CHAPTER V

DEMAND FOR CREATION OF PAKISTAN
(1942-1944)

During the course of Quit India movement, Jinnah proclaimed a new slogan for the Muslim League, "Divide and Quit". Viceroy Lord Linlithgow, who was once on friendly terms with the Congressmen, turned more cooperative towards the Muslim League, which helped Jinnah in strengthening the League's position. The Viceroy advised Sikandar Hyat Khan and Fazl-ul-Haq got to undermine Jinnah's position as the leader of the Muslim League and made him a "Crescent Card to neutralise the Congress challenge". Linlithgow wrote to Amery on October 12, 1942:

"It was particularly important not to antagonise Mr. Jinnah at a time when Muslim League were in fact unofficially cooperating in the war effort ... Any reconstruction would tend to bring Congress into power".

Encouraged by the Government, Jinnah revitalized the Muslim League and claimed:

"The Muslim India was never so well organised, nor so alive and politically conscious as today. The League has established a flag and a platform displaying and demonstrating the complete unity of the entire body of the Muslims and has defined its goal".

By 1941, the total number of League's membership rose in Madras to 1,12,978, in Central Provinces, to 33,541 (1943); in Bengal 5,50,000 (1944) and in Sind 3,30,000 (1944). The League with its divisions, sub-divisions, city branches and wards, became a 'revolutionary' and 'mass movement', with a vast allegiance of the Muslims. To educate

3. Linlithgow Collection, Microfilm No. 11, Letter No. 17-H.E./42, from Linlithgow to Amery, dated October 12, 1942, p. 290, NAI.
5. Z.H. Zaidi, n. 4, p. 268.
Muslim opinion in favour of the League, District and Provincial Conferences widely publicised its aims through newspapers and leaflets and the League leaders extensively toured the country. A separate department of information, publicity and propaganda was created to collect information about the existing newspapers in various languages. News agencies were classified as 'Sympathetic', 'Neutral' and 'Opposition'. A number of propagandists, preachers and speakers were trained and audience were classified as 'educated', 'literate', 'urban', 'rural', 'industrial', 'trade' and 'tribal' groups. The publicizers were grouped as 'organizers', 'workers', 'followers', 'inactive sympathizers', 'neutrals', 'inactive oppositionists' and 'hostiles'. Paid propagandists were appointed and whole time workers lived at party houses. A Committee of Writers produced Pakistan literature Series and Home Study Series, besides suitable literature on social, political, educational and other matters. Tracts and brochures were issued by the Central Office, reading rooms and libraries were set up and services of professional musicians were acquired for reciting the songs. The propaganda machinery was backed by the official press. The Muslims produced a few Urdu papers and Morning News and Star of India in English, from Calcutta. With the help of Isphani, a business magnate, Jinnah turned the Dawn Weekly (Delhi) into a daily to support the League's cause.

Jinnah organized Muslim National Guards and provided them with uniforms. The League's Secretary explained: "The uniform was intended to give them a uniformity of dress and only the preliminaries of the military formation parade were sought to be taught to facilitate the regulation of their movements". The purpose of the Guards was "to create in them a spirit of service and sacrifice and to shape them into a disciplined body of enthusiastic selfless workers for the social, economic and political uplift of the masses". The District Leagues had to recruit

6. Ibid., pp. 245-75. For details, literature may be consulted at the Quaid-i-Azam Library, M.A.O. College Library and the Panjab Archives in Lahore; Quaid-i-Azam University Library, the Allama Iqbal Open University Library, and the Pakistan Archives in Islamabad; and the University Library, Hamdard Library, the Freedom Movement Archives, the Pakistan Historical Society Library, and the National Iqaquat Ali Khan Library in Karachi and privately owned Library of Shamsul Hasan and K.K. Aziz in Karachi.
7. Z.H. Zaidi, n. 4, p. 269.
8. Ibid., p. 270.
young men and "to teach them a code of morals, to engage them in beneficial activities like the spread of literacy and keep them attached to the League by providing for them healthy sports and games ... The national guards on different occasions performed 'excellent services'...".

After 1941, Jinnah started his 'Second Five Year Plan', which laid increased emphasis on the educational, social and economic uplift of the Muslims. The object of the Second Plan though covered 'Muslim India' in the British India, but actually all the efforts and resources were directed towards the proposed area of Pakistan, which was mainly agricultural but industrially backward and wherein the Muslims lagged behind their sister community. Jinnah encouraged Muslim businessmen to establish heavy industries, which would open new vistas for workers and labourers and new prospects of employment to educated youth. On July 4, 1943, Jinnah, addressing the Baluchistan Muslim League Conference, said: "So long as a nation is weak economically, it cannot hope to win the battle of life". At the ML Karachi Session in December, 1943, Jinnah appointed a Planning Committee consisting of technicians, economists, men of commerce and practical businessmen "to examine the condition of India, particularly of the 'Pakistan area', with a view to preparing the Muslim 'to participate in the national developments in the directions of commercial and agricultural expansion, and industrialization, and be ready for a gigantic and co-ordinated drive in the field of economic reconstruction, and in the post-war reconstruction".

In 1943, Jinnah decided to establish a Federation of Muslim Chambers of Commerce, and Nurur Rehman, the Secretary of the Calcutta Muslim Chamber of Commerce, was appointed its Organising Secretary. The Federation was established in 1944. The Federation held its first meeting on April 24, 1945. Jinnah wrote to Isphani on May 6, 1945:

"I hope that you people realize the urgency and the importance of Muslim India making every effort to make up the leeway. What we want is selfless workers and deeds and not mere words and thoughts and speeches".

9. Ibid.
Jinnah encouraged the creation of the Muslim Commercial Bank, which was incorporated in Calcutta in July, 1947, with an authorized capital of three crores of rupees, and launched the Muhammadi Steamship Company with the help of the Habibs. In 1946, Jinnah, backing a project of Orient Airways owned and operated by Muslims, purchased shares for Rs. 25,000, while fixing the value of the share as low as Rs.5/- for the poor Muslims.

In 1944, an Education Committee was appointed for the preservation, fostering and promotion of Islamic traditions, culture and ideals and general well-being of the Muslims. The Committee appointed various other sub-committees, the primary and secondary education committee, the Women's Education Committee, the Teachers' Training Committee, the higher education committee, and the science education committee.

Jinnah took up the task of revitalisation and popularisation of the Muslim League after the 1937 elections, with full determination to establish a Muslim Homeland. If Calcutta was a business centre in the east, Karachi was also a well-developed town in the west. Jinnah had in his mind that Pakistan would cover Bengal and Assam in the east and Baluchistan, Sind, NWFP and Punjab in the west. It is not understood as to why Jinnah emphasised establishment of industries in the West rather than in the East while the number of League members were also more in the East. If the western region was barren without any distinct commercial development, the neighbouring areas of Calcutta were yet in a very miserable condition and the economic condition of the Muslims was poorer than that of the Muslims in the west. The measures like Planning Committee, Steamship Company and Airways benefitted the West utmost. Jinnah viewed the West as a very strategic region being nearer to the Muslim countries of Iran and Arabs. He had gone with his plan of Pakistan to such an extent that he did not agree to any proposal for achieving independence without partition of India. He wanted his own rule with his own history.

**Congress Policy Towards the League**

The League's constant demand for creation of Pakistan and growing gulf between the Congress and the League forced Gandhiji to change his

15. Ibid.
policy towards the League. On June 15, 1940, he wrote: "There are only two parties - the Congress and those who side with the Congress, and the parties who do not", to which Jinnah had replied that the Muslim League was the third party. Gandhiji also wrote on the same date: "It is an illusion created by ourselves that we must come to an agreement with all parties before we can make any progress". Soon after the departure of Cripps in April, 1942, Gandhiji realized that "attainment of independence is an impossibility till we have solved the Communal tangle" and concluded that the communal problem would not be solved unless and until the British leave India. Therefore, he began to demand independence and transfer of power to the Congress, being a majority party, and afterwards the Congress would solve the communal problem, to which the League expressed its strong opposition - and this stalemate continued until 1947. Gandhiji, however, laid down his policy on the Indian unity without brooking over the idea of partitioning. He wrote:

"If the vast majority of Muslims regard themselves as a separate nation having nothing in common with the Hindus or others, no power on earth can compel them to think otherwise. And if they want to partition India on that basis, they must have the partition, unless Hindus want to fight against such a division. So far as I can see, such a preparation is silently going on, on behalf of both parties. That way lies suicide".

To maintain the Indian unity, A.K. Azad stated on August 2, 1942, that "he had no objection to British handing over power to the Muslim League or any other party" as, he believed, no single party could function without the cooperation of other parties. He had not supported the League's demand in 1937. Gandhiji clarified it in his letter written to a Muslim businessman in Bombay a few hours before his arrest:

17. Ibid.
18. Harijan (Ahmedabad), April 18, 1942; see also Sir Reginald Coupland, n. 16, p. 298.
19. Harijan, Ibid.
"Provided the Muslim League co-operated fully with the Congress demand for immediate independence without the slightest reservation, subject of course to the proviso that independent India will permit the operations of the Allied armies in order to check Axis aggression and thus help both China and Russia, the Congress will have no objection to the British Government transferring all the power it to-day exercises to the Muslim League on behalf of the whole of India. And the Congress will not only not obstruct any government that the Muslim League may form on behalf of the people, but will even join the Government in running the machinery of the Free State".

A British politician has also quoted Mahatma Gandhi as telling him that if Britain did not wish to hand over India to the Congress it could "hand it over to (Mohammed Ali) Jinnah and the Muslim League". But if the Government had really agreed and Gandhiji persuaded the Congressmen to serve under Jinnah, it would have created a great mess. There was also the likelihood that Jinnah could form the Government on principles purely in the interest of the Muslims, then there would have been riots and Jinnah would have been forced to mend his ways. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Gandhiji "wanted India to remain intact". Gandhiji is reported to have said:

"We must quit India forthwith and not bother about what happened afterwards. If we did not want to give charge to the Congress, we must hand it over to Jinnah and the Muslim League. On no account was Britain to divide India. It must be handed over intact. If Britain had no thoughts of self-interest, she should gain from India's freedom. Her trade with India would increase because there was so much goodwill towards her".

