CHAPTER II

THE GROWTH OF THE IDEA OF PARTITION

(1914-1939)

The Renaissance of Hindu-Muslim Differences

The demand and emergence of a separate homeland of a particular community, distinguished by its religion, culture, language and geographical conditions, is not very uncommon in the political history of the world. India as a subcontinent of different races, languages and cultures, has always been regarded a country of different sub-nationalities, such as, the Bengalees in Bengal, Punjabis in the Punjab, the Marathas in Maharashtra, the Tamils in the South and the Muslims scattered all over India. They are recognised by their distinctive culture, language, dress, manners and behaviour and patterns. In East Bengal, Sind, N.W.F. Province and Kashmir, there were mostly Muslims. In U.P., Bihar, Orissa and South India, there was a mixed population of the Muslims and the Hindus; the Sikhs, particularly living in Punjab, Christians in South India and the Parsis in West Maharashtra and Gujarat being in the least minority. The Hindus were in majority in almost all the states except the four stated above. In spite of all these diversities, all the Indians had a bond of love and goodwill for each other and, thus, they remained united. This was a unity in diversity. The "European writers as a rule have been more conscious of the diversity than of the unity of India". The British imperial interests prompted them to adopt a policy of 'Divide et Impera' and highlight the factors of diversity. For the Hindus, the most important uniting bond was provided by their religion - the Hinduism, which cemented their relations in North and South, East and West, despite cultural and linguistic differences. All Hindus regarded India as the Holy Land. Their sacred places are spread from Setubandhu-Rameswaram in the extreme south to Badrinath in the bosom of the snow-capped Himalayas in the north. Contrary to this, the Muslims in India had scarcely any native cultural, linguistic or religious moorings.

The Islamic culture is that of Arabs, which the Muslims in India had imbibed as faithful Muslims, but, side by side, they had also adopted

and continued to knit many customs and rituals of India also. The Islamic language was Arabic but their language had become Urdu or Hindustani written in Persian script in India. Urdu is in reality an emergence of intermingling of Persian and Sanskritized Hindi spoken in the 17th and 18th centuries in India. Thus, Urdu is not the language of Muslims but of the Indians. The British politicians, to gain their political ends, through the Fort William College, Calcutta, created two distinct languages - Hindi and Urdu, which had been a matter of controversy even during the days of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan on the question of Nagri-Persian script. The Hindus adopted the Sanskritized Hindi having alliance with their religious books - Ramayan, Ved and Gita, while the Muslims preferred the Urdu language with Persian and Arabic words, as their holy book - Qur'an - is written in the same script. Thus, Hindi became the language of Hindus and Urdu the language of Muslims. Thus, from 1867, Urdu, the *lingua franca* of the larger part of India began to collapse and two separate languages - Hindi and Urdu, began to sow seeds of differentiation between the Hindus and the Muslims. The differences intensified when Hindi became a highly Sanskritized language, which could not be understood by the Muslims. On the other hand, Urdu, which included words of almost all the languages, was being ignored. This resulted in carving a great hatred of Muslims towards Hindi and the Hindus and it also stamped on the Muslim minds that Hindus were orthodox in their behaviour. Further, there were "33 major tongues along with a host of minor languages and dialects". This led to the growth of separatism.

Sir Syed took the Hindi-Urdu controversy, culminating to the Mosque-Temple differences, very seriously. He realised that any attempt to impose Hindi on Muslims or Urdu on Hindus would undermine the composite culture of India. It was, undoubtedly, to him was "a symbol of the beginning of communal consciousness and revivalism among the Hindus".

The third factor is the religion. The Muslims pray to one God and the Hindus many god and goddesses. Their method of worship is different. Likewise, they differ in dress, food and manners and civilization as well. The ethnic differences, thus, being poles apart could not reconcile the Hindus and Muslims to settle their differences and instead led to parting-ways.

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It is argued that most of the Muslims in India are local converts and are of the same race as the Hindus; hence, there was no question of their differences. But this contention finds no ground in view of the fact that the new immigrants, who came to India with invaders' forces or as followers of Muslim Saints left a permanent community of Islamic thoughts. Thus, on the one hand, the Muslims in India are of two stocks while the Hindus are of only one. Thus, India was inhabited by two races. If we account the pre-historic times we find, there were four races as has been disclosed by the archaeologists during excavations at Mohenjodaro. They were the proto-Australoid, the Mediterranean, the Mongolian branch of the Alpine stock and the Alpine. Of the many ethnic groups, the Aryans, the Scythians, the Kushans, the Huns and the Semite came to India. Professor Dixon says that this racial diversity is the very root of caste system in India. Evidently, the caste groups differ from each other racially. Thus, caste system came into existence in Hinduism and, Hindus were divided into many groups, especially into high caste Hindus and the low caste Hindus i.e. Scheduled Castes. Likewise, the immigrant Muslims considered themselves as the 'high born Muslims' and the converts as 'low born Muslims'. The separatism in society played a major role in partition of India.

Politically also India was not united in the true sense of the word. From 500 BC to 273 BC, we find disintegration and wars among the different races in all parts of India. India was united only in the days of Ashoka and Alauddin Khalji, whose general, Malik Kafoor, subdued the whole region of south India. The Mughal rule, though had a strong centre but had also the enemies - the Rajputs, Sikhs and Marathas.

After the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, the provincial governors became independent. When the British took over reign of the Red Ford, India was divided into a large number of states, ruled by Rajas and Nawabs. The division of India after the Great Revolt until Independence gave an idea of partition of the sub-continent.

Idea of Partition in the 19th Century

The idea of a separate Muslim homeland may be traced back to the

political and psychological effect since the British occupation of Delhi in 1803 and Subsidiary Alliances with Hyderabad in 1798, Nawab of Awadh in 1901 and Peshwa Baji Rao II in 1802, when they merely served as a political front for the British. By 1818, except Sind and Punjab, the whole of India had come under the British rule. John Bright, a British statesman in 1817, was the first, who "recommended the formation of five semi-independent Indian presidencies with capitals at Agra, Bombay, Calcutta, Lahore and Madras. They were to be ... controlled by Britain". The British adopted a policy of suppression for complete control and the people were psychologically attached to their past rulers. The Marathas in Maharashtra, Sikhs in Punjab, Kols in Bihar, Muslim Nawabs in Awadh, Nizam in Hyderabad and Amirs in Sindh came under direct British control by 1857. They each represented a particular community and gave sense of the Hindu State and the Muslim State. This sowed the seed of separatism in India.

The masses were influenced by the political change. Their attitude, specially between Hindus and Muslims, became uncooperative and they began to look at each other with suspicion. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, the prophet of Hindu-Muslim unity, disgruntled by the Hindu-Muslim differences due to many reasons, changed his views from one-nation theory to two-nation theory, that is, Muslims and Hindus are two separate communities. Sir Syed imagined that the two, being different, would conflict like the minority and majority groups on the issues of race, religion and language as in Europe and would not live in hearty communion with each other. These doubts of Sir Syed proved true with the rise of idea of a separate homeland for Muslims in future. A famous pan-Islamist Afghan proposed establishment of an Indian Muslim state comprising of North-West India, Afghanistan and the states of Turkistan. Wilfred Scawen Blunt suggested to divide India into a Northern Indian Muslim state and a Southern Indian Muslim state both largely self-governing within the British Indian Empire.

S.R. Mehrotra says that the historians traced the "idea of Pakistan back to Sir Sved Ahmad Khan in the nineteenth century", to "Shah Waliullah and Shah Abdul Aziz in the eighteenth century, and even to Muhammad bin Qasim, the first Muslim invader of India early in the eighth century". Truly, Sir Syed's 'two-nation theory' is the landmark of Pakistan, but it is quite untrue that the latter three expressed ideas of a separate Muslim homeland as there is no clear statement but whatever Mehrotra refers is based on assumptions. Neither it may be admitted that the Muslims inherited the idea of a Muslim state from the insurgents during eighth to the eighteenth century. The reign of Muhammad bin Qasim (713-715) "was an insignificant event in the history of Islam", which did not help much in the establishment of the future Muslim Empire in India and, hence, Lane Poole characterised it as an episode in the History of India and of Islam, a triumph without result". Shah Waliullah and Shah Abdul Aziz were mainly religious leaders. In fact, the earliest Muslim rulers and their followers intermarried with the local people and produced a mixed race. They became part of India as the Hindus and advocated their movements against the British to inflame the Indian conscience. Thus, they laid the foundation of freedom struggle. For instance, in 1799, Aga Muhammad Baza assumed the character of a prophet and styled himself Immaun Mahadi. Shariatullah, in 1804, founded the Faridi sect and turned it into political entity. He appointed deputy or Khalifa to establish a Islamic rule. In 1810, Abdul Rahman proclaimed himself the Imam Mehdi in Surat. In 1820-21, Syed Ahmad of Rae Bareilly (U.P.), who led the Wahabi Movement, preached "to perform Hijrat or flight from the country governed by Mushriks" and aimed to fix his headquarters at Sittana in NWFP, which was a Muslim dominated state. In Bengal, Titu Mir of the Wahabi sect "claimed the sovereign power as the

12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 37.
hereditary right of the Muslims which had been unjustly usurped by the Europeans. He wanted to overthrow the British and to establish an Islamic kingdom in India. There may be called the people with religious frenzy, but their aim to establish an Islamic regime in India was but a dream.

The province of Bengal, since the promulgation of 1874 constitution, comprised of besides Bengal proper, Bihar, Orissa and Chota Nagpur, which was difficult to be administered as a single unit. Risley considered various schemes of territorial adjustment in order to achieve the following objectives:

"(1) To bring all the Oriya-speaking people outside the territorial limits of Orissa, under the administration of Bengal.
(2) To separate the whole of Chittagong Division and the Districts of Dacca and Mymensingh from Bengal and to incorporate them with Assam, and to transfer portions of Chutia Nagpur to the Central Provinces."

By the end of the nineteenth century, a large number of daily newspapers came in circulation. They embodied opinions of different political groups, particularly the Muslims and the Congress. The papers are full of apprehensive feelings of Muslims and their fear of being treated as grass-roots by the Hindus in future. They anticipated the solution of this problem. For instance, Abdul Halim Sharar, a novelist and editor of Muhazzib, in 1890, observed:

"If both Hindus and Muslims cannot live together in peace and mutual respect, then it is better for them to divide India into Hindu and Muslim provinces and exchange their population."

