CHAPTER III

PAKISTAN RESOLUTION
(1940)

Although the idea of Pakistan was taking shape in the Muslim majority states, East Bengal, NWFP, Sind and Punjab, amongst proselytized Muslim aristocrats and educated men, a large majority of Muslims supporting the Congress had denounced Jinnah's demand for a Muslim homeland. After the Lucknow session of the League (April, 1936), Jinnah won favour of Sikandar Hyat Khan, leader of the Unionist Party and premier of Punjab, and on October 17, 1937, at the League Lucknow session declared the League's creed changed from "full Responsible Government" to "full Independence" and resolved as follows:

"Resolved that the object of the All-India Muslim League shall be the establishment in India of full Independence in the form of a federation of free democratic states in which the rights and interests of the Muslims and other Minorities are adequately and effectively safeguarded in the Constitution".

The Muslim League emphatically disapproved the federal scheme of the Government put forth in the 1935 Act, and also opposed the Congress plan of a 'constituent assembly', describing these "detrimental to the interests ... of the Muslims in particular", as Mehrotra rightly observed, the "League rank and file were pressing for it". He does not write that the whole of Muslim India was pressing for it because there was a large number of Muslims in the Congress fold also.

Jinnah and other speakers "breathed fire and sword against the Congress and the Hindus" and "accused the British of aiding the Congress in its design of establishing Hindu raj and perpetrating 'atrocities' on the Muslims". They "denied that India was a nation and talked of

2. The Leader (Allahabad), October 20, 1937. No definite conclusion was reached on the question of an alternative to federation.
establishing 'Muslim raj' in opposition to 'Hindu raj'.

Dr. Mahmudullah Jun' wrote:

"The doctrine of aloofness was preached ad nauseam in a most unrestricted and irresponsible language. Out of the clouds of circumlocution and confusion arose the cry of Islam in danger. The Muslims were told that they were disunited and were about to be crucified by the Hindus ... In the name of Muslim solidarity, Mr. Jinnah wants to divide India into Muslim India and Hindu India".

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru reacted sharply. He commented:

"The League and its supporters stand clearly and definitely today for the division of India, even on the political and economic planes, into religious groups. Whatever it may be, it is the antithesis of the nationalist idea of the unity of India. It is a reduction to absurdity of modern life and its problems. It is mediaevalism in excelsis".

Evidently, the division of India, emphasised above, had become as common as the independence itself. The root of the growing differences goes deep in the soil of political achievement endeavoured by the Hindus and the Muslims sacrificing others interest followed by accusations and manipulation of charges against each other. The confidential report on the Political Situation for the first half of November, 1939, relating to Bengal, says that the Congress and Hindu papers had been denouncing Jinnah for his "intransigence" and "constantly expanding demands" and proclaiming the problem of minorities as "entirely factitious".

Jinnah toured the whole of India to propagate the League's stand. The Hindu-Muslim antagonism culminated into riots during Holi and Moharram in 1938, and Jinnah's letter of October 9, 1938, at last, closed all doors of a settlement and the rupture grew wider and wider. Gandhiji also failed to win over Jinnah. These circumstances, inevitably, led to the clear demand of Pakistan by the Muslim League in Lahore on October 10, 1938.

However, the enthusiasm for demand of a Muslim Homeland became

4. Ibid.
5. The Pioneer (Allahabad), November 7, 1937.
6. Ibid., October 19, 1937.
7. Mss - National Archives of India, Government of India (First half of November, 1937).
parallel to fanaticism as the Muslim League leaders lost all brain to talk in parliamentary terms. At the Sind MI Conference held at Karachi in October, 1938, which was presided over by Jinnah, the leaders delivered fiery speeches, which was sufficient to excite the mostly innocent and illiterate Muslim audience against the Congress and the Hindus. Shaukat Ali remarked: "If the Congress will not allow the Muslim League to have ministries in the four provinces where the Muslims are in a majority, vagabonds like me will run amuck". Jinnah, accusing the Congress of attempting to divide the Muslims, warned: "This will result in India being divided". Sir Abdulla Haroon, the Chairman of the Reception Committee of the Conference, spoke of "an independent federation of Muslim States".

Farzul Haq was cheered by the audience when he said, "If Muhammad bin Qasim, an eight year old lad, with 18 soldiers could conquer Sindh then surely nine crores of Muslims can conquer the whole of India". Sheikh Abdul Majid threatened that if the Muslims were not granted their rights, they would "fall back upon the 'Pakistan scheme', and that 'nothing would prevent Muslims, from Karachi to Calcutta, to march to their own self-determination". The Muslim League, analysing the sins of the Congress and the Hindus, tabled the following resolution on October 10, 1938:-

"The Sindh Provincial Muslim League Conference considers it absolutely essential in the interests of an abiding peace of the vast Indian continent and in the interests of unhampered cultural development, the economic and social betterment and political self-determination of the two nations, known as Hindus and Muslims, that India may be divided into two federations, namely, the federation of Muslim States and the federation of non-Muslim States.

"The Conference therefore recommends to the All-India Muslim League to devise a scheme of constitution under which Muslim-majority provinces, Muslim Indian States and areas inhabited by a majority of Muslims may attain full independence in the form of a federation of their own with permission to admit any other Muslim State beyond the Indian frontiers to join the federation and with such safeguards for non-Muslim minorities as may be conceded to the Muslim minorities in the non-Muslim Federation of India".

8. The Leader (Allahabad), October 11, 1938.
9. Ibid.
10. The Times of India (Bombay), October 10, 1938.
11. Ibid., October 11, 1938. In fact he had with him 6000 cavalry and camel troops each and 3000 camels for transport.
12. The Statesman (Calcutta), October 12, 1938.
13. Ibid., October 11, 1938. See also The Times of India (Bombay), October 5 and 10, 1938; A.H. Albiruni, Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India (Lahore: Shaikh Mohammed Ashraf, 1950), p. 218.
It is very much felt that the Muslim League spokes so vehemently that the Hindu population got completely distracted from the federal scheme, as the Pakistan scheme claimed the area from Karachi to Calcutta. The outcome is traced by some to the orthodoxy of the Congress, which did not concede the League demand of forming coalition ministries in the Muslim minority states. It is contended that Jawaharlal Nehru accepted Jinnah's scheme for Muslim states and the Hindu states with a weak centre, there was no harm to the country, as the federal system adopted by other countries like the USSR, USA and Switzerland has proved workable. In fact, the Congress and the League leaders wanted a country purely dominated by them so that their religion, culture and language could flourish without any conflict with the others. Further, as has been pointed out earlier protagonists of Congress-League raporochment assume genuine urge on the part of Congress-League to come together for and in a free country. These postulates appear to be non-existent in real politic of the country and so one can never be sure that any coalition could have a "fair chance of being tried in this country.

In December, 1938, the AIMI Patna session reiterated the opposition to the Federal scheme and authorised Jinnah to explore a suitable alternative scheme "which would safeguard the interests of the Muslims". On March 26, 1939, the MI Working Committee appointed a committee, headed by Jinnah, to examine and report on the various draft schemes, "already expounded by those who are fully versed in the constitutional development of India and other countries and those that may be submitted hereafter to the President and report to the Working Committee their conclusions at an early date".

In March, 1939, the Muslim League appointed a small committee to submit report on various constitutional schemes. Until August, 1939, there were only two schemes those of Muhammad Iqbal and Rahmat Ali. Two League leaders, Syed Abdul Latif and Sir Mohammed Shah Nawaz Khan, drew up schemes for a separate state for the Musulmans. Two other schemes devised

15. The Pioneer (Allahabad), March 28, 1939.
by Sikandar Hyat Khan and a joint scheme of Sayyid Zafrul Hasan and Muhammad Afzal Husain Qadri were put forward for consideration of the Committee. The ML Working Committee examined the "several schemes in the field including that of dividing the country into Muslim and Hindu India", but yet the League had not finally come to a conclusion in favour of devising a scheme of its own for separation of India. But as the schemes were not acceptable to the Congress, the last efforts for settlement, inevitably, failed and Jinnah, very seriously began to think over the possibility of creation of a separate sovereign Pakistan exclusively for the Muslims. Rahmat Ali proclaimed in enthusiasm: "We are Muslem, not Hindu, Pakistani, not Hindustani, and Asian, not Indian". He spoke of a federation of three Muslim majority states viz, Pakistan (Punjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan), Bang-i-Islam (Bengal and Assam), and Usmanistan (Hyderabad and Deccan). He wrote:

"For this alone would set the final seal at our separation from India, inspire the Millat and impress the world as nothing else would".

Evidently, the demand for Pakistan had become a major issue during the first half of 1939, and all the leaders had been thinking about the possibility of creation of Pakistan, which continued to widen the gulf between the Congress and the League.

