CHAPTER THREE

THE AFTERMATH OF THE LAHORE RESOLUTION

AND THE CRIPPS PLAN

The Lahore resolution accepted by the All-India Muslim League in its session at Lahore in 1940 was a watershed in the history of India. It presented a sharp departure from the Hindu-Muslim unity who were thinly tagged with the one nation theory. The Lahore resolution, as we have seen, treated Hindus and Muslims as two different nations and demanded a separate homeland for Muslims. But it was not favourably viewed by the political parties in India. After two days of the acceptance of Lahore Resolution by the All-India Muslim League, the Hindu Mahasabha leader, Mr. Savarkar declared his parties view and proclaimed that it was unacceptable to it and that it would wage war against it.

Master Tara Singh, leader of the Sikh community, presiding at the First U.P. Sikh Conference at Lucknow said, "If the Muslim League wants to establish "Pakistan" they will have to pass through an ocean of Sikh blood." He further said "opposing the Pakistan scheme, some sikhs have lost their heads and are preaching establishment

1. The Hindu, March 26, 1940.
of Sikh rule. This will simply be adding to the confusion already created by the Muslim League. The 'Pakistan' scheme may prove to be a declaration of civil war and therefore proposed in mad."

Mahatma Gandhi called the two nation theory or Lahore Resolution as 'an untruth' and wrote:

"The vast majority of Muslims of India are converts to Islam or are the descendants of converts. They did not become a separate nation as soon as they became converts. A Bengali Muslim speaks the same tongue that the Bengali Hindu does, eats the same food and has the same amusements as his Hindu neighbour. They dress alike. I have often found it difficult to distinguish by outward sign between a Bangali Hindu and a Bengali Muslim. The same phenomenon is observable more or less in the south among the poor, who constitute the masses of India ..... Hindus and Muslims of India are not two nations. Those whom God had made one, man will never be able to divide."

But while Congressmen did not accept the two nation theory and the proposed partition of India they continued to make it clear that they would not use coercion to resist the demand for Pakistan or Lahore Resolution.

The Muslim leaders of different political parties also expressed their views and condemned the Lahore Resolution.

Azad Muslim Conference called a meeting on behalf of the Jamiatul-Ulama and other Muslim organizations like Majlis-e-Ahrar-i-Islam, the Independent Party of Bihar, the All-India Momin Conference, the Anjuman-e-Watan of Baluchistan and the Central Standing Committee of the All-India Shia Conference in April 1940 at Delhi. This conference voiced its opposition to the division of India. It reiterated its deep concern for the religious and cultural safeguards of the Muslim community in any future constitutional set-up of the country. The Jamiat never admitted the principles of two nation theory advocated by the League.

4. Ibid.
But Jinnah was not a man to be stooped down. Like a rock he stood firmly and replied to his critics. In one of his replies he clarified the misunderstanding of the Muslims who had said that they would have to migrate Pakistan if it was created. Jinnah continued:

"In the first place a wrong idea and false propaganda appears to be set in motion in order to frighten the Muslim minorities that they would have to migrate enbloc and wholesale. I wish to assure my Muslim brethren that there is no justification for this insidious misrepresentation. Exchange of population, however, on the physical division of India, as far as practicable, will have to be considered. Secondly the Muslim minorities are wrongly made to believe that they would be worse off and be left in the lurch in any scheme of partition or division of India. I may explain that the Musalmans, whenever they are in a minority, cannot improve their position under a united India or under one Central Government. Whatever happens, they would remain a minority. They can rightly demand all the safeguards that are known to any civilised government to the utmost extent. But by coming in the way of division of India they do not and can not improve their own position. On the other hand, they can, by their attitude of obstruc-
tion, bring the Muslim homeland and 60,000,000 of the Musalmans under one government where they would remain no more than a minority in perpetuity." In reply to Jinnah's call to celebrate Pakistan Day on April 19, 1940 thousands of public meeting of the Muslims were convened and attended by tens of thousands of Muslims in all parts of India. Jinnah sent his messages to these meetings in which League's point of view was further clarified. In a message to the Bombay Presidency Provincial Muslim League conference convened at Hubli on May 26, 1940, Jinnah said:

"I am asked, will the British agree to the basic and fundamental principles of Lahore Resolution, namely to create independent Muslim states in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India? Whether they agree or whether they do not, we shall fight for it to the last ditch. I know that the British politicians, press and public are still holding on the conception of unity and one India, but I am convinced that it is a self-deception and complete ignorance of reality. At the same time I am confident that we have successfully dispelled the false pro-

7. Jamiluddin Ahmad, Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, op.cit., pp. 157-58.
paganda and removed the delusion under which the British public are suffering, they with their sense of sagacity will not fail to meet us." The Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League Council met in Bombay on June 15-16, and passed a resolution authorising Jinnah to corresponed the Viceroy to explore the possibility of effective measures regarding India's defence.