Idea of Partition in the 20th Century

The East Bengal had great Muslim population and their domination through election was sure. The Maharaja Manindra Chunder Nundi lamented that in East Bengal, the Bengali Hindu will be in a minority and shall

15. Ibid., p. 18.
become strangers in their own land. Bankim Chandra's song, 'Vandematram', led the Vandemataram Movement. Tilak organised Ganapati festival and brought many people into the political field and Aravindo Pal and Lajpat Rai brought a large number of people into the national movement. On September 5, the Durga Puja Day, thousands of people took religious vow at the Kali temple that they should boycott British goods, adopt Swadeshi and make every effort to overthrow the British yoke. Minto enacted several repressive laws. Tilak was imprisoned for six years. Arvindo was arrested. Lajpat Rai went into voluntary exile. On the other hand, the partition was supported by a small group of Muslims led by Nawab Salimullah of Dacca as induced by Lord Curzon, while a few members of family of the Nawab opposed the partition and joined the Swadeshi movement. However, the annulment of the partition of Bengal in 1911 by King George V, caused deep frustration of the Muslims and an occasion of great jubilation for the Hindus. The partition of Bengal left a permanent impression on the Indian's mind anticipating the possibility of India's partition.

The question of separate electorate and reservation of seats for Muslims, an important stand of the Muslim League, could not be solved at the Allahabad Conference in 1910. Further, the birth of Hindu Mahasabha and establishment of Muslim communal institutions embarked Hindu-Muslim antagonism. Sapru's suggestion was opposed by orthodox conservative Hindu leaders. The Muslim leaders began to severely think to solve the communal problem with safeguard of their interests.

In 1913, Maulana Mahomed Ali suggested that North India may be assigned to the Muslims and rest to the Hindus to solve the Hindu-Muslim problem. Similar idea was expressed by Abdul Jabbar and Abdul Sattar at the International Socialist Conference at Stockholm in 1919. A Pathan chief, Mohammad Gulkhan, suggested a separate Muslim homeland in the North-West extending as far as Agra.

On August 3, 1911, Harcourt Butler said that the establishment of

17. R.C. Majumdar, n. 11, p. 18.
the Muslim University "would ... tend to keep alive the Hindu-Muslim feelings". Montagu opposing the foundation of a denominational Muslim University said: "those, who accused the government of a policy of 'divide and rule', would have a strong case". "The Secretary of State and some members of his Council objected to the term "Muslim" in the nomenclature of the University". Since the Aligarh Muslim University Plan included 'Muslim religion', there was a counter-move amongst the Hindus to found a Hindu University teaching Hindu religion. The Government encouraged both the plans to develop separatism among the Hindus and the Muslims, which deepened mistrust, created new misunderstandings and made the path of national leaders difficult. In 1915, the Banaras Hindu University Act was passed. The Muslim University Act was passed in 1920. The establishment of the two universities obviously created a gulf between the Hindus and the Muslims and the idea of being two-nation got much strength.

Political Developments during the First World War

Great Britain declared war against Germany on August 4, 1914. The United States of America sided with the former and Turkey joined the latter. The Congress and the Muslim League expressed loyalty to the British and helped the British war aims. Henry, in February, 1915, pleaded for the grant of 'political autonomy' to India and the Indians began to look towards a great advance in self-government. In January, 1915, Gandhiji returned to India after spending twenty-two years in South Africa and became a leading force in the Congress. The British attacked the holy places of Muslims in Hedjaz, which enraged the Muslims in India. The Congress joined hands with the Muslim League to solve the communal problem. Gokhale, Mrs. Annie Besant, Surendranath Banerjea & Wazir Hasan prepared their schedule of demand, which were almost identical. The Special Provincial Conference held at Allahabad on May 30, 1915, manifested wholehearted cooperation between the Hindus and the Muslims.

21. Butler to The Aga Khan, August 3, 1911, Butler Papers, MSS EUR, F.116 (71), and Butler to Hardinge, September 25, 1911, Hardinge Papers (82).
Congress-League Conferences

In July, 1915, the U.P. Government introduced a Municipalities Bill into its Legislative Council, as a result of Jinnah's proposal to increase non-official participation. The conservative Hindu politicians were opposed to granting of a separate representation to the Muslims, and when the Congress made its policy to grant concessions to the Muslims, the orthodox Hindus resisted. The Congress and the League prepared their 'Reforms Scheme', but the Congress scheme excluded the separate representation. After much heated discussions, at the Joint Reform Committee meeting held on November 17-18, 1916, the Hindus agreed to separate representation of Muslims provided the Muslims had no vote in the general electorates, which the Muslims accepted. The proportion of representation in five provinces were settled, but in the case of Bengal and U.P., matters were postponed to be settled, which were agreed upon at the Congress-League Joint Session met from December 25-28, 1916, at Lucknow under the Presidency of Jinnah, who drafted the scheme, known as 'Lucknow Pact'.

The Lucknow Pact, 1916

The scheme postulated representative government and Dominion Status and direct election by the people on as broad a franchise as possible and recognised separate electorates for Muslims with a weightage of seats in excess of their proportion of the population in areas where they were in minority. According to the scheme, the question of allocation of seats in the Legislative Council was almost dead and the Congress and the League felt satisfied, and welcomed the scheme. But in U.P. and the Punjab, the Hindus resented. The All-India Hindu Mahasabha and the local Hindu Sabhas denounced the Pact due to the excessive representation given to the Muslim minorities. On the other hand, the conservative Muslims in Bengal demanded 52% instead of 40% seats and in Bombay they

25. Syed Ali Nabi to Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh, October 19, 1915, Municipal 1915, 230 E No. 58, UPS.
27. See for details of proportion of Muslim representation, Mushirul Hasan, n. 23, p. 72.
28. The Tribune (Lahore), December 29, 1916.
demanded 36% of the seats. The ulema of Deoband demanded: (a) an Alim to be appointed to each Legislative Council; (b) the Wakfs and the mosques to be placed under the charge of the Sheikhul Islam; and (c) the dispute amongst Muslims to be settled in accordance with Muslim Personal Law. Due to these differences, the Memoranda, submitted to Montague and Chelmsford, indicated no common political demands and communal interests varied from class to class and region to region.

Dr. Lal Bahadur stated:

"The fact was that in regard to communal adjustment the Congress, generally speaking suffered from self-delusion. Nothing could be done more head-strong than to hope for the disappearance of separate electorate after 10 years of its birth. The evil could easily be nipped in the bud, but it was allowed to grow till it served an easy stepping stone for the demand of Pakistan".

He holds that the Pact was the evidence of the tactful bankruptcy of the Congress leaders and their helpless lack of shrewdness as they could not visualise that the concession would tear the nation for ever into two communities and the division of the country would be inevitable. He concludes that "The Lucknow Pact demanded a heavy toll of the country's sacrifice and the price was paid in the formation of Pakistan".

Non-Brahmin and Sikh Movements

The non-Brahmin movement began in 1916-17, under the leadership of Dr. C. Sankaran Nair (1857-1934), who was President of the Indian National Congress in 1897; Judge of the Madras High Court during 1908-15; and was then a Member of Governor-General's Council (1915-19). The "non-Brahmins demanded special representation either through separates or through reservation of seats in joint electorates". Further, the

30. Maulvi Mohammad Ahmad to Sheweth, October 30, 1917, Meston Papers (19), NAI.
32. Ibid.
Sikhs, who formed only 11 per cent of the population in Punjab claimed special representation and weightage in the Councils "on historical, political and economic grounds", as they were the rulers of Punjab for seventy years and had stood by the British in 1857. These demands also strengthened the idea of separate homeland.

Keith observed that the idea of a separate Muslim homeland was in the air even long before as early as 1919:

"Among the Muslims also there was propagated a wild but not negligible scheme for the creation of a Muslim State based on Afghanistan and embracing all those North-Western areas where the faith is strong. Such a State would inevitably form a permanent source of danger in India".

**British Declaration of Self-Government, 1917**

In November, 1916, Lord Chelmsford, who had assumed the office of Governor-General on April 5, 1916, in his despatch to the Secretary of State, accepted self-government as the goal for India and enlarged the powers of the provincial councils by extending the electorate and increasing the elective element. Edwin Samuel Montagu, on August 20, 1917, became the Secretary of State for India in place of Lord Chamberlain, who had resigned. Montagu, on August 20, 1917, announced in the House of Commons: "The policy of His Majesty's Government ... is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-government institutions" and "responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire", which realised the infinite divisions of India. The people believed that if Parliamentary government would be formed "the electorate will be at the mercy of a small coterie of politicians who will use their power to exalt themselves". Therefore, Montagu left Indians "to try to set things right for themselves, and to learn by suffering from their own mistakes".

Montagu visited India and the Montagu-Chelmsford Report saw the light of

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34. Ibid.
37. Ibid., p. 17.
38. Ibid.
the day on April 22, 1918 (published in July, 1918). The Report did not satisfy any community. However, it intensified the efforts of the Congress and the League to acquire their legitimate rights. Three months later, the First World War came to an end.

Gandhi and Khilafat Movement

During the period from 1916 to 1921, the Hindu-Muslim unity continued. On September 21, 1919, an All-India Central Khilafat Committee (AICKC) was founded and Local Khilafat Committees and District Khilafat Committees were organised throughout the country. In November, 1919, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind (The Society of Indian Theologians) was founded under the influence of Maulana Abdul Bar! of Lucknow. Gandhiji was elected President of the AICKC on November 24, 1919. As the British planned harsh terms on Turkey, aiming its dismemberment, Hasrat Mohani's resolution for boycott of British goods was adopted in spite of Gandhiji's formidable opposition. **Gandhiji, to make the new Reforms Bill a success, did not like to create any hinderence in furtherance of the Congress policies. Therefore, at the Amritsar Congress session by the end of December, 1919, Gandhiji got passed a resolution to cooperate with the Government.**

The Government of India Act, 1919

On the basis of reports of the Franchise Committee, the Function Committee and the Committee on Home Administration, the Government of India drafted a Bill, which received the Royal assent on December 23, 1919, which is known as the Government of India Act, 1919.

In each of the nine provinces, the Governors had an Executive Council and a Legislative Council. The members of the Executive Council were nominated by the Governors and the members of the Legislative Council were chosen by the Governor from amongst the members of the Legislature. The 'Reserved Subject' were dealt by the Executive Council and the 'Transferred Subjects' were administered by the Legislative Council.

There were two houses: the Central Legislative Assembly and the Council of State. The former consisted of 145 members (103 elected + 42 nominated (25 officials + 17 non-officials) - 51 elected by general

constituencies + 32 communal constituencies (30 by Muslims and 2 by Sikhs), 20 by special constituencies (7 by landholders, 9 by Europeans and 4 by Indian Commerce). The latter consisted of 60 members (33 elected and 27 nominated by the Governor-General).

The Constitution was based on the Montagu-Chelmsford Report and provided for separate Muslim electorates, as envisaged in the Lucknow Pact of 1918. As Montagu was personally opposed to the principle of communal representation and regarded it a "great mistake" of Morley and Minto in 1909, the 'communal representation was not accorded in any province where Muslims formed a majority of the voters. However, the Act introduced responsive government in the Centre. The Congress demanded 'responsible government'. The new Assembly recommended for revising the Act. The Congress and the Muslim League boycotted the elections in 1920 as a result the Moderates captured the seats. C.R. Das and Motilal Nehru entered the Assembly to adopt method of 'wrecking legislatures from within'.

