Chapter EIGHT

CONCLUSION

In the preceding pages an attempt has been made to describe the relation between the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress, the two great political parties of the period between 1940-1947 which is a very crucial period in the political history of modern India. Their political faults and lack of adjustment ultimately led to the vivisection of the country which cost tens of thousands of lives of the people of this continent and even today when more than four decades have gone by, the two countries are at dagger's drawn. One, not knowing much about Indian politics and Muslim League, takes it for granted that it was the Muslim communalism that was opposed to a United India and the Muslim League was the precursor of many problems that led to the division of the country.

But an objective study leads one to the conclusion that League from the beginning was not opposed to United India, neither was it founded to oppose the Congress. A study of its objectives reveals that it was not anti-Hindu since its birth. When the non-Muslim Secretary of the Nawab of Dacca issued a circular to the leading Muslims,
on behalf of the Nawab, inviting them to assemble at Dacca to form an anti-Hindu association, it was very much resented by almost every Muslim leader. It was suggested by them that the Muslim community needed a political organisation for the Indian Muslims with a view to safeguard their political interests. It had nothing to do with the Hindus and the Congress. Thus the League was founded only to safeguard their political interests. The formation of the League was welcomed by the non-Muslim Press and save a very microscopic section, the Muslim move was appreciated.

Some controversy had erupted at the grant of separate electorate to the Muslims but sober-minded Congress leaders welcomed it also and Gokhale recognised the justice in the claim of the Muslims for 'adequate, real and genuine representation in the Council through separate electorates. He wrote to Minto, 'My Lord, I sincerely believe that your Lordship and Lord Morley have saved India from drifting towards what cannot be described by any other name than

chaos. For, however strong a government may be, repression never can put down the aspiration of a people and never will.

The Tripoli-Balkan War of 1911-12 united the League and Congress. The Council of the All-India Muslim League chalked out a new policy in 1912 and the "achievement of self-government" was adopted as one of its objectives which was decidedly a departure from the current policy of the League and it "marked an important step in Muslim politics." Sir Ibrahim Rahimtulla who presided over the Muslim League session of 1913 at Agra very extensively dealt with the League's ideals of 'self-government' which astonished Maulana Azad who remarked that since the advent of Muslim political movement it was the first speech in their political literature so coloured in Indian nationalism. The Lucknow Pact (1916) further cemented the bond of unity between the two organisations. Their relations


3. The Times, January 1,1913, see also the letter of Mirza Salimullah Beg to the editor of the Pioneer regarding "The Future Policy of Mohammadans."January 15, 1912.

4. The Tribune, January 1914.
were so cordial that the Congress Leaders attended the
League annual session and the League leaders participated
in the annual deliberations of the Congress. During the
Khilafat-Non-Cooperation Movements, both the organisations
worked amicably for the major cause of the country. This
could have continued had not the Nehru Report annoyed
Jinnah and other Muslim political leaders. Jinnah wanted
perfect safeguards for the minorities inspite of his being a
Congress leader which the Report failed to provide and
Jinnah withdrew himself from the Congress. Mohammad Ali
who was once the President of the Congress stepped into
his boots on the same ground; withdrew himself from the
Congress and this secession administered a severe blow to
the Congress. The Congress could have very easily conceded
the Muslim demands without any loss to its programme or
prestige but it did not do so and thus missed many influ-
ential Muslim leaders one after the other. During the
Round Table Conference 1930-31 the question of minority
was raised again and again and here also it failed to
reached any compromise and the deadlock continued.

5. For Jinnah's speech see The Times of India, December 29, 1928.

6. For Mohammad Ali's speech see The Indian Daily Mail December 24, 1928.

Then came the Act of 1935 under which elections took place and both the Muslim League and the Congress fought for their destiny. The Congress won the election by a thumping majority in eight out of eleven provinces. In the United Provinces the League won 27 seats out of 64 Muslim seats. The Congress won almost all Hindu seats and was in a position to form a government. But in view of the settlement which had earlier taken place between the Congress and League for providing considerable seats to the Muslim League, the Congress could not fulfil its promise and instead of two seats in the cabinet it proposed to give one on the condition that the Muslim League Parliamentary Board in the United Provinces would be dissolved. It was a high price for the League and it did not accept it. Leaguers formed the idea that the Congress wanted to merge the League within its fold.