Meanwhile on July 1, 1940 Jinnah made some very important proposal to the Viceroy, persuading him to accept that:

(i) The British Government would not make any declaration which would go contrary to the Lahore Resolution.

(ii) The Government would not frame any Constitution without the approval of the Muslim League.

(iii) In the event of the expansion of the Executive Council, the number of Muslim members would be equal to that of the Hindus, and if the Congress fails to join Muslims must have the major share.

8. Ibid., pp. 162-163.

(iv) In the proposed War Advisory Committee, Indian princes should have sufficient representation and with regard to the representation from British India, Muslim representation should be equal to that of the Hindus.

The Viceroy Lord Linlithgow in reply to Jinnah on July 6, 1940 endorsed Jinnah's viewpoint and wrote that "I readily accept the importance in the event of any expansion, of securing adequate representation of Muslim interests and that is a point which I would bear in mind."

The British policy was moving favourably to the Muslims. Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, on August 8, 1940, declared the British policy and said that it could not contemplate the transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any system of government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life. Nor could they be parties to the coercion of such elements into submission to such a Government."


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This was very appealing to the Muslim League and its Working Committee expressed its satisfaction with the Viceroy's announcement and gave a mandate to Jinnah to seek further details from Lord Linlithgow. When Jinnah had a talk with the Viceroy, he was unsatisfied. Jinnah actually wanted Muslim League's majority on the Executive Council to which the Viceroy did not agree and Jinnah rejected the offer with regard to both the Executive Council and the Defence Advisory Body on December 26, 1940. Two days earlier to the rejection Jinnah in his birth day message on December 24, 1940 said "we have now to prove to the world that we are fit to govern and achieve our goal as laid down by the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League, popularly known as Pakistan. Our organisation, which is undoubtedly the only authoritative and representative body of the Muslims of India has given us a flag, a platform, a programme and a cherished goal, which we are determined to fight for and, if necessary, to die for. But we have yet to do many (things) before we can achieve our political emancipation.'

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12. Ibid., pp. 238-42.

As seen earlier the Congress was not happy over the British attitude on the question of the declaration of war and resigned. The Linlithgow announcement of August 8, 1940 had annoyed it deeply. Since freedom of speech was restricted the Congress proposed to launch a 'Satyagraha' under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi who suggested that it would be an 'Individual Satyagrah.' On October 17, 1940 the campaign was successfully taken and many of the Congressmen offered themselves for imprisonment. In 1941 the movement was vigorously taken up and about 20,000 men and women were imprisoned and put on trial.

The Council of the All-India Muslim League met at Delhi on February 23, 1941/criticised the Civil Disobedience Movement of the Congress and in a statement it said that it was designed to pressurise the British Government from the position it had taken in regard to the future of India relating to the Muslims and other minorities.

On July 21, 1941 the Viceroy again issued a Government communiqué regarding the expansion of the Viceroy's

Council and the Constitution of the National Defence Council. He reiterated that the objective of the above bodies were "non-political and non-communal" and further announced that the Government still held the promises made in the August Offer and there was no change of policy since then. The Viceroy nominated the members of the League also in the Councils to win the support of the Muslim League and some of them had joined it also without seeking the permission of the League. The Viceroy actually prevailed over the Muslim Premiers who joined the Council without referring it to the League. Jinnah objected to this and regretted that the nomination of the Muslim members would not solve any purpose as "it will not secure the whole hearted, willing and genuine support ... for the simple reason that the persons chosen and nominated ... are neither real representatives of the people nor will they command the confidence and trust of the Muslims." He continued to oppose the Viceroy who in spite of the declaration of August Offer did not give the representatives of the Muslim

League a real and substantial share in the authority and power of the Government.

The League brought to the notice of Government one of the statements of Gandhi who wrote in the Harijan: "So long as there is no workable arrangement with the Muslim League civil resistance must involve resistance against the League." On the basis of the above statement of Gandhi, the League said that it had no doubt that the Satyagraha Movement was launched against the British as well as the League. It warned the Government that if any concession to the Congress was made which was against Muslim demand it would resist it. But the Individual Satyagraha Movement of Congress had to be stopped in view of war situation. Russia was hard pressed by Germany and Japan also had entered into the war and was knocking at the gate of East of India. The Government realised the gravity of the situation and began releasing the Satyagrahis one by one. The Congress Working Committee


was worried on the entry of Japan in war which threatened India and therefore the Satyagraha was suspended.