Jinnah's Resignation from the Muslim League

At the AIML Session at Amritsar in December, 1919, the Muslim League censured the Government for its atrocities at the Jalianwala Bagh, expressed strong resentment at the proposed dismemberment of Turkey, showed unflinching loyalty to the Sultan of Turkey, demanded the recall of the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford from India and decided not to sacrifice cow on the occasion of Id-ul-Azha. The Muslim League was dominated by the Khilafat leaders and the country was echoing with shouts of "Ali Bhaion Ki Jai" and "Gandhiji Ki Jai". Jinnah supported the non-cooperation programme of Gandhiji but he was apprehensive of Gandhiji's influence.

Gandhiji chaired the Home Rule League (Swaraj Sabha) Bombay meeting on October 3, 1920, and proposed "To secure complete Swaraj for India". Jinnah argued that "Attainment of self-government within the British Commonwealth ... by constitutional methods" remained the Sabha's best goal, which only he could accept. Gandhiji remarked that those opposing

the majority's decision were "free" to "resign" from the Sabha as a result Jinnah with his 18 members left the meeting and on October 27, 1920, resigned from the Muslim League "with great sorrow", because the League members were eulogizing Gandhiji more than the Hindus for his participation and cooperation in the Khilafat Movement. This was Jinnah's first "shudder" of apprehension which caused him to uproot his faith in Gandhiji or his judgment to save India from being "shattered" and which led to the partition of India.

Jinnah's Resignation from the Congress

Gandhiji at the Nagpur meeting of the Subjects Committee on December 28, 1920, amending the Congress creed, proposed "the attainment of Swaraj by the people of India by all legitimate and peaceful means". Jinnah immediately objected that it was impractical and thought it dangerous to the Muslim interests to dissolve "the British connection" without greater preparation for independence, but Jinnah was shouted and voted down the next day. When he mounted to the dias, he was "howled down with cries of 'shame', 'shame' and 'political imposter'. He, however, appealed and argued, but the irate audience, mostly Hindus, and Gandhiji did not answer his appeal and drove him from the platform. This was Jinnah's most bitter humiliating experience of his public life. He left Nagpur by the next train and his hopes of National leadership were buried that day. The memory of his defeat always emblazoned on his brain, which forced him to wait and stand exclusively for the cause of Muslims, if required. Thus, Gandhiji's humiliating attitude may be held responsible for making Jinnah determinant to achieve Pakistan. However, Jinnah, as a protest against the 'pseudo-religious approach to politics', resigned from the Congress. He warned the futility of the Gandhi-Khilafat express, which became manifest when Gandhiji, after the Chauri Chaura episode, on February 5, 1922, called off the Non-Cooperation Movement and Abdul Bari at Ajmere on March 5, 1922, charged Gandhiji for not launching the Non-Cooperation Movement and Dr. M.A. Ansari called the Maulana a


45. Dr. Naeem Qureshi, Papers (IV,I), Vol. V, p. 229, NMML.
release, he launched a Shuddhi Movement and Moonji started Sangathan Movement. The Hindu Sabha was refounded as the Hindu Mahasabha towards the end of 1922, to counter the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, which campaigned Tabligh and Tanzim Movements. In 1923, the Arya Samaj reconverted four and a half lakhs of Malakhana Rajputs, which caused 112 major 'communal riots' between 1923 and 1927. The Kohat riots broke out in August, 1924. Gandhiji "considered the Muslims the prosecutors and the Hindus the prosecuted". He refused to settle the Hindu-Muslim disputes, even when the Ali Brothers, Dr. M.A. Ansari, Maulana A.K. Azad and Dr. Mahmud, approached him. Instead, in May, 1924, he said: "The Mussalman as a rule is a bully and the Hindu is a coward", which added fuel to the fire of communal entanglement.

The riots strengthened the impression among the Muslim masses that their life, land and property would not be safe in Congress ruled India with a massive Hindu majority. This feeling naturally made them think of a better solution of their anticipated dangers and they appeared to find it readily in the proposition of a separate homeland for the Muslims.

However, on September 18, 1924, Gandhiji announced a fast of 21 days appealing for Hindu-Muslim accord.

Bengal Pact, 1923

In the 1923 elections, the Swarajists formed ministries in the Central Provinces and secured substantial number of seats in Bombay, and U.P. Legislative Councils as also in the Central Legislative Assembly. In Bengal, they were able to prevent formation of any ministry.

In December, 1923, the Bengal Swarajya Party formulated the 'Bengal Pact', which "provided inter alia for separate representation to Muslims in the Bengal Council on a population basis; for representation on local bodies in the proportion of 60:40 accordingly as their community was in a majority; and for the grant of 55 per cent of Government appointments to Muslims", but the Congress Coconada Session rejected the Pact and drafted the "Indian National Pact". In early 1924, the Punjab Muslim League drew up a third pact. These pacts, instead of bringing about communal harmony made the situation worse.

49. Ibid., p. 247.
50. Indulal Yajnik, n. 39, p. 373.
Lala Lajpat Rai's Partition Proposal, 1924

Lala Lajpat Rai wrote in 1924:

"Punjab should be partitioned into two provinces, the Western Punjab with a large Muslim majority, to be a Muslim governed province; and the Eastern Punjab, with a large Hindu-Sikh majority, to be a non-Muslim governed province".

R.C. Majumdar writes: "Lala Lajpat Rai 'suggested the creation of Moslem provinces in the north-east and north-west of India ... to set at rest the ceaseless Hindu-Muslim bickerings and jealousies in some provinces".

Communal Ideas of Hindus

The Shuddhi and Sangathan Movements, the Arya Samaj, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Swaraj Party were proud of Hindu nationalism and openly worked for Hindu domination, but the Congress was somewhat better than them in view of its proclamation of secular ideas. It was tragic that the Congressmen did not condemn the anti-Muslim propaganda carried out by the conservative Congress leaders. For instance, Lala Lajpat Rai at Ambala said:

"O Hindus! do not bother if such and such a man is an agent of the Government ... We need men now who in the interests of the Hindus will cooperate with the Government".

Bhai Parmand, in his book, Hindu Sangathan and Arya Samaj, wrote:

"They (Hindus) should join with the Government to weaken the Muslims, and so enhance Hindu strength; and after we have increased our power in this way, then we try to get Swaraj".

C.S. Anka Ayer at Nagina said:

53. R.C. Majumdar, n. 33, p. 538, note 22. See also The Modern Review (Calcutta), 1925, Part I, p. 489.
"Swaraj means the rule of the majority. It follows that the greatest service to Hindu solidarity that can be rendered is to strengthen the Indian National Congress, in which Hindus predominate".

Likewise, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, Swami Shraddhanand, Dr. Moonje, Savarkar and others were engaged in anti-Muslim activities. In contrast, when Dr. Kichlew started similar Muslim movements, the League and the Khilafat leaders stood aloof. Mahomed Ali complained that Motilal Nehru said: "at election times he could in no circumstances be expected to oppose the Hindu Maha Sabha's unseemly activities". Rajpal, who wrote Rangila Rasul (The Colourful Prophet) was, by Justice Dilipsingh, in July, 1927, acquitted of the charges against him. None of the Hindu leaders, even Gandhiji, said nothing. Motilal Nehru said: "I have nothing to say".

Lord Birkenhead's Declaration, 1925

The Congress refused to cooperate in the working of the reforms. Lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State, on July 7, 1925, declared: "let them produce a constitution which carries behind it a fair measure of general agreement among the great people of India". He thought that Hindu-Muslim agreement on a common constitution would not be possible, and, thus, the British rule would continue.

Jinnah's Revitalisation of the Muslim League

The Muslim League due to fall of the Khilafat Movement had become leaderless as their leaders had lost their influence so much so that one of its meetings was adjourned for lack of a quorum. At this juncture, Jinnah, who was elected member of the Legislative Assembly in September, 1923 elections, had drafted a "national demand", minority report by the end of 1924 and always spoke in defence of invididual rights and equal justice, full religious liberty to all communities, began to advocate separate electorates for Muslims, since joint electorates were deemed a "source of discord and disunion" as well as "wholly inadequate to

58. Ibid.
59. V.P. Menon, n. 36, p. 34.
60. Ibid.
achieve the object of effective representation\(^6\). Jinnah was appointed by the League to frame a scheme for a constitution for the government of India. He came forward to fight for the cause of Muslims and revived the Muslim League in 1925 "for the articulation of Muslim political demands such as communal representation in the legislative bodies, extension of separate electorates to local bodies, and reservation of seats in public service\(^6\). Jinnah aimed to regain the influence which he had lost during the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation movements. He was elected permanent President of the Muslim League in 1924 for three years.

**Jinnah's Conference, 1927**

The Conference, presided over by Jinnah, was held in Delhi on March 20, 1927, and was attended also by Dr. M. A. Ansari, Mahomed Ali, M. Yaqub, M. Ismail, Ali Nabi and the Raja of Mahmudabad besides Muslim leaders from the Punjab, Bihar, Delhi and Bombay. Jinnah still had faith in the Congress dominated by Gandhi. The Conference agreed to forego separate electorates if their following four demands were accepted by the Congress, in toto\(^6\):

1. That Muslim representation in the Bengal and Punjab Legislative Councils would be in proportion to their population;
2. That Muslims would be allowed one-third of the seats in the Central Legislature;
3. That Sind be separated from Bombay Presidency and constituted as an independent province; and
4. That Reforms be introduced in the NWFP and in Baluchistan on the same footing as in any other province in India."

The demands were later endorsed by the All-India Muslim League, the All-India Khilafat Committee and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema.

Motilal Nehru and Srinivas Iyengar persuaded the All-India Congress Committee and the Congress Working Committee to adopt Jinnah's proposals at its Bombay session to be held on March 15, 1927, in order to maintain Hindu-Muslim unity. Hindus bitterly condemned the Congress for accepting

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the Muslim demand for representation in the Legislatures in proportion to their population\textsuperscript{64}, and "for recognising the principle of partition along the 'permanent lines of religious cleavages'".

**Lord Birkenhead's Declaration, 1927**

The Congress at its Madras session in 1927, resolved to boycott the Simon Commission and proclaimed independence as its goal and to place a draft constitution before a Special Convention. Lord Birkenhead, in November, 1927, repeated his challenge that Indians should put forward their own suggestion for a constitution. Consequently, the INC authorised the Working Committee to draft a Swaraj constitution for India.

