"Foreign policy is the key element in the process by which a state translates its broadly conceived goals and interests into concrete courses of action to attain these objectives and preserve interests"

- Padelford and Lincoln

India's foreign policy is born out of a country's factors, basic principles, objectives, goals and the personality factors of national leaders. The main aim of any country's foreign policy is to protect the national interest. The historical development is revealed by the continuous existence of two 'Indian' traditions. These have dominated Indian thinking and Indian history for several thousand years. The first Indian tradition is called the pursuit of synthesis. Here one finds a continuous attempt by conflicting parties to integrate, merge and harmonise as far as possible a variety of ethnic and cultural streams, or group attitudes and policies. A continuous attempt to interrelate diverse nationalities and their interests may be studied in the context of Indian history. This pursuit can be seen in the relations between the Aryans and the non-Aryans in the Sub-continent. It was also in play when the Aryans in India came into contact with Greek, Persian, Turkish and eventually Islamic forces. The first encounter between native 'Indians' and the invading Muslim forces in the eleventh and the twelfth centuries was initially one of the conqueror and the conquered. Consequently a conflict between two different and major lines of thinking emerged. On the one hand was
the theory of the ideal state, which emphasized, along the lines of Mahabharata, that good policy required the development of state power along ethical lines. On the other hand lay the Islamic view, which holds that, there can be no compromise between believer and non-believer. In Indian history there was the encounter between Indians and the Moghuls but as the subsequent discussion shows, even this was accommodated by the Indian tradition of searching for synthesis.

The second Indian tradition is called Kautilyan tradition. It originated around 300 BC, and in this tradition the strategy was to promote rivalries between neighbours, to rely on intrigue, to fight, to develop alliances, to engage in territorial aggrandisement to engage in subversion and intelligence activities, and generally to seek to maximise the king's and the state's power. But it also had a moral dimension, namely to engage in activities that advanced the well being of the King's subjects. Despite this moral dimension, most experts judge it as an imperial tradition, where the use of war, intrigue and territorial expansion became necessary. Indian political and military history from ancient times is replete with such examples, and furthermore British Indian history fits into this tradition. British imperial attitudes and practices vis-a-vis the Indian Princes and their policies and attitudes towards each other demonstrates the vitality of the Kautilyan approach. But his approach was failed to create peaceful atmosphere in the Indian history.

The message of Islam baffled Indians because it was contrary to Indian practice, which stressed the value of synthesis. There were two reactions to the Muslim invasion of India. The first was that Indian Hindu Society, when exposed to the Muslim encounter,
closed itself against Islam. The second was the caste system. The practice of Sati increased during the period because women were afraid that they would be taken and abused by the Moghul invaders: on hearing of the defeat of their men in battle they thought it was better to burn themselves in their husband's funeral pyre. This was the policy of non-cooperation with the invader. There was no attempt to seek a peaceful synthesis between Hindus and Muslims. But eventually this rigidly and non-co-operation was transformed into a situation of uneasy coexistence, because the longer the Moghul invaders stayed in India the more Indianised they became.

In the last days of the Moghul Empire, when the decay had already set in, British Merchants in the form of the East India Company entered the Indian scene. This story has been told very well by Philip Mason and others. The British started with a toehold in Madras and from thence the East India Company developed its commercial and political relations with Indians, including princes, and by the mid-1700s its presence in different parts of the sub-continent was established. After the Indian Mutiny of 1857, the affairs of the East India Company were taken over by Britain, and India became a part of the British Empire. The position and privileges of the East India Company and its relations with the Indian Princes and people were taken over by the British Crown. The British wanted to rule, not to synthesize. They relied on a different set of traditions; namely to divide and rule, and to engender rivalries among the neighbouring countries. The British wanted to exploit India and its fabulous riches. They wanted to subordinate Indians and to maintain British separateness and exclusivity. By the turn of the century the British had developed a sense of racial superiority in relation to the Indians. This experience completely disorientated the
Indians because it ran counter to the historical idea that encounters between different peoples and different civilisations and cultures required conflict resolution by a process of synthesis, but there was no prospect of this happening between the British and the Indians. In addition, the position taken by the Indian National congress on many issues of international import may be found the immediate roots of Foreign Policy of independent India. A resolution passed at the first session of the congress in 1885 deprecated the annexation of upper Burma by the British. The 1892 the congress objected to "The Military activity going on beyond the natural lines of the defence of this country in pursuance of the imperial policy of Great Britain in its relations with some of the great powers of Europe". This resolution passed by the Indian National Congress will reveal that the congress took a deep interest in certain external questions from its inception, and that it based its position on certain fundamental principles which still shape the Foreign Policy of India today.

One should not forget that till the advent of independence, Indian political scene was dominated by Gandhi and thus his teaching and approach had a big impact not only in domestic matters but in Foreign Policy as well. Even when Nehru drafted the foreign policy resolutions of the Congress year after year, he only cited it as his disciple and Gandhi's blessings were always incorporated with all the resolutions drafted and piloted by Nehru. It is interesting to note here that the Indian National Congress in 1921, for the first time, adopted a resolution on foreign on foreign policy. This resolution drafted that the interests of the nationalist India in the field of foreign policy were opposed to those of Britain. Prior to this, in 1919 at the Amritsar session, the Congress protested against the hostile attitude of some of the British Ministers towards the Turkish and Khilafat question.
and appealed to British Government to settle the Turkish question in accordance with the just and legitimate sentiments of the Indian Musalmans.

The Nagpur session of the AICC in 1920 paid homage to sacred memory of the Great Irish people patriot Mac-swiney and sent its message of sympathy to Irish people in their struggle for independence. In successive sessions at Ahmedabad in 1921, Gaya in 1922 and Delhi special session in 1923, the congress pledged India's support to the Turkish people and congratulated Kamal Pasha on his victorious leadership. All India congress committee in Belgaon in 1924 expressed sympathy to the Egyptians, in 1925 session the AICC opened a foreign department under it, to look after the interests of Indians abroad, and in 1927 in Madras session supported the people of China in their fight for emancipation and in 1928 Congress session at Calcutta sent its greetings to the people of Syria, Palestine and Iraq in their struggle for emancipation from the grip of western imperialism. These resolutions gave the first indication that India's national leaders were thinking of in terms of a pan-Asian movement to resist European Imperialism. The Congress also condemned the action of then British Indian Government in refusing passports to the medical mission which the AICC wanted to send to China. The same year, representing Indian National Congress in Brussels in which 37 countries from Asia, Africa, and Latin America participated, Nehru felt that the struggle for freedom was a common one against the thing that was imperialism. Nehru's feelings at Brussels later reflected in the Calcutta session of the AICC held in the year 1928 in which the Congress declared that the struggle of the Indian people for freedom was a part of the general world struggle against imperialism. In
the Calcutta session, four basic principles of Congress Foreign Policy may be said to have been established, which were as follows.

a. Opposition to imperialism and colonial rule.
b. Active sympathy and support to the people fighting for independence.
c. Opposition to war and devotion to peace, and
d. Avoiding foreign entanglements for India.

The congress recognised the above four principles as integral part of its foreign policy aiming at prosperity for the entire human race. This was why in Wardha, the working committee in 1936 sent its greetings and full sympathy to the Arabs of Palestine in their struggle for Independence against British Imperialism. The same year in Lucknow session the congress while expressing sympathy for the Ethiopian people in the heroic fight against imperialistic aggression, considered Abyssinians fight as part of the fight of all exploited nations for freedom. Again at Faizpur in the same year, the congress sent greetings to the Spanish people and assurance of its solidarity with them in their great struggle for liberty.

In 1937 in Calcutta session, the Congress condemned Japanese aggression in China and assured the Chinese people of Indian People's solidarity with them in their struggle for maintaining their freedom. Similar sentiments were expressed at Haripura Conference in 1938 and in the Tripura Session in 1939 in which the Congress expressed disapproval of British foreign policy culminating in the munich part, the Anglo-Italian Agreement and the recognition of rebel Spain.
In August 1939, the working committee defined and condemned the persistent aggression in Europe, Africa and the Far East of Asia, as well as the betrayal of democracy by British imperialism in Czechoslovakia and Spain. The Congress working committee in December 1943 expressed the heart-felt sympathy with the Indonesian and Indochinese nationalist for the enormous loss and suffering inflicted upon them by the imperialist powers and thus the British Government in India did not grant necessary facilities to enable Jawaharlal Nehru to go to Java in response to Dr. Sukarno's invitation. However, it could not affect the Congress stand. In 1945 Simla meeting, the Congress resumed its demands for Indian Independence and it spoke out strongly for the freedom of all countries and "The elimination of all traces of imperialist control by whatever name it may be called", which it welcomed the formation of the United Nations, from the outset it expressed certain major points of dissatisfaction with the kind of organisation that had been formed.

The declaration on September 7, 1946 of India's decision not to get aligned with any power bloc was the starting point of its independent policy. It came in the announcement made by Nehru on All India Radio as the Vice-president and the member-in-charge of external Affairs of the first national government, formed on 2nd September, 1946. In his announcement Nehru declared, "we propose as far as possible to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the part to world wars and which may again lead to disaster on even faster scale". In subsequent resolutions in 1945 and 1946 the working committee voiced apprehensions regarding the consequences of the atom bomb and the growing tension in international relations, "resulting in open discrimination between the great powers and attempts on their part to secure (or) hold on to
colonial areas and create satellite states". The congress was specially concerned over the many evidence that "the imperialist powers are again engaged in the cold war context for domination over other".

The Asian Relations conference held in New Delhi from 25th March to 2nd April, 1947 was a historical land mark where Asians from different parts of the continent met for the first time in New Delhi, Nehru told them, "Far too long have we, the people of Asia been petitioners in Western courts and chancelleries. That story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on our own legs and to cooperate with us. We do not intend to be the playthings of others". Again December 1948, when the Netherlands Government launched a second 'police action', Nehru issued an emergency call to Asian, African and Arab countries to meet in New Delhi on January 20, 1949 for conference to consider the situation, in Indonesia.

Article 51 of the Indian Constitution also state that India is committed to international peace, security, cooperation and conciliation. By defining the concept of peace, Nehru told in parliament, afterall peace is not peace, it is a quality : It is a way of doing thing; it is the objective you want to reach. By peace, he did not mean the peace of any particular country, rather he was convinced that the success and failure of any foreign policy was sure to cast its influence on the whole world and from this point of view there was no doubt that India's foreign policy behaviour was significant.
India never intended to be the leader of the Asian countries, yet her pivotal geographical situation in the continent destined to offer her leadership. India always regarded the sovereignty of its small neighbouring countries. Sikkim was going to be converted into a protectorate and Bhutan was to be covered under a vassalage and Nepal derived simply patronisation. As the interests of Nepal and India were identical, India was not prepared to tolerate the invasion of Nepal from anywhere. As a result Indo-Nepalese friendship treaty was concluded in July 1950. India maintained close and warm relations with Burma (now Myanmar), Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) and Indonesia which needed mutual confidence. On Kashmir issue, when China reserved her opinion, Russia boycotted the meetings and the West disappointed India, even then friendship with Pakistan was sought for.