The Working Committee at its meeting at Bardoli on December 23, 1941, repeated that full cooperation would be forthcoming if its demands were met. Gandhiji wrote to the Congress President that the means contemplated by the Working Committee were those of violence while he was a believer of non-violence. He asked that he should be relieved of the Congress.

As stated above Japan had entered into the war and it was feared that its entry would create more problems for the Allies in India and therefore America and Australia who were also anxious for a solution of the Indian problem pressurised the British Government to solve the ticklish problem of India. Mr. Churchill did not listen to it first and was known to have said that 'I did not become the king's First Minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.' But on February 22, 1942, President Roosevelt of America and Dr. Evatt, 

18. Ibid.
19. Peter Heens, op.cit., p. 139.
Foreign Minister of Australia, again made speeches in the Parliament supporting the cause of India's independence. In view of the American and Australian pressure, Mr. Churchill sent Sir Stafford Cripps, a member of the British war cabinet, to explain to the Indian leaders certain constitutional proposals accepted by the Government of England. Sir Stafford Cripps, had been a very successful British diplomat in Russia who had persuaded the Russian Government to join the Allies. He was specially selected by Churchill to go to India to gain its support in war while convincing them with full British sympathy for its national aspiration.

Sir Stafford Cripps landed in India on March 23, 1942. After reaching Delhi, Cripps soon called a Press Conference and in the course of his opening speech he said:

"I have come here because I am, as I have always been, a great friend and admirer of India and because I want to play my part as a member of the war cabinet in reaching a final settlement of the political difficulties

20. Ibid.
which have long vexed our relationship. Once these questions are resolved, the Indian peoples will be enabled to associate themselves fully and freely, not only with Great Britain and the other dominions, but with our great allies, Russia, China and the United States of America, so that together we can assert our determination to preserve the liberty of the peoples of the world. There is no time to lose and no time for long discussions .... My intention is to stay at Delhi for two weeks ... and I believe that within that time with energy and goodwill, the essentials of success can be achieved."

Continuing the speech he further said, "My association in the past had been more close with my friends in the Congress than with members of other parties or communities, but I am fully impressed with the need in any scheme for the future of India to meet the deep anxieties which undoubtedly exist among the Muslims and other communities. I shall therefore embark upon my task with a "mind equally open to all points of view - Hindu, Muslim, Sikh and others." With these notions in mind he imme-

22. Ibid.,
diately plunged into negotiation with the Viceroy, his councillors and advisors. Thereafter he proceeded to interview the leaders of the various leading political parties. He talked to Gandhi, Maulana Azad and Jawaharlal Nehru together with other members of the Congress Working Committee. Of the League members, he called upon M.A. Jinnah, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Fazlul Haq and others. He held discussions with leaders of minor though influential political parties. Important among them were Savarkar (Hindu Mahasabha); Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and M.R. Jayakar (liberals); Dr. Ambedkar and M.G.Rajah (Depressed classes); representatives of Sikhs, Indian Christians; Anglo Indian and Europeans and representatives of Indian states.

On March 29, Cripps published the Draft Declaration at a Press Conference. The summary of the proposals is as follows:

(1) To speed up the realisation of self-government in India the British Government proposed that steps should be taken to create a new Indian Union, with full status of a Dominion by a

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common allegiance to the Crown, and free in its internal and external affairs. The Union could secede from the British commonwealth.

(2) At the cessation of hostilities a constitution making body was to be set up on the basis of the proportional representation by the lower houses of the Provincial Legislatures; Indian states were to send their representatives in the same proportion of their total population.

(3) The British Government would implement the constitution so framed on two conditions.

(a) Any Province of British India not prepared to accept the new Constitution had a right to retain the existing constitutional position. It could accede to the Union later if it so wished and for that provision would be made later. Similarly the states were also free to take a decision according to their willingness.

(b) A treaty would be negotiated and signed between the British Government and constitution-making body for the complete transfer
of responsibility. Minorities interests would be looked after in accordance with the British Government's past commitments to them.

(4) During the making of the Constitution, the British Government would remain responsible for the defence of India, but they invited effective participation of the leaders of principal sections of the Indian people.

