as their leader. He pawned his brothers and himself. They have no right to ask whether Yudhīśṭhīra had the right to pawn his brothers. Their queen Draupadī was dragged before the court, she asked:

Let the learned in this court might classify and remove my doubt. With this logical questions, had to face by Bhīma and like in the royal court.

**Philosophy of Jainism**

Sixth century is recorded as the period of great wave of religious and philosophical awakening in India. H.H. Gowden records that this is quite evidently not to be explained by merely perverse spirit of rebellion against the authority of Vedas or against the status of Brāhmaṇ people in Indian Society. He points out that more than seventeen movements comprehensively designated as heretics have been referred to as making the great transitional period of Indian history of the sixth and seventh
century BC. Among these movements two of them have survived to afford their existence even to the present day and tried to contribute extensively to Indian Literature. These two were Jainism and Buddhism. Buddhism became a world religion even though it expelled from the land of its birth. Jainism never tried to find a home outside of India.

**Jainism**

The word Jainism is derived from the root 'Ji' (to conquer) and signifies the religion of those who have conquered the lust of living. Jainas believe that their beliefs are as old as Vedas. They respect their first teacher named ऐलाहादेव as the first Tirtha’kara. Jainism represent a teaching antecedent to the career of its most distinguished teacher Mahāvīra. They accepted him as the twenty forth Tirtha’kara. He was born in 599 B.C and attained nirvāṇa in 527 BC.
Jaina philosophy, which is earlier to Buddhism, has considerable relevance in the field of logical thoughts. Therefore let us consider the logical theories which reflected in Jaina cannons.

The Jainas are not considered as spiritualists. But they believed in the permanence and in the imperishability of the soul. But their concept is not about a soul which is ever pervading. They believe that each life has a soul. Life itself is the soul. The number of souls and the number of lives are in correct proportion in this world. One of the philosophers argued that there is soul which is common to all and it is ever victorious ever living and ever noble. The disciple of Mahavera, Erdraka, denies it and declares thus: If there is only a common soul for all living things, they cannot be identified. They can not have different experiences. There may not be Brhmmins, Ksatriya, Vaisyas, Sdras, Worms, Birds and Snakes. Everything will be one and the same either men or Gods."
The basic laws of the Jainas are right vision, right knowledge, and right conduct. These are the means of 'Kaivalya'. Though the Jainas negate God, they are not materialists.

Jacoby observes that some of the views of Mahavera have courtesy to the materialists and the rest views are from the conclusions of incessant debates with the materialists. For example, to the Jainas, the soul is permanent; But it is related to body and other material objects. Therefore, in order to understand life or soul, one has to examine it in terms with animate objects. They think that soul in an elephant is equal to its size and the soul in ant is small like an ant. Likewise inanimate objects are to be viewed in terms of life. This is the vision of the Jainas on soul.

Thus the Jainas divide the universal reality into two: Jeva and Ajeva (animate and inanimate objects). They accept inter relationship among them. Both the Jeva and
Ajeva have permanence. They are not created. They call Ajeva not only the 'still' things, but also the abstract concept life time, motion and stillness. There are five types of Ajeva objects. Life is based on the inanimate object. Soul is life itself. Life is its essence. It is exhibited through the senses and the conscious mind. Life is that which visualises and understand things and that which enjoys the fruit of good or evil.

Life and 'Pudgala' are different realities. There are numberless objects, atoms and souls. All these are realities. Each object has its own peculiarities. Each matter has the qualities of touch, smell, taste and colour. Atom has also all these qualities. Each object has limitless characteristics. (Matter is of limitless dimensions and possibilities).

This theory is known as Anek\textntav\textvd. Jaina philosophy acknowledged this Anek\textntav\textvd so they didn't like to debate with others. They accept other's freedom to think with other's intention. Their
teachings focus on the theory of Śyādvāda (may be). Their spiritualist views gained
predominance with the help of 'śyādvāda' and the visions of Jainism is a treasure to the
Indian thought.

Philosophy of Buddha

Buddha the founder of Buddhism was born in 567 BC. In the present borders
of Nepal, Kapilavastu. He was the son of āudhodana the king of ākṣya dynasty. He was
empathetic troubled by the sorrows, miseries and sufferings of the people of his
neighborhood. He sought to find out the cause and solution of misery. Buddha tried
to root out the miseries of this world.