**Rift in the Muslim League, 1927**

As Mian Mohammad Shafi (ex-Law Minister) and Firoz Khan Noon, the landed aristocrats, backed by a small group mostly from the Punjab, voted at Lahore to welcome and cooperate with the Simon Commission, most of the members of the League's Council joined 'Jinnah Group' in Calcutta on December 30, 1927, and New Year's Day, 1928. Annie Besant and Sarojini Naidu were the honoured guests. The Aga Khan was to preside, but he withdrew at the last moment. Mohammad Yakub delivered the presidential address. It resolved that "the Musalmans throughout the country should have nothing to do with the Commission at any stage or in any form\textsuperscript{65}", and re-elected Jinnah as permanent President of the League for another three years. The Shafi Group Manifesto was signed by the Punjab Muslim leaders - Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Muhammad Iqbal, Abdul Qayyum, Mian Abdul Haye and Maulvi Mahomed Ali. Jinnah's Manifesto was signed by Mohammad Alam, Hissam-ud-Din, Chaudhuri Afzal Haq, Mazhar Ali Azhar and Mohammed Sharif.

**All-Parties Conference, 1928**

On February 12, 1928, at the Delhi Conference, G.B. Pant and Madan Mohan Malaviya rejected Jinnah's Delhi proposal regarding the principle of reservation of seats in favour of any majority community in any province and "cleared that it considered separate electorates a lesser evil than

\textsuperscript{64} Mushirul Hasan, \textit{n. 23}, p. 268.

the creation of new provinces". Daulat Ram, Moonje and Lajpat Rai strongly opposed the Congress resolution relating to the creation of an independent Sind province, and, backed by the Nehrus and other Congressmen, demanded that the issue of Sind be reviewed again, to which Jinnah, Hasrat Mohani and Mahomed Ali argued that as the Jinnah's proposals (March, 1927) were once agreed upon by the Congress leaders, they had no right to change their opinion, and, hence, they decided to boycott the All-Parties Conference.

All-Parties Conference, March, 1928

The Conference held in Delhi on March 9, 1928, considered the League's resolution and opined to devise "a system of election on the principle of proportional representation by a single transferable vote or some other similar method", and appointed two committees - one to investigate into the whole matter of communal representation and the second to enquire into the financial aspect of the separation of Sind.

However, the prospects of the All-Parties Conference became quite gloomy and Motilal Nehru criticised the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League equally. He declared that he would stand by the Madras resolution, which accepted Jinnah's proposals and in order to achieve this end, he expressed desire even to dissociate some of the communal parties like the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha "if they were dissatisfied with it". Jawaharlal Nehru was hopeless to find a "common formula", and the League refused to attend any Conference unless the Delhi proposals were accepted by all the political parties.

All-Parties Conference, June, 1928

The Conference, held in Delhi on June 22-24, 1928, appointed a

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66. Purshottamadas Thakurdas Papers, NML.
67. The Leader (Allahabad), February 15, 1928.
68. Ibid., February 13 and 28, 1928.
70. Ibid., p. 40.
71. Motilal to Ansari, May 1, 1928, Ansari Papers, JMI.
72. Motilal to Gandhi, June 26, 1928, Motilal Nehru Papers, NML.
Committee of ten members under the Chairmanship of Motilal Nehru to draw up a constitution for India.

Informal Conference, July, 1928

Motilal Nehru called on an Informal Conference on July 7, 1928, which accepted reservation of seats for Muslims in majority provinces for ten years, but on July 8, the resolution was modified by "only the reservation of seats for minorities in both central and provincial legislatures was permitted".

Motilal Nehru and Sapru observed that separation of "Religion" from "Politics" was the only remedy of the communal tangle and favoured separate representation for Muslims, due to which they were opposed to the Hindus.

Nehru Committee Report, August, 1928

The Report, submitted on August 10, was published on August 15, 1928. It recommended "Full responsible government on the model of the constitution of self-governing Dominions" and acceded to the Dominion Status; federal constitution inviting Indian States to join, retaining their position in the new "Commonwealth of India as they occupied at present in the Indian Empire". The All-Parties Conference met at Lucknow from 28 to 30 August, 1928. The Conference approved the Report but a group of Congressmen, including Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose, opposed the 'Dominion Status' and advocated 'Complete Independence'.

The Report annexed Sind to the NWFP but rejected the Muslim demand for reservation of seats in the Punjab and Bengal. The Report in the Hindu-majority provinces reserved seats for Muslim minorities in proportion to the population both in the central and the provincial legislatures and the principle of weightage and separate electorates were done away with. The Muslims divided into two groups. The first group of the Nationalist Muslims (Azad, Dr. Ansari and T.A.K. Sherwani) supported the Report wholeheartedly. The second (Sir Mohammad Shafi and his followers)

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75. Ibid., pp. 43-44.
adopted a non possumus (we cannot). The third (led by The Aga Khan) opposed and held that the Hindus were determined to secure power for themselves. The fourth (led by Jinnah) rejected the Report. Jinnah had left for England in May, 1928, and when he returned after six months, he expressed indignation and disapproved of the Report. In U.P., the Congress faced stiff opposition, because leaders like Hasrat Mohani, Azad Subhani, Shafi Daudi and the Ali Brothers "considered 'Dominion Status' inconsistent with the spirit of Islam".

All-Parties National Convention, December, 1928

A Convention under the Presidency of Dr. M.A. Ansari was held in Calcutta on December 28, 1929, to consider the Nehru Report and the proposed constitution. Jinnah, on behalf of the Muslim League, and Tassaduq Ahmad Khan Sherwani, on behalf of the CKC, put forward six amendments to the Nehru Report, as follows:

"1. A majority of four-fifths of the two houses first sitting separately and then together would be necessary for the amendment or alteration of the constitution by Parliament;

2. The Punjab pact regarding communal representation should be incorporated in the Nehru Report."

These two amendments were adopted by the Convention, but the later four amendments regarding one-third of the elected representatives, reservation of seats in the Punjab and Bengal, residuary powers to the provinces and separation of Sind were rejected, as a result Jinnah left the Convention in protest. Jinnah "joined the groups of Muslims led by The Aga Khan and Sir Mohammad Shafi, and organised a united opposition", and founded the 'All-Parties Muslim Conference'.

All-Parties Muslim Conference, December, 1928 - January, 1929

The Conference held in Delhi on December 31, 1928 - January 1, 1929, and accepted the Jinnah's five-point proposal, as follows:

77. See for details Proceedings of the All-Parties National Convention, December 28, 1928 to January 1, 1929, Allahabad, p. 5.
78. R.C. Majumdar, n. 33, p. 460.
1. The only form of Government suitable to Indian conditions was federal system with complete autonomy and residuary powers vested in the constituent status.

2. Muslims should not be deprived of their right to elect their representative through separate electorates without their consent.

3. Muslims should continue to have weightage in the Hindu majority provinces and they were willing to accord the same privilege to non-Muslim minorities in Sind, the NWFP and Baluchistan.

4. Muslims should have their due share in the Central and Provincial cabinets.

5. Muslim majority in all Muslim majority provinces should in no way be disturbed.

**Foundation of the All-India Muslim Conference, March, 1929**

At the ML Council meeting on March 3, 1929, under the Presidentship of The Aga Khan, the All-India Muslim Conference (AIMC) was founded, which was joined by Jinnah, Shaukat Ali, Shafi Daudi, Iqbal and Sir Mohammad Yaqub.

**Jinnah's Fourteen Points, March, 1929**

At the AIML Council meeting held on March 28, 1929, it was emphasised that no scheme for the future constitution of the Government of India will be acceptable to the Muslims until and unless provisions were embodied therein to safeguard their rights and interests. Jinnah accommodated the various views in his fourteen points, which were adopted by the Council. These points were as follows:

1. The form of the future constitution should be federal, with the residuary powers vested in the provinces.

2. A uniform measure of autonomy shall be granted to all provinces.

3. All legislatures in the country and other elected bodies shall be constituted on the definite principle of adequate and effective representation of minorities in every Province without reducing the majority in any Province to a minority or even equality.

4. In the Central Legislature, Mussalman representation shall not be less than one-third.

5. Representation of communal groups shall continue to be, by means of separate electorates as at present, provided that it shall be open to any community, at any time, to abandon its separate electorate in favour of joint electorate.

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80. Ibid., pp. 245-47. See also The Indian Annual Register, Vol. I, 1929; also see Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom Movement (Lahore: Publishers United Ltd., 1970), pp. 98-100.
6. Any territorial redistribution that might at any time be necessary shall not in any way affect the Muslim majority in Punjab, Bengal and N.W.F. Province.

7. Full religious liberty, i.e., liberty of belief, worship and observance, propaganda, association and education, shall be guaranteed to all communities.

8. No bill or resolution or any part thereof shall be passed in any legislature or any other elected body if three-fourths of the members of any community in that particular body oppose such a bill, resolution or part thereof, on the ground that it would be injurious to the interests of that community or in the alternative, such other method is devised as may be found feasible and practicable to deal with such cases.

9. Sind should be separated from the Bombay Presidency.

10. Reforms should be introduced in the N.W.F. Province and Baluchistan on the same footing as in other provinces.

11. Provision should be made in the constitution giving Muslims an adequate share along with the other Indians, in all the services of the State and in local self-governing bodies having due regard to the requirements of efficiency.

12. The Constitution should embody adequate safeguards for the protection of Moslem culture and for the protection and promotion of Moslem education, language, religion, personal laws and Moslem charitable institutions and for their due share in the grants-in-aid given by the State and by local self-governing bodies.

13. No cabinet, either Central or Provincial, should be formed without there being a proportion of at least one-third Moslem Ministers.

14. No change shall be made in the constitution by the Central Legislature except with the concurrence of the states constituting the Indian Federation.

Zaruri Allan (Important Declaration)

The All-Parties Muslim Conference released Zaruri Allan urging the Muslims to abstain from the Congress participation. The nationalist Muslims also carried on a vigorous propaganda against the Nehru Report. Dr. M.A. Ansari, Jinnah and Mahomed Ali "regarded the settlement of the communal problem as the sine qua non for India's participation in the freedom struggle. Jinnah stressed: "unless the majority community and their leaders grasp that elementary principle (political demands of Muslims) and deal with it in that spirit it will not be possible to get the minority community into line with any national programme."