Muslim Organizations

Besides the All-India Muslim League, there were a number of Muslim organizations playing their role in different parts of the country. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind, founded by Maulana Mahmud-ul-Hasan in 1919, was a group of conservative ulema, with its headquarters in Delhi and the Deoband School was the centre of its activities. The Jamiat formed the

20. Ibid., p. 185.
Azad Muslim Conference against the League. The Ahrars, a combination of lower middle-class Muslims, was operative in Punjab with aggressive outlook. The Mominis, especially in the eastern U.P., consisted of the weavers, who were not well-organized. The Shiis, a religious group of Lucknow, supported the joint electorates for all. The Kisans of Bengal organized the Krishak Sabha. All these organizations opposed the Muslim League and the League's demand for Pakistan. However, they joined the Azad Muslim Conference for the safeguards of Muslim interests in India.

Non-Muslim Organizations

There existed a number of political and politico-religious organizations with varied aims and objectives, which fomented differences between different groups of politicians and peoples, whose path was separate but the goal of independence and after was the same. The Forward Bloc, founded by Subhas Chandra Bose in July, 1939, when he resigned in protest from the Congress Presidency due to differences with Gandhites on the question of sanction of Satyagraha to be adopted by the Provincial Congress Committees concerned, was a radical and progressive party. It was not a purely Hindu organization as it included Muslim volunteers also. However, the Bloc brought the entire left-wing under its banner.

The Communist Party of India, banned by the Government, was working underground. M.N. Roy, who had escaped any how from India in 1915, went to Java and contacted with German agents. In 1917, he met Lenin, who put him on the Executive Committee of the Communist International. After the victory of Stalin, he went to Germany in 1929, and returned to India and was imprisoned for six years. After his release, disgusted with the Congress policies, Roy became a staunch critic of Gandhi and Nehru. In 1934, the Congress Socialist Party (CSP) was formed, which, favouring the British War aims and opposing the Congress, added to the disruptive


tendencies within the national movement. The Kisan Party was more radical with positive action. All these parties were causing weakness to the Congress and national movement, but there was most importantly the Hindu Mahasabha which was playing no less important a role in poisoning the stream of Indian politics. The Mahasabha emphasised Hinduism, Hindutva and Hindudom. Its President, V.D. Savarkar, at the annual session of the Hindu Mahasabha, declared the aim of the organization as maintenance, protection and promotion of the Hindu race, Hindu culture and Hindu civilization and the advancement of the glory of Hindu rashtra. The President called upon the Hindus to boycott the Congress and not to vote for the Congress candidates in the elections. There was also the Arya Samaj, which emphasised Hindu Raj, Hindu culture and Hindu civilisation. The Arya Samaj was a response to Muslim fanaticism. The Samaj launched a satyagraha against the Nizam of Hyderabad in protest of atrocities against the Hindus. This move was supported by the Hindu Mahasabha and the Congress could not keep itself alienated from the connivance, which encouraged the Hindus so much so that they proved themselves no less fanatic than the Muslims. Baldev observed: "There should be no trace of Muslims in India; there should be Hindu raj. We have to secure the throne of Nizam within six months." Further, the demand of making Hindi as the lingua franca of India assured the Muslims that the Congress rule would "prevent the progress of Urdu language and obliterate the religious traditions and cultures of Musalman", as a result they began to go out of the Congress fold. Jinnah concluded that the salvation of the Muslims lay only "in getting rid of the Hindu majority".

The Hindus, Sikhs and even the Christians had realized that there were essential differences between the Hindu and Muslim outlooks of life and, hence, the Britons urged that future constitutional and other developments in India should be decided ensuring the consent of both the communities. But it was opposed by the Hindus and the Sikhs, who urged that "the League claim that the Muslims formed a nation separate from the other Indian communities was fallacious and that, in spite of different religions, all Indians formed one single nation and therefore the League case for a

separate State for the Muslims was untenable.  

Congress and League Towards the War Aims

On September 3, 1939, the war broke out between Britain and Germany. Soon the world was divided into two military blocs. Germany occupied Luxembourg, Belgium, Holland and France in quick succession and attacked England on August 8, 1940. The British Dominions and India also joined the fight.

Soon after the War was declared on September 3, the Viceroy declared that "India was at war" and began to despatch Indian troops to Singapore and the Middle East for the defence of the British Empire and designed a number of Ordinances "to equip the Indian bureaucracy with stringent powers to suppress "internal disorder" as also took steps to amend the 1935 Act so as to concentrate all powers of the Provincial Government into the hands of the Central Government. Jinnah realised that, in the state of war, the Congress ministries in the Provinces, would not last long. Therefore, he adopted the policy of appeasement with the Government, assuring cooperation of Muslim India the British needed, and, in return, hoping British assistance in dissolution of the Congress Ministries in the Provinces. Jinnah, thus, aimed to level grounds for the League's culmination to power.

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in his Presidential Address in April, 1936, at the Congress Lucknow Session had said: "Every war waged by imperialist powers will be an imperialist war whatever the excuses put forward; therefore, we must keep out of it". Later, the Congress made it clear that "India cannot fight for freedom unless she herself is free". The AICC Session at Tripuri in March, 1939, seeing the dark clouds of war rising in the West and exploitation of Indian resources, had vehemently opposed the British foreign policies "culminating in the Munich Pact, the Anglo-Italian Agreement and the recognition of rebel Spain" and "constantly" helping the Fascist Powers "in the destruction of democratic countries". Strongly opposing the "Imperialism and Fascism alike", the Congress urged

that the "world peace and progress required the ending of both of these".

On September 5, 1939, Gandhiji expressed his own sympathy with England and France and broke down at the very possibility of the destruction of London. He offered unconditional support to Britain. Jinnah also did not lack in palating the Government. On September 7, 1939, Jinnah expressed his sympathy for Poland, Britain and France and declared that Great Britain may prosecute the war successfully taking the Muslim India into confidence through the All-India Muslim League. The League Working Committee declared that "real Muslim cooperation and support to Britain in this hour of trial could not be secured successfully if H.M.'s Government and His Excellency the Viceroy were unable to secure to Muslims "justice and fairplay" in the Congress-governed Provinces.

At the Wardha CWC meeting, which met on September 8-14, 1939, Jawaharlal Nehru, on September 8, declared: "We do not approach the problem with a view to taking advantage of Britain's difficulties ... I should like India to play her full part and throw all her resources into the struggle for a new order". Nehru had, actually, adopted the policy of appeasement to Britain in view of the Jinnah's statement of September 7. Both aimed to win favour of the British Government for perpetuating their provincial control. But Subhas Chandra Bose stressed to launch freedom struggle at once to make use of the weak position of the Allies in the War, while the Germans had threatened to burn England. Bose said that the Congress "since 1927, repeatedly declared that India should not cooperate in Britain's war, and that the Congress should now put that policy into practice", as a result the Gandhi Wing gave up the idea of cooperation with the British war-aims altogether, as Bose said that if the Congress would not agree, the Forward Bloc would do so. However, the Congress on September 14, taking a grave view of the Viceroy's steps, resolved that "The issue of peace and war must be decided by the Indian

33. Subhas Chandra Bose, n. 23, p. 340. See also R.C. Majumdar, n. 29, p. 625.
people" and they cannot "permit their resources to be exploited for imperialist ends". The Congress also resolved that if the war was "to defend the status quo, imperialist possessions, colonies, vested interests and privileges, then Indian can have nothing to do with it. If, however, the issue is democracy and a world order based on democracy, then India is intensely interested in it". The Congress also resolved that if Britain was fighting "for the maintenance and extension of democracy, then she must necessarily end imperialism in her own possessions and establish full democracy in India". The Resolution also demanded right to the Indians for framing their own constitution without any external interference, and asked the London Government to declare their war aims "in regard to democracy and imperialism" and how those aims were going to apply to India and to be given effect to in the present.

It may be pointed out that Subhas Chandra Bose was, perhaps, pondering over the possibility of gaining military and financial assistance from the Axis Powers to overthrow the British yoke from India by force. Anticipating the very small army in India to be left by the British during the War, Subhas Bose's proposal seems to be very radical and convincing. He did not like to beg but to take his right with might. This was the very idea that led to the formation of the Azad Hind Army. Had his proposal prohibiting the recruitment of Indians to British army was accepted the British would have been reduced really ineffective and, perhaps, defeated and India might have become independent much earlier.

However, the CWC resolution of September 14, 1939, was endorsed by the AICC on October 9, 1939, demanding an independent country, democracy and the principle of "self-determination of dependent peoples".

