

CHAPTER 4

TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS IN KASHMIR:

HARKAT- UL - ANSAR

The Harkat-ul-Ansar (HA) was formed on October 13, 1993, in Muzaffarabad, following the merger of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami (HJI). Initially, its objective was stated to be to organise humanitarian relief for the Afghan refugees in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan. A few months after its formation, the HUM decided to send volunteers into Afghanistan for assisting the Afghan Mujahideen groups. The recruitment was initially done in Pakistan and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK). The HUM was estimated to have recruited about 5,000 volunteers and sent them into Afghanistan. The money came from Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Osama bin Laden was an important contributor), the arms and ammunition from the CIA through the ISI and the training was given by the Pakistan army. Subsequently, the HUM recruited volunteers from the Muslim communities in other countries too. About 6,000 volunteers were thus recruited from Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Jammu & Kashmir of India, Bangladesh, Myanmar and the Philippines. Its volunteers have since participated in terrorist operations in Myanmar, Kashmir, Tajikistan and Bosnia.

On February 17, 1998, Abdul Aziz Kamilov, the Foreign Minister of Uzbekistan, for the first time accused the Markaz, the HUM and the TJ of fomenting Islamic extremism and violence in Uzbekistan. He revealed that 400 persons from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were undergoing training in arms and ammunition in the training centres of these organisations located in the Karachi, Islamabad, Mardan and Peshawar areas. The HA also purchased arms and ammunition directly from the arms market of Darra Adam Khel in the NWFP.

It is a Sunni organisation, closer to the Deoband school of thought and to Wahabism. Like the Markaz Dawa Al Irshad, it holds the sufi tradition of tolerance of other religions and the importance of the teacher (guru)-taught (shishya) relationship as the corrupting influence of Hinduism on Islam. It also holds that the woman's position is at home

and denounces pluralist, parliamentary democracy and equal rights for women as the corrupting influence of the West on Islamic societies

HA militants are fanatic Sunnī Muslims and distinguished themselves from other Sunni Muslims by describing themselves as Ansar, the term given to actual Muslim residents of Medina by Prophet Mohammad. The jihadi activities of HJI began when Amir Ershad Ahmed, Qari Saifullah Akhtar and Maulana Abdus Samad Siyal went to Afghanistan on February 25, 1980, to participate in the jihad against Soviet troops along with Ahmed Shah Masood and Prof Berhanuddin Rabbani's forces. On June 25, 1985, Ershad Ahmed was killed. Maulana Saifullah Akhtar then succeeded him as Amir. The HA split into two groups in 1997. One group was led by Maulana Fazalur Rehman Khalil and the other by Mufti Mohd. Uvais Kashmiri.

In PoK and Pakistan, its office-bearers include an Amir with Naib Amirs, a secretary, a publicity chief, a finance chief and a training incharge. According to journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai of Pakistan, this organisation is close to Osama bin Laden. Due to its violent activities the United States declared it a terrorist organisation after which a split occurred in it and the two factions that emerged abandoned the old name.

HUM activist, who had claimed to have fought against the Indian army in Kashmir, said²: " We try to go wherever our Muslim brothers are terrorised, without any monetary consideration. He further stated, "Separate cells look after the training, operations and funds within the organisation. A typical Harkat sympathiser first contacts one of its offices and offers his services for jihad anywhere in the world. The sympathiser, after the necessary in-house security clearance, is then sent for a ten-day training programme. Later, he is sent to the relevant Harkat commander, who arranges weapons and selects routes to transport the Mujahid to the area of operation to work under a field commander. Each worker volunteers his services for 40 to 120 days.

“The Mujahid is told in advance that in case of martyrdom, his body would not be brought back to Pakistan and he would be buried at the place of the operation. The Harkat takes full care of the families of the martyrs. Our brave warriors are buried in Kashmir, Tajikistan, Bosnia, Burma and the Philippines. Muslims in those countries would never forget these courageous boys from Pakistan. We always tell those intending to join us that we are devoted to Islamic jihad and, by joining us, you have chosen a path that may take you to death HUM office-bearers also claimed that amongst the foreign volunteers trained by them were 16 Afro-American Muslims from the US. They also claimed that since the demolition of the Babri Masjid in India in December 1992, the HUM had been receiving funds from some members of the Indian Muslim community in the UK.