According to Azad - "If the U.P. League's offer of cooperation had been accepted, the Muslim League party would for all practical purposes have merged in the Congress. Jawaharlal's action gave the Muslim League in the U.P. a new lease of life .... It was from the U.P. that the League was reorganised. Mr. Jinnah took full advantage
of the situation and started an offensive which ultimately led to partition." This was Himalayan blunder.

This view has been supported by many scholars also. Dr. S.P. Sen in his Dictionary of National Biography says: 'In 1937 when the Congress was flushed with victory in the majority of Provinces, it was mainly because of Nehru that a chance of communal harmony was spoiled by his idealistic and doctrinaire intransigence ... . The political destiny of India would have been shaped in an entirely different way if Nehru had shown more political maturity and accommodating spirit, hoping for a real rapprochement between the two major communities in India. But Nehru could not rise to the occasion.' Dr. R.C. Majumdar has this to say in relation to the above: 'To sacrifice collaboration with the Muslim League in the name of ideals which did not at all correspond with existing facts was an extremely unwise - almost fatal-step for which India had to pay very dear ... The Muslims now realised that as a separate community they had no political prospects in future. The Congress ultimatum was the signal for the

parting of ways, which by inevitable stages, led to the foundation of Pakistan."

Then came the Congress rule in eight provinces and the League raised much hue and cry for Hindu atrocities on Muslims in their provinces. The Pirpur Committee Report; Fazlul Haque's Muslim Sufferings Under Congress Rule branded the Congress Rule as Hindu Raj and demanded its withdrawal. There is no doubt that in some of the provinces the Congress ministers did not take into account the Muslim grievances and it was injurious to the national cause. Since Hindi language was allowed an equal status along with the Urdu in the Congress ruled provinces, Hindus in vengeance Sanskritised the language throwing Urdu away. According to Ram Gopal "The more communal-minded among the protagonists satisfied their communalism by loading textbooks with biographical sketches of Hindu heroes, practical ignoring Muslim heroes. The indiscretions committed at lower levels of the administration were capable of correction at the annual stock taking of administrative activities, but the Congress Governments stayed in office for barely two years, and had no time for correction. Two year:

was too small a period for curing the chronic ills." This is one example of Congress negligence and Jinnah on these issues demanded the withdrawal of the Congress ministries. The opportunity automatically came when the World War II was declared by the British and Lord Linlithgow announced India as a party to it. The Congress resigned the office and the League celebrated "The Day of Deliverance" on December 22, 1939.

The gulf between the Congress and the League had widened. Jinnah was now completely a changed man. He started thinking on the two nation theory and in an article he strongly pleaded about two different languages and cultures - one of the Muslims and the other Hindus between which there was no meeting ground. This attitude of Jinnah had certainly shocked Jawaharlal Nehru who in December 1939 wrote to Jinnah "It thus seems that politically we have no common ground and that our objectives are different. Jinnah could not be checked. Congress and League were now poles asunder and in the annual session of All-India

Muslim League at Lahore on March 23, 1940 Jinnah presented a resolution, known as 'Lahore Resolution' demanding a separate Homeland for the Muslims on the basis of his popular two nation theory. "Musalmans are a nation according to any definition of a nation and they must have their homeland, their territory and their state." He later made a call to observe Pakistan Day on April 19, 1940 which was taken by the Muslims as an occasion of great festivities. By all this Jinnah wanted to prove the strength of the League which had not been accepted as a representative organisation of the Muslims. Thus from now an struggle between the Congress and League started which ended in the partition of the country.

Jinnah had come to make the demand for Pakistan not all of a sudden. Though he had revived League but till 1939 he considered himself as nationalist which is clear from the letter he wrote on March 17, 1938 to Nehru in which he said. "It is the duty of every true nationalist

15. In March 1937 Nehru said: "There are only two forces in India today, British imperialism and Indian nationalism as represented by the Congress."Jinnah immediately responded to this and said that there was the third party also - the Musalmans."
to whichever party or community he may belong to help
achieve a united front."

Though the demand of Pakistan was made yet neither Congress took it very seriously nor the League insisted much on it. Both the parties still believed in evolving a formula on which Hindus and Muslims might have lived peacefully in a United India. Search for a solution continued. League wanted no more than the safeguard of the rights of minority. This feeling ultimately led to Desai-Liaquat Ali Pact which proposed an equal number of persons, nominated by the Congress and the League in the Central Legislature and the formation of the Coalition ministry to repair the loss in their relation done in 1937. It was an attempt to bring parity between the Congress and League in forming the coalition Government. The rejection of the Pact by the Congress was another jolt in the Congress-League relation.

