CHAPTER FOUR

THE MUSLIM LEAGUE AND THE QUIT INDIA MOVEMENT

Generally the incident of the Quit India Movement was of great importance to the followers of the Congress objectives propagated by Gandhi, who planned it as a means for getting power from the British, but not for the Muslim League which considered it a precursor of Hindu Raj in India. Why the Muslim League opposed the Movement? What were the consequences had the Muslim League joined Gandhi in this movement? What benefits Jinnah wanted to gain during the movement? Why the Government crushed it? What was the impact of the Movement on Indian politics? Whether all the minorities, the Muslims being the largest, participated in the Movement? These are some of the questions which emerge in the mind which need answer, but to the disappointment of a scholar the contemporary writers have written the least on the causes of non-participation of the Muslim League and its reaction to the movement in different states.

However, to have a clearer understanding of the circumstances of the movement and League's opposition to it, it is indispensable to know the depth of the differ-
ences between the Congress and the League. Since the Quit India Resolution was adopted at the Wardha Congress meeting (1942) the political developments have to be reviewed before and after this date.

For Churchill, "Freedom" meant freedom for the British and other European nations, and for Roosevelt democracy meant democracy for the United States, though they advocated the principle of independence through the U.N. Charter. The same policy continued to be followed by the British Government for retaining their control in the colonies. During the World War II the U.S. Government, though played a significant role in the effort of breaking the constitutional deadlock in India, Churchill's directives to Cripps, proved all his plans a farse. The Allies had started war to safeguard their own interest against Germany, Japan and Italy. The United States saw in it a threat to American global interest. Roosevelt - Churchill pronouncement for the liberty, peace and democracy in all the dependent countries only aimed to draw men and material support from them. The change in the U.S. and British foreign policy was met with surprise by the American and

European nations. If the European nations and the United States were fighting against the Axis powers for the establishment of peace, liberty and democracy, Churchill declared that this principle was not applicable to India. In view of this embarrassing statement, Cripps Mission to install an interim government in India with the assurance to get India's assistance in the war and to grant independence after War was a clear indication of the oppressive British policy. As a result, the Congress opposed the Cripps proposal and demanded independence first and to take the question of the defence of India later, to which the British did not agree. When the war broke out on September 3, 1939, Linlithgow declared India a belligerent without making any effort to consult the Indian leaders. The British used the rule of force. The Congress asked the British Government to state her war aims, which made the Congress-Viceroy negotiations stagnant. Hence, the Viceroy turned towards the Muslim League for support in the British War aims.

Initially, there was cleavage between the Muslim political parties. The United Muslim Party was led by

the Nawab of Dacca, representing big landlords and the
Krishak Proja Party (KPP) was led by Faz-ul-Haq, repre-
senting the poor peasants. He was Vice-President of
the Bengal Provincial Muslim League. In Bihar, the
United Muslim and Ahrar Parties did not join the League.
In Central Provinces and Madras also, there were differ­
ences between the Muslim Parties. In Sind, since the
Azad Muslim party did not like interference of others in
the provincial matters, the formation of a single Muslim
party in the state was not possible. In U.P., the Muslim
Unity Board, led by Khaliquzzaman was sympathetic to the
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Muslim League. Jinnah had already purified and revived
the League and stressed the need for a United Muslim
front. Jinnah made the Muslim League the only representa-
tive body of the Muslims. He exhorted the Muslims all
over India to rally round the League banner. After the
1937 elections, the League's position became so weak that
the Congress proposed the merger of the Muslim League with-
in its own. However, the Jinnah League survived and on
June 30, 1937, Jinnah appealing the Muslims said:

5. The Leader, March 22, 1937.
"My only object in organising the Muslim League, and the Muslim League Parliamentary Board, and putting forward the programme for the "Nazm" (organization) of Musalmans ... is that Musalmans should unite among themselves as they have been ordered to do by God and his Prophet."