Rajagopalachari, in the absence of the Congress leaders in jail, renewed his plea for acceptance of Pakistan but neither the press nor Jinnah nor Ambedkar supported him. The Hindu Mahasabha disapproved the idea of Rajagopalachari, Azad and Gandhiji, and opposed the scheme of Pakistan as strongly as possible. Savarkar, in the annual meeting of the Hindu Mahasabha held in December, 1942, at Kannur, spoke in bitter and provocative language: "The Moslems' duty was allegiance to the nation.

23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
Their rights and responsibilities were the same as those of other minorities, and they would be similarly represented on a democratic basis at the Centre. But the 'outrageous and treacherous' demand for Pakistan would not be tolerated. The outburst of Hindu Mahasabha gave a clarion call to the Muslim League and they became more conscious of their position and demanded more strongly the creation of Pakistan.

Civil Disobedience Movement

Gandhiji believed in the peaceful demonstration through non-violent means and an harmless instrument for pressurising the British to come to terms. Woodrow Wyatt met Gandhiji and the members of the parliamentary delegation. He observed that Gandhiji was not as rigid about non-violence as was conceived. Gandhiji once said to him that if it were god's will that there be a civil war, there would be one. Wyatt asked that if there will be a civil war, would he tell the Congress to adopt non-violence when the Muslims won't and, thus, "they will sweep through India with fire and sword". Gandhiji said slowly:

"Yes, I would certainly tell the Congress to adopt non-violence. But I wouldn't expect them to. What I would expect them to do is to take one eye for one eye and one tooth for one tooth. Not like the British who take one hundred eyes for one eye and one hundred teeth for one tooth".

In Bombay on August 8, 1942, as the AICC, demanding immediate end of British rule, resolved to sanction "a mass struggle on nonviolent lines on the widest possible scale' under Gandhiji's leadership and the Congress President proposed to address appeals to President Roosevelt, Marshal Chiang Kai-shek and Maisky, Russian Ambassador in Britain, the Government, in the morning of 9th of August, arrested Gandhiji and the members of the CWC and, gradually, all the important leaders in the country. The League utilising this vacuum, demanded in a resolution at Bombay on August 20, condemning the Congress Civil Disobedience movement, that the Government should immediately guarantee "to the Muslims the right of

26. B.K. Tiwari, n. 22,
27. Indian Express (New Delhi), June 11, 1985.
28. Ibid.
self-determination" and a pledge that"they will abide by the verdict of a plebiscite of Musalmans and give effect to the Pakistan scheme "

The Hindu Mahasabha also "formulated demands which did not differ markedly from those of the Congress, except that they were more militant in tone and more openly antagonistic to the Muslim League". The Hindu Mahasabha, however, set up a committee under Shyama Prasad Mookerjee "to make a final effort for an Indo-British settlement on honourable terms", but all talks between Mookerjee and Jinnah failed. Besides the Hindu Mahasabha, the Muslim leaders on the Congress side and some amongst the Muslim League also realised the necessity of an honourable settlement at any cost. They seriously began to think that the dream of Pakistan would take shape causing perpetual drift and differences between the Congress and the League, the Hindustan and Pakistan, and the Hindus and the Muslims. One such leader anxious to bridge the gulf between the two parties, was Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, who had formulated a scheme to solve the communal problem.

Distrust of Jinnah for Hindus

Jinnah visited Kashmir in 1935 and exhorted the Muslim majority to carry the minorities along with them, while Sheikh Abdullah, sided with the Congress and said good-by to communal politics. Ghulam Abbas, joined by Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah, revived the Muslim Conference and invited the well known Ittahad-ul-Mussalmeen leader of Hyderabad Bahadur Yar Jung to a session of the Conference in Srinagar, but when he was about to address, the session, he was asked to leave Srinagar within 24 hours. Sheikh Abdullah's statements against the League created a wedge of misunderstanding between the National Conference and the League. Sheikh Abdullah along with Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad met Jinnah in Delhi at his Aurangzeb Road residence, and said, that Jammu and Kashmir was a "Muslim majority area and our view could only be that of a majority. On the contrary, Mr. Jinnah was the leader of a minority in the country which had to seek some protection and guarantees ... I told Jinnah that he had

31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. See Appendix I, n. 16, Chapter III.
every right to plead on behalf of the Muslims and to ask for safeguards. Sheikh Abdullah said that there were other factors like geographical contiguity, language, culture etc. necessary for a separate State and "if religion were the only factor for nationhood, India could then be divided and sub-divided into several entities." Jinnah replied:

"I am like your father and have grown old in politics. It is my experience that Hindus can not be relied upon. They can never be your friends. For years I have tried to own them but have not succeeded. A time will come when you will repent and appreciate my viewpoint."

Jinnah also said:

"How can you trust a people who refuse to take water from your hand. There is no place for you in their society."

**Congress Politics to Throw the League**

After the arrest of Gandhiji and other Congress leaders, there was a great hue and cry in the country that the Congress "meant to be fair and honest with the Muslims" and wanted "to give them the type of independence they were seeking" and, therefore, it was the responsibility of the Muslim League "to join hands with the Congress to gain independence for the peoples of the sub-continent." The Muslim League at the Bombay, August, 1942 session considered the serious situation. Ispahani and other League leaders were convinced that the league "should not let slip the opportunity to achieve freedom from the British for both Hindus and Muslims", which could be plainly considered also to be in the interest of the League. But they failed to anticipate the aftermath, when the Congress leaders would come out from jail and struggle for power and dominate being in majority. It was Jinnah only who anticipated the Congress designs and called the Muslims to avoid both the Congress and British traps. The cause for Jinnah's view were the two articles - one written by Gandhiji in the Harijan and the other a statement by Nehru.

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35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
which appeared in the Bombay Chronicle of August 23, 1942, which proved that "all the inspired talk which had filled the air with the blessings of the Congress leaders outside prison and influential big Hindu businessmen had no meaning and was a clever trap to throw the Muslim League off balance and to involve it in trouble similar to that of Congress, a ship that had lost its rudder and was caught in a storm in mid-ocean". The Congress, later, tried to entrap the League with the formula of second-line leader, Rajaji.

**Sir Sikander Hyat's Formula**

"His scheme provided that, in the absence of a 75 per cent majority of members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly in favour of either accession or non-accession to the Indian Federation, the Muslim community should be given an opportunity of deciding on non-accession by means of a referendum; if they so decided, the non-Muslim portions of the Punjab should, by a similar referendum, be accorded the right to cut themselves adrift from the province. If it actually came to the point where non-Muslims decided to break adrift, it would mean (assuming the unit concerned to be a district) that the Ambala division and a large part of the Jullundur division, and also the Amritsar district, would cease to belong to the Punjab". Thus, in either case dismemberment of the Punjab was indispensable. The Viceroy, however, dissuaded Sikander Hyat Khan "from publishing or proceeding with his scheme".

Sir Sikander had resigned from the Muslim League soon after the League conference on May 29, 1942, and in spite of persuasion and request made by Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman on behalf of Jinnah did not withdraw his resignation. Sir Sikander did not like the idea of partition of Punjab but he was confident that the way the League was going on it would become inevitable. Khaliquzzaman and other members of the League were reluctant at the Lahore Resolution and wanted to get rid of it by accepting the Cripps proposal, but due to Jinnah's opposition to this approach, the Cripps proposal could not be accepted by the League, while the Congress had totally rejected it.

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40. Ibid., p. 347.
41. See Appendix I, n. 16, Chapter III.
42. V.P. Menon, n. 30, p. 144.
43. Ibid.
On the one hand, Jinnah had chalked out a well planned scheme for creation of Pakistan, and, on the other, he sought every opportunity to capture seats in Provincial Legislative Assemblies to make the Congress as much ineffective as possible and to mobilise the British favour towards the League's demand. In Assam, Sir Mohammad Saadullah had reconstituted a League Ministry supported by the European members in December, 1941. In Bengal, Sir John Herbert, the Governor, caused the downfall of Fazl-ul-Haq's ministry and Nazim-ud-din, supported by the European members, formed the League ministry on April 24, 1943. In Sind, Sir Hugh Dow, Governor, forced Premier Umar Allah Baksh, who was later murdered in May, 1943, to resign and Sir Ghulam Hidayatullah formed the League ministry. In NWFP, Aurangzeb Khan, with the tacit approval of the Governor, Sir George Cunningham, formed the League ministry after May, 1943. In Punjab, there was the Government of the Unionist Party composed of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs under the leadership of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, who pressed Jinnah "to abandon the provocative catchword of Pakistan". After the death of Sir Sikander in late December, 1942, Jinnah dominated the Punjab politics because Sikander's successor, Khizar Hyat Khan could not check the increasing support of the Muslim members of the Indian Civil Service to the Muslim League. Thus, the death of Sikander Hyat Khan and Umar Allah Baksh in quick succession left the field open for Jinnah in west India. In the east, Fazl-ul-Haq, who was "fickle and changed sides easily", and fought against the growing intransigence of the Muslim intelligentsia, lost popularity and his support declined as a result the Governor removed him from office, after which his weakness became public and he could not come back to the political stage. The British supported Jinnah and his prestige rapidly increased. The outright rejection of the August Offer and the Cripps proposal by the Congress were taken seriously by the Government but the League's rejection was

44. Fazl-ul-Haq had broken away from the Muslim League and formed an alliance with the Krishak Praja Party (a section of the Congress) and the Hindu Mahasabha.

45. Unionist Party was established by Sir Mian Fazl-i-Husain and Chaudhru Chhotu Ram as a joint front against the Congress.

