CHAPTER-6
RELATIONS WITH THE NOBLES OF THE IMPERIAL COURT

The parties and politics operating at the Mughal court and the role of different sections of the nobility in our period has been exhaustively gauged. The present chapter, therefore, restricts to shed light only on the development of Jai Singh Sawai’s attitude towards the nobles and benefits reaped thereof. The study characterises the relations towards premier nobles; nobles belonging to adjoining ares of Jai Singh’s watan and the other major Rajputs Râjas.

It is the setback which followed the participation of Jai Singh after the battle of Jajau which manifested itself in the resumption of Amber to Khalisa and the importance given to Vijay Singh in the context that made Jai Singh aware of the grave difficulties he could face with the uncertain support of the Emperor in the given fluid situation prevalent at the court. In the circumstances Jai Singh’s relations with the premier nobles came to occupy crucial importance.

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In the above backdrop, it is deemed essential to delineate the relations of Jai Singh with the premier nobles.

It goes to the credit of Zulfiqar Khan to have adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the Rajputs. The fact that in such a policy, he was directed more by compulsion of circumstances to recognize the importance of Rajputs and mobilize them to serve in the hour of need is inexplicable. Given the situation Jai Singh welcomed the overtures.

This policy of Zulfiqar Khan manifested itself in the abolition of jāziya and the concession given in the form of enhancement of mansab and conferment of title to the Maharaja. Though the confirmation of both these promises could be fulfilled after the death of Zulfiqar Khan, the fact remains, that he took up the Rajput cause. Wākil reports are replete with the interest shown by Raja Sabha Chand, the diwān of Zulfiqar in the affairs of Amber.¹

The Sayyids continued to endorse the trend Zulfiqar Khan had set by confirmation to abolition of jāziya. Moreover, the enhancement of mansab and title were affirmed

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1. WR dtd Jyestha Vadi 1, V.S.1768/18 May 1711; WR dtd Sawan Vadi 2, 1768/5 Aug 1711 etc.
by them. This was the extent to which the attitude of the Sayyids stretched.

So far as their relations with Jai Singh were concerned the cleft occurred due mainly to the intervention of the Sayyids in the Kotah-Bundi affairs in which Jai Singh had sided Budh Singh his brother in law against Bhim Singh of Kotah. The Sayyids delayed the restoration of the watan of Bundi to Budh Singh which antagonized Jai Singh.

The tacit support of the Sayyids to the jats whetted further annoyance of Jai Singh. The territories of jats and Kachhwas brushed each other and therefore endangered their territories. The Sayyids tried to appease Jai Singh by bringing Ajit Singh into picture. Jai Singh had open options to accept invitations of Sayyid’s opponents but he sided none.

II

Jai Singh Sawai as we have already observed had extensive jāqīrs and manipulated large chunks of jāra apart from the watan area.¹ His conscious effort to chalk out a

¹. See infra Chap. II.
concrete principality is also not oblivious to us. With the increase in mansab and extension in his assignments, his power and prestige increased constantly.

Interestingly enough, the Raja was not satisfied with the power and prestige he already wielded, instead, he used it as an asset to assert his strength over the neighbouring jagirdars and ijaraadars partly for the reason that he did not have any other strong jagirdar close to his watan.

Thus as early as 1694, we come across complaints regarding the looting of grain worth Rs. 2000 by Jai Singh's several from the jagir of the prince in pargana Anupanagar. Similarly in 1696, the qumashla of Maharaaja collected mahsul from the jagir of Muhammad Taqi Khan who was assigned 1,20,000 dama in pargana Chatsu. Such complaints became more numerous in the time of Sawai Jai Singh the qumashla of Ilkhas Khan the diwan-i-tan complained against Maharaaja's mutasaddis, who collected revenue from the haveli Ajmer. Muhammad, who held jagir at Mauzabad amounting to one lakh and many thousand dama for a

1. WR 23 Rabi'II, 1105/22 Dec. 1694.
2. Azdāšt of Bhawani Das to the Mahāraja 1753/1696.
3. WR Asārh Vadi 5, 1769/12 July 1712.
duration of one year was similarly treated by Maharāja's officials.¹ In 1714, 11,000 dāms from Afzal Khan's jāgīr in pargana Dipalpur were appropriated by Maharaja's officials.² In the same pargana from the jāgīr of Hakim ul Mulk, Maharaja's official forcibly collected 7000 dāms.³ In pargana Taal, he appropriated half the revenue assigned to the grandson of Amirul Umara Zulfiqar Khan as also 2800 dāms from the same pargana which was assigned to Jani Khan's son, the Khānsāma of Jahan Shah were collected by Maharaja's officials.⁴