The appeal had a sharp effect on Muslim voters and the Muslim League emerged victorious at Bundelkhand and gained strength. In February, 1938, Pant wrote to Nehru that it would not be possible to ignore the Muslim League and, therefore, the Congress resolved to settle communal issues with it. The Congress Mass Contact and Movement\textsuperscript{7} at its atrocities in the Congress governed provinces created in the hearts of Muslims an anti-Congress feeling and made them a nation by 1939. Encouraged by these developments, Jinnah demanded the Muslim homeland for Muslims in 1940 at Lahore, which caused the alienation of

\begin{itemize}
  \item[6.] The Khilafat, June 30, 1937.
  \item[7.] Pant to Nehru, February 11, 1938, Nehru Correspondence, Vol. 79.
\end{itemize}
Muslim League from the Congress and later from the Quit India Movement.

On May 10, 1940, Winston Churchill replaced Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister and on May 19, 1940, L.S. Amery became Secretary of State for India in place of Lord Zetland, while Lord Linlithgow remained the Viceroy of India. Amery, the Leader of the Labour Government, changed the British policy towards India and declared that the "attainment by India of full and equal partnership in Commonwealth was the goal of British policy." On the one hand, on June 15-16, 1940, the League's subject committee authorised Jinnah only to negotiate with the Congress, and on the other, the Congress Working Committee meeting on July 7, 1940, resolved that its struggle for India's independence would continue without violence, and above all the Viceroy, on July 6, 1940, had assured the expansion of the Executive Council with adequate representation of the Muslims. If the Congress


11. V.P. Menon, op. cit., p. 89.
demanded complete independence before assisting the British war committee, the League would mean it the establishment of Hindu Raj which would be unacceptable to the Jinnah League which demanded the creation of Pakistan. The Viceroy realised that the Congress help would not come and, therefore, he turned towards Jinnah for help asking the League to cooperate with the Government in the war efforts.

On August 8, 1940, Linlithgow declared that power would not be transferred to any system of government whose authority is directly denied "by large and powerful elements in India's national life." Further, the Cripps proposal in 1942, indirectly indicated the recognition of the establishment of Pakistan, as it provided for the creation of two or more independent Unions in India. The Congress Working Committee expressed its indignation over these proposals. On July 13, 1942, Gandhi threatened that either the British should recognise India's independence

12. See Correspondence between Jinnah and Lord Linlithgow between February 1940 to July 1940 in Jamiluddin Ahmad (ed.) Historic Documents.


14. Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from April 1942, to May 1943, Delhi, p. 2.
or he will launch an open rebellion. This was too much for Jinnah. He accused the Congress of aiming to establish 'Hindu Raj' placing the Muslims and other minorities at the mercy of the Congress Raj. However, Jinnah was apprehensive that the British government would be pressurised by the Congress to accept its terms, leaving the League in the cold.

In 1940, while the War between the Allies and the Axis powers was fought in Europe and Japan was capturing British territories in the East and there was a possibility of Japanese attack on India also, the Congress on September 15, 1940, decided to start a civil disobedience movement against the British war efforts and announced its plan for "direct action" and consequently started satyagraha on November 7, 1940. The Government took repressive measures and arrested Nehru, Azad and as many as 4,749 congressmen. The Muslim League

characterised the Congress movement as a pressure on the British to concede its demand and declared to resist the movement with its power. The Government suppressed the movement with all power at its command by arresting the Congressmen and the Congress was forced to suspend the movement. Jinnah was much encouraged by the statements of Amery and Linlithgow on this occasion and he found in it a favourable climate to propagate the idea of Pakistan and win the support of Muslim masses for it. In November 1940, he said:

"The whole effort of the Congress seems to me to be like that of a bat which has entered a room and flies round and round knocking against the walls but will not, cannot, see that the door is wide open. That is what the policy of the Congress is like."

