CHAPTER V
THE INCLUSION OF THE DOCTRINES OF BOTH NYĀYA AND VAIŚEṢIKA IN TARKASAMGRHA
AND OTHER MANUALS OF LOGIC

Nyāya philosophy gives more importance to epistemology and Vaiśeṣika philosophy gives more importance to ontology. In Tarkasamgraha Annambhaṭṭa adopted the epistemology of Nyāya system and accepted the ontological structure of the Vaiśeṣika system. The combination of these two branches viz. epistemology and ontology helps us attain the highest values. Tarkasamgraha deals with the ‘padārthas’ (objects of right knowledge) mentioned in the Vaiśeṣika philosophy and the ‘pramāṇas’ (means of right knowledge) in the Nyāya philosophy. Annambhaṭṭa gives equal stress on epistemology and ontology in Tarkasamgraha. But the fusion of the two systems is not felt.

In Annambhaṭṭa’s hand both systems have mingled into one.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, like all other schools of Indian philosophy, aims at realizing the highest good. In order to achieve this end, these systems have presented an analytical demonstration of the universe, and also the
means to comprehend the phenomenal world. As such, Nyāya has classified the positive objects of the universe into sixteen categories, and is pre-eminently concerned with epistemology and Logic. Vaiśeṣika on the contrary, is mainly a system of physics and metaphysics. Its doctrine has seven categories and embraces all reality. These two systems were separate in their origin and early development, but were, blended into a single syncretic system later on because of logical and intellectual necessity.

Nyāya, in the course of its development took a considerable help from Vaiśeṣika. In the ancient and mediaeval period, both the philosophies contributed each other for their development. Hence Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika were treated as samāṇatantra or allied systems. And in due course of time, both the systems merged together to a great extent. The six or seven categories of Vaiśeṣika became the part of Nyāya philosophy. Likewise Nyāya category of pramāṇa in its developed form, actually was absorbed in the treatise on Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

We can cite the cases of Tārkikarakṣa by Varadarāja and Tarkabhāṣa by Keśava Miśra for Nyāya’s absorption of Vaiśeṣika
categories. Varadarāja, an exponent of Nyāya, takes into his account not only the sixteen categories, but also the six categories of Vaiśeṣika such as dravya, etc. in the second category of prameya under Nyāya. Likewise Keśava Miśra also brings six categories of Vaiśeṣika under 'arthā' which is one of the twelve objects included in the second Nyāya category, prameya.

Let us have an overview of both of the works. Nyāya, the science of reasoning, demonstration, debate and critical study, stresses predominantly intellectual and analytical methods. Vaiśeṣika is poorer in its epistemological interest as it is pre-eminently a metaphysical system. The system is so designated because, according to it, diversity and not unity is at the root of the universe.

The seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika and the sixteen categories of the Naiyāyika are basically the same. According to Annapūrṇā and Visvanātha the sixteen categories mentioned in the Nyāya-sutra are included in the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.¹

The inclusion of the sixteen categories in the seven categories as follows:-
1. Means of right knowledge — pramāṇa

(a) Perception (pratyakṣa) is included in substance
(b) Inference (anumāna)
(c) Comparison (upamāna) are included in quality.
(d) Verbal testimony (śabda)

2. The objects of right knowledge — prameya

(a) Soul (ātma)
(b) Body (śarīra) are included in substance
(c) Senses (indriya)
(d) Objects of senses (artha)
(e) Intellect (buddhi) are included in quality
(f) Mind (manas) is included in substance.

(g) Activity (pravṛtti)
(h) Fault (doṣa)
(i) Transmigration (pretyabhāva) are included in quality
(j) Fruit (phala)
(k) Pain (duḥkha)
(l) Emancipation (apavarga) is included in negation

3. Doubt (samśaya) is included in quality.

4. Purpose (prayojana)

5. Example (dūṣṭānta) are included in substance, quality, etc.

6. Tenent (siddhānta)
7. Members of syllogism (avayava)
8. Confutation (tarka)
9. Ascertainment (nirṇaya)
10. Discussion (vāda)
11. Wrangling (jalpa)
12. Cavil (Vitāṇḍā)

13. Fallacy (hetvābhāsa) - are included in quality
14. Quibble (chāla)
15. Analogue (jati) - are included in quality
16. A point of defeat (nigrahaṇa) - is included in substance, quality, etc.

