CHAPTER I

EVOLUTION FROM DISARMAMENT TO ARMS CONTROL

Instinct for violence, aggression, exercising authority over others have been innate in human nature. Reliance upon the threat or use of physical violence as the main instrument of influencing the behaviour of neighbouring groups has constituted a permanent feature. As the size of the group controlling the instruments of violence increased so did the destructiveness of these instruments; thus by the mid-twentieth century, that group was the national state and its tools included nuclear warheads, intercontinental missiles, biological weapons etc. The acquisition of armaments has generally given rise to the desire for the absence, reduction or elimination of such capabilities. The considerations affecting decisions to arm and disarm are almost interdependent.


Needless to say that mankind has never been faced with such "an unprecedented threat of self-destruction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons" as today. The available stockpile of nuclear weapons is more than sufficient to annihilate all forms of life on earth. Persistent attempts have therefore been made at disarmament and arms control and to help establish a stable and peaceful international order.

With an advance in weapon-technology from the age of cross-bow to the present day of horrifying weapons, voices have been echoed for its abolition. The use of that technology was, however, abandoned or 'controlled' only when proved unproductive. Before we attempt to trace out the evolution from disarmament to arms control it seems appropriate to briefly analyse the distinction between the disarmament and arms control and then review the efforts made by India and other countries towards nuclear disarmament and arms control.

DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL

Disarmament, is often mistakenly used as a synonym for arms control. Every plan for disarmament or arms control has

a common feature, that it presupposes some form of cooperation or joint action among the military programmes of a certain number of states. Neither cooperation nor joint action can be accomplished because of trail of political differences among the negotiating powers. Yet, the development of modern weapons has forced nations to think over this problem. 4

There are three main factors which concern the question of disarmament. Firstly, it has a political connotation. Every country wants disarmament, but more than that it wants to maintain its sovereignty and retain its freedom of action. The second factor is procedural in nature. How to negotiate, what powers are to be represented and by whom, whether to consider arms control or disarmament as general and complete or piecemeal, and whether it should have precedence over security or not. The third factor is purely technical. It is concerned with the "characteristics of weapons and armed forces, the design of systems of inspection and supervision and the elaboration of administrative machinery". 5 In fact, however, whole problem of disarmament revolves around only the political


5 Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age (London, 1961), p. IX.
consideration.

It is said that the problem of disarmament is the problem of organization of 'world community.' Disarmament means curtailment of armaments that may be unilateral or multilateral, general or local, comprehensive or partial, and controlled or uncontrolled. Arms control on the other hand is a "restraint internationally exercised upon armaments policy, whether in respect of the level of armaments, their character, deployment or use".7

Technically, 'disarmament' involves the reduction or the elimination of armament or armed forces. 'Arms Control' or arms limitation involves limitations on the number or types of armaments or armed forces, on their deployment or disposition, or on the use of particular types of armaments. 'Arms control' also encompasses measures designed to reduce the danger of accidental war or to reduce concern about surprise attack. Post-War negotiations have involved efforts at both 'arms control' and 'disarmament' but most agreements actually concluded have technically been measures at 'arms


7 Bull, n. 5, p. 65. See also Richard B. Foster, "Unilateral Arms Control Measures and Disarmament Negotiations", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol. 6, no. 2, Summer 1962, p. 264.
According to Alva Myrdal, terminology 'disarmament' is used as the generic term, given a larger connotation than 'elimination of armaments', it covers all degrees of reduction of armaments, and it includes the pre-emption of option for further development (non-armament) as well as measures for regulating the production or use of arms quality and quantity. 'Arms limitation' as a more specific term, refers to international agreements or rules in regard to armaments. It has been more appropriately termed as 'regulation of armaments'.

The distinction between 'disarmament' and 'arms control' has varied with time and place. Disarmament usually implies a reduction or abolition of armaments, although it has been used, especially between the World Wars, to denote mere limitation of arms. Arms Control is a more inclusive concept having to do with any regulation or limitation on the construction, maintenance, or use of arms.

From the time of the Baruch Plan to the mid-1950s or early 1960s, the term 'arms control' occasioned in many East-West debates, partially rooted in semantic differences. In Russian as well as in French language, 'control' signifies

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'inspection' or 'checking', without the broader meanings included in English or German. The use of arms control by Western diplomats therefore tended to reinforce Soviet suspicion that the West wished only control over armaments instead of arms reduction. The term 'arms control' was often translated in just this way.