Jinnah was happy on the failure of the Civil Disobedience Movement and gave an impression to the people that Congress aimed at capturing power by sword. He exhorted the Muslims not to cooperate with the Congress and its movement. He said:

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22. Ibid.
"I say to Musalmans, please don't get mixed up or involved in this terrible situations, for which the Congress alone is responsible. But if we find at any time that our interests are at stake we shall play our part and intervene, if necessary. Let that be understood."

The Council of the All-India Muslim League met on February 23, 1941 and in a resolution it said that 'the Civil Disobedience Movement started by the Congress is designed to bring pressure on the British Government to resile from the position it has taken in regard to the future constitution of India relating to the Muslims and other minorities and concede to the Congress demands, which are fundamentally opposed by Muslim India as they are detrimental to its vital interests.' The resolution also quoted a statement of Gandhi of November 5, 1939 published in the Harijan which said. 'So long as there is no workable arrangement with the Muslim League Civil resistance must involve resistance against the League.'

"The resolution concluded by saying that 'if any concession to the Congress is made which adversely affects or militates against the Muslim demands it will be resisted by the Muslim League with all the power it can command and the Muslim League desires to place it on record that
if the situation demands it would not hesitate to intervene and play such part in the struggle as may be necessary for the protection of the rights and interests of the Mussalmans of this country." This amply clarifies the stand taken by the League.

Thereafter the All-India Muslim League met at Madras for its annual deliberation on April 12, 1941 and was attended by eminent leaders like E.V. Ramaswami Naicker, the leader of the justice Party; R.K. Shammukham Chetty, Dewan of Cochin, K.V. Reddy, A.P. Patro, Kumarrajah, M.A. Muttiah Chettiar, C.R. Srinivasan, the editor of the Swadesi Mitran, and M.C. Rajah, besides N. Sivaraj and other non-Brahmin leaders. In the session Jinnah declared that the League goal was Pakistan and he extended his support for the establishment of Dravidistan. He asked the Muslims to have education which/a means to an end and which was Pakistan. "Your biggest task is to have Muslims," he said, "so well-trained in political science, in political language, in the political movements not only of this country, but of the whole world." Defining the League's policy he said that under no circumstances, it would accept

24. The *Bombay Chronicle*, April 15, 1941.
any constitution of an 'All-India Character with one Government at the Centre.' He was afraid that if the League agreed to this the Muslims would be absolutely wiped out of their existence. He bitterly criticised for Pandit Jawaharlal's statement in which he stood/’Akhand Bharat' and said that Muslim did not like to live in Democracy. It would mean the rule of majority.

Announcing the League's policy Jinnah said that its policy was to endeavour to promote goodwill and harmony among other peoples on the basis of equality, fair play and reciprocity. This can best be secured by agreement with other peoples and parties....Any ambition of domination by one over the other must be abandoned and the sooner that is abandoned the quicker will be the solution of India's problems.

The Conference also passed a resolution to the effect that "every Muslim who is to join the League from now onwards will have to take an oath of allegiance to Pakistan." The session characterised the Gandhi's Civil

25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
Disobedience Movement as a pressure tactics on the British Government to make it accede to the Congress demand. The session warned the Government that any constitutional change, either interim or final, made without the approval of the League, would mean violation of the solemn pledges of August 1940, and threatened that "if any attempt was made to depart, in any way, from the declarations of August, 1940, the Muslims would feel constrained to resort to any measure and method to resist it with all the powers they possessed."