**Tarkasamgraha**

In *Tarkasamgraha* Annāmbhaṭṭa accepts all the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy without any change. Substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, inherence and negation are the seven categories. Quality is of twenty-four kinds, of which buddhi (knowledge) is one. Buddhi is of two kinds, experience (anubhava) and smṛti (recollection). Anubhava or experience may be right or wrong. The right experience is of four kinds, viz. (1) perceptual knowledge
(pratyakṣa), (2) inferential knowledge (anumitī), (3) comparative knowledge (upamitī) and verbal knowledge (sābda). The means by which these four kinds of knowledge are derived are called respectively (1) perception (pratyakṣa), (2) inference (anumāna), (3) comparison (upamāna) and verbal testimony (sābda).

The scheme of incorporation is shown below:

Padārthā

(1) dravya (2) guṇa (3) karma (4) sāmānyaa (5) viśeṣa (6) samāvāyaa (7) abhāva

(1) rūpa (16) buddhi (24) samskāra

anubhava smṛti

right (prama) wrong (aprāma)

(1) pratyakṣa (2) anumitī (3) upamitī (4) sābda

pramāṇa³
In *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, Kaṇāda have keenly described seventeen qualities.¹ But the commentators have described twenty four qualities² which has been accepted by Annambhaṭṭa also.

The Vaiśeṣikas have classified the sāmānyya into two kinds viz. para and apara. Para means sattā. But according to Navya Naiyāyikas this classification is incorrect.⁶ However both para and apara classification is accepted in *Tarkasamgraha*.

According to Navya Naiyāyikas particularity is not a separate category.⁷ But Annambhaṭṭa accepts it as a separate category.

The Vaiśeṣikas say that there is only one inherence. But according to Navya there are a number of inherence.⁸ Annambhaṭṭa accepts the Vaiśeṣika view:

Negation is two-fold: samsargābhāva and anyonyābhāva.

Again samsargābhāva is three-fold: antecedent negation, destructive negation and absolute negation.⁹ In *Tarkasamgraha*, Annambhaṭṭa does not divide negation as samsargābhāva and anyonyābhāva. He simply mentions negation is four-fold.
Praśastapāda classifies the non-eternal air into four kinds viz. body, organ, object and prāṇa. Where as Annāṁbhāṭṭa classifies it into three viz. body, organ and object.

According to Vaiśeṣika, ākāsa is that which is characterized by the distinctive quality of sound. Navya Naiyāyikas say that God is the cause of sound not ākāsa. But Annāṁbhāṭṭa accepts the view of Vaiśeṣika.

The theory of Pāka

The Vaiśeṣika theorists are known as Pīḷupākavādins. They say that when a pot or ghaṭa is baked at first the pot is destroyed into atoms and then once again the atoms joined together produce a new one.

The atoms of the pot become red colour because of the contact with the heat. The new pot is entirely different from the former one. This transformation is imperceptible, because the destruction and the reformation of the pot happen in a very short duration of time. This theory of Vaiśeṣika is known as pīḷupāka.

The Naiyāyikas differ in this aspect and object this theory of Vaiśeṣika. They establish the theory of Piṭharapāka. According to them,
the change in the colour, etc. of the atoms and in the product, come into existence at the same time. Due to the speed of the fire the atoms of fire enter the different particles in the ghaṭa and destroy the colour etc. and the new colour etc. are produced. There is no need of accepting the destruction of whole. If the first pot is destroyed and new one substituted we shall not be able to identify it as the old pot. We see the same pot as before except for the difference in colour etc.

In Tarkasamgraha neither pīlapāka nor pīṭharapāka is described. Annāmbhaṭṭa says that the four qualities beginning with colour are produced in earth through the application of heat, and are non-eternal. In other substances (i.e. water, light and air) they are not produced by the application of heat (i.e. natural) and so are eternal and also non-eternal; in eternals (i.e. in atoms) they are eternal; and in non-ernernals (i.e. in products) they are non-eternal.12

The Navya Naiyāyikas say that pṛthaktva is mutual negation and not a separate quality.13 But Annāmbhaṭṭa accepts pṛthaktva as a distinct quality.
Inference is of two kinds: for the knower himself and for others. This type of classification is not accepted by the praciina Naiyāyikas.