The “News” identified Fazlur Rahman Khalil as the head of the HUM. However, the US State Department’s Counter-Terrorism Division identifies the leader of the HUM as Maulana Sadaatullah Khan. It is believed that while Rahman Khalil heads the HUM for the whole of Pakistan, Sadaatullah Khan, heads its POK unit. Longtime leader of the group, Fazlur Rehman Khalil, in mid-February 2000 stepped down as HUM amir, turning the reins over to the popular Kashmiri commander and his second in command, Farooq Kashmiri. Khalil, who has been linked to Bin Ladin and signed his fatwa in February 1998 calling for attacks on US and Western interests, assumed the position of HUM Secretary General. HUM operated terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan until Coalition airstrikes destroyed them during fall 2001.

The Chain of command is

Maulana Fazlul Rehman Khalil of Dera Ismail Khan (Pakistan) - Amir-e-Aala.

Maulana Abdula Jabbar Wasmi of Dera Gazi Khan (Sahiwal, Pakistan) Naib Amir.

Farooq Kashmiri of Rawlakote (POK) Commander in Chief.

Mufti Asghar of Bagh (POK) Launching chief.

Salahudin alias Salar of Gujarat chief in India.

Tasleem of Muzaffanagar -U.P. Deputy chief in India.

Nayeem Khalid alias Sonallah of Karachi- J&K chief (reportedly dead).

Azam Kashmiri alias Zahoor Ahmad Dar ,Nawakadal, Srinagar- J.K No 2.

Jehangir of Mirjanpur, Srinagar -District commander, city.

Its recruiting, training and launching centres are at Athmuqam, Kel Sector, Sahiwal, Bahawalpur, Faisalabad, Maskar Khaliddin Walid, Kotli and Maskar Kotli.

The HA main office is located at Lahore, (192, 9/9 Sham Nagar Road, Main Burji Chowk). Its other offices are at 379, Sector 1, Pindora, Chungi, Islamabad; 247; Huma Block, Kali Kothi, Iqbal Town, Lahore; 159-G, Masjid Chowk, Opposite Eddy Centre, Defence Society, Lahore Cantt; Lal Masjid, Begumpura, Lahore; House No. 1, Gali 1, Aftab Park, Shezan Factory, Bund Road, Lahore; and Daftar, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Ali Akbar Awan High School, Upper Chattar, Muzaffarabad.

It Collects donations from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf and Islamic states and from Pakistanis and Kashmiris. The HUM's financial collection methods also include soliciting donations from magazine ads and pamphlets. The sources and amount of HUM's military funding are unknown. In anticipation of asset seizures by the Pakistani Government, the HUM withdrew funds from bank accounts and invested in legal businesses, such as commodity trading, real estate, and production of consumer goods. Its fundraising in Pakistan has been constrained since the government clampdown on extremist groups and freezing of terrorist assets. The HA relied on donations from rich Pakistanis and collections from abroad — West Asia, the UK and the USA, the Saudi Arabia and other Gulf and Islamic Countries. It also published appeals for donations in its magazine Sada-e-Mujahid. The

modus operandi of sending funds to Kashmir was either through militants working as couriers or hawala channels. Besides funds from within Pakistan and abroad, the ISI remained a major financier of the HA. It maintained the following bank account in Pakistan: HuA J&K Moh. Farooq Kashmiri, Current A/c No. 2904-7, Allied Bank of Pakistan, Civil Centre Branch, Islamabad³

Like all other terrorist organisations this organisation also suffers from inter and intra organisational conflicts. The formation of the Jaish-e-Mohammad outfit by Maulana Masood Azhar led to serious differences among the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen leadership. Some of the HM leaders Mufti Mohd Asghar, Sajid Jehadi, Gazi Baba, Maulana Jabbar, Maulana Zafar and Maulana Umar (operational commander in Poonch) left the HM and joined the JM.