A thorough analysis of the Draft Declaration reveals that the clause beginning with the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands was certainly a promise for the future Independence of India. The other clause of the Declaration was concerned with the method by which the new constitution was to be framed and it dealt with a treaty between the British Government and the Constitution-making body. The Draft Declaration also dealt with the right of any Province of British India to retain its position if it was not prepared to accept the new constitution.

25. Ibid.
It is said that the Draft Declaration made no improvement over the August Offer. The August Offer had previously promised Dominion Status after the war and also accepted that the framing of the new constitution was the responsibility of the Indians. But a close study of the two documents reveals that it did make an advancement over the August Offer. Prof. Reginald Coupland, assessing the two has rightly said that the Draft Declaration was more 'concrete and constructive'. It clarified the meaning of Dominion Status and explicitly declared that the people of India would be solely responsible for making the new constitution. 'It can not be said', Professor Coupland pointed out that 'those improvements on the August Offer' were of no great moment. On the contrary, the Draft Declaration provided precisely those additional aids required to bring a settlement between the British Government and the Indian parties within the bounds of possibility.

But these proposals were subject to vehement criticism from all political parties. The Congress was disappointed on the question of independence for which promise was made for some future date. It wanted

26. Ibid., p. 50.
that the National Government must be a Cabinet Government with full power while Cripps from the very beginning said that no change was possible during war. On March 25, at the second conference, he made it absolutely clear that 'there is no question of negotiating a fundamentally different scheme.' And on March 30, he further said 'Everyone agrees that in these troublous times we cannot, here and now set about forging a new constitution.' Gandhiji said that it was 'a post-dated cheque on a bank that was obviously crashing.' Secondly the clause concerning the provision for the non-accession of provinces to the new constitution was also not acceptable to the Congress, which implied that it directly encouraged the partition of India, a demand raised by the League.

Cripps met Maulana Azad the Congress President on March 25, 1942. Azad insisted that to mobilize Indians "effectively" it was "necessary" to give them "control of the defence" of their country. Cripps pointed out that

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., p. 35.

29. Ibid.
strategically India had to be regarded as part of "a much greater theatre of war". Azad reiterated his point, however, and Cripps decided that what Congress really wanted was the "appearance and name of an Indian Defence Minister", not actual control over, "the movement of troops or other military arrangements." This solution demanded that the Government should make a fair appraisal of the Congress stand. The sympathy of Congress lay with the Allies. It was willing to support Britain in the war provided two main conditions were fulfilled. First, the British Government should give a definite and solemn assurance that India would be made independent immediately after the war, and would be allowed to frame its own constitution through a democratically elected constituent assembly. Secondly, Congress should be allowed to form a 'national government' at the centre with other parties during the continuation of the war. Congress was in a distrustful mood. The past experiences of its leaders had made them believe that the British Government did not intend ever to transfer power to Indian hands but was perpetually occupied in out-manoeuvring the national movement by setting against it the communal forces

of the Muslim League, which was entirely their own creation. Congress had noticed with grief that it had taken decades of hard struggle and sufferings on its own part to get one of its demands accepted by the British Government, while the Muslim League's demands were incorporated in toto in British policy even before they were made. The Congressmen believed that the Muslim League movement thrived on the support of the British. It had neither body nor soul and would evaporate as soon as the British left India.

Throughout the negotiations the provision of the non-accession of the Provinces of British India formed the crux of the controversy, specially in view of the fact that Sir Stafford Cripps had in his broadcast speech on March 30, 1942 declared that in the great sub-continent of India there were more than one people. There were many peoples and races - as there were in the great sub-continent of Russia. "Our object is to give to the Indian peoples full self government with complete freedom as to how they will devise and organise their own constitution." To

Congress it was quite enough, and soon after the Draft Declaration was published, the Hindu Press started a powerful campaign of propaganda against it. The Congress objected from the very beginning to several important and far reaching proposals for the future. It had imagined that the new government would function with full powers as a cabinet with the Viceroy acting as a constitutional head.

The interim proposals contained in the declaration were vague. The long term proposals contained certain features which were unpalatable to the Congress, such as 'provincial option' and the inclusion in the constitution-making body of states representatives who would not be the choice of the state people, but it was contended that such provisions were essential in order to make the scheme as a whole tolerable to other parties and interests in India, and to fulfil certain solemn pledges of His Majesty's Government.