The sixth century BC. is a great landmark in the history of world. India has
given birth to two jīryas named Mahāvera and Gautama Buddha. These two teachers
preached their teachings for the people of marginalized community. Their teachings
were in the language of common people, i.e., Prakrit and Pali in respectively. Buddha's teachings seem to be more rational and logical than Mahavera. The teachings of Buddha were rational and material. His teachings on misery are classified into two parts viz. Pratityasamutpada (Patisa Samuppada) Dukha (The reality of misery), Samudaya (the reason for misery), Nirodha (Solution of misery) and Marga (The means for the solution of misery). There are the four noble truths related to dukha. Buddha tried everyone to be free from dukha. Dukha is a reality in life. Man undergoes many types of miseries. Why does man suffer? What is the reason or cause of this suffering? According to Buddha, desire is the base root of all miseries. To root out misery, one has to get rid of this desire. Dukhanirodha implies the curtailment of desires. How the prevention of misery is possible? Either by involving in limitless pleasures, or by renouncing all kinds of pleasures? In this world one may try to withdraw from life and go for fasting and physical self-inflections. These two existing methods are possible.
Buddha did not feel both these two means are acceptable. He viewed that the eight path, viz. the right visions etc are the means to deprive of one's misery in life. And these means were eight in number.

After getting enlightenment, in his speech made in 'Kṣi' Buddha declared thus: You monks! what is the holy truth related to misery? Birth is misery; old age is miserable, illness is misery, death is miserable. To mingle with the hostile is also miserable. Separation is miserable. To miss something longed for is miserable. In short the sensual relations to the world are miserable. You monks! therefore what is the holy truth behind the misery. Misery is the infatuation which leads from birth to births. You, monks, what is the holy truth to the means of depriving misery. It is to prevent the flow of longing; and to get away from infatuations. To boycott desire and to put out desire and thereby become non-attached to desire. You monks, then what is holy truth of the means of eradication of misery? They are the eight paths. Right
belief, right decision, right word, right duty, right life, right work, right thought and
right meditation are the eight paths.

Pratyayasamutpada are subject to the relation between cause and causation.

There is no matter without a cause. It is a standpoint against the material theories of
coincidence and instinctiveness. Matter comes out from a cause. When an object
emerges out, the cause becomes irrelevant. An object is the result from the destruction
of another object. For example seed generates the tree, here the seed is the cause.

Certain visions argued that the tree is not the evolution from the seed and the seed
contains the essence of the tree and it gives the reflection of the essence of the tree.

Buddha did not agree with them. In his opinion tree emerged from the destruction of
the seed. An object comes out from the destruction of another object. The present is
not the mere continuation of the past. What we see today is the continuation of the
things that were experienced yesterday. The new emerge out from the destruction of
the old one. Pratetyasamutpada is the argument that one comes out from the destruction of another.

The time of Buddha was intensive with the discussions on eternity, motion and transformation based on the visions of various movement. A particular school opines that the eternal and the changeless is only the Brahma which is independent. It is the only existence, and changes and transformations are mere illusions. This was the argument of that particular school of thought.

While some others such as Lokyata etc argued that only the material essence is the real one and sensory perceptions are the reflections of that external object and they will not be permanent but subject to decay.

Buddha accepted a middle path which states that what we see do exist. But they are not permanent or eternal. Permanence is a visual illusion. Each object has a
reason of its own. It is cause of another matter and at the same time there are the root
of another matter. One is related to other and nothing is independent or free. If so, its
essence cannot be established with the help of cause and causation theory. How can we
know that there is a particular matter, which exists without interdependence. How can
that we know this universe as complemented fusion of many related things? We do not
know anything which becomes free or that can be made as freed. Thus the
Pratetyasamutpāda is the core of Buddhist philosophy is a kind of cause and causation
theory. Because the universe is an amalgam of closely related phenomena. Every thing
is controlled by the axis of a cause and causation.

Stcherbatsky remarked that this theory can be explained thus. All material
things, like the mental objects, are ephemeral and decaying and they are fleeting. There
is no matter or an object but isolated components only. It is the short lived sparks of
the power which acts independently. It is fleeting process or a flow of short lived existence.

Buddha urged his disciples not to believe in anything irrational. He advised one of his disciples: It is a general practice to believe what is heard. And we should not believe in customary and conventional practices since they are part of our ancestry. A rumour, however it is spread should not be believed. No statement is to be accepted, even if it is written by an age old monk without examining them. A practice is to be accepted only after proper observation and analysis, and only if it will do good to humanity and rational to the sense. Then live in accordance with that view.

Buddha demanded that every thing is to be examined in the light of reasoning and his exhortation should also be examined and convinced by observations. You may
accept my exhortations like gold after testing its purity through fire and measure its quality.

Buddha promoted free thoughts. He advised to look at things with rational eyes and get rid of misery from prudential knowledge.

