CHAPTER II

ATTITUDE AND ADJUSTMENT

The purpose of the present chapter is to assess and evaluate the relationship between attitudes and adjustment. These two, being essential to the study of human behaviour, constitute the central problems of psychological researches. But the relevant psychological literature is replete with divergent views and modes of attack regarding these two terms, especially the attitudes. It is proposed to analyse the two terms separately in order to locate their common boundaries and finally to establish their mutual relationship. We shall start with attitude, tracing its origin, examining the meanings which have been assigned to it and finally reaching the most suitable definition of the term. The same scheme of analysis will be followed for adjustment. Finally, the relationship between attitude and adjustment will be discussed.

Attitudes:

More than one meaning have usually been assigned to the term attitude. It has been derived from the Latin word APTUS, meaning
'fitness'. It connotes a mental state of preparation for action and in this sense it is analogous to its bys-form aptitude. At one time it was used in Fine Arts to designate the bodily position of the figures in painting. In psychology we have "MENTAL ATTITUDES" and "MOTOR ATTITUDES". History tells us that 1 Mentalistic viewpoint appeared earlier on the horizon of psychology than the Response point of view, so it is natural to assume that mental attitudes were given recognition earlier than motor attitudes. Spencer was probably the earliest among the philosophers to recognise the term. He writes: 2

"Arriving at correct judgements on disputed questions, much depends on the attitude of mind we preserve while listening to, or taking part in the controversy; and for the preservation of the right attitude it is essential that we should learn how true, and yet how untrue, are average human beliefs."

That was the time when mentalistic psychology was prevailing over other trends of thought and in 1868 Bain 3 shared Spencer's belief, which is evident by what he said:

"The forces of the mind may have got into a set track or attitude, opposing a certain resistance as when some one subject engrosses our attention, so that even during a break in the actual current of the thoughts other subjects are not entertained."

Psychology gradually dropped the exclusively mentalistic point of view and this gave rise to the popularity of motor attitudes. In 1888 Lange developed his motor theory of perception in which he suggested that perception was a consequence of muscular preparation. 4
In 1889 Munsterburg put forward his action theory of attention in which emphasis was laid on the role of 'Motor Attitudes'. The theories of Munsterburg and Lange came nearly at the same time. These two psychologists duly recognized the importance of attitudes, but both differed in their approach towards the term. Notwithstanding their differences, however, both of them believed in motor attitudes. Ferre, in 1890, maintained that the determining condition of selective consciousness was a balanced condition of tension in the muscles of the individual. It may be noted here that the concept of attitude, at that time, was rapidly gaining physiological orientation. In fact psychology itself was becoming more interested in seeking the help of physiological phenomena to define various forms of behaviour. In 1895 Baldwin proposed motor attitudes as the basic and fundamental approach for studying emotion.

The recognition of attitude as an important variable of experimental situations dates back to 1888, when reaction-time experiments were conducted by L. Lange. He observed that conscious attention to a stimulus was an important factor in diminishing the reaction-time of the subject. This variable Aufgabe, that is task-attitude, was later on considered to play a vital part in nearly all psychological experiments such as reaction-time, perception, recall, thought, etc. The task-attitude or subject's preparedness, was designated by numerous technical expressions. In Germany, where most of the experimental work was done, the following terms were coined to represent the 'mental' and
'motor' "Set" of the subject, e.g.

ABSICHT - Meaning Conscious Purpose.

EINSTELLUNG - Roughly equivalent to 'Set'.

DETERMINIERENDE TENDENZ - (Any disposition which brings in its train the spontaneous appearance of a determined idea).

BEWUSSTSEINSLAGEN - (The posture of consciousness).

Thus we find that though various terms were being used by the psychologists yet the central idea was the same - they all implied mental or motor sets or attitudes. This started a controversy regarding the role played by attitudes and their relation with consciousness.