46. Linlithgow Papers, Microfilm No. 128, No. 15, Extract from Quarterly Report (February 1, 1941 to April 30, 1941), prepared by the Office of Secretary to Governor-General, NAI. See also Bhim Sen Sachar, Oral History Transcript, No. 181 and K.K. Gauba, Ibid., No. 76, NMML.

treated formal rather than substantial. The British authorities decided to curb the power and influence of the Congress at any cost and to encourage the League with a view to making it a rival of the Congress on the all-India scene. Though the British authorities made no secret of their pro-League tendency, they could not help the League to substantially improve its position due to political resurgence in the country. Firstly, the Congress leaders were in jail and, Jinnah, whose policy was mainly against the Congress, was fighting in the air and, thus, the League was losing its impact. Secondly, with the passage of time, the Muslims, who once criticised the Congress policies, began to come into fold of the Congress remembering the progressive measures they had taken. Thirdly, life became more difficult than earlier due to unemployment and supply of goods from India to warring Allies; and fourthly, October cyclone and floods destroyed stocks on a large scale which resulted in 1943-44 famine claiming the lives of about two million people. All this happened during the course of the League's ministry. Obviously, the people hoped that it was the Government's responsibility to save the masses from such calamities. Jinnah's exhortations that it was owing to the Hindu machination did not carry much conviction as a result the League ministry in Bengal was thrown out in spite of having the Governor's support.

The question of division of Punjab had become a very burning question during the second half of 1942. Raja Maheshwar Dayal Seth, Secretary, Hindu Mahasabha, met Khaliquzzaman in the early October, 1942, and proposed to form a coalition when the Congress leaders were behind the bars, provided that Muslim League could agree on the partition of Punjab. The Raja said that he had met with Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan and he was agreed to leave the Ambala Division and if he (Khaliquzzaman) could agree to leave the Jullundur Division, there would be no problem to divide the country into India and Pakistan according to the Lahore Resolution. Khaliquzzaman replied that the Raja wanted to dismember the country. Khaliquzzaman wrote to Jinnah that the population of the Muslims in Punjab and Bengal was much more than the Hindus and there was no fear from the general elections as the Muslims had very much emancipated during the last five years (1937-1942). Khaliquzzaman pointed out that

48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., p. 393.
in case of formation of a Muslim ministry in Bengal, the League would have the benefit of having Calcutta and the coal and iron mines from Calcutta to Bihar, but in case of partition, at the most the Sylhet Division would be obtained, but Calcutta and the mines would go off their hands. And if Punjab would be divided, India would get a way to Kashmir. Thus, the boundary, which was to be marked along the River Yamuna would shrink up to that of Lahore. Further, the Muslims and other minorities in U.P., Bihar, C.P., Bombay and Madras, would be like a bird in the net, which would be very disastrous for the Muslims of U.P. and Bihar. Therefore, Khaliquzzaman appealed to Jinnah not to accept a small Pakistan, which though he might get easily, but would sacrifice the life of crores of Muslims in India.

At the League Working Committee in November 8, 1942, in Delhi, Khaliquzzaman voiced his views against the partition of Punjab. Meanwhile, Husain Imam spoke that if the Ambala Division would be separated from the proposed boundary of Pakistan, there would be no harm. Khaliquzzaman, who had to accept the partition of Punjab and Bengal with a heavy heart, replied that on certain principles of partition, the Jullunder Division will also have to be separated there being non-Muslim majority. Jinnah said that he had "no idea of giving up of our claim" for the division Punjab. The Congress was declared unlawful and the Hindu Mahasabha was the only party with which the League could negotiate for any settlement.

In December, 1942, the Muslim League resolved that Muslims were entitled to homelands in North-West and North-East of India where they were in majority.

Gandhi's Fast

The Government accused the Congressmen for being mad after power and held them responsible for violence and bloodshed as the Bombay AICC session had expressed doubt that Jinnah might form the National Government, and that had much agitated the Hindus and the riots broke out. Gandhi, on September 23, 1942, wrote to the Viceroy refuting the charges. The Viceroy suppressed the letter and violence and agitation continued. Gandhi resented and wanted to be allowed to clear his position or to be tried in a court of law, but the Government wanted to release Gandhi

only after he had withdrawn the Quit India Movement. Gandhiji replied:

"My answer is that the Government goaded the people to the point of madness. They started leonine violence ... on a scale so gigantic that it displaces the Mosaic law of tooth for tooth by that of ten thousand for one ... If then I cannot get soothing balm for my pain, I must resort to the law prescribed for Satyagrahis, namely, a fast according to capacity".

In jail Gandhiji had realised that the Civil Disobedience Movement was launched when time was not yet ripe and people were not properly trained. Gandhiji, in protest against the conduct of the Viceroy and also for self-purification sent notice to the Viceroy that he would begin his fast on February 9, continuing for 21 days, which actually started on February 10, 1943. The Government in New Delhi and London took it as a threat and pressure and an act to embarrass them in case of his death. Therefore, instead of persuading Gandhiji, the Government prepared for his cremation. After 9-10 days, his condition very much deteriorated. On February 19, a conference of about 150 leaders of all parties (except Congress and Muslim League) was held in Delhi. The conference urged the Viceroy to release Gandhiji immediately, but Churchill and Linlithgow remained unmoved. Rajagopalachari and others saw him in jail and succeeded in getting the fast ended on March 3, 1943. Gandhiji's 21 day fast impressed the people about his "extraordinary strength and supernatural powers". However, Gandhiji still remained in jail and attitude of Gandhiji and the Government remained unchanged. The Congress leaders urged the Government to release Gandhiji and expressed hope that he would do his best to solve the "internal deadlock". The Viceroy pointed out that "the essential preliminary to such a government was that measure of agreement between parties, communities and interests which he had been so anxious to foster, but to which the excessive claims and the totalitarian ambitions of the Congress and its leaders had been so consistent an obstacle". The Muslim League applauded the

51. Correspondence with Mr. Gandhi, August, 1942 - April, 1944 (New Delhi: Government of India, 1944), pp. 7-9.
54. Ibid., p. 235.
55. V.P. Menon, n. 30, p. 148.
decision of the Viceroy. Rajagopalachari remarked that the Viceroy's reply was "revealing the Versailles spirit wishing to humiliate the Congress and others and was influenced by passion and prejudice".

During the period of war, the breach between the Congress and the Government was skillfully exploited by the shrewd politician, Jinnah, for "consolidation of the Muslim League in the Muslim majority provinces", which he practised since the very outbreak of the War. This assumption finds ground as Jinnah, in February, 1940, had asked Linlithgow for the Governor's support to teach "a salutary lesson to the Congress" by forming a League ministry in the NWFP, when the Congress ministry had resigned a few months earlier.

The Muslim League at its annual session held in Delhi on April 24, 1943, claimed that all the Muslim majority provinces (Assam, Sind, Bengal and NWFP and Punjab), which the League claimed for Pakistan, were then under the control of the League ministries due to fall of the Congress ministries and resignations tendered by three prominent Congressmen. Jinnah presented the demand for Pakistan in a forceful manner and in appreciable words. He reiterated his earlier contention that the Congress had not changed its policy and its suggestions for settlement contained the same ideas with change of words which meant to establish Congress rule, that is, Hindu Raj, which the League could never accept. He said that he would be happy if Gandhiji would like settlement on the basis of creation of Pakistan, for which he was ready. He complained that Gandhiji was writing letters to Lord Wavell but not to him directly, for which nobody was creating hindrance to him. Jinnah also said that there was no use of going to the Viceroy or sending deputation to him or writing to him. Jinnah saw no difference between political mentality of Gandhiji and the Congress and the Hindu leadership. Jinnah proclaimed:

56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
60. V.P. Menon, n. 30, p. 78.
"I say to the Hindus - and the Britishers know it better than anybody else - that the quickest way for the freedom of the peoples, both Hindus and Muslims, is Pakistan. It may come in my life-time or not, you will remember these words of mine. I say this with no ill-will or offence. Some nations have killed millions of each. That is not permanent. An enemy of today is a friend of tomorrow. That is life. That is history".

Jinnah further examined the various suggestions put forward by various organizations and individuals, analysed their various implications and concluded how they failed to meet the Muslim demand. Referring to the Phoenix-like rise and regeneration of Muslim India from the very ashes of its ruination after the destruction during the 18th and the 19th centuries, Jinnah said that the rise of the Muslim League and demand for Pakistan amounted to a 'miracle'.

The session regretted the Government's failure to guarantee Muslims' self-determination, warned the Government that the imposition of any kind of federal constitution would be forcibly resisted, and exhorted Muslims "to face the effort and sacrifice required to reach the cherished goal of Pakistan". On May 22, Sanru and a few Liberal leaders urged the Viceroy to appoint an impartial tribunal to investigate into the charges levelled against the Congress, but their appeal was rejected. On July 24, a non-Party conference appealed both to the government and Gandhiji to close the "present dismal chapter of strife and ill-feeling in the country".

In February and April, 1943, William Philips, Roosevelt's Personal Representative, was not allowed to see Gandhiji and the CWC members in jail to break the impasse between the Congress and the government. He wrote to Roosevelt that it might "affect our conduct of the war in this part of the world, and our future relations with the coloured races". In early May, Philips met Churchill in Washington; the latter, on the question of constitutional development in India, became hot and blue and warned it "was only Britain's "business" and no American "interference" would be tolerated".

63. V.P. Menon, n. 30, p. 148.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
War Situation

London was fully absorbed in the Second World War. In late January, the Allies entered into Tripoli (Libya). In May, the Axis Powers were driven out from Africa. On September 3, Italy surrendered and Mussolini was dismissed from Premiership. In Russia, German troops were pushed back 400 miles westward from Stalingrad. In the Far East, by November, New Guinea and Gilbert Islands were got vacated by the Japanese. There was no sign of end of the war. Rome and France were still under occupation of Germans and Hitler was still talking of world conquest. Japan still occupied a vast emprise in Asia and the Pacific.