The question of arms control acquired a more definitive form with the signing in Moscow of the US-Soviet treaty on the limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system and the interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. These documents referred to checking the race in strategic offensive armaments and taking effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament. Many military terms are also provided, such as additional fixed landbased ICBM launchers etc.¹⁰

'Arms Control', in the broadest sense, presupposes the continued existence of national military establishments. It does not require radical changes in the present world order because it makes no claim to abolish war. However, the ultimate goal of all peaceful endeavours is to abolish the use of force.

in inter-state relations by eliminating war as an instrument of national policy and — "by building blocks of new political order — could gradually develop, beginning with an effective machinery for keeping and enforcing peace and settling international disputes simultaneously with meaningful, comprehensive arms control measures". ¹¹

Thus it can safely be assumed that arms control is the first stage to general and complete disarmament.

DAWN OF NUCLEAR AGE

The nuclear age can be said to have commenced with the 'Trinity'¹² test at Alamagordo, New Mexico on 6 July 1945 which unveiled gigantic secret from the mysteries of nature to show that if it was used cautiously it could prove to be a blessing for mankind or else it could prove disastrous. A month after the Alamagordo test, the destructive potential was discernible from the catastrophe caused by two nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August 1945. This traumatic experience of the awesome nuclear holocaust was fresh in the memory of mankind when the United Nations (UN) was

¹² This Trinity comprised United States, United Kingdom and Canada.
found on 24 October 1945. It was clearly reflected in the agreed declaration issued in Washington on 15 November 1945 after the meeting of Heads of Government of the Trinity. The declaration took note of the possibilities of international action to prevent the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes, and to promote the use of recent and future advances in scientific knowledge, particularly in the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful and humanitarian ends. It further stated that "with a view to attain the most effective means of entirely eliminating the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes and promoting its widest use for industrial and humanitarian purposes, a Commission should be set up under the United Nations Organisation at the earliest practicable date."14

Though until then the United States was the only nuclear weapon state, but the 'Trinity' had expressed deep concern about future proliferation and the need to devise an international machinery to prevent the use of atomic energy for military purposes. Thus without any fear of exaggeration it can be stated that the idea for the establishment of the UN Atomic Energy Commission is traced back to the Trinity

14 Ibid.
Declaration of 15 November 1945. On 27 December 1945, the three Power (USA, UK and USSR) Foreign Ministers Conference held in Moscow, formally proposed the establishment of such a Commission. With the setting up of the United Nations, the primary concern of the three Great Powers was to control nuclear energy because of the possibility of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The USA was apprehensive that her nuclear monopoly would soon be broken and with the increasing spread of nuclear weapons, international peace and security would again be endangered.

Thus with a view to deal with the problem of nuclear proliferation, the first session of the United Nations, adopted Resolution 1(1) on 24 January 1946, providing for the establishment of the UN Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC). The proposed Commission was to comprise one representative from each of those states represented on the Security Council and Canada, and was made accountable to the UN Security Council. The Commission was under obligation to make specific proposals regarding:

- the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful use between all nations;
- the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful

purposes;

— the elimination of national armaments adaptable for mass destruction, atomic or other;

— effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.\textsuperscript{16}

This resolution was jointly sponsored by the USA, Soviet Union, UK, France and Canada and was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly. On 23 January 1946, the First Committee of the UN General Assembly approved by 46 votes, with one abstention, the establishment of the UNAEC to study the transcendant importance of the security aspect of the problems raised by the discovery of the atomic energy.\textsuperscript{17} The first, second and third reports of the UNAEC primarily focussed attention on “the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes and for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons.”\textsuperscript{18}


\textsuperscript{17} UN Doc. A/C.1/2.

\textsuperscript{18} UN GAOR, First Committee, 1946-49, UN Doc. A/C.1/308, 30 September 1948. Also see, UN Doc. A/C. 1/333, p. 5.
The ongoing struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union influenced the nuclear policy of the two nations. As long as the Soviet Union remained a non-nuclear power, despite the Soviet superiority in conventional weapons, it was treated as a secondary power in relation to the United States. Hence, the US nuclear disarmament strategy was to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The United States also wanted to retain its nuclear monopoly as long as it was manageable. She professed to accept nuclear disarmament provided it was preceded by the creation of an international control agency which could be dominated and controlled by the United States. This was the essence of the Baruch Plan. The Soviet Union naturally would not have accepted such a proposal which ran counter to its vital national interests and calculations. The Soviet policy was to forge ahead with its own nuclear bomb programme. Thus nuclear disarmament diplomacy of both the major powers became an integral part of the Cold War politics. Soon began the competition between

19 Baruch Plan was an American proposal introduced in the General Assembly in June 1946 by Bernard Baruch, leader of the US delegation to the AEC which contained a comprehensive plan for the prevention of nuclear proliferation.

the United States and the Soviet Union to dominate the international system by expanding conventional and nuclear power. This power struggle determined their policies, their military strategies, their negotiating strategy, their disarmament proposals and counter proposals.