Many terrorists of one organization are also members of another terrorist groups. A terrorist organisation may have many groups and sub-groups. Al-Faran was a branch of Harkat-ul-Ansar about which nothing more was heard after the kidnapping of the foreign tourists. That is the reason why, according to police officers, it is very difficult to form a clear cut listing of terrorists according to their group. The most fundamental division is those who favour accession to Pakistan and others which favour complete independence of Kashmir or pro-azadi elements. Initially JKLF was supported by Pakistan but when they realised that they were talking too much about independence, Zia floated in Hizbul Muzahideen. In Kashmir even today a lot of rivalry exists among groups. During the Amarnath Yatra of 1994 the Hizbul Mujahideen, Allah Tigers, APHC, Jamaat-e-Islami and JKLF all lifted the ban and appealed to the Harkat-ul-Ansar to do the same. These appeals refused to evoke a positive response. The attack failed and the Ansars suffered heavy casualties. The ban could not be successful as other militant organisations opposed the ban.

Kanti Bajpai feels that the hijacking was part of some inter group competitiveness. By doing this, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen wanted more publicity. They wanted to draw attention

to their group. Publicity matters because that would persuade elements in Pakistan that this is the group to fund. They would want to project themselves as the most effective group in the struggle. It would cause militants working in other organisations to switch over to them. Publicity for the Kashmiri cause, publicity against the Indian government. Publicity of themselves - hijackers were probably aiming for these things. The Pakistanis have probably realised that to carry forward the Kashmir movement they need one dominant group which carries out massive insurgency systematically. The question is which group. Perhaps, this incident is part of that strategy.⁴

Intelligence officials monitoring the Srinagar and Ganderbal operations of the Harkat-ul-Ansar, suggest that the group simply cannot afford to send back its Pakistani and Afghan cadres because of the difficulty in bringing in new recruits from abroad. The Srinagar chief commander of the Harkat-ul-Ansar, Bilal Ahmad Sheikh, is now believed to command 30 active personnel, half of them foreigners. By contrast, the Harkat-ul-Jihad unit, which he commanded in 1990, had over 300 active members. Given that 15 foreign terrorists were killed in and around Srinagar in the same year, the manpower shortage the Harkat-ul-Ansar faces is evident. Local recruitment has been almost non-existent in recent years, and this is a key factor that led terrorist groups to ship in Pakistanis and Afghans since 1993.

The unforgiving fundamentalism of the Harkat-ul-Ansar and the Lashkar-e-Toiba often leads them to conflict with Kashmir's syncretic religious traditions. Although the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Hizbul Mujahideen also reject Kashmir's popular religious traditions, including the worship of the Moe-e-Muqaddas at Hazratbal, sensitivity to ground reality has prevented local operatives from interfering with these practices. By contrast, madrassa-educated Pakistani and Afghan recruits are often dismissive of local custom. The endorsement of Afghan terrorists operating in Kashmir by All-Party Hurriyat Conference leader Abdul Ghani Lone in October, for example, led to howls of protest from mainstream

and pro-independence groupings, which are appalled over the Taliban's patently illiberal politics.

It is in this context that security officials in Kashmir are dismissive about claims of massive Taliban entry into Kashmir. "I estimate that there are perhaps a maximum of 500 foreign terrorists in Kashmir today," say some officers in the field. "If there has been an escalation in violence, it is not because their numbers have increased, but because they are desperate to make their presence felt."

The Harkat first came into limelight in Kashmir when it banned the Amarnath Yatra in 1993 in retaliation to the demolition of Babri Masjid. It wanted the reconstruction of the mosque and wanted other closed mosques to be reopened.

The group again made news when it kidnapped two Britons David Mackie and Kim Housego from Aroo, Pahalgam on June 6, 1994 & was also suspected so be involved in the abduction of five western tourists in July 1995 allegedly by masquerading as Al Faran. The two Britons were released unhurt after the intervention of Mirwaiz of south Kashmir, the late Qazi Nisar. However the Harkat denied any role in the abduction of these western tourists. One escaped Norwegian national was beheaded while the police announced that DNA tests had confirmed that a body exhumed in South Kashmir in 1997 was of Paul Wells who also was among the tourists abducted. The fate of the other two remains unknown.. The link between such groups became clear when the captors signalled their willingness to free the hostages on the condition that 15 political prisoners, held by the Indian authorities, were also released. Three of those named Sajad Ahmad, Masud Azhar and Khan Mohammad were HUA leaders.⁵ The police claim that Azhar sneaked into India on a Portuguese passport identifying himself as Issa Wali Adam. Azhar had flown from London to New Delhi via Bangladesh and entered Kashmir on February 9, 1994. Born in an affluent family of Bhawalpur in Pakistan on July 10, 1968, his father is a retired school teacher. Azhar had