Congress August, 1943 Proposal

The political deadlock continued and Rajaji, to resolve it, continued to propagate for the acceptance of Pakistan. B. Siva Rao opines that Rajagopalachari's suggestion was worthy of consideration. The resolution passed in Bombay on August 8, 1943, as well as correspondence between Azad, Nehru and Abdul Latif, shows that the Congress and the AICC, whatever might be their attitude in the past, agreed to make the following concessions to the League:

"(a) For the interim period, provided the British agree to the formation of a real National Government, the task for forming such a Government may be entrusted to Mr. Jinnah;

(b) In regard to the permanent constitution, the Congress is prepared to accept the largest measure of autonomy being conceded to the federating units and residuary powers vested in them. If, however, a territorial unit is not satisfied with the basic structure of the new constitution, and desires secession, the federation will not resort to coercion."

The proposal did not satisfy the League. On February 10, 1944, William Philips wrote to President Roosevelt in Washington:

67. Correspondent in Delhi from 1935 of The Hindu and The Manchester Guardian. Brother of the late Sir Senegal Rau had close contacts with Indian nationalist leaders.
69. Ibid., p. 458.
70. William Philips was Roosevelt's Special envoy in succession to Johnson.
71. B. Shiva Rao, n. 68, p. 458.
"The impression is widespread among Indians that the British Government is determined to preserve the status quo in spite of the promises given with regard to post-war independence and general assurances contained in the Atlantic Charter".

Arrival of Field-Marshal Viscount Sir Archibald Wavell

Wavell's selection for the Viceroyalty of India came as a surprise to Lord Linlithgow. Amery, in the House of Commons, announced that his appointment "does not imply any change in the settled policy to which his Majesty's Government were pledged with regard to the development of Indian self-government". On October 20, 1943, Lord Wavell took over charge of the Viceroyship of India from Lord Linlithgow. Wavell was the C-in-C of India before his appointment as Viceroy and had taken a prominent part in the negotiations between different parties and the Government during the Cripps Mission in India.

On August 2, 1943, Linlithgow had said that the Indian political parties were responsible for the constitutional deadlock and advised: "If there is to be any progress, Indian publicmen should, without delay, start to get together and to clear the way for it". He did not refer to Jinnah's allegation made four months earlier that the British "were not willing to part with power" and Azad's statement that "the National Government be placed in the hands of the Muslim League, and the Congress would extend full cooperation to such a government". Lord Wavell was mindful that just after the War, the Indian people would demand transfer of power. This period was economically very disastrous and politically difficult. Before assuming charge, Lord Wavell's speeches revealed that he was keenly interested to resolve the Indian deadlock.

Amery's Policy Towards India

Amery, the Secretary of State for India, answering to a question by Sorenson, a Labour Member, on the floor of the House of Commons on October 28, 1943, said that the Congress had "embarked upon a policy of

73. D.C. Gupta, n. 53, n. 238.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
irresponsible sabotage of the war effort" and, hence, no negotiations could be undertaken with the Congress leaders. Amery also warned Wavell to be sufficiently careful in dealing with the Congress for constitutional advancement and that he should not "go beyond the Cripps proposals during the war". With such instructions from home, Wavell was quite unable to rectify, as he stated, "mistakes" and "blunders" committed in the past. Therefore, he declared that Cripps offer still remained open, which neither satisfied the Congress, nor the League nor any non-party member and, consequently, the political deadlock continued to find roots in the communal differences. By that time, the League leaders had realized that they had committed a mistake by rejecting the Cripps proposal, but it is astonishing that Jinnah rejected the same proposal when reiterated by Lord Wavell. Had the Cripps proposal been accepted and the League agreeing to the Congress August, 1943 resolution, had cooperated with the Congress, it was quite possible that the history of India might be different. But, during the year 1943, Jinnah's position had become very much consolidated and he was quite sure of getting a Muslim homeland under his own leadership. He saw in the horizon the star of his fate making him the Father of the Nation of Pakistan.

Reaction to Amery's Policy

Lord Wavell anticipated that after the Allies victory in sight it would be difficult to deny or delay the transfer of power. Therefore, he hastened to prepare conditions for it, but communal settlement between the Congress and the League seemed impossible. The AIML Karachi session held on December 24-26, 1943, established an "Action Committee" and "Parliamentary Board". The Committee and the Board were to supervise the working of the League in the State Assemblies and "to organise the Muslims all over India to resist the imposition of a unitary constitution and to prepare for the coming struggle for the achievement of Pakistan".

77. D.C. Gupta, n. 53, p. 239.
78. See Ch. Khaliq-uz-Zaman, n. 50, p. 311. Khaliq-uz-Zaman had proposed for the formation of a 'Supervision Committee', but on the advice of Jinnah, the Committee of Action and the Parliamentary Board were established.
the other hand, the Hindu Mahasabha in a meeting in Amritsar demanded "the preservation of the integrity of India, the introduction of federation with a strong Centre, and the refusal to any province, community, or section, of the right to secede".

Wavell's Declaration of United India

On February 13, 1944, Lord Wavell delivered his first important speech addressing the joint session of the Central Legislature. The important point in the speech was the emphasis on "united country enjoying complete and unqualified self-government as a willing partner of the British Commonwealth". He laid the responsibility of delaying the transfer of power on the Indians for not agreeing as to "how the two great communities and certain other important minorities, as well as the Indian States, should live within that unit and make the best use of its wealth and opportunities".

Jinnah criticising Wavell's emphasis on 'United India' accused him of "fishing in Congress waters". Further, the Congress and the Liberals also condemned Wavell's refusal to release the Congress leaders. However, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru agreed that formation of a national government at the Centre would need a whole-hearted support of the political parties, which was not forthcoming.

Release of Gandhiji

Shortly before the death of Kasturba Gandhi on February 22, 1944, Gandhiji had written a letter to Lord Wavell refuting the charges against him. He wrote:

"Promises for the future are valueless in the fact of the world struggle in which the fortune of all nations and therefore of the whole of humanity is involved. Present performance is the peremptory need of the moment if the war is to end in world peace ... Therefore a real war effort must mean satisfaction of India's demand. "Quit India" only gives vivid expression to that demand, and has not the sinister and poisonous meaning attributed to it without warrant by the Government of India".

80. Ibid.  
81. Ibid., p. 154.  
82. Ibid.  
83. Ibid.  
84. Ibid., p. 159.  
85. Ibid., p. 155.
Lord Wavell replied expressing sympathy with Gandhiji and also enclosed a copy of his statement made in the central legislature. Wavell complained that the Congress policy was "to hindering and not forwarding India's progress to self-government and development" and hoped the Congress to abandon the policy of non-cooperation and join with the other political parties and the British for economic and political progress of India "not by any dramatic or spectacular stroke, but by hard steady work towards the goal ahead". Meanwhile, the Congress and the League, being dissatisfied by the Viceroy's address, made a common cause in the Central Legislative Assembly and the Government was defeated in a series of important divisions, in particular, the Finance Bill was thrown out. Further, the Liberal leaders continued their efforts to resolve the impasse. A Non-Party Conference held at Lucknow recognised the frustration caused by the "immobility of the Government" and authorised Sapru to prepare a memorandum for submission to the Viceroy. The memorandum pointed out that out of 18 advisers, only three were Indians and the Governors were acting in their discretion, and demanded the coalition ministries or ministries representing all the important elements in the legislature should be established in those provinces where Governor's autocratic rule is manifest. The Viceroy was of the view that though the British Government wanted India to progress towards self-government, but he did not know as to how His Majesty's Government or the Governor-General could help to produce a 'national government'. In his view, drastic constitutional change was impossible during wartime and that a body should be formed to suggest a scheme for political settlement and the means of a changeover after the war, to which Sapru agreed but said that such a body formed by the government without support or backing of political parties will have no effect on the people's mind. Wavell agreed to Sapru's views but did not agree to setting up provincial executive councils with hostile legislatures. While these negotiations were afoot, the Congress was demanding in resolutions for the release of Gandhiji to help in arriving at a permanent settlement between the Congress and the League. In the middle of April, 1944, Gandhiji suffered an attack of malaria and there were apprehensions of his sudden collapse. Therefore, the Government found it a favourable time to release Gandhiji for two purposes; firstly, to help in constitutional settlement, and secondly,
for his recovery. Gandhiji, along with a few CWC members, was released on May 6, 1944, "solely on medical grounds", and 'Quit India Movement' came to an end.

Gandhiji's release had no effect on the war situation, because the German divisions were destroyed in the Ukraine (USSR) in the spring of 1944, and German resistance was cracking in Crimea. In the Indian Ocean, the Allies forces were advancing to reconquer Burma and the Japanese were starving in Assam. On the other fronts in Africa, the German forces were being defeated. In this circumstance, when the British were foreseeing their victory, there was no need of having any help through releasing Gandhiji. However, it may be said that Great Britain released Gandhiji for maintaining internal peace in India and, if required, to have a favourable condition for recruiting more sepoys from India. The Congress and the Hindu Press had realised that the Nazi and Fascist forces in the West and Japanese in the East would soon come to terms and were afraid of severe action against them by the British as they had not cooperated with them in their war aims. Therefore, to minimize the severity of the impact of the Quit India Movement, which had caused riots and destruction they had begun to call it as a mere civil disobedience movement. Such statements were given by many a prominent Congressmen.

The release of Gandhiji cannot be looked at as a British plan to get assistance for winning the war. Had it been so the British Government would have released all the Congress leaders from jail ensuring their favour for this aim. The Government did not release the Congress leaders and even did not allow Gandhiji to interview them in order to discuss a fresh approach.