Friendship with Arab countries was in its right direction but Egypt and Afganistan came closer. India worked for the stability and the unity in Korea and her approach was quite free from outside in position. India was also conscious of position of China in Asia. India played her role as the bridge between the Far East and Islamic bloc. India did not appreciate the Moorne Doctrine for Asia and also did not appreciate the American outlook of checking the advancement of communism because she was convinced that it was the outcome of socio-economic maladies. India declined to participate in SEATO and Baghdad pact and worked for the unity among the developing countries. India's role in Korea, Congo, Swez and Hungary has been widely appreciated by the member countries of UNO. India not only in the United Nations but in the commonwealth, NAM and even on other world fora raised the issue of racialism and apartheid and attacked on colonialism and imperialism.
II. FACTORS OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy is never original. It is always determined by a certain order of facts. Further, it is never determined by any one factor (or) a set of factors, but is the result of interplay of a large number of factors that affect the formulation of policy in different ways and different circumstances. Generally speaking, factors of foreign policy include historical, geographical, economic and ideological, had influenced in designing of Indian foreign policy. According to V.P. Dutt. "The Indian Foreign Policy is determined by conceptual and operational frameworks and the parameters and the motivating forces, the perceptions about world developments, the pulls and tides of history and geography, the interplay strategy, economics and aspirations, the cut and thrust of international situation, the subtle interaction between domestic, regional and international balance of forces and the zigzag of relations with countries and regions critical to India".10

Now let us examine these factors one by one as how they affect and shape the Indian foreign policy.

A. Historical Factors

India's historical development, no less her recent experience inevitably backboned towards an independent foreign policy stance. A pround civilization with the weight of centuries of tradition and the rich legacy of what appeared to Indians and abiding civilization like China, India was too deeply conscious of her priceless heritage to accept the role of client state. India was too big a country to become a camp follower of any other
Besides, the country had gone through the experience of a prolonged struggle against British imperialism, the mightiest of western imperialism, and was pulsating with nationalist urges and impulses\textsuperscript{11}.

India fought a prolonged struggle for freedom. Innumerable people courted prisons, resisted the Raj in a hundred and one ways and challenged the might of the British Empire. This fight provided some inspiration to the struggles for freedom in other Asian Countries too and strengthened the Indian people's determination to fight on. India's entire background was consistently antiimperialism and India necessarily sympathized with the struggle against western colonialism, no matter where it was being carried on. It could not be surprising than an integral aspect of independent India's foreign policy was "the policy of standing up for the weak and the oppressed in various continents". India could not seize independence within hand and accept intolerable constraints on it with the other in the form of western-bloc alliance system. Thus history and recent experience were powerful factors making for a strong independent foreign policy to take shape over the years and for this foreign policy to be mainly anchored to the Asian-African community and the community of the developing countries\textsuperscript{12}.

**B. Geographical Factors**

The geographical factors of India's foreign policy are governed by its location - a meeting point of West Asia, the Far East and South - East Asia. India's vast size, natural resources and population could not be ignored by the rest of the world, which viewed it with some concern\textsuperscript{13}. 
Nehru told the Constituent Assembly on March 8, 1949 "If you have to consider any question concerning South - East Asia, you cannot do so without India, so also with the Far East. While the middle East may not be directly connected with South - East Asia, both are connected with India. Even if you think in terms of regional organisation in Asia, you have to keep in touch with other regions, and whatever regions you may have in mind, the importance of India cannot be ignored"\(^1\).

India's priorities were in a way naturally fixed. The immediate neighbours had the first claim on this country's attention. The relations with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Burma, Afghanistan, China being not the least constituent part of it, were of paramount importance of India. India's security, vital interests and well being was intimately tied up with the fate and future of this region. Similarly, India was vitally concerned with developments in South - East Asia, on our doorstep, the Gulf and West Asian countries, equally our immediate neighbours and the Indian ocean area, whose very name testifies to its importance for India\(^2\).

C. **Economic Factors**

In the case of developing countries like India, rapid economic development being the central objective, economic considerations became significant determinants of our foreign policy. India adopted a pattern of mixed economy in which the public sector was given a dominant role while private sector was largely confined to consumer and light industry. The formulation of such an economic policy led to the development of contacts and cooperation with the former Soviet Union and East European countries while the US
and its allies looked at India with suspicion. India sought abiding ties with fellow-developing countries as part of South - South cooperation.}

Our large and rapidly expanding population profoundly affects our foreign policy, primarily by slowing down the rate of growth and making the country heavily dependent upon foreign aid. Food shortage in our country provides a striking example of economic consideration influencing foreign policy moves. That this constraint is not a mere subjective Indian feeling is brought out by Morgentha's statement in which he cites India as "the prime example" of a country being forced to have a weak foreign policy because of her food difficulties.

Another aspect of population problem which affects our foreign policy is the emigration of large number of Indians in the past to South and East Africa, Ceylon, several countries of South - East Asia, the U.K. and other certain countries. The argument that when a high level of technology has been attained, a large population gives a definite advantage in terms of military power, would have some validity in the event of technological advancement. On the whole, India's enormous and fast increasing population has been a liability rather than an asset from the economic point of view.

Natural resources constitute an important element of national power and hence must be regarded as one of the determinants of foreign policy. The growth of advanced technology itself presupposes a certain level of industrialization, which it would be very hard to attain in the absence of a minimum resource base. Even if technology is assumed to have
been borrowed entirely, it cannot really create something out of nothing, although at a certain stage of development it can overcome the drawbacks in the use of relatively low grade minerals and fuels for industrial purposes. The richness and self-sufficiency of the U.S.A and the U.S.S.R with regard to most natural resources account to a large extent for their economic and military power. The fact that, India has relatively abundant supplies of natural resources is, therefore, a material element making for her national power and independent foreign policy in the long run.

There is practically no country in the modern world which does not depend, to a greater (or) less extent, on borrowed technology in the early stages of its economic growth. It is not surprising that during the first few decades of her development, India has inevitably to depend, to a considerable extent on foreign technology and capital. Our foreign policy, then world be inevitably affected our dependence on the economically advanced states for capital and technology. India would be unable to play the role of a big power in international relations for year to come.

It is an elementary principle of the science of international relations that the aid giving states act largely in their own interests, and the giving of aid for other reasons, as an eminent authority on the foreign aid has rightly pointed out, constitutes the exception rather than the rule.

In a predominantly bipolar world it is not easy task for an aid receiving state to preserve its external sovereignty in the midst of the inevitable pressures from the aid giving.
states. It has, therefore, been necessary for India not to put all her eggs in one basket. The diversification of the Sources of aid can above enable India to minimize the pressure that could be exerted by any state or bloc.

**Security**

Security is taken here to mean not only the defence of territorial integrity but also internal security, in the sense of safeguarding the politic-economic system established under the constitution and preserving external sovereignty in the sense of freedom of action in international relations. In this sense, security is largely a function of the military and economic strength of the state concerned. Yet the defence of our territorial integrity cannot slowly depend on military power, but must be sustained to a considerable extent by one diplomacy as Nehru often rightly emphasized. There is no escape from the conclusion that the only rational stance for our diplomacy can be one of avoidance of won to the best of our ability. In other words, it is necessary for India for the sake of her economic development to avoid entanglement in the world wide bipolar, Multipolar power conflict and to play a role in international politics in general and in the U.N. in particular. It is also necessary for her to build such relations with neighbouring countries as would minimise the chance of war or other forms of conflict with them.

In addition to this, the domestic factors that influenced foreign policy included the fact that India's independence was fragile and the political unity of the country a bit shaky. Partition led to an exodus of population, serious problems of law and order and economic instability in many parts of India arose. Besides fissiparous tendencies, there were forces
within the country and abroad which were always trying to dictate terms.

D. Ideological Factors

India is the place for peace and non-violence principle India is a country where Buddha, the herald of peace war born. Basing on the traditional concept of peace and non-violence under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, the National Congress fought against the British imperialism. Thats why we see the impact of Mahatma Gandhi's principle of peace and non-violence influence on Indian foreign policy. With the same concept India supported the resolutions in different countries, which came up against the colonialism and imperialism. In the struggle for freedom. India was supported by socialist countries and later India developed friendly attitude towards the socialist countries.

So, the compulsions of history, geography, economic, ideology factors and past experience thus were important formative influences on the formulation of India's foreign policy.

III. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

The main principles of India's Foreign Policy are as under:

1. Non-Alignment

Non-alignment is one of the most significant principle of India's Foreign Policy. When India gained independence, the world was divided into two camps headed by two superpowers - Soviet - Union and U.S.A. As India was keen to play an effective role in the
international arena, it thought proper to keep away from these blocs. Emphasising this point Pandit Nehru said, "If by any chance we align ourselves definitely with one power group we may perhaps from one point of view do some good but I have not the shadow of doubt that from a larger point of view, not only of India, but of world peace it will do harm. Because then we lose that tremendous vantage ground that we have of using such influence as we possess and that influence is going to grow from year to year in the cause of world". He further asserted "I feel that India can play a big part, and may be an effective part, in helping the avoidance of war. Therefore, it becomes all the more necessary that India should not be linked up with any groups of power which for various reasons are in a sense full of fear of war and prepare for war".

It may be observed that the policy of non-alignment was dictated by the consideration of national interest. Because of its liberal traditions India could not align itself with Soviet Union which believed in ideology of violence and revolution. On the other hand her geographical location (with Soviet Union and China close to her borders) demanded that she should not join the Western alliance. The traditional attitude of tolerance also impelled India to remain non-aligned. Above all, the interests of the country demanded that India should pursue policy of non-alignment. This point was emphasised by Nehru thus: "By aligning yourselves with one power, you surrender your opinion, give up the policy you would normally pursue somebody else wants you to pursue another policy. I do not think it would be a right policy for us to adopt. If we did align ourselves we would only fall between two stools. We will neither be following the policy based on our ideals inherited from our past or the one indicated by our present nor will we be able to adapt ourselves to the policy
consequent on such alignment. According to Prof. A.K. Damodaran, the discovery of nuclear weapons and the possibility of their use in warfare also greatly influenced Nehru's views on non-alignment. He says "added to the earlier longer preoccupations with decolonisation and social justice... this became one of the cardinal factors influencing India's adoption of a non-aligned posture".