been editing Sada-e-Mujahadeed, a magazine committed to spread of Islamic teachings. He had joined Harkat to raise funds for the group and also to enrol people for Jihad. He was rated as a strong motivator and orator. According to the interviewed intelligence officers, he came to India in January 1994 and checked into hotel Ashoka and then into a hotel at Janpath in New Delhi. He had visa for India, Pakistan & Bangladesh. He visited Deoband in U.P. on January 29 accompanied by Ashraf Dar & Abu Mehmood. He then returned to his hotel in Delhi & left for Nadwa, on February 9 & caught the flight to Srinagar along with Dar to begin his assignment. His description is medium height, shallow complexion, strong built, round face, protruding belly, eyebrows joined, thick lips, keeps a maulvi beard.

After passing the eighth standard examination in 1989, he completed the Almia examination from the Jamia Islamia. Later he joined the university as a teacher and worked there till 1992. He was a follower of Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the founder of the anti-Iran and anti-Shia organization Sipah-i-Sahaba, who was killed in 1990. He was arrested along with senior Harkat commander Sajjad Afghani who was at that time heading HUA group in Kashmir. The duo were booked under TADA (FIR1/9) in the police station (counter intelligence) Kashmir. But police sources believe that two months before his arrest, Azhar had reorganised the two factions as Harkat-ul-Ansar to boost recruitment of local youth said a senior security forces officer who had been one of Azhar's interrogators. Sources in the security agencies claim that these Harkat recruits were imparted arms training in Yawar camp in Khost province in Afghanistan. This camp was said to be run by the Afghan Mujahideen group Hizbe-Islami (Yunis/ Khalid) faction. Before the Yawar camp the outfit has already set up another training camp in Allaq-e-Gare (Fiza) area, sources said. After his release, Masood Azhar wished to revive the legacy of his master. By this time Harkat had become a major Deobandi organization in Pakistan. Its main strength remained the militants of Punjab who not long ago had been the militants of Sipah-i-Sahaba

His return therefore caused an upheaval which climaxed in a grand split in the Harkat. The split was soon followed by the assassination of Maulana Yusuf Ludhianvi, a key figure in the Deobandi movement because of his status as a spiritual guide to two important Deobandi leaders, his Khalifas: Maulana Fazlur Rehman of JUI and Maulana Azam Tariq of Sipah-i- Sahaba.

Their Deobandi connection with Mullah Omar, the Amir of Afghanistan, strengthened their presence in Pakistan, especially in Karachi where Binuri Masjid emerged as the big centre of the Pakistani Taliban. The Binuri Town complex of the Deobandi seminary was headed by Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai who was also a member of the Majlis-i-Shoora of JUI under Maulana Fazlur Rehman. According to a police officer, who has been questioning the arrested Harkat militants for years now, this fundamentalist pan Islamic outfit is extremely selective in choosing recruits, who are generally taken from theological schools worldwide to ensure a high level of motivation for jihad. Harkats strategy has three cardinal components - Tableeg (religions discourse), Publicity & Jihad (Holy war) to achieve its pan Islamic ambitions. The officer admits that being cadre based, the foreign militants dominated Harkat and Lashkar have more conviction than other groups.

Post Kargil, Lashkar and Harkat have changed the tactics from hit-and-run to openly attacking military camps. Though Islam forbids suicide , these' fidayen' missions are virtually suicide attacks .In fact , lost in the blaze of hijack publicity , was the Harkat audacious occupation of the Srinagar headquarters of Jammu and Kashmir police special operations group. Some 150 police men were trapped, a deputy superintendent and seven other ranks were killed, and the desperados were overpowered only after a 24-hour gunfight.

In 1996, Harkat-ul- Ansar was a powerful Deobandi militia fighting in Held Kashmir. Its activities were so violent that the US declared it a terrorist organization. Thereafter a split occurred in it and the two factions that emerged abandoned the old name.

Harkat-ul-Mujahideen under Fazlur Rehman Khalil emerged as a big organization, while Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami, led by Saifullah Akhtar, failed to widen its influence. One reason was the involvement of Saifullah Akhtar in the unsuccessful rebellion by a section of army officers' led by Major-General Zaheer-ul-Islam Abbasi and Major Mustansir Billah in 1995. Saifullah Akhtar saved himself by turning state witness.