Buddha dared to confront with the religions, superstitions, rituals and the predominance of priests of his time. He cast out spiritualism, theism, miracles, divine revelations and super human interventions. His lien is towards reasoning, justice and experience. His compulsion was on justice. His means is a kind of psychological analysis which is not based on the concept of spirit. To one who was accustomed to practice and conventions, Buddha's ways were like the softness of the fresh wind blowing on the mountain tops.
Buddha doesn’t think that áatkiya vision- or spiritual concept as a natural instinct. A child does not have any spiritual concept. The atheistic views of Buddha, according to Açvaghošha, progress in these ways. If God is the infinite truth, how can there be doubt about it?

Mahāyāna, made drastic changes in the early Buddhist view. Mahāyana also followed atheism, which is one among the important concepts of Buddhism. Mahāyana rationally fostered this concept.

Caraka Samhitā.

The Caraka Samhitā\(^2\) (CS) gives a summary of the principal doctrines of Ēnvekāike. This work is regarded as the first text which discusses about the rules of a good debate and the means of valid knowledge to attain the object of valid knowledge.

According to tradition, it was Punarvasu Ētreya (C. 550 BC) who was the original
author of the so called *CS*. The name Caraka might be that of a sect or a physician who was the redactor of the *Ayurveda Samhita*. The ancient physicians of India were the real exhibitors of Indian science and scientific methods. We came to know about discussions, symposiums and debates even before the dates of Caraka in 100 BC. From the primitive age itself, the art of debate and discussions had been developed and it is seen in the traditional medical books. An argument has two phases; constructive and destructive. The origin of the deductive and inductive methods as well as experimental methods can be traced in the *CS*. Logical forms of debate and the definition of logical categories are to be found in the *CS* for the first time.

In the 11th Chapter of *Śtrasthānaiśastra* a chapter is described Prāṇaśa, Dhānaśa, and Paralokaiśa. Among these when one earns Paralokaiśa there arises doubts about 'Paraloka'. How is birth possible after death? Some believe in what is visible. Cārvāka and the like atheists are of opinion that rebirth has no substantiate validity.
Some others believe in rebirth, which is mentioned in the āstras. Some others believe that rebirth takes place in different forms as explained various traditions.\textsuperscript{34}

Some think, parents are the cause of birth. Others believe that the cause of birth is instinctive and it is the decision of God and it happens accidental. There are some differences in opinion. Is there a rebirth?\textsuperscript{35}

The wise has to avoid the doubt about the other world and the thoughts about it. For the visibility it is very scanty and invisibility is plenty. It means, what we know about is very small and what we have not known is very much. Some says that this knowledge is attained through the Vedas, inference and reasoning capacity. All senses help to find out the visible, even then some are invisible till we know them.\textsuperscript{36}

Visible experience minimises the failure of memory, weakness of the senses, absent mindedness, associated with the similar objects or mixed with another or too
small to be seen etc. So to state that visible is existing and invisible is no-existing are not out of experience. According the Čīrvīka birth is accidental. He denies cause, effect, God and soul. But according the Caraka the cause of birth is destiny. In short he claims that birth is by accident has no validity.37

Every object in this world is of two types (1) essence and (2) non-essence. The test is also of four types: Êptopadeśa (Verbal Testimony Pratyakṣa (Perception) Anumāna (Inference) and Yukti (Continuous argument).38 Who are the Êptṣs? Those who are free from evil and good, equipped with the power of asceticism and self knowledge, having the knowledge of 'thrikāla' are dignified as Êptṣs. Their words need not be doubted. They are truthful and since they are non-attached to material things why should they become untruthful.39
Pratyakṣa (Perception):- It is the sudden perception of the unified acts of the soul, sense, mind sound and the like.

Anumāna (Inference):- It is the inference with the help of acquired perceptions of the types and functions in past, present, and feature. Where ever is smoky, we infer that there is fire inside. When pregnancy is seen, we assume that there was coition. Thus inference is done with associative and presumptive knowledge. The fruit is assumed from the seed and its future is guessed. Memory of association also works here. The present knowledge presumed with the help of acquired knowledge. Knowledge becomes wisdom as it identifies the meaning of the amalgamation of many things, knows the Dharma, Artha and Kāma. It is also to be identified as prudential wisdom through logic and reasoning which have no difference in meaning. Because reasoning is the guessing of the mater from its cause. There will be difference in opinion about a thing which is presumed. To know whether there is rebirth the best means is the test
through verbal testimony. Yogic perception, inference and continuous arguments supports it. Similarly everything is to be tested and the essence is to be identified.