The term non-alignment is often mistaken for 'neutrality', which does not convey the real nature of India's Foreign Policy. Nehru took strong exception to the use of 'neutral' for India's Foreign Policy and asserted "The use of work 'neutral' to describe India's Foreign Policy is wrong except in terms of war. If you say there is war on today we are neutral. If you say there is a cold war, we are certainly neutral... we do not propose to join that war. It does not matter who is right and who is wrong. We will not join in this exhibition of mutual abuse, because we do not serve anybody that way certainly not the cause of peace". The adoption of non-alignment as policy has not in any way hampered India's friendly co-operation with other countries. It has concluded number of agreements for economic, cultural as well as political co-operation. Again, it has also not prevented her from taking an unbiased view of the various political events and expressing her views. It is well known that India strongly condemned the North Korean aggression against South Korea in 1950, Anglo-French invasion of Suez in 1956, the Soviet intervention in Hungary and U.S.A. use of force in Vietnam. In short, India has tried to judge the various international issues on merit and taken definite stand on these issues25.
This policy of non-alignment proved immensely beneficial to the country. India not only kept the option open to develop its relations with various countries, but was also able to secure all types of aid from countries or blocs. No doubt, in the initial years the country had to face lot of difficulties because the two Super Powers did not look at India's non-alignment with favour and interpreted it as extending support to the rival power. However, slowly this hostility towards non-alignment died and most of the countries of Asia and Africa after their independence preferred to adopt this policy. This policy apart from serving the national interest of India also went a long way in strengthening the cause of world peace.

2. Anti-colonialism and Anti-imperialism

Another outstanding principle of India's Foreign Policy has been her strong opposition to colonialism, and imperialism. This policy was largely the outcome of her long sufference as a colony under the British. Naturally, after independence India showed full sympathy for all those people who were still under colonial rule. It took up the cause of such people at the United Nations and played an important role in the promotion of decolonisation. Pandit Nehru emphasised the commitment of India to support the people under imperial domination thus "Asia till recently was largely a prey to imperial domination and colonialism; a great part of it is free today, part of it still remains unfree and it is an astonishing thing that any country still ventures to hold and to set forth this doctrine of colonialism whether it is under direct rule or whether it is indirectly maintained in some form or another. We, in Asia, who have ourselves suffered all these evils of colonialism and imperial domination have committed ourselves inevitable to freedom of other colonial countries."
This anti-colonial, anti-imperialist stand of India was not confined to mere pronouncements. On the other hand India tried to practice it and extended support to Indonesia, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco etc. Thus India extended full support to Indonesia when the Government of Netherlands tried to overpower it and played a vital role in Indonesia's independence. Ali-Sastromidjajo, the Prime Minister of Indonesia's acknowledged India's help and observed "The assistance which India has given so fully and wholeheartedly to my people will be written in letter of shining gold in the pages of the history of free Indonesia". India also supported the people of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and helped them to free themselves from the yoke of military regime of Pakistan. This stand of India naturally earned for India the wrath of the colonial and imperialist powers. However, India remained undaunted and continued to support anticolonial struggles. Asserting India determination to pursue this policy at all costs Nehru observed 'India will not give up her policy which she had pursued all along.... I want to say to the world on behalf of this country that we are not frightened of the military might of this power or that - India will never hesitate to do that she thinks it necessary for the progress of humanity". According to critics, India's opposition to colonialism somewhat called down after 1987. For example India did not accord recognition to the Interim Algerian Government, while other countries like China and Egypt stole a march over India in this regard. However, this criticism is not wholly towards the Algerian issue but it is a fact that it consistantly continued to oppose imperialism and colonialism. India's support to the people of East Pakistan which ultimately led to the creation of Bangladesh can be cited as another example.
3. **Opposition to Racialism**

India has always emphasised the principal of brotherhood of man and opposed all type of discriminations based on race and culture, etc. It was the first country to highlight the problem of racial discrimination at the International level and severely condemned the policy of racial segregation being pursued by the government of South Africa. It sought international intervention to pressurise the White Government of South Africa to abandon the policy of racial discrimination. In 1952, India along with twelve other Afro-Asian states, raised the question of apartheid at the U.N. and asserted that its practice not only constituted a flagrant violation of the U.N. Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights, but also constituted a serious threat to the world peace. Nehru asserted "We repudiate utterly the Nazi doctrine of racialism wheresoever and in whatsoever form it may be practiced. We seek no domination over others and we claim no privileged position over other people. But we do claim equality and honourable treatment of our people wherever they may go and we cannot accept any discrimination". In subsequent years India took up the cause of the Negroes in American and African population of Rhodesia. In short, it can be said that India has taken consistent cudgels against racial discrimination wherever it was practiced.

4. **Faith in Peaceful Coexistence and Cooperation**

India was not merely satisfied to adopt policy of non-alignment but also tried to promote the spirit of co-operation and peaceful coexistence among the states professing different ideologies. India cultivated very intimate relations with China, Nepal, Yugoslavia, Egypt etc. and played a leading role in the evolution of five principles (Panch Sheela)
emphasising mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-intervention in each other's domestic affairs; mutual benefit and equality; and peaceful coexistence. It was in this spirit of peaceful co-existence and co-operation that India laid great emphasis on the settlement of disputes peacefully. The firm faith of India in these principles is evident from the fact that despite the Chinese betrayal in 1962 India has persistently expressed its faith in these principles.

5. **Special Bias for Asia**

Even though India advocated co-operation among all the countries of the world, it shows a special bias for the countries of Asia in its Foreign Policy. It developed very close relations with countries of Asia, and tried to promote unity among them by organising a number of conferences. At these conferences Nehru emphasised that Asia could play an effective role in promoting the world peace and play a dominant role in the shaping of the international relations. In the speech of 7 September, 1946 Nehru asserted "We are of Asia and the people of Asia are nearer and closer to us than others. India is so situated that she is the pivot of Western, Southern and South-Eastern Asia. In the past her culture flowed to all these countries, and they came to her in many ways. Those contacts are being renewed and the future is bound to see a closer union between India and South-East Asia on the one side and Afghanistan, Iran and Arab world on the other". In one of his subsequent speeches also Nehru emphasised the important role which Asia could play in the preservation and promotion of world peace. He said "In the atomic age, Asia will have to function effectively in the maintenance of peace. Indeed, there can be no peace unless Asia plays her part. There is today conflict in many countries and all of us in Asia are fully aware of our own troubles."
Nonetheless, the whole spirit and outlook of Asia are peaceful and the emergence of Asia in the world affairs will bear powerful influence on world peace".

Even though India showed a special bias, it tried to create no separate bloc of the Asian nations. No doubt, India took a lead in organising some conferences of the Asian countries during the period 1947 and 1949 but their chief purpose was to promote cooperation among the countries of Asia, Nehru categorically stated. "We meet in no spirit of hostility to any nation or group of nations but in an endeavour to promote peace through the extension of freedom".

6. **Intimate Relations with Commonwealth**

Intimacy of relations with Commonwealth has been another important feature of India's Foreign Policy. India sought the membership of Commonwealth even after adopting a Republican constitution, because it thought that the membership of Commonwealth shall be beneficial in the economic and other spheres. India played a leading role at the various Commonwealth meets. No, doubt occasionally certain irritants appeared in relations with Britain, there was a demand for withdrawal from the Commonwealth, but the Government was always able to withstand the pressure for withdrawal and continued its membership.

7. **Faith in the United Nations**

India as a proponent of peace has shown great faith in the United Nations. It has not only encourage the settlement of disputes through methods but also extended full support to
the United Nations actions. It has been contributing military as well as other personnels for implementing the decisions of the United Nations. It is wellknown that India played a commendable role during the Korean and Indo-China crisis. It provided necessary personnels for the Observations Group in Lebanon which performed the stupendous task of checking the infiltration of personnel and supply of arms, etc. across the Lebanese border. India also sent a large contingent to preserve peace in Congo. The valuable service rendered by the India to the United Nations to preserve the world peace were acknowledge by the U.N. Secretary General Hammarskjold. He said in March, 1959 "I would like to (acknowledge with gratitude) the co-operation of the Indian people and the Indian Government first of all and still on a very large scale in the Gaza operations with a very quick response, with a very noble response because the Indian units in Gaza were of a very high quality. I can speak from personal experience and I am not flattering you". He also commended the valuable service rendered by India in Lebanon and asserted that "both these contributions are very valuable contributions to the whole development of the U.N. security and legal system on which it is possible to build the future".

8. Special Emphasis on Means

Another notable feature of Indian foreign policy is that it lays great emphasis on purity of means. India has consistently held that the means for the attainment of national interest must be pious. India has always nourished very high ideals and has never aspired to acquire territory of other countries. This is fully borne out by the fact that India returned to Pakistan her territory which she had captured during the 1965 and 1971 wars. India has
always laid emphasis on settlement of disputes through amicable negotiations and peaceful methods.\textsuperscript{29}

Thus we find that the Indian foreign policy is based on high ideals and attaches great importance to methods.

IV. OBJECTIVES OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The foreign policy of a country is generally expressed in terms of objectives. The Indian foreign policy objectives logically correspond with the principles mentioned above. These are:

1. Maintaining country's security and its territorial integrity,
2. Prosperity and progress of the country,
3. Establishment of India as a pre-eminent power in South Asia,
4. Promotion of strength and solidarity of all Afro-Asian Countries so that they may count in world affairs,
5. Fighting against all types of colonialism, imperialism and racialism,
6. Avoidance of involvement in power blocs (or) military alliances,
7. Solicitation of foreign aid from all quarters for economic development,
8. Playing an active role in the United Nations,
9. Supporting the cause of disarmament, particularly, prohibiting manufacture, stock piling and use of nuclear weapons, and
10. Supporting the cause of developing nations and of the NIEO.\textsuperscript{30}
V. GOALS OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

India has indeed come a long way. The whole of India's foreign policy from Independence onwards centres around four goals. They are:

1. National Security
2. Economic development
3. Regional Hegemony and
4. Search for an international role.

1. National Security

Security is the primary concern of every state. The first charge on foreign policy of every country is the provision and enhancement of security. The security of a country is the most fundamental demand upon foreign policy. Every country's foreign policy is first of all geared to the objective of ensuring the maximum possible security in a given situation. India is no exception. But it is universally accepted that security cannot be conceived of in a very narrow sense of mere protection from physical attack, although that is an important component of it. The concept of security, to be fully serviceable, includes a peaceful environment, friendly relations with neighbours and as many countries as possible, the availability of countervailing factors and forces where hostility was inevitable, internal cohesion and stability, economic development and progress, indeed in the final analysis the well-being, happiness and prosperity of the people. Security is deeply influenced by the international situation as well as the regional equations and relationship.