82. Jinnah to Chagla, August 5, 1929, Chagla Papers, NMML.
Attitude of Hindu Politicians Towards Jinnah's Demands

Sarojini Naidu tried to arrange a meeting between Gandhiji and Jinnah. Jayakar wrote to Gandhiji not to yield to Muslim demand. Malaviva, Lajpat Rai and Moonje though paid lip-service to the Congress ideals but used "communal platform as a means of rallying public support and made concessions to communal feelings which were already running high" in view of recurring riots. They "assumed the nationalist garb and freely sailed between the Hindu Mahasabha and the Congress", and created a wedge between Hindu and Muslim Swarajists. Malaviya, Lajpat Rai and Moonje "moved in and out of communal politics with remarkable ease". They had strong links with religious and revivalist bodies throughout India and the Congressmen had to rely on their support. Hence, Motilal, Jawaharlal, Gandhiji and Sapru completely succumbed to their pressure and ceased to negotiate with the Muslims. The Muslim League "could find no way of reconciling their fears of Hindu domination". Maulana Azad remarked: "The Muslims were fools to ask for safeguards and the Hindus were greater fools to refuse them". However, Hindu-Muslim differences grew stronger leading to the demand for partition of India.

Civil Disobedience Movement, 1930

Gandhiji launched the Civil Disobedience Movement in March, 1930, but as Shafat Ahmad argued it would be 'suicidal' to the Muslims and at Lucknow he asserted that the movement without the cooperation of the Muslims would not be successful, the Muslims in the League-fold did not participate. As no fruitful result came out, the movement gradually died like a door-nail by August, 1933.

Round Table Conferences

On October 31, 1929, Lord Irwin announced that H.M. Government intended to confer Dominion Status upon India and called upon all the

83. Jayakar to Gandhi, July 25, 1929, Jayakar Papers, NAI
84. Mushirul Hasan, n. 23, p. 304.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid., p. 305.
parties to assembly in London to express views before proposals for
the future constitution of India was placed before the British Parliament.
The First RTC commenced on November 12, 1930, the second on September 7,
1931, and the third on November 17, 1932. The Congress and the League
proposals for settlement of communal problems were put forward but the
question could not be solved. Hindus and Sikhs did not agree with the
Muslim demands. The main problem was that the Hindus wanted their majority
in some provinces with a strong centre, while in certain other the
Muslims wanted to dominate.

As all the parties consented, the Prime Minister came forward
with his award on the communal problem, and announced the 'Communal
Award' on August 16, 1932.

**ML Session, Allahabad, December, 1930 :Iqbal's Idea of Pakistan**

Jinnah and his League leaders on their return from England after
attending the First RTC, met at Allahabad in December, 1930. Iqbal
emphasised the "Muslim nationality, and rejected the notion that India
was a social unit". He said: "India is an Asia in miniature. India is
a continent of human groups belonging to different races, speaking
different languages and professing different religions". Thus, he
proclaimed the 'two-nation' theory, on the basis of which he put forth
his plan for a separate state for the Muslims as a solution of the
Hindu-Muslim deadlock. He said:

"I would like to see the Punjab, N.W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan
amalgamated into a single State. Self-government within the
British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation
of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to
me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-
West India. I, therefore, demand the formation of a consolidated
Muslim State in the best interests of India and Islam".

Observing that "the Hindus and the Muslims had differences based
on culture, caste and religion and as such the two communities could
not live in harmony", Iqbal in his presidential address said:

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89. Uma Kaura, n. 69, n. 74.
90. F.K. Khan Durrani, The Meaning of Pakistan (Lahore: Shaikh Mohammad
Ashraf, 1944), p. 156.
91. Mohammad Noman, Muslim India: Rise and Growth of the All-India
92. Sandhya Chaudhri, Gandhi and the Partition of India (New Delhi:
93. Shamloo (ed.). Speeches and Statements of Iqbal (Lahore: Al-Manar
Academy, 1948), 2nd edn., p. 11.
"If the principle that the Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian homeland, is recognised as the basis of a permanent communal settlement, he will be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India".

This was the occasion when Atlee, as stated by him, heard of Pakistan when he was a member of the Simon Commission.

Iqbal's contention was to create Muslim majority areas within India where Islamic culture could flourish and he certainly did not advocate a separate sovereign state for Muslims without political or administrative connection with India as advocated by the Muslim League and Jinnah. "He did not envisage the partition of India". He advocated "Muslim India within India" by the creation of an autonomous state based on the unity of language, race, history, religion and identity of economic interest, which was desired also by Jinnah, Mahomed Ali, Shaukat Ali and Muhammad Shafi. However, he "undoubtedly provided the Muslims with an ideological weapon which was used by the Muslim leadership as the basis for (the demand of) a separate Muslim Homeland". One can agree that what Iqbal, in effect, had done was to state the proposition of Lajpat Rai (1924) in his own intellectual manner and provide it with a scholar's logic and reasoning. Lajpat Rai had proposed partition of Punjab; and Bengal (according to Majumdar), but Iqbal suggested creation of a Muslim state in north-west India only. However, Iqbal's address "gradually led to the idea that India is not one nation". Iqbal's idea, however, was later given more elaborate shape by Rahmat Ali and thus, Jinnah gave credit to Iqbal for initiating the move for an independent sovereign state in the Indian sub-continent.

Dr. Iqbal is said to have suggested the creation of a separate Muslim state, on the basis of his letter written to Jinnah on May 28, 1937:

94. Moin Shakir, n. 18, Khilafat to Partition, n. 18, p. 190.
95. Uma Kaura, n. 69, p. 151.
96. Ibid.
97. Moin Shakir, Khilafat to Partition, n. 18, p. 197.
98. Ibid., p. 190.
"But the enforcement and development of the Shari'at of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim state or states. This has been my honest conviction for many years and I still believe this to be the only way ... It is necessary to redistribute the country and to provide one or more Muslim states with absolute majorities. Do not you think that the time for such a demand has already arrived?"

He wrote to Jinnah again on June 21, 1937:

"In this connection, it is obvious that the only way to peaceful India is a distribution of the country on the lines of racial, religious and linguistic affinities".

Iqbal, criticising the Government of India Act, 1935, condemned the idea of a single Indian Federation:-

"A separate federation of Muslim provinces reformed on the lines I have suggested above is the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the domination of non-Muslims. Why should not the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled to self-determination just as other nations in India and outside India are? ..."

Dr. Iqbal emphasised that "the life of Islam as a cultural force in this country very largely depends on its centralisation in a specified territory and in "possessing full opportunity of development within the body politic of India, the North-West Indian Muslims will prove the best defenders of India against a foreign invasion". He did not, however, envisage an explicit partition of India. He only professed the League's demand for an Indian federation comprising Muslim majority provinces. Rahmat Ali writes: "By the word 'state', he meant not a separate or sovereign state but a big province within and as a part of the proposed Indian federation". Iqbal's proposition was given shape by Rahmat Ali, who pioneered the partition scheme and coined the word 'Pakistan' in 1933.

102. Ibid.
103. Shamloo, n. 93, p. 11.
Probable Sources of the Ideas of Iqbal

Iqbal was a poet and a philosopher and had a great intellect of deriving inspiration from the realities of the day-to-day life. Being studious, he might have learnt about the ideas of other leaders. In 1921, Nadir Ali of Agra had written a pamphlet in which he discussed the partition of India and suggested the principles on which the Hindu-Muslim problem could be settled in India. In 1923, Mohammed Gul Khan, a tribal chief "suggested the establishment of separate homelands for Muslims in the North-West extending as far as Agra". In 1924, Maulana Mohammed Ali said that if the Hindu-Muslim problem is not settled India will be divided into Hindu-India and Muslim-India. In 1925, Lala Hardyal said that "a joint Hindu-Muslim State is sheer nonsense, which under no circumstances can exist". In 1928, Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi spoke something of Pakistan or the Islamic State criticising the government that it was foreign and un-Islamic in character. On August 21, 1931, Madina, a nationalist paper, quoting a letter from Ploden, stated that there was only one solution of the Indian problem: "it should be partitioned into Muslim-India and Hindu-India". Who were responsible for such ideas? Pandit Sunderlal, quoting in "Unpardonable Crime of Jinnah", replies:

"The truth may be unpalatable to you, but it may be admitted that the Hindus themselves are responsible for the cry of Pakistan raised by the Muslims. The Pakistan scheme is not the scheme of Mr. Jinnah. It is the Hindus who started Pakistan; you have a Pakistan in each Hindu household. If a non-Hindu comes to your house for water you refuse to give him your vessel."

Rahmat Ali's Idea of Pakistan

Rahmat Ali belonged to an orthodox Muslim family. His father's teaching that the Muslims should be treated as a distinct nation and not

109. Abdul Majid Daryabadi, Makimul Ummat, n. 23; quoted in Moin Shakir, Khilafat to Partition, n. 18, p. 190.
110. Moin Shakir, Ibid.
111. Ibid., p. 204.
as a minority belonging to Indian nation always influenced his thinking and of this feeling, Rahmat Ali write: "I grew with it and it grew 112." He, from his early childhood, believed that "Muslims are a Millat distinct from the caste Hindoo Jati, that our destiny lies in integration with other Muslims and not with the caste Hindus; that among other territories the north-western provinces of present day 'India' belong to 113". His thoughts and arguments found expression for the first time in his inaugural address at the Bazm-i-Shibli. He said:

"North of India is Muslim and we will keep it Muslim. Not only that, we will make it a Muslim state. But this we can do only if and when we and our North cease to be Indian. For that is a prerequisite to it, so the sooner we shed 'Indianism' the better for us all and for Islam".

Rahmat Ali deprecated the "activities of other Muslim leaders" as leading to "Indianization of our nation and our lands". He condemned the federal ideas, which, according to him, involved the "renunciation of Pak nationhood" and the Muslim's acceptance of Indian nationhood. He believed the 'absorption by the caste Hindus (of the Muslims)' a certainty and its acceptance by the Muslims an act of self-immolation 116. But when in 1933, "the scheme of an all-India federation became a reality he became more vociferous in his condemnation of this development", because, in his view, "it portended an immediate peril to the life and liberty of our nation". Explaining his reaction, he writes 119:-

"I warned the Muslim delegates. I knew that their action had obliterated the twelve centuries of our history, destroyed the very foundations of our heritage and crippled all hopes of the fulfilment of our mission. I begged them to realize their responsibility before Allah and His Rasool and to withdraw their demand for the Indian Federal Constitution and ask for a separate federation of our north-western homelands".

But when his consuls were not heeded to, he assumed that "Allah

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112. Ibid., p. 214.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid., p. 213.
116. Ibid., p. 245.
119. Ibid., pp. 222-23.
had assigned that fateful task to me\textsuperscript{120}, and directed his full attention for propagating the idea of a separate homeland for the Muslims i.e. Pakistan. He, in 1933, along with Mohammad Aslam Khan, Shaikh Mohammad Sadique and Inayatullah Khan drafted a four page pamphlet entitled, "Now or Never", in which he proclaimed "the freedom of the Muslims from the British-Bania domination, the release of our nation from the bonds of minorityism". He denounced and condemned the activities of the delegates at the Round Table Conference for their stand or the demand and support to the creation of an all-India federation. He demanded 'recognition of our distinct nationhood in Pakistan', on the one hand, and a separate creation of "a Federation of India\textsuperscript{122}", on the other. He explained the term 'Pakistan' in the following words:

"Pakistan is both a Persian and an Urdu word. It is composed of letters taken from the names of all our homelands - 'India' and 'Asian', that is, Punjab, Afghania (North-West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Iran, Sind (including Kachch and Kathiavar), Tukharistan, Afghanistan and Balochistan. It means the land of the Paks - the spiritually pure and clean. It symbolizes the religious beliefs and the ethnical stocks of our people and it stands for all the territorial constituents of our original Fatherland; it has no other origin and no other meaning; and it does not admit of any other interpretation".

