The decline of Buddhism began in Deccan in the seventh century A.D. and by 1200 A.D. almost every Buddhist were wiped off from North India. The Brāhmaṇas took advantage of this situation and made efforts to revert back their members from Buddhism and to establish a secure society. New admissions to the society was also prevented. Accordingly the Brāhmaṇic legislators of different provinces brought stringent laws to their newly formed society. This paved way for different schools of thought and culture which was different to the old school which has a single unique thought and culture. The advent of Muhammadans in India brought about a more pronounced social exclusiveness in Hindu society in this period.

Composition of the Prakāraṇa Works

With the demise of Buddhism, the Brāhmaṇic writers under influence of local landholders began to study and teach the logic in a new way. The logic was based on ideas from works of mediaeval school
and subject of ancient school. The works of this period was called Prakaraṇas or Manuals of Logic. In the Parāsara Upapurāṇa, the Prakaraṇa is referred to as a book which deals with some topics of śāstra and of others not included in sastra.\(^1\) The topics that have been explained elaborately in the works of ancient school is not given much importance while topics that were neglected in earlier works are given more importance and are explained. This might be due to the intervention of Jaina and Buddhist. In respect of their styles also the ancient works differed considerably from the manuals: while the style of the former was mostly aphoristic, the style of the latter was expository. The Prakaraṇas (manuals) are in fact remarkable for their accuracy and lucidity as well as for their direct handling of various topics in their serial orders.\(^2\)

Vidyābhūṣan categorizes Prakaraṇa works into four types. They are:- (1) The Nyāya works treating only of the pramāṇa to which the remaining fifteen categories were subordinated; (2) the works which embody in them the categories of the Vaiśeṣika Philosophy; (3) the works which treat of six or seven Vaiśeṣika categories assimilating in them the
Nyāya category of pramāṇa, and (4) the works which treat certain topics of the Nyāya and certain topics of the Vaiśeṣika.¹

Tarkasamgraha

*Tarkasamgraha,* the excellent work of Annamśhaṭṭa belongs to the third category of Prakaraṇa works by Vidyābhūṣan’s classification. According to Athalye the *Tarkasamgraha* is a model work, because it combines in a remarkable degree the three essential qualities of a good manual viz. brevity, accuracy and lucidity.² It is the most popular introductory work on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophies. At present *Tarkasamgraha* and *Dīpikā,* the commentary on *Tarkasamgraha,* became very popular and have been in use as elementary text books in all parts of India. In *Tarkasamgraha* Annamśhaṭṭa simplify the doctrines of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems by pruning all superfluous technicalities out of them and bringing them within comprehension of beginners.

Annamśhaṭṭa, has a unique place in the field of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophies. His father was Melgiri Tirumalarāya. A native of Andhra, Annamśhaṭṭa is said to have flourished in the latter part of the 17ᵗʰ century A.D. He seems to have been an all-round scholar in the field of Indian
philosophical thought, for he has left works on at least four sciences viz. Nyāya, Vyākaraṇa, Vedanta and Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. Of all these works of Annapūrṇa, only the Tarkasāṃgraha and Dīpikā seem to have obtained only wide celebrity.

Annāṃbhaṭṭa’s other works are Ranakojīvāni—commentary on Bhaṭṭa Somesāra’s Nyāyasudhā, Brahmaśūtravyākhyā—a commentary on Bādarāyaṇa’s Brahmaśūtra, Aṣṭādhyāyītīkā—a commentary on Paṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī, Udyotanātika—a commentary on Kayyāṭapradīpa and Siddhāṅjanaṭīka—a commentary on Manьяāloka of Jayadeva.

Commentaries on Tarkasāṃgraha

Vidyābhūṣaṇ mentions thirty five commentaries on Tarkasāṃgraha. Of these commentaries the Dīpikā of Annāṃbhaṭṭa is the most popular. The commentaries are—

1. Tarkasāṃgrahadīpikā or Tarkadīpikā by Annanāṃbhaṭṭa.

2. Tarkasāṃgrahatīkā by Anantha Nārāyaṇa.


4. Tarkaphakkīkā by Kṣamākalyāṇa.
5. *Nyāyabodhini* by Govardhana Miśra.


8. *Padakṛtya* by Candraja Simha.