Meanwhile what annoyed the Muslim League more was Mr. Amery's Statement in the House of Common on April 22, 1941. He said:

"It was suggested that the framework of India's future constitution should be devised by Indian themselves and not by this House ... Even more important in this connection is the stipulation that the constitution itself, and also the body which is to frame it, must be the outcome of agreement between the principal elements in India's national life. That is a pre-requisite to the success of the future constitution. For if Indians cannot agree upon the kind of constitution they are prepared

to work, how are they likely to agree upon the actual working of it. I have dwelt deliberately upon Indian responsibility in the matter; for unless Indians are prepared to face that responsibility now, they will fall to face it hereafter. Any agreement imposed by us from without cannot survive the withdrawal of our power to enforce it. Only a real agreement freely reached, can stand that test." Contrary as it was to the previous policy of the Government. The Working Committee of the League took the above statement very seriously and requested the British Government to stand by their declaration and pledges solemnly given earlier by the Viceroy and the Secretary of State. It threatened the Government that if the Muslim League's demand of Partition would not be forthcoming, Muslim League would be forced to resort to methods which would be other than peaceful.

There was no settlement between the League, the Congress and the Government while an understanding on some constitution which may serve as a future guide was very necessary at a time while all these were busy in speculating their own efforts. Hence the British Government sent

Sir Stafford Cripps to India to negotiate with the Indian leaders about a workable constitution.

Cripps Mission reached India on March 23, 1942. His arrival gave fresh hopes to the people of India because he called himself 'a great friend and admirer of India' who was eager to bring a 'final settlement of the political difficulties' of Indian people. He was confident that his efforts would resolve the problems and a generally acceptable line of practical action could be laid down.

In his message to the people of India he said that His Majesty's Government desired to lay down in precise and clear terms the steps leading to the realisation of self-Government in India. Their 'object is the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion associated with the United Kingdom and other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown but equal to them in every respect, in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs.' The Cripps proposals published on March 30, 1942 announced the formation of 'one Indian Union' and 'one constitution-making body'. Thus the Draft Declaration on one hand had accepted the Congress demand to frame a constitution through a Constituent

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Assembly and on the other / to the Muslim League's demand
for the establishment of Pakistan by giving the Provinces
the right either to join or not the Indian Union.

But the League was very critical to these proposals.
Its Working Committee met on April 11, 1942 and criticised
the idea of 'one Indian Union.' In a resolution it said
that since Muslim League had been trying to be friendlier
with the Indian National Congress and got no success it
was neither just nor possible to constitute one Indian
Union. It reiterated its demand of Partition of India
into independent zones. It criticised the machinery which
Cripps had proposed for the creation of the constitution
making body and said that it would take decisions by a
bare majority and Muslims would not have their say.

The non-accession clause and Cripps Defence Formula
could not bring about a settlement between the Congress
and the League and the Mission, having failed, flew back
to England on April 2, 1942. After the departure of the
Mission both the parties began to accuse it and the political
deadlock continued. The League met at Allahabad on

31. B.R.Nanda, Nehru, The Indian National Congress and
the Partition of India, 1935-47 in C.H.Philips
and Wainwright, op.cit., p.169.
32. See Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League from
April 1942 to May 1943, published by Nawabzada
April 3-6, 1942 for its 29th session and the Cripps proposals were subject of heated discussion. In his Presidential speech Jinnah concluded 'We will ... endeavour that the principle of Pakistan which finds only veiled recognition in the document should be conceded in unequivocal terms.' To solve this problem, Rajagopalachari, better known as "Rajaji", on April 23, 1942, recommended to the All-India Congress Committee to "acknowledge the Muslim League's claim for separation." Rajaji's resolution in favour of the creation of Pakistan was rejected at the All-India Congress Committee which met at Allahabad on May 2, 1942. Rajaji being disappointed began his campaign in favour of Pakistan and met Jinnah also. On July 22, 1942, Jinnah warned the Government that serious consequences will follow if the Congress demand against the creation of Pakistan would be accepted. The Congressmen were completely disappointed and they realised that if the Congress would not

33. See All-India Muslim League Allahabad Session, April 1942, Presidential Address, by M.A. Jinnah, Printed and Published by S. Shamsul Hasan, Assistant Secretary All-India Muslim League at Muslim League Printing Press (Darya Ganj, Delhi, 1945), p. 12.