On the other hand, the Muslim League was closely watching the reaction of the Congress Working Committee at Wardha. They happily noted that the Congress had refused to cooperate with the British war-aims in view of the past bitter experience at the close of the First World War, when Great Britain had assured to grant self-determination to the Indians. The Congress did not want to be befuddled again. The Muslim League took all

35. Ibid.
these in view and formulated its own resolution demanding such thing that may be effectively obtained in its interest and the British may also find better to accede to it. The British Government, realising the fact that the Congress would not lend any assistance, felt that if the Muslim League, which had the huge Muslim following, would also go against. They also viewed with danger the opposition of various Hindu organisation to the British war-aims. Therefore, the Government took the way of appeasement to the Muslim League to satisfy their own objectives. The Muslim League, taking advantage of the British appeasement posture, raised a resolution on the situation created by the war; at the Lahore Conference on September 18, 1939, that "no assurances must be given as to the constitutional advance nor any new constitution framed without the consent and approval of the League - the only organization that can speak on behalf of Muslim India". R.C. Majumdar writes that the League promised support to the British only on two conditions: "First, the Muslims must be assured of "justice and fair-play" in the Congress provinces. Secondly, the British Government must give an undertaking, "that no declaration regarding the question of constitutional advance for India should be made without the consent and approval of the All-India Muslim League, nor any constitution be framed and finally adopted by His Majesty's Government and the British Parliament without such consent and approval". Further the Government was asked "to take into its confidence the Muslim League which is the only organization that can speak on behalf of Muslim India". Notwithstanding the fact that the Viceroy on October 17, 1939, "accepted, at least implicitly, the League's claim to speak for the Muslims of India", the questions of provincial ministries and the demand for Pakistan were not shelved, in view of many grievances of Muslims in the Congress ministries. But it is noteworthy that when the CWC invited Jinnah to state the grievances against the Congress ministries, the latter rebuffed the gesture.

It was an atmosphere of divergence of opinion on war-aims. All the parties had their own views, policies and programmes. On September 10, 1939,

37. Ibid., Vol. V, p. 163.
38. R.C. Majumdar, n. 29, p. 626.
the Hindu Mahasabha had declared that it was a matter of "common concern to the British Government as well as Indians" to defend the country from foreign attack and that in order to have "effective" cooperation of the Hindus, the Government should introduce responsible government at the centre and revise the Communal Award. "The National Liberal Federation and Hindu Mahasabha offered unconditional support to the Government ...". However, other organizations, such as, the Liberation Federation and the All-India Christian Conference extended their full support to the British war aims unreservedly. The Indian States were solidly behind the Government and Rabindra Nath Tagore also favoured their stand. As the Congress was mitigated by the Hindu Mahasabha since the last decades, it may be said that the Congress was being fed back by the revivalists of Hinduism, whose main aim was to cause a setback to the Muslims and the Muslim League. They thought that if the British perpetuated their dominance in India, the power would one day be transferred to the Hindus being in majority and if they were defeated and left the country, the Hindus would be able to capture Delhi by force. Jinnah had also realised this danger and that is why he came forward to help the British war-aims so that the British could transfer power safeguarding the Muslim interests or even by vivisecting the country.

Gandhiji, Dr. Rajendra Prasad and Jinnah met the Viceroy to discuss the Government plan to expand the Executive Council. In the discussion, the Congress members refused to cooperate till the British "accepted the CWC viewpoint" of September 14, 1939. On the other hand, Jinnah emphasised that the British Government and the Congress should recognise the League as "the sole representative body of the Indian Muslims". Due to severe differences amongst the three parties – the Viceroy, the Congress and the League, the talk failed and it resulted in the resignation of the Congress ministries and Jinnah's observing the "Day of Deliverance".

Zetland's Desiderata

Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, prepared a memorandum

41. R.C. Majumdar, n. 29, p. 624.
43. Ibid.
It is significant that only two nations (Hindus and Muslims) are emphasised in this statement, ignoring other communities like Christians, Sikhs and Parsis. The obvious inference is that the British were only keen to pronound the viewpoint of the minority which was acting as an impediment to the Congress movement.

On February 3, 1940, Linlithgow said to Sikandar Hyat Khan that the position of Muslims, as maintained by Jinnah, was "unhelpful" and "static to a dangerous degree". Fazlul Haq, explaining the position of Muslims, assured him of his entire loyalty and support to the Government saying: "He was a Muslim first, always and his duty to his community was one which he could not at any stage forget". He complained also that the case of Muslims was not fully and properly considered either in India or in England and assured that he would not enlist support of the Congress but expressed willingness to join the Congress ministry. Referring the Muslim position, he said:

"The Muslims were in the constant difficulty of being on the defensive. They could not recommend any recession from the present position in regard to constitutional advance or publicly reject the principle of Home Rule or Dominion Status".

Linlithgow advised Fazlul Haq and Sikandar Hyat Khan that "so long the Muslims adopted a negative attitude and unconstructive policy, it would be very difficult to make it understood in Great Britain, the United States and even in this country". Therefore, Linlithgow advised them to follow a positive attitude preparing a positive scheme or an alternative scheme for the benefit of Muslims. Such encouragements directly contributed to and resulted into the demand for Pakistan by the Muslim League.

Linlithgow, the Viceroy, had encouraged Jinnah to adopt a positive attitude i.e. positive alternative in favour of the Muslims alone, defining

49. Enclosure 2 to letter dated January 30, 1940. Note of a conversation between Linlithgow and Sikandar Hyat Khan at Delhi on January 25, 1940; Linlithgow Collection, NAI
50. Uma Kaura, n. 44, p.146.
51. Note of a conversation between Linlithgow and Sikandar Hyat Khan and Fazlul Haq, February 14, 1940; Linlithgow Collection, NAT
52. Uma Kaura, n. 44, p. 147.
future constitution of India, but Jinnah expressed his inability to present in detail "the considered opinion of his colleagues and himself on this very important subject" and pleaded for some time to frame his response. It reveals that though Linlithgow encouraged Jinnah to present an alternative scheme to the federal scheme envisaged in the 1935 Act, Jinnah was not eager to give details. Linlithgow insisted that negative policy would do harm to the Muslim League and wrote to Jinnah:

"If he and his friends wanted to secure that the Muslim case should not go by default in the United Kingdom, it was really essential that they should formulate their plan in the near future. At the risk of wearying him I was bound to repeat what I had often said before that I was convinced that it was quite useless to appeal for support in Great Britain for a party whose policy was one of sheer negation".

Jinnah replied that he would "make public at any rate the outlines of their position in time to enable him to explain the Muslim position in Great Britain and in India", and found this opportunity at the meeting of the Council of AIMI on February 25, 1940, where he, appealing to the Muslims to organise themselves and to convey the message of the League to every Muslim, said:

"People ask me what is our goal ... The whole question is very simple. Great Britain wants to rule India. Mr. Gandhi and the Congress want to rule India and the Mussalmans. We say that we will not let either the British or Mr. Gandhi rule the Musalmans. We want to be free".

The role of the British colonial rulers in prompting the separatist stance of the AIMI is quite evident. As for the acquiescence of the League leadership, it was clearly a situation in which they were in an extremely happy position to ask for a free Muslim state with support and patronage of colonial power guaranteed without virtually and conditions imposed. The tragedy, apparently of this whole episode, lay in the inevitable turmoil and violence that both the Muslims and the Hindus masses were to undergo in the event of partition. In as much as the Muslim League, on the bidding of the British rulers, readily agreed

53. Note of an interview between Linlithgow and Jinnah, Enclosure 3 to letter dated February 6, 1940, from Linlithgow to Zetland, Linlithgow Collection, NAI
54. Uma Kaura, n. 44, p. 149.
to precipitate this situation, perhaps the blame can be laid more at their door. But the guilt of the Congress which all the time claimed to be the custodian of the interests of the Indian masses including the Muslims can nevertheless be mitigated. Their impatience in dealing with this manoeuvre was just a negation of Gandhian strategy of compassion, love and tolerance. On the issue of the partition both AIML and INC appeared to be operating from the same pedestal and level of response. Hence, the disillusionment of Maulana Azad in his memoirs.

Congress Ramgarh Session, 1940

In the same week, after the Lahore AIML Session, at the Congress Session held at Ramgarh on March 19-20, 1940, Maulana Azad reiterated the Congress view:

"It was India's historic destiny that many human races and cultures and religions should flow to her, finding a home in her hospitable soil, and many a caravan should find rest here ... One of the last of these caravans, following the footsteps of its predecessors, was that of the followers of Islam. This came here and settled here for good. This led to a meeting of the culture-currents of two different races. Like the Ganga and Jumna, they flowed for a while through separate courses, but nature's immutable law brought them together and joined them in sangam. This fusion was a notable event in history ... Eleven hundred years of common history have enriched India with our common achievements. Our language, our poetry, our literature, our culture, our art, our dress, our manners and customs, the innumerable happenings of our daily life, everything bears the stamp of our joint endeavour. This joint wealth is the heritage of our common nationality and we do not want to leave it and go back to the time when this joint life had not begun ... The cast has now been moulded and destiny has set its seal upon it. Whether we like it or not, we have now become an Indian nation, united and indivisible. No fantasy or artificial scheming to separate and divide can break this unity. We must accept the logic of fact and history and engage ourselves in the fashioning of our future destiny".

It is apparent that Jinnah, as a shrewed politician, aimed to take advantage of the growing rift between the Congress and the Government. Further, the Day of Deliverance had created a new gulf between the Congress and the Muslim League. After the dissolution of the Congress ministries, the League took over the seats and gained power. Jinnah strengthened the League's position under the shadow of the slogan, "Islam

56. The Leader (Allahabad), March 21, 1940.
in danger" and realised that settlement between the Congress and the League was impossible and, hence, determined to work for achieving Pakistan, a separate homeland for Muslims, which would be free for their development without any interference of the Hindus.