Through this test, one should realize that there is rebirth or not.\textsuperscript{43}

\textit{Vim\=nasth\=ina of CS} describes that the wise should know things through his power of reasoning and thought. Likewise, one who is an aspirant to be a physician should test the branch of science he wants to learn. He should select the science which is having no defects, having philosophical and rational basis, and having suitability to meaning.\textsuperscript{44} 
\textit{E\c{c}\={r}ya should teach} only after testing the validity of the subject and knowledge of that person who wishes to learn. For example he should be devoid of doubts and should have knowledge of that science and its philosophy. Deep study is the means advised by him to practice \=a\jstra. Moreover he should converse with those who learnt science.\textsuperscript{45} Those who want to become teachers should test the disciples and know whether he has the ability to argue.\textsuperscript{46}
The CS introduces the debate under the name V\áda. V\áda proper is in Caraka a constructive discussion guided by the laws of logic, as between the members of the same school wishing to advance their philosophy. Caraka divides the debates into two based on the nature of discussion and the place where it held.

At public debates there was a chairman, who ought to be neutral, responsible for conducting the proceedings according to fixed conventions and for determining when a debater was defeated. There was also an audience, likely to contain partisans of the protagonists. Caraka warns his students to be careful before entering a debate to ascertain what kind of assembly it is likely to be, whether friendly or hostile. One should refuse to take part if the assembly is hostile. One should also consider the character of the opponent, his abilities and his weaknesses, before deciding whether to meet him and how to tackle him. Purely psychological attacks are recommended in
some cases, such as perplexing the opponent with tremendous quotations from Štrīs or demoralising him through satire and jokes.

Sambhājīvidhi directs that the doctor should seek consultation of other doctors. Such mutual conversation will increase one’s knowledge and happiness.

Ācārya should be happy to teach the disciple and should at times reveal the secrets which were concealed. He may make use of it to win the debate. Therefore ‘Ta·vida’ or conversation is made use of by the wise. ‘Ta·vida’ are of two types: (1) Sandhīya (peaceful), (2) Vīgṛhya (in a spirit of opposition). The first is called Anuloma Sambhāja or a congenial debate and the second Vīgṛhya Sambhāj or a hostile debate. The anuloma sambhāja takes place when the respondent or opponent is possessed of erudition, wisdom, eloquence and readiness to reply, is not wrathful or malicious, is well versed in the art of persuasion, and is patient and sweet speech. In debating with such a person one should speak confidently, interrogate confidently and
give answer in confidence. One should not be alarmed at suffering defeat from him nor should one rejoice in inflicting defeat on him. It is improper to show obstinacy towards him, or to introduce before him matters, which are irrelevant. While using persuasion with gentleness, one would keep in view the subject of debate. This kind of debate is called anuloma sambhaṇā.\textsuperscript{48} Those who are opposite to this view of debate want to have fame for themselves. They make self assertions. They are incompetent to argue with knowledge and confidence. They are opposed to knowledge, they are envious and intolerant. They do not converse amicably with others and they always oppose their adversary. They quarrel and talk by disrespecting the equality of the opposite group. Before making such talks one should know the ability of his opponent and the attitude of the audience. Every thing is to be examined in such a kind of debate. The knowledge of science and the knowledge of arthas, mental ability, genius, verbal efficiency are great and they bring
fame to the owner: What is adverse? It's answer is to get easily irritated, carelessness and lack of concepts. These are undesirable.\footnote{59}

The greatness of the power of perception and the power of being careful, are to be compared with each other with due importance. The one who is full of knowledge can not impart it at the presence hostilities or fools. But in foolish and careless group one can debate with question and response. When we talk to others, it must be with confidence and the sentences must be long. Moreover, he should be pleasant and his eyes should sometimes be on the opponents face and he should smile at him. The other also should be given chance for his response. It other makes any unfavorable sound he should be told that, for the time being the talk is to be stopped, or he should be told that he is inattentive. If his argument is rejected and it should be expressed in a pleasing manner. Likewise it is advised that debate is to be done with good people. But to debate in a quarreling manner towards the elders is not becoming and praiseworthy.
Debates must be done with the learned with foot and with equals and juniors.

Discussion with these people should result in identifying the quality and fostering of things that have been discussed. And when comes to know that the debaters are more learned, then debate is not be prolonged further. If one feels that the other is inferior and bad, then the discussion must be stopped. The debate with mood of quarrel must be handled carefully and reasonably. The controversial discussions with the learned opponents are to be avoided. But extreme vighya or hostile debate would be harmful to some people. One who is angry cannot distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable statements. Therefore the skillful scholars do not like to quarrel in the presence of a gentle group.⁵⁰

Debate is to be done in this way. First of all the group should become familiar with the topic and the debater should reveal the topic of debate which he has learned.