The authors of the 'Pamphlet', explaining the need for the establishment of a separate Muslim State in the North West of India, stated - P stands for Punjab, A for Afghanistan, K for Kashmir, S for Sind and Tan for Baluchistan.

Rahmat Ali founded the Pakistan National Movement in 1933 and during 1935 and 1937, established propaganda centres all over the proposed regions of Pakistan. When the 1935 Act was being discussed, Rahmat Ali issued a circular letter on July 8, 1935, from Cambridge, which emphasised that "Government of India Bill, based on the Indian Federal Scheme has created an acute crisis in the national life of Pakistan and has raised a supreme issue - an issue of life or death for

\textsuperscript{120} See for details Ibid., pp. 305-306.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., p. 269.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., p. 227.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., p. 225.
its national future" and hoped for full support to the "inexorable demand of Pakistan - a demand based on justice and equality - for the recognition of its sacred right to a separate national existence as distinct from Hindoostan. He wrote:

"The very basis and content of our national life is founded on fundamentals essentially different from those on which Hindooism lives and prosers. Our age long social system and our ancient national tradition have given us a civilization with a philosophy - culture, language, a literature and an art basically and fundamentally different from that of Hindoostan. This is not all. We do not interdine; we do not intermarry. Our national customs and calendars, even our diet and dress are different".

Rahmat Ali emphasised that "geographically also the lands comprising Pakistan form a separate and distinct Unit and viewed that "Jumna should flow as 'boundary river' between Pakistan and Hindoostan". He treated the Indo-Pakistan problem not as an inter-communal issue but as an international problem.

The ideas of Rahmat Ali were brought home by the league delegates, who, in their speeches propagated Iqbal's and Rahmat Ali's views. The Indian Muslims in large numbers, siding with the Muslim League, began to urge that they "were a 'nation' by themselves, totally different from the other 'nations' in India, and as such entitled to exercise their right of self-determination and to establish a homeland for themselves where they could work out their destiny according to their own ideas of Islamic culture and polity". It would be worthwhile to conclude that Iqbal favoured the 'creation of Muslim India (with-) in India' and Rahmat Ali advocated the idea of separation of 'Muslim India' from the rest of India.

After the 1937 elections were held, Iqbal, on June 21, 1937, wrote

124. Ibid., p. 260.
125. Ibid., pp. 301-302.
127. Uma Kaura, n. 69, p. 155.
129. S.R. Mehrotra, n. 8, p. 199.
to Jinnah that 'the idea of a single Indian federation' was 'completely hopeless' and that Muslim leaders 'ought at present to ignore Muslim-minority provinces' and instead concentrate on the creation of a 'separate federation of Muslim (-majority) provinces' in the north-west and the north-east. As stated, he wanted a state with enactment of Islamic laws (Shariat). This is called 'Pan-Islamism'. Iqbal's Pan-Islamism was thus "based upon the totalitarian character of the State in which there is no distinction between its spiritual and secular domains". Iqbal says:

"I confess to be a Pan-Islamist. The mission for which Islam came into this world will ultimately be fulfilled, the world will be purged of infidelity and the worship of false gods, and the true soul of Islam will be triumphant ... This is the kind of Pan-Islamism which I preach".

Iqbal says that as the Hindus and the Muslims had shown no inclination to sink their respective individualities in a larger whole and each group is intensely jealous of its collective existence, the unity of an Indian nation "must be sought, not in the negation but in the mutual harmony and co-operation of the many". But he observed that "attempts to discover such a principle of internal harmony have so far failed" and said that a unitary form of Government is simply unthinkable to self-governing India.

The Government of India Act, 1935

After the end of the Second RTC, Macdonald had issued the Communal Award, which recommended separate electorates for Muslims. It raised a storm of opposition of Hindus. After the end of the Third RTC, the Government put forth its proposals in March, 1933, which is known as the White Paper. A joint Parliamentary Select Committee, appointed to discuss the enactment of the Paper, published its Report on November 11, 1934, which was redrafted in the form of a Bill, which received the Royal assent in August, 1935, and came to be known as the Government of India Act.
The India Act, 1935. The Act envisaged supremacy of the British parliament, federal form of government, provincial autonomy, dyarchy at the Centre, safeguards to British power in the hands of the Governor-General and the Governors and enumeration of 59 items, which defined powers of both the Centre and the Units. As the Congress and the League both rejected the Federal scheme, the Governor-General on September 11, 1939, suspended it for ever, but elections on the basis of 'Provincial Autonomy' was held in 1937.

Idea of Pakistan after 1937 Elections

The results of the 1937 elections shocked the Muslim League. In the two Muslim-majority provinces - Bengal and Punjab, they had no effective majorities and depended on the support of non-League parties. When the separate electorate, which they considered to be their Magna Carta, could not prove effective to win the elections, they, ultimately, proposed an all-India federation, that is, the Muslim-majority states and the Hindu-majority states should be independently joined in a federation. It is surprising that Iqbal, on May 28, 1937, wrote to Jinnah:

"... the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim State or States ... It is necessary to redistribute the country and to provide one or more Muslim States with absolute majorities. Don't you think that the time for such a demand has already arrived".

Iqbal wrote to Jinnah again to make the idea of a Muslim state public, but Jinnah, being not a visionary like Iqbal, decided to wait until the Muslims "were sufficiently organized and disciplined". Jinnah, as a practical and shrewed politician, had realized that before demanding the creation of Muslim federated state or states, the Muslim League should have a control of the governments in the Muslim-majority provinces at the time the withdrawal of the British was definite.

Rahmat Ali, endorsing the views of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and describing the social and religious differences between the Hindu-majority

137. Ibid., pp. 23–24.
and the Muslim-minority, said:--

"Therefore for us to seal our national doom in the interest of one Indian nationhood would be a treachery against our posterity, a betrayal of our history and a crime against humanity for which there would be no salvation".

Till this time the Muslim League had not endorsed the ideas of Iqbal and Rahmat Ali.

Jinnah, however, was not so far confident that India would achieve its independence in that near a future. He was still hoping that the Congress and the Muslim League would settle their differences and reach an agreement. For the purpose of this settlement, the Congress and the League, both tried to come to a settlement on the question of Federation.

It would appear that partition philosophy was apparently going to hurt both the Hindus and the Muslims. Besides, it was also too radical. It would have necessitated shifting of both Hindus and Muslims, in large numbers, from their native places and environment; it meant starting life anew also and problems of big split arising from one's own linguistic and cultural moorings and environment. The idea of partition, therefore, was not headed to either by the Hindus or by the Muslims. It had to be gradually made popular and the scheme of Hindu and Muslim states in a federal India with weak centre was just a step in that direction. Two other effective means which helped to make the idea of partition gradually popular were communal hatred fanned by frequent riots and introduction of religious factor - a promise of a theological polity coming into vogue after partition. As a predicament, while the use of religious factor involved large number of Hindu masses in Congress movement, likewise a large number of Muslims were involved in support of the idea of partition.

**Federal Plan**

As was evident from the 1937 election results, the Congress formed ministries in six provinces and the League failed to form ministry even in the five Muslim-majority provinces. The Muslims were very apprehensive of the Congress atrocities after the formation of Congress ministries in spite of Congress assurances for justice. The Congress, under the leadership of Gandhiji, was utterly unaware of the trends of Muslim
opinion going devastatingly against the Hindu-Muslim unity. Further, the Congress was "becoming increasingly metaphysical, having lost all touch with reality, thereby also losing its primary purpose which was meant to be political". Moreover, the extremist Hindus also pronounced with emphasis on Hindu-Muslim differences. In 1937, V.D. Savarkar clearly said: "India cannot be assumed today to be an uncertain and homogeneous "nation; but on the contrary, there are two Nations in the main, the Hindus and Muslim in India."

Rajendra Prasad wrote to Vallabhbhai Patel on October 11, 1938:–

"...we have been wasting all our time and energy and trying to win over people of doubtful integrity by doubtful means. This has had its reactions and created prejudice against our organisation. Even a good suggestion from us apt to be looked upon with suspicion and has hardly any chance of being accepted".

He wrote also:–

"The Mussalmans as a body have been alienated and in spite of all that the Congress ministries have been doing to be just and even generous to them, there is not only no recognition but positive opposition to even a good scheme like the Wardha Scheme. I think if we had not been engaged in breaking, or at least discrediting, Muslim ministries in non-Congress provinces the position would have been different. The Muslim propaganda has gained much strength on account of this attitude of Congress in Muslim provinces ..."

Obviously, the Congressmen had realised that the Congress ministries were not committing some wrongs intentionally with the Muslims. Rajgopalachari rightly wrote to Kher on November 20, 1938, in a secret letter as follows:–

"I am afraid we are going the wrong way to deal with these communal attacks (League charges). The Muslims who refuse, without sufficient thought, to join the Congress now see that there is no way to political influence and power. They are desperate. If we only allow them to work off their anger, I believe that large bodies of them will join the Congress at the next elections".

141. Rajendra Prasad Papers, MNI
142. Ibid.
143. E.G. Kher Papers, NMML.
In fact, the Congress ministries "demonstrated by positive evidence that most of the charges had no foundation in fact". They were there for many years. However, the Congress tended to remove the grievances of the Muslims by removing the first two stanzas of the 
Bande Mataram song, that referred to a Hindu Goddess; even though this action was strongly "resented by the Hindus". Sir Harry Haig, the Governor of the United Provinces, wrote at the end of 1939: "In dealing with communal issues the Ministers, in my judgment, normally acted with impartiality and a desire to do what was fair".

By the end of 1938, the League concluded that complete independence of India on Federal basis would provide a strong hold to the Congress Hindus at the Centre and, thus, the Federal Muslim States, as envisaged in the 1935 Act, would be dominated by them and they would live on their mercy. Therefore, deciding that the Federal system was detrimental to the Muslims, the Muslim leadership began to search for an alternative scheme.

Alternative Schemes

In October, 1937, the alternative scheme was referred at the Lucknow session of the Muslim League. By then Linlithgow had realised that "an all-India Federation was the only line of constitutional advance and a corollary to provincial autonomy" and he was looking forward to an early implementation of the federal scheme.