Lord Wavel, the Viceroy, was very sincere in his efforts to bring about a solution of Hindu-Muslim problem to keep India united. The Conference he convened at Simla on June 25, 1945 agreed on the parity principle but Jinnah

insisted all the five members of the League. In other words the Congress did not have the right to appoint any Muslim on its quota and thus the Conference failed.

While Azad was aware of the Muslim fear about their safety which led them to oppose the nomination of any Muslim on the Congress quota, the Congress was not prepared to allay the fears of Muslims about their fate in a free and united India. He founded a solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem in a proposal sent to Gandhi in a letter dated August 2, 1945 in which he rejected Pakistan on two grounds. Firstly, it would not be in the interest of the Muslims themselves and secondly its acceptance by the Congress would be a defeatist policy. The proposal he made in his letter was a midway between both the wrongs. He suggested (a) a federal government in which central subjects of an all India nature were agreed upon by the constituent unit. (b) The units were given the rights to secede (c) There were to be joint electorate in Centre and Provinces with reservation of seats. (d) There must be parity of Hindus and Muslims in the Central Legislature and the Central Executive so long as the communal suspicion and frenzy did not disappear.

This was the best solution that Azad had founded but Gandhiji and the Congress was silent about it and nothing was heard of it. Had this proposal which was only a "rough outline" been accepted Pakistan could have been averted but the Congress did not take it seriously and it lost one of the best solutions founded by Azad. The Congress further did not take any lesson from the results of December 1945 election wherein the Muslim League won almost every Muslim seat defeating every nationalist Muslim, and was now the sole spokesman of the Muslim masses. This was accepted by Gandhiji who signed with the Jinnah the formula which said:

"The Congress does not challenge, and accepts that the Muslim League now is the authoritative representative of the overwhelming majority of the Muslims of India. As such and in accordance with democratic principles, they alone have today the unquestionable right to represent the Muslims of India."

When in March 1946 the Cabinet Mission visited India and discussed with Azad and Jinnah the future constitution of India, it accepted Azad's proposal which while preserving

18. Ibid., Vol. VIII, p. 673.
the unity of India also secured Hindu-Muslim Unity. The proposal did not provide for a strong centre and thus Muslims fear was allayed. The grouping of the subjects was reluctantly accepted by the Congress and was also accepted by the League. The Muslim community had secured all that Pakistan would give it. But the unfortunate statement of Nehru on July 10, at Bombay changed the whole situation. Replying to a correspondent Nehru said that "Congress would enter the Constituent Assembly completely unfettered by agreement and free to meet all situations as they arose." This was slightly confusing. The "Press representatives further asked if this meant that the Cabinet Mission Plan would be modified." In reply Jawaharlal Nehru emphatically said that the Congress had agreed only to participate in the Constituent Assembly and regarded itself free to change or modify the Cabinet Mission Plan."

This left Jinnah unsatisfied and forced him to think that Jawahararlal's statement represented the real mind of the Congress. He argued that if the Congress could change so many times while the British were still in the country and power had not come to its hands, what assurance would

the minorities have that once the British left, the Congress would not again change and go back to the position taken up in Jawaharlal's statement." Thus the acceptance of the Plan changed into its rejection and this hastened the process of partition which took place on August 15, 1947. Mountbatten had no choice. Jinnah was not so keen on Partition but he wanted safety for the minority. When Mountbatten argued with him for a United India Jinnah replied that 'even though nothing would have given him greater pleasure than to see such unity, it was the behaviour of the Hindus that had made it impossible for the Muslims to share it.' Jinnah was certain in his mind that if India got full independence and British withdrew from here, Hindu majority could not be relied upon. Jinnah was a "strong bulwark" against the partition of the country but as B. Shiva Rao says that 'new and formidable forces' turned the 'apostle of Indian unity' for the first time to see the need of the partition of the country.

There was a clash of personalities also which led to the partition. Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and Jinnah were

20. Ibid., p. 141.
21. The Illustrated Weekly of India, August 13, 1972 see Article 'Break-up of Pakistan - A Prophecy Come True' by Kuldip Nayar, p.17.
the top ranking leaders who were determined to decide the fate of India. Jinnah mistrusted both Gandhi and Nehru and Nehru in turn underestimated Jinnah. Dr. Tara Chand criticises Congress for ignoring Jinnah which 'wounded his vanity'. The great scholar deplores the chauvinistic attitude of some of the Hindu leaders for alienating Muslim sympathies. Kanji Dwarkadas says that if Congress leaders could have been friendly with Jinnah and his ego had not been hurt, Jinnah might not have raised a slogan for partition. Apart from this the Congress and the League leadership differed regarding the political set-up in the country. Jinnah had always stood for a loose federation with the centre having limited powers and residuary powers resting with the states. While on the other hand the Congress always pleaded for a strong centre. In these circumstances a United India was an impossibility.