The attitude of the other non-Muslim political parties was also not favourable. The Depressed classes, the Sikhs, the Indian Christians, the Anglo-Indians, the

Liberals, and the Europeans community took different views of the Cripps proposal. The Depressed classes needed special safeguards from the caste Hindu domination and said that they were a distinct community and not a 'part of the great Hindu society'. To Dr. Ambedkar and Mr. Rajah, the proposals were 'circulated to do the greatest harm to the Depressed classes, and were 'sure to place them under an unmitigated system of Hindu rule.' The Indian Christians and the Anglo-Indian were more apprehensive of their fate and pleaded that the 'safeguards' should be given to them for about fifty years. The Liberals like Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. Jayakar mainly concentrated, like the Congress, on the non-accession proposals. They declared that 'the creation of more than one Union, however consistent in theory with the principle of self-determination, will be disastrous to the lasting interests of the country and its integrity and security.' The Hindu Mahasabha rejected the proposals on the ground that the option given to the provinces to stay out of the Union would destroy the unity of the country.

33. Ibid., pp. 40-41.
The Sikhs also protested against the non-accession of the provinces and said that they would resist by all possible means separation of the Punjab from the all India Union.

When Cripps came to Delhi airport, the second anniversary of the 'Pakistan Day' was celebrated in Delhi by a mile-long procession and a mass public meeting was addressed by Jinnah.

"I can say without fear of contradiction that the Muslim League stands more firmly for the freedom and independence of this country than any other party", the Quaid-i-Azam told a crowd of 50,000 Muslims in Urdu Park.

"We are asking for justice and fair-play. We have no designs upon our sister communities. We want to live in this land as a free and independent nation. We are not minority but a nation." About Cripps Mission Jinnah said:

"There is the fear that he is a friend of the Congress. He had enjoyed the hospitality of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru ..... That is all true but we should

34. Ibid., pp. 125-26.
not be afraid on that score. Don't get cold feet .......
We are prepared to face all consequences if any scheme
or solution which is detrimental to the interests of
Muslims is forced upon us. We shall not only accept
it but resist it to the utmost of our capacity. If we
have to die in the attempt we shall die fighting."

On April 2, 1942, Jinnah left Delhi for Allahabad
where the annual session of the All-India Muslim League
was convened and which was to be chaired by him. The
League's attitude is clear from the Chairman of the
Reception Committee, Sir Mohammad Yusuf, who explained
his party's standpoint. Referring to Sir Stafford Cripps
he hoped that some solution for a readjustment of Hindu-
Muslim problem will be found out which would be in conso-
nance with the two nation theory, leading to the creation
of Pakistan.

Thereafter Jinnah made his Presidential speech.
In his address he took up the Cripps Proposals. He

36. Ibid.
37. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan,
analysed the whole scheme to the audience and said that it was based on four important points. The first was the creation of a new India Union equal in every respect with other Dominions which had to give its allegiance to the Crown; secondly after the cessation of hostilities an elected body would be created to frame a new constitution for India, thirdly, provision for the Indian states was made and fourthly, the Constitution framed by the constitution-making body would be accepted and implemented by His Majesty's Government with few exceptions. One very important exception was concerned with the right of any British Indian province to retain its existing constitutional position, if it was not willing to accept the constitution. The League had studied the pros and cons of the proposals and was very critical to the composition of the constitution-making body. Cripps in his scheme about the formation of the constitution-making body said that its members would be elected from the Provincial Legislatures by a system of proportional representation. It meant that out of the Assemblies of 11 provinces an electoral college of 1600 members would be made which would be entitled to elect one-tenth, which means in all, 160 members by means of proportional representation. Jinnah felt that
MuBalmans even by separate electorate, would not be more than 25 per cent in it and by the system of proportional representation, they might be still less in number in the Constitution-making body. Thus a non-Muslim majority would dominate the process of framing the constitution and the majority would be absolutely in favour of only 'one Union'.

He also attacked the provision of the scheme which said that any province not willing to accept the constitution had a right to seceded from it. There was no clear indication as to how that province or provinces would express their willingness to accept or reject the constitution. A suggestion to this effect was made by Sir Stafford that if a province, in the Legislative Assembly of the province, was in favour of accession by 60 per cent of votes, there would be an end of it. It meant that the province was bound to accede. But if they got 59% of votes and the minority happens to be 41 per cent, then there would be a plebiscite of the people of the province and these non-acceding province or provinces could form another Union or a Dominion or a single province may stand

38. Ibid., p. 385.
by itself as a Dominion. To Jinnah this was all meaningless. He said that after the publication of the proposals Muslim India felt 'deeply disappointed that the entity and integrity of the Muslim nation has not been expressly recognised.' He felt that the real issue i.e. the issue of Pakistan had been deliberately evaded "by over emphasising the territorial entity of the provinces, which are mere accidents of British policy and administrative division is fundamentally wrong." He asked the British Government to accept the right of 'national self-determination' 'unequivocally recognised' for Muslims. In a long speech Jinnah reiterated that India was never a country or a nation. Cultural, social, political and economic differences had been so fundamental among different nations that it would be impossible to conceal them. They need a clear handling by the realists.