Annaṃbhaṭṭa accepts this type of classification.

In Vaiśeṣikasūtra and Praśastapādabhāṣya the number of fallacies are three\(^4\) and four\(^5\) respectively. Five fallacies are included in Nyāya-sūtra\(^6\) and Nyāyabhāṣya. Like in Nyāya Annaṃbhaṭṭa also accepts five fallacies of reason.

Both the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems recognize the reality of God, individual souls and minds, physical things, atoms of earth, water, light and air, space, time and ether. They hold the same view of the nature of the individual soul and its liberation. They both propound realism and pluralism. They advocate the similar deistic view of God. But these systems differ from each other in certain respects. First, Nyāya recognizes four means of valid knowledge viz. perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. Nyāya gives a vivid description of the criteria of truth, validity of knowledge and different kinds of inference and fallacies. It treats the problems of logic and epistemology in the most comprehensive manner. Vaiśeṣika, on other hand, admits perception
and inference only as pramāṇas and deals with these pramāṇas in peripheral way.

Secondly, these systems differ in their treatment of categories. Nyāya recognizes sixteen categories which mostly refer to the basic points of a theory of knowledge. The Vaiśeṣika on the other hand, divides the whole reality into seven padārthas which present an analytical demonstration of this phenomenal world.

**Bhāsarvajña’s Nyāyasāra**

*Nyāyasāra*, the essence of logic was a highly acclaimed logical treatise of Bhāsarvajña. It had a distinct status in the history of Indian Logic. He gave importance to pramāṇa which was the current subject at that time. It was divided into three types viz. perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāṇa) and verbal testimony (āgama). It was in contradiction to Aksapāda where in a fourth type named comparison (upamāna) was mentioned. This lead Bhāsarvajña’s work to be similar to that of Sāṃkhyas and Jainas who also divided pramāṇa into three kinds. This is different from that of Buddhists who classified it into only two viz. perception and inference. He divided inference into two — that
for one's self (svārthānūmāna) and that for the sake of others (parārthānūmāna). Salvation (mokṣa) was described by him as the soul's attainment to eternal pleasure. Quibble, analogue, etc. which had been prominent topics in the Nyāyasūtra, were not altogether overlooked by Bhāsarvajña who dealt with them in connection with an inference for the sake of others.

The scheme laid down in the Nyāyasāra, for the reduction of sixteen categories into one, may be exhibited in the tabular form thus:-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pramāṇa</th>
<th>Anumāna</th>
<th>Agama</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pratyākṣa</td>
<td>Svartha</td>
<td>Parārtha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(the means of establishing prameya, (2) without a stain samsaya, and (3) Viparyaya)</td>
<td>carried on through</td>
<td>Avayava (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogī</td>
<td>Laukika</td>
<td>which includes hētvabhasa (13) and leads to nirmaya (9), through the channels of tarka (8), vada (10), jalpa (11), vitanda (12), chala (14), jati (15), and nigrahasthana (16).17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadvidha</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuktā</td>
<td>Ayukta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arsa</td>
<td>Anarsa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Varadarāja’s Ĥeirkarakaṣa

"Tārikaraḵaṣa" was mainly divided into three chapters. Among them the initial one deals with the fourteen categories of Nyāya such as (1) Pramāṇa, (2) Prameya, (3) Samśaya, (4) Prayojana, (5) Dṛṣṭānta, (6) Siddhānta, (7) Avayava, (8) Tarka, (9) Nirṇaya, (10) Vāda, (11) Jalpa, (12) vitanḍa, (13) Hetvābhāsa and (14) Chala. The second chapter covers the fifteenth category such as jati, while the last chapter deals with the sixteenth category viz. nigrāhasthāna.

Prameya according to Nyāyasūtra refers to atman, śarīra, indriya, artha, buddhi, manas, pravṛtti, doṣa, pretyabhāva, phala, duḥkha and apavarga, but Varadarāja includes the six predicaments of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy also. They are substance, quality, action, generality, particularity and inherence.