If the opponents are unable to meet with the debate it must also be conveyed to the
These are the formalities of debate. The noblest thing is that one must be tolerant to realise that he has been defeated in the debate. To understand the means of debate, the words are \(V_{\text{id}}\) (Debate) Dravya (Substance) Gu, a (Quality), Karma (action), \(S_{\text{m}}\)nitya (generality), \(V_{\text{je}}\) (particularity), Samavya (Inherence), Pratij\(\text{a}\), (Proposition), Sthi\(\text{p}\)ana (Demonstration), Prati\(\text{t}\)h\(\text{i}\)pan\(\text{a}\) (counter-demonstration), Hetu (Reason), Upanaya (application), Nigamana (conclusion) Dr\(\text{A}\)\(\text{f}\)\(\text{r}\)nta (example), Siddh\(\text{n}\)nta (Tenet), \(\text{a}a\)b\(\text{d}\)a (word), Pratyak\(\text{a}\) (perception), Anum\(\text{n}\)\(\text{a}\) (Inference), Aupamya (comparison), Aithhy\(\text{a}\) (Tradition), Sam\(\text{z}\)\(\text{a}\)ya (Doubt), Prayojana (Purpose), Savyabhi\(\text{c}\)\(\text{r}\)a (Uncertain), Jij\(\text{u}\)\(\text{s}\)a (Inquiry), Vyavas\(\text{i}\)ya (Ascertainment), Artha - Pr\(\text{r}\)\(\text{i}\)\(\text{t}\)i (Presumption). The Sambhava (originating cause), Anuyojya (censurable), Ananuyojya (Non-censurable), Anuyoga (Interrogation), Pratyavuyoga (Re-interrogation), \(V_{\text{k}}\)\(\text{a}\)do\(\text{a}\) (Defects of speech), \(V_{\text{k}}\)\(\text{a}\)-Pr\(\text{c}\)\(\text{a}\)msa (excellence of speech), Chala (Quibble), Ahetu (fallacy), Atetak\(\text{i}\)\(\text{a}\) (Mistimed), Up\(\text{l}\)\(\text{a}\)mbha (Attribution of censure), Parih\(\text{r}\)a
(Avoidance of defect), Pratijñāṇī (Abandonment of a proposition), Abhyanujja (admission), Hetvantara (Shifting the reason), Arthāntara (Shifting the topic), Nigrahasthāna (A point of defeat). 

Debate is a scientific and rational talk opposing the ideas raised. Debate in short is of two types Jalpa (Wrangling) and Vītā (cavil). When equality is established and the controversy is proved without further doubt is called Jalpa (wrangling). And what is against Jalpa (wrangling) is described as Vītā (cavil).

The powerful word that is possible is called Pratijja (proposition). Pratijja (proposition), Hetu (reason) Dūṣyānta (example) Upanaya (application), Nigamana (Conclusion) when established are called Sthāpanā (Demonstration). First Pratijja then Sthāpanā (demonstration), why is it so? It is impossible to establish without pratijja? So to say the debater's statement is that 'man immortal'. The cause is not
created by anyone and its instance is described as 'like the sky', the sky is not created,
likewise man is also not created and the conclusion is that since man is not created he
is eternal. This is the established idea of the debater.

Prati\$h\$pan\$ (counter demonstration): It is the opponents establishment of the
opposite of what is established by the first. If the first debater argues that man is
eternal, the opponent denies it and gives the statement that man is ephemeral or non
eternal.

Hetu (Reason): Hetu is the basis or cause of one's knowledge. The cause is persumed
from Praty\$k\$a (perception) Anum\$n\$a (Inferences) Aupamya (comparison) or A\$t\$ihya
(Tradition) is knowledge.\textsuperscript{57}
DrAGjnta (Example): What is explained with the resemblance of the wisdom of the learned and ignorant is called example. For example fire is hot and water is liquid and the like.

Upanaya (Hypothesis): When the debater puts forward something and the opponent rejects it. But debater establishes his claim and is called hypothesis and conclusion.

The first debater tells about his final conclusion. Since the sky is not created, likewise man is also not created. The opponent through his hypothetical conclusion tries to establish the vice-versa. How is the pot so is the puruÀa. Thus the first one debates that man is immortal and the opponent argues or concludes that man is mortal. Thus a possibility showed to establish with the illustration of sjdharmya or vaidharmya qualifications is called Upanaya.
Nigamana (Conclusion): The debater establishes, since man is not created he is eternal and the opponent concludes that it is beyond sensual perception and therefore man is not eternal.