The quest for security has led to different courses of action among the newly
emerging countries. Some have sought to involve the big powers and buy security through alignment. Many others decided that security could best be ensured by keeping away from international power politics. Under Jawaharlal Nehru India concluded very early that involvement in military blocs of the big powers would not enhance her security but could very well escalate the pressures on her and in fact encourage destabilization. Staying out of power blocs and remaining non-aligned appeared to offer a better mix of security and independence.

India adopted the policy of non-alignment as this policy was looked upon as the best security for India. Simultaneously it enabled India to preserve her identity in world affairs and fortify her independence. Non-alignment endured only because it proved to be a better alternative than any other policy. Non-alignment by itself did not confer absolute security, but it was critical in meeting some of the challenges. Twice India was attacked by Pakistan and once by China. Still India managed to survive and develop as an independent nation because of the framework of Non-alignment with a hard-headed exercise of national interest.

Nevertheless, the threats to India's security have been manifold in the last four decades. In the fifties during the first cold war it was brought to India's doorsteps when Pakistan joined the US military alliance system and China and US went on a collision course. In the late seventies, during the second cold war, the Indian ocean was being turned into a threat of conflict and amassing of deadly armament. The US introduced nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean. The Rapid Deployment Force of the US is more an
instrument of force and pressure against Gulf and South-West Asian countries than a move to contain the Soviet Union. The strategic environment of the littoral states of the Indian ocean has become enormously ominous. The Soviet troops went into Afghanistan and have been battling rebel forces aided by the West through Pakistan since 1979, creating a new strategic crisis for India. This development came handy for the Reagan administration to renew its military relationship with Pakistan. The Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin heights whose hot breath can be felt down the Karkaram Highway and the Northeastern border - India was virtually encircled.

Equally undeniably, major challenges to India's security have come from Pakistan and China. The driving passion for parity with India of the ruling elite of Pakistan over the last four decades and its propensity to externalize its problems with India in order to obtain additional leverage against the country created grave security challenges. As is well-known, Pakistan tried to involve first the United States and then China and both of them in the affairs of the subcontinent. General zia's government has actively tried to use the secessionist movement of the sikh extremists and terrorists. Sanctuaries, training camps and material assistance as well as weapons have been provided to select groups of the extremists. This has been the most serious and the most sustained effort made by the Pakistani Government to utilize internal dissidence in India which added to the security problems. All these factors would need to be carefully examined for a continuous assessment of India's security problem.
Security, however, remained a primary and continuing concern of India's foreign policy. Whenever occasion demanded there was a flexible approach keeping in view the country's national interests. So, the security plays an important role in foreign policy of India.  

2. Economic Development  

India's second foreign policy goal is economic development. The problem of foreign policy apart, the subsequent growth of extensive relations with the soviet union and East European countries was a logical consequence of the shaping of our economic policies. The national leaders, even during the struggle of freedom, had placed before the country the goal of gradual establishment of a democratic, socialist society, and the concept of planning for Indian development had come into existence even before India obtained independence. To this was added a commitment to achieve self-reliance which implied the construction of a strong and viable infrastructure of industry, both heavy and light.  

Immediately upon the attainment of independence, India embarked upon planned economic development, the first five year plan having been framed early in the fifties. The second five year plan saw the beginning of a vigorous and purposeful development of heavy industry and an industrial infrastructure. India also adopted a pattern of mixed economy in which the public sector would hold a key position, while the private sector would largely remain in consumer and light industry. The commanding heights of the economy were to be firmly seized by the public sector so that the country's economy could be given a planned direction. The public sector comprised broadly of steel, coal, oil, machinery electrical goods, etc.
The formulation of such an economic policy carried within itself the logic of development of contacts and cooperation with the Soviet Union and East European Countries. Foreign assistance was sorely needed for laying the foundations of heavy industry and quite obviously this was not forthcoming in the field of heavy industry either from the United States or other developed Western countries. Soviet assistance was critical in initiating a programme of industrialization in the true sense of the term. It was not fortuitous that the first steel plant in the public sector was established with the help of Moscow. The economic policy reinforced by the adoption of gradual establishment of a democratic, socialist society as the nation's goal required and brought about close economic and other forms of cooperation with the Soviet Union. The sinews of such industrialization could hardly have been created at a quick tempo without the development of this cooperation and this relationship.

Thus both the specific problem faced by India's foreign policy and the compulsions of her pattern of economic development and consequently the present and urgent requirements in both these areas manifestly influenced the filling in of the contours of foreign policy and the evolution of specific relationships in the international field. These contacts with the Soviets and other communist bloc countries developed a pace in the ten years and came to be an integral part of Indian foreign policy and an important parameter to be reckoned with in any analysis of this policy.

Thus, with the growing importance of external components in the ongoing process of India's economic development, Indian diplomacy is no longer weighed down by political
issues only. Economic issues have become important, and will become even more so as India moves towards the end of the century.  

3. Regional Hegemony

India's third foreign policy is regional Hegemony. India has always been a dominant factor in South Asian politics. Regardless of the historical period, the geopolitical environment, the country always occupied the central stage in the area. This central position became particularly important with the advent of British colonialism, and with the consequent unification of the subcontinent. A power centre finally emerged to gain control of the Indian Ocean, the whole of the subcontinent land mass and the countries surrounding it. The whole area had, thus, become a vast British empire or a sphere of influence with the decision making centre located at Delhi.

The second factor is the sheer size of the country. India is a giant relative. Her size population, natural resources, military clout are far larger than that of the six countries of the region combined. For example, she accounts for 72 per cent of the total land in the area and 77 per cent of the population of South Asia, 85 per cent of the total land under cultivation is in India. The regional ramifications of giantism are farreaching. The leverage that India has over her neighbours is considerable.

The third factor is the subcontinent's geographical unit and religio-cultural-ethnic diversity. Its unity system from the fact that the subcontinent is 'indisputably a geographical unit' which is marked out by nature as a region by itself, and which has features that clearly
separate it 'as a whole from the surrounding regions. This geographical unit accentuates the importance of India in South Asia Politics.

The fourth factor is stability of the Indian political system and the contrasting instability that afflicts the other States of the area. Practically all the states have had their civil wars, their ethnic discontent and their authoritarian governments. It is, indeed, hardly possible for India to design the broad framework of her foreign policy without taking this dimension into account, for nothing is worse for the future of a nation than the continuous existence of endemic instability in the areas surrounding the country. With hardly India is managing the cordial relations its neighbouring countries in South Asia.

The fifth factor that has also contributed to the manifestation of the new Indian determination to play a more conspicuous role in the area is the core value system to which she adheres. India is a political and secular democracy, and has been so since her Independence – with the exception of a brief period (1975-77) when Indira Gandhi had clamped an emergency rule on the country. This has very much a part of India's core values, on which there is a wide consensus among the Indian population and among all the mainstream political parties.

However, in contrast to the general acceptance of these core values, the other South Asian States have been hovering between some form of authoritarianism and some form of Endogenously contrived democracy, thus generating considerable political uncertainty in the region as a whole. If an unstable South Asian strategic environment is bad for India, a
systematic uncertainty surrounding the country is an equal threat, to which India has to respond by designing a pattern of diplomacy that would closely monitor the overall situation prevailing in the area.

A combination of all the above five factors pertaining to this region finally resulted in the emergence of a dual pattern of foreign policy - a pattern that was global as well as regional. At the global level, India built up her image as a non-aligned, peaceful, friendly and anti-imperialist country. At the regional level, India's regional policy under Nehru, was ill-conceived and ill-defined. In fact, it was hardly conceived and hardly defined. If anything, it was purely reactive, the most important manifestation of which Nehru's improvised efforts to establish some sort of security belt in Himalayan region against any vaguely conceived threat from China in Tibet. The only thing that was visible was this great confidence that Nehruvian diplomacy successful and appreciated as it was at the macro level-could also be successful at the micro level. It was not so much that India did not see the problems at the micro-level, it was must that there appeared to exist a peculiar confidence in India's capacity to manage regional crises through, more or less, the same pattern of actions and initiatives that India was applying at the macro-level. Nehruvian diplomacy was successful at the macro level but not the micro-level. India was a successful performer internationally, but not regionally.

After Nehru, things began to change. Priorities began to be reversed. Interests began to shift. While India's global policy, intelligently conceived by Nehru, began to gradually lose its lustre, its coherence, its framework and, what is more, its importance, the broad
contours of a regional policy began to slowly emerge. This policy was more coherent, pragmatic, national interest - oriented and forceful. While, on the one hand, there was a new Indian determination to play a dominant role in South Asia, there was, on the other hand a visible drive to project an amiable image of a big brother looking after the interests of the neighbouring smaller nations.

Admittedly, the diplomatic policies that were designed by different successive governments were not always the same. The form and content given to India's regional preoccupations changed from Prime Minister to Prime Minister. While some sought to define India's South Asian policies in confessional and friendly terms, there were others who designed more assertive and more power - oriented policies. But whatever direction Indian foreign policy took, the fact of the matter is that it invariably reverted back to the carrot and stick policy of making the smaller nations conscious of India's giantism while, at the same time, being prudent about not becoming too assertive.

The defining moment in this ongoing process was India's military intervention in East Pakistan. This was militarily conclusive and politically successful since Bangladesh emerged as a new and independent state. For the first time since independence, India defeated Pakistan militarily and also, India had successfully defied Chinese and US pressures to dissuade her from any military action; and finally, for first time too, India had intelligently used Soviet protection to achieve her goals. India's successful military action projected her as a new regional power in South Asian Region. The impact of this military and diplomatic success, Pakistan and other South Asian nations had recognized India's predominance power in the South Asian region. By far the most important ramifications of
the firm and decisive action in Bangladesh was the international recognition of India's newly established predominant position in South Asian politics. The NIXON administration (USA) accepted Indian supremacy in the South Asian region. China also finally accepted India's predominant position in the South Asian region. The Soviet Union, with whom close ties had been forged, including the 1971- Friendship and Treaty of Peace and Co-operation but which had begun to show sings, under Brezhnev, of seeking out Pakistan, abandoned that policy once India was successful in her endeavour to detach East Pakistan.

Thus, India's successful intervention in Bangladesh is a major landmark in Indian diplomacy. It was thus event that this crisis generated a major shift from the original Nehruvian tradition of concentrating on the affairs of the world to a more practical and more power - oriented policy, the focal point of which was the mobilization of India's power to safeguard her national interests. And within this broad framework, what has clearly emerged is the centrality of South Asia in India diplomatic thinking with a dimension and a coherence that did not exist before 39.

4. Search for an International Role

Playing a role in the international system is India's fourth goal. During Nehru's time, with the benign image that India had acquired externally, he was able to craft a generally acceptable role : a role that had more to do with global than regional politics, and a role that had four dimensions.
The first was that of being a role model for others. Externally India had projected non-alignment as a defiant model in world that was bipolar; internally, India had crafted a socio-economic system for domestic modernization that was distinct from what exist at the time. The eventual importance of these two independent and defiant orientations can be gauged from the fact that both of them acquired a very respectable status in third world politics.