The categories of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika are thus combined together, but the combination is far from being satisfactory. It is evident that the categories of the Vaiśeṣika and objects coming under prameya of the Nyāya overlap each other. Moreover there is hardly any truth in the statement that the knowledge of the sixteen categories of Nyāya is the
direct means of our attaining emancipation. Whereas that of the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika is only an indirect means, because atman (the soul), manas (the mind), buddhi (intellect or knowledge), duḥkha (pain), etc. are included both the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems.

Scheme of representation of Varadarāja's incorporation of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems:—

Padārtha

Pramāṇa, Prameya, Samśaya, Prayojana, Drśṭānta, Siddhānta, Avayava, Tarka, Nirṇaya, Vāda, Jalpa, Vitanḍa, Hctvābhāsa, Chala, Jāti, Nigrahasthāna

1. Twelve objects of Nyāya 2. Six categories of the Vaiśeṣika\textsuperscript{30}
Valid knowledge (Pramāṇa)

Varadarāja in his Tārkikarakaśa introduces some unique discussions. For example, the Buddhists define valid knowledge (pramāṇa) as that which is not non-correspondent with our practical activity, e.g. my knowledge of a cup of water is valid if the activity prompted by it is fruitful. Varadarāja criticizes this definition by saying that it is too narrow. We can test the validity of our knowledge only of a thing that exists in the present time. With regard to a past or future thing we can draw an inference, but cannot judge the validity of the inference in as much as there is no practical activity prompted.

Inference (anumāna)

Varadarāja opines that ‘inference is the knowledge of a thing derived through its invariable concomitance with another thing’. Invariable concomitance (vyāpti) also called inseparableness (āvinābhāva), is that relation which is devoid of condition (upādhi).

Naiyāyikas say that the invariable concomitance of one thing with another thing is based on their uniform agreement in presence and absence, for example smoke is in invariable concomitance with fire, because where there is smoke there is fire and where there is no fire there is no smoke.
But the Buddhists say that the invariable concomitance of one thing with the other thing is really based on their mutual relation of cause and effect or identity in essence, e.g. there is rain, because there was cloud.

Varadarāja strongly criticized the Buddhist view by saying that, we infer the form of an apple from its taste, though between the taste and form there is neither the causal relation nor the relation of identity in essence.

**Kesava Misra’s Tarkabhasa**

Keśava Miśra starts his work thus — ‘in order that even dull people may get admittance into the science of Logic, I bring out this *Tarkabhāṣa* (Technicality of Logic) replete with concise arguments’.24

*Tarkabhāṣa* incorporates the Vaiśeṣika categories

In Nyāya the word artha is signified five objects of sense viz. gandha (smell), rasa (taste), rūpa (colour), sparśa (touch) and śabda (sound). In order to bring the Nyāya categories with Vaiśeṣika, Keśava Miśra explained artha as dravya, guṇa, karma, sāmāṇya, viśeṣa and samavāya.

The scheme of combination of the categories Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika in Tarkabhāṣa is shown below:-


(1) Dravya, (2) Guṇa, (3) Karma, (4) Sāmāṇya, (5) Viśeṣa, (6) Samavāya
Nyāyālīlavatī of Vallabhācārya

While a large number of treatises in which the Nyāya category of pramāṇa was included in the Vaiśeṣika category of guṇa, others bring it under atman. Some writers keep aloof from Nyāya in the description of Vaiśeṣika. But Vallabhācārya incorporates Nyāya category of pramāṇa on the Vaiśeṣika category of guṇa.

Nyāyālīlavatī deals with six categories viz. (1) Substance (dravya), (2) Quality (guṇa), (3) action (karma), (4) Generality (sāmānya), (5) Particularity (viṣeṣa) and (6) Inherence (samavāya). Under the category of guṇa there comes buddhi which is again subdivided as vidyā and avidyā. The way to get right knowledge (buddhi) are perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna) and verbal testimony (śabda).
The scheme of amalgamation of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in Nyāyālīvatī is shown below:-

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Padartha

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Dravya, (2) Guna, (3) Karma, (4) Samanya, (5) Vīsesa, (6) Samavaya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) rupa .................. (16) buddhi ........................ (24) samskara</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

vidya                             avidya

pratyaksa                        anumana

doctrine of pramana26
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Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana’s Bhāṣāpariccheda

Viśvanātha opens his Bhāṣāpariccheda with a salutation to Śrīkṛṣṇa and his Siddhāntamuktāvī, which is a commentary of Bhāṣāpariccheda opens with a salutation to Lord Śiva. Viśvanātha’s work, Bhāṣāpariccheda deals with seven categories viz. dravya, guṇa, karma, sāmānya, viśeṣa, samavāya and abhāva.