The Baruch Plan for international control of atomic energy without eliminating the US nuclear weapons monopoly was presented before the Atomic Energy Commission on 14 June 1946. According to the Baruch Plan, an International Atomic Development Authority would be set up and entrusted with all phases of the development and use of atomic energy including: (1) managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security; (2) the power to control, inspect and license all other atomic activities; (3) the fostering of beneficial uses of atomic energy; and (4) responsibility for research and development possibilities of an affirmative character intended to put the Authority in the forefront of atomic knowledge thereby enabling it to comprehend, and detect the misuse of atomic energy. It was also envisaged that "there must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes." 21

The glaring contradictions and anomalies of the Baruch Plan were exposed by the Soviet representative, Gromyko, on 19 June 1946. The Soviet Union rejected the Baruch Plan and proposed an International Convention prohibiting the production and employment of weapons based on the use of atomic energy for the purpose of mass destruction. By the terms of the Convention the signatories would oblige themselves:
(a) not to use atomic weapons in any circumstances, (b) to prohibit the production and storing of weapons based on use of atomic energy; and (c) to destroy within three months of the signing of the Convention all stock of finished nuclear weapons.

The UN General Assembly and the Security Council have been entrusted with the specific responsibilities pertaining to disarmament and regulation of arms vide Articles 11 and 26 of the UN Charter. Principles governing disarmament and

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23 Article 11(1) of the UN Charter envisages: "The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament, and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the members or to the Security Council or to both."

... continued
the regulation of armament have been included among the
general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of
international peace and security to be considered and
recommended by the General Assembly to the Security Council.
These recommendations have no mandatory character but do
carry political and moral weight, especially when made
unanimous.

The formulation of plans for the establishment and
regulation of armaments is of course one of the Statutory
responsibilities of the UN Security Council. It is to be
assisted in this work by the "Military Staff Committee,
consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members
of the Council and their representatives."24 A number of
UN bodies have been established to deal with disarmament and
arms control issues. Some of them have ceased to function
with time while others were adjourned sine die or simply
dissolved.

Article 26 says: "In order to promote the establishment
and maintenance of international peace and security with
the least diversion for armaments of the world's human
and economic resources, with the assistance of the
Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans
to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for
the establishment of a system for the regulation of arma-
ment." See, UN, Everyone's United Nations (New York, 1979),
edn. 9, pp. 384-6.

24 Article 26 and 47 of the UN Charter.
In fact, the member nations of the United Nations were guided by the spirit of optimism and mutual confidence at the time of framing of the Charter and the question of disarmament was placed to a subordinate position. The Charter does not define disarmament as the ultimate objective and the "architects of the Charter did not look upon disarmament as a principal method of achieving peace and security but rather as a subsidiary one." But this does not mean that the problem of disarmament and regulation of armament has been ignored by the United Nations. One of the main objectives of the UN is to maintain international peace and security.

Soviet Union's acquisition of nuclear capability in 1949 was instrumental in envisaging a change in the attitude of Western powers who expressed willingness to merge the discussion of nuclear and conventional disarmament. This led to the resumption of negotiations resulting in the establishment of a single Disarmament Commission in 1952. Its task was to suggest proposals for the regulation, limitation and balanced

25 Eichenberger opines that "the Charter of the United Nations neither places disarmament as one of the overriding tasks of the organisation nor does it make willingness to agree to disarmament regulations a price of membership."


reduction of all armed forces and all armaments.\(^{27}\) Consequently the UN Disarmament Commission was established by the General Assembly in 1952 with a limited membership\(^{28}\) which was expanded in 1959 to include all members of the UN.\(^{29}\)

**India and Nuclear Disarmament**

India had not yet attained independence and an interim Government headed by Jawaharlal Nehru had assumed office in September 1946. India did not take any stand on Baruch Plan. India's active role in this regard started only after it became independent in August 1947. In September 1947, India's representative to the UN Mrs Vijaylakshmi Pandit, while participating in General Assembly, referred to disarmament and said that there was an uneasy "awareness that things are perhaps moving towards some new annihilating disaster . . . not enough is being done to check the trend."\(^{30}\)

The third session of the UN General Assembly held during 1948-49 witnessed India actively making proposals on the

\(^{27}\) SIPRI, Yearbook 1968-69, n. 11, p. 152.