**AIMI Lahore Session, 1940**

By the end of 1938-39, Syed Abdul Iatif, Khaliquzzaman, Sikandar Hyat Khan, Professor Syed Zafrul Hasan, Mohammad Afzal Musain Qadri and Sir Abdullah Haroon put forward proposals for the reorganization of the country on the basis of federation, confederation or vivisection, which were considered by the Conference of the All-India Muslim League held at Lahore on March 22-24, 1940. Jinnah, propounding the two-nation theory and in the typical tradition of a brilliant lawyer arguing his point, said:

"Notwithstanding a thousand years of close contact, these nationalities are as divergent today as ever, and they cannot at any time be expected to transform themselves into one nation merely by means of subjecting them to a democratic constitution and holding them forcibly together by the unnatural and artificial methods of British Parliamentary statutes".

On March 23, 1940, Jinnah red out the resolution:

"... the scheme of Federation embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, is totally unsuited to, and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India.

"... Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is reconsidered de novo and that no revised plan would be acceptable to the Muslims unless it is framed with their approval and consent.

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57. See for details Jinnah's Speech, Appendix IV.
Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim league that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, viz. that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the north-western and eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute "Independent State" in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.

"That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them and in other parts of India where the Mussalmans are in a minority adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them".

The Session also authorised the Working Committee of the AIML "to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary." 61

To understand the implications of the words used in the resolution and to highlight the argumentative and conflicting stance which the whole issue of partition was fact-assuming, it seems worthwhile to quote below the questions raised by Gandhiji and replied by Jinnah in 1944:-

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<th>Gandhiji's Questions</th>
<th>Jinnah's Answers</th>
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<td>1.</td>
<td>Pakistan is not in the resolution. Does it bear the original meaning - the Punjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan, out of which the name was mnemonically formed? If not, what is it?</td>
<td>Yes, the word &quot;Pakistan&quot; is not mentioned in the resolution, and it does not bear the original meaning. The word has now become synonymous with the Lahore resolution.</td>
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63. Letter from M.A. Jinnah to M.K. Gandhi, September 17, 1944, in Gandhi-Jinnah Talks, Ibid., pp. 16-18; L.A. Sherwani, n. 61, pp. 78-79.
2. Is the goal of Pakistan pan-Islam?

This point does not arise, but still I reply that the question is a mere bogey.

3. What is that distinguishes an Indian Muslim from every other Indian, if not his religion? Is he different from a Turk or an Arab?

This point is covered by my answer that the Mussalmans of India are a nation. As to the last para of your query, it is hardly relevant to the matter of clarification of the resolution.

4. What is the connotation of the word "Muslim" in the resolution under discussion? Does it mean the Muslims of the India of geography or of the Pakistan to be?

Surely you know what the word 'Muslim' means.

5. Is the resolution addressed to Muslims by way of education, or to the inhabitants of the whole of India by way of appeal, or to the foreign rulers as an ultimatum?

This point does not arise by way of clarification of the text of the Lahore resolution.

6. Are the constituents in the two zones to constitute 'independent States', an undefined number in each zone?

No. They will form units of Pakistan.

7. Is the demarcation to take place during the pendency of the British rule?

As soon as the basis and the principles embodied in the Lahore resolution are accepted, the question of demarcation will have to be taken up immediately.

8. If the answer to the last question is in the affirmative, the proposal must be accepted first by Britain and then imposed upon India, not evolved from within the free will of the people of India!!!

In view of my reply to (7) your question (8) has been answered.

9. Have you examined the position and satisfied yourself that these 'independent State' will be materially and otherwise benefitted by being split up into fragments?

Does not relate to clarification.

10. Please satisfy me that these independent sovereign States will not become a collection of poor States, a menace to themselves and to the rest of India.

My answer to (9) covers this point.
11. Pray show me the facts and figures or otherwise how far independence and welfare of India as a whole can be brought about by the acceptance of the resolution? Does not arise out of the clarification of the resolution. Surely this is not asking for clarification of the resolution. I have in numerous speeches of mine and the Muslim League in its resolutions have pointed out that this is the only solution of India's problem and the road to achieve freedom and independence of the people of India.

12. How are Muslims under the Princes to be disposed of as a result of this scheme? "Muslims under the Princes". The Lahore resolution is only confined to British India. This question does not arise out of the clarification of the resolution.

13. What is your definition of 'minorities'? The definition of 'minorities'. You yourself have often said "minorities" means "accepted minorities".

14. Will you please define the "adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards" for minorities referred to in the second part of the resolution? The adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards for minorities referred to in the resolution are a matter for negotiation and settlement with the minorities in the respective States, viz. Pakistan and Hindustan.

15. Do you not see that the Lahore resolution contains only a bare statement of the objective and does not give any idea as to the means to be adopted for the execution of the idea and the concrete corollaries thereof? It does give basic principles and when they are accepted, then the details will have to be worked out by the contracting parties.

For instance:

(a) Are the people in the regions falling under the plan to have any voice in the matter of separation and, if so, how is it to be ascertained? Does not arise by way of clarification.

(b) What is the provision for defence and similar matters of common concern contemplated in the Lahore resolution? Does not arise by way of clarification.

(c) There are many groups of Muslims who have continuously expressed dissent from the policy of the League. While I am prepared to accept the
preponderating influence and position of the League and have approached you for that very reason, is it not our joint duty to remove their doubts and carry them with us by making them feel that they and their supporters have not been practically disfranchised?

(d) Does this not lead again to placing the resolution of the League before the people of the zones concerned as a whole for acceptance?

No; see answer (c)

Final paragraph

"As I write this letter and imagine the working of the resolution in practice, I see nothing but ruin for the whole of India ...".

... you have already passed your judgment when you say, "As I write this letter and imagine the working of the resolution in practice, I see nothing but ruin for the whole of India".

However, the resolution asserted the demand for Pakistan leaving behind and rendering redundant all problems of separate electorates, composite cabinets, reservation of posts etc.

M.A. Jinnah's Two-Nation Theory

Jinnah, in his presidential speech, analysing the Hindu-Muslim differences, said that it was "not of an intercommunal character, but manifestly of an international one" and he suggested, "it must be treated as such". He anticipated that, in the presence of Hindu-Muslim differences, "any constitution that may be built will result in disaster and will prove destructive". Therefore, deciding that the differences cannot be settled, he conclusively said that "If the British Government are really in earnest and sincere to secure peace and happiness of the people of this sub-continent, the only course open to us all is to allow the major nations separate homelands by dividing India into 'autonomous national states'. These words reveal the spirit that Jinnah sincerely longed for Pakistan not for enemity between Hindus and the Muslims, but dejectedly

since the Hindu-Muslim differences could not be settled. One might add that on this point of inevitability of partition the League and the Congress viewpoints appeared to converge. Jinnah also expressed himself on the advantages of vivisection. He said:

"On the other hand, the rivalry and the natural desire and efforts on the part of one to dominate the social order and establish political supremacy over the other in the government of the country will disappear. It will lead more towards natural goodwill by international pacts between them, and they can live in complete harmony with their neighbours. This will lead further to a friendly settlement all the more easily with regard to minorities by reciprocal arrangements and adjustments between Muslim India and Hindu India, which will far more adequately and effectively safeguard the rights and interests of Muslims and various other minorities".

Jinnah, in view of the prejudicial statements and reactions of Hindus, asserted that "our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism". He justified that as the Hindus have "different and distinct social orders ... it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality". He said that "this misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of most of our troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time". Still Jinnah wanted to settle the Hindu-Muslim problems by revising notions against each other. He had in mind the Hindu-Muslim relations during the past when they lived like brethren. Justifying his view of two-nation theory, which protracted the demand for a separate Muslim homeland, he gave a long statement:

"The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literature. They neither inter-marry, nor interdine together and indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Mussalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, their heroes are different, and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the

65. L.A. Sherwani, n. 61, p. 24.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
other and, likewise their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state".

Supporting his idea of India's division, Jinnah recalls the examples of Balkan Peninsula which "comprises as many as 7 or 8 sovereign states. Likewise, the Portuguese and the Spanish stand divided in the Iberian Peninsula". He observed that the then state of India was "artificial" and was "maintained by the British bayonet". He expressed his fears that "the termination of the British regime ... will be the herald of the entire break up with a worse disaster than has ever taken place during the last one thousand years under the Muslims". Assessing the constitutional development in view of the Hindu-Muslim differences, he said:

"Muslim India cannot accept any constitution which must necessarily result in a Hindu majority government. Hindus and Muslims brought together under a democratic system forced upon the minorities can only mean Hindu Raj. We have had ample experience of the working of the provincial constitution during the last two and a half years and any repetition of such a government must lead to civil war and raising private armies as recommended by Mr. Gandhi to Hindus of Sukkur when he said that they must defend themselves violently or non-violently, blow for blow, and if they could not, they must migrate".