The WÜRZBURG School held that attitudes were neither sensation, nor any combination of these states. Kulpe, trained in Wundt's methods, suggested that a subject's behaviour in the experimental situation depended not only upon elements in his consciousness but also on adjustments or attitudes, which might operate decisively although they might not be available for introspective analysis. Titchener argued that the factors which condition volitional processes might be either conscious or unconscious. Kulpe's doctrine gave an impetus to the experimental study of both conscious and unconscious aspects of attitudes. Marbe, an adherent of the Würzburg School in Germany to which Kulpe also belonged, suggested that BEWUSSTSEINSLAGEN (roughly translated as "Conscious Attitudes") was among the factors which
influenced volitional processes.\textsuperscript{10} \textsuperscript{10} Watt concluded that \textit{Aufgabe} (Task-attitude) exercised a controlling influence upon acts of thought or judgement and it might not be present in consciousness.\textsuperscript{11} \textsuperscript{11} Ach, in the course of his analysis of the process by which decisions were made, came to the conclusion that in addition to attitudes many other predispositions lying outside consciousness, controlled the course of thought.\textsuperscript{12} \textsuperscript{12} Ach gave the name "Determining Tendencies" to the agencies important in the process of volition.

Wundt considered attitudes to be intimately related to feelings. He believed that attitude was a blend of strivings and excitement. Titchener held the following view:

"Behind everything lies a cortical set, a nervous bias, perhaps inherited and permanent, perhaps acquired and temporary. This background may not appear in consciousness at all; or it may appear as a vague, conscious attitude (passive imagination), or as a more or less definite plan, aim, ambition, intention (active imagination). Whether conscious or not, the nervous disposition determines the course of consciousness."\textsuperscript{13} \textsuperscript{13}

Clarke, a student of Titchener, found that the representation of attitudes in consciousness is done through imagery, sensation and affection.\textsuperscript{14} \textsuperscript{14}

We have so far emphasised the conscious aspect of attitudes. Let us now consider unconscious aspect of attitudes as well. The persistence of attitudes which are totally unconscious was demonstrated by Muller and Filzecker, who called it 'perservation'.\textsuperscript{15} \textsuperscript{15} Gestalt psychologists also supported unconscious aspects of attitudes. The
tendency of the subject to slip into some frame of mind, peculiar to the individual, led Koffka to postulate "latent attitudes". 16

We find attitude being nursed in the lap of experimental psychology but it was adopted by other fields of psychology as well as in allied social disciplines. In Sociology this term (attitude) was borrowed by Giddings to emphasize the role played by attitudes in social understanding. 17 Orth, a follower of the Wurzburg School of Psychology, used this term to explain the part played by the mental state of the individual in carrying out an action. 18 The term attitude was introduced in American Social Psychology by Thomas and Znanieckie. 19 These investigators were interested in the study of the adjustment of the Polish Peasants to the changed social environment. They perceived the problem in terms of the substitution of new values for the old ones, consequently its main feature was a 'state of mind' of the individual towards a value, hence the wide variety of views it must have incorporated and the diverging modes of attack it must have adopted. Now, if we start examining the various definitions, given by psychologists and sociologists, it will be an uphill task. In order to minimise the labour, the various types of definitions are categorised and classified, in the discussion that follows.

"An attitude is readiness for attention or action of definite sort." 20 Washburn 21 like Baldwin, identifies an attitude with motor set. At that time psychologists emphasised the importance of
muscular tonicity in determining the content of consciousness and the response of the individual. This definition considers only that aspect of attitude which is evident prior to an action. More specifically these writers thought that the attitude was preparatory muscular activity. Such a definition reduces the term attitude to motor level thus depriving it of its mental counterpart. Allport (F.H.) seems to be in partial agreement with this view. About the subject who was given suggestion under hypnosis and was later released, he observed:

"The motor set thus built up by suggestion, we may call an attitude. In everyday life, attitudes are built up in similar fashion. . . . Examples of this sort involve a preparatory setting of the synapses at the motor centres and possibly increases tonicity of the muscles to be employed in carrying out the line of behaviour suggested."22

According to him public opinion is formulated in this way through individual attitudes, which are built upon a motor set - "preparatory setting of the synapses."