The split in Harkat-ul-Mujahideen: The split was caused by the militants in Punjab. Masood Azhar and his Punjabi following isolated the Harkat leader Fazlur Rehman Khalil. The formation of Jaish-i-Muhammad as a new organization was announced in January 2000, but Masood Azhar and Fazlur Rehman Khalil began to fight over the Harkat assets.

On 19 March 2000, the two submitted to a hakam (arbitration) of their elders. Harkat was represented by Muhammad Farooq Kashmiri and Jaish was represented by Maulana Abdul Jabbar (a key figure in the Kathmandu hijack) on the pledge given that they would abide by hakam. The verdict was given by three elders: Mufti Rasheed Ahmed of Zarb-i-Momin Jihadi militia, Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai of the Binuri Town complex and Dr Sher Ali Shah of Waziristan. The decision was that all offices of the Harkat, occupied by Jaish in Punjab, would be returned to the Harkat, which in turn would pay the Jaish Rs 40 lakh as its share of the division of assets.

The implementation of the hakam, however, was not so smooth. The vehicles and offices returned by Jaish to Harkat were in such bad repair that Harkat refused to accept them and thus also refused to pay the stipulated 40 lakhs. Meanwhile, in the field, the splinter groups fell upon each other. At Ath Maqam in Kashmir members of Harkat suffered serious injuries in ambush by the Jaish⁶.

In the following month, Jaish was also involved in the alleged killing of a Harkat militant in Kabul⁷ which led to a case of qisas being registered in the Taliban court.


Despite summons, the leaders of Jaish did not appear in court to defend their militants.

Meanwhile, another rumour reached Lahore about a serious incident caused by Jaish and Lashkar militants in Kabul. Six members of the Jaish were found guilty by a Taliban court of the rape and murder of a Shia family and were executed. This news was never confirmed but the upshot was that the Taliban authorities closed the Reshkhori camp and banished Jaish and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militants from Afghanistan.

The Jaish and Mullah Omar: In Pakistan the Jaish emerged as the more radical and more sectarian part of the Harkat because of its Sipah-i-Sahaba background. Maulana Yusuf Ludhianvi, it is said, inclined to their creed more than to Harkat's moderate view. Mufti Shamzai seemed to vacillate between the two splinter groups, thus allowing the Harkat's over-all leader Fazlur Rehman Khalil to be eclipsed.

Finding himself thus isolated, Khalil is said to have gone to Osama bin Laden and made up some of his losses by getting from him 12 new double-cabin pick-up trucks to replace those ruined by the Jaish in Punjab. It is said that the split in the old Harkat-ul Mujahideen was so deep that Maulana Fazlur Rehman did not find himself in a position to prevent armed clashes between them.

Meanwhile the image of Masood Azhar was greatly enhanced in Punjab when he was allowed to travel to Lahore with scores of Kalashnikov-bearing guards. The agencies restrained him only when his statements against the Musharraf government became too aggressive. Meanwhile Pakistan's pressure on the Taliban to surrender Pakistani terrorists coincided with the Taliban's own decision to banish Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jaish from Afghanistan.

Role of U.S.A.

It was after the notification made to the United States Congress on October 1, 1997 by Mrs Madeleine Albright ,the U.S Secretary of state listing 30 organisations as international terrorist organisations that the US Government to bring under the purview of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 1996, which makes it an offence for any citizen or resident of the US to provide funds or other assistance to such organisations. The Act also empowers the US Administration to deny visas to members of such organisations and prohibits their representatives from operating from US territory. The HUA was also one of these 30 organisations. The report of the US State Department on "Patterns of Global Terrorism" during 1994, submitted to the US Congress in April, 1995, for the first time took note of the activities of the HUM (HUA) in the following words: "The HUA raised its visibility (during 1994) by kidnapping two British citizens (in India) in June. This group has recently carried out a number of operations against Indian groups and civilian targets in Kashmir. The HUA captured Lt.Col. Bhupinder Singh in January and demanded that Indian forces turn over an HUA commander in return for Singh's release. When the Indian authorities refused, the militants killed Singh. In mid-May, HUA militants conducted two attacks in Doda district in which they stopped buses, forced the passengers off , then singled out individuals for execution the last victim was a 14-year-old Muslim boy."