Here Jinnah has advocated the reason of demand for Pakistan based on the assumption that there would be Hindu Raj leading to civil war. However, Gandhiji's provocation to Hindus for "blow for blow" otherwise they should "migrate" had very much encouraged the Hindu Mahasabha, who weaved a long net of riots and conspiracies resulting in the assassination of Gandhiji's himself.

Jinnah tried to remove the misunderstanding of the Congress, which proclaimed the Muslims in India a minority. Jinnah claimed that "Mussalmans are not a minority as it is commonly known and understood ... Mussalmans are a nation according to any definition of a nation and they

70. Ibid.
71. Ibid., pp. 24-25.
72. Ibid., p. 25.
must have their homelands, their territory and their state. We wish to live ... as a free and independent people ... in consonance with our own ideals and according to the genius of our people...".

A.K. Fazlul Haq on the Lahore Resolution

The Bengal Premier, Moulvi Fazlul Haq, while moving the resolution, said that the "idea of federation must not only be postponed, but abandoned". He emphasised that "Muslims of India would not consent to any scheme which was framed without their approval. To them only that constitution would be acceptable as was framed from the Muslim point of view", otherwise it would be unworkable. He hoped that the framers of the future constitution would consider also the Muslim feelings. He said that they "constituted 80 millions scattered all over India" and "were in a weak position numerically in almost every province of India". He characterised Azad's presidential address as "un-Islamic". The Maulana had said that "Muslims should not feel nervous: 80 millions was not a small number and they need not be afraid".

Choudhry Khaliquzzaman on the Lahore Resolution

The MLA and leader of the Opposition Party in the U.P. Legislative Assembly, Ch. Khaliquzzaman, laid responsibility of the disastrous proposal: firstly, on the Government, "who in order to exploit the Indians declared that India was one nation and started the majority and minority question"; secondly, on the Congress, which gave a realisation to the Muslims that "their existence was in danger and, if they wanted to maintain their identity, they must struggle for it"; and, thirdly, on those Muslims, "who tried to split the ranks of the Muslims by setting up rival organizations or joining the Congress or other non-Muslim political parties". Criticising Azad's advice that Muslims should not demand separation since they were strong enough to defend themselves, Khaliquzzaman said: "if

73. Summary of Speech made by A.K. Fazul Haq, as reproduced in All-India Muslim League, Lahore Session, 1940, 'Presidential Address by M.A. Jinnah', (Nawabzada) Liaquat Ali Khan, n. 60, pp. 30-32. Also see S.S.Pirzada, n.60, pp. 337-38. See also Radical Humanist (Calcutta-12: 15, Bankim Chatterjee Road), p. 196. The Journal later shifted to New Delhi in March, 1940.

74. Summary of Speech made by A.K.Fazlul Haq, Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.
the issue between the Hindus and Muslims was to be decided by means of the sword, the Muslims had no fear. They did not need 9 crores to settle it. As it was, the issue depended on votes". Assuring the Muslims in minority provinces, he clarified that, "Muslims in the minority provinces should not be afraid as to what would happen to them after the partition of India into "Hindu India" and "Muslim India". The same thing would happen to them as to the minorities in the Punjab and Bengal".

K.K. Aziz on the Lahore Resolution

Searching the cause for the demand of Pakistan, K.K. Aziz said that it was "a proof of the desperate apprehension with which Muslims regarded the prospect of Hindu domination". He opined that "Had the Congress formed coalitions in the provinces the already existing fissiparous tendencies might have been prevented from spreading". "All the assumptions, he further said, "on which the Muslim acceptance of the 1935 constitution had been based were destroyed by the working of provincial autonomy in the Hindu provinces. The Hindu demand for a constituent assembly to draw up a constitution for all India proved the last straw". Analysing the cause of differences he said, "If the Hindus wanted a strong centre and were not prepared to compromise on it, the Muslims did not want a centre at all. If the Hindus believed in the rule of the majority, the Muslims denied that they were a minority". Assuring the Muslims left in India after the alleged partition, he stated that "Pakistan would not only safeguard the Muslims left behind in India (on the principle of 'mutual retaliation') but also give self-respect to those who lived within the boundaries of Pakistan".

Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan on the Lahore Resolution

Explaining the Lahore resolution on March 11, 1941, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan said: "... When that resolution was passed it was termed the Lahore resolution; the word Pakistan was not used at the League meeting and this term was not applied to the League resolution by anybody until


the Hindu press had a brain-wave and dubbed it Pakistan. They have sown the wind and must now reap the whirlwind.\(^7\) Admitting the authorship of the proposal, he said that the resolution which he drafted was radically amended by the Working Committee eliminating the part which related to the "Centre and co-ordination of the activities of the various units ... It must be taken as the official resolution of the Muslim League which was ratified by the Muslim League ...". He expressed his conviction that "the future destiny of India lies in accepting a position of freedom within the British Commonwealth". Proposing the solution of the constitutional problem, he reiterated:--

"Under my scheme every unit will enjoy complete autonomy in its internal affairs. It is fortunate that the population of India is so distributed in the various units that in four out of the eleven British Indian provinces Muslims are in the majority, though in two of these they have just a bare majority--while in the remaining seven provinces Hindus are in the majority ... it provides the fullest opportunity and scope to the two major communities, within their respective territorial spheres to exercise and enjoy the rights of a majority, subject, of course, to the rights and privileges of the minorities. If we accept this principle, which to my mind is a rational principle, then all those difficulties which are of our own making, and which obstruct our constitutional progress, will disappear as if by a magic wand".

Considering the Muslim acceptance of the proposal, he says:--

"At the same time they are willing to concede—and they cannot reasonably deny to the Hindus what they claim for themselves as a just right—the same rights and privileges to the Hindus in the provinces in which they happen to be the majority community ... Since the Hindus will benefit from this proposal in seven out of eleven provinces, why should they grudge the same facilities and privileges to the Muslims in the four Muslim majority provinces?"

He also thought of the fear that "if the provinces are not free and autonomous, there will always be a danger of undue and unwarranted interference from the Centre which will be dominated by the Hindus. He further anticipated that a "Central Government with a Hindu majority would use its authority and influence to strengthen the position of Hindu


\(^8\) Ibid.

\(^8\) Ibid.
provinces in the political, economic, social and cultural fields at the expense of the Muslim majority provinces on the one hand, while on the other they would try to undermine the authority and position of the latter by unnecessary interference and unjust restrictions and obstructions". However, as its solution, Sir Sikandar recommended as follows:

"I say, give complete autonomy and freedom to the units and let them be demarcated into regions or zones on a territorial basis. Representatives of the units within each zone should represent their respective units as also the region at the Centre. The Centre constituted will not be a domineering hostile Centre looking for opportunities to interfere with the work of provincial Governments, but a sympathetic agency enjoying the confidence and support of the provinces - ".

Sir Hassan Suhrawardy on the Lahore Resolution

In his opinion, "Mr. Jinnah envisages the course followed in the evolution of the Union of the Commonwealth of Australia and that of the Dominion of Canada. The Muslim States will first function as separate and independent units in the British Commonwealth of Nations, and, if and when found feasible, confederate as equal partners by mutual consent with other parts of India and with other Dominions". Discussing the nature of Pakistan to be a symbol of certain facts and progress, he says that "It is by no means an aggressive movement against any community or political party. If anything, it is a protective and defensive movement; its root causes lie in the social injustice and selfish exclusiveness of that great evil, the caste system of the Hindus".

Suhrawardy highlighted the position of Punjab also. Counting the total Sikh population in India as 5.7 millions and that of the Muslims 94-1/4 millions; and the total Sikh population in Punjab as 03-3/4 millions and Muslim 16-1/4 millions out of total population of 28-1/2 millions, he observed that "most of the Sikhs of the Punjab live in the area south-east of a line following the Sutlej River up to Ferozepore, and from there the railway line passing by Amritsar and Gurdaspur to the

82. Ibid.

River Ravi". He further indicates that "there has been antagonism between the Muslims and the Sikhs" and, therefore, "if after careful consideration the Sikh community are not satisfied that, with the constitution of the North-West Dominion under the Pakistan scheme, their present influential position in the Punjab and in the whole of India will be much improved, they could form an enclave to include the majority of the Sikh population, and by treaty rights safeguard the interests of the minority living outside the enclave".

The opinions of eminent Muslims in different states may be instanced also. Maulana Zafar Ali Khan said that during his association with the Congress he experienced that the Congress was not anxious for freedom but wanted to suppress the minorities, and that the Congress had achieved its strength with the help of the Muslim League (during association of Gandhiji with the Ali Brothers and Maulana Abdul Bari in the Khilafat movement). Sardar Aurangzeb Khan, Leader of the Opposition in the Frontier Assembly, thanked the Muslims living in minority provinces for their support to the League, which meant freedom for six crores of Muslims. Sir Abdullah Haroon, M.L.A., Central Province, said that "if the Hindus did not treat the Muslims fairly, the latter would treat the Hindus in the same way as Hitler treated the Sudetans". Abdul Hamid Khan, a Muslim Leader of Madras, said that two and a half years Congress rule had been instrumental for awakening the Muslims and consolidating the League. Mohammed Alam, who was an eminent leader of the Congress in Punjab and an admirer of Gandhiji, "blamed the Congress and said that it simply aimed at establishing Hindu Raj within British India".