\(^{28}\) UN Doc. A/RES/502 (VI).

\(^{29}\) UN Doc. A/RES/1403 (XIV).

\(^{30}\) UN Doc. A/FP.85, p. 134.
problem of nuclear disarmament. On 25 September 1948, India opined that "the question of controlling atomic energy and disarmament was one of the most important and significant problems which warranted full discussion." It regretted the failure of AEC's efforts in having made no progress towards disarmament. Mrs Pandit further told the General Assembly that the elimination of atomic weapons was equally important as the banning of biological and chemical warfare.

At this session, India raised three important points — emphasis on the abandonment of the arms race, need for continued dialogue on disarmament with a view to reach an agreement and ban on the use of atomic, biological and chemical weapons. These three points had been reiterated by India during the subsequent deliberations in the General Assembly or elsewhere. With regard to controlling atomic energy, Indian representative emphasised India's keen interest, as a peace loving and underdeveloped nation, for the peaceful utilization of atomic energy.

Despite two years of deliberations, differences between the Soviet Union and the United States continued on the issue

31 UN Doc. A/PV. 143, pp. 7-10.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
of control over atomic energy. India made efforts to reconcile these differing viewpoints. B.N. Rau, Indian representative, was unanimously elected as Chairman of the 11-member sub-committee which was established to chalk out a compromising resolution. Its resultant effect was that the Western powers agreed to continue the negotiations. However, India was not satisfied by these developments.

Consequently, India presented a fresh draft resolution seeking the approval of the Findings and Recommendations and the specific Proposals of the AEC on merits. India's objective was to provide a necessary basis for envisaging an effective system of international control of atomic energy. However, India's compromise formula was rejected in the First Committee in the wake of a Canadian resolution.

India attached tremendous significance to the international control of atomic energy, and as an underdeveloped country, expressed its keen desire to use atomic energy for peaceful and beneficial purposes. India having been endowed with large resources of atomic raw materials like thorium and lacking the other sources of energy like oil, pleaded that the importance of atomic energy as a source of power was all the

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35 Canada's resolution is given in UN Doc. A/700.
more greater for India. Thus India was opposed to an international ownership and distribution of only those materials capable of generating atomic energy and leaving other materials like oil under private ownership.

India was thus indirectly opposed to the Baruch Plan which envisaged international control over the ownership and management of mines and all plants generating atomic energy or the disbursement of the raw materials. It disfavoured the idea of subjugating its sovereign rights for the development and utilization of the vast atomic raw material resources to an outside authority. India abstained on the resolution moved by Canada envisaging the endorsement of the objectionable control provisions of the Baruch Plan.

India maintained the same attitude during the succeeding years. In 1954 India made it clear that it was opposed to any move which could restrict the peaceful utilization of atomic energy or "establishing some form of control which would be detrimental to the interests of less-developed countries or would discriminate against them."

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36 UN Doc. A/PV. 156, pp. 56-61.
37 Ibid.
38 See, Indian representative's speech at the Eight Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), ENDC Doc. 144.
Difference of opinion prevailed with regard to the international ownership of atomic raw materials, among the members of the United Nations. The AEC reported in July 1949 that an impasse existed and the differences were irreconcilable. With a view to break the deadlock, India introduced in 1949 a draft resolution in the Ad hoc Political Committee of the General Assembly, which sought the consolidation of the work already done in this regard "in such a form as to contribute most effectively to the progressive development of international law in this field." India's draft resolution was described as an effort to obtain the assistance of international law to justify India's position of not transferring its sovereign right for developing atomic energy for peaceful purposes to an international control authority.

India's proposal did not, however, aim at reconciling the Soviet and Western positions. It was rather in consonance with India's stand on the control of atomic energy. Indian

39 UN Doc. A/AC.31/126.


41 Rose N. Berkes and Mohinder S. Bedi, The Diplomacy of India (Stanford, 1958), pp. 64-65.
representative, B.N. Rau, emphasised that the proposed Indian
draft along with the AEC's work in the form of a declaration
might contain three propositions:

— It is the duty of every state to submit to,
and act in aid of, an effective system of
international control adequate to insure the
use of atomic energy only for peaceful
purposes and the elimination of atomic
weapons from national armaments;

— No state or individual shall manufacture,
possess or use atomic weapons;

— No state or individual shall use atomic
energy except for peaceful purposes. \(^42\)

There was mixed reaction to India's draft proposal. New
Zealand and Norway expressed the opinion that the question of
the control of atomic raw-material resources by an international
agency was not a legal but political question. \(^43\) Socialist
countries like Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Poland also
regarded Indian proposal as unacceptable and expressed the
view that it required a political solution. Third World
countries like Iraq, Mexico and Argentina supported India's

\(^{42}\) Adopted from UN, *Ad hoc Political Committee*, 30th Meeting,
7 November 1949, pp. 169-70.