Linlithgow met Gandhiji and the latter extended various concessions to the League on the Hindu-Muslim question. The Viceroy conveyed those proposals to Sultan Ahmed, Feroz Khan Noon, Nawab of Chhatari and Nazimuddin to let them know the concessions to which Gandhi was prepared to make. Their proposals were as follows:

"(1) Population proportion or else weightage in minority provinces for appointments in all branches of the services. A corresponding arrangement to be made in respect of provinces in which the Hindus were in a minority.

144. R.C. Majumdar, n. 33, p. 608.
145. Ibid., p. 609.
147. Uma Kaura, n. 69, p. 131.
148. Linlithgow to Zetland, March 25, 1939, Linlithgow Collection, NAI."
(2) A committee to be set up consisting of equal numbers of Hindu and Muslim philologists to prepare a dictionary of Hindustani and to meet the difficulties which had arisen over the Hindi-Urdu question. If the Muslims attached importance to the retention of Urdu, he would be ready to agree to the amount spent in the case of Muslims on education in Hindu majority provinces to be handed over to a Muslim body entirely outside the Ministry of Education, on the understanding that a similar arrangement would be introduced in respect of Hindus in provinces in which they were in a minority.

However, Gandhiji's proposal could not bring the Congress and the League to a conclusion, but it could have paved the way of reconciliation if the leaders had taken up rapprochement more seriously. Whether they really wanted a rapprochement knows their heart.

In February, 1939, certain Muslims in the Punjab advocated for "a federation of the North-West comprising of the Punjab, Sind, N.W.F.P. and the Punjab States". Sir Sikander had placed this scheme before the Viceroy but was dissuaded to drop it. Jinnah met the Viceroy on February 28, 1939, and proposed "in any federal scheme, the government should ensure an adequate equiocide between the Hindu and Muslim votes. In order to secure that ... 'manipulation' of territorial voter and the adjustment of territorial divisions" should be maintained. Jinnah also advocated that India was not "competent" to run a democracy and the League misjudged "the capacity of India to run such a system". He complained also the Congress atrocities in the Hindu-majority provinces where the Hindus considered the institution of Congress ministries as establishment of the Hindu Ram Raj.

In March, 1939, Khaliquzzaman and Abdur Rehman Siddiqi explained Zetland about the proposal for establishment of three or four federations of provinces and states, which would be co-ordinated by a small central body giving equal measure of control to the Hindus and the Muslims, and which would comprise a federation of Bengal and Assam, a federation of Bihar and Orissa, a federation in the North-West India, and the rest for the whole of India, i.e. the federation of Hindu provinces and states.

149. Note on an interview between Linlithgow and G.D. Birla at New Delhi on February 1, 1938. Enclosures 1 to letter dated February 7, 1938, Linlithgow Collection, NAI.

150. Uma Kaura, n. 69, p. 133.
151. Ibid.
152. Zetland to Linlithgow, March 20, 1939, Linlithgow Collection, NAI.
On March 20, 1939, Zetland wrote to Linlithgow that "we should probably have greater difficulty in bringing the Muslims into a federation than the Congress". Though Linlithgow was sympathetic to the Muslim grievances, he did not give any importance to these proposals and remarked that "any of the schemes that have so far been ventilated have the least chance of surviving critical examination", and treated them as a "formless apprehension". Zetland wrote to Linlithgow to give due weightage to the Muslims, who had no "adequate mouthpiece" in view of the widening gulf between the Congress and the League, and also exhorted the Congress to accede to the Muslim demands and placate them. But as the two parties could not settle their differences, it led to the idea of partition of the sub-continent on the basis of Parliamentary system and democracy.

Parliamentary Democracy

The provincial sections of the Government of India Act, 1935, had an approach to the transfer of power through adoption of the parliamentary system, which envisaged the Congress and the League to demonstrate their popular support in electoral terms and to form governments. The Congress after its massive victory in the 1937 provincial elections formed one-party governments in provinces, while the Muslim League expected coalitions, making themselves as partners. But the League's failure had proved that the Congress represented all-India. Thus, there was no need to the Congress to make concessions to the League. The Congress conviction that only those Muslims would be in the government who had renounced the League and joined the Congress. Therefore, both Jawaharlal Nehru and Rajender Prasad stated that if there would be League members in the government, the 'collective responsibility' would be meaningless. Rajendra Prasad said: "Congressmen thought it contrary to the spirit of Parliamentary democracy to appoint any outsider in their Ministry". This conviction frustrated the League members and they

153. Ibid.
155. Ibid.
156. Zetland to Linlithgow, May 19, 1939, Linlithgow Collection, NAI
declined to cooperate with the Congress. Sir Penderel Moon argued that "the Congress leaders 'were responsible, though quite unwittingly' for the critical change in Muslim sentiment from readiness to contemplate co-operation in an all-India federation to insistence upon separation'. The differences grew and the Congress passionately continued to preserve the unity of India, while the League acted to ensure the partition of India i.e. formation of Pakistan, on communal issues.

Communal Problem

The communal differences were deep rooted in the past history of the majority and minority communities which had strong hold on the Congress and League mentalities. Gandhiji opined that communal differences were insoluble as long as the British remained in India. On the other hand, the British maintained that they could not leave India until the communal problems were solved, which they knew would be impossible. Thus, they meant that they would stay in India for ever. The Congress emphasised that it was a domestic problem and it would be solved after the British would leave India. At the Round Table Conference the Princes and the Muslims had proclaimed that they did not like to create 'Ulsters in India'. Gandhiji complained that it was the traditional policy of Great Britain "to prevent parties from uniting". The Congress conviction was that the British had followed (for some forty years before partition) the policy of 'divide and rule'. Had the British Government decided to transfer power, they could have preferred to transfer power to a single party preserving India's unity. This fact was realised by both the Congress and the League, who realised that the British had their own interest in dividing them. To remove this obstacle, wittingly or unwittingly, both the parties began to think over the question of partition of India.

The War Aims

The Second World War ensued when Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, and Britain declared war against Germany on September 3, 1939. The British Government "declared India a belligerent country without consulting the Indian people" on "the same day that Britain declared
war on Germany. The Viceroy issued an ordinance, which contained "the most stringent powers for the suppression of internal disorder". Subhas Chandra Bose, the leader of the Forward Bloc, addressing a gathering of about two hundred thousand people on September 3, 1939, on the seashore in Madras considered the war as the "golden opportunity" to win freedom, which cautioned the Government that the Congress would not be supporting Great Britain in her war aims. Therefore, Linlithgow sought help of Jinnah for securing favour of Muslims towards the war aims promising to treat the Muslim League on terms of equality with the Congress. He reminded Jinnah on September 4, 1939, that he had told him "again and again that he regarded the influence of the British in India as essential to the survival of his own community", and told Jinnah that as per his desire, the British Government had decided "in view of the onset of war, to suspend the work in connection with the Federation". Sir Sikandar expressed loyalty and cooperation of Bengal and Punjab with the British in the war and Jinnah also agreed to 'share those sentiments' saying that "he was a public man and had to think of his followers'. A Linlithgow's letter to Zetland reveals that Linlithgow wanted to strengthen the hands of Jinnah and complete overhauling and reshaping of the constitution as the Congress provinces were doing injustice with the Muslims and that Jinnah has said that the Congress ministries should be turned out". Linlithgow asked Jinnah that "if democratic government was unsuitable to this country, how was she to obtain her goal of self-government. Was such a policy not to condemn India to a perpetual condition of communal strife"? Jinnah replied that "an escape from the impasse ... lay in the adoption of Partition". Consequently, the British Government, on September 11, 1939, announced that "the inauguration of the federal constitution under the Act of 1935 was postponed for the duration of the war".

161. Ibid.
162. Ibid.
163. Linlithgow to Zetland, September 4, 1939, Linlithgow Collection, NAI.
164. Ibid.
165. Ibid., September 5, 1939.
166. Ibid.
167. Note of an interview between Jinnah and Linlithgow, October 5, 1939, Linlithgow Collection, NAI
168. Ibid.
169. Ibid.
On September 14, 1939, at Wardha the Congress Working Committee issued a lengthy resolution inviting the Government to declare in unequivocal terms what their war aims were in regard to democracy and imperialism and "how those aims were going to apply to India ...". The resolution also declared that if India were granted freedom, then "a free and democratic India will gladly associate herself with other free nations for mutual defence against aggression and for economic cooperation".

At the ML Working Committee meeting held on September 18, 1939, Jinnah declared that Muslim India was "irrevocably opposed to any 'federal objective' which must necessarily result in a majority-community rule under the guise of democracy and a parliamentary system of government. Such a constitution is totally unsuited to the genius of the peoples of this country which is composed of various nationalities and does not constitute a national State".

Further, the Committee resolved that the Viceroy's declaration suspending the Federation was in favour of the Muslims and demanded for its complete abandonment without further delay and the future constitution should be considered de novo. The Committee pointed out:

"It had hoped to occupy an honourable place in the national life, government and administration of the country and work for a free India with free and independent Islam in which they could play an equal part with the major community with a complete sense of security ... but the developments that have taken place and especially since the inauguration of the provincial constitution based on the so-called democratic parliamentary system of government and the recent experiences of over two years have established beyond doubt that it has resulted wholly in a permanent communal majority and the domination of the Hindus over the Muslim minorities whose life and liberty, property and honour are in danger and even their religious rights and culture are being assailed and annihilated every day under the Congress government in various provinces".

171. Rajendra Prasad to Lord Linlithgow, November 3, 1939, Rajendra Prasad Papers, NAI.
175. Ibid.
Illinthgow reiterated that "Dominion Status was the natural issue of India's progress" and announced that after the War all parties would be consulted "with a view to secure their aid and cooperation in the framing of such modifications in the details of the plan embodied in the Act of 1935" keeping in mind the communal differences, which encouraged Jinnah. After their support to Britain in the war, the Muslim League further strengthened its credibility in the eyes of the British.

Dr. Rajendra Prasad approached Jinnah and Nehru to break the communal impasse. He wrote to Nehru that the communal question was dominant because "not only the decision of the British government but any future line of action that we may decide upon depends to a large extent upon its satisfactory solution". He stressed to Jinnah that the tales of Congress atrocities were unfounded and based on "misapprehensions" and "one-sided reports" and offered to get the charges of atrocities on Muslims investigated by Sir Maurice Gwaer, the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, but Jinnah turned down the proposal and replied that His Excellency was "the proper authority to take such action and adopt such measures as would meet our requirements and would restore complete sense of security and satisfaction among the Muslims".