According to this viewpoint an attitude is an organic state of readiness which consists of neuromuscular adjustments, of preparations for response set up in the neuromuscular system of the individual. The development of neuromuscular adjustment is attributed to the interstimulation of individuals. Each individual reacts to another person and the outcome is the development of a set of attitudes of one individual towards the other and vice versa. It is further argued that
it is the neuromuscular set, preparation for response, that constitutes the attitude proper.

Allport's neuromuscular set is a hypothetical construct which cannot be experimentally verified. It also fails to inform us about the type of set formed and the function of the set. Does the neuromuscular set, once formed, continue to assert its influence or is extinguished immediately, or for each attitude a new set is formed? Such questions are not satisfactorily answered, rather they are left to the speculation of the reader.

Allport's view that attitude is a latent response is very similar to Dewey's who holds that an attitude is latent and requires positive stimulation to issue in action. Dewey has made attitudes and habits synonymous terms and points out that under certain conditions attitudes may be considered as subshed forms of habit. According to him a habit is an acquired predisposition to a way of response but not to a particular act except insofar as it expresses a way of behaving. In this sense the term attitude becomes limited to a special case of predisposition.

We all know that habits are more specific in their dependence upon the stimulus and it is also beyond any doubt that habits are more unvarying in their expression. Further, habits lack direction and direction is the chief characteristic of attitude. By direction is meant the accompanying feeling of like or dislike, favour or disfavour.
Tuttle, while discriminating between habits and attitudes, reserves the term attitude for a 'set' or an anticipated result.\textsuperscript{25} Parks distinguishes attitude from habit or any other form of behaviour in so far as it is an "incompleted act", which involves tension even when latent. Attitude is further described as an "index of the tendency and intention" of an individual, "communicable" and under proper conditions "contagious".\textsuperscript{26}

Parks seems to be influenced by Lundberg to whom "an attitude denotes the general set of the organism as a whole which calls for adjustment."\textsuperscript{27}

Let us accept, for argument's sake, that attitudes are "incompleted acts" involving tension even when latent. These definitions do not furnish any information as regards the fate of attitude when the act is completed and the accompanying tension is released. These definitions fail to explain the function of attitude when adjustment is made to a situation. They attribute a temporary state of organic readiness to attitudes. It is difficult to accept such a characteristic of attitude. First, the state of readiness is not entirely organic, secondly it is not temporary as has been suggested. In the pages which follow it has been shown that the state of readiness is enduring and this very quality differentiates an attitude from other forms of readiness or dispositions.

Psychologists do not seem to accept organic definitions which
neglect the mental counterpart of attitudes. Some writers regard it as 'neural sets' which in some cases may be as definite as a physical posture or muscular contraction while in other cases it may remain diffused and non-identifiable. Bernard suggests that identifiable bodily sets may be called "neuro-muscular attitudes" while the more diffused mental sets may be termed as "neuropsychic attitudes". The neuro-muscular attitudes have already been discussed and now we proceed to examine the neuropsychic ones.

Warren probably advocates neuropsychic attitude as is evident from his following suggestion:

"When a certain type of experience is constantly repeated, a change of set is brought about which affects many central neurons and tends to spread over other parts of the central nervous system. These changes in the general set of the central nervous system tamper the process of reception... In terms of the subjective mental life these general sets are called attitudes."

The dissimilarity between Warren's view and that of the advocates of 'motor set' is basically very great but they are in agreement in accepting attitude as acquired disposition. The most important aspect of Warren's definition is his recognition of attitude universe which consists of varied and separate sets that are formed to differentiate one type of attitude from the other. However, his concept of attitude bears a mentalistic label, because he believes that:

"Attitude is the specific mental disposition towards an incoming (or arising) experience, whereby that experience is modified, or a condition of readiness obtains for a certain type of activity."
It is generally believed that "the readiness for a certain type of activity" provokes behaviour that is favourable or unfavourable, positive or negative. This concept of double polarity is thought to give direction to and is the most distinctive feature of attitudes. There are many who stress the concept of double polarity and Bogardus is prominent among them. He proposes that:

"An attitude is a tendency to act toward or against some environmental factor which becomes thereby a positive or negative value."31

According to Bogardus an attitude is a tendency to overt action.