34. The Indian Annual Register, Vol. I, January-June, 1942, pp. 294-95. See also Jinnah-Gandhi Talks (September Contd.....
start any movement to engage the masses it would suffer a great setback.

Since news were forthcoming that Gandhiji will intensify the non-violence non-cooperation movement, the war cabinet was authorised to take decisive action whenever it seemed necessary. The Governors were asked to take political leaders in their confidence in order to suppress the movement, but they were unable to find any influential Indian politician to speak out against the Wardha All-India Congress Committee Resolution of July 14, 1942, which stated that since the Government had not given any consideration to the Congress proposal, Gandhiji would be authorised to launch a non-violent and widespread struggle. The Wardha Resolution was to be ratified by the All-India Congress Committee at Bombay on August 7, 1942.

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However, there was lull in the political activities in India, British officials were sceptical whether Gandhi could really start the non-violent non-cooperation, no-tax or no-rent movement interfering in the British military and administrative services. A responsible official of the British Intelligence Department noted that there was no apparent sign of Congress assault on the British Raj and it was simply a bluff on the part of Gandhi. But, in fact, Congress and League workers were in action in the states. A Central Intelligence officer, Lahore, reported on January 15, 1942, that Congress work was proceeding without a break in NWFP and members of the Red Shirt Movement organised many demonstrations and harassed the Government. Abdul Qaiyyum was paid Rs. 2,000/- to carry on the Congress work, while Dr. Khan Saheb was found unfit for piloting the Congress movement on socialist lines. Geo D. Parkin an officer of the Criminal Investigation Department, wrote to all Superintendents of police of the United Provinces on July 24, 1942 that the Congress anticipated their arrest on the inauguration of the mass movement. Therefore, they had made arrangement of suitable successors. He also wrote that the Congress had planned

that open and subversive groups would paralyse the Government. In Andhra Pradesh Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya and Kala Venkata Rao organised programme for laying the trees on road sides, marching in government offices, appealing to police not to do their duties, and removing fish plates from railway lines. Parkin reported on August 4, 1942, Congress plans of boycott, non-payment of rent, strikes, sabotage and inactivation of army in U.P. to paralyse the Government in the shortest possible time. In Bengal the Congress movement seemed to have no influence. Faz-ul-Haq said to Lt. Governor that he did not think that civil disobedience would succeed in Bengal and that the League and Hindu Mahasabha were enough to deal with it. But he was reluctant to issue any statement against Gandhi in view of his relations with Jinnah.

After the resignation of Congress ministries in October 2, 1939, the Governors in the Non-Muslim majority states and the Muslim League in the Muslim majority pro-

39. Dr. P.N. Chopra, op.cit., p.10.
vinces had taken over the provincial administration and Jinnah's hand was considerably strengthened. Further, the Viceroy began "to lean more on the support of the Muslim League" and Muslims began trickling into the League and Jinnah, an 'adroit politician that he was' made the most of the situation. Jinnah organised the scattered forces of Muslim India and League's position became more and more satisfactory. The Viceroy realised that Jinnah's politics were realistic and he was not a visionary. His suggestions and cooperation made the Viceroy to think that he would be helpful in the most successful prosecution of the War. Thus, Jinnah considerably impressed the Government, and this contributed much to Jinnah's success and he launched an anti-Congress movement throughout the length and breadth of India.