Jinnah was not happy with the creation of Pakistan. At the height of his glory he was disillusioned and lonely. When the Nizam's emissary Laiqat Ali Khan met Jinnah, the

25. Ibid.
later was in tears as he realised what great harm the partition of India had brought to the millions of innocent people who suffered beyond their control. He also visualised a poor future for Pakistan because of the poor calibre of the Pakistan leadership. He was not even happy with his Prime Minister, Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan who did not give any proof of his sharpness in political matters. Jinnah is said to have told his Prime Minister, "you have started thinking yourself as a big man. You are nothing... you think you have made Pakistan. I have made it. But I am now convinced that I have committed the biggest blunder of my life. "Jinnah was in his death-bed that time and after taking a fresh-breath he continued "If now I get an opportunity I will go to Delhi and tell Jawaharlal (Nehru) to forget about the folies of the past and become friends again." It, therefore, appears from the above that Jinnah was not keen on Partition. He only needed protection for the minorities and used the idea of Partition merely as a bargaining counter. There appears to be much truth in the letter of Rajgopalachari who wrote to Kuldip Nayar in October 13,1971 that

"Mr. Jinnah was certain in his mind that if India got full independence and British control was altogether

eliminated, the Hindu majority could not be relied upon for dealing justly with the Muslim population of India. He, therefore, was clear in his mind that some how or the other, overall British control must be retained over the Indian sub-continent and its affairs. He never believed that Britain would withdraw leaving India totally independent. Nor did he wish it. He consequently put up objections and obstructions to which, he calculated, the Congress would not yeiled. He, therefore, expected that the Congress demand for total independence would not be acceded to by the British and the Muslim population would continue to have overall British protection."

In his letter to the editor Dr. Chamanlal, brings to light one more incident of history which goes to prove of Jinnah's ideas on the unity of India. He said that when he met Jinnah sometimes in 1943, Jinnah told him to write to Mahatma Gandhi, then in Poona Jail, that if the principle of Pakistan was accepted, he would not ask for a division of the country. Dr. Gopichand Bhargava was expected to go to Poona to deliver that letter of Chamanlal, but since he could not proceed the message had not been

delivered to him. Thus the opportunity was lost.

Even before that Jinnah invited Chamanlal to a lunch. During conversation Jinnah asked him as to why the Congress did not give him the two annas. This financial conundrum confused Mr. Chamanlal who requested Mr. Jinnah to explain his point fully. In reply Jinnah said, "The communal award has given me 14 annas in the rupee. I want the other two annas." Mr. Chamanlal wanted more clarification to which Jinnah said, "First of all I want joint Electorates" and "secondly I want a 33 \frac{1}{2}% representation in the centre and suitable weightages in the U.P., Bihar and elsewhere." Mr. Chamanlal was so astonished that the fish knife and fork dropped from his hand on the table. It was unexpected from Jinnah to be so mild. He would not believe it and asked the late Raizada Hans Raj who was also a friend of Jinnah to check it from the League leader. He did it and found that Jinnah actually wanted what he said. Just after this Mr. Chamanlal sent a letter to Gandhiji, briefing him the gist of his conversation with Jinnah. Gandhiji received the letter and wrote back to Chamanlal to wait for further instructions. Gandhiji consulted Jawaharlal Nehru whose reaction to this was most unfavourable. Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to
Chamanlal that he had no objection to meeting Mr. Jinnah. But it was not Nehru but Gandhi with whom Jinnah wanted to talk and settle the problem once for all. Eventually Gandhiji wrote to Chamanlal that "he was not even a four anna member of the Congress, that he did not see the light, and that we must wait for a better opportunity." This was an excellent opportunity provided by Jinnah who happened to be in a conciliatory mood after League's debacle in 1936. "Thus ended a dialogue", says Chamanlal "which might have changed the course of recent events."