10. *Nirukti* by Jagannātha Śāstrī.

11. *Nirukti* by Paṭṭābhirāma.


15. *Nyāyabodhini* by Śuklaratnanātha.


24. *Nyāyacandrikā*

25. *Tarkasamgrahopanyāsa*

26. *Tarkasamgrahadīpikāprakāśa* by Nīlakanṭhaśāstrī

27. *Suratakālpatur* by Śrīnivāsa.

28. Ṭīkā by Gangādhara Bhāṭṭa.

29. Ṭīkā by Jagadīśabhaṭṭa.

30. Ṭīkā by Rāmarudra Bhāṭṭa.


32. *Tarkasamgrahadīpikāprakāśa* by Nīlakanṭha.

33. *Nīlakaṇṭhītiṭīka*, a gloss on *Tarkadīpikā* by Nīlakanṭha.

34. *Bhāṣyavr̥ttion* *Tarkasamgraha* by Meru Śāstri.


**Content of Tarkasamgraha**

Annaṁbhāṭṭa opens his *Tarkasamgraha* with a Salutation to Siva thus:—Devotedly meditating on the Lord of the universe in my heart, and offering my salutations to the preceptor, I proceed to compile the book the *Tarkasamgraha* for the easy comprehension of the beginners.
The work deals with seven categories viz. (1) substance (dravya), (2) quality (guna), (3) action (karma), (4) generality (samanya), (5) particularity (vishesa), (6) inherence (samavaya), and (7) non-existence (abhava).

Of the seven categories, the substances are only nine viz. earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, soul and mind.

Quality is of twenty-four kinds viz. colour, taste, odour, touch, number, magnitude, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, weight, fluidity, viscidity, sound, intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit and tendency.

Action is of five kinds; they are: upward motion, downward motion, contraction, expansion and motion from one place to another.

Generality is of two kinds: the more comprehensive and the less comprehensive.

Particularities abiding in eternal substances are innumerable indeed.

Inherence is only one.
Negation is four-fold: antecedent negation, destructive negation, absolute negation and mutual negation.

After that Ananñbhaṭṭa describes the characteristics of each substance specifically.

Earth

Of the substances, earth is that which has odour quality. It is of two varieties; eternal and non-eternal. Eternal is the atomic and non-eternal is the product. Again, it is three-fold: body, organ and object. Body is that like ours; that which grasps odour is the olfactory organ and it abides at the tip of the nose. The earthy objects are like clay, stone and such other things.

Water

Water is that which has cold-touch. It is of two kinds: eternals and non-eternals; eternals are of the nature of atoms and non-eternals are of the nature of products; it is again of three varieties: body, organ and object. Its body is in the region of varuṇa; organ is the gustatory sense by which one perceives savour, and it is located at the tip of the tongue. Objects are rivers, oceans and the like.
Light

Light is that which has hot touch. And, that is of two kinds: eternal and non-eternal. Eternal is of the nature of atom and the non-eternal is of the nature of the product. It is again of three kinds: body, organ and object. The body is well known in the solar region. The organ is the eye which perceives colour and it has for its seat the forepart of the dark pupil of the eye. The object is of four kinds: earthy, heavenly, gastric and mineral. The earthy variety is the common fire and the like; lightning produced from watery fuel is the heavenly variety; the gastric variety is that which causes digestion of food eaten; lustrous metals like gold etc. belong to the mineral variety.

Air

Air is that which possesses touch but is without colour. It is of two-fold: eternal and non-eternal. The eternal is of the nature of atom; the non-eternal is of the nature of product. Again, it is three-fold, owing to its classification into body, organ and object. Body is found in the world of wind-God; organ is the tactile organ, by which one apprehends touch, and it is spread over the whole body; object is the cause of tremor.
of trees etc. The air that circulates within the body of the vital breath. Though one, it is denoted variously as prāṇa, apāna, etc. owing to different situations.