Nationalist Muslims on the Lahore Resolution

The nationalist Muslims criticised the League's demand for a separate homeland. Begum Abdul Aziz, President, Nationalist Muslim Women's Association, characterized the scheme as mischievous, impracticable and against the Islamic principles. Azad Muslim Conference, which comprised various nationalist groups, such as, "Jamiat-ul-Ulema, All-India Organisation of Muslim Divines and Scholars, Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam, the Independent

85. Sandhya Chaudhri, n. 58, p. 54.
87. The Tribune (Lahore), March 29, 1940.
Party of Bihar, the Krisha Praja Party of Bengal, the All-India Momin Conference, the Anjuman-e-Natan of Baluchistan and the Central Standing Committee of All-India Shia Conference condemned the partition plan and did not recognize the claim of the League to be the only representative of all Muslims in India.

Khan Bahadur Allah Bux, the Sind Premier, said:

"A majority of the Ninety million Indian Muslims who were descendants of the earlier inhabitants of India were in no sense other than sons of the soil. He characterised the Pakistan scheme as harmful and fantastic and ... that it sought to create another Palestine under British mandate".

He exhorted the Muslims to "live like brothers in a joint family". Maulana Abul Kalam Azad described the partition scheme as "meaningless and absurd". Maulvi Abdul Majid, presiding over the U.P. Azad Muslim Political Conference, on July 28, 1940, repudiating the Pakistan demand said: "No power on earth can deprive the Muslims of their religion, culture and other rights if they themselves are determined to stand on their own legs". Sir Habibur Rahman, President, All-Bengal Krishak Praja Party, remarked: "If Pakistan means Muslim Raj, I will have nothing to do with it". He further said: "... the Muslim majority provinces of India namely the Punjab, the Frontier, Sind and Bengal etc., had now openly turned down the Pakistan scheme of Jinnah" and "the proposal was not only absurd, chimerical and visionary but also would remain for ever a castle in the air ... The Indians, both Hindus and Muslims, live in a common Motherland, use the offshoots of a common language and literature, and are proud of the noble heritage of a common Hindu and Muslim culture, developed through centuries of residence in a common land. There is no one among Hindus and Muslims who will be prepared to sacrifice all this in order to accept what is demanded by MrJinnah". Khan Abdul Qaiyum declared that "the Frontier Province will resist the partition of India with its blood".

88. Sandhya Chaudhri, n. 58, p. 54.
90. The Hindu (Madras), April 8, 1940.
91. The Tribune (Lahore), July 21, 1940.
92. The Hindu (Madras), April 4, 1940.
93. Ibid.
94. The Tribune (Lahore), September 11, 1940.
Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah rejected the idea of Pakistan outright.95

M.K. Gandhi on the Lahore Resolution

Gandhiji disclosed his mind in Harijan on April 6, 1940:—

"I know no non-violent method of compelling the obedience of eight crores of Muslims to the will of the rest of India, however powerful a majority the rest may represent. The Muslims must have the same right of self-determination that the rest of India has. We are at present a joint family. Any member may claim a division".

Rejecting the two nations' theory of Jinnah, Gandhiji wrote in the same issue of Harijan:—

"The 'two nations' theory' is an untruth. The vast majority of Muslims of India are converts to Islam or are the descendants of converts. They did not become a separate nation, as soon as they became converts. A Bengali Muslim speaks the same tongue that a Bengali Hindu does, eats the same food and has the same amusements, as his Hindu neighbour. They dress alike. I have often found it difficult to distinguish by outward sign, between a Bengali Hindu and a Bengali Muslim. The same phenomenon is observable more or less in the South among the poor who constitute the masses of India ...".

In reply to a statement of Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, Gandhiji wrote on April 13, 1940:—

"As a man of non-violence, I cannot forcibly resist the proposed partition, if the Muslims of India really insist upon it. But I never can be a willing party to the vivisection. I would employ every nonviolent means to prevent it. For it means the undoing of centuries of work done by numberless Hindus and Muslims to live together as one nation. Partition means a patent untruth".

Gandhiji was against the two-nation theory. He wrote:—

95. The Hindu (Madras), April 17, 1940.
97. Ibid.
98. From reply to the statement of Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, see Harijan (Ahmedabad), April 13, 1940, as reproduced in D.G. Tendulkar, n. 96, pp. 271-72.
99. Ibid.
"My whole soul rebels against the idea that Hinduism and Islam represent two antagonistic cultures and doctrines. To assent to such a doctrine is for me denial of God. For I believe with my whole soul that the God of the Koran is also the God of the Gita, and that we are all, no matter by what name designated, children of the same God. I must rebel against the idea that millions of Indians who were Hindus the other day changed their nationality on adopting Islam as their religion.

"But that is my belief, I cannot trust it down the throats of the Muslims who think that they are a different nation. I refuse, however, to believe that the eight crores of Muslims will say that they have nothing in common with their Hindu and other brethren. Their mind can only be known by a referendum made to them duly on that clear issue. The contemplated constituent assembly can easily decide the question. Naturally on an issue as this, there can be no arbitration. It is purely a matter of self-determination. I know of no other conclusive method of ascertaining the mind of the eight crores of Muslims".

Gandhiji, who was deeply pained and perturbed at these proposals, wrote in the Harijan:

"I cannot think in terms of narrow Hinduism or narrow Islam. I am wholly uninterested in a patchwork solution. India is a big country, a big nation composed of different cultures, which are tending to blend with one another, each complementing the rest. I must wait for the completion of the process. I must wait. It may not be in my day. I should love to die in the faith that it must come in the fullness of time...Pakistan cannot be worse than the foreign domination. I have lived under the latter, though not willingly. If God so desires it, I may have to become a helpless witness to the undoing of my dream. But I do not believe that the Muslims want to dismember India.

"The partition proposal has altered the face of the Hindu-Muslim problem. I have called it an untruth. There can be no compromise with it. At the same time I have said that, if the eight crores of Muslims desire it, no power on earth can prevent it, notwithstanding opposition, violent or non-violent. It cannot come by honourable compromise".

Gandhiji further wrote:

"... if the Congress loses hope and faith and comes to the conclusion that it must surrender its original position for the purpose of getting a common measure of agreement, it will cease to be the power it is. Today, it is the sheet-anchor of India's hope and faith. It will be well for it, if it refused to move away from its moorings, whether it is in a minority or a majority".

100. The Statesman (Calcutta), May 5, 1940.
101. Ibid., June 6, 1940.
Jawaharlal Nehru on the Lahore Resolution

Jawaharlal Nehru, at a speech in Allahabad, categorically rejecting the Lahore proposals, said:-

"We will have nothing to do with this mad scheme. This whole problem has taken a new complexion and there is no question of settlement or negotiations".

However, he felt relief especially at the thought that the League had come out with clear terms and open decision. Therefore, Jawaharlal Nehru, instead of expressing grief, was happy to say:-

"... he was pleased, not because he liked it - on the contrary he considered it to be the most insane suggestion - but because it very much simplified the problem, they were now able to get rid of the demands about proportionate representation in legislatures, services, cabinets, etc.... (He) asserted that if people wanted such things, as suggested by the Muslim League at Lahore, then one thing was clear, they and people like him could not live together in India. He would be prepared to face all consequences of it but he would not be prepared to live with such people".

At other occasion Nehru said:-

"Many knots of the Hindu-Muslim problem had been merged into one knot, which could not be unravelled by ordinary methods, but would need an operation ... he would say one thing very frankly that he had begun to consider them (Muslim Leaguers) and people like himself, as separate nations".

Jawaharlal Nehru, expressing his least anxiety wrote of the resolution as "Jinnah's fantastic proposals" reading it as a cat's paw of British imperial duplicity.

Dr. Rajendra Prasad on the Lahore Resolution

Admitting that the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, the Jamiat-ul-Mominin, the Ahrars, the Nationalist Muslim organizations, the All-India Shia Conference

102. The Tribune (Lahore), April 14, 1940. See also The Leader (Allahabad), April 15, 1940.

103. Ibid.

104. The Leader (Allahabad), April 16, 1940.

and others "expressed their opposition to separation". Dr. Rajendra Prasad made it clear that "the Hindus and the Sikhs have declared their unequivocal determination to resist partition. This is bound to become more pronounced and more bitter with the persistence with which the proposal for division is pressed. It is difficult to forecast what shape this conflict may take in the future". He was sure that the "Distrust which is the basis of the proposal is bound to grow and any hope that after separation things will settle down and the independent states will soon become friendly will have been built on sand". Explaining the position of minorities, he said:-

"For the minorities it will veritably be a case of jumping from the frying pan into the fire. The non-Muslim minorities will have the situation forced upon them, if the proposal succeeds. But the Muslim minority will have chosen it, worked for it and extorted it from the non-Muslims and could not blame any one else for it".