\(^{43}\) Ibid., p. 172.
The draft resolution. It was finally rejected. Thus even by the close of 1949, the impasse over the question of transferring ownership of atomic raw-material resources to an international authority or agency continued mainly because of differing attitude of the Super Powers.

Despite the rejection of its draft proposal, India did not relent in its efforts for persuading the Third World countries to mobilise support for utilization of atomic energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. At the fourth session of the UN General Assembly, both the Soviet Union and the United States presented modified proposals. The Soviet draft, urging the UN member states to furnish information on both atomic and conventional arms, was rejected. The United States insisted on first satisfactorily resolving the problem of international control of the atomic energy before considering the idea of prohibition of the atomic weapons. The result was again a stalemate. India participated in the session but put forward no proposals.

During the fifth session of the UN General Assembly both Eastern bloc and Western bloc submitted draft resolutions. The

44 Ibid.
45 UN GAOR, Fourth Session, Plenary Meetings.
Western bloc resolution,\textsuperscript{46} supported by 8 nations envisaged that with a view to make the regulation and reduction of armaments effective, covering weapons of all kinds, it had to be based on unanimous agreement and every nation endowed with substantial military resources, had to be included in the process. The Soviet draft resolution\textsuperscript{47} called upon the AEC to prepare draft conventions on the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and on the international control of atomic energy.

The Soviet draft resolution was rejected by 32 votes to 5 with 16 abstentions. The 8-Power draft resolution was adopted by 47 votes (including India) to 5 with three abstentions.\textsuperscript{48}

In the wake of continued deadlock between the Super Powers, the meeting of the AEC and the Commission on Conventional Armaments, were adjourned \textit{sine die} in 1950. Its resultant effect was that between 1950-51, there was hardly any new development with regard to either disarmament or the question of the international control of atomic energy. These developments could not deter India's initiatives in making specific proposals in 1950 and 1951 for the establishment of a UN Peace

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{46} UN Doc. A/1668.
\textsuperscript{47} UN Doc. A/1676.
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Fund. India's representative, B.N. Rau, told the General Assembly that India always stood for the prohibition of atomic weapons not only because of their destructive potential "but also on account of the waste which their production entailed." 49

In 1951, India moved another draft resolution suggesting the establishment of a UN Fund for Reconstruction and Development and for Peace Fund. India expressed the view that the amount spent on armaments could be used for peaceful and constructive purposes. It opined that existing socio-economic inequalities likewise posed a threat to world peace. 50

The Second Committee of the UN General Assembly had adopted a more comprehensive resolution which incorporated a substantial part of the Indian proposal, 51 and therefore, in the wake of introduction of a draft resolution by the Western countries in 1951 which covered Indian standpoint too, India withdrew its draft resolution. In this way, India to some extent succeeded in influencing the resources released through disarmament measures for the purpose of development.

50 UN Doc. A/C. 1/SR.454, 26 December 1951, pp. 28-29.
51 UN Doc. A/C. 1/SR.470, 18 December 1951, p. 96.
Twelve Nations Committee on Disarmament (TNDC) at its sixth session in 1951 recommended the dissolution of the AEC and the Commission on Conventional Armaments. Instead it recommended the establishment of a Commission for the Control of Armaments and Armed Forces to carry out the tasks of earlier two commissions. Resolution to this effect was sponsored by the United States, UK and France with the recommendations that the new body should be called Disarmament Commission. The Soviet Union suggested certain amendments. India, abstained at the time of voting on the resolution. But it did vote for certain parts pertaining to the establishment of a new commission, preparation of proposals for the regulation of all armed forces and all armaments, for the effective control of atomic energy etc. The Indian representative made it clear that India was not merely interested in any particular resolution on disarmament but in the actual beginning of disarmament.

In pursuance of the General Assembly resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952, the Disarmament Commission was established

52 UN General Assembly Resolution 502 (VI).

53 On 26 December 1951, the Indian representative clarified that he had voted for those provisions of the resolution which were non-controversial and also for the setting up of the Disarmament Commission.