The second role was that of a go-between, by being useful at the end of Korean war, by working out compromise formulae on Indo-China in the corridors of the Geneva conference, by seeking out acceptable solutions to the intractable issue of admitting new members to the United Nations\textsuperscript{40}, and by attempting to manage the Suez and Lebanese crisis.

The third role was that of a leader proposing a broad framework of international action in the Afro-Asian meeting in Bandung and at the Belgrade non-aligned conference and also took the initiation to establish the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation) with its neighbouring countries for their economic developments of the South Asian Region.

The fourth role was that of a representative that voiced, at international fora, pressing demands for decolonization of the third world, and for the removal of apartheid in South Africa\textsuperscript{41}. 

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But these goals of role-playing, like the three other goals, changed with the evaluation of the Indian and global situations. For one thing, Nehru's successors had no interest in global affairs, for another the military actions in which India was involved against the Portuguese in Goa (1961), against the Chinese in the north (1962), and against Pakistan in the east (1971) seriously affected her global image. Further, the international system, having evolved radically, did not need a mediatory power at the global level, as it did during Nehru's time. Besides, India's public position on Hungary (1956), Afghanistan (1980) and Kampuchea (1980) did not help matters since India gave the impression of being against nationalism.

While most of Nehru's successors moved away from globalization and focussed essentially on regional politics. Rajiv Gandhi was the only other Indian Prime Minister after Nehru who attempted to establish an equilibrium between a heavy handed regional role and a radical international role of supporting violent liberation movements in Africa, and of insistently calling upon the international community with clearcut proposals for international disarmament. He was certainly successful in carving a regional role for India, though it is open to doubt if he was successful in projecting India on to the global scene.

The balance in India's policy, thus, has clearly tilted towards regionalism, and it is difficult to imagine that the growing domestic uncertainties and destabilization of the region is ever going to permit India to extricate herself from regional preoccupations to once again acquire a global role. Besides, and this is important for role-playing charismatic leaders who are well-equipped, well informed and interested in international affairs have disappeared.
from the Indian political scene, with no hope of them re-appearing in the foreseeable future.

The four goals that constitute the fulcrum of India's foreign policy have thus evolved through the years. Some have grown to include wider concepts, while the others have become more constricted. But all of them have two determining factors in common factors that have had a major, if not decisive, impact on this evolutionary process.

VI. THE PERSONALITY FACTOR

The personality factor is being increasingly as a crucial element in foreign policy making, perhaps even more crucial than some of the established institutions. Country like India it is the office of the Prime Minister which performs this role. It is the Prime Minister who is the central figure in the foreign policy sector. It is he who has the responsibility of taking decision and it is around him that the decision making process really functions. There is really no other personality that has replaced the Prime Minister. The role of the Foreign Minister has never been crucial, since India never had one who was independent, and who was politically powerful enough to leave his own imprint on foreign policy. So any analysis of the Indian decision making process has to centre on the Prime Minister, his personality, his beliefs and his role.
FOREIGN POLICY UNDER JAWAHARLAL NEHRU (1947-1964)

Nehru, undoubtedly, was the sole architect of India's Foreign policy during most of the period of his mandate. Since he was also his own foreign minister, practically all decisions were taken by him personally, with the infrastructural support of the ministry of external affairs. Although the Indian cabinet was composed of powerful men, it left foreign policy making to Nehru. His own party, the Congress party, virtually dominated the political scene with nobody really to challenge it. Even the secretariat, established to assist Nehru, was basically a coordinating agency which was classified as his personal secretariat. It never really acquired any degree of authority or power to become a policy making body. Its members were only silent spectators and accepted Nehru's ideas unquestioningly. It was, thus, Nehru personally who defined the broad frame work of India's foreign policy. Nobody belonging to the mainstream of Indian politics really challenged it. Nehru's more or less complete hold over foreign policy was a unique experience that was never replicated under any other Prime Minister.

While analysing the substantive elements of his policy, Nehru's broad thinking stemmed from two sources. The first clearly was anti-imperialism, which flowed from the long history and tradition of the Congress party's struggle for independence. The second was his broad socialist outlook, which stemmed from a variety of influences, which were essentially Fabian character, though there were also brief preindependence periods when he was attracted to marxism.
The framework Nehru designed for India's Foreign Policy essentially mirrored these influences. They were anti-colonialism and Non-alignment. Such a policy, which constituted the two pillars of India's foreign policy, was almost universally accepted by Indian public opinion and by the mainstream political parties. However, notwithstanding the general approval extended to his basic principles, there were two critical situations during his mandate when the decisions he had taken were challenged and when he had to take into account the criticisms that were levelled against him.

The first was the 1950 Hungarian uprising, during which the Soviet army marched into Hungary to brutally suppress it. This was a crisis in which India was not directly involved. Hungary was a faraway European country that was dominated by the Soviet Union. And yet Nehru received his first taste of popular resentment over a foreign policy decision related to this country. India had abstained in the UN General Assembly on a US resolution that had condemned Soviet military intervention in Hungary. What was perhaps even worse, which gained considerable international media publicity, was India's decision to vote with the Soviet bloc against a 5 nation resolution calling for free elections in Hungary. Though it is not clear at what level such a decision was taken it created uproar. Leaders like Jayaprakash Narain led the opposition to it.

The press, too, was up in arms. Important leaders requested that Krishna Menon be recalled from the United Nations, and that he be removed from the political scene, since he was the one who had apparently himself taken the decision to vote with the communist bloc on the resolution. The principal thesis of the whole debate on Hungary that took place in
parliament on 19 and 20 November was that of criticism of the government. Nehru was finally obliged to backtrack. He declared that the government in Hungary was not a free government. It was an imposed government.\textsuperscript{44} 

The second controversy surrounding the 1961-62 Sino-Indian crisis was even worse. Informed public opinion was even more strident in its criticism. In fact, even before the actual explosion of the conflict, Nehru was under considerable pressure to abandon what was considered by many as a soft policy towards China. The decision to give asylum to the Dalai Lama in the aftermath at the 15th session of the General assembly in favour of China's admission to the organization was due to an anticipated fear of a strong public reaction. Again, Nehru's readiness to recognize the 1956 Chinese border claim line in order to start negotiations was settled by an article in the Hindustan Times that leaked the information, thus generating a ferocious debate that finally led Nehru to renge upon the original idea of ceding to the Chinese on the delineation of the Sino-Indian border.\textsuperscript{45} 

After India's defeat in the Sino-Indian war, it was Nehru personally rather than the government that was targeted for attack. For the first time in his life, wrote a journalist, Kuldip Nayar, "Nehru heard his countrymen say that he had betrayed them. Never before had Nehru faced such hostile parliament, it was not in a mood to accept any compromise formula on the Aksai-China road. Nehru's options were rapidly closing.\textsuperscript{46} Nehru's own anguish at the possible reaction of parliament is illustrated in his letter to Krishna Menon on 28 October 1962 in which he declared. I do not know how I shall explain to the parliament why we have been found lacking in equipment.\textsuperscript{47} It is difficult to imagine that but for the
strong public reaction against the Chinese, Nehru would have allowed Sino-Indian relations to reach almost a vanishing point. During his tenure Nehru had to introduce changes in some foreign policy issues. He was the soul of Indian foreign policy. Without Nehru, there is no foreign policy.

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER 1962

The year 1962 marks a watershed in the development of India's Foreign Policy. Though the basic principles outlined above still continued to form the basis of the Indian Foreign Policy in the post 1962 period, but it came to be characterised by greater pragmatism and realism. The defeat at the hands of the Chinese in 1962 commenced the leadership that purely moralistic foreign policy shall not be in the interest of the country and necessary modification should be made in the policy to make it more effective instrument of national interest. This change was discernable during the Prime Ministership of Nehru itself when he openly declared that India was no more non-aligned so far as China was concerned. Lal Bahadur Sastri, who succeeded Nehru as Prime Minister tried to cultivate friendly and intimate relations with neighbours like Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka as well as the super powers. He succeeded in procuring military and economic assistance from both the powers and greatly strengthened India's position what is significant is that even U.S.A. despite strong protests from Pakistan continued to provide liberal military aid to India. This aid was suspended only on the outbreak of war between India and Pakistan in 1965. Profs. Palmen and Parkeis have asserted that the Chinese attack "came as a traumatic shock to India and caused a searching reprisal of India's foreign policy and her whole approach to the
problem of national security and external relations". It is true that methods of foreign policy after 1962 underwent a change, but the basic principles of India's foreign policy continued to be the same\textsuperscript{46}.

FOREIGN POLICY UNDER LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI (1964-66)

Another outstanding feature of the Indian Foreign Policy during the Shastri era was that the emphasis shifted to collective decision making". He was very different, from his predecessor. He was a neophyte in external affairs, with the exception of a trip to Nepal in March 1963 for discussions with Nepal leaders, and a brief of assigned responsibility to deal with papers that come to the Prime Minister from the ministry of external affairs\textsuperscript{50} during Nehru's last illness, he hardly had any grounding in foreign affairs, infact, none. There was nothing in his political life, before or after assuming the Prime ministership of the country, that gives any clue of any perception that he may have personally had of international affairs or of the macro issues that faced the world. Most of the declarations that he made on such issues were repeat of what Nehru had declared before\textsuperscript{51}. His whole political career centred around domestic politics, where he had established a niche for himself with the active support of Nehru. Though during his brief period as Prime Minister, he naturally had to deal with external matters (including a war with Pakistan), he was probably uncomfortable and perhaps even insecure taking the complete responsibility of designing India's Foreign Policy on his own.

It was probably this insecurity and neophytism that drove him, at the very outset, to take a series of initiatives to assure himself of advice in the sector, and to some extent
His first major decision was to appoint a full-time Foreign Minister who would have the formal responsibility of running the ministry of external affairs. Sardar Swaran Singh, his foreign minister, was more adept at foreign affairs than Shastri, since he was a marvelous success in the negotiations with Pakistan on the Kashmir question\textsuperscript{52}.

His second major decision was to appoint L.K. Jha, a person with good experience in economic diplomacy, as his private secretary apparently authorizing him to establish a powerful secretariat\textsuperscript{53}.

His third major decision was to appoint a committee to investigate the whole foreign service system. The two major recommendations of the committee were the upgradation and expansion of the economic division and the External Publicity division of the External Affairs Ministry.

The fourth major decision was to attempt to create a committee of secretaries to coordinate the activities of the External Affairs Ministry with other ministers. All this was viewed as a spectacular record for a period of one-and-a half years\textsuperscript{54}.