Gelder's Interview of Gandhiji

A British journalist, Stewart Gelder, interviewed Gandhiji on July 9, and it was published without Gandhiji's permission. In the interview, Gandhiji had said that he had no intention to hinder the Allied war efforts and offer civil disobedience. He wanted "a national Government

90. Correspondent of the News Chronicle (London).
91. The Times of India (New Delhi), July 11, 1944.
in full control of civil administration" (Viceroy and C-in-C to have complete control of military operations), and to "advise the Congress to participate in such a government if formed". He wished it to be composed of persons chosen by the elected members of the Central Assembly. The ordinance rule would give place to normal administration in the presence of the Viceroy, who would be like the King of England, guided by responsible ministers, and popular government to be restored in all the provinces. He suggested that the Viceroy and the C-in-C would have complete control over the military operations, subject to advice and criticism from the national Government. Gandhi aimed that the portfolio of defence should remain in the hands of the Indians, and had no objection to the Allied forces carrying on their operations on Indian soil, however, the expenses of the operations would be borne by Great Britain and not by India. The interview could serve one of the two purposes of Gandhi, that is, either the Viceroy had to allow Gandhi to see the Congress leaders in jail or he was to be granted interview with the Viceroy.

The Viceroy replied that he would be glad to consider Gandhi's any constructive suggestion. On July 27, 1944, Gandhi wrote to Wavell:

"I am prepared to advise the Working Committee to declare that ... mass civil disobedience envisaged by the resolution of August, 1942, cannot be offered and that full co-operation in war efforts should be given by the Congress if a declaration of immediate Indian independence is made and a national government responsible to the Central Assembly be formed subject to the proviso that during the pendency of the war, the military operations should continue as at present, but without involving any financial burden on India."

On July 28, the House of Commons noticed that Gandhi's demand for immediate independence did not ensure the safeguarding of the constitutional position for minority elements and that this demand was not different from those put forth two years ago by the Congress President to Cripps in April, 1942, upon which the negotiations between the Congress and the Government had ceased. The Viceroy also made it clear that the "British offer to India of unqualified freedom after the war

92. V.P. Menon, n. 30, p. 160.
had been made conditional upon the framing of a constitution agreed
to by the main elements of India's national life" and the "object of
these conditions was to ensure the fulfilment of their duty to safe-
guard the interests of the racial and religious minorities and of the
Depressed Classes, and their treaty obligations to the Indian States".
He also said that the constitution could not be altered during the
period of the war and if the "leaders of the Hindus, the Muslims, and
the important minorities were willing to co-operate in a transitional
government established and working within the present constitution, I
believe good progress might be made". The Viceroy opined this although
he knew that it was not possible. He laid down the following measures
for transfer of power:

"For such a transitional government to succeed, there
must, before it is formed, be agreement in principle
between Hindus and Muslims and all important elements
as to the method by which the new constitution should
be framed. This agreement is a matter for Indians them­
selves. Until Indian leaders have come closer together
than they are now, I doubt if myself can do anything
to help. Let me remind you too that the minority problems
are not easy. They are real and can be solved only by
mutual compromise and tolerance".

Wavell announcement, undoubtedly, was a clear plan for prolonging
the British rule in India or, at least, until the war was over, as the
communal tangle was not likely to be solved in near future. Gandhiji
characterised the Viceroy as a conjurer and concluded: "It is as clear
as crustal that the British Government do not propose to give up the
power they possess over the 400 millions, unless the latter-­
develop strength enough to wrest it for them. I shall never lose hope that India
will do so by purely moral means". Thus, the negotiations between
Gandhiji and Wavell closed and the former, after rebuff from the Govern­
ment, helplessly turned towards Jinnah for a communal settlement and
the latter awaited the outcome of their talks.

95. Sir Francis Low (ed.), The Indian Year-Book, 1947 (Bombay: Bennett,
Coleman & Co. Ltd.), np. 879-80.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. D.G. Tendulkar, n. 93, p. 265.
Rajagopalachari's Formula

Rajaji, who openly proclaimed for acceptance of Pakistan, believed that only through Congress-League unity, independence could be achieved and peace could be maintained in future. With this view, Rajaji put forward a set of proposals, which he had discussed with Gandhiji in March, 1943, and even before in jail in February, and the latter had expressed his full approval of them. In view of Government's refusal to relax any restrictions or to discuss or negotiate terms of any settlement with the Congress, Rajaji wrote to Jinnah on April 8, 1944, enclosing the draft formula on behalf of Gandhiji hoping that it would bring about a final settlement of the impasse. The proposals were publicised on July 10, 1944. Gandhiji on September 24, 1944, stated: "When he presented the formula at the Aga Khan Palace, I did not take even five minutes and said 'Yes' because I see in it concrete shape".

The formula embodied the following six clauses, which formed the basis for terms of settlement between the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League, to which Gandhiji agreed and M.A. Jinnah was requested to agree:

"(1) Subject to the terms set out below as regards the constitution for free India, the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand for independence and will co-operate with the Congress in the formation of a provisional interim Government for the transitional period.

(2) After the termination of the war, a commission shall be appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in the north-west and east of India, wherein the Muslim population is in absolute majority. In the areas thus demarcated, a plebiscite of all the inhabitants, held on the basis of adult franchise or other practicable franchise, shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from Hindustan. If the majority decides in favour of the formation of a sovereign State separate from Hindustan, such decisions shall be given effect to, without prejudice to the right of the districts on the border to choose to join either State.

99. AICC File 6/1947, NMML. See also I.A. Sherwani, Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan, 1940-1947 (Delhi: Daya Publishing House, 1985), p. 44.
100. Bombay Chronicle (Bombay), October 31, 1942, Home Poll. File No.3/21/42, containing clipping of the paper, NAI.
(3) It will be open to all parties to advocate their points of view before the plebiscite is held.

(4) In the event of separation, a mutual agreement shall be entered into for safeguarding defence, commerce and communications and other essential purposes.

(5) Any transfer of population shall only be an absolutely voluntary basis.

(6) These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by Britain of full power and responsibility for the governance of India.

As the proposal contained recognition of principles of partition of the country and, indirectly, creation of Pakistan, Jinnah took interest and observed that Gandhiji at last accepted the principle of Pakistan and only how and when this should be carried out remained to be settled. He said also that the words "endorses the Indian demand for independence" (clause 1) implied that the Muslim League was against independence and in this sense was a cause of insinuation to the Muslim League. Further, it gave the Congress a superior position and made the league a subordinate body. He raised the question as to who would appoint the commission (clause 2), what would be its personnel and power and who would enforce its findings: 'The ridiculed the "contiguous districts" while the Lahore session had recommended "geographical contiguous units" where the Muslims were in majority. Jinnah also questioned as to who would safeguard the defence, commerce and communication in case of separation as there was no indication of the form, character and personnel of the provisional Government. The most objectionable was clause 6, which, according to Jinnah, meant that all steps for partition would remain on paper pending transfer of power to the Congress by the British Government. Further, independence to British India was also objected to by him and many league leaders as they held that independence for them meant liberation not only from foreign yoke but also from Hindu Raj. Therefore, Jinnah rejected the Rajagopalachari's formula saying "it offered a shadow and a husk, a maimed, mutilated and moth eaten Pakistan that torpedoed the Muslim League Resolution of 1940."

104. Dawn (Delhi), July 31, 1944.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid. See also Gandhi-Jinnah Talks, n. 103, p. 5.
109. Sandhya Chaudhri, n.102, p. 109; see also Dawn(Delhi),July 31,1944; see also D.G.Tendulkar, n. 93, pp. 267-69.
Rajaji, being perturbed having no response from Jinnah, wrote a letter followed by a telegram on June 30, 1944, asking whether the proposal had been accepted or rejected by the League. Jinnah did not consider Rajaji as a responsible representative capable of carrying out its acceptance by the Congress. Hence, earlier he did not reply and ignored it, but on receipt of the telegram, he replied on July 2, 1944, expressing surprise as to why Rajaji had presumed that the proposal had been rejected and that he would place the formula before the League, if it was offered by Gandhiji. Rajaji had earlier written and wrote again that it was conceded by Gandhiji and if he (Jinnah) could not approve of it, there was no sense in placing it before the League Working Committee. As Jinnah did not reply to it, Rajaji telegraphed him that the negotiations should be treated as closed and that he would release the correspondence. The release of the correspondence exchanged between Rajaji and Jinnah, though caused a great sensation and evoked very strong reaction from the Hindu Mahasabha, the Sikhs, and the Liberals, including V.S. Srinivasa Sastri, but it could not affect Jinnah's mind.

The MI Working Committee met at Lahore on July 29, 1944, to consider the offer of Rajaji-Gandhi formula. On July 30, Jinnah delivered a long historic speech at the meeting of the League Council. He discussed the formula clause by clause. His main observation was that neither Gandhiji nor Rajaji was authorised by the Congress to commence the negotiations on the formula with him. He said that the Lahore Resolution did not mention plebiscite of any type and, hence, declared the idea of a district-wise plebiscite as simply absurd. He said that the formula "was not conceived to lead to fruitful results, or a solution or settlement of the problem pertaining to the destiny of a nation of 100 millions of Muslims and their posterity". Evidently, Jinnah did not conceive Pakistan only in the east and the west for the Muslims there, but he talked about the problems of the Muslims living throughout the length and breadth of India. Jinnah maintained this contention until partition and left the Muslims of other parts of India to fight for their right and safety themselves after the creation of Pakistan.

Jinnah criticised the hasty release of the proposals, which, in his opinion, was deliberately done to put him down in the eyes of the

public in India and abroad. He did not find any harm if Gandhiji had communicated the proposals to him so that he could have placed the same before the MI Working Committee. As Gandhiji and Rajagopalachari had not consulted Jinnah regarding the proposals, he "interpreted them as pure and simple dictation without a sincere desire to negotiate". He asked whether Gandhiji was associating with the proposals as a dictator of the Congress or in his personal capacity. The whole argument of Jinnah was in the finest tradition of a brilliant lawyer who was the least concerned about the secular concept of an Indian nation and was keen to use it to further the basic goal of achieving Pakistan as a pre-condition of Indian Independence.