UN Doc. A/C.1/SR.454, 26 December 1951, pp. 28-29.

54 Ibid.
on the same day. It was directed to prepare proposals to be incorporated in prospective treaty or treaties for:

- the regulations, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments;

- elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; and

- effective international control of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.  

The Commission held its first meeting on 4 February 1952 at Paris. In March 1952, two committees — Committee-1 and Committee-2 were established at the ninth meeting of the Commission. Committee-1 was entrusted with the responsibility of the regulation of all armaments and armed forces whereas Committee-2 was entrusted with the task of disclosure and verification of all armaments including atomic weapons, armaments and of all armed forces.  

India welcomed the establishment of the Disarmament Commission as a significant step in right direction and hoped that it would envisage the formulation of an agreed plan on

56 Ibid., p. 314.
disarmament. Krishna Menon, head of the Indian delegation, observed on 8 April 1952 that disarmament could be achieved only when there was an agreement among the major powers. He expressed the hope that the work of Commission would continue since this was indispensable for accomplishing some fruitful results. The anti-colonial stance in Indian foreign policy was also discernible in its pronouncements on disarmament when Krishna Menon said in March 1953 that India was opposed to the use "against colonial people of bombs and all types of weapons by military forces trying to prevent them from achieving their independence."

During the eighth session of the General Assembly in 1953, India made three important points with regard to disarmament. One of them related to the question of banning of weapons of mass destruction. In the wake of 14-Power draft resolution A/C.1/L.72, India suggested some amendments vide draft resolution A/C.1/L.74, seeking the insertion of a clause affirming the earnest desire of the General Assembly for the altogether elimination of the use and power to use

atomic, bacterial, chemical and all such other weapons of war and mass destruction. The Western Powers initially objected to Indian suggestion but it was later finally adopted by the Assembly.

The second point mooted by India in 1953 related to another clause of the 14-Power draft resolution wherein India had emphasised on the insertion of the sentence — "an armament race is not only economically unsound but is in itself a grave danger to peace." Both UK and USA objected to it. Peru suggested an amendment to the Indian suggestion which was finally incorporated.

India's third suggestion to the 14-Power draft resolution related to the establishment of a sub-committee to hold private meetings with the members to facilitate the task of the Disarmament Commission. On this point, Indian representative, Krishna Menon, opined that the proposed sub-committee would be able to accomplish much if it held its meetings in private. Consequent upon the adoption of this resolution and the establishment of the sub-committee, which discussed the question of atomic energy, Krishna Menon observed that

60 UN Doc. A/C. 1/L. 74 Rev. 293.
61 UN Doc. A/C. 1/SR. 265, 13 November 1953, p. 221.
it was a development which was in refreshing contrast to the state of oblivion to which the Disarmament Commission was relegated between the seventh and eighth sessions. The Indian delegate observed that Disarmament Commission had made no progress and there was an augmentation in the production and accumulation of the armaments.

A congenial atmosphere for negotiations on disarmament was created in the aftermath of the cessation of hostilities in Korea and Indo-China. India while moving the draft resolution A/C.1/L.100 in early 1954 observed that these developments appreciably contributed to a more favourable climate for negotiation and the settlement of the problem of disarmament. Both East and the West seemed agreeable to a unanimous proposal on disarmament when Soviet Union after initial hitch endorsed the Anglo-French proposal of 11 June 1954. Difference of opinion, however, prevailed with regard to the quantum, and limits of agreed levels of armed forces. India, along with other countries conceded that the disarmament question could not be resolved by majority voting but by agreement among the Powers concerned, especially

62 Ibid.

63 For details about the Anglo-French proposals, See UN Doc. DC/SC.1/10.
the United States and the Soviet Union. 64

Krishna Menon, Indian representative to the UN, reiterated India's stand at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 4 November 1954. He further expressed the hope that the sub-committee would give serious attention to the question of increased production of atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons. 65

The consistency and emphasis on India's attitude towards disarmament and arms control as espoused in the United Nations, was also reflected in the joint statements issued during that period after the visit of foreign dignitaries to India. A joint statement issued by the Prime Ministers of India and the Soviet Union on 23 June 1955 clearly envisaged that "nothing should be allowed to hamper the imposition of a complete ban on the production, experimentation and use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons of war." 66