Two broad developments seen to have emerged during the Shastri period. One is the growing importance, for the first time of the Prime Ministers Secretariat as an important centre of decision making in foreign policy. The second was the emergence of realism in Indian foreign policy. India, under Shastri, became more preoccupied with what was good
for India. Clearly, it was a movement away from the preceding Nehruvian concern with global issues. The inputs provided by the secretariat apparently began to have an important impact on foreign policy making.\(^5\)

Thus, the decision making process in Foreign Policy, during the brief period of Shastri underwent some change compared to what existed during the Nehru period. The authority regarding routine matters and macro issues was passed on the Ministry of external affairs, while the visible issues, which were identified more and with South Asia and relations with Super Powers, were kept firmly in the hands of the Prime Minister.

**THE INDIRA GANDHI PERIOD (1966-77) - HER FIRST INNINGS**

Following the death of Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi was chosen as the third Prime Minister of India on 24 January 1966 with the help of the so-called syndicate, who preferred a dumb doll (a docile dummy of a pliant puppet) in comparison with a veteran and doughty politician like Moraji Desai. Mrs. Gandhi was her father's (Nehru's) counter personality in many ways. Nehru possessed strong political instinct and was a highly learned man. He was a liberal and convinced democrat. Mrs. Gandhi, on the other hand, gave the impression of great acquisitive instinct. She was very earthy with the robust common sense in her personality. Further, she was haughty and arrogant, yet gracious. She was able and competent but cold blooded. In the opinion of Henry Kissinger, "she had few peers in cold blooded calculation of the elements of power. Her interest and her values were inseparable". She was superb tactician, master strategist and manipulator and flawless in timing.
Indira Gandhi, however, was a tragically lonely person. It is generally believed that her alienated childhood, her unhappy marriage, insufficient education and tremendous inferiority complex, and her sense of political insecurity after the death of her father had combined to give her a persecution complex, which was projected in her authoritarian and aggressive policy in both foreign and domestic affairs. Underneath her confident exterior, she suffered from insecurity and a feeling of intellectual inadequacy. Because of personal as well as political insecurity her threat perceptions used to be extraordinarily high. Aloof and insecure person like Mrs. Gandhi could feel secure only with the absolute possession of power. No wonder, her sense of insecurity was transferred to political scene of her country. According to Ashish Nandi, "Her problem was her unending search for total security and total acceptance, which made her intolerant of criticism and unwelcome advice." And above all, she had the reputation of never forgetting and never forgiving.

However, all these debit side traits in her personality were balanced by her considerable personal charm, astonishing will power, indomitable determination. Moreover, she was level headed, forceful, effective and down to earth. She had an extraordinary political acumen, and was a very successful leader. The secret of her success was ascribed to her acute sense of timing - taking right decision at the right moment. Probably she was gifted with gambrel's instinct. Her only faux pas being the declaration of 1977 elections, which she lost miserably. Altogether, unlike her father, she lacked vision and planning perspective. Without any ideology or world view or blue print to direct her, she was woefully deficient in hundrum task of nation building. In short, she was a good politician but a poor states person.
The year of 1966 (when Mrs. Gandhi took over) was a year of reverses all around. The politico-economic structure looked like a thoroughly leaking boat tossed in the tempestuous sea. The country was facing unparalleled drought, acute food shortage, galloping inflation, official language controversy, demand for a Punjabi Sub etc. The year was marked by bandhs, marches, demonstrations and strikes. It was against this background that Indira Gandhi began her first innings. Naturally, she had a shaky and inauspicious start. In her first Republic Day broadcast, she pledged to follow her father's policy of friendship among the nations, to implement the Tashkent Declaration, to maintain friendly relations with neighbours, to resolve all disputes peacefully and to uphold the policy of non-alignment. The underlying philosophy behind her foreign policy was implicit in her statement. "Where there is friendship, we must enlarge it. Where there is difference we must blunt it. Where there is misunderstanding we must remove it. (Yet) national interest we cannot compromise". To quote Trevor Drieberg, "She took particular care to emphasise that she was a believer of a firm base of Indianness as against Nehru's emphasis on internationalism". The days of global and moralistic over tone in the Indian foreign policy were over.

In March 1966, Indira Gandhi undertook her first foreign tour as Prime Minister, visiting Paris, London, Moscow and Washington. She left her first impression on this Wall Street. President Johnson was all praise 'for this little girl'. She returned from Washington with a bagful of promises of help from the US administration and the World Bank, of course, conditional upon rupee devaluation. Indira Gandhi, however, became tough on Vietnam when she found that only the socialist camp was willing to help India in real terms.
The Fourth General elections of 1967 (known as a watershed of Indian politics) smashed the long monopoly of the Congress for the first time. In this election, the Syndicate leadership too was made to lick the dust. As her second successive term began in 1967, she found her difficulties multiplying both on domestic as well as foreign fronts. The closing of the Suez Canal after the Arab-Israel war of 1967 affected the Indian economy very adversely. She made efforts to further consolidate the pro-Arab policy to satisfy the Indian Muslims and Muslims of neighbouring countries like Iran and Pakistan. She managed an invitation for India to attend the World Muslim Conference in 1969 at Rabat (Morocco), which, however, proved fiasco.

The year 1969 will go down as the year of great divide in the Congress. The death of Dr. Zakir Hussain, the third President of India in May, 1969, posed the issue of leadership in the Congress organisation, resulting in a major split. But after the split Mrs. Gandhi acquired a dominant position in the government, for until 1969 she was in office but not in power, and she continued to enjoy this position until 1977.

The revival of economic and political momentum during 1969-71 culminated in an increasingly high profile foreign policy. The Sino-Pak axis against India had started developing in the early sixties. The growing rapprochement between the US and China in the early seventies extended this axis into a global one, and seriously threatened the security of India. It was in this situation that the liberation movement in East Pakistan started, followed by the military crack down in March 1971. As the resistance movement escalated, the number of refugees pouring into India reached the staggering figure of twelve million
and imposed an unbearable strain on the Indian economy. Predictably, the US and China threw their weight on the side of West Pakistan vis-a-vis East Pakistan. It was in the context to India’s security that Mrs. Gandhi adopted a diplomatic strategy which was typical of her personality and political style. On 9 August 1971, she took the bold and desperate step of signing the Indo-Soviet Treaty, which to a certain extent compromised India’s policy of non-alignment as traditionally understood. But it could be justified as a historical necessity and strategic compulsion in the given international context - as a measure of counter - veiling the Sino-American adventurism in coalition with Pakistan. The dismemberment of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation would not have been possible but for the military intervention on the part of India. India, no doubt, derived a great strategic as well as diplomatic advantage from this event. With resounding victory in the third Indo-Pak war of 1971 and the liberation of Bangladesh, the political career of Indira Gandhi touched its peak. Indeed, the year 1971 was her masterful moment - her finest hour. With this crowning movement, the ‘dumb doll’ (Gungi Gudia) became the ‘goddess Durga’.

The immediate aftermath of Bangladesh, her finest moment, indeed, but like all moments of glory, it was all too brief. While basking in international limelight, conditions at home were turning sour. The exorbitant cost of Bangladesh was coming home to roast. Additionally, a disastrous monsoon coincided with populist policies - nationalisation of Banks and General Insurance, coal mines, wheat trade, and Garibi Hatao slogans. By 1973, the allround disillusionment turned into anger which first exploded in Gujarat and Bihar. By 1975, her popularity rating dipped to its lowest point and the Allahabad High Court judgement, invalidating her election of 1971 made her panicky and desperate. It was out of
desperation that she declared internal emergency on 26 June 1975. During the emergency period, her regime turned into a dictatorial dispensation. Her style of functioning made her establishment - both government and party into one pillar structure. No wonder, the Cabinet became just a committee of ratification during the closing year. It was because of the emergency stigma that she and her party were trounced in the 1977 - elections.

But whatever may be her failings on the domestic front, her foreign policy report card was quite impressive. Some of her foreign policy achievements during the first term were as follows: (1) Creation of Bangladesh (1971) and the assertion of dominance of Indian power in South Asian region, (2) Normalisation of relations with Pakistan, following the Simla Agreement (1972), (3) Repairing of relations with China (1976), (4) Strengthening of relations with small neighbours - boundary and sea zone pacts with Sri Lanka (1974 and 1976), with Indonesia (1974) and with Bangladesh (1974) - by exchanging Dharam and Belonia with Berubari enclave, (5) Conversion of Iran into a good friend (1973), (6) Merger of Sikkim as the 22nd state of the Indian union (1975), (7) Sturdy study independence on the nuclear policy - refusing to be pressurised into signing the NPT, and (8) the nuclear explosion at Pokharan - explosion was meant to serve as an image booster and as a domestic diversion for her shaky regime at a time of mounting economic and political crisis. In short, in international affairs India had never had such a favourable situation as in her regime until 1975. She had definitely made contribution by tilting the super powers in India's favour. Besides, her bilateralism also reaped rich dividends. But at the same time she ignored a major region, South - East, Asia and snubbed an important economic power, Japan.
But her real failings lay in the sphere of foreign policy administration. With her built-in sense of personal insecurity, her eternal mistrust of people around her and her inevitable authoritarian political style, Mrs. Gnadhi was psychologically incapable of operating through the normal institutional channels for the administration of her foreign policies. In fact, she would not like a particular Foreign Minister to become effective or powerful. She wanted to exercise almost total control over the formulation and implementation of her foreign policy. If she failed to rely on her Foreign Ministers for the making of her foreign policy neither did she rely on the foreign office. She relied only on personal factotums who were irrevocably loyal to her. Ironically, the moths who flew too close buried themselves after brief flickering in its radiance.

To conclude, in comparison with Nehru's millenarian principles, her tendency to see world politics in terms of hard interest and cost-calculations was refreshingly realistic. She enunciated pragmatic precepts in Indian foreign policy outlook. She realistically appreciated India's limitations and hence avoided mediatory or exhortation role as was the case in her father's time. Yet, she was only a short term realist lacking broader conception of national good.

FOREIGN POLICY UNDER JANATA PARTY (1977-79)

With the formation of the Janata Government in 1977 it was expected that a drastic change in India's foreign policy would take place. It has hoped that there would be a certain amount of cooling off of relations with Soviet Union and more intimate relations with
U.S.A. This feeling was largely the outcome of the fact that while in opposition leaders of
the Janata Party (from the forums of their respective political parties) had severely
condemned India's tilt towards Soviet Union. Atal Behari Vajpayee, the then External Affairs
Minister had particularly been a bitter critic of India's growing intimacy with Soviet Union,
and considered it a violation of the principle of genuine non-alignment. But all these
speculations were set at rest when Atal Behari Vajpayee, announced that the views
expressed by him and his Cabinet colleagues while in the opposition will not influence their
conduct of foreign policy. However he made it clear that the new government wanted to
pursue a policy of genuine non-alignment. The Janata Government, therefore, tried to
develop very intimate relations with both the Super Powers, and bring about greater balance
and Sobriety.