**Ether**

Ether is that which is characterized by the distinctive quality of sound. And it is one, all-pervading and eternal.

**Time**

Time is the special cause of conventional expression of words like past etc. and it is one, all-pervading and eternal.

**Space**

Space is the cause of conventional expressions like east etc. and is one, all-pervading and eternal.

**Soul**

The Soul is the substratum of knowledge. It is two-fold: the Supreme soul and the individual soul. Of these, the Supreme Soul is omnipotent and omniscient and one only. The Individual Soul is different in each body, is all-pervading and eternal.
Mind

Mind is the internal organ which is the instrument in obtaining the knowledge of pleasure etc. It, being linked up with each human soul, is innumerable, atomic and eternal.

Then Anamâbhaṭṭa describes the different kinds of qualities.

Colour

Colour is the quality apprehended only by the eye. It is again of seven kinds due to its division into white, blue, yellow, red, green, brown and variegated. It exists in earth, water and light. Of these, all the seven varieties exist in earth. In water, pale-white variety is found; and in light, bright-white variety resides.

Taste

Taste is the quality apprehended by the gustatory organ; it is of six varieties; sweet, acid, saline, pungent, astringent and bitter. Taste subsists in earth and water. Of these, earth has all the six varieties while water has only the sweet variety.
Odour

Odour is the quality perceived by the olfactory organ. It is two-fold; fragrant and foul. It subsists in earth alone.

Touch

Touch is the quality perceived by the tactile organ alone. It is three-fold: cool, hot and lukewarm. It resides in water, earth, light and air. Of these, cool touch resides in water, hot touch in light and lukewarm in earth and air.

The theory of pāka

The four qualities beginning with colour are produced in earth through the application of heat, and are non-eternal. In other substances they are not produced by the application of heat and are eternal and also non-eternal; in eternals they are eternal; and in non-etrnals they are non-eternal.

Number

Number is the cause of common usage of expressions like one, two, etc. It is found in all the nine substances. It starts from one and ends with parārtha. Oneness is eternal and non-eternal; eternal in eternal
substances and non-eternal in non-eternals. Number two and higher numbers are only non-eternals everywhere.

**Dimension**

Dimension is the special cause of the common usage of words pertaining to measurement. It is found in all the nine substances. And, it is of four varieties: atomic, large, long and short.

**Distinctness**

Distinctness is the special cause of conventional expressions such as this is distinct from that. It is found in all the nine substances.

**Conjunction**

Conjunction is the special cause of conventional expressions of contact between two objects. It exists in all the substances.

**Disjunction**

Disjunction is the quality which destroys conjunction. It resides in all the nine substances.

**Remoteness-paratva and Proximity-aparatva.**

Remoteness and proximity are the special causes of common usage of words expressing remoteness and proximity. They reside in four
substances beginning with earth and also in mind. Each of them is of
two varieties: spatial and temporal. In things existing at a distance, spatial
remoteness is found; in things near, spatial proximity is found; in an
elderly person, temporal remoteness is found; in a younger person,
temporal proximity is found.

Heaviness

Heaviness is the non-intimate cause of the first down-ward motion
in a falling substance. It resides in earth and water.

Fluidity

Fluidity is the non-intimate cause of the first flow. It resides in
earth, water and light. It is of two varieties; natural; and artificial. In
water, natural fluidity is found. In earth and light, artificial fluidity is
found. In earth artificial fluidity is generated through the contact of fire
with ghee etc. Artificial fluidity is found in gold etc. belonging to light.

Viscidity

Viscidity is the quality which causes the agglutination of powder
etc. It exists in water only.
Sound

Sound is the quality apprehended by the organ of hearing. It subsists in ether alone. It is two-fold: of the nature of inarticulate sound and of the nature of the alphabetic sound. Inarticulate sound is found in the sound produced by drum etc. The alphabetic sound is found in the form of languages like Sanskrit etc.