Congress was in a dilemma. It could not go back to the Legislature or start a programme with a dual policy - one to keep the leadership intact and other to gain power by militant means. Joining the Legislature was fraught with Hindu opposition and Government's harsh terms and

41. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 69.
42. Ibid., p. 70.
surrender to Muslim League. Launching a movement was the only way out which could engage the masses and therefore, the Congress adopted the second move. Gandhi declared that "whoever did not coalesce with the Congress programme was essentially selfish, and consequently against India's independence." Gandhi committed mistake in assessing the strength of the Muslim League and its hold on Muslim India, in spite of protests and objections raised by them. In such political uncertainty, the All-India Congress Committee met at Bombay on August 8, 1942 and endorsed the July 14th resolution, which proclaimed to start "a mass struggle on non-violent lines" under the leadership of Gandhi. Gandhi remarked:

"Mr. Jinnah does not seem to believe in the Congress programme and in the Congress demand. But I can not wait any longer for India's freedom. I can not wait till Mr. Jinnah is converted, for the immediate consummation of Indian freedom." This implied that Jinnah did not want independence of India and this was the greatest libel on the Muslim leader. Gandhi's charges against

Jinnah were characterised by the Muslims as extreme violence on the Muslim League and the Muslim India. The All-India Congress Committee demanded Britain to withdraw, which to League clearly meant handing over power to the Hindus. Gandhiji said that he was fighting to evolve a National Government to represent the masses in the fullest sense of the term. An analysis of it reveals that the National Government would be in a position to decide the fate of India in the event of Axis entry in the country, and to decide the fate of Muslims in the event of British remaining in India after the war.

A day before the resolution of Quit India was to be moved at Bombay there was a great deal of sensation in India. The Government was prepared to crush the movement in order to save the population from the evils of civil war. Police were tighten in view of the Congress threat to the administration of law and order. The Congress had made preparations in all parts of the country to launch the movement violently and it was the game of life and death for the Congress either to win independence by demonstration or to perish in jail. The Congress gave a

feeling to the Hindus that the movement would completely annihilate the leadership of Jinnah and would result in the fall-out of Muslims from the demand of Pakistan and thus, they would save the vivisection of their motherland, the Bharat. This aroused the religious feeling among the Hindus and they were prepared to participate in the movement at the cost of their lives and property. The Muslims became very suspicious to the impending situation. Jinnah visualised the situation that there was possibility of serious Hindu-Muslim clashes, which would bring about a complete estrangement between Hindus and Muslims while his silence would bring death to his own political career and the demand of Pakistan. In case of conflicts, there was every possibility of Muslim support to him and the creation of Pakistan was crystal clear. Thus his desire of becoming the 'Father of Pakistan' began to pang in his heart. However, he did not like the destruction of Muslim lives and property. Therefore, he appealed to the Muslims to view the political developments calmly and wait for the decision of the All-India Muslim League Working Committee to meet in the middle of August, 1942. The decision of the League depended on the political situation in India as a result of Gandhi's launching the
Quit India Movement. He, with his usual cool and thought­ful mind, was watching the situation.

In the morning of August 9, 1942, Gandhi, Nehru, Azad, Patel, Rajendra Prasad, Kripalani, Asaf Ali, Mrs. Sarojini Naidu and many other Congress leader were arrested. This was followed by the arrest of Congressmen all over the country. This was for the first time after the Great Revolt of 1857 that vast number of people stood to challenge the British forces without arms. Matlubul Hasan Saiyid, on August 9, morning was the first to break the news to Jinnah of the arrest of the Congress leaders in Bombay and the latter took the local paper from the former's hand and went through its columns. Soon Jinnah began to receive information of disturbances in the city. The Hindus committed outrages against the Muslims and angry mobs of Hindus surrounded the business premises of Muslims, who enquired on telephone from Jinnah as to what they should do. Jinnah had made arrangements to face such happenings with the help of the local Muslim League, who handled the situation with great tact and courage.