"The distinguishing evidence of an attitude is behaviour. With no behaviour evident, no attitude can be claimed." In explaining his concept Bogardus has omitted the consideration of "tendency" and tells nothing about its latent or dormant aspect which may affect the resulting behaviour before it is made observable.

He considers attitude in relation to the configuration of the entire personality. The behaviour pattern, for him, is the counterpart of the stimulus object and attitude is its meaning. "When a natural object acquires a meaning it becomes a value. An object without meaning, in other words, has no value: it is a 'bare entity'".32

Regarding the relationship between attitudes and values it must be realised that attitudes are as numerous and heterogeneous as the situations which give rise to them. (It is the influence of the values that shapes our attitudes, consequently the deviation of attitudes from
the influence of values may not be adequately studied until and
unless the underlying tendency is fully accounted for). More precisely
the role of the "tendency" in accepting or rejecting or influencing va-
values is vital which, in turn, remains at the root of attitudes. The
term "tendency" has been defined by many but again in differing ways.
Droba has given a place, in his definition, to tendency which he calls
'mental disposition'. He states that

"An attitude is a mental disposition of the human
individual to act for or against a definite object."

He groups attitudes according to their object of reference, according
to their individual or social significance and according to their posi-
tive and negative direction. Apparently there seems no harm in accepting
attitudes as mental dispositions but it must be borne in mind that there
are other mental dispositions which may be confused with attitudes.
Every mental disposition cannot be called an attitude, for example,
traits have been interpreted as attitudes which is a fallacious notion.
Traits, like attitudes, have been defined as determining tendencies. A
determining tendency is a condition of readiness to respond. Dorba
differentiates traits from attitudes and points out that

"An attitude has a definite object of reference, while
a trait has a very vague object of reference or it has
none at all. Honesty, aggressiveness and trustworthi-
ness are traits because the object to which they refer
has a very wide range and hence is very vague. Radicalism,
militarism and liberalism, are attitudes because they refer to definite objects, races, war and social changes
respectively."
Similarly Allport (F.H.) distinguishes a trait from an attitude and defines a trait as follows:

"By trait I mean a unique and important habit which an individual has acquired as a constant manner of adjusting himself to numerous situations differing widely in character." 34

A trait, then, is an individual's personal and unique way of responding to the circumstances of his life and it has very little reference to objects. At this point it must also be made clear that in certain cases this distinction cannot be rigidly maintained. It is often debated whether radicalism or extroversion-introversion is a trait or an attitude. The distinction often fails to yield fruitful results and it is difficult to maintain a sharp distinction between the two, if we hold the view already expressed. It may be very helpful to take into account Allport's principles which suggest that

"The more generalized the attitude becomes the more it resembles a trait." 35

Murphy and Murphy also support the double polarity concept. They advocate that

"The attitude is primarily a way of being 'set' toward or against things." 36

They regard attitudes as tendencies, dispositions, or adjustments towards certain acts. These tendencies or dispositions are either
verbalised or verballisable. Tendencies do not relate primarily to the past or present but, as a rule, remain more inclined towards the future. Attitudes are then predictors of future response. The stimulus or stimulus situations, then, have no part to play in eliciting responses. If we set aside the consideration of stimulus situations, then an attitude will be an inherited tendency to respond to situations irrespective of the character of the situation and more dependent on the type of inherited tendency to respond.

Doob has suggested a behaviouristic approach to the study of attitudes. He defines attitude as an "implicit, drive-producing response considered socially significant in the individual's society." By an implicit response he means a response occurring within the individual which may not be immediately observable to an outsider. According to him an attitude refers to the individual's immediate but implicit response to a stimulus pattern and his consequent tendency to respond still further as a result of that implicit response. He further argues that an implicit response is both 'anticipatory' and 'mediating' in reference to patterns of overt response. But Doob's concept of 'anticipatory response' is based on Hull's 'antecedent response,' which states that a rewarded response is reinforced so that it occurs before its 'original time in the response series.' The anticipatory character of an attitude indicates its temporal relation to a goal while the mediating attribute draws our attention to its functional connection with that goal. The mediating function of attitude led May to argue that attitude
"a kind of substitute goal response" which "arises when the goal response cannot be immediately and easily made". 40