Cognition

Cognition is the quality which is the cause of all kinds of communications; and it is knowledge. It is two-fold: remembrance and apprehension.

Remembrance

Remembrance is the knowledge born of mental impressions alone.

Apprehension

Knowledge other than recollection is apprehension. It is two-fold: conformable to the object and not conformable to the object.

Valid apprehension

A valid apprehension is that in which an object is known as possessing attributes which it really possesses. E.g. the apprehension of
silver arising in an object where there is silverness. This is also known as valid knowledge of a thing.

**Erroneous apprehension**

That is a non-valid apprehension in which an object is known as having an attribute which it does not have in reality. For example, the apprehension of silver arising in a piece of mother-of-pearl. This indeed is called the false cognition.

Valid apprehension is four-fold due to the division into perception, inference, comparative knowledge and verbal testimony.

Their instruments too are four-fold due to division into the instrument of perception, instrument of inference, instrument of comparative knowledge and the instrument of verbal testimony.

**Definition of cause:** that which invariably precedes its effect is its cause.

**Definition of effect:** effect is the counter-correlative of its own antecedent non-existence.

Cause is of three kinds: inherent, non-inherent and occasioning.
The inherent cause is that in which the effect is produced in inseparable union, as the yarns are of the cloth and the cloth is of the colour in it.

The non-inherent cause is one which is inseparably united in the same object either with the effect, or with the cause, as the conjunction of yarns in relation to the cloth or the colour of the yarns in relation to the colour of the cloth.

The cause which is different from both these causes is the occasioning cause, such as the shuttle, loom, etc. in the case of a piece of cloth.

That alone which is the uncommon cause among the three varieties of causes mentioned above, is the special cause.

Perception

Among them, perception is the special cause of perceptive knowledge.

Perception is the apprehension born of the contact of the organ with an object. It is of two kinds: indeterminate and determinate. Of these, the knowledge of a thing without any attribute is known as the
indeterminate apprehension; such as, this is something. Attributive knowledge is determinative apprehension. Apprehensions like, he is Dittha, he is a Brāhmaṇa, he is black, he is a cook are examples of determinate apprehension.

The conjunction of organs with objects which causes perception is of six kinds: (a) conjunction, (b) inherent union with what has come into contact, (c) inherent union with what is intimately united with a thing which has come in contact; (d) inherent union, (e) inherent union with the intimately united; and (f) the connection of the attribute with the substantive.

Conjunction is the contact, producing perception of the jar by the eye.

The inherent union with the conjoint is the contact in producing the perception of the colour of a jar, as the colour is inherently united with the jar which is in contact with the eye.

Inherent union with the intimately united which has come in contact is the contact in producing the perception of the universal genus colourness, as colour is inherently united with the jar that is conjoint
with the ocular organ, and the genus colourness is inherently united therewith.

Inherent union is the contact in the perception of word by the organ of hearing, as the organ of hearing is the ether in the cavity of the ear in as much as sound is the quality of ether and the quality and the qualified are inherently united.

Inherent union with the inherently united is the contact in cognizing soundness, as the genus soundness is inherently united with sound which is inherently united with the auditory sense.

The connection of the qualifier and the qualified is the contact in the perception of negation, as in the cognition: this spot of earth is with the negation of jar. Here, the negation of a jar is an attribute of a place in contact with the eye.

Perception is thus the cognition caused by the six-fold contact, and the organ is its cause. Therefore, organ is the proof of perception.

Inference

Inference is the special cause of inferential knowledge.
Inferential knowledge is the knowledge born of subsumptive reflection.

Subsumptive reflection is the knowledge of reason existing in the subject accompanied by invariable concomitance, e.g. the knowledge: this mountain has smoke which is invariably pervaded by fire. The cognition that results from it and takes the form: the mountain is fiery is the inferential knowledge.