Sdharmya (Affirmative): Sickness is detected by 'sddharmya' this is established by the debater. Coldness causes fever. This example shows that fever (high temperature) is caused coldness (winter season). But the opponent argues that it is vaidharmya. When body is hot, season and snow help to get rid of the heat and this is the contradictory argument.

Theory is something that has been researched and scrutinised by the learned in many ways with all its parameters and then is established. That theory is of four types.

(1) Sarvatantra theory (2) Pratitantra theory

(3) Adhikara Theory (4) Abhyupagama theory.
Sarvatantra theory is the most well known among all ājstras what is well known is the particular branches is called as 'Pratitantra', when a theory is established in a particular context it is 'Adhikara'. 'Abhyupagama' is the manner received by the physician at the time of debate and it is beyond test and insurpassible.

CS Says that perception is a kind of knowledge which soul perceives through senses and through the self.\(^{59}\)

Anumāna is a knowledge which depends on inference or reasoning. The debate based on reason is called as inferential knowledge.\(^{60}\)

**Aupamya (Comparison):** When two similar or dissimilar objects are explained with the help of illustration it is called Aupamya or comparison.

**Aitihya (Tradition):** It is consisting of reliable assertions for example the Veda.\(^{61}\)
**Samjaya (Doubt):** That which can't be established owing to indecision and vagueness is called doubt. 62

**Prayojana (purpose):** What for one likes to do his duty is called purpose. Later hetudo of fallacy is explained.

**Savyabhicra (Uncertain):** It is a 'fallacy' which is well known in āśtras. It is one of the five parts of fallacy. It means something that can't be established with definite conclusions. Examination is explained as curiosity. 63

**Vyavasya (Ascertainment):** Determination e.g. that disease is due to the disturbance of wind in the stomach and this is its medicine.

**Arthapripti (Presumption):** The knowledge of a thing implied by the declaration of another thing e.g. when it is said that a person should not eat during the day, it is implied that he should eat during the night.
Sambhava (The originating cause): That from which something springs out, e.g. the six dhātus (ingredients) constitute the originating cause of the foetus in the womb.

Anuyojya (censurable): That sentence with defect of speech or vākyadosa is called Anuyojya.\(^6\)

Ananuyojya (Non censurable): That which is against the signs of anuyojya (censurable) is ananuyojya or non censurable. This is impossible and it does not arose curiosity and it is unsuitable

Anuyoga (interrogation): When each of the debaters knows the same topic well and when they select a particular part of the topic for discussion within the limit, it is called Anuyoga. For example man is mortal and man is immortal is a debate on the same topic and such debate which does not go beyond the topic is anuyoga.\(^6\)
**Pratyānuyoga (Re-interrogation):** An inquiry about another inquiry, e.g. when one says that the soul is eternal because it is non-produced the pratyanuyoga will be "why it is non produced?"

**Chala (quibble):** It is a round and fake way of verbiage and it is of two types namely Vakchala and Śmanyachala.⁶⁶

**Ahetu (Fallacy):** It is also called fallacy. It is of three types.

1. Prakara, a sama (begging the question)  
2. Samāya sama (assumption based doubt)  
3. Var, ya sama (balancing the subject).⁶⁷

**Prakara,asama (Begging the question):** The fallacy exemplifies the soul which is different from body is eternal when the first one argues so, the opponent asks why is it so? Of the party lacks reasons to establish his facts it is called fallacy.⁶⁸

**Samāyasama (Assumption base doubt):** That which makes doubt becomes the cause of the eradication of the doubt.⁶⁹ For example, some one says something about Ayurveda,
then there is a doubt whether he is a doctor. Then the opponent says that he is a doctor since he can explain a part of the Ayurveda. Here there is no reason to doubt it. This is called Samayyasama.

**Varyasama (Balancing the Subject):** The explanation of the reason fails to free full its duty is called Varyasama fallacy. The opponents may say since intelligence is intangible, it is ephemeral. Here sound and intelligence becomes the topics of possible discussion. When these two descriptions are possible with available sources with different it becomes Varyasama.\(^7\)

**Atetakila (Mistimed):** That which is repeated is called Atetakila.\(^7\) It becomes difficult and is comprehend owing to its oldness. The contesting or opponents conceal their ideas and they cannot be described later owing to its oldness is called Atetakila.