It would be worthwhile pondering over as to what was the reason of this aggressive attitude. For a specific period as 1707-11, one may take this as a reaction to the confiscation of watan. It may, however, be borne in mind that this attitude continued till the time he established his principality of Jaipur state and his position among the fellow Rajput rājas. This was the process which gained momentum in the later years of Jai Singh Sawai. It is,

1. Ibid.
2. WR Asār Sudi 15, 1771/27 June 1714.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
therefore, needful to examine, where this policy of Sawai Jai Singh was aiming at.

In an earlier chapter, we have noticed how zamindāri areas were converted into watan jagīra. How zamindāri was acquired when a jagārī had already been held for a longer period. How far for that matter, ijāra were sought in perpetuity so that the claim for jagārī might be stronger.

In the present context the above mentioned facts are of much relevance in the sense that a closer scrutiny reveals that Muhammad Taqi was being harassed in pargana Chatsu, since the pargana was not only a zamindāri mahāl but was also in the jagārī of the Rāja and Kunwar and also shared by Taqi Khan. The mahārāja was interested to hold it in entirety (dar-o-bast) as this pargana was only at a distance of 30 kōs from Jaipur. Such examples can be multiplied.

The jats proved the most formidable rival in the sense that their territories (zamindāri/jagirdāri) brushed each

1. Arzidashts dtd. 1753/1696 also dtd Daagh Vadi, 1768/1712 Dec. 1711; Asārh Vadi VS, 1769/16 June 1712 and Sawan vadi 15, 1769/12 July 1712.
2. Arzdāṣṭ 1756/1699.
3. WR dtd Māgh Vadi 7, 1770/23 Jan 1714.
others. There was a time when, the Raja felt his jāgīr in pargana Deoti Sauchari was endangered due to zamīndāri mahāl of Churaman in pargana Khohri. Consequently, the Raja swept the zamīndāri rights in his favour leaving Churaman in a similar insecurity. The problem did not end here. The efforts were made to deprive the jats of many important parganas like that of Kaman, Pahari, Khoh etc. Jai Singh Sawai's intention was to push back the jat claims from the areas encompassing the immediate vicinity of his wātan. The Raja took the added precaution not to sub-assign tracts of his own jāgīr to the jats.

Surprisingly enough, we gather from the testimony of the wakīl that complaints against the Maharāja were reaching to the Emperor. Also at the same time, we find the leading nobles being instrumental in recommending the assignment and leases for Jai Singh Sawai. The Emperor is found complying

1. WR dtd. Asārh Vadi 7, 1771/4 July 1714; Asārh Vadi 4, 1769/6 Oct 1712.
3. For details see my article on 'Agrarian Condition of Pargana Kaman' 1768-1775, P.I.H.C., Goa, 1987.
5. WR dtd. 11 Shawwāl 1105/5 June 1694; WR dtd 23 Rabi' II 1105/22 Dec 1694 etc.
to such recommendations. His attitude impressing more trust upon Jai Singh Sawai in comparison to the other smaller jagirdars and zamindars.

III

The above study wherein we pursued the appreciation of Jai Singh by the nobility as a tangible tool in the scheme of events unleashed at the Imperial Court as also the aggressive attitude of Jai Singh towards the nobles in the immediate vicinity of Amber leads one to speculate the reason as to why he was deemed so important. True, that he was an important noble belonging to the highest rank of nobility, but so was Ajit Singh. A close analysis of the relations with the major Rajput might be self illuminating.

The period which followed the death of Aurangzeb was crucial for Rajputana due mainly to the resumption of war and Jains of Jai Singh and Ajit Singh.² The vital role that Rana played in the negotiations and conciliations is notorious enough.³

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2. For details see supra.