If we take a close view on the proposal, we find: firstly, that the plebiscite was to be held after the power was transferred to the Congress majority government in the Centre and the League being in minority would have been powerless. Therefore, in the elections or referendum there was every likelihood that the Congress might use undue influence and power as had been experienced during the Congress ministries earlier. Secondly, we find that League's position was becoming weak due to internal differences with Fazlul Haq and Khizar Hyat Khan, as a result of which Jinnah's prestige was suffering a setback and the League was losing ground. But when Rajagopalachari sent the proposal, Jinnah, a clever lawyer, found therein a way to rise on the political horizon as the sole and single guiding torch of the Muslim League. Representing himself as the only benefactor of the Muslims, raised many questions to publicise his popularity and the important role of the League being played for the cause of the Muslims. The League made it a point for rejoicing throughout the country that the Congress Patriarch after all inclined to concede its demand. Thirdly, the League began to warn the Muslims that they should strengthen their unity as the Congress was laying trap after trap for them. Such type of proclamations made the position of Jinnah very strong.

Critical Analysis

Abdul Halim Ghaznavi, MIA (Central) and President, National Mohammadan Association, said that the proposals were the shrewdest stroke

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111. *Dawn* (Delhi), July 31, 1944.

of policy, differed from the League's demand and aimed to destroy the League's scheme. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad opined that the motive of the formula was to put Jinnah and the Mussalmans of India in the wrong and bypass the League's demand for Pakistan. Roshan Jaman Khan, President, District Muslim League, Gonda, said that the formula meant enslavement of Muslims through their cooperation with the Congress. The Dawn characterized the formula a "Booby trap" to force the League to accept what the Congress offered after the British had been eliminated from the scene. The paper observed that like the Cripps' proposals, the formula also did not accept the principle of self-determination demanded by the Muslim League. Cripps "proposed a plebiscite province to province" and the formula suggested "plebiscite district by district".

The Spectator commented that Jinnah "did not find it attractive as the whole formula "rests on the air as it talks of independence during war which will not be granted by the British". Moonje, Jayakar and George S. Arundala opposed the formula as it surrendered to the League's claim of vivisection of India. Sir Chiman Lal Stalved, N.N. Sarkar, Sir P.S. Sivaswami, Sastry, Sir Homi Mehta and Sir Sultan Chenoy proclaimed that the division of India into two sovereign states without a Central control of subjects of vital issues and having separate armed forces was "fraught with dire consequences for the future and will imperil the very independence of the country ... Such partition will, instead of solving the problem of minorities, accentuate it and will not be in the interest of Muslims themselves. The Sikhs, on August 20, 1944, opposed the formula because the Sikhs were to be divided into two sections to be held in perpetual bondage, and as Master Tara Singh said the divisions would put 17 districts in Pakistan and 12 districts in Hindustan. The Tribune wrote that Jinnah had been treading the path leading "not to the heaven of peace and prosperity but to the jungles of civil strife and rancour". Lord Wavell opined that the "Formula is a try out" and

113. Dawn (Delhi), August 1, 1944; also see of July 12 and 13, 1944.
114. Ibid., July 13, 1944.
115. Ibid., July 23, 1944.
116. Ibid., July 12 and 30, 1944.
117. Spectator (London), July 13, 1944.
119. The Tribune (Lahore), August 21, 1944.
120. Ibid., July 12, 1944.
Gandhiji aimed to "assess the strength of the Hindu feelings against Pakistan". Amery viewed the formula conditional to transfer of power by the British and partial because it did not include the whole of Punjab, Bengal and Assam, and believed that Gandhiji meant humiliation of Jinnah and his removal from all-India politics. However, the formula formed the basis for Gandhi-Jinnah talks.

Gandhi-Jinnah Talks

Gandhiji saw in the League's demand for Pakistan increasing pace of communal strife and, hence, desired on May 4, 1943, to have a face-to-face talk with Jinnah. He immediately blessed the Rajagopalachari's formula with an aim to take the wind out of the League's sails as he believed that Jinnah's demand for separation was merely a slogan. But he was disappointed by Jinnah's two-nation theory. Gandhiji did not agree to the creation of a Central Government, but he desired a Board of Representatives of both the States to solve the matters of common concern. According to Pyarelal this was not only to form part of the federal constitution but was to be brought into being by a treaty between the two states.

The ideological background and distrust between Gandhiji and Jinnah stood in the way of commencement of their talks. Unfortunately, the Congress and the League could not create a congenial atmosphere and sincere desire for 'give and take'. According to the Congress viewpoint, Rajaji's formula was to be implemented after transfer of power while the League wanted the settlement under the aegis of the British so that the Muslims might not be left at the mercy of the Hindus, who could forget all the commitments and agreements. This was the main difference which remained and Gandhi-Jinnah talks could not solve this issue.

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122. Ibid., p. 1101.

123. The Tribune (Lahore), May 19, 1944. Also see Gandhi-Jinnah Talks, n. 103, p. 69. "It was a striking contrast to the high and mighty attitude displayed by Nehru in rejecting Jinnah's offer of coalition ministry in 1937", R.C. Majumdar, Struggle for Freedom (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1969), p. 712.
As Gandhiji failed to reconcile with the Viceroy, he had written from Panchgani to Jinnah at Srinagar on July 17, 1944, expressing desire to meet him for talks on the question of Pakistan. He wrote: "Do not regard me as an enemy of Islam or of Indian Muslims. I have always been a servant and friend to you and to mankind. Do not disappoint me". Jinnah replied that he would be glad to receive him at his house in Bombay. The MI Working Committee met in Lahore on July 30, and fully authorised Jinnah to negotiate with Gandhiji. Jinnah having the pleasure of Gandhiji's acceptance of the principle of partition, dismissed Rajagopalachari's formula, as offering "a shadow and a husk, a maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten Pakistan".

Gandhiji and Jinnah met almost daily from September 9 to 27, 1944, and had 14 sittings and initiated their talks on the basis of Rajagopalachari's formula. On September 10, Jinnah wrote that he was doubtful about the representative character of Gandhiji, which was very shocking to the Congressmen as such objection was not raised even by the British Government, and which conduct was contrary to the content of the telegram to Rajaji, in which Jinnah had said that if Gandhiji would send his proposal directly to him, he would place it before the MI Working Committee. Gandhiji assured that he would be able to get his agreement with him, if any, ratified by the AICC. Gandhiji laid down on September 11, the following conditions, to which the League was required to agree before taking up the question of Pakistan:

"(1) The immediate grant of independence to India as one single unit;
(2) The immediate formation of a provisional interim government responsible to the existing central assembly or a newly elected one (naturally with a 75 per cent Hindu majority);
(3) The provisional government to frame the constitution of India or to set up an authority to frame the constitution after withdrawal of British power;"
(4) This government to draft the treaty and agreements as regards administration of matters of common concern such as foreign affairs, defence, communications, customs, commerce and the like which would be matters for efficient and satisfactory administration under a central authority;

(5) the provisional government to set up a commission to demarcate continuous districts having an absolute Muslim majority. After all these conditions had been complied with, the demarcated areas would be permitted to decide through a plebiscite of all their inhabitants whether they wished to form a separate state. But in any case all matters of vital importance were to be administered by a central authority with a Hindu majority.

Gandhiji called this scheme a partition or division between brothers, but Jinnah, who demanded sovereign Pakistan, declared: "This is not independence. It is a form of provincial autonomy subject always in the most vital matters to an overwhelmingly Hindu federal authority".

Rajaji's formula also came under discussion. Clause 6 was not acceptable to Jinnah, as according to it the power was to be transferred to a Hindu Raj and the coming into existence of Pakistan had to depend on the mercy of Hindustan. Jinnah said that Rajaji had presented the Lahore resolution in the formula in a distorted way. Gandhiji said that he had given it a shape and life. The discussion continued up to September 15. Later, Gandhiji raised the question of Jinnah's two-nation theory and said that there was no indication of it in the Lahore resolution. Therefore, Gandhiji abandon the Rajaji formula and to find a solution in the light of the Lahore Resolution put forward his own formula.

Gandhiji's Proposals

On September 24, 1944, Gandhi ji wrote to Jinnah:-

"Differing from you on the general basis, I can yet recommend to the Congress and the country the acceptance of the claim for separation contained in the Muslim League Resolution of Lahore, 1940, on my basis and on the following terms:-

128. Jinnah-Gandhi Talks (Central Office of the All-India Muslim League, 1944), p. 76.

"(a) The areas should be demarcated by a commission approved by the Congress and the League. The wishes of the inhabitants of the areas demarcated should be ascertained through the votes of the adult population of the areas or through some equivalent method.

(b) If the vote is in favour of separation, it shall be agreed that these areas shall form a separate State as soon as possible after India is free from foreign domination and can, therefore, be constituted into two sovereign independent States.

(c) There shall be a Treaty of Separation which should also provide for the efficient and satisfactory administration of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Communications, Customs, Commerce and the like, which must necessarily continue to be matters of common interest between the contracting parties.

(d) The Treaty shall also contain terms for safeguarding the rights of minorities in the two States".

Jinnah rejected Gandhiji's proposal on September 25, as being 'fundamentally opposed to the Lahore Resolution'. Jinnah said:

"It is impossible to maintain that either of them satisfies any of the essentials embodied in the Lahore Resolution ... These terms are a veritable trap and a slough of death".

Gandhiji requested Jinnah to refer the matter to the League's Council instead of rejecting it at his own and to allow him to address the League's Council, but Jinnah did not agree as some prominent leaders were opposed to the move of Pakistan and wanted a settlement with the Congress. Jinnah insisted for acceptance by the Congress of the following principles:

(1) The Muslims should be recognised as a nation with an inherent right of self-determination;

(2) Pakistan should comprise six provinces, that is, Sindh, Baluchistan, the NWFP, Punjab, Bengal and Assam, subject only to minor territorial adjustments;

(3) Important matters like foreign affairs, defence, internal communications, customs and commerce should not be delegated to the Central Government.