This attribute has also been suggested by other writers. 41, 42 However, all attitudes cannot be thus classified especially if Doob's view is analysed which emphasises that overt behaviour may be mediated by attitudes almost immediately and there need not necessarily be a conflict or a restraint before the attitude is evoked. Doob's view has many inconsistencies which Chess 43 has critically examined. The important ones among them are given below:

a. Attitudes may pertain to matters socially significant or insignificant.

b. Doob writes that "the individual ... may not express his attitude in overt behaviour because its expression would be contrary to his general philosophy; but his attitude persists". 44 Doob has explained an attitude in terms of S-R, and holds that it (attitude) is itself not merely a response, but also a stimulus which may evoke any one variety of learned responses. A response occurs and is gone, it does not persist. An attitude if persists, cannot be a response. Moreover, in terms of S-R, a stimulus immediately precedes the response. The persistence of response does not lie within the framework of S-R formula.

c. He considers attitude as an established stimulus-response 'bond' and in such a case attitude more closely resembles habit and finally loses its property of response.

Now we come to the last classification in which attitudes are explained and discussed as a frame of reference. Most of the sociological
theories fall into this category.

Morgan advocates that "Attitudes are literally mental postures, guides for conduct to which each new experience is referred before a response is made."\textsuperscript{45} Krueger and Reckless, like Morgan state that

"An attitude, roughly, is a residuum of experience, by which further activity is conditioned and controlled ... We may think of attitudes as acquired tendencies to act in specific ways towards objects."\textsuperscript{45}

Attitudes are then conscious acts, because a conscious act is intentional. Faris defines an attitude as "a tendency to act", which is the determining force of the course of behaviour.\textsuperscript{47} In explaining the nature of attitudes, Faris states that it is an "acquired predisposition to ways or modes of response, not to a particular act except as under special conditions these express a way of behaving."\textsuperscript{49}

An attitude is a subjective state whereas a conscious act is the realisation of an attitude in action.\textsuperscript{49} Further, attitudes are not merely constant dispositions to repeat precisely the same act in the same way when the same stimulus recurs in an old or a new context.

Symonds\textsuperscript{50} has mentioned seven common meanings of the term and the most prevalent meaning attached to it, according to Bain, is the 'Neural Set' or 'Readiness to Adjust'.\textsuperscript{51} Bernard\textsuperscript{52} likes to add "the preparatory movement or partial adjustment" to this prevalent use, that is, neural set.

Reviewing representative definitions of attitudes, Allport (G.W.)
concludes that "the essential feature of attitude is a preparation or readiness for response".\textsuperscript{53} In his own definition of attitude he considers an attitude as "a mental and neural state of readiness, organised through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations to which it is related."\textsuperscript{54}

It is quite true that attitudes have a directive and dynamic influence upon the individual's response and they are organised through experience. It is also beyond any doubt that attitudes are 'states of readiness' but it is doubtful whether the 'state of readiness' is neural. Neural state of readiness, if it is believed to exist, cannot be experimentally verified. The second important question which this concept raises is the nature of the neural connections made during the formation of attitudes. There remains nothing of the ambiguity as far as we accept that a mental state of readiness is the disposition of the individual to react in a particular way to objects. Such a disposition can very well be tested in the laboratory or in any other controlled situation.

Cantril has eliminated the 'neural state of readiness' from his definition of attitude. He writes that

"attitude is a more or less permanently enduring state of readiness of mental organisation which predisposes an individual to react in a characteristic way to any object or situation with which it is related."\textsuperscript{55}
His recognition that attitude is an 'enduring state of readiness' helps in distinguishing attitude from other forms of disposition or readiness which are not as enduring. Again, a state of readiness is a general term, but an attitude refers to specific cases of readiness. Later, Cantril in collaboration with Sherif has modified his concept of the term (attitude) and proposes that the essential feature of an attitude is a 'functional state of readiness.' They write:

"In all the representative definitions or characterisations of attitudes, one feature is common to them all; that an attitude, whatever else it may be, denotes a functional state of readiness which determines the organism to react in a characteristic way to certain stimuli or stimulus situations."56