**Invariable concomitance**

Invariable concomitance is the certainty of co-existence like, ‘wherever there is smoke there is fire’.

**Pakṣadharma – the special feature of a subject**

The presence of an invariably concomitant thing in an object like a mountain makes it the characteristic of a receptacle or subject.

Inference is of two kinds: for a person himself and for another.

**Inference for oneself**

Of them, inference for oneself is the cause of one’s own inferential knowledge. For instance, one, having repeatedly seen in the hearth, etc. the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire, arrives at the universal
generalization: wherever there is smoke there is fire, and goes near a mountain. On suspecting fire on the mountain, and seeing smoke thereon, he remembers the universal concomitance: wherever there is smoke there is fire. After this, there downs in him the knowledge this mountain is smoky, pervaded by fire. This is known as subsumptive reflection arising from a mark. From the above knowledge, the inferential knowledge, ‘mountain has fire in it’ arises. This is one’s own inference.

**Inference for others**

But when, one, having inferred for oneself fire from smoke, employs the five-membered syllogism to make others understand the same, it is known as ‘inference for others’, e.g. the mountain is fiery, because there is smoke; whichever is smoky is fiery, as a hearth, and this is such, and therefore it is so. From this five-membered syllogism, others also apprehend fire.

The five members of syllogism are: the proposition set down; the reason adduced therein; the example; the subsumptive correlative; and the conclusion. The proposition set down is, ‘the mountain is fiery’, the reason adduced therein; the example; the subsumptive correlative; and
the conclusion. The proposition set down is ‘the mountain is fiery’, the reason adduced in support of the above proposition is, ‘due to smokiness’; the example cited is ‘whichever is smoky is fiery’, as a hearth; subsumptive correlative is ‘so this mountain’; ‘therefore it is such’ is the conclusion.

The special condition for anumiti

Consideration of the mark alone is the special cause of inferential knowledge for oneself as well as for others. Therefore, consideration of the mark is inference.

Liṅga is three-fold

Liṅga is three-fold: that which is (a) positive and negative; (b) purely positive, (c) purely negative. That which pervades both positively and negatively is the positive-negative; e.g. smokiness when fire is the thing to be proved. The proposition, where there is smoke, there is fire, as in a hearth is the positive concomitance. The proposition where there is the absence of fire, there is the absence of smoke, as in a lake, is the negative concomitance.
Kevalānvayi liṅga

Purely positive liṅga is that which has only positive concomitance, e.g. jar is nameable because it is knowable, like a cloth. Here, there is no negative concomitance of knowability or nameability, as all things are both knowable and nameable.

Kevalavyatireki liṅga

The purely negative reason is that which has a negative concomitance only, e.g. earth differs from the rest because it has smell. Whichever does not differ from the rest has no smell in it, e.g. water. But this earth is not so. Therefore, it is not so. Here, there is no positive example like whichever has smell is different from others, because the whole earth constitutes the subject here.

Subject (Pakṣa)

Subject is that on which the thing to be proved is suspected, e.g. a mountain when smokiness or smoke is the reason.

Similar instance (Sapakṣa)

The subject in which the existence of the thing to be proved is known for certain is the similar instance; e.g. a hearth in the same case.
Contrary instance (Vipakṣa)

The subject in which the non-existence of the thing to be proved is determined is the contrary instance; e.g. a lake in the same inference.

Defective reason (Hetvābhāsa)

The defective reasons are five: (a) straying (savyabhicāra), (b) adverse (viruddha), (c) antithetical (satpratipakṣa), (d) unestablished (asiddha), and (e) stultified (bādhita).

The Strayer reason (Savyabhicāra hetu)

Savyabhicāra reason is three-fold: the straying reason is one that is known also as the deviating. It is of three kinds due to its division into common, uncommon and non-exclusive.

Of these, the reason which is present in a place where there is the absence of the thing to be proved is the common strayer reason; e.g. the argument mountain is fiery, because, it is knowable; here knowability exists in a lake also where there is the absence of fire.