The new Government continued friendly relations with the Soviet Union relaising it
fully well that India had immensely benefited from the close connections with Soviet Union
through supply of sophisticated military hardwares, assistance in diversification of country's
economy through establishment of basic industries and ever expanding trade between the
two countries. Any deviation from this policy would have done much harm to the country.
Therefore, the Janata Government tried to develop very intimate and close relations with
Soviet Union without showing in any way a tilt in its favour. The leaders of the two
countries, Desai and Gromyko, exchanged visits to keep up the existing intimate relations
intact. A new dimension to growing bilateral cooperation in the economic, scientific and
technological field was added by setting up an Indo-Soviet Joint Commission.
The Janata Government also tried to improve relations with U.S.A. Which had been cooling-off since 1967. A new chapter was opened in Indo-U.S. relations with the visit of President Carter. Most of the irritants and suspicious which had marred the relations between the two countries were removed and a spirit of mutually beneficial co-operation was revived. For the first time the traditional donor-recipient relationship between U.S.A. and India was replaced by an equal partnership based on friendship and common will to co-operate both in bilateral matters and on some issues, but by and large there was a comparative lack of rancour in their mutual dealings and discussions. In short, we can say with Pran Chopra that the Janata Government "tried to be more even handed in dealing with them (USA and USSR), more free of unnecessary asperity towards the U.S.A. on the one hand and on the other hand more free out of season warmth and praise for the Soviet Union. It has not gone out of its way to heak up controversies with the U.S.A. or to line up in haste with the Soviet Union or too readily grasp every offer of aid by Moscow".

Another outstanding feature of the Janata Foreign policy was an attempt to develop more closer relations with the neighbouring countries, like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Srilanka and Maldives etc. by coming to an understanding regarding some of the outstanding disputes. Thus it reached an agreement with Pakistan on the question of Salal Dam in Kashmir. It concluded an agreement on Farakka with Bangladesh which was an improvement over the interim agreement concluded by Mrs. Indira Gandhi which Sheikh Mujibur Rahman earlier. The concession given by the Janata Government to reach an understanding with neighbours like Bangladesh and Nepal met with criticism at certain hands and "The government was accused of bartering away India's essential interests for the
sake of mere good neighbourliness”. Again it has been contented that there was nothing new with policy of good neighbourliness, because even the earlier government tried good relations with neighbours but could not succeed due to the involvement of the big powers. By this time the involvement of the big powers had decreased and the Janata government made full use of this opportunity to improve relations with neighbours. Infact, this process started during the times of Mrs. Gandhi herself. Another consideration which compelled India to improve relations with neighbours was that India needed markets for its rapidly expanding agricultural surpluses, especially food grains. Pakistan and China, which were importing huge quantities of wheat could be the most suitable markets. In this context good neighbourliness became a strong concern with the Janata Government.

The Janata Government tried to improve its relations with China in the past had distorted the priorities of the country by imposing a heavy defence burden. Secondly, it was desirable to cultivate friendly relations with Beijing so that Pakistan may not revert to its old stance. On the other hand China was also eager to improve relations with India because they were so much engrossed in their domestic problems that they wanted peace on borders with India. An improvement in relations with China manifested itself in the resumption of trade and exchange of trade delegations. The two countries also co-operated in the cultural and sports activities. As a result of these exchanges the tension between the two countries was greatly relaxed.

In addition to this, the Janata party continued the policy of improving relations with the countries of South-East Asia, and West Asia extended full support to the anti-racial
policies and liberation movement in Africa. It also claimed to play more positive role in disarmament and insisted that it should not be left to the super powers alone to provide a lead in this regard.

In short, Janata party followed a foreign policy which was highly pragmatic and aimed at promotion of national interests. However, there was not much deviation from the basic principles on which the Indian foreign policy had been based so far. According to Pran Chopra "the shifts in Indian foreign policy under the Janata rule are neither new nor great. They are continuing adjustments Sometimes more marked than in the past, to India's changing need in the external and domestic context". Even A.B. Vajpayee admitted in the course of his address to the Indian School of International Studies. "If there has been a change, it has been to impart honesty and sincerity to our national purpose consistently with our principles. If there has been a change, it has been to impart a fresh thrust to the promotion of the cause of peace and disarmament, to strengthen stability and cooperative spirit to fortify independence and freedom from exploitation".

POLICY IN POST-JANATA PERIOD

With the fall of the Janata Government and the formation of Congress (I) Government, India's foreign policy again reverted back to the pattern prevailing before the formation of Janata Government. However, the special tilt towards Soviet Union, which was a characteristic of the foreign policy in the years preceding the Janata rule, disappeared and the cooling of relations with U.S.A. gave place to more mature relations with that country.
FOREIGN POLICY UNDER CHARAN SINGH (1979)

Charan Singh was even less knowledgeable and less interested in foreign affairs than his predecessor. There is really no way of finding out if he had any specific perceptions of his own about the outside world. Besides, he was prime minister for too short a period, and that, too, of an interim coalition government pending elections, to permit any real analysis of his own rule in foreign policy formulation. The only thing known, about his connection with foreign affairs was his firm and critical attitude to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, which occurred during his premiership. In the middle of the election campaign, he returned to New Delhi to convey his displeasure to the Soviet Ambassador, and demanded immediate Soviet withdrawal.

FOREIGN POLICY UNDER INDIRA GANDHI (1980 - 84) HER SECOND INNINGS

Indira Gandhi returned to power after a dramatic victory in the election. Her position had become even stronger than during her first tenure. She was firmly in control of the party, of two-thirds of parliament and all the major states. Coalition politics at the centre had disappeared from Indian politics. Once again, a strong and knowledgeable Prime Minister had came to power. She did the opposite of Morarji Desai. She continued the foreign policy she had crafted during the first tenure. The Prime Minister's secretariat was again strengthened. Once again, it become a channel of information and the centre of foreign policy making, infact even more so than during her previous mandate, since the expanded Secretariat was no longer allowed to be separated from the Prime Minister by a
powerful secretary in charge, with a rather weak principle secretary carrying out her instructions. The secretariat, like before, was invested with considerable power and authority to monitor the activities of the entire government, to take decisions, and to see to it that they were operationalized either by the secretariat itself or the relevant ministry concerned.

The second channel of foreign policy formulation was the interaction that Indira Gandhi has with her own close group of foreign policy advisers and visitors, both foreign and Indian, that she received regularly. A good listener, she allowed herself to be exposed to an array of information, analysis, recommendations. It is, of course, impossible to measure the importance of such a factor as there is no way of determining the impact of all these interactions. But, given India Gandhi's insecurity on international affairs, presumably they did have some impact.

The third channel was the MEA. Though the MEA was no longer important in designing visible foreign policy, it was undoubtedly another crucial source of information, which is received regularly from its vast network of missions and embassies.

Finally, the Prime Minister's house became a powerful decision making centre, distinct from the secretariat. It was an extra constitutional institution, which is not seen but heard through its oral and unwritten hints. Indira Gandhi, thus, had at her disposal four channels of information (The PMS, Interaction with visitors, the MEA and the PMH), all of which were apparently used varyingly before any major decisions were taken. And, after having received the inputs from
all these sources, she apparently used all of them to implement these decisions\textsuperscript{61}. Consider India's policy on China finally took shape in the early eighties. All the four channels were important sources of information and action, with the Prime Minister's secretariat acting as the real coordinating body. To understand this process of foreign policy formulation, it may be useful, for example, to trace the evolution of Indira Gandhi's policy towards China.

Indira Gandhi was exposed to two constraints on China: One external and two domestic. The external constraint was Moscow. Soviet leaders were apparently pressing her not to normalize relations with Beijing\textsuperscript{62}. The domestic constraints were public opinion and the bureaucracy. Normalization of relations obviously implied the resolution of the border dispute, which was only possible if the two countries were mutually prepared to make concessions. Indian public opinion, it would seem, was not ready for this. This was also the case with the bureaucracy. Having lived through the 1962 humiliation, which according to some killed Nehru, it generally argued against any concessions to the Chinese\textsuperscript{63}. Based on all the information she was receiving from different channels regarding the new moderation in Chinese internal and external policies, Mrs. Gandhi opted for a policy of establishing contact with Beijing. The basis had already been established for doing this since Indira Gandhi had re-established, during her first tenure, ambassadorial level relations with Beijing.

All the channels were used to establish contact and to sound out the Chinese. Indira Gandhi herself initiated this process by arranging to meet her counterpart, Huo Guofeng, on the occasion of Tito's funeral in May 1980. The Prime Ministers secretariat was used, in cooperation with the MEA, to organize what was clearly an important meeting, and an
important signal to the Chinese. After considerable signals and contacts, an agreement was reached to open Sino-Indian boundary negotiations. This agreement was announced on the occasion of the Chinese foreign Minister, Hang Hua's visit to New Delhi in June 1981. The North-South meeting in Cancun in October 1981 was also used by Indira Gandhi to meet her Chinese counterpart. And, finally, to cap it all, along with official level talks R.N. Rao, former Chief of RAW, was secretly despatched in October 1984 to Beijing with a comprehensive proposal to settle the border dispute.

In addition to that, she improved relations with USA and other neighbouring Countries in South-Asia. Indira Gandhi's control over foreign policy, thus, was total. She was probably the first Prime Minister who diligently absorbed a wide array of inputs provided by different channels and institutions before taking a decision.

FOREIGN POLICY UNDER RAJIV GANDHI (1984 - 89)

After the assassination of his mother Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi became the Prime Minister. One can only presume that when he came to power, his views were not very different from that of his predecessors, for all that he said and did subsequently as Prime Minister was to continue the broad goals that had been established before.

However, where Rajiv Gandhi did leave his imprint was on foreign policy making. If one were to look at the five years of his Prime Ministership, it is evident that his impact on foreign policy making was considerable, in fact much more than on domestic front by his political courage and the domestic political situation. A number of personal and political
factors contributed to Rajiv Gandhi's impact on foreign policy making. The first was personal. Rajiv Gandhi clearly showed a conspicuous interest in foreign affairs an interest that was a striking contrast to his predecessors and an interest that was free from any ideological influences. He did not according to an observer, find himself in conflict with any world power.

Besides, he carried himself well with his counterpart, and was dazzled by the world of diplomatic summits and all the glamour that went with it. The extent of his interest is evidenced by the fact that he made as many as 48 foreign trips in four years. No prime minister before or after him has made so many visits to so many countries in such a short time.