Attitudes are thus inferred from the responses which individuals make to stimulus situations. Sherif's statement assumes that a 'state of readiness' and 'stimulus situations' are functionally related and the response is the outcome of this relationship. Sherif and Cantril57 have proposed the following five important properties of attitudes:

a. **Attitudes imply a subject-object relationship:**

Attitudes always involve the relation of the individual to specific situations in his environment. The specific situations may be OBJECTS, such as one's pen, home, some particular hotel; PERSONS such as a friend, a teacher, boss, father, etc.; GROUPS such as a football team, class-mates, the community; INSTITUTIONS such as a university, school, club, or "socially established and standardised
concepts, values or norms," such as communism or democracy, flag of
a country etc.

b. **Attitudes are learned:**

Such subject-object relationships are not biological heritage
of individuals or innate qualities but are formed in relation to
objects, persons and values or are acquired. It implies that the
individual is required to come in contact with persons, objects, values
towards whom the attitudes are in the process of formation. By coming
in contact is not meant the physical contact of the individual with
objects. The contact may be brought about in any form in which the
individual is exposed to the situations. In many cases short-cut
verbal judgements bring things in contact with the individual.

c. **Attitudes have affective properties:**

Attitudes are usually held in connection with values (such
as nation, church, a religion or a race, caste or creed) and are
bound up with an individual's role and status in the community or
social group of which he is a member.

Surrounded by such situations the individual often reacts
emotionally. Most of the attitudes are outcome of prevalent values
in the group. This very property of attitudes was interpreted by the
Behaviourists as implicit response.
d. **Attitudes are relatively enduring states of readiness:**

Attitudes are not momentary states of readiness. Hunger is also a sort of readiness to take food, but the state of readiness comes to an end as soon as hunger is satiated. Let us consider a hungry Bengali gentleman. He may eat bread, but after being relieved of the pangs of hunger he may curse himself even apprehend digestive disorder. Give him a plate of fish and he will continue eating and praising it even after he has overeaten himself. "Attitudes tend to persist because of their cognitive quality" and they are enduring because they are learned.

e. **Attitudes are as numerous and as varied as the stimuli to which they refer:**

Allport writes that "an attitude characteristically provokes behaviour that is acquisitive or avertive, favourable or unfavourable, affirmative or negative toward the object or class of objects with which it is related."58

Bogardus states that "attitudes are as numerous as the objects to which a person responds."59 Thus attitudes are particular tendencies of the individual to make characteristic responses in particular situations. Let us now proceed to discuss the meaning of the term Adjustment.

**Adjustment:**

The term adjustment has a wide variety of meanings. In law
courts it is used in the sense of settlement of property disputes. A mechanic uses it to denote simple changes made in machines, such as manipulating a screw or a bolt. Biologists use it to define and explain the evolutionary processes. The origin of this term in psychology is very well phrased by Sarbin. He writes

"Borrowed from juristics by mechanics, adapted to biology, and finally taken over by psychology, the history of the term adjustment is one of accretion of meanings."50

In the 19th century the theory of evolution was advanced by Darwin and the concept of evolution was strongly supported by Huxley and Spencer. In his 'Struggle for Existence,' Darwin pointed out that organisms suitably equipped to adapt themselves to the demands of their environment are most likely to survive. In this sense adjustment meant the process of survival. More precisely, it was suggested that responses which have survival value constitute adjustment. The most important consideration in this connection was the relation of the organism to its environment. Spencer stressed to the fullest extent the idea of the relationship between the organism and his environment. He defined life as

"the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations."51

He further argued that as we go higher in the evolutionary scale the complexity of the relations existing between the organism and its
environment increases. The relation of the ameba to its environment will be comparatively less complicated than that of the anthropoid. However, he maintained that at each level of the evolutionary ladder, perfect life consisted of perfect adjustment. As is evident from the above Spencer described adjustment purely in terms of biological responses.