Dravya is subdivided into kṣiti (earth) ap (water), tejas (light), marut (air), vyoma (ether), kāla (time), dik (space), dehi (soul) and manas (mind). Viśvanātha opines that ātman (soul) was the seat of intellect which may of two types viz. apprehension (anubhūti) and remembrance (smṛti). Apprehension includes perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony.

The Nyāya doctrine of pramāṇa, as represented by perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony, is incorporated in the
categories of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. The scheme of incorporation is shown below:

\[
\text{Padartha}
\]

\[
(1) \text{Dravya}, (2) \text{Guna}, (3) \text{Karma}, (4) \text{Samanya}, (5) \text{Visesa},
(6) \text{Samavaya} \quad (8) \text{Abhava}
\]

\[
(1) \text{Ksiti}, (2) \text{Ap}, (3) \text{Tejas}, (4) \text{Marut}, (5) \text{Vyoma}, (6) \text{Kala},
(7) \text{dik}, (8) \text{Atman}, (9) \text{Manas}
\]

\[
\text{Buddhi}
\]

\[
\text{Anubhuti} \quad \text{Smrti}
\]

\[
\text{Pratyaksa} \quad \text{Anumana} \quad \text{Upamana} \quad \text{Sabda}
\]

the Nyaya Category of Pramana
Tarkāmṛta of Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra

*Tarkāmṛta* starts with a salutation to God Viṣṇu. According to his view if a man wants to get emancipation should possess the true knowledge of soul.

In the first part of *Tarkāmṛta*, that is known as viṣayakāṇḍa, he divides things into two kinds positive (bhāva) and negative (abhāva). The positive things are substance, quality, action, generality, particularity and inherence. The negative things are of two kinds, viz. (1) relative non-existence (samsargabhāva) and (2) reciprocal non-existence (anyonyabhāva). The first kind is subdivided as: (1) antecedent non-existence (prāgabhāva), (2) subsequent non-existence (pradhvamsābhāva) and (3) absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva).

The second part of *Tarkāmṛta* that is known as Jñānakāṇḍa, section of knowledge, treats of right knowledge (pramā) which is derived through four means called respectively, perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony.
The manner in which the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika and the four pramāṇas of the Nyāya have been combined, is ingenious and reasonable.

The scheme of combination of the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya categories:

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Tarkāmṛta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Visayakanda</th>
<th>Jnanakanda</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dravya, Guna, Karma, Samanya, Viscsa, Samavaya, Abhava</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pratyaksa</td>
<td>Anumana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Vaisesika combined with Nyaya\(^1\)
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Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika some comparison

Concept of God

The concept of God is almost the same to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. They believe in God as eternal, omniscient and omnipotent. Kaṇada does not refer to God in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra. He probably traces authority of the Vedas to the seers, who perceive supersensible objects like merit, demerit, etc. But Praśastapāda regards God as the efficient cause of the world and atoms as its material cause. They also believe that God is the author of the Vedas, who is free from error, inadvertence and deficiency of the sense-organs. He is the promulgator of the moral law.

The atoms of earth, water, fire and air are the material cause of the world. Their conjunction is its non-material cause. Merits and demerits of the individual souls are its auxiliary cause. Knowledge of the six categories is the cause of liberation. It depends on virtue which is enjoyed by God. Duality and plurality are produced by discriminative intellect. Large magnitude and length are produced in triads by plurality of dyads, which is due to the discriminative intellect of God.
Vātsyāyana regards God as a particular soul endowed with merit, knowledge, intuition and sovereignty. He is devoid of demerit, false knowledge and inadvertence. He has eight kinds of supernatural powers due to his merit and intuition.32

God transcends the atoms, time, space and ether which are coeternal with Him. He creates the world out of the atoms in time and space by conjoining them with one another, and destroys it by disjoining them from one another. He creates it through His immediate knowledge of the atoms and the souls, merits and demerits, desire to create and volition without a body.