Jinnah's first demand could not be conceded by the Congress because it ran counter to its creed, could give Pakistan a right to interfere

130. *Dawn* (Delhi), October 5, 1944.
in the affairs of India, could undermine the basis of India's existence and could encourage the other groups and communities to emulate the Muslim League.

The second demand was unjustified and the Congress was determined that if Jinnah will have Pakistan it should not include those districts of Assam and Bengal and of Punjab which were predominantly non-Muslim. Jinnah's demand for inclusion of Punjab, Bengal and Assam in the boundaries of Pakistan was quite unjustified, because the Muslim majority in Punjab and Bengal was marginal and in Assam it was non-existent. "Jinnah did not see why non-Muslim populations in these provinces should have a voice in determining their own fate; if there was to be a plebiscite or referendum, it was to be confined to Muslims."

As the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League had admitted the necessity of "territorial readjustments" and the non-Muslim majority districts of Assam, Bengal and Punjab had strong feeling against their inclusion within Pakistan, the Congress was in a bargaining position vis-a-vis the Muslim League. After the breakdown of the talks with Jinnah, whom Gandhiji had started addressing as 'Qaid-e-Azam' (the great leader), 133 Gandhiji proclaimed:

"Where there is an obvious Muslim majority they should have the fullest right to constitute themselves into a separate state. But if it means utterly independent sovereignty, so that there is nothing common between the two, I hold it to be an impossible proposition. Then it means a fight to the knife."

Gandhiji's threat to use knife against the Muslims had a very dangerous repercussion on the Hindu masses and they rose against the Muslims and riots broke out while the country was already in flame. On the other hand, the British Government only enjoyed the scene and were delighted in seeing the two major communities destroying each other and blaming the other for the killing.

With regard to the third demand of Jinnah - the total separation of Pakistan from the rest of India and the elimination of a common centre in any form, the Congress had gone a long way in opposing it. As Jinnah

pressed the Congress to first accept complete partition and then to make agreements on Foreign Affairs etc., the Congress leaders felt no need to make further material concession in order to meet Jinnah's third demand. The Congress cherished the dream of a united India since its very existence, and its acceptance of the partition was the destruction of its dreams and the failure of its struggle. However, there was a universal desire outside the League circle for the unity of India. Thus, if the partition of India was repugnant to the Hindus as they worshipped the map of India, it was also repugnant to those Muslims who did not like the vivisection of their community. Further, the League's demand for Pakistan had encouraged the forces of communal, cultural, linguistic and political separatism for there was also demand of separate homeland for the Sikhs (Khalistan) and Dravidians (Dravidistan) and creation of linguistic provinces, such as, Andhra and Maharashtra, and even the Princes were dreaming of independence. The Congress saw that the establishment of Pakistan would cause disintegration of India.

Further, notwithstanding the Lahore resolution, which envisaged two independent sovereign states with no connexion between them, except probably by treaty, Jinnah demanded only one Pakistan with two wings and he did not agree to the plebiscite and demanded self-determination as a nation the League being the only authority representing the Muslims and the Muslim nation. Gandhiji's argument that India was a big family and it was better if the Hindus and the Muslims of the north-west and the east could settle their problem amicably was instantly objected to by Jinnah, who replied:

"It seems to me that you are labouring under some misconception of the real meaning of the word, "Self-determination". Apart from the inconsistencies and contradictions of the various positions that you have adopted in the course of our correspondence, as indicated above, can you not appreciate our point of view that we claim the right of self-determination as a nation and not as a territorial unit, and that we are entitled to exercise our inherent right as a Muslim nation, which is our birth-right? Whereas you are labouring

134. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, n. 128, p. 577.
under the wrong idea that "Self-determination" means only that of "a territorial unit", which, by the way, is neither demarcated nor defined yet, and there is no union or federal constitution of India in being, functioning as a sovereign Central government. Our is a case of division and carving out two independent sovereign States by way of settlement between two major nations, Hindus and Muslims, and not of severance or secession from any existing union, which is non est in India. The right of self-determination, which we claim, postulates that we are a nation, and as such it would be self-determination of the Muslims, and they alone are entitled to exercise that right).

Gandhiji stated that all the talks and correspondence seemed "to run in parallel lines and never touch one another". He said: "The breakdown is only so called. It is an adjournment sine die". Jinnah said: "We trust that this is not the final end of our efforts".

Gandhiji wrote to Jinnah on September 26, 1944:

"I cannot accept the Lahore Resolution as you want me to, especially when it seeks to introduce in its interpretation theories and claims which I cannot hope to induce India to accept".

In the meanwhile, Jinnah's attitude hardened because he had received message from Feroz Khan Noon that Amery was thinking to grant 40 per cent representation each to the Hindus and the Muslims and 20 per cent to other communities at the Centre. The talk made crystal clear that Congress-League cooperation was not possible at all as the Congress, on the one hand, did not agree to yield to the League's demand for Pakistan, and, the League members, though in minority, were not prepared to live as second-class citizens on the mercy of the Hindu Raj and that for maintenance of their respect, dignity, rights, religion and culture, they were determined to fight to the last breath for creation of Pakistan, a Muslim homeland, under the leadership of Jinnah, while the very extremism of the Muslim League annoyed and alienated many moderate groups and parties and made them closer to the Congress. Despite this, a very sizable population of Muslims in India were swept with a revolutionary

136. V.P. Menon, n. 30, p. 166.
137. Ibid.
138. Gandhi-Jinnah Talks, n. 103; Letter from Gandhi to Jinnah, September 6, 1944, p. 34.
spirit created by speeches of Jinnah and they were almost mad after him. Having such a strong background, Jinnah on October 8, 1944, proclaimed:

"There is only one realistic way of resolving Hindu-Muslim differences. This is to divide India in two sovereign parts, Pakistan and Hindustan".

Jinnah, expressing friendly understanding with the Congress, told a London newspaper correspondent that "Pakistan would resist any aggression on India by a foreign power".

Opinions on Gandhi-Jinnah Talks

Gandhiji's recognition of Jinnah as the only leader of the Muslims and his negotiations for settlement only with him made the Muslim League an important political organization and gave to Jinnah the highest rank of Muslim leadership. As a result all those, who were earlier vacillating in their loyalty, began to support Jinnah and placed him on a footing of virtual equality with Gandhiji. Maulana Azad, the then Congress President, reluctantly commented: "I think Gandhiji's approach to Jinnah on this occasion was a great political blunder. It gave new and added importance to Jinnah which he later exploited to the full". Sapru supported the stand taken by Gandhiji. B.I. Mitter, Advocate General of India, commented: "Jinnah played the part of Hitler and demanded acceptance of Lahore Resolution with no interpretation of it". The Hindu-Mahasabha criticised Gandhiji's offer to Jinnah as it strengthened Jinnah's position. The Sikhs considered the Gandhiji's offer as a sword of Damocles hanging over their heads. Humayun Kabir looked upon the offer as a Himalayan blunder. Azad said it gave added importance to Jinnah.

140. D.C. Gupta, n. 53, p. 245.
143. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, n. 52, p. 93.
145. The Tribune (Lahore), October 2, 1944.
146. Humayun Kabir, n. 47, p. 394.
Yugantar supported Gandhiji's stand and Amrit Bazar Patrika criticised the ever increasing demands of the Muslim League. The Tribune and The Times of India commented that both Gandhiji and Jinnah were responsible for the failure of the talks. The Bombay Chronicle criticised uncooperative attitude of Jinnah. However, it provoked the Hindu and Sikh minorities in Punjab and the Hindus in Bengal. The most bitter criticism came from the Hindu Mahasabha. Savarkar asserted that "the Indian provinces were not the private properties of Gandhiji and Rajaji so that they could make a gift of them to anyone they liked."

Liaqat Ali Khan said that Gandhiji's offer was "a fraud calculated to thwart and frustrate the Muslim demand of Pakistan". Chaudhri Ghulam Abbas charged Gandhiji for his persistence in the spirit of Savarkar. As the majority of the Muslim League were in favour of compromise with Gandhiji, Jinnah was afraid of losing their support, while the League position in Punjab, NWFP and Bengal was not sufficiently strong. Jinnah, however, rejected the Gandhiji's terms of plebiscite, which ensured deprivation to Pakistan of eleven districts in Punjab and twelve district in Bengal including Amritsar and Calcutta.

Lord Wavell concluded that the talks failed as Gandhiji and Jinnah differed completely as to the nature and scope of Pakistan. Bertrand Glancy, the Governor of Punjab, stated that claim for Pakistan was not a viable proposition. Sir H. Twyman, the Governor of U.P. and Berar, said that the talks meant to trap Jinnah into an exhibition of unreasonableness. Gandhiji and Jinnah were poles apart. However, undoubtedly, it proves extraordinary wisdom of Jinnah, who saw in the darkness of cloudy political strife a clear light of second silver spoon of poison administered by Gandhiji to kill the League. Jinnah saved the Muslim

148. Home Poll. 18/10/1944, Press Reports, NAI
149. Ibid.
150. R.C. Majumdar, n. 123, p. 713.
151. Dawn (Delhi), October 31, 1944.
153. Ibid., Vol. V, pp. 63 and 75.
154. Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 1223.
League first from the acceptance of Rajaji's formula and second time from agreeing to Gandhiji's terms. Both the formula and the talk meant establishment of Congress rule after Independence and then a decision about the creation of Pakistan.

The talks had a great reaction on the public mind and they were keenly awaiting the practical outcome. The Congressmen had disapproved of Gandhiji's move but very few of them were in a position to criticize Gandhiji. On the other side, the Muslim Leaguers were jubilant as they had, at last, succeeded in making the Congress accept Jinnah as an equal to Gandhiji. B. Shiva Rao, a correspondent of The Hindu and The Manchester Guardian, and brother of Sir Benegal Rau, who had close contacts with the Indian nationalist leaders, wrote to Khurshed Ben, who was functioning as one of Gandhiji's Secretaries, on December 31, 1944, that the intended forty days fast of Gandhiji would do no good to the country and that he should rather apply his mind for a constitutional settlement.