**Uplambha (Attribution of censure):** When the cause is not really substantiated it is called Uplambha. When Prakara,asama fallacy are denied it is called Uplambha.
Parihra (Avoidance of defect): The rejection of Upâlambha is called parihra. For e.g.

The immortal soul shows signs of life when it is in the body. When the life is gone there is no sign of it. Therefore soul is different from life. Here Prakara,asama fallacy is solved. So it is Parihra.

Pratijuhini (abandonment of a proposition): When the first claim is rejected with opposite illustrations, it is called Pratijuhini. For example, the first debater argues that man is immortal and when the opponent denies his claim through arguments he tries to give up his own declaration this come under the category of Pratijuhini

Abhyanuja (Admission): When likes and dislikes are received in argument with same attitudes it is called admission or abhyanuja.

Hetvantara (Shifting the reason): When the cause of two different things are described.

For e.g. the cause of mischievous illustrated simultaneously it is called Hetvantara or shifting the reason.
**Arthântara (shifting the topic):** When there is further implication in the same statement, it is called Arthântara.

**Nigrahasthâna (Point of defeat):** The position to be defeated is called Nigrahasthâna.

When one has to repeat three times what he has to establish and still the hearers do not understand what he intends it is Nigrahasthâna. Pratijñâti, Abhyanuja, Kalâtâta, Athetu, Nyâsa, Vyârtha, Anarthaka, Punarukta, Viruddha, Hétvántara and Anarthanthara also come under this point of defeat.  

Thus the debate of the doctors must be based on Ayurveda. But here, everything is explained and described with examples and illustrations. Every word must be uttered with all these views in mind. Foolish, unscientific, irrational illogical, tragic, meaningless and useless expressions must not be presented with reason. The normative and rational use of debates, increases the power of reasoning. So the debate is meaningful and reasonable. It will also be beneficial in the process of treatment.
The Êtmavidya as rightly pointed out by Dr. S.C Vidyabhusana, gave rise to the

Ênekaïike the science of enquiry. The Ênekaïike was recognized identical with the

Êtmavidya. But in the real sense Ênekaïike was a separate branch of knowledge.

Kauïîlya recognized it quite distinct from all other branches of knowledge. But in the
course of development, this branch of knowledge could take a definite and distinct
shape upto 1st century B.C.

At about 650 BC, Ênekaïike bifurcate into the science of soul and the science
of reasoning. From this bifurcation later on evolved darjana and Ênekaïike (logic).

In about 327 BC. Kauïîlya held Ênekaïike the most useful science for clear
thinking and subtle understanding; hence further modifications were added into it.

For being the science of reasoning it was also called Hetuîîstra or Hetuïîdy; and also
Tarkavidya. It is quite evident from the *Mahabharata* etc. This tarkavidya was later on named as *Nyaya* when Gautama *Sutra* came into being.

The writers of *Enkevikevidya* are apprehended as the following:

**Brhaspati** (C.650.BC) the exponent of *Cauruka* system. He was the propounder of materialist school of philosophy and was the great pioneer of materialistic realism. He used *Enkevike* in support of eliminating the metaphysical speculations.

**Kapila** (C. 650-575 BC) took *Enkevike* to propound his famous doctrine of Puruṣa and Prakṛti.

**Dattatreya** (C. 650 BC), is considered some what junior to Kapila. From the *Mṛkṣeyapurāṇa*, it is evident that he propounded *Enkevikevidya* to support the conceptions of soul according to his philosophy of Yoga.
Punarvasu Etreyā (C.550 BC) is a reference in CS about a logician namely Punarvasu Etreyā who was well versed in Ēnvēkāike.

Sulabhī (C. 550 - 500 BC) was a lady ascetic and her speeches were supported by reasonable arguments based on Ēnvēkāike.

Āṅgīvakra (C. 650-500 BC) was a mighty debater. He was well-versed in rhetoric and very careful in interpreting the language of opponents in accordance with his own aim of arguments. Ēnvēkāikevidyā was much applauded at the hands of Āṅgīvakra.

Medhātithi Gautama (C. 550, BC) is considered to be the founder of Ēnvēkāike par excellence. His name is mentioned in the R̤miya, a, The Mahābhārata etc.

The centre of Ēnvēkāike is mainly considered in the debate conferences, which were very much prevalent in the ancient time. Public debate, at that time, was the only source for the reconciliation of mutual differences and ascertainment of the truth.
Another cause for the widespread popularity of this debate system was also the patronizing attitude of the rulers of the area. Under the partnership of the state rule Hetuvidyā or the science of reasoning was regarded in high ranks at that time.