Turning Point

The Soviet-US, or more appropriately the East-West dis-

64 Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: 1946-61 (Delhi, 1961), p. 200.
65 UN Doc. A/PV. 497, 4 November 1954, p. 278.
66 Foreign Policy of India (New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1958), p. 171.
armament negotiations assumed new dimensions, when the Soviet proposals of 10 May 1955 was rejected by the West. Harold Stassen, President Eisenhower's Special Assistant on Disarmament put forward the new US Plan on disarmament. The East-West negotiations were marked by the irreconcilable approaches namely 'ban the bombe first' approach enunciated by Gromyko since 1946 as a response to the Baruch Plan and 'International Control First' approach of the US. During the July 1955 meeting of the Heads of Government held at Geneva, the US proposed practical steps namely that the US and Soviet Union agree immediately to exchange complete blueprints of their military establishment, and furnish each other facilities for aerial reconnaissance, in order to provide against the possibility of surprise attack. This US proposal was regarded as the beginning of an effective and comprehensive system aimed at inspection of nuclear armaments and a step forward towards disarmament. However, Soviet Union opposed the proposal on the plea that open skies could not be subject to inspection.

69 Jain, p. 41, p. 46.
71 Ibid., pp. 516-21.
Mowcow indicated the eventuality of the acceptance of the proposal in the form of aerial photography as one type of control in the final stages of a comprehensive programme on disarmament.\textsuperscript{72} This difference of opinion on the open skies proposals, between Moscow and Washington, belied the hopes that were generated in the wake of Geneva meet of July 1955. India on its own did not relent in its efforts in mobilising the international support for nuclear disarmament.

On 5 October 1955, four Western Powers — UK, Canada, France and the United States — presented a draft resolution A/C. 1/L.150, which laid more stress on control rather than complete disarmament. The new draft was not in conformity with the General Assembly resolution 808 (IX) of 1954 which had emphasised both the control as well as disarmament. Soviet Union opposed the new draft resolution. The result was again a deadlock. India opposed this draft on the ground that it had failed to pay adequate attention to such vital matters as the regulation and reduction of all armed forces and conventional armaments and banning the use and manufacturing of the nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 538-45.

\textsuperscript{73} UN Doc. A/SR. 808, 9 December 1955, pp. 277-8.
India suggested some amendment in the draft resolution A/C.1/L.153, with a view to bring about a compromise in the opposing views. India's major emphasis was on treating all the other aspects of disarmament besides control on priority basis, reconstitution of disarmament machinery and to expedite the work on drafting the disarmament convention. Syria and Soviet Union made efforts for inclusion of India as a member of the Disarmament Commission but it did not materialise. Finally, the four-Power draft resolution was adopted by 53 votes to 5. India voted for the resolution. The Soviet Union opposed it. Despite the passage of the resolution, the impasse between the East and the West continued. Though India had voted for the resolution, it also made it clear that the resolution had created grave apprehensions among certain countries.74

India made another attempt to reconcile the Big Powers' differences in the middle of 1956. In a note written to the UN Secretary-General on 27 June 1956, India sought an opportunity to present its case before the Disarmament Commission. Having been granted permission, India presented a Note Verbale on 25 July 1956 to the Disarmament Commission and made the following proposals aiming at the achievement of

74 UN Doc. A/PV. 559, 16 December 1955, pp. 483-5.
nuclear Disarmament:

— Cessation of all explosions of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction;

— prohibition of the further use of fissionable material for military purposes;

— prohibition of the transfer of fissionable material from civilian to military stocks;

— an agreement by those powers most advanced in the production of weapons of mass destruction to dismantle in public, as a token of their will towards disarmament, a limited number of atomic or hydrogen bombs and to make available for peaceful purposes the fissionable material contained in these weapons; and

— prohibition of export of conveying of nuclear weapons to other countries by those countries at present manufacturing such weapons. 75

These proposals were meant to be practical suggestions with a view to achieve complete disarmament. The Great Powers, however, attached no significance to these proposals. India was only thanked for presenting such proposals and the Disarmament Commission failed to take any concrete steps on the basis of these proposals. A 'new approach' was discernible.