The uncommon strayer reason is that which is found only in the subject while not being present in any similar and contrary instances;
e.g. sound is eternal because of soundness. Soundness exists only in sound and is absent in all eternal and non-eternal things.

The non-exclusive strayer reason is that which has neither positive instance nor negative instance, as in the argument, everything is non-eternal because it is knowable. Here, since everything is treated as the subject, no example is available to support the inference.

Adverse reason (Viruddha hetu)

The self-contradicting reason is that which is pervaded by the negation of the thing to be proved e.g. the argument, sound is eternal because it is produce. Here, producibility is pervasive of non-eternality which is of the nature of the negation of eternality.

Antithetical reason (satpratipaksa hetu)

The antithetical reason is that of which there exists another reason capable of proving the negation of the thing to be proved, as in the argument, sound is eternal, because it is audible, like soundness; and sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a jar.
The Unestablished reason (Asiddha)

The unestablished reason (asiddha) is of three kinds: (a) unestablished in respect of its substratum; (b) unestablished in respect of itself; and (c) unestablished in respect of its concomitance.

(i) The reason with non-existent substratum is found in the argument: sky-lotus is fragrant because it is a lotus like a lotus in a lake. In this argument, sky-lotus is the subject but it never exists.

(ii) The reason that is unestablished in respect of itself is found in the argument: sound is a quality because it is visible; here visibility does not exist in sound, as in sound only audibility exists.

(iii) The reason associated with an adventitious condition is known as unestablished in respect of its own pervasion adventitious condition is that which pervades the thing to be proved but is not pervasive of the reason. Not having counter-correlative of its absolute negation while co-existing with the thing to be proved is being pervasive of the thing to be proved. Having the counter-entity of absolute negation co-existing with reason is being non-pervasive of reason. In the argument: Mountain is smoky, because it has fire, contact with wet fuel is the upādhi. It is
pervasive of the thing to be proved, because of the concomitance, wherever there is smoke there is contact with wet fuel. But there is no contact with wet fuel wherever there is fire; for example, in a red hot iron-ball there is fire, though contact with wet fuel is not there. Thus the adventitious condition is non-pervasive of the reason. In like manner, contact with wet fuel is the adventitious condition in the present instance because it is pervasive of the thing to be proved while not being pervasive of the reason. Therefore, fire which is the reason in the argument under reference is unestablished in relation to its own pervasiveness owing to its association with adventitious condition.

**Contradicted reason (Bādhita hetu)**

The contradicted reason is one where the negation of the thing to be proved is established by another proof, e.g. fire is not hot, because it is a substance, like water. Here, non-hotness is the thing to be proved. But hotness, the negation of non-hotness, is cognized through tactile perception. Therefore, the above reason is known as the contradicted reason.
**Analogy (Upamāna)**

Analogy is the instrument of assimilative knowledge. It is the knowledge of the relation existing between a name and the object denoted by it. The knowledge of similarity is its immediate special cause; the remembrance of the meaning of a former direction conveying similarity between two objects, is the intermediary operation; this may be exemplified thus: a person who is ignorant of the object denoted by the word ‘gavaya’ learns from a certain forester that the ‘gavaya’ is similar to a cow. Subsequently, going to the forest, he sees the strange animal similar to a cow, and remembers the declaration. Then arises in him the knowledge: this is the animal denoted by the word gavaya.

**Verbal testimony (Śabda)**

Valid verbal testimony is a sentence spoken by a trustworthy person. A trustworthy person is one who speaks of things as they exist in reality. Sentence is a group of words, like: ‘Bring a cow’. Word is that which has significative potency. Significative potency is the desire of God that a certain concept be understood from a certain word.
Verbal expectancy, compatibility and juxtaposition are the causes of the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence. Verbal expectancy consists in the inability of a word to convey the meaning of a sentence due to the absence of some other word. Compatibility is non-contradiction of the sense. Juxtaposition is the utterance of words in quick succession.