3. See arzdasht of Ghaziuddin Khan's munshi to Jai Singh Asoj Vadi 13, V.S. 1764/12 Sept. 1707; Vir...Vinod p.781-784.
Though the proposal that the Rāna be made the Emperor of Hindustan after ejecting the Mughals is recorded\(^1\), it would suffice our purpose to presume that a platform had been founded which had woven the Rajput interest in quite an exceptional manner.\(^2\) A clear manifestation of this was the adamance for complete restoration of their jagîrs and posting in adjacent provinces.\(^3\)

The circumstances whereupon the Rāna receded into oblivion and Ajit Singh was murdered brought Jai Singh inevitably to the fore providing thereby to the Imperial Court a representative of the Rajputs.

The process, it is noteworthy was by no means devoid of complexity, since Jai Singh had earned this through mediating and maintaining tremendous rapport with the other Rajputs and benefitting from the dissensions that had cropped up within the Rajputs.

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Jai Singh's relations with Marwar were fairly cordial. The reflection of the deep understanding is reflected not only in the united stand they took to recover their watan but also in the reservation to entertain the invitations extended by the nobles to attend on the Emperor.¹

The breach of understanding occurred when Ajit Singh decided to support Sayyids contrary to Jai Singh's resistance. A direct confrontation was provided by Jai Singh's attempt to support Neku Syar's claim to the throne in league with Rana Sangram Singh and Chabela Ram.² The

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1. WR reporting that Khan-i Khanan has been informed about the arrival of Maharaja and Ajit Singh. Requests to leave Ajit Singh if he delays because the latter's ancestors had acted always in a similar manner unlike Maharaja's ancestors who were always in the Emperor's service dtd Phalgun Sudi 12, Mon V.S. 1767/2 March 1710; also W.R. "Ajit Singh is safe since he is away while you are only 80 kòs away from Jahanabad. You are staking your watan without reason. Nawab Amirul Umara says that "Raja Ram Singh and Nawab Asafuddaula had become brothers by exchanging turbans and I (Amirul Umara) and Kunwar Kishan Singh had also become brothers. You have been granted mansab and title keeping the above in view. You are considered the grandson even then you do not stop non-cooperative activities. You should fulfill your ancestor's wish" dtd Sawan Vadi 2 V.S. 1768/5 Aug 1711.

Sayyids foiled tactfully the above plan. Jai Singh maintained consistent unoffensive contacts with Ajit Singh after the deposition of Sayyids.

Following the death of Ajit Singh he had diplomatic relations with Abhai Singh and Bakht Singh, sons of Ajit Singh. However there occurred a clash between Jai Singh and Bakht Singh due to Jai Singh's involvement in Jodhpur, the former became victorious easing the situation more in the interest of Jai Singh.

Jai Singh's relations with Bundi were slightly in variance to that of Marwar since Budh Singh had taken the side of Bahadur Shah. He was therefore fortunate enough to relish the royal favours. Irrespective of the above differences in their policy they had considerable of good diplomatic as well as family relationship, Budh Singh being the brother in law of Jai Singh.

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1. Ibid No.24, p.90.
2. Vir Vinod, p. 848.
4. For details, see Parties and Politics pp. 122-123.
It was at the setback which was provided by the confiscation of the watan Bundi that Budh Singh was placed in an unfavourable disposition of the Imperial Court. On the testimony of wakil reports we learn that Jai Singh was extremely instrumental in the restoration of Bundi.\(^1\) Not only at this time but later too Jai Singh recovered Bundi for Budh Singh. The relations, however, in the meantime became strained between the two Rajas ever since the clash occurred between Budh Singh and his wife over succession of their son.\(^2\)

The relations were regenerated when Dalel Singh another son of Budh Singh was married to Jai Singh’s daughter and Budh Singh died. Jai Singh requested honours from the Imperial court at the birth of his grandson from the above wedlock.\(^3\) Dalel Singh continued to pay strong allegiance to Jai Singh.

Readable from our framework seems the fact that Jai Singh was not only able to secure benefits from the individual nobles but also made an important usage of

\(^1\) WR dtd Baisakh Sudi, I, V.S., 1772/4 May 1715.

\(^2\) Yaddasht Mangsir Vadi 10 V.S., 1789/1 Nov 1732.

\(^3\) Letter of Dalel Singh to Jai Singh dtd Bhadva Vadi 5 V.S., 1799/10 Aug 1742.
prevailing condition in his favour. So much so that while premier nobles could not ignore him he whetted his status by involving in the succession and problems of the Rajput states. All this in turn cushioned his contacts with the Emperor.