God is the moral guide of the individual souls and the dispenser of the fruits of their actions. He cannot override the law of Karma. He lays down moral injunctions and prohibitions for the good of mankind and favour their free actions with their fruits. Without His favour free human actions are ineffective.33

**Individual self (Atman)**

The Nyāya arguments for the existence of the soul are similar to the Vaiśeṣika-view. The Naiyāyikas accept sixteen categories viz.
pramāṇa, prameya, etc. They include the soul in the second category viz. prameya. According to Vaiśeṣikas there are seven categories. They considered the self as a substance - the first category.

The self is too subtle to be perceived. It cannot be perceived through the external sense-organs. It is an object of inference.

Self is the first object of cognition in Gautama’s list of prameyas. It is, says Vātsyāyana the seer, experiencer, knower and indicator of everything. Our knowledge of the self is a product of two pramāṇas, word and inference. But Vātsyāyana then goes on to add that the self can be considered as perceived but not in an ordinary sense. It is perceived by a yogin through a special kind of mind-self contact. This perception is the product of yogic Samadhi.

According to Gautama, the marks of the self are: desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and cognition. In the state of liberation the soul retains its integrity and is not merged in God. Thus, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of the soul is the same. They recognize the plurality of individual souls, which is inferred from the variety of experiences and conditions of different souls. Some are happy while others are miserable. Some are
bound while others are liberated. These differences in the status of individuals prove the existence of many souls. The plurality of individual souls is confirmed by the Vedas also.

**Liberation**

All the philosophical systems try to explain the idea of liberation from their own point of view. For example, the Čārvāka philosophy has a materialistic conception of liberation. They say that liberation is the destruction of the body.38 In the Buddhist philosophy Nirvana is at least the arrest of the stream of consciousness leading to the cessation of the possibilities of future. In Jaina philosophy liberation is the total deliverance of the soul from all karmic-matter which has entered into the soul. Nirvana is attained by realization of the true nature of the soul.

According to Nyāya liberation is absolute cessation of pain. The body, the sense-organs and mind are the causes of pain. Pleasure is invariably accompanied by pain. At the time of dissolution the soul becomes free from pain. Its merits and demerits remain dormant during dissolution at the will of God and are active again the time of creation,
when it assumes a body fit for their maturation and consequent enjoyments and sufferings. So during dissolution the soul has relative freedom from pain and possibility of its recurrence and rebirth. But liberation is the soul’s absolute freedom from pain.

The Nyāya view of liberation is the same as the Vaiśeṣika view. According to them liberation is the complete extinction of the special qualities of the soul viz. cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit and impression. In the state of liberation the soul is free from all these qualities.

Mind

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of mind is similar in many ways. According to them mind is distinct from the self and it is a subtle matter. They maintain that mind is the internal organ which is the instrument of directly knowing pleasure, pain, etc. It is one in each body. It is an immaterial, corporeal, part less, atomic, unconscious, eternal substance, which is capable of action or movement. The existence of mind is inferred
from the non-production and production of perception at particular times. Here, when the mind is present there is perception. The conjunctions of the self with the mind, of the mind with the sense-organs and of the sense-organs with the objects are necessary conditions of perceptions. Recollections of colours, sounds, tastes, smells and touches are produced, even when the external sense-organs do not function. Therefore they must be produced by the internal organ. The mind is the internal organ, through which the self recollects, infers doubts and dreams.

The non-simultaneity of the qualities proves that the mind is one in each body. It has no specific qualities. The non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions from the different senses indicates the existence of mind. The Naiyāyikas include the mind in the second category - prameya, while the Vaiśeṣikas consider it as a substance. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of mind is an external substance.

**Atomic theory**

Kaṇāda the founder of Vaiśeṣika system gave the idea of atom to the world for the first time. The Indian philosophies like Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Saṃkhya, Jaina and Baudhā admitted the theory of atom. Atoms are
the non-spatial, indivisible and eternal units of physical substance. They are spherical and supersensible. They can be perceived by Yogins and God.

According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, earth, water, fire and air are eternal as atoms and non-eternal as composite products. The world is created by the atoms.