**Verbal expectancy**

A sentence devoid of verbal expectancy etc. is unauthoritative; e.g. the words; a cow, a horse, a man, an elephant, etc. are not authoritative as they are devoid of verbal expectancy. The sentence, 'sprinkle with fire' is not authoritative owing to the absence of compatibility. Words like 'bring ... a ... cow' etc. pronounced at long intervals are not authoritative owing to want of juxtaposition.

Sentence is of two kinds: sacred and secular. The sacred being the pronouncements of God, are all authoritative. But the secular pronunciation made by trustworthy persons only are authoritative; all pronouncements made by others are unauthoritative.
Meaning of a sentence

The apprehension arising from valid testimony is the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence. Its special cause is the word.

Erroneous apprehension

Erroneous apprehension is of three types: doubt, misapprehension and false assumption.

Doubt

The cognition that apprehends several mutually contradictory attributes in the same attributive thing is doubt, like: is it a post or a man?

Misapprehension

Misapprehension is erroneous knowledge, like the knowledge: ‘this is silver’ in a piece of oyster shell.

False assumption

False assumption is the deduction of a more extensive thing by the hypothetical assumption of a less extensive one, as in the example: if there were no fire, then there would be no smoke.
Recollection

Recollection also is of two kinds: true and erroneous. The one arising from the valid cognition is the true one; that arising from false cognition is the erroneous one.

Pleasure

That which is experienced by all with agreeable feelings is pleasure.

Pain

That which is experienced by all with disagreeable feelings is pain.

Desire, etc.

Wish is desire; ill-feeling is anger; volitional effort is the will-to-do; merit is that which is born of enjoined actions; but demerit is that which is born of prohibited actions.

Eight qualities beginning with Buddhi

The eight qualities beginning with buddhi are the specific qualities of the soul only. Cognition, desire and effort are of two kinds: eternal and non-eternal. Eternals belong to Īśvara; non-etrnals belong to the human soul.
Impression - Samskāra

Impression is of three kinds: velocity, reminiscent impression and elasticity. Velocity resides in four substances beginning with earth and in mind. That which is born of experience and which causes recollection is reminiscent impression. It resides in the Soul only. Elasticity is the force that brings a thing back to its normal shape whenever it is distorted. It resides in mat etc. which are the transformation of earth.

Action

Action is of the nature of motion. That which causes connection with regions upward is tossing; that which causes connection with regions downwards is dropping; that which causes connection nearer the body is contraction; that which causes connection with distant regions is expansion. All other varieties of motion is gamana. It resides in the four substances beginning with earth and in mind.

Generality

That which is eternal, one, and which resides in many things is the universal. It resides in substance, quality and action. It is two-fold due to its division into the more extensive and the less extensive. Existence
(sattā) is the more extensive, and substanteness etc. are the less extensive variety.

**Particularity**

Particulars are the differentiating features residing in eternal substances.

**Inherence**

Inherence is the eternal relation; it exists in an inseparable pair; when, between two things, one thing, as long as it is not destroyed, exists in the other thing only, they are known as inseparable pairs; for example, parts and the whole; quality and the qualified; motion and the moving object; genus and the individual; and particulars and the eternal substances.

**Antecedent negation**

Antecedent negation is without a beginning but with an end; it exists prior to the production of an effect.

**Destruction**

Destruction has a beginning but is without an end; it occurs after the production of an effect.
Absolute negation

Absolute negation exists in all the three times, having that which ascertains or reflects counter correlative delimited by relation or connection, as in the statement: there is no jar on this ground.

Reciprocal negation

That which ascertains or reflects counter correlative as delimited by the relation of identity is reciprocal negation, e.g. the statement: jar is not cloth.

Conclusion

Since all categories are included severally in those enumerated above, it is proved that categories are only seven.