These report added: "The HUA has several thousand armed members located in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and in the southern Kashmir valley and Doda regions of India. The HUA uses light and heavy machine guns, assault rifles, mortars, explosives and rockets. Membership is open to all who support the HUA's objectives and are willing to take the group's 40-day training course. It has a core militant group of about 300, mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris, but includes Afghans and Arab veterans of the Afghan war. The HUA is based in Muzaffarabad, Pakistan, but its members have participated in insurgent and terrorist

operations in Kashmir, Burma, Tajikistan and Bosnia. The HUA's Burma branch, located in the Arakans, trains local Muslims in weapons handling and guerilla warfare. In Tajikistan, HUA members have served with and trained Tajik resistance elements. The first group of HUA militants entered Bosnia in 1992. The source and amount of HUA's military funding are unknown, but are believed to come from sympathetic Arab countries and wealthy Pakistanis and Kashmiris."

The State Department's reports for 1995 and 1996 continued to bring on record the terrorist activities of the HUA. What the state department's report did not add was the fact that it was the CIA which issued Stinger missiles to them and trained them in their use for bringing down Soviet planes and helicopters.

After the collapse of the Najibullah Government in April 1992, the CIA wanted the HUM and other Mujahideen groups to return the unused Stinger missiles for which it offered handsome payments. It also asked the ISI to pressurise these groups to return the unused missiles. They refused and Lt.Gen.Nasir allegedly did not co-operate with the CIA in getting them back. This was one of the reasons for the CIA's anger against him and against the HUM.

It demanded and obtained in 1993 the removal of Lt.Gen.Nasir and in August, 1998, when the Cruise missiles attacked the suspected infrastructure of bin Laden in Afghanistan, the HUM training camps came in for focussed attack, apparently to teach the HUM leaders a lesson for double-crossing the CIA by not returning the unused Stinger missiles. The HUM was the largest recipient of these missiles before 1992.

The State Department's report for 1997 released in April, 1998, said that there continued to be credible reports of official Pakistani support for the Kashmiri extremist groups such as the HUM.

It added: "Muslims from around the world, including a large number of Egyptians, Algerians, Palestinians and Saudis continued to use Afghanistan as a training ground. The Taliban as well as many other combatants in the Afghan civil war facilitated the training and the indoctrination facilities for the non-Afghans in the territories they controlled. Several Afghan factions also provided logistic support, free passage and sometimes passports to the members of the various terrorist organisations."

It further said: "These individuals, in turn, were involved in fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Kashmir, the Philippines and parts of the Middle East."

Addressing a press conference at Islamabad on August 22, 1998, after the US bombing of the HUM training camps in Afghanistan, Fazlur Rahman Khalil denied that bin Laden was indulging in terrorism and accused the US of killing 50 innocent civilians, including 15 Arabs.

He said that the camps bombed by the US in Afghan territory had actually been set up by the CIA during the Afghan war and claimed that these were being used by the HUM for giving education to the Afghans. He denied that any training in terrorism was going on in these camps.

He alleged that the Nawaz Sharif Government was privy to the bombing and said that 40 Cruise missiles had struck three HUM camps in Afghan territory.

He then warned: "The USA has proved itself to be the world's biggest terrorist by carrying out the attacks on Afghanistan and the Sudan and I want to convey to the US leadership that we will take revenge for the attack."

The US attacked the following HUM camps:

- (a) The Salman Fasi camp situated in Jawah, two kms inside Afghan territory from the Pakistani border post of Saidgai. This camp was initially started in the 1980s by the

Hizbul Mujahideen of Kashmir with the help of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) of Pakistan. Angered over the JI's support to Gulbuddin Heckmatyar, the Taliban expelled the Hizbul Mujahideen from the Afghan territory and handed over the camp to the HUM, which re-named it as the Hazrat Amir Mawia camp. When the HUA changed its name as HUM after the US notification branding the HUA as an international terrorist organisation, some members of the HUA, having differences with the HUM Amir, set up a splinter group called the Jamaitul Mujahideen under Mufti Bashir. They have their own training camp in the same area.

- (b) The Khalid bin Waleed camp in the Zhavar area near the Pakistan border: Seven HUM members, including Abu Huraira, an instructor, were killed.
- (c) The Liza camp at Tanai in the Khost area, 40 kms to the West of the Mawia camp. This was run by another HUM splinter group called the Harkat Jihad Islami under one Qari Saiful Islam Akhtar.
- (d). Another camp close to the Darwanta hydel power station near Jalalabad. This camp originally belonged to Heckmatyar's Hizbe Islami. The Taliban captured it in September 1996, and handed it over to the HUM.