Refusal of Jinnah to have the atrocities perpetrated by Congress ministries inspired by a British Chief Justice and his insistence on the role of Viceroy as arbiter is significant. Also one has to see the wordings of his two conditions placed before Gandhiji. They confirm to the sophisticated British traditional clever coating applied to manipulated vested interests. Congress under Gandhiji could come to ethical norms but he could not afford to take that kind of minimal t'wo stance. It appears that after giving Gandhiji a popular chance, Congress leadership just got fed up of the whole drama of pretences and may be beliefs and became a party to partition. Gandhiji appeared to believe

176. Speeches and Statements of Illinthgow, October 17, 1939, Illinthgow Collection, "AI.
177. Ibid.
178. Illinthgow to Zetland, November 5, 1939, Illinthgow Collection, "AI
179. Prasad to Nehru, October 14, 1939, Rajendra Prasad Papers, "AI
180. Uma Kaura, n. 69, p. 141.
the ultimate victory of good and truth but, unfortunately, his disciples exhausted their patience and placed into the side of the British and the League.

Jinnah said to Gandhiji, in Delhi, October, 1939:

"(1) that so long as the Congress was not prepared to treat the Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organization of the Mussalmans of India it was not possible to carry on talks regarding the Hindu-Muslim settlement; and

(2) that the League would not endorse the Congress demand for the declaration of British war aims till the two organizations had reached an agreement with regard to the minority problems".

The AICC on October 10, 1939, asked the Government to declare that the war aims "would not countenance the country being made a part to the War unless India was treated as an independent nation whose policy would be guided in accordance with the wishes of the people".

Jawaharlal Nehru persuaded Jinnah to forge a united front to oppose the war aims of the Government and wrote to Jinnah in a rather apologetic way:

"I entirely agree with you that it is a tragedy that Hindu-Muslim problem has not so far been settled in a friendly way. I feel terribly distressed about it and ashamed of myself in so far as I have not been able to contribute anything substantial towards its solution. I must admit to you that in this matter I have lost confidence in myself though I am not usually given that way. But the last two or three years have had a powerful effect on me".

The Congress prepared a draft statement to settle the differences under signature of Rajendra Prasad, Nehru and Jinnah. Though the statement had much in common, but there was no solution of the communal question, which was left for future discussion, to which Jinnah did not agree and the statement could not be issued.

182. Jinnah to Nehru, December 13, 1939, Nehru Papers, NAI
184. Nehru to Jinnah, October 18, 1939, Nehru Papers, "AI
185. Draft to be issued under the joint signatures of Rajendra Prasad, M.A. Jinnah and Jawaharlal Nehru, November 4, 1939, Nehru Papers, NAI.
On October 17, 1939, the Viceroy, in reply to the Wardha resolution of September 14, 1939, issued a statement, which was published in London as a White Paper. The Viceroy proposed to 'establish a "Consultative Group", including Indian representatives, which would advise the Viceroy on questions pertaining to the war. He also reaffirmed the pledge of Dominion Status at some future date, which had been first made ten years ago by the then Viceroy, Lord Halifax (Irwin)". This statement infuriated the Indians in view of the fact that while the British were fighting for the sake of "freedom and democracy", they had adopted totally an adverse policy suspending the credibility of the 1935 Act and its Federal scheme, thereby concentrating all powers in the hands of the Viceroy, restricting personal liberty, prohibiting all public meetings and demonstrations without trial etc.

The CWC on October 22-23, 1939, considered the Linlithgow's declaration on British war aims. As the Congress had extended unconditional help to Britain during the First World War (1914-1918), but after the War, the national leaders, including Gandhiji, were disillusioned, the Congress did not like to be fooled again. Its demand for immediate transfer of power was not acceded to by the Government. Therefore, the CWC "categorically declined to admit any necessity for prior agreement with the Muslim League as a condition precedent to the fulfilment of its demands. Its contention was that the Constituent Assembly would adequately secure protection for the Muslims. To express its disapproval of the Viceroy's statement (October 17, 1939), the Committee called upon the Congress ministries to tender their resignations". Therefore, the Congress ministries resigned in October, 1939, adopting a resolution in the Provincial Legislatures on the War aims and condemning the way in which the Government was treating sentiments of Indians. Gradually, the Muslim League, which in 1937 could not form a Ministry even in one province, swept over the seats, consolidated its position and established its sway in five provinces - Assam, Bengal, the Punjab, Sind and N.W.F.P."

186. Subhas Chandra Bose, n. 51, p. 341.
Jinnah's Day of Deliverance

Jinnah's position by then became rather politically sound. He unfurled the League's flag at Bombay on November 13, 1939, at Esplanade Maidan, and, on December 2, 1939, called upon Muslims, in a statement, to observe December 22, as 'Day of Deliverance', since the Congress government had ceased to function. Jinnah was surprised at the 'sudden conversion' of Gandhiji to the idea of a Constitutional Assembly. On December 9, Jinnah reiterated his statement about observance of the Day of Deliverance. On December 13, Jinnah demanded the appointment of a Royal Commission to investigate into the grievances of the Muslims in the Congress provinces and repeated his appeal for observing the Day of Deliverance.

Demand for a Royal Commission and refusal of an enquiry by the Chief Justice again is indicative of the desire of Jinnah to have this matter treated by politicians and bureaucrats and not by judicial personnel.

In reply to Nehru's letter of December 9, Jinnah said:

"So long as the Congress is not prepared to treat the Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organization of the Mussalmans of India, it was not possible to carry on talks regarding the Hindu-Muslim settlement".

To Jinnah the problem of Hindu-Muslim conflict obviously appears to be subservient to his concern to have Muslim League declared as their sole representative of Muslims of India.

In reply to Nehru's letter of December 14, Jinnah, on December 15, refused to talk with Nehru on Hindu-Muslim issue as the Congress did not recognise the League as a representative of the Indian Muslims. Ultimately, Jinnah rejoiced the dissolution of the Congress ministries by observing December 22, 1939, as a "Day of Deliverance" from the Congress "tyranny, suppression and injustice during the last two and a half years", which aggressiveness caused Nehru to gasp and leave the Leaguers in surprise as they felt that "Jinnah had overshot his bolt.

and that his extreme tactics might even cause a split in the League\textsuperscript{191}.

In an appeal to the Muslims, Jinnah, ridiculing the Congress High Command, accused it of the "wrongs that had been done to Muslims\textsuperscript{192}", for destroying Muslim culture and interfering with the religious and social life. Jinnah said if his 14-point demands had been accepted, the Congress ministries had not been dissolved. These statements closed the door of further negotiations between Jinnah and Nehru. Linlithgow, who wanted to keep the Congress under effective control and was determined not to give Government ministry to it, encouraging Jinnah assured that:\textsuperscript{193}

"His Majesty's Government are not under any misapprehension as to the importance of the contentment of the Muslim community to the stability and success of any constitutional development in India".

Thus, the Jinnah's Day of Deliverance created a wider and new gulf between the Congress and the League. Therefore, Nehru set his heart on political independence and a socialist society through a constituent assembly. Jinnah said that the proposal of the Constituent Assembly was wholly utopian and Nehru's "all talks of hunger and poverty is intended to lead the people to socialistic and communistic ideas for which India is far from prepared\textsuperscript{195}.

Encouraged by the new developments, Jinnah demanded that "no new pronouncement or new constitutional departure should be made without the approval of the League\textsuperscript{196}", to which Linlithgow agreed to and thus gave it the recognition of an arbiter of future policy.

Without any agitation, impoverishment and punishments, the League leadership acquired a position from where they could, by playing

\textsuperscript{191} Report from the U.P. Government to the Government of India, January 5, 1940, Government of India, Home Department, File 16/12/39 Po.
\textsuperscript{192} Uma Kaura, n. 69, p. 142.
\textsuperscript{194} Linlithgow to Zetland, January 4, 1940, Linlithgow Collection, NAI.
\textsuperscript{195} Jamil-ud-Din Ahmed, n. 193, p. 126.
\textsuperscript{196} "Note of a Conversation between Linlithgow and Jinnah", Linlithgow to Zetland, January 12, 1940, Linlithgow Collection, NAI.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid.
their cards carefully, get all that the Congress was forcing the British to part with.

As Linlithgow was determined not to hand over the Government machinery to the Congress, he wrote to Zetland that the main problem of constitutional progress in India was the "finding of shoulders broad enough to carry the burden which he should relinquish" and, in other words, he conveyed that he had found the "broad shoulder" of the Muslim League for the purpose during the war when the British were struggling for their own existence. Zetland, on the other hand, though considering the Congress an anathema, was not as averse as Linlithgow. The realization that the widening gulf between the Congress and the League might result in a civil war prompted him to take some measures. It was neither accurate nor dignified on the part of Linlithgow to say again and again that "communal difficulties were the biggest hurdle in the way of constitutional development".

By the end of 1939, the Congress and the League stood poles apart and both had concluded that any settlement of the communal issue was impossible between them. The matter could have been decided if the Hindu Mahasabha had not had a dominant hold on the working of the Congress. They were orthodox Hindus and they were not agreeable to relinquish any concession to the Muslims. At this stage, Jinnah was "thinking only of how to realise his plan of Pakistan (division of India) with the help of the British". On the other hand, Savarkar seemed to be oblivious of the international situation and was only thinking how Hindus could secure military training by entering Britain's army in India. In this circumstance, it was quite a hopeless view that either the Muslim League or the Hindu Mahasabha or the Indian National Congress could do much for the unity and independence of India. All the parties came down to prepare drafts of plans for partition of India.

198. Linlithgow to Zetland, January 30, 1940, Zetland Collection, NAI
199. Zetland to Linlithgow, February 4, 1940, Zetland Collection, NAI
200. Subhas Chandra Bose, n. 51, p. 344.
201. Ibid.
Conclusion

The Hindu-Muslim communal antagonism led to political impasse and Jinnah's Fourteen Points. Jinnah opposed the Civil Disobedience Movement. Due to communal tension and riots, the Muslim League at the Round Table Conferences demanded safeguards for the Muslims and claimed itself as the sole representative of the Muslims, to which the Congress expressed its pronounced opposition as there were thousands of Muslims in the Congress fold. As the Congress and the League could not reach an agreement, the British Prime Minister announced the Communal Award, which reserved considerable seats for the Muslims in the Central and Provincial Legislative Assemblies. At the elections held in 1937, under the Government of India Act of 1935, the Congress was returned to power with overwhelming majority. Jinnah to win the by-election of 1937, used the slogan of 'Islam in Danger' and charged the Congress ministries with committing atrocities on Muslims. The Congress challenged the charges and called for arbitration, but Jinnah declined. The League leadership appeared to have realized that by pursuing a politics of isolation and exclusiveness vis-a-vis the Congress with its overhauling Hindu leadership; and with the explicit support and patronage of the British, who were obliged to seek the cooperation of the Muslim League in the fight against the nationalist movement under the auspices of the Indian National Congress the Muslim League could place itself in a position of immense advantage. It could achieve a lot of political objectives and have a lot of its demands conceded by the British in view of the then existing nationally over-charged political situation in India.