The Jaina and Buddhist writers who were the founders of Medieval school of Indian Logic confirmed only one category, i.e. pramāṇa, the means of valid knowledge. Thereby some Brāhmaṇic writers also dealt with only one category as done by Jaina and Buddhist writers but it included the remaining fifteen categories of ancient school. Some categories such as Prameya (objects of knowledge), Jalpa
(wrangling), Vītaṇḍa (cavil), Jāti (analogue) and Nigrahasthāna (the point of defeat) were not included while other were considered as subdivisions.

**Other writers of Prakaraṇa works**

**Bhāsarvajña (about 950 AD)**

Bhāsarvajña, the well known author of *Nyāyasara* was the first Brāhmaṇic writer who tried to assimilate the sixteen categories into one.

There is not much knowledge about the age in which he became a celebrated writer or about his birth. He might have been a native of Kāśmīra. His unusual name shows similarity to the names of two people who lived in Kāśmīra about 775 AD. and 1025 AD. they were Sarvajña Mitra and Sarvajña Deva respectively.

**Varadarāja (about 1150 AD)**

It is believed that, Varadarāja born in Andhra or Teliṅgāna, in the Madras presidency. He wrote a work on Logic called *Tārkkarakṣa* or protection of Logicians. He might have lived in the 12th century AD. Most probably his date of living may be around 1150 AD., shortly after which Jīṇāna Pūrṇa or Jīṇāna Deva, a disciple of Viṣṇu Svāmin, wrote a commentary on the *Tārkkarakṣa* called *Laghudīpikā*.
Keśava Miśra (about 1275 AD)¹⁰

Keśava Miśra, the author of Tarkabhāṣā, a Nyāya treatise, was a native of Mithilā and a preceptor of Govardhana Miśra who wrote a commentary on Tarkabhāṣa, called Tarkabhāṣāprakāśa. Padmanābha Miśra, author of Kiraṇāvalī Bhāśkara and Kanādarahasya Muktaḥara was an elder brother of Govardhana. So Keśava Miśra, Padmanābha and Govardhana were contemporaries. Padmanābha lived between the beginning of the 13th century and end of the 14th century AD. Probably he lived at the end of the 13th century AD.¹¹

Vallabhācārya

We cannot put an exact date to the birth and life of Vallabhācārya. He might have flourished in the second half of the 13th century. But Vallabhācārya of Vaishnava sect was different from this Vallabhācārya. Vallabhācārya's work is Nyāyalīlāvatī.

Viswanātha Nyāyapañcānana

Pancanāna was the author of a Vaiśeṣika treatise called Bhāṣāpariccheda and of a commentary on the same called Siddhāntamuktāvalī. He was a native of Navadvīpa and an adherent of
the Nyāya school of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. Viśwanātha himself composed the *Gautamaśūtra-vṛtti* at Vṛndāvan in the year 1634 A.D.

Viśwanātha also wrote another work called *Māṃsa-tattvaviveka*. The work was written as the result of a controversy with the paṇḍitas of Mahārāṣṭra with a view to vindicating the custom of meat-eating among the Brahmins of Northern India.

**Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkara**

Another important treatise on Vaiśeṣika philosophy was written by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkara known as ‘*Tarkāṁṛta*’.
REFERENCE

1. ‘नन्देयं शाश्वस्मकरणयो: को भेद इति चेत्
शाश्वस्मकरणसम्बन्धं शाश्वस्मकरणान्तरे स्थितम्।
आदु: प्रकरण नाम ग्रन्थपेदे विपक्षतःस।’ Quoted from H.I.L., p. 356.

2. ibid.

3. ibid.

4. Tarkasamgraha of Anumābhaṭṭa, Y.V. Athalye, P.L. VIII.


6. ‘निषाधय हृदि विषेषं विधाय गुरुवन्तनम्।
बालनं सुखवोधय क्रियते तर्कसाध्यः’ T.S. opening lines

7. H.I.L., p. 357

8. ibid.

9. H.I.L., p. 373

10. ibid., p. 381.

11. ibid.

12. ibid., p. 392.

13. ibid.