Addressing the Karachi Press Club on August 23, 1998, Azizur Rahman Danish, the head of the Sindh branch of the HUM, warned: "The US air strikes have drawn a clear dividing line between the Muslim Ummah and non-believers and this is the beginning of a crusade. The USA will be paid back in the same coin."

Addressing a press conference at Peshawar on August 25, 1998, Fazlur Rahman Khalil said that nine HUM members died in the US attack on its camps in the Khost area, of whom five were killed on the spot and the remaining succumbed to their injuries in Pakistani hospitals. In addition, two Tajiks and four Arabs, two of them physically

handicapped, were also killed. According to him, the Cruise missiles destroyed four mosques, partially damaged another and burnt 200 copies of the Holy Quran kept in the camps.

He added: "The USA calls Osama a terrorist and President Clinton is claiming that all terrorist training camps had been destroyed in the air strikes. Let me tell the Americans that not even one per cent of the so-called terrorist camps run by Osama have been destroyed."

In another warning to the US on September 1, 1998, Fazlur Rahman Khalil said: "The USA has struck us with Tomahawk Cruise missiles at only two places, but we will hit back at them everywhere in the world, wherever we find them. We have started a holy war against the US and they will hardly find a tree to take shelter beneath it."

Khalid Ahmed, a well-known Pakistani analyst, wrote as follows in the issue of the "Friday Times", a Pakistani weekly, for the week from August 28 to September 3, 1998: "The national consensus on Kashmir often blinds Pakistan to the isolationist compulsions that arise from it. Internal politics has compelled the removal of Heckmatyar's Hizbe Islami from the Afghan jihad and his ally Qazi Hussain Ahmad's Hizbul Mujahideen from the Kashmir jihad. The vacuum created by their ouster has been filled exclusively with Deobandi and Wahabi Mujahideen.

"The Deobandi HUA and the Wahabi Lashkar-e-Toiba are the main outfits fighting in Kashmir, but their guerilla training is acquired in Afghanistan. ..That the jihad in Kashmir is dependent on the Afghan jihad is hidden from no one. That it gives a locus standi to India in Afghanistan is not clear to most Pakistanis. The Pakistani compulsion to wage the Kashmiri jihad with the help of Deobandi-Wahabi warriors has allowed anew religious stringency to prevail in Pakistani society."

He added: "In 1996, the Lahore High Court openly favoured *the* Wahabi jurisprudence as some of the judges were found to be of *Ahle Hadith persuasion*. *Prime*

Ministers and Presidents have been attending Deobandi congregations to demonstrate their new faith. Violent sectarianism is the offshoot of this social change.”

In an editorial in the issue for the week from August 14 to 20, 1998, the same journal warned: “ Pakistan is gradually falling under the puritanical faith of Deobandi-Wahabi forces that are allied to the Taliban. In the past two years, for example, Pakistani judges are increasingly falling prey to Islamic extremism....The Pakistani state will become hostage to the Taliban Deobandi brand of Islam by continuing to give succour to the Jamiat Ulema Islam, the Sipah-e-Sahaba and the HUM.”

In an article in the same issue, Ejaz Haider, another Pakistani analyst, said: “A recent report brought out the linkage between Deobandi sectarian organisations in Pakistan and the HUA which has links both with the Taliban and the JUI.” It said that Imams belonging to these organisations have been saying in their addresses to their congregations that after consolidating its hold in Afghanistan, the Taliban would not only “liberate” Kashmir, but also rid Pakistan of Shias and Brelvi Sunnis.

The HUM has strongly opposed the process for the normalisation of Indo-Pakistani relations. In a statement before the recent visit of the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, to Lahore for talks with Nawaz Sharif, Fazlur Rahman Khalil warned: “More bodies of Indian officials would be sent in coffins from Kashmir on the days Vajpayee visits Lahore.” He also said that Islam’s enmity with India was ideological and not just territorial. He alleged that it was the US which had pressurised the two Prime Ministers to meet.

The Markaz and its Lashkar and the HUM are determined to wreck the normalisation process by stepping up their terrorist activities against India.

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