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar on the Lahore Resolution

He asserted that an integral India will never be an organic whole. "India may in name be continued to be known as one country but in reality it will be two separate countries - Pakistan and Hindustan - joined together by a forced and artificial union". Assessing the impact of the Jinnah's two-nation theory, he said:-

"The two-nation theory will not leave room even for the growth of that sentimental desire for unity. The spread of that virus of dualism in the body politic must some day create a mentality which is sure to call for a life and death struggle for the dissolution of this forced union".

He anticipated that if India will not be divided, the continued union will go on sapping her vitality, loosening its cohesion, weakening its hold on the love and faith of her people and preventing the use, if not retarding the growth, of its moral and material resources. India will

106. Dr. Rajendra Prasad, India Divided (Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1946), pp. 320-320A.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
be an anaemic and sickly state, ineffective, a living corpse, dead though not buried". He opined that "if this forced union continues there will be no political advance for India unless it is accompanied by Communal Settlement". He said also that in case of a federation, there will be a need of a third party to appeal to in cases of dispute with sufficient armed forces to see that the settlement is not broken. The prestige of this assessment is amazing. Ambedkar appeared to be the only statesman who could assess the future course and incidentally the future logic of Indian leadership which led to emergence of a mental preparedness for partition.

Chimanlal H. Setalvad on the Pakistan Demand

Setalvad in plain words held the Congress responsible for the demand of Pakistan by the Muslim League. He says:

"The real parentage of the Pakistan movement can be traced to the Congress who by the wrong way in which they handled the communal question and by their behaviour when they were in power, created the great distrust in the minds of the Muslim community which has driven them to advocate Pakistan. In the beginning, Congress leaders said that there was no communal problem in India and if there was, it could be settled after India got Independence, forgetting that for the very purpose of getting Independence, communal unity was essential. There is the tragic perversity which the Congress displayed when they assumed office under the Act of 1935. When the Congress won at the elections in Bombay, they pretended, when forming the ministry, to provide for minority representation. For that purpose, they made a Muslim member of the Assembly sign the Congress pledge on one day and made him minister the next day. This was indeed a travesty of Muslim representation when that Muslim minister had not the confidence of the 22 Muslim League members of the Bombay Legislative Assembly. They dealt unjustly with the Muslim community and made them hostile..."

M.R. Jayakar on the Lahore Resolution

Jayakar, speaking at the Tilak Anniversary on August 1, 1940, regarding the Lahore Resolution, said:-

"Its technique is very skillful and astute, and is primarily intended to create panic amongst the Hindu community in the hope that in the panicky condition, the Hindus would surrender more and more rights in order to avoid the advent of Pakistan".

111. Ibid.
113. Jayakar Papers, File No. 711, NAI
On another occasion, in a public meeting, Jayakar said: "The remedy for India was not vivisection, but was greater fraternisation and mutual understanding."

However, the Congress leaders decided to secure political freedom of India as early as possible preserving the political unity of as large a part of the country as possible and their cherished ideals and left the Muslim League for giving up or pursuing its demand of a separate homeland.

The Sikhs on the Lahore Resolution

Sardar Ujjal Singh, Parliamentary Secretary to Government of Punjab, said that "Khalsa would resist attempts to divide India" and Master Tara Singh, at the UP Sikh Conference held at Lucknow on April 15, 1940, warned, "If the Muslim League wants to establish Pakistan, they will have to pass through an ocean of Sikh blood". Speaking at Karachi on April 12, 1941, Master Tara Singh said:

"I do not share the view of those who say that Pakistan is impracticable. We are opposed to Pakistan because its very conception is based on extreme communal considerations, because its aim is not the protection of Muslims but their domination over the minorities, because it is conceived in the interest of one community and not in the interest of the minorities, because it creates ever-fighting divisions of the country. The Pakistan scheme aims at Muslim domination in certain parts of the country. This mentality of domination is so bad that its result can only be chaos and anarchy. If we think we, Hindus and Muslims, cannot unite on any basis whatsoever, let us then frankly say that we are unfit for swaraj and agree to foreign rule."

The Civil and Military Gazette

An article (the author has not given the name) embodies the following interesting lines:

114. The Statesman (Calcutta), August 15, 1941. See also The Hindu (Madras), August 15, 1941.
115. The Tribune (Lahore), April 16, 1940.
116. From Speech at Karachi, The Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), April 13, 1941.
117. Gazette of Lahore (Lahore), November 18, 1941.
"The proposal of vivisection of the country can offer no solution of the communal problem, for minorities and majorities are bound to remain in Pakistan scheme, unless it is followed by an exchange of populations. In that case every community should have its sovereign State. Taken to its logical conclusion, the Pakistan idea will lead to the establishment of hundreds of small warring states, which will become an easy prey to an ambitious foreign invader. History will then repeat itself. Muslims should therefore think seriously about the danger of the scheme which they seem to have evolved in a fit of anger or desperation".

British Attitude to the Demand for Pakistan

A few Britons believed that India could be governed as one and indivisible by their brown successors. "To many Britons in India, who found the Congress either incomprehensible or irritating, the demand for Pakistan appeared to be a condign punishment to the Congress for its impudence in asking the British to quit India. They regarded the partition of India as inevitable and not entirely unwelcome".

Jim Masselos, a scholar of Indian nationalism, observed that "the Muslim League Resolution was not widely accepted seriously even by Muslim intellectuals and leaders, much less by middle class and masses". Hugh Tinker says: "Some British officials welcomed this (Pakistan) plan as means of checkmating Congress demands".

J.P. Griffiths on the Pakistan Scheme

Echoing the work of the British officials for building a united India, Griffiths says that "The demand for Pakistan is largely akin to that cry of "Islam in danger" which has never yet failed to rouse the Moslem to action". He argued that "For many Moslems today the demand for Pakistan is connected with one of their deepest emotions; it has become a cry from the heart, which will not be gainsaid". Supporting this idea, he quotes Guy Hint: "Among Moslem youth - at least among the urban classes - there is developing one of those romantic, turbulent movements which have been among the great driving forces of human history". He concludes that

118. S.R. Mehrotra, n. 3, p. 211.
the demand for Pakistan "is a movement which may well destroy irreparably the British conception of a united India".

**L.S. Amery on Indian Unity and Division**

Amery sees that there was a fundamental geographical, racial and political unity, which made them a nation to defend their country from time to time in her history. I wished at that time that "if some sort of Indian unity had not existed it would have to be invented". Expressing his apprehension, he says: "If India were broken up and reverted to chaos tomorrow, Indians would have to set about trying to invent for her at any rate some minimum unity against the dangers from outside".

**Lord Linlithgow on Peace and Welfare**

The Viceroy on August 8, 1940, made it public that the Government "could not contemplate the transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any system of government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life". Speaking on December 17, 1942, the Viceroy, emphasising the importance of geographical unity of India, said: "I would judge it to be as important as it ever was in the past, nay more important, that we should seek to conserve that unity in so far as it may be built up consistently with full justice for the rights and the legitimate claims of the minorities, whether those minorities be great or small".

**Lord Wavell on Indian Unity**

Lord Wavell in an address in Calcutta on February 17, 1944, gave instances of England and Ireland, Canada, Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Switzerland and the Soviet Union, having federal agreements, which operate satisfactorily. He infers that "two communities and even two

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nations can make arrangements to live together in spite of differing cultures or religions".

Sir Reginald Coupland on Centre and Provinces

Coupland finds the Centre's composition more difficult. He observed:

"The Moslems, it seems certain, would prefer no Centre, whatever the material results might be, to one which constitutes in any shape or degree a Hindu Raj".

Referring to the statement of Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, he said:

"The moslems claim to be a separate nation, and, as such, entitled, if asked to share in an all-India Centre, to fifty percent of all its organs, legislative, executive and judicial. If, however, the shape of the constitution is such as to reassure them that there would be no room for the domination of one community by another, they might be willing to abate, to some extent, their claim to a fifty per cent share".

Press Reports on Lahore Resolution

Commenting on the Lahore Resolution, the Statesman wrote:

"Partition, we have to recognize, is becoming a live issue. If India receives Dominion Status partition seems the inevitable result in view of the attitude which the Muslim community appears disposed to adopt. If that really represents their position neither the Congress nor the Hindu Mahasabha would be able to hold them. There would probably be fighting, but in any case there would be partition. The situation would be further complicated by other facts. The Congress resolution repudiates association with Great Britain and aims at severing economic links, and the most vocal section of the Congress, the Leftists, demand a new economic orientation and affiliation with Soviet economy, while the Rightists are in economics purely reactionary and talk of reversion to the spinning wheel, and village economy to replace national industry. The Muslims on the other hand propose that their independent Northern and Eastern federation shall be permanently allied with Great Britain and free from fads either about the spinning
wheel or the dictatorship of the proletariat. Actually at the back of their minds is probably the intention of making an easy meal of the other half of India, while it is busy with the quarrel between the spinners and the Marxists, and establishing an Islamic empire to be a glory of the modern world.