75 UN Doc. DC/98, 31 July 1956.
in the Soviet position. The Soviet Union made this known to the Disarmament Commission on 4 May 1956. It stressed that the decade old experience of discussion on the disarmament problem within the United Nations had shown that, in existing conditions, the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons was most complex and required time for its solution. The Soviet delegate further added that in order not to delay the solution of the question of reducing conventional armaments and armed forces, "the Soviet Union proposed that agreement should be reached first of all on the reduction of conventional armaments and the establishment of the necessary control — such agreement not to be made conditional on an agreement on the prohibition of atomic weapons." 76

Gromyko reiterated the Soviet position when he told the Disarmament Commission:

The Soviet Union continues as in the past, to advocate the prohibition of atomic weapons — the immediate and unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons. We have pointed out that we submitted the proposals of 10 May 1955 (DC/71/ annex 15) which relate inter alia to the atomic question. I have drawn attention to other proposal which the Soviet Government has presented on the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons. But the fact is that for the present, as experience has shown, we are unable to reach agreement on

76 DCOR, supplement January-December 1956, Annex 11, Doc. DC/SC.1/47, 4 May 1956.
this question, and for the present, we are faced with the alternatives of either reaching agreement on part of the disarmament problem or reaching no agreement at all. We should prefer to reach agreement first on part of this problem, on conventional armaments, rather than reach no agreement on the problem at all.  

The West's position was clearly reformulated by the UK:

We have always contemplated that nuclear disarmament should figure as part of a comprehensive disarmament programme - and we have always included such a provision in our plans. Thus we have always insisted that it should come at the end, whereas formerly the Soviet Union insisted that it should come at the beginning.

The US dogmatic insistence on control system and the Soviet refusal to accept it had resulted in the decade-old stalemate in the disarmament negotiations. The US representative Stassen told the Disarmament Commission that it had always been the US position that if a disarmament agreement were to prove to be of true value to those who signed, it should be covered by a thorough and effective inspection system. He further added:

The Soviet Union has not moved to accept what we consider to be the minimum elements.

77 Ibid., supplement January-December 1956, Annex 12, p. 34.
78 Ibid.
of a thorough and effective inspection system. If, the Soviet Union, in fact, had moved towards the position taken by the United States on the matter of a thorough and effective inspection system, including — because of the vast territories involved the spread of jet aeroplanes and the power of modern weapons the essential components of aerial inspection, than a major agreement mutually desirable to all, would have been near at hand.79

Between 1956-58, no substantial achievement came through either Disarmament Commission or the sub-committee. The major preoccupation of the deliberations carried out in these bodies pertained to the enlargement of the membership of the bodies and the problem of prevention of the surprise attacks. There was a difference of opinion in the approaches of the Eastern and Western powers on these issues.

At the twelfth session of the General Assembly, India did request the inclusion of the item "Expansion of the Membership of the Disarmament Commission and its sub-committee." India's plea was that both the Commission and the sub-committee being subject to great power rivalry had failed in their objectives. The deliberations in the sub-committee, in India's view, were deadlocked, because of having fallen into two camps and reflected two opposing views.80 India's motive

79 Ibid., p. 32.
80 UN Doc. A/C. 1/PV. 873, 16 October 1959.
behind getting the expansion of the membership of these bodies was to give better representation to the Third World countries which could be helpful in resolving the impasse or deadlock and thus help expedite the working of the Disarmament Commission and its sub-committee. The Indian proposals, however, did not get the desired attention till almost 1958.

Similarly, the deliberations on the measures designed to prevent the surprise attack during 1956-58 also failed to bear any fruitful results. Both the Soviet Union and the United States showed willingness on the necessity and usefulness of devising measures to prevent the surprise attacks but major differences arose on the constitution, functions and scope of the process of the inspecting authority in the agree areas or zones. Even the Conference of Experts on the Prevention of Surprise Attacks held at Geneva in November-December 1958 failed to make any headway. Prime Minister Nehru said on 8 December 1958 that "we feel that it is in the nature of a crime against humanity to continue nuclear tests which endanger not only the present generation but the future generations to come . . . — as far as the question of surprise attacks, I fear the failure is not at all promising."  


82 Lok Sabha, Debates, vol. 23, 8 December 1959.
Despite the prevailing deadlock, Nehru had hoped that great Powers would "gradually find some way to go on and even to come to some minor agreement rather than have no agreement at all." \textsuperscript{83}

These major developments led to a shift in the approach on the disarmament negotiations from comprehensive to partial measures or as was commonly known to a step by step approach. The UN General Assembly debates "showed that partial measures were considered as a first step of disarmament in existing political conditions. It was the general belief that by such partial measures confidence would gradually be strengthened and that comprehensive disarmament would be facilitated." \textsuperscript{84}

This marked the beginning of "arms control" negotiations. India's role in these arms control negotiations is analysed in succeeding chapters.

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{84} GAOR, Session 12, plen. mtg. 715, 14 November 1957.