B. Shiva Rao's Proposal

Shiva Rao wrote also to Khurshed Ben in the letter of December 31, 1944, that Jinnah wants complete separation while Gandhiji was willing to give self-determination to Muslim majority areas and this issue should be settled at the forthcoming general elections and before the elections Gandhiji should set up a small Committee to work out the main principles of Federation Constitution for all India. Giving details of his proposal, Shiva Rao wrote:

"What I would suggest is that this small drafting committee with Sapru as the Chairman should draw up a new list of subjects, a very short federal list, say of six or seven subjects which must be federal (like Defence, Foreign Affairs, Currency, Tariffs etc.) and a concurrent list. There will be no Provincial List according to my plan, all unspecified subjects being left to the Provinces or federating units. Provinces and States will all have to federate in regard to this short list. In regard to the subjects in the concurrent list, it will be open to them to decide if they federate or keep the subjects to themselves. The advantage of this will be that some provinces where the Muslims are not in a majority will want a strong Federal Centre and can federate in regard to a large number of subjects. Muslim provinces can federate only in regard to the minimum federal list and thus enjoy the largest measure of autonomy. There will be provision in respect of the new subjects in course of time".

156. B. Shiva Rao, n. 68, p. 465.
He wrote about the States:

"So far as the States are concerned, the Drafting Committee should lay down certain minimum requirements of administration to which they should conform before being eligible for admission into the Federation. Gandhi has from time to time laid down some of these minimum. The elective principle must of course be recognized."

Regarding the elections, he said:

"My own suggestion is that, when the Drafting Committee has completed its preliminary task, the principles of the new Constitution on these lines should be popularized. The next general elections for the Provinces and the Centre should not be fought by the Congress on party lines. The only question should be whether the candidate accepts Federation of the type proposed by the Committee (and later approved by Gandhi and a few other leaders) or prefers Pakistan of Jinnah's conception. Candidates should be set up for every constituency including Muslims. The question must be taken up whether Muslims want Federation of this type or Jinnah's Pakistan. All this work needs a great deal of planning and organization and Gandhi should think of those lines and not contemplate a fast."

Shiva Rao wanted Khurshed Ben to place the proposal before Gandhiji for his consideration.

Sapru's Formula

In a letter to Sir B.N. Rau, Sapru wrote about the attitude of Gandhiji. Sapru had long interviews with Gandhiji, who showed him his letter to the Viceroy and discussed the whole situation at length with him. About the establishment of national government, Sapru writes of his discussion with Gandhiji as follows:

"I told him that it was hopeless to establish a national government responsible to the Legislature during the war and that therefore he might accept my formula of a national government consisting of representatives of all parties, who would not be liable to be dismissed by the Legislature during the interim period but would technically be responsible to the Crown, which meant that the power of Parliament and the Secretary of State would continue during the interim period."

158. Ibid.
159. Ibid.
160. Ibid.
Gandhiji entertained this proposal at first sight, but in the evening he considered it far from meeting his demand. Gandhi was prepared to agree to the principle of self-determination, but he was not agreeable to go beyond the Rajaji's formula. However, Gandhi was in dead earnest to find a solution of the problems. Further, the Muslim League also rejected it as they recommended joint electorate but not Pakistan.

**Desai-Liaquat Pact**

On the one hand, Gandhi was willing to continue his efforts for a peaceful settlement, and, on the other, the vast and varied sections of the public, party and non-party leaders, Liberals, Hindu Mahasabha, Depressed Classes and the Non-League Muslim Majlis, particularly the newspapers, were urging steps for resolving the deadlock, which was not possible without the release of the Congress leaders, about whom Amery had declared in early January, 1945, in the House of Commons that there was no plan of releasing them. The Government's intention was to force the Congress and the League to settle their differences so that a central government could be established and the Japanese could be driven to their lands. Gandhi was also convinced that the British Government would not grant independence to India unless and until the Congress and the League had reached some accord as to the country's future government and immediate formation of an interim National Government. Therefore, Gandhi advised Sapru and Bhulabhai J. Desai, a constitutional lawyer of great eminence, to continue the talks for settlement. Desai was the leader of the Congress Parliamentary Party in the Central Assembly and also a personal old friend of the Deputy Leader of the Muslim League, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, who was also the General-Secretary of the League since 1937. Desai and Liaquat Ali Khan held a series of discussions and drew the following private and confidential proposals for cooperation between the Congress and the League so as to make the two parties agree to form a coalition government at the centre:

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Draft "Desai-Liaquat Pact"

"The Congress and the League agree that they will join in forming an Interim Government in the Centre. The composition of such Government will be on the following lines:-

(a) An equal number of persons nominated by the Congress and the League in the Central Executive (the persons nominated need not be members of the Central Legislature);

(b) Representatives of minorities (in particular the Scheduled Castes and the Sikhs);

(c) The Commander-in-Chief.

The Draft further explains:

"The Government will be formed and function within the framework of the existing Government of India Act. It is, however, understood that, if the Cabinet cannot get a particular measure passed by the Legislative Assembly, they will not enforce the same by resort to any of the reserve powers of the Governor-General or the Viceroy. This will make them sufficiently independent of the Governor-General.

"It is agreed between the Congress and the League that, if such Interim Government is formed, their first step would be to release the Working Committee members of the Congress.

"The steps by which efforts would be made to achieve this end are at present indicated to take the following course:

On the basis of the understanding, some way should be found to get the Governor-General to make a proposal or a suggestion that he desires an Interim Government to be formed in the Centre on the agreement between the Congress and the League and when the Governor-General invites Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Desai either jointly or separately, the above proposals would be made declaring that they are prepared to join in forming the Government.

"The next step would be to get the withdrawal of Section 93 in the provinces and to form as soon as possible provincial Governments on the lines of a coalition!"

Desai showed this plan to Gandhiji and secured his consent and the Viceroy recommended its adoption to the Secretary of State. The Khan, the League's General Secretary, remained quiet for a considerable time, but when his reply came, it was surprisingly an outright rejection of the proposals. The Nawabzada said to Desai that the proposals can be made a basis for discussion and whatever he told was his "personal opinion"
However, the pact furnished a basis for Wavell's Offer. Later, the Pact was repudiated by the Congress leaders also as a result, Desai, like Rajaji, made an exit from the political stage.

Liaquat Ali Khan, however, had placed the proposals before Jinnah, who declared:

"We are willing and ready to sit down and come to a settlement with the Hindu Nation on the basis of a division of India. Otherwise it is not possible to make any progress. It is immaterial whether I do to Mr. Gandhi or he comes to me".

On the fifth anniversary of the Lahore resolution, Jinnah said:

"It is not possible to believe that any Musalman, who has got the slightest of self-respect and iota of pride left in him, can tolerate a Ministry in a Muslim majority province, which takes orders from and is subject to the control of Mr. Gandhi at Sevagram or the Congress who are deadly opponents to all Muslim aspirations and their national demands".

While Desai negotiated with Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, Sapru called a Non-Party Conference in Delhi on November 19, 1944, and appointed a Non-Party Conciliation Committee to go through the various problems of the partition of India. The Committee recommended a single union of India. The report was closer to the Congress demand but did not find favourable response from the Muslim League besides the Muslim press started its scathing criticism.

The Congress-League conflict affected the League, which began to lose grounds in the States. In February, 1945, the League Ministry in Sind, led by Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, was defeated. He formed new ministry on March 14. On March 12, League Ministry in NWFP was defeated.

168. Ibid.
and Dr. Khan Sahib, leader of Congress Party, invited to form a new government. On March 28, Nazimuddin's ministry in Bengal was defeated and the Viceroy took over the administration under Section 93. In Assam Sir Mahomed Saadullah formed coalition cabinet with Gopinath Bardolai, the Congress leader.

Meanwhile, the War in Europe came to an end on May 7, 1945, when the Germans laid down arms and the Indian and overseas politics moved in a different direction as a result the proposal was left over. Thus, an attempt to solve the constitutional deadlock died a premature death. It may be pointed out that the Desai-Iiaquat Pact had made it an essential objective to get the Congressmen released immediately. The imprisonment of the Congress leaders and the harsh attitude of the British government against their release drew the attention of the world politicians, thinkers and philosophers. Bertrand Russell, the famous philosopher urged Britain to "Quit India" after the end of the Japanese war. Bernard Shaw, the noted novelist and writer, considered the VE-Day as a mockery of the victory celebration in Europe as millions of people were then subjected to tyranny, injustice and exploitation. Public opinion in the United States also was demanding that the Indian deadlock should be resolved, as the Japanese were still holding Singapore and Indonesia and Truman's advisers visualised that cooperation of India would make significant contribution to Allied operations against Japan from the Indian soil. There was every likelihood of revitalisation of Japan and even ninety days after surrender of Germany there was no certainty that the Allied forces would crush the Japanese up to their land. Thus, the international pressures, persuasions and appeals forced Churchill to reconsider his attitude towards India.

CONCLUSION

The Congress-League antagonism grew more and more intense. Gandhiji did not care if there was a civil war. The Hindu-Muslim distrust turned into violent riots. The Congress attempted to reconcile with the League proposing the interim government to be entrusted to Jinnah and maximum powers to the federal provinces, but Jinnah disagreed. On the other hand, there was no sign of the end of the War in Europe and the British Government was willing for settlement of the communal problems for establishing an interim government. Wavell criticising the Quit India
Movement emphasised for the unity of India. Jinnah criticised the Nivell declaration. Gandhi-Jinnah talks involved the Rajagopalachari's formula, but no settlement could be reached. Besides other proposals, Desai-Liaquat formula also could not bring the two parties to a point of agreement. The Muslim League persisted for the creation of Pakistan.