The Manchester Guardian wrote: "Mr. Jinnah has re-established the region of chaos in India". Amrita Bazar Patrika considered the Lahore Resolution an 'absurd scheme'. Advance observed:

"The child, Mr. Jinnah has begotten, is already dead, still he hugs it if only he can thereby spite the Congress by proclaiming to the world the disunity between the Hindus and the Muslims in India".

Rozana Hind commented that "Mr. Jinnah is an enemy of Indian freedom". The Nagpur Times wrote: "The two-nation theory advanced by Jinnah was the crown and culmination of the communalistic attitude so elaborately built up by the one time ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity". The Leader commented: "Mr. Jinnah's remedy is worse than the disease and that it will tend to create Sudetenland all over the country". Bharat observed: "There is bulk of conflict but no effort for unity, there are instructions to how slavery may be perpetuated but there is no hint as to how freedom may be achieved".

The Intelligence Reports from Bombay informed the Government that Jinnah's Presidential Address at Lahore Session was severely criticised by all except three pro-League Muslim papers. His scheme was characterised as "... impracticable and disastrous to the people of India including the Muslims themselves since it strike at the very root of national unity of India".

129. The Manchester Guardian (Manchester), April 12, 1940.
130. Sandhya Chaudhri, n. 58, p. 57.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid.
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid.
137. Home Poll, 18.3.1940, Fortnightly Reports for Second Half of March, 1940, NAI
Needless to emphasize that Jinnah was honoured and greeted with the slogan of 'Qaid-e-Azam Zindabad' and a song: "Millat ka Pasban hai Muhammad Ali Jinnah" (Jinnah is the protector of national unity) was sung in his presence, which reveals that in spite of the large scale criticism, he had considerable number of followers.

Despite massive pervasive press comments, Jinnah persisted in his demand for Pakistan, because he was backed by Muirhead, the Under-Secretary of State, and Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, who said to Khaliquzzaman and Abdul Rahman Siddiqi, in March, 1939, that "the British would ultimately concede partition". Further, Jinnah had taken the Viceroy into his confidence, who "informed him that he could not possibly agree to the demands of Mr. Gandhi". The motive behind the proposal for creation of Pakistan seems to lay in Jinnah's anxiety for attaining a title of the Father of Pakistan like Mahatma Gandhi as the Father of the Nation in India. The proverb comes true that "Two beggars can sleep under one rug, but two kings cannot live in one country" (Saadi Sheerazi). Jinnah thought that he could not live in supremacy vis-a-vis Gandhiji in a united India; therefore, he propounded Pakistan for the Muslim majority provinces, while the Muslims in other parts of India preferred to live in India and opposed the Lahore resolution. The same proverb comes true in case of Nehru. While Gandhiji felt grief and tried his best to have settlement with Jinnah, Nehru felt a sense of relief in the demand for Pakistan, which he appeared to accept, in an ambiguous expression. The demand was Jinnah's last straw and if they wanted settlement, there was a very easy scheme i.e. reservation of seats in the Centre and the States according to population much like the Lucknow Pact, which was almost agreed upon by all the parties. But, later, the Nehru Constitution created antagonism, which could not be settled under the pressure of the Hindu Mahasabha and, subsequently, the 1935 Act was implemented, which was followed by the Lahore Resolution envisaging a separate Muslim homeland. They knew that "it would not bring peace but sword. The Muslims in India would raise the cry for oppression at the hands of the Hindus and the Hindus in Pakistan would raise a similar cry, and there would be retaliatory wars. Instead of peace and harmony there would be aggression.

139. Ibid., p. 234.
of one state against the other and the sub-continent would for ever
remain exposed to third-party intervention. The creation of Pakistan
would be detrimental even to the best interests of the Muslims, for it
would permanently divide and weaken them.

Gandhiji's statements impressed a great majority of people - the
Hindu and Muslim masses alike as they were wedded to democracy and
non-violence. The Pakistan idea was favoured by ten per cent of Muslim
population comprising only the landed groups and the Ashrafs, who, as
we have seen earlier, were the important elements in the Muslim League
and were opposed by the third element, the Momins etc. As the first and
the second elements were less numerous, Jinnah was not very confident
to secure a decisive verdict in favour of Pakistan, but hoped that the
two elements, being in power, would dominate over the third element,
which was in majority, by using their personal influence. But the Viceroy's
and Amery's statements of August, 1940, tilted the opinion of most of
the Muslims in favour of the demand.

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The Viceroy said:

"It goes without saying that they (His Majesty's Government
could not contemplate the transfer of their present
responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any
system of government whose authority is directly denied by
large and powerful elements in the Indian national life
nor could be a party to the coercion of such elements into
submission to such a government".

Amery, encouraging the Pakistan proposal, said:

"The foremost among these elements stands the great Muslim
community, ninety million strong and constituting a majority
both in north-western and north-eastern India, but scattered
as a minority over the whole sub-continent. In religious
and social outlook, in historic tradition and culture, the
difference between them and their Hindu fellow countrymen
goes as deep, if not deeper than any similar difference
in Europe".

The British policy was to encourage the Muslim League so as to
extract help in their war efforts. With this view, Linlithgow wrote to

Zetland:

141. Ibid., pp. 167-68.
142. Ibid., p. 168.
143. From Viceroy to Secretary of State, April 6, 1940, Linlithgow
Collection, Microfilm No. 16, NAI.
"My first reaction is, I confess, that silly as the Muslim scheme for partition is, it would be a pity to throw too much cold water on it at the moment, though clearly, one cannot accept it or associate ourselves with it."

He reaffirmed it more elaborately in a subsequent telegram to Zetland:

"It remains as important as ever that the fullest weight should be given to the Muslim position when their assistance and support is so essential to us both from the military point of view (as they provided at the moment 60 per cent of the army) and because of possible reaction in other Muslim countries."

The Viceroy, Linlithgow, however, felt that the scheme was more a bargaining counter. He wrote to Zetland:

"Jinnah has put forward the scheme in order to show that the Muslims have a constructive scheme of their own; to offset the extreme Congress claims to independence and the contention that the Congress is the mouthpiece of India; and that a constituent assembly on the basis of adult suffrage is the only machinery for deciding future progress."

The Secretary of State, Zetland, considered the scheme practically void. He mentioned it in a telegram to the Viceroy:

"I wonder whether Jinnah has ever contemplated that the resources of their North-West unit would find the revenue for any army that could hold the frontier against Afghanistan, let alone Russia, and how does he contemplate North-West India and Bengal working together. Pakistan would mean the beginning of endless civil war in India."

At the CWC meeting in April, 1942, C. Rajagopalachari openly accepted the demand for Pakistan of the Muslim League, but as no other member supported him, he resigned and propagated the acceptance of Pakistan, which strengthened the claim of the League, and, in due course, the country was partitioned.

144. Telegram No. 930-S, from Viceroy to Secretary of State, June 10, 1940, p. 156, NAI. Also see Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, June 30, 1940, p. 192, NAI.

145. Telegram No. 517-S, from Viceroy to Secretary of State, April 6, 1940, p. 85, NAI

146. Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, December 13, 1940, Microfilm No. 7, p. 245, NAI
The Madras annual session of the Muslim League was held in April, 1941. The League amended its constitution and adopted the Lahore resolution with slight amendments as one of the aims and objectives of the All-India Muslim League and in the year to come, Pakistan became the goal of the Muslim League.

CONCLUSION

The Congress aimed to retain unity of India, but the Muslim League, being encouraged by the British policy of 'Divide et Impera' began to think over the idea of partition of the country. Iqbal's idea of a Muslim homeland within India and Rahmat Ali's idea of a separate homeland strengthened the belief of the Muslim League in this regard. They opposed the Federal Scheme envisaged in the 1935 Act, which could provide a strong hold of the Congress at the Centre. The Muslim League proposed three or four federations of states, but the Congress opposed. The 1935 Act was based on the principle of parliamentary democracy, but the Congress after winning the 1937 elections did not agree to form coalition ministries in the provinces and at the Centre. As a result of this the communal problem became more intense and Jinnah declared the observance of the 'Day of Deliverance', which caused the Congress ministries to resign. All these events helped the growth and spread of the idea of Pakistan and the Muslim League began to seriously think for the demand of a separate homeland, for Muslims. Since the Muslim and non-Muslim organizations stood poles apart and failed to settle their differences, Jinnah, to break this permanent impasse, as he considered, resolved at the Lahore Session, 1940, for partition of India. The nationalist Muslims opposed the resolution, while the Muslim League massively propagated the demand. The British officials focussed upon the dangers and the bad consequences of the partition. The foreign and Indian papers opposed the idea of partition, but the Muslim League conscious of the prospects of its being conceded ultimately not only by the British but by the Congress leadership also - Gandhiji's personal objections notwithstanding - struck to its demand. However, Jinnah, despite condemnations, remained determined for the creation of Pakistan. He made the dream a reality.