In Delhi, a large number of Hindus were arrested including a few Muslims. On August 9, there was a hartal in Delhi. "The Hindu shops were completely closed although Muslim shops were generally open." The Communists had joined the procession, but the Radical Democratic Party abstained. According to a C.I.D. report, "Of the 15,000 mill-labourers in Delhi only a small portion were probably involved." Another C.I.D. report dated August 14, says that "The Delhi disturbances have been roughly planned by Asif Ali." Another C.I.D. report dated August 15, says that "most Hindus closed their shops forthwith, but Muslims plainly refused to do so and are carrying on their usual business." Despite Jinnah's opposition to the Movement, Jamayat-ulema-i-Hind joined hands with the Congress. Maulvi Hussain Ahmad Madni was imprisoned in U.P. The students of Banaras, Allahabad, and Lucknow Universities played an important role in the disturbances and destructions in urban and rural areas, while the Aligarh Muslim

51. Ibid., p. 15.
52. Ibid., p. 16.
53. Ibid., p. 17.
University was an exception. It is reported that "Vice-Chancellor Sir Ziauddin Ahmad had been most useful to the authorities and has kept his students completely aloof from the Movement." In Baluchistan, a large number of Kandaharis took interest in the movement because the Hindus said that the Congress aimed at the re-establishment of their ex-king Amanullah on the throne of Afghanistan. Abdus Samad Khan, the Chief Leader of the Anjuman-e-watan after his return from Sind on August 17, began to organize support for the Quit India Movement. According to the Intelligence Report dated September 11, 1942, the Khan failed to create any interest.

However in Bombay, the effect of the Movement was very serious and the students, who led the Movement, and when mob violence started, receded into the background. The Communists were in a dilemma whether or not to participate in the movement. Hindu Mahasabha allowed its members to join the Congress movement, while the Muslim carried on a certain amount of anti-Congress and anti-civil Disobedience propaganda. The Government gave discretionary

54. Ibid., p. 25.
55. Ibid., see also Pattabhi Sitarammay, Vol.II, op.cit., p.373.
57. Ibid., p. 43.
powers to the Provincial Governments to deal with the Movement. Obviously the League Ministers in the Muslim majority provinces used their full influence to crush the movement. The All-India Muslim League Working Committee met on August 16, 1942 at Bombay. Since there were disturbances and riots, a few Muslim leaders could not come in time. The League Committee passed a lengthy resolution which deplored the Congress decision of August 8, 1942, to launch an "open rebellion", which resulted in lawlessness and considerable destruction of life and property. The committee considered that the Movement was directed "to coerce the British Government into handing over power to a Hindu oligarchy "and" to force Muslims to submit and surrender to the Congress terms and conditions." The Committee observed that while the Congress claimed the right of self-determination for India i.e. for Hindu majority, "it has persistently opposed the right of self-determination for the Muslim nation to decide and determine their own destiny." The Committee also stated that settlement of communal problem was a condition precedent to the attainment of the freedom and independence

59. Ibid., p. 396.
60. Ibid.
of India and, since the All-India Congress Committee on May 1, 1942, repudiated the League's demand for the right of self-determination, the Congress had closed the door for the settlement and instead "substituted the fantastic theory that the solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem could only follow the withdrawal of British power from India."

The Committee deplored that the Congress movement aimed at the establishment of Hindu Raj and it was a death blow to the Muslim goal of Pakistan. The Committee warned that "if the Congress demand is accepted, it would bring the hundred millions of Musalmans under the yoke of Hindu Raj which must inevitably result either in anarchy and chaos or complete strangulation and annihilation of Muslim India and all that Islam stands for." In the end, the League's Committee called upon the Musalmans "to abstain from any participation in the movement initiated by the Congress and to continue to pursue their peaceful life."

The Committee hoped that the Congress would avoid "to intimidate, coerce, molest or interfere in any manner with

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61. Ibid., p. 397.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
the normal life of the Muslims", otherwise the Muslims "would be compelled and justified to offer resistance and adopt all such measures as may be necessary for the protection of their life, honour and property."

Jinnah described the movement as "tentamount to forcing their demands at the point of bayonet and internecine civil war." He appealed the Muslims not to participate in the movement and "to stop this internecine civil war" before it was too late. However by the end of 1942, police and army resorted to firing 538 times, as a result 40 persons were killed, 1,630 injured, 26,000 convicted and 18,000 detained under the D.I.R. The Government collected Rs. 25,000,000 as fines.