The direct outgrowth of evolutionists’ writings was the Functional School of Psychology, supported by Dewey, Carr and Angell. This school did not add much to Spencer’s concept of adjustment. It replaced the biological referent by a cultural one. Thus survival was interpreted as conformity to cultural norms. The biological meaning of adjustment was a progressive modification of the organism to environmental forces. In psychology the modification is evaluated in terms of cultural and social forces. Thus we are made to believe as Hinshaw points out, that

"the term adjustment, apparently, with a slight change in connotation, is the 'adaptation' of evolutionists."62

The term used presently in psychology takes into account the following three important implications:

1. Any adjustment situation involves
   a) an individual or psychological factor
   b) exposed to a social or environmental situation

The solution of the adjustment problem may be brought about by modifying the individual or the environment or both.
2. Adjustment is always related to a specific frame of reference. An individual is labelled as adjusted in terms of his relationship with his family, boss, job, etc.

3. The term adjustment is normative, that is, the adjustment of an individual in any frame of reference is always compared with a standard or a norm.

The norm employed for adjustment by Social Psychologists postulates the minimum of conflict between the individual's behaviour and the existing social institution. Fransworth defines a maladjusted person as an individual

"whose personality includes modes of behaviour .... which deviate so much in degree and mode from the norm of group behaviour that he is socially classified as abnormal and is, therefore, treated in some exceptional manner by society."63

The picture of maladjustment here brings it closer to delinquency and we all know that it exists in varying degrees. In most cases it is often difficult to notice at a glance whether a particular person is adjusted or maladjusted. However, Fransworth's definition makes it clear that the yard-stick of the social psychologist for assessing the maladjustment of an individual is the conformity to the group mores and standards.

Shaffer maintains that "Any response that reduces the drive-tension and thereby brings the activity sequence to an end is a solution of the adjustment."64

The norm proposed by Shaffer's is the biological one. Many
psychologists, especially authors of books on Abnormal Psychology prefer the biological norm to explain and define adjustment. Lens (F) says that an organism is adjusted to its environment, "if its structure and the consequent forms of behaviour secure the maintenance of life in that environment." 55 The biological norm has gained considerable theoretical support from the writings of Goldstein 66 and Rogers 67 who see the individual reacting to his environment as a total organism. Rogers writes:

"It would appear that when all of the ways in which the individual perceives himself ... all perceptions of the qualities, abilities, impulses, and attitudes of the person, and perceptions of himself in relation to others ... are accepted into the organised conscious concept of the self, then this achievement is accompanied by feelings of comfort and freedom from tension which are experienced as psychological adjustment." 58

This is too broad a concept of adjustment which includes nearly all types of behaviour. However, the core of the concept, as seen by the writer, implies that an individual's adjustment reflects how well he gets along with himself and his environment.

Another norm employed for adjustment is that of integration, which means the harmonious cooperation of various levels of personality. Integration is defined by Young as the "coordinated working of the total organism toward the attainment of some end, goal or purpose." 69 Stagner defines integration as consistency of response. 70 According to Burnham, the function of integration is to cope with the conflicting
tendencies, imposed by the situation on the individual. If the individual succeeds in resolving the conflicts in a manner which is satisfying to him as well as suits the situation, then he may be thought to have made adjustment to the situation. Maladjustment on the other hand reflects disharmony resulting from opposing conflicts and tendencies. Fisher and Hanna argue that adjustment in everyday life means harmonious relations between the individual and the environment. The environment includes not only the physical objects but such things as his friends, boss, relatives, work, etc. More simply stated, those objects constitute the individual's environment with whom he constantly interacts.

In the various definitions reviewed above we have observed that adjustment implies absence of tension or conflict and consistency or unity of various levels of personality. Absence of conflict and integration of purposes, added together, denote the adjustment of an individual. Rogers and Wallin characterise a well-adjusted individual as one whose needs are being satisfied to a reasonable degree and in a reasonably direct fashion with a minimum of conflict between motives and a maximum of integrated purposes; whereas the individual whose needs are blocked and who uses more elaborate or devious devices in an attempt to satisfy his needs is maladjusted.