In the face of all these evidences it is not wrong to say that the lack of the spirit of conciliation on the part of Congress leadership prompted Jinnah to go ahead with his plan. Durga Das holds that inspite of Congress opposition Jinnah was still a nationalist. He wanted only an acknowledgement from the Congress that he was the 'sole spokesman of the Muslims.' "That is all that I seek", he told Durga Das. The election of Maulana Azad as a Congress President to preside over its annual session in March 1940, at Ramgarh further irritated him. By electing Maulana Azad Congress wanted to show to the world that Jinnah was not the sole spokesman of the Muslims and Jinnah bitterly remarked that "they have now added insult to injury by

selecting that show-boy." He held the Congress leaders responsible and told Durga Das that 'if only Gandhi would join hands with me, the British game of divide and rule would be frustrated.'

After this frustration Jinnah on March 23, 1940 in the Annual session of the All-India Muslim League at Lahore presented his resolution known as the Lahore resolution. The resolution did not use the word Pakistan and when a Hindu correspondent asked him whether the resolution "meant a demand for Pakistan?" Jinnah avoided the word Pakistan and only replied that "it was open to him to think so and that he was prepared to accept his interpretation."

After the session Durga Das met Jinnah and told him that 'Sikandar Hayat Khan had categorically told me that the resolution was essentially a bargaining counter.' Jinnah replied: 'A bargain my friend, is struck between two parties. Let the Congress first accept the League as the other party."

This amply goes to prove that Jinnah was interested in the recognition of Muslim League as the only party of

31. Ibid.
Muslims to look after their interest. The vivisection of India was far from his mind.

Another question which is very much asked: could the Partition have been averted? The answer may be 'yes'. If the Congress had been in a conciliatory mood the League would not have insisted on it. To Jinnah the safety and security of the Muslims was the major issue. Had it been provided, it would have satisfied Jinnah. Even in the Cabinet Mission when the League accepted the Plan, thinking that it would secure what it wanted, Jawaharlal's statement provoked his ire and Jinnah took his last weapon, 'The Direct Action' to get Pakistan.

B. Shiva Rao by his personal experience further opines that the Partition would have been averted if:

(i) The Congress had accepted Gandhiji's advice of unconditional cooperation with the Government or

(ii) The Congress Leaders had accepted Sir Aurobindo's advice to accept the Cripps offer without discussion.

32. Ibid.
In his opinion the League would have made no objection and cooperated the Congress as it had been cooperating with the Government. These counsels were not accepted and as a result of many formidable forces in the latter half of the war, partition was thought out to be the only way out of a tangled situation. Both Jinnah and Gandhi had accepted the partition much against their willingness but 'both Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah', says Shiva Rao, 'looked forward during their life-time to a happy relationship between India and Pakistan either on the basis of a treaty or, at least, as a gentleman's agreement.'

Jinnah, as said earlier, till 1939 was a nationalist and he in spite of his two-nation theory and slogan of Pakistan continued to have soft corner for India. It is evident from the fact that when the Cabinet Mission decisively rejected the idea of Pakistan the Muslim League accepted its Plan. Jinnah himself was not clear about the implications of his demand, he only wanted at least 'Pakistan' in principle to be accepted. He wanted 'statutory safeguards' for the minorities to be incorporated

33. The Statesman, August 15, 1966 see B. Shiva Rao's article 'Road to Partition 'Paved with Good Intentions.'
34. Ibid.
on the basis of parity in any scheme which was to deliver independence to India. To Jinnah India was a bigger whole to which both Pakistan and Hindustan (as he called the rest of India) were to belong. Elucidating his point Jinnah said "Let us therefore, live as good neighbours, let the Hindus guard the South and West and let the Muslims guard the frontiers. We will then stand together and say to the world 'Hands off India, India for the Indians.'"

Mr. Shri Prakasa India's first High Commissioner to Pakistan corroborates the above by saying that Jinnah wanted the two states to be known as parts of India. This can further be seen in Jinnah's dealing with the Cabinet Mission. The Cabinet Mission told Jinnah that he had to make choice between "an Indian Union, confined to defence and foreign affairs having under it two Federations of Pakistan and Hindustan and a sovereign Pakistan, but from which large blocks of territories inhabited pre-dominantly by non-Muslims, would be excluded." It was rejected by both the Congress and the League. Thereafter both the sides presented their proposals. The Congress proposals formally put forth on May 12, provided that "groups of provinces may be formed." In this connection what is most noteworthy


36. Ibid.
is that while on April 29, 1946 Mr. Jinnah sent to the Mission a copy of the resolution passed by the subjects committee of the All-India Muslim League Legislators Convention with a scheme of Pakistan the formal proposal he put to the Mission on May 11, did not provide for the Partition of India, but for a confederation of Pakistan and the rest of India. This amply goes to prove that Jinnah was not keen on Partition and was willing to solve his differences with the Congress amicably. The swift Journey towards Pakistan also took place because of the British decision to leave India by June 3, 1948. Lord Mountbatten who succeeded Lord Wavell on March 22, 1947 was determined to end the drama by any means accepted by the political parties.