The second factor was institutional. Rajiv Gandhi has no confidence in the bureaucracy. He perceived it as an institution that opposed change, was incapable of seeing the larger picture and was far more interested in safeguarding its own interest than that of country. As a stark manifestation of this lack of confidence, no less than 25 secretaries of the Indian government were transferred in one major single reshuffle shortly after he came to power. But perhaps the most important indicator of his reservation about the bureaucracy, and of his own determination to personally play a role in foreign affairs, was the discontinuation of the traditional weekly Prime Minister - foreign secretary meeting, and the way he publicly and summarily dismissed his own foreign secretary.

The third factor pertained to his personality. Highly individualistic and impulsive in character, Rajiv Gandhi had firmly arrived at the conclusion that the job of all bureaucratic
institutions and advisers was to carry out the decisions taken by the executive. Indira Gandhi had the merit of meeting many people, listening to her advisers, and interacting with them wherever necessary. Rajiv Gandhi did not do that. He was inaccessible, his way of functioning was highly individualistic, and there were hardly any crucial and visible issues on which he went beyond the small group of advisers that surrounded him.

The fourth factor was political. Rajiv Gandhi was firmly installed politically, with no one to really challenge him. In the elections that took place soon after he came to power, his party was reelected with a record of 401 seats out of 515. This was the largest parliamentary victory in Indian history. Though the congress party lost the elections in many states in 1985 to a string of regional parties, this did not really have much effect on India's foreign policy.

The fifth factor was the nature of Rajiv Gandhi's foreign policy. This also contributed to the enhancement of the personality factor. The main thirst of his foreign policy was centred on South Asia. Though this focus was already becoming evident Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi and Morarji Desai, it was under Rajiv Gandhi that real content was given to this policy. India's basic goal in South Asia was to play a dominant role, make others accept her policies, and design a cloak-and-dagger and carrot and stick diplomacy all of which required discretion, secrecy and behind the scenes pressure on India's neighbours. Rajiv Gandhi was apparently convinced that the effective operation of such a policy required that the reins of power in foreign policy be in the hands of a small group of people.
All the major decisions at least during the first two years of his mandate, thus were taken by him, with heavy infrastructural support from his own secretariat, RAW, and same of his close political advisers whom he had brought in from outside. By the end of 1986 things began to change, problems began to emerge. All the power that he had kept in his hands was challenged. All the glamour that surrounded his office was gone. Besides, he became the centre of a controversy regarding financial scandals. His image was seriously tarnished. Faced with all these difficulties, he turned to the traditional political machinery that he had ignored so far, and support he needed to survive politically.

But this change was more relevant to domestic issues than to foreign affairs. In internal matters, decisions were no longer taken single-handedly. A number of people and institutions were consulted, and their views were taken into account before any initiatives were taken. In foreign policy, it was different. Though after 1986, existing institution were formally consulted more than before their opinions or recommendations were still hardly taken into Foreign Policy was still considered by Rajiv Gandhi as his domain reserve.

The initiatives that he took and continued the foreign policy of his predecessors and reaffirmed his faith in the United Nations, the non-aligned movement, opposition to colonialism, old or new in his very first broadcast to the nation on 12th November, 1984. He also indicated his determination to work for narrowing international economic disparities, develop closer relations with immediate neighbours, pursue policy of non-interference, peaceful co-existence and non-alignment: promised to pursue the concept of common regional development of South-Asia, improvement and strengthening of relations
with China, Soviet Union and United states: to carry on relentless crusade against arms race;

to promote dialogue between the North and South to build a just world economic order.

He has faithfully pursued these objectives and not only improved relations with U.S.A. and
other neighbouring countries but also made frantic efforts to promote international peace,
nuclear disarmament and greater economic co-operation between North and South.
something to do with foreign affairs would re-emerge. The Prime Minister's own secretariat was cut down to size and the cabinet, RAW, MEA and even parliament re-asserted their authorized mandates to define the direction that India should take in foreign affairs.

The cabinet re-emerged with heightened authority and fulfilled its constitutional role of making foreign policy decisions while the MEA had the authority of interacting with the cabinet through the foreign Minister, and of having enough leeway to execute the decision taken.

The extent of decentralization in foreign policy making can be discerned from the manner in which some of the decisions were taken and executed regarding the Gulf crisis.

The first was the public stance taken by the V.P. Singh government. It adopted a non-committal attitude on the crisis. To avoid displeasing anyone, it avoided taking a very definite position. This has been likened to playing in the centre of the sector field and trying to score goals at both ends. However, after having taken a position, however vague, much of the responsibility of handling the crisis was left to the MEA, with hardly any significant interferences from either the cabinet or the Prime Minister.

The second was India's decision to try to mediate in the crisis. The cabinet decided to send three emissaries to Baghdad, Moscow and Washington to ascertain the position of those involved and to meditate, if possible, before the whole crisis escalated into a fullscale war.
Finally, foreign minister I.K. Gujral decided on his own to go to the three capitals. The prime minister was informed of this decision just before Gujral left.

The third decision pertained to the sending of food and medicines to stranded Indians and their evacuation, should it be possible. Once the decision was taken, all the work of negotiating the deal with the UN and the US was left to the MEA.

What is perhaps, even more revealing is that the foreign minister apparently himself took the decision at the last minute to personally visit occupied Kuwait, assess the situation and evacuate as many Indians as possible. The decision making process thus, had changed. For the first time in the history of Post-Independence India the Foreign Minister, I.K. Gujral and his ministry were given enough leeway to autonomously take a wide range of foreign policy decisions.

FOREIGN POLICY UNDER CHANDRA SEKHAR (Nov. 10, 1990 to June 21, 1991)

Chandra Sekhar's method of coming to power is comparable to that of Charan Singh. He broke with the V.P. Singh government, let it fall and himself manoeuvred to become Prime Minister. His government was also a caretaker government, since he was able to form the government only with Rajiv Gandhi's support. The element of political uncertainty had become much greater than under V.P. Singh. No one really knew, not even the Prime Minister, how long the government would last and where India was heading in foreign affairs.
Under such circumstances, it is hardly possible for the head of the government to take any particular interest in foreign policy, particularly if one were to also take into account the fact that his interest in this sector was marginal. Even the cabinet was not interested, since most of the members were busy playing a game of political survival.

The Ministry of External affairs thus continued to play a key role in foreign policy making, as it had done under the preceding government. But it was not alone. A new dimension had emerged, for the first time, in Indian politics: that of foreign policy making by Rajiv Gandhi, as the Prime Minister-in-waiting, much to the annoyance of the MEA. And what is more significant is that since Chandra Sekhar was totally dependent on him for political survival, he often had to take into account Rajiv Gandhi’s views. During his period MEA gained considerable importance. While having acquired enlarged leeway in routine and global issues, its input with the Prime Minister on visible regional matters also increased significantly. In Chandra Sekhar’s decision to unambiguously condemn Iraq on Kuwait to send a delegation to China to discuss the resumption of border trade, to establish personal contact with his Pakistan counterpart, Nawaz Sharif and to visit Nepal to resolve bilateral issues, the input provided by the MEA was curial.

FOREIGN POLICY UNDER P.V. NARASIMHA RAO (21 June, 1991 to April, 1996)

After the dastardly assassination of Rajiv Gandhi during the Tenth Loksabha Elections (21 May, 1991), P.V. Narasimha Rao was hurtled into the leadership of the Congress by accident. After the elections, as leader of the Congress, Rao was sworn in as the Ninth Prime Minister of India.
With the global scene undergoing head along changes in the post cold war era, foreign policy is naturally attracting greater attention than before. With fast-paced, rapid-fire changes, startling shifts are taking place in traditional foreign policy stance all over the world. The Rao Government too has sought to give a new orientation to foreign relations, keeping in view the harsh economic and other realities. The new emphasis is on economic diplomacy, Rao has declared that his government would use foreign policy as a dynamic instrument for promoting national interest in the changed global context. Hence, one can observe some far-reaching departures from traditional foreign policy postures. To be sure, India under the Rao regime has scripted a new course in its relations from Washington to Beijing.

To begin with, India has established diplomatic relations with Israel, a move which was considered heretical hitherto. Till now India has been rabidly pro-Arab but this is no longer so. For instance, in January 1992, India voted along with the west on UN Resolution criticising Libya for refusing to cooperate in investigation into terrorist bombing of two countries in 1988. Similarly, in December, 1991, she supported the US on a vote rapudiating the 1975 UN Resolution equating zionism with racism. Again, in December, 1992, the Indian cricket team was allowed tour of South Africa for the first time. Though India did not move any closer to resolving the boundary question with China, yet both sides agreed to reduce their military strength on the border.

In the pursuit of his economic diplomacy, Mr. Rao has undertaken visits to Davos, Bonn, Tokyo, Rio, Dakar, Bangkok, with a view to muster support for the country's
economic reforms and to attract foreign investment. For Rao's government, economic diplomacy is not just an adjunct but the fulcrum of foreign policy. This was highlighted in a series of visits by foreign dignitaries like John Major, Helmat Kohl, Boris Yeltsin, etc., in the last Winter (1993). They all came to India not just to establish personal rapport with the new Prime Ministers but to explore avenues of business with India.

Since India was marginalised in world affairs during the two previous regimes because of domestic preoccupations, there followed a serious introspection and reassessment of our role in world affairs. Consequently, now our foreign policy is freed from ideological excesses and moorings and is displaying even-handedness. But on the whole, his regime remains reactive rather than active; it jerks only when it fears a sledgehammer. This reactive way of governance was equally operative even in foreign policy. To substantiate, India shifted towards the US when the USSR ceased to exist and from Arabs to Israel when they were weakened because of the Gulf war. However, it is too early to make any final assessment of Rao's foreign policy and of the outcome of economic liberalisation, for he has been in office for two and a half years only. He played a dominant role in the foreign policy sector during his tenure. detain

The conclude, the Indian foreign policy has shown a refreshing originality, a remarkable consistency and a rare continuity. Although, there may be no sanctity of consistency in foreign policy, yet it is remarkable that stability has characterised the Indian foreign policy much more than any other foreign policy. The general contours, the principles, goals and personality factors have remained firmly steady. The validity of the
framework of Indian foreign policy has never been shaken. Unquestionably, it has stood the test of time and helped India to play a dynamic role in international affairs. The main credit, or course, goes to Nehru, whose vision, foresight and realistic idealism helped to shape it.

The foreign policy of India has been influenced by two basic factors: one, it has emerged out of our historic commitments to certain principles and was moulded over decades as a part and parcel of our freedom struggle and international commitments. Two, India's foreign policy has always been marked by a consensus from all sections of her people as far as basic approach to international affairs was involved.

The basic contours of Indian foreign policy may be summarised as follows: It is the policy of peaceful and constructive co-existence, of non-alignment, of moral support to liberation struggles and national freedom movements, of cooperation with developing countries in the battle for scientific and technological self-reliance and support to the assertion of equal rights of the newly independent nations of the world. The policy has given India place of prestige in the comity of nations and has won for her friendship from all quarters of the world.
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