Every living organism is characterised by the presence of tension which we call needs, drives or motives. A drive is a state of disequilibrium of the organism. Every organism strives to restore and to reduce tensions that promote disequilibrium, and to satisfy
its wants. During early childhood the organism's chief concern is the satisfaction of the biogenic needs. Through inter-personal stimulation and response the biological organism is changed into biosocial individual. During the course of such an inter-action the individual learns to adjust himself to the action of others. He learns to conform to the patterns of behaviour designed by his environment. His environment sets up levels of needs and suggests the ways and means to achieve them. The combination of needs may be unique for each and every individual, rather it depends on such important variables as the home, family, education, etc., of the individual. The accumulation of needs and the means adapted to satisfy them, often produce tension in the individual. An individual's happiness depends upon the extent to which he succeeds in minimizing tension and satisfying his needs. But there are many hurdles which block the individuals' chances of achieving happiness. The satisfaction of one need often frustrates the satisfaction of another. This is called internal conflict which generates frustration and unhappiness. So we may say that "the best-adjusted man is he who can deal with his obstacles and conflicts in the way which is most satisfying and productive in the long run". The evidence clearly supports that "the goal of adjustment is satisfaction." 

Vitaica has very precisely defined adjustment and incorporated nearly all the aspects of satisfaction. He proposes three criteria for adjustment. According to him

"adjustment demands a proper balance in the 'total situation'"
Different people perceive the same situation in different ways.

"A situation can have meaning to the individual if he can relate it to his purposes through past experiences. Purposes and past experiences are both known to play a part in perceptual processes."  

If the individual and social purposes are important determinants of perception then the differences in the evaluation of a social situation does not depend merely on conscious judgement and interpretation. The relationship between stimulus situations and attitudes has already been discussed. It may be mentioned here that the most influential variable in perceptual processes is attitude of the perceiver. Many researches have shown that the perception of ambiguous stimuli primarily reflects the needs and attitudes of the perceiver.  

Bruner and Goodman, McClelland and Atkinson, Sanford and many others have found that even well-structured stimuli are perceived in symptomatically distorted fashion – the distortion being brought about by associated needs and attitudes.

Another important fact to be taken into account is that employees work to satisfy their needs. Needs are accompanied by tension, which is released when they are gratified. It has also been confirmed by researches that social and emotional needs are important
functions of work. The worker feels satisfied with his job to
the extent to which job serves to satisfy his needs. Need satis-
faction, then, is the hall-mark of the individual's adjustment to
his job. The employee's satisfaction with his job is his judg-
ment or his subjective feeling regarding the gratification of his
needs. In the course of gratifying the needs he develops likes
towards those aspects which are more conducive to his satisfaction
and dislikes to those aspects which thwart him in his pursuits.

Satisfying and thwarting work experiences generate likes and
dislikes for the causative stimuli, that is, persons, materials and
situations. These experiences, undoubtedly, are responsible for
developing attitudes. As satisfactions result in generating likes
they become the basis of favourable attitude formation and vice versa.
These attitudes once formed contribute to still more satisfaction
from similar experiences. Thus in terms of worker's satisfaction,
these two terms, attitudes and adjustment, supplement each other.

Adjustment is made in relation to persons and situations. The
first stage in adjustment is obviously the perceptual stage. As
needs and attitudes influence perceptual processes it is natural to
assume that they (needs and attitudes) influence the process of
adjustment. After being satisfied needs cease to exert directive
influences but attitudes, being relatively enduring, continue to
operate.

An attitude involves state of readiness, which guides our
activities. More precisely it is a precondition of an activity or a preparatory stage. Being preparatory it is always ready to issue the action, directing the course of action to follow a certain pattern towards a particular situation. The intent to action is the attitude, but the actual performance of the activity is adjustment. When the intent to carry out an action towards an object, value or situation is favourable, the execution of that action is satisfying to the individual and the individual may be said to have made proper adjustment.

It means that attitudes are the foundations of every adjustment situation. On them is erected the massive structure of adjustment. Naturally, the future of this building depends on the strength of the foundation. We may, therefore, conclude that the stronger the attitudinal foundation the stabler, more grand and stronger the adjustmental structure. More technically speaking attitudes and adjustment are the two processes of the same psychological continuum.

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