Had the Muslims joined the movement Gandhi ji could have claimed that he represented the whole of India alone and that his demand was supported by Muslim India also.

65. Ibid.
67. Statesman, August 10, 1942.
But the Muslims did not fall into Gandhiji's trap, Jinnah characterised, the Movement a "gambler's Law throw."

Jinnah asked the Muslims, to let them fight it out and told them to be neutral. This is one of those cases which was the most effective policy. Therefore, the movement went without even the slightest support of the Muslim.

The British Government admitted that the Muslims had not cooperated with Gandhiji's Quit India Movement, with the exception of a few cases and hence, exempted the Muslims from the punitive tax that was later levied in certain areas on the saboteurs. Further, since the provincial Muslim Leaguers had been persuading the Muslims to keep themselves aloof from the movement, the League devoted much attention to getting the Muslims exempted from collective fines, which was imposed on areas where sabotage had taken place. In N.W.F.P. many Muslims had participated in the Congress movement, but there were also anti Congress propaganda, "organised by British officials"

70. Ibid., P. 783.
71. Ibid.
72. The Morning News, September 1 and 8, 1942.
73. Cunningham to Linlithgow, September 28,1942.
through ulama. In the Central provinces and Berar, Muslims were "generally exempted from collective fines but individual liability was enforced." Although the League and Hindu Mahasabha kept aloof from the movement in Bihar, there were cases of arrests of Muslims, because they participated in the lawlessness. Big landlords of Bihar did not participate in the movement.

The remarkable feature of the Quit India Movement was that there was absence of any communal incident or disorder. It was because of two reasons. Jinnah on August 16, 1942, reiterated his faith in Pakistan as a peaceful solution of India's constitutional problem in the interest of both the Hindus and the Muslims and expressed his willingness to consider any proposals, with any party on the basis of equality. The Hindus should consider it a right of Muslims for self determination. Secondly, a number of parties, organisations and eminent persons opposed the Movement. Sapru called the Wardha

74. *Fortnightly Report for Central Provinces and Berar for the first half of September*, Home Department, Political, File No. 18/9/1942.

75. *Fortnightly Report for Bihar for the first half of September*, Ibid.

However, a few Congressmen were let loose to negotiate a peaceful settlement between the Congress and the British Government. The Muslim League sensed some sort of compromise which could effect the Muslim interest. Jinnah thought that the Congress would never start the Movement and the British Government would never agree to any terms with the

79. Ibid., p. 231.
Congress in view of the contemplated Japanese attack on India. Therefore, it was the ripe time for Jinnah to assert the League's stand. In November 1942, Jinnah made a bold and courageous statement:

"People ask, supposing the British and the Congress make up their differences and the former yield and surrender to the Congress demand, what will happen to us? The answer is. "If the British Government after all their solemn pledges attempt to sacrifice us, let us down and throw us at the mercy of the Congress Raj, believe me, 

Jinnah, in the same statement, cautioned the British Government against any settlement with the Congress in harsher words. He said:

"Now we are able to stand up and make such a of Government impossible. Even the combined forces/China and America cannot impose on us a constitution which will sacrifice Muslim India. But if such a mad blunder is committed by the United Nations, remember even a worm turns, and notwithstanding the foreign bayonets upholding

the Congress Raj, we shall make the administration of the country impossible, for it is far too grave an issue for us to submit to."

The Quit India Movement was launched by the Congress as the British Government did not yield to their demand of handing over power to them. The Muslim League characterised the Congress move as a plan to annihilate the Muslim League and its demand for Pakistan. Since the Movement involved disturbance in the country, the British Government crushed the movement and the Congress leaders were imprisoned. The League stood calmly to watch the development, believing that disturbances at a time when the British were busy in their life and death struggle would be of no use.

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81. Ibid.