The existence of atom is inferred from experience that finite wholes like a jar can be split up into smaller parts. This process of division cannot be carried on indefinitely, for then it will be impossible to account for the observed differences in their magnitude as all of them, small or big, would consist of an infinite number of atoms. If we assume a limit to the division, the differences in magnitude found in objects like "a mountain and a mustard seed" may be explained by the difference in the number of atoms going to make them up of two things, the smaller in size will contain fewer ultimate parts than the bigger. It is the final constituent of material objects in this process of division and sub-division that is termed an atom.
CONCLUSION

From the opening verse itself it is clear that the Tarkasaṁgraha is very simple and can be easily studied by the beginners. The way of presentation and lucid manner are very notable. The treatment of subject matter is by way of enunciation (uddeśa) definition (lakṣaṇa) and examination (parīkṣa). Enunciation is the mere mention of the categories by name; definition consists in setting forth that character of a category which differentiates it from other categories; and examination is the settlement, by reasoning, of the question whether the definition of a certain category is really applicable to it.

The combination of the principles of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems are in a unique manner. They are allied and nobody can feel it as of the different systems of Indian philosophy. In other prakaraṇa-granthis the fusion of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika doctrines are projected as two different systems. For example, in Tarkabhāṣa, Keśava Miśra treats of two sects of categories separately: i.e. the sixteen categories of Nyāyasūtra viz. pramāṇa (means of right knowledge), prameya (object of right knowledge), samśaya (doubt),prayojana (the objective or purpose),
dṛṣṭānta (familiar instance), siddhānta (established tenet), avayava (member), tarka (disputation), nirṇaya (ascertainment), vāda (discussion), jalpa (rejoinder), vitanḍa (cavil), hetvābhāsa (fallacy of the reason), chala (quibble), jāti (legitimate objection) and nigrahasthāna (deficiency) and the six categories of Vaiśeṣikasūtra, viz. dravya (substance), guṇa (quality), karma (action), sāmānya (generality), viṣeṣa (particularity) and samavāya (inherence).

A notable difference in the concepts of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems is seen while dealing with the theory of ‘pāka’. According to Vaiśeṣika system pāka occurs in the parts (atoms) but in Nyāya system it occurs in whole as well as in the parts simultaneously. In the classification of categories Annambhāṭṭa deals with the seven categories as the base. But we can see that he includes the sixteen categories of the Nyāyasūtra and the six categories of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra in these seven categories including the abhāva. Annambhāṭṭa accepts the six categories that are mentioned in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra without any modification or change. In the concluding part of Tarkasamgraha Annambhāṭṭa states that all the padārthas in the universe are included in the seven categories.
In the presentation of pramāṇas also Annapambaṇṭṭa joins the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika principles. In the Vaiśeṣikasūtra we see only two pramāṇas viz. perception and inference. In Tarkasamgraha Annapambaṇṭṭa accepts Nyāya view i.e. he deals with the four pramāṇas (perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony) separately. Annapambaṇṭṭa explains the pramāṇas while discussing qualities. Buddhi, a kind of quality which is divided into valid and invalid. The valid knowledge is acquired by these pramāṇas.

In presenting some subjects the author includes different opinions of ancient and modern logic. For example in Dīpika while discussing the theory of sṛṣṭi and pralaya there is a mention of the principle of ancient Nyāya that the dissolution of things is always caused by the decay of samavāyikāraṇa. According to modern Nyāya it is due to the decay of asamavāyikāraṇa.

Tarkasamgraha gives equal importance to the principles of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. Although Nyāya gives prominence to pramāṇas and Vaiśeṣika to prameyas, Annapambaṇṭṭa gives equal importance to both.
The treatment of ontology and metaphysics of Vaiśeṣika are agreeable to Nyāya.

The ultimate aim of both these systems is liberation (niḥśreyasa) but in *Tarkasamgraha* the author never mentions the term liberation.

*Tarkasamgraha* is the most popular work among the prakaraṇagranthas. It contains the essence of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems. All the Universities and Colleges provide *Tarkasamgraha* as the primary book for the beginners to study Logic. *Tarkaśāstra* is believed to be the science of sciences. It helps to study how to think properly.
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   T. S. p.52
   ‘एवं च पदार्थां: वैशेषिकय वासिज्ञानम्। नैवायिकनामार्थविधिवाद्।’
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