The logical science in ancient India was Nyāya. They learn the universe, with the aid of reason. In Nyāyadarśana, perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony are means for attaining valid knowledge. Nyāyadarśana puts forward the theories of the structure of the universe. It rejects God and the infallibility of the Vedas.

According to Stcherbatsky Nyāyadarśana was formed from the study of the common debates and their complexities. That is why they are known in other names like Hetuvidya, Hetu-jīstra, Tarka-jīstra, and Pramana-jīstra and Ėnvēkāikē. In other words the logical science of ancient India is known as Nyāya.
The founder of Nyāyadarśana is Gautama. He is also known as Akāśapāda. Dr. Vidyabhusana is of opinion that Gautama and Akāśapāda are not one and the same person, and they two have their own contributions to Nyāyadarśana. But other scholars do not agree with this statement. Perhaps the clan name might be Gautama and the real name might be Akāśapāda. There is no historical evidence of his life, life time and biography. Some scholars presume that he lived in the period of the Mahabhārata. It is also believed that he lived in the sixth century BC. According to Jacobi, the NS of Gautama was composed in the second century BC. Many common principles of Nyāyadarśana were relevant even before Gautama. According to Dr. S.C. Vidyabhusana, Gautama as the founder of Nyāya darśana was different from the author of NS. He declares that the founder of Nyāyadarśana might be Medhatithi Gautama of 5th century BC and the author of NS, the first systematic work of Nyāya is to be considered as Akāśapāda Gautama. These ideas, transmitted and spread through
centuries, were codified in sūtra form in the first or second century AD by 'Ākāśapida
Gautama'.

Gautama made a constructive form to Nyāyadāśana in aphormatic style. After
his effort there was a long series of systematic works on Nyāyadāśana. The contents
and extracts of systematic arrangements of Nyāyadāśana will be discussed in the next
chapter.

Notes:

1. Swami Jagdīśa Saraswathi, Īgvedasamhita, Samskara Prakasan, Delhi, 2000,
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2. Ibid., p. 171, 2.12.1

3. Ibid., p. 701, X.37.6
4. Ibid., p.172, 2.12.5

5. Ibid., p.139, 1.164.6

6. Ibid., p.171, 2.12.1
7. Ibid., p. 171, 2.12.1

8. Patric ollivelle, *The early Upaniṣads*, Annotated text and Translation,

9. Ibid., Bzh. p.75, 3.1.1

10. Ibid., 2.1.9, p.60.
11. Ibid., 2.110, p.60.

13. Ibid., IV.3.6, p.110.

14. Ibid., 11.4.12, p.60.
15. Ibid., 11.4.13, pp. 68-70.
16. Ibid., KenopaniAd, 1.1, p.364.
17. Ibid., PrinopaniAad, p.456.

18. Ibid., p.458, 1.1

19. Maurice Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature; Vol.I, Translator,


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23. Ibid., p.1513.


26. M.N. Dutt, Mahabharata (Translated in English from Original Sanskrit Text)

Vol. II, Parimal Publications, Delhi, 1994,

Vanaparva, p. 194.

27. Ibid., (Vol. I) Sabhaiparva, p. 413.


33. Ibid., *Strasthna*, n.2, p.86.

34. Ibid., n.5, p.87.
35. Ibid., n.6, Ibid., n.7

36. Ibid., n.7.
37. Ibid., n.14-5, p.89.

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38. Ibid., n.17.
39. Ibid., n.8-9.

39. Ibid., n.11-18.

39. Ibid., p.90.
41. Ibid., n.23.

42. Ibid., n.24.

43. Ibid., n.25.

44. Ibid., Vimśastīṣṭa 8th Adhyaya p.245.
45. Ibid., 8.5, p.248.

46. Ibid., 8.7.

47. Ibid., 8.14, p.258.
48. Ibid., 8.15, p.258.

49. Ibid., 8.17, p.261.

50. Ibid., 8.22, p.264.
51. Ibid., 8.23, p.264.

52. Ibid., 8.24, pp.264-265.
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Ibid., 8.25, p.265.

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55. Ibid., 8.27, p.266.

56. Ibid., 8.28, p.267.

57. Ibid., 8.30, p.268.
62. Ibid., 8.43, p.274.

63. Ibid., 8.47, p.275.

64. Ibid., 8.51, p.277.

65. Ibid., 8.53, p.278.

67. Ibid., 8.65, p.283.

68. Ibid., 8.66, p.283.
69. Ibid., 8.67, p.284.

70. Ibid., 8.68, p.284.
Ibid., 8.69, p.285.

Ibid., 8.76, p.287.
73. Ibid., 8.79, p.288.

74. See, Bharatiya Cinta, p.212.