He did not agree with the power of minority in the matter of secession. To him it was 'illusory' as Hindu India would give its decision in favour of one All-India Union of all the provinces, and the Muslims of Bengal and the Punjab would be at the mercy of the Hindu

39. Ibid., pp. 385-88.
40. Ibid.
minority in those provinces. "The document shows" said Jinnah, "that Pakistan is treated as a remote possibility and there is a definite preference for a new Indian Union, which is the main objective and suggestion, and the rules of procedure and the process; indicated in the document, and the interviews and explanations of Sir Stafford Cripps so far, are against us."

Later the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League met on April 11, 1942 and while appreciating the pronouncement made by the British Prime Minister regarding the 'Draft Declaration' which maintained the validity of August Offer which had promised that no constitutional machinery for the framing of the constitution should be set up or the constitution enforced without the consent of the Muslims of India, it expressed its disappointment on the Cripps Proposal. It objected to the rigidity of the attitude of His Majesty's Government regarding the fundamentals of the 'Draft Declaration' which were not open to any modification. The League, therefore, resolved that it, has finally decided that the only solution of India's constitutional problem is the partition of India into independent zones, and it will, therefore, be unfair

41. Ibid., pp. 388-89.
to the Musalmans to compel them to enter such a constitution making body, whose main object is the creation of a new Indian Union.

"Besides the machinery which had been proposed for the creation of the constitution making body ... is a fundamental departure from the right of the Musalmans hitherto enjoyed by them, to elect their representatives by means of separate electorates, which is the only sure way in which true representatives of Musalmans can be chosen." It also resolved that "The right of non-accession to the Union, 'as contemplated in the Draft Declaration, has been conceded, presumably, in response to the insistent demands by the Musalmans for the partition of India, but the method and procedure laid down are such as to negative the professed object ..... The Musalmans cannot be satisfied by such a Declaration on a vital question affecting their future destiny and demand a clear and precise pronouncement on the subject."

True, the failure of Cripps was because of the obstinacy of the political parties but it was itself

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42. Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League from April 1942 to May 1943 published by Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, Honorary Secretary All-India Muslim League Delhi, pp. 1-6.
responsible for its failure. It did not explicitly described the character of the proposed National Government or the method of its operation. It only talked about 'the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of principal sections of the Indian people in the councils of their country'. This was slightly different from the demand of the Congress which had been demanding from the very beginning a 'National Government'.

On the question of personnels it was agreed that the majority of them on the Viceroy's Executive Council would be Indian save the Commander-in-Chief. But its mood of operation was not diffused. The Governor-General was still required to act in his discretion when emergency arose and whereby the safety, or interest of British India or any part thereof, was in danger.

Thus the powers of the cabinet consisting of Indians was still limited. But it should be said to the credit of Sir Stafford Cripps that he had come to secure an agreement on the Draft Declaration and his concern was not with the details. But the Congress Working Committee did not look eye to eye and insisted on a 'Cabinet with full powers.' However, Sir Stafford Cripps could not have accepted it because the minorities were not to
acquiesce. When Congress was proceeding ahead with its clarification, Jinnah told to a Press Conference on April 13, that the Muslims would be at the 'mercy' of the Congress Rule, while his object had been to secure an inter-communal agreement 'as to how independence should be achieved after the war' and 'next, on the basis of such an agreement, to bring about the formation of an interim government. Thus minority opposition to the Congress demand was in itself an obvious and conclusive reason for its rejection.'

After the Cripps Mission left India, the All-India Congress Committee met at Allahabad and resolved that it was impossible 'for Congress to consider any schemes or proposals, which retain even a partial measure of British control in India .... Britain must abandon her held on India. It is on the basis of independence alone that India can deal with Britain or other nations.' Though the resolution was passed its objective was not to 'embarrass' the British Government. The morale of the Congress High Command was high and it was not going to surrender to Japan or any invader.

44. Ibid., p. 63.
45. Ibid.