Jinnah had rejected the Plan after Nehru's statement at Bombay and there was no means left to him except the Direct Action demonstrated to the Government. An explosive situation had come to surround the whole country. While the leaders of the Congress and League saw more disaster in the coming months, Mountbatten on the other hand found that 'the British Government were sitting on

37. Ibid.
General Ismay who accompanied Mountbatten to India as his Chief of Staff described the situation in 1947 as "an ammunition ship on fire." It could explode any time and it was Mountbatten's business to see that when the explosion came the British were on dry ground. June 3, 1948 appeared to him to be a distant time for transferring power in such an atmosphere. The Viceroy therefore hastened the process of division. Mountbatten's persuasive power finally convinced the League and the Congress that Partition of the country was the only solution which could bring peace to India. According to Mr. R. Thaper, Nehru was "impatient to throw the British, and though emotionally opposed to Pakistan, immediate compulsion had become irresistible to him. There was a

38. The Sunday Standard, September 28, 1975, see article The Road to Partition by D.P. Mishra.


40. Leonard Mosley says that since his youth Mountbatten decided that he would one day become the First Sea Lord and his first consideration, when he got his assignment as Viceroy of India was to see that it did not constitute a break in his naval career. It was the naval compulsion that made him rush the partition. See The Hindustan Times, September 1, 1980.
gnawing fear that delay would certainly spark uncontrollable extremism—communal, feudal and secular—which even an exhausted alien ruler could exploit for further vivisection of the sub-continent." It appears from a chronological study of documents that neither the British authorities, nor the Congress leaders nor the Muslim League contemplated over the partition in human terms. General Tukar opines that all the three forces in the sub-continent were absorbed in their own calculation. 

What worried Lord Wavell was the safe deportation of the British army which could have been attacked by the mob any time. His successor Lord Mountbatten was worried for his next promotion as the First Sea Lord. The Congress finding the League slightly nearing its goal insisted on the partition of Punjab and Bengal, not anticipating the lose of human lives. The League which had raised the Pakistan demand as a bargaining counter had lastly to accept the truncated Pakistan never believing if it could happen. This ultimately led the Congress to accept partition without foreseeing the magnitude of the disaster that followed. With the creation of the two dominions, the migrations on either side of the border were so colossal, that imagination fails to

41. The Hindustan Times, September 28, 1966, See 'Was it Possible to Prevent India's Partition.'

42. The Hindustan Times, December 31, 1972.
visualise. By the end of 1948 about 6,599,000 Muslims migrated to Pakistan and 5,563,000 Hindus to India. In the wake of migration countless people - variously estimated at 2,00,000 to two millions were massacred and the Viceroy and the Indian and Pakistani statesmen stood helplessly watching 'the calamitous consequences of the decision to divide India.' The main actors of the drama were not aware of the magnitude of communal frenzy which had bewildered them and Jawaharlal had very candidly admitted it to Liaquat Ali Khan that "we never foresaw anything like this when we agreed to it." Lord Mountbatten, who hastened the speed of Partition because of British disillusionment regretted it and felt that partition might have been avoided. Pakistan was not 'a gift of the Britishers to the Muslims' as assessed by Y.B.Mathur. If it has been so why a million lives were lost and many more millions people were uprooted from their homes. The creation of Pakistan was due to some tactical mistakes of the

44. The Sunday Standard, November 16, 1975, see Politics of Partition in Retrospect being a Review on Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre's book 'Freedom at Midnight,'
45. Ibid.
47. Ayesha Jalal, op.cit., p. 262.
Congress on one hand and of the last Viceroy's on the other who had their nationals safety in view as well as their personal ambitions. In view of what had been discussed above it is not incorrect to say as Dr. Ayesha Jalal has said that "it was the Congress that insisted on partition. It was Jinnah who was against it."

During the Round Table Conference, "a palmist who read Jinnah's hand prophesied for him the headship of an independent state at the end of his career. Jinnah 48 laughed at the suggestion as absurd. Certainly in 1930-31 when the British were at the top of their excellence politically and administratively and when Jinnah himself a nationalist could not have thought of it. Neither at the end of 1946, there was any clue of his becoming the head of a country. It was the drift of events within six months that changed the course of Indian history; won Pakistan for League and headship of